

BIBLIOTHECA BUDDHICA

BUDDHIST LOGIC

BY

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TO THE DEAR MEMORY

OF

MY BELOVED MOTHER

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ABBREVIATIONS

Anekāntaj	Anekānta-jaya-patāka of Haribhadra (Jain)
AK	Abhidharmakośa
AKB	Abhidharmakośabhūṣya
BB	Bibliotheca Buddhica
BI	Bibliotheca Indica
CC	The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the term Dharma (London 1929, R. A. S.)
CPR	Critique of Pure Reason by Kant, transl. by Max Müller
ERE	Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics
GGN	Göttinger Gelehrte Nachrichten
IHQ	Indian Historical Quarterly (Calcutta)
JBOBS	Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
Khand	Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khūḍya by Śrīhara
Mallavādi.	Nyāya-bindu-tīkā-tippaṇi by this author, different from the tippaṇi printed by me in the BB
Madhy. v.	Mūla-mādhyamika-kīrīkā-vṛtti by Candrakīrti
Nirvāṇa	The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa (Leningrad, 1927)
NB.	Nyāyabindu by Dharmakīrti.
NBT.	Nyāyabindutīkā by Dharmottara
NBT (or Tipp simply)	Nyāyabindutīkā-tippaṇi ed by me in the BB and erroneously ascribed to Mallavādi, g c
NBh	Nyāya-bhūṣya.
NK	Nyāya-kanikā (reprint from the Pandit)
NKandali	Nyāya-kandali by Śrīdhara (Vizian)
NMukha	Nyāya-mukha by Dignāga, transl by Tucci
NY	Nyāya-vārtika (BI)
NVT (also Tātp)	Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-tīkā (Vizian)
NS	Nyāya-sūtra
Pariśuddhi	Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-tīkā-parīśuddhi (BI)
Pr vārt	Pramāṇa-vārtika by Dharmakīrti.
Pr viṃśc	Pramāṇa-viṃścaya by the same
Pr samucc	Pramāṇa-samuccaya by Dignāga
SD	Śūtra tīpikā by Pārthasārathimīśra
SDS.	Sarvadarśanasamgraha (Poona, 1924)
Tipp	Nyāyabindutīkā-tippaṇi by unknown author edited by me in the BB and erroneously ascribed to Mallavādi q c
Tātp.	cp NVT.
VS	Vaiśeṣika-sūtra

PREFACE

This work claims the consideration of the historian of the culture of Asia, of the Sanscrit philologist and of the general philosopher.

It is the last of a series of three works destined to elucidate what is perhaps the most powerful movement of ideas in the history of Asia, a movement which, originating in the VI century BC. in the valley of Hindustan, gradually extended its sway over almost the whole of the continent of Asia, as well as over the islands of Japan and of the Indian archipelago. These works are thus concerned about the history of the ruling ideas of Asia, Central and Eastern.¹

It also claims the consideration of the Sanscritist, because it is exclusively founded on original works belonging to the *śāstra* class; these are Indian scholarly compositions, written in that specific scientific Sanscrit style, where the argument is formulated in a quite special terminology and put in the form of laconic rules; its explanation and development are contained in numerous commentaries and sub-commentaries. To elucidate this quite definite and very precise terminology is the aim of a series of analytical translations collected in the second volume.²

¹ A systematical review of the full extent of that literature which under the general name of the «Law of the Buddha» migrated from India into the northern countries, compiled by the celebrated Tibetan savant Bu-ston Rinpoche, is now made accessible to European scholars in a masterly translation by E. Obermiller, cp his History of Buddhism by Buxton (Heidelberg, 1931) The ruling ideas of all this enormous bulk of learning are 1) a monistic metaphysics and 2) a logic. The metaphysical part will be fully elucidated in a series of works of which the general plan has been indicated in the Introduction to our edition of the Abhisamayāṅkāra (Bibl Buddh XXXIII) In realization of this plan E. Obermiller has already issued two works, 1) The Sublime Science being a translation of Asanga's Uttara-tantra (Acta Orient, 1931) and 2) The Doctrine of Prajñā-pāramitā according to the Abhisamayāṅkāra and its commentaries (A. O. 1932). The place which Logic (*śāstra*) occupies in the whole purview of Buddhist literature is indicated by Buxton in his History, cp. p. 45—46, vol I of the translation.

² In order to facilitate the verification of our analysis we quote the original term in a note By utilizing the index of Sanscrit and Tibetan words appended to the second volume the contexts will be found, on which the interpretation of the term is based.

In addressing itself to the philosopher this work claims his consideration of a system of logic which is not familiar to him. It is a logic, but it is not Aristotelian. It is epistemological, but not Kantian.

There is a widely spread prejudice that positive philosophy is to be found only in Europe. It is also a prejudice that Aristotle's treatment of logic was final; that having had in this field no predecessor, he also has had no need of a continuator. This last prejudice seems to be on the wane. There is as yet no agreed opinion on what the future logic will be, but there is a general dissatisfaction with what it at present is. We are on the eve of a reform. The consideration at this juncture of the independent and altogether different way in which the problems of logic, formal as well as epistemological, have been tackled by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti will possibly be found of some importance.

The philosopher in thus considering and comparing two different logics will perceive that there are such problems which the human mind naturally encounters on his way as soon as he begins to deal with truth and error. Such are, e. g., the problems of the essence of a judgment, of inference and of syllogism, the problems of the categories and of relations; of the synthetical and analytical judgments; of infinity, infinite divisibility, of the antinomies and of the dialectical structure of the understanding. From under the cover of an exotic terminology he will discern features which he is accustomed to see differently treated differently arranged, assigned different places in the system and put into quite different contexts. The philosopher, if he becomes conversant with the style of Sanscrit compositions, will be tempted not only to interpret Indian ideas in European terms, but also to try the converse operation and to interpret European ideas in Indian terms.

My main object has been to point out these analogies, but not to produce any estimate of the comparative value of both logics. On this point I would prefer first to hear the opinion of the professional philosopher who in this special department of knowledge has infinitely more experience than I may claim to possess. I would be amply satisfied if I only succeed to arouse his attention and through him to introduce Indian positive philosophers into the community of their European brotherhood.

Introduction.

§ 1. BUDDHIST LOGIC WHAT.

Under Buddhist Logic we understand a system of logic and epistemology created in India in the VI—VIIth century A. D. by two great lustres of Buddhist science, the Masters Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The very insufficiently known Buddhist logical literature which prepared their creation and the enormous literature of commentaries which followed it in all northern Buddhist countries must be referred to the same class of writings. It contains, first of all, a doctrine on the forms of syllogism¹ and for that reason alone deserves the name of logic. A theory on the essence of judgment,² on the import of names³ and on inference⁴ is a natural corollary of the theory of syllogism just as it is in India in Europe.

But the logic of the Buddhists contains more. It contains also a theory of sense perception or, more precisely, a theory on the part of pure sensation⁵ in the whole content of our knowledge, a theory on the reliability of our knowledge⁶ and on the reality of the external world as cognized by us in sensations and images.⁷ These problems are usually treated under the heading of epistemology. Therefore we may be justified in calling the Buddhist system a system of epistemological logic. It starts with a theory of sensation as the most indubitable voucher for the existence of an external world. It then proceeds to a theory of a coordination⁸ between that external world and the repre-

¹ *parārtha-anumāna*.

² *adhyavasāya = niścaya = viśalpa*.

³ *apoha-vāda*.

⁴ *svārtha-anumāna*

⁵ *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*.

⁶ *pramāṇya-vāda*.

⁷ *bāhya-artha-anumeyatva-vāda*.

⁸ *sūrūpya*.

sensation of it as constructed by our understanding in images and concepts. Next comes a theory of judgment, of inference and of syllogism. Finally a theory on the art of conducting philosophic disputations in public¹ is appended. It thus embraces the whole area of human knowledge, beginning with rudimentary sensation and ending with the complicated apparatus of a public debate.

The Buddhists themselves call this their science a doctrine of logical reasons² or a doctrine of the sources of right knowledge³ or, simply, an investigation of right knowledge.⁴ It is a doctrine of truth and error.

In the intention of its promoters the system had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i. e., as the teaching of a path towards Salvation. It claims to be the natural and general logic of the human understanding.⁵ However, it claims also to be critical. Entities whose existence is not sufficiently warranted by the laws of logic are mercilessly repudiated, and in this point Buddhist logic only keeps faithful to the ideas with which Buddhism started. It then denied a God, it denied the Soul, it denied Eternity. It admitted nothing but the transient flow of evanescent events and their final eternal quiescence in Nirvāṇa. Reality according to Buddhists is kinetic, not static, but logic, on the other hand, imagines a reality stabilized in concepts and names. The ultimate aim of Buddhist logic is to explain the relation between a moving reality and the static constructions of thought.⁶ It is opposed to the logic of the Realists, the logic of the schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā for whom reality is static and adequate to the concepts of our knowledge. By the champions of all other established religions in India the Buddhists were generally regarded as arrogant nihilists, and they, in their turn, called their opponents "outsiders"⁷ and "pagans."⁸ In that sense only is the logical doctrine created by the Buddhists a Buddhist logic.

¹ *śāstra-vidhā* = *codanā-prakāraṇa*

² *hetu-vidyā*

³ *pramāṇa-vidyā*

⁴ *samyag-jñāna-vyutpādāna*

⁵ *laukika-vidyā*, cp. *Mādhyamika*, p. 58 14, and my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 140

⁶ Cp. TSP, p. 259 21 — *na hiacid arthe paramārthato vikalpā asti, ananyato 'rīhasya adbhūtāi...* (*śarvesu itī pal sesu samānam dūsanam*)

⁷ *bāhya* = *phyi-rol-pa*

⁸ *īrthika*

§ 2. THE PLACE OF LOGIC IN THE HISTORY OF BUDDHISM.

Buddhist logic has its place in the history of Buddhism in India, and it has also its place in the general history of Indian logic and philosophy. In the broad field of Indian logic it constitutes an intermediate Buddhist period, while in the domain of Buddhist philosophy logic constitutes a remarkable feature of the third, concluding phase of Indian Buddhism.¹

The history of Buddhism in India may be divided, and is divided by the Buddhists themselves, into three periods² which they call the three «Swings of the Wheel of the Law».³ During all of them Buddhism remains faithful to its central conception of a dynamic impersonal flow of existence. But twice in its history — in the 1st and in the Vth centuries A.D. — the interpretation of that principle was radically changed, so that every period has its own new central conception. Roughly speaking, if we reckon, beginning with 500 B.C., 1500 years of an actual existence of Buddhism in the land of its birth, this duration is equally distributed into three periods, each having a duration of about 500 years.

Let us briefly recall the results of two previous works devoted to the first and the second period⁴ The present work, devoted to its third and concluding period, must be regarded as their continuation.

§ 3. FIRST PERIOD OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY.

At the time of Buddha India was seething with philosophic speculation and thirst for the ideal of Final Deliverance. Buddhism started with a very minute analysis of the human Personality⁵ into the elements⁶ of which it is composed. The leading idea of this analysis was a moral one. The elements of a personality were, first of all,

¹ *āntya-dharma-cakṛa-pravartana*.

² The orthodox point of view is that Buddha himself made three different statements of his doctrine, one for simple men, another for men of middle capacities and a final one for acute minds. But this is evidently an afterthought.

³ *trīcakṛa* = *trīkhor-lo-gsum*.

⁴ The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the word «Dharma», London, 1923 (R. A. S.) and The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Leningrad, 1927 (Ac. of Sciences)

⁵ *puṭṭgala*

⁶ *dharma*

BUDDHIST LOGIC

divided into good and bad,¹ purifying and defiling,² propitious to salvation and averse³ to it. The whole doctrine was called a doctrine of defilement and purification.⁴ Salvation was imagined and cherished as a state of absolute quiescence⁵ Therefore life, ordinary life,⁶ was considered as a condition of degradation and misery⁷ Thus the purifying elements were those moral features, or forces, that led to quiescence, the defiling ones those that led to, and encouraged,⁸ the turmoil of life. Apart of these two classes of conflicting elements, some genecal, neutral, 'fundamental'⁹ elements were also found at the bottom of every mental life, but nothing in the shape of a common receptacle of them could be detected: hence no Ego, no Soul,¹⁰ no Personality.¹¹ The so called personality consists of a congeries of ever changing elements, of a flow¹² of them, without any perdurable and stable element at all.

This is the first main feature of early Buddhism, its Soul-denial The No-Soul theory¹⁰ is another name for Buddhism

The external world¹³ was also analysed in its component elements It was the dependent part of the personality, its sense-data There were other systems of philosophy which preceded Buddhism and which envisaged the sense-data as changing manifestations of a compact, substantial and eternal principle, the Matter.¹⁴ Buddhism brushed this principle away and the physical elements became just as changing, impermanent¹⁵ and flowing, as the mental were found to be This constitutes the second characteristic feature of early Buddhism: no Matter, no Substance,¹⁶ only separate elements,¹⁷ momentary flashes of

¹ *sāśvara-anāśvara*.

² *sāṃkleśa-vyāvāḍānīka*.

³ *kuśala-akuśala*

⁴ *sāṃkleśa-vyāvāḍānīko dharmāḥ*

⁵ *nirōdha* = *śānti* = *nirvāṇa*

⁶ *samsāra*

⁷ *duḥkha* = *samsāra*

⁸ *anuśaya* = *duḥkha-posaka*

⁹ *citta-mahā-bhūmika dharmāḥ*.

¹⁰ *anātma-vāda*

¹¹ *pudgalo nāsti* = *anātmavāda* = *nairātmya* = *pudgala-śūnyatā*

¹² *samskāra-pravāha*

¹³ *bāhya-āyatana* = *viśaya*, incl everything external to the six *indriyas*.

¹⁴ *pradhāna* = *prakṛti*

¹⁵ *anitya*.

¹⁶ *na kincit sthāyī*

¹⁷ *sarvam prithak*.

efficient energy without any substance in them, perpetual becoming, a flow of existential moments.

However, instead of the abandoned principles of a Soul and of a Matter, something must have come to replace them and to explain how the separate elements of the process of becoming are holding together, so as to produce the illusion of a stable material world and of perdurable personalities living in it. They were in fact substituted by causal laws,¹ laws of physical and moral causation. The flow of the evanescent elements was not a haphazard² process. Every element, although appearing for a moment, was a «dependently originating element».³ According to the formula «this being, that arises»⁴ it appeared in conformity with strict causal laws. The idea of moral causation, or retribution,⁵ the main interest of the system, was thus receiving a broad philosophic foundation in a general theory of Causality. This is the third characteristic feature of early Buddhism. It is a theory of Causation.

A further feature consists in the fact that the elements of existence were regarded as something more similar to energies⁶ than to substantial elements. The mental elements⁷ were naturally moral, immoral or neutral forces. The elements of matter were imagined as something capable to appear as if it were matter, rather than matter in itself. Since the energies never worked in isolation, but always in mutual interdependence according to causal laws, they were called «synergies» or cooperators⁸

Thus it is that the analysis of early Buddhism discovered a world consisting of a flow of innumerable particulars, consisting on the one side of what we see, what we hear, what we smell, what we taste and what we touch;⁹ and on the other side—of simple awareness¹⁰ accompanied by feelings, ideas, volitions,¹¹ whether good volitions or bad ones, but no Soul, no God and no Matter, nothing enduring and substantial in general

¹ *hetu-pratyaya-vyavasthā*

² *adhītya-samutpāda*

³ *pratītya-samutpanna*.

⁴ *asmiṃ sati idam bhavati*

⁵ *vipākā-hetu* = karma

⁶ *samskāra* = *samskṛta-dharma*.

⁷ *citta-caitta*

⁸ *samskāra*

⁹ *rūpa-śabda-gandha-rasa-sprastavya-āyatanāni*.

¹⁰ *citta* = *manas* = *vyñāna*

¹¹ *vedanā-samvīkā-samskāra*.

However, this flow of interconnected elements in which there were no real personalities was steering towards a definite aim. The steersmen were not personalities or souls, but causal laws. The port of destination was Salvation in the sense of eternal Quiescence of every vestige of life,¹ the absolutely inactive condition of the Universe, where all elements or all «synergies» will loose there force of energy and will become eternally quiescent. The analysis into elements² and energies had no other aim than to investigate the conditions of their activity, to devise a method³ of reducing and stopping⁴ that activity, and so to approach and enter into the state of absolute Quiescence, or Nirvāṇa. The ontological analysis was carried in order to clear the ground for a theory of the Path towards Moral Perfection and Final Deliverance, to the perfection of the Saint⁵ and to the absolute condition of a Buddha. In this we have a further feature of Buddhism, a feature which it shares with all other Indian philosophic systems, with the only exception of the extreme Materialists. It is a doctrine of Salvation. In the teaching of a path towards this goal the Buddhists had predecessors in early Indian mysticism.⁶ All India was divided at the time of Buddha in opponents and supporters of mysticism, in the followers of the Brahmans and those who followed the Shramans, in, so to speak, an open High Church and in popular sects strongly inclined to mysticism. The main idea of this mysticism consisted in the belief that through practice of concentrated meditation⁷ a condition of trance could be attained which conferred upon the meditator extraordinary powers and converted him into a superman. Buddhism adapted this teaching to its ontology. Transic meditation became the ultimate member of the Path towards Quiescence, the special means through which, first of all, wrong views and evil inclinations could be eradicated, and then the highest mystic worlds could be reached. The superman, the Yogi, became the Saint,⁸ the man or, more precisely, the assemblage of elements, where the element of Immaculate Wisdom⁹

¹ *nirodha* = *nirvāṇa*

² *dharma-pravacaya*

³ *mārga*

⁴ *śāntāna-prahāṇa*

⁵ *ārya*

⁶ *yoga*.

⁷ *dhyāna* = *saṃādhi* = *yoga*

⁸ *ārya* = *arhat* = *yogin*

⁹ *prajñā amālā*

becomes the central and predominant principle of a holy life. This gives us the last feature of primitive Buddhism. It is a doctrine of the Saint.

Accordingly the whole doctrine is summarized in the formula of the so called four «truths» or four principles of the Saint,¹ viz. 1) life is a disquieting struggle, 2) its origin are evil passions, 3) eternal Quiescence is the final goal and 4) there is a Path where all the energies cooperating in the formation of life become gradually extinct.

These are the main ideas of Buddhism during the first period of its history, the first «Swinging of the Wheel of the Law». It can hardly be said to represent a religion. Its more religious side, the teaching of a path, is utterly human. Man reaches salvation by his own effort, through moral and intellectual perfection. Nor was there, for ought we know, very much of a worship in the Buddhism of that time. The community consisted of recluses possessing neither family, nor property, assembling twice a month for open confession of their sins and engaged in the practice of austerity, meditation and philosophic discussions.

The Buddhism was divided, after Aśoka, of this period in 18 schools on points of minor importance. The acceptance of a shadowy, semi-real personality by the school of the Vātsīputrīyas was the only important departure from the original scheme of that philosophy.

§ 4. SECOND PERIOD OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY.

At the verge of the fifth century of its history a radical change supervened in Buddhism, in its philosophy and in its character as a religion. It forsook the ideal of a human Buddha who disappears completely in a lifeless Nirvāṇa and replaced it by the ideal of a divine Buddha enthroned in a Nirvāṇa full of life. It forsook the egoistic ideal of a personal Salvation and replaced it by the Universal Salvation of every life. It changed at the same time its philosophy from a radical Pluralism into as radical a Monism. This change seems to have been contemporaneous with a development in the brahmanic religions of India where at the same epoch the great national Gods, Shiva and Viṣṇu, began to be worshipped and established on the background of a monistic philosophy.

The fundamental philosophic conception with which the new Buddhism started was the idea of a real, genuine, ultimate existence,

¹ *catevāre ārya-satyāni = āryasya buddhasya tattvāni*

or ultimate reality, a reality shorn of all relations, reality in itself, independent, unrelated reality.¹ Since all the physical and mental elements established by the pluralism of early Buddhism were admittedly interrelated elements,² or cooperating forces,³ none of them could be viewed as ultimately real. They were interrelated, dependent and therefore unreal.⁴ Nothing short of the whole of these elements, the whole of the wholes, the Universe itself viewed as a Unity, as the unique real Substance, could be admitted as ultimately real. This whole assemblage of elements,⁵ this Elementness⁶ as a Unity, was then identified with Buddha's Cosmical Body, with his aspect as the unique substance of the Universe.⁷ The elements⁸ established in the previous period, their classifications into five groups,⁹ twelve bases of our cognition¹⁰ and eighteen component parts¹¹ of individual lives were not totally repudiated, but allowed only a shadowy existence as elements not real in themselves, elements «devoid» of any ultimate reality.¹² In the former period all personalities, all enduring substances, Souls and Matter were denied ultimate reality. In the new Buddhism their elements, the sense data and the fundamental data of consciousness, nay even all moral forces,¹³ followed the Souls in a process of dialectical destruction. The early doctrine receives the name of a No-Soul and No-Substance doctrine.¹⁴ The new Buddhism receives the name of a No-Elements doctrine,¹⁵ a doctrine of the relativity and consequent

¹ *anapeksaḥ svabhāvaḥ* = *sarva-dharma-sūnyatā*

² *samskṛta-dharma*

³ *samskāra*

⁴ *paraspara-apeksa* = *sūnya* = *svabhāva-sūnya*

⁵ *dharma-kāya* = *dharma-rūḥ*.

⁶ *dharma-tā*

⁷ *Dharma-kāya* = *Buddha*

⁸ *dharma*

⁹ *skandhā* (5)

¹⁰ *āyatana* (12)

¹¹ *dhātu* (18)

¹² *svabhāva-sūnya*

¹³ *citta-saṃprayukta-samekāra*

¹⁴ *anātma-vāda* = *niḥ-svabhāva-vāda* = *puṭgala-nāvrūṭmā* = *puṭgala-sūnyatā*

¹⁵ *dharma-nāvrūṭmā* = *dharma-sūnyatā* = *svabhāva-sūnyatā* = *paraspara-*

apeksatā, or *sūnyatā* simply. By the references collected in my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 43 n. 1. it has been sufficiently established that *sūnyatā* does not mean *abhāva* simply, but *ataretara-abhāva* = *paraspara-apeksatā*, which is want of ultimate reality (= *aparimāṇatā*) or Relativity. The opponents called it *abhāva*, cp *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. 1. 34, (cp W. Ruben *Die Nyāyasūtras*, An. 260) M-r E. Obermiller

unreality of all elementary data into which existence has been analysed.

This is the first outstanding feature of the new Buddhism. It denies the ultimate reality of the elements accepted as real in early Buddhism.

The doctrine of Causality, causality as functional interdependence of every element upon all the others,¹ not as production of something out of other things,² this doctrine so characteristic of Buddhism from its beginning, is not only retained in the new Buddhism, but it is declared to be the foundation-stone of the whole edifice.³ However, its meaning is slightly changed. In primitive Buddhism all elements are interdependent and real, in the new Buddhism, in accordance with the new definition of reality, they are unreal because interdependent.⁴ Of the principle of "Interdependent Origination" the first part is emphasized, the second is dropped altogether. From the point of view of ultimate reality the universe is one motionless whole where nothing originates and nothing disappears. Neither does something originate out of the same stuff, as the Sāṅkhyas think, nor do the things originate from other things as the Vaiśeṣikas maintain, nor do the elements flash into existence for a moment only as the early Buddhists think. There is no origination altogether.⁵ This is the second feature of the new Buddhism, it repudiates real causality altogether by merging reality in one motionless Whole.

However, the new Buddhism did not repudiate the reality of the empirical world absolutely, it only maintained that the empirical reality was not the ultimate one. There were thus two realities, one on the surface⁶ the other under the surface.⁷ One is the illusive aspect of reality, the other is reality as it ultimately is. These two realities or "two truths" superseded in the new Buddhism the "four truths" of the early doctrine

calls my attention to the following eloquent passage from Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* (Minayeff MSS f 71b. 7—9) — *dharmasya dharmena śūnyatvāt sarva-dharma-śūnyatā, sa va-dharmānām saṃskṛta-asamskṛta-rāśer itaretara-pel.sabvena sabhāva-aparimāṇatvāt*

¹ *pratītya-samutpāda*

² *na sabhārata utpādaḥ*

³ Cp the initial verses of *Mādhyamika-kārikās* and of TS

⁴ Cp. my *Nirvāṇa*, p 41

⁵ Cp *ibid* p 40 n 2

⁶ *samvṛta-satya*

⁷ *sāmvrta-satya* = *paramārtha-satya*

A further feature of the new Buddhism was the doctrine of complete equipollency between the empirical world and the Absolute, between *Samsāra* and *Nirvāna*¹. All elements which were in early Buddhism dormant only in *Nirvāna*, but active energies in ordinary life, were declared to be eternally dormant, their activity only an illusion. Since the empirical world is thus only an illusory appearance under which the Absolute manifests itself to the limited comprehension of ordinary men, there is at the bottom no substantial difference between them. The Absolute, or *Nirvāna*, is nothing but the world viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*. Nor can this aspect of the absolutely Real be cognized through the ordinary means of empirical cognition. The methods and results of discursive thought are therefore condemned as quite useless for the cognition of the Absolute. Therefore all logic as well as all constructions of early Buddhism, its Buddhology, its *Nirvāna*, its four truths etc are unflinchingly condemned as spurious and contradictory constructions². The only source of true knowledge is the mystic intuition of the Saint and the revelation of the new Buddhist Scriptures, in which the monistic view of the universe is the unique subject. This is a further outstanding feature of the new Buddhism, its merciless condemnation of all logic, and the predominance given to mysticism and revelation.

Subsequently a school of more moderate tendencies broke off from the main stock of these Relativists, the so called *Svātantrika* school. It admitted some logic for the argumentative defense of its standpoint which nevertheless consisted in a dialectical destruction of all the fundamental principles on which cognition is based.

The Path towards Salvation was changed into the Grand Vehicle in that sense that the ideal of the former period, of the Small Vehicle, was declared to be egoistic, and another ideal, not personal Salvation, but the Salvation of mankind, nay of all the Universe of the living creatures, was declared to harmonise with the monistic tendency of speculation. The empirical world was allowed a shadow of reality only in that sense that as a field for the practise of transcendental altruistic virtues,³ of the Universal Love,⁴ it was a preparation for the realisation of the Absolute⁵. The Immaculate Wisdom which was

¹ Cp. *ibid*, p 205

² *ibid*, p. 188.

³ *pāramitā*

⁴ *mahā-karūṇā*

⁵ *nirvāna* = *dharma-kāya*

one of the elements of the Saint, became now, under the name of the Climax of Wisdom,¹ identified with one aspect of Buddha's Cosmical Body;² his other aspect being the world *sub specie aeternitatis*.³ Buddha ceased to be human Under the name of his Body of Highest Bliss⁴ he became a real God. He however was not the Creator of the World. This feature the new buddhology retained from the preceding period. He was still subject to the law of causation or, according to the new interpretation, to illusion.⁵ Only the Cosmical Body, in its twofold aspect, was beyond illusion and causation. Buddhism in this period becomes a religion, a High Church. Just as Hinduism it gives expression to an esoteric Pantheism behind a kind of exoteric Polytheism. For its forms of worship it made borrowings in the current, thaumaturgic, so called «tantristic», rites For the sculptural realisation of its ideals it made use, at the beginning, of the mastership of Greek artists.

Such were the deep changes which supervened in Buddhism in the second period of its history.

The new or High Church did not mean, however, an exclusion from the former or Low Church. The theory was developped that every man, according to his natural inclination, according to the «seed»⁶ of Buddhahood which is in his heart, will either choose the Grand Vehicle or the Small one as a the proper means for his Salvation. Both churches continued to live under the roof of the same monasteries.

§ 5. THE THIRD PERIOD OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY.

After another quinquentenary, at the verge of the first millennium of the history of Buddhism in India, a further important change supervened in the orientation of its philosophy. The following development became contemporaneous with the golden age of Indian civilization, when a great part of India was united under the prosperous rule of the national dynasty of the Guptas. Arts and sciences flourished and the Buddhists took a prominent part in this revival. The new direction was finally given to Buddhist philosophy

¹ *prajñā-pāramitā*.

² *jñāna-lāya*.

³ *svabhāva-lāya*.

⁴ *sambhoga-lāya*.

⁵ *samvrti*, there is in the *sambhoga-lāya* «a little relic of *duḥkha-satya*»

⁶ *bīja* = *prakṛti-sīham gotram*

by two great men, natives of Peshaver, the brothers Saint Asanga and Master Vasubandhu. Evidently in accordance with the spirit of the new age, the condemnation of all logic which characterized the preceding period, was forsaken, and Buddhists began to take a very keen interest in logical problems. This is the first outstanding feature of that period, a keen interest in logic, which towards the end of the period becomes overwhelming and supersedes all the former theoretical part of Buddhism.

The starting point of the new departure seems to have been something in the kind of an Indian „*Cogito, ergo sum*“: „We cannot deny the validity of Introspection, the Buddhists now declared, as against the school of total Illusionism, because, if we deny introspection, we must deny consciousness itself, the whole universe will then be reduced to the condition of absolute cecity“. „If we do not really know that we cognize a patch of blue, we will never cognize the blue itself. Therefore introspection must be admitted as a valid source of knowledge“. The problem of Introspection afterwards divided all India as well as the Buddhists into two camps, its advocates and its opponents,³ but originally the theory, seems to have been directed against the extreme skepticism of the Mādhyamikas. It constitutes the second feature of Buddhist philosophy in its third period.

- A further feature, a feature which gave its stamp to the whole period, consists in the fact that the skepticism of the preceding period was fully maintained, regarding the existence of an external world. Buddhism became idealistic. It maintained that all existence is necessarily mental⁴ and that our ideas have no support in a corresponding external reality.⁴ However, not all ideas were admitted as equally real, degrees of reality were established. Ideas were divided in absolutely fanciful,⁵ relatively real⁶ and absolutely real.⁷ The second and the third cate-

¹ SDS gives the formulation evidently from *Pr vinīścaya*, cp NK., p 261. Expressed more precisely the Indian formula would be — *cogitantem me sentio, ne sit caecus mundus omnis* = *svasamvedanam angikāryam, anyathā jagad-ānāhyam prasajyeta*. Prof Sylvain Lévi has already compared the *sva-samvedana* to the *cogito ergo sum*, cp *Mahāyāna-sūtrāṅkāra*, II, p. 20.

² Cp vol II, p 29 n 4

³ *vyākāṇa-mātra-vāda* = *sems-tsam-pa*

⁴ *nirūlambana-vāda*

⁵ *parikalpita*

⁶ *para-tanira*

⁷ *pari-nispanna*

gory were considered as real. Two realities were admitted, the relatively and the absolutely real, whereas, in the preceding period, all ideas were declared to be unreal,¹ because they were relative.² This is the third feature of the last phase of Buddhist philosophy, it became a system of Idealism.

Finally, a prominent feature of the new Buddhism is also its theory of a «store-house consciousness»,³ a theory which is predominant in the first half of the period and dropped towards its end. There being no external world and no cognition apprehending it, but only a cognition which is introspective, which apprehends, so to say, its own self, the Universe, the real world, was assumed to consist of an infinity of possible ideas which lay dormant in a «store-house» of consciousness. Reality becomes then cogitability, and the Universe is only the maximum of compossible reality. A Biotic Force⁴ was assumed as a necessary complement to the stored consciousness, a force which pushes into efficient existence the series of facts constituting actual reality. Just as the rationalists in Europe assumed that an infinity of possible things are included in God's Intellect and that he chooses and gives reality to those of them which together constitute the maximum of compossible reality, just so was it in Buddhism, with that difference that God's Intellect was replaced by a «store-house consciousness»⁵ and his will by a Biotic Force. This is the last outstanding feature of the concluding phase of Buddhist philosophy.

Just as the two preceding periods it is divided in an extreme, and a moderate⁶ school. The latter, as will appear in the sequel of this work, dropped the extreme idealism of the beginning⁷ and assumed a critical or transcendental idealism. It also dropped the theory of a «store house consciousness», as being nothing but a Soul in disguise.

As a religion Buddhism remained in this period much the same as it has been in the preceding one. Some changes were introduced in the theory of Nirvāṇa, of the Buddha and of the Absolute in order to bring it in line with the idealistic principles of the system. The

¹ *śūnya*.

² *paraspara-aparīkṣa*

³ *ālaya-vijñāna*.

⁴ *anādi-vāsanā*.

⁵ *āgama-anusārin*

⁶ *nyāya-vādin*.

⁷ Cp below, vol. II, p 329 n.

greatest men of this period seem to have been free thinkers. The elucidation of their system of philosophy is the object of the present work

S C H E M A
of the three main phases of Buddhism

Periods	First	Middle	Concluding
Central Conceptions	Pluralism (<i>pragala-sūyatā</i>)	Monism (<i>eka-dharma-sūyatā</i>)	Idealism (<i>bāhya-artha-sūyatā</i>)
	Extreme Moderate	Extreme Moderate	Extreme Moderate
Schools	Sarvāśvādas Vāsiṣṭīyas	Prāsaṅgika Sūtrāntrika Mādhyamikas	Āgama-anuśrīta Nyāyavādins
Chief exponents	—	Nāgārjuna and Deva Bhavya	Asanga and Vasubandhu Dignāga and Dharmakīrti

§ 6. THE PLACE OF BUDDHIST LOGIC IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Such was the state of affairs which the first Buddhist logicians have found in their own Buddhist home when they first took up the study of logic. They found there three different systems. But in the wider purview of All India the variety of philosophic opinion was still greater. It was really infinite. However, out of all this infinite variety seven philosophic systems seem to have exercised some traceable, either positive or negative, influence upon the formation of the different phases of Buddhist philosophy.¹ They were, 1) the Materialists, (Cārvāka-Bārhaspatya), 2) the Jains with their doctrine of universal animation, 3) the evolutionism of Sāṅkhya, 4) the mysticism of Yoga, 5) the Monism of Aupanisada-Vedānta, 6) the realism of the orthodox Mīmāṃsakas and 7) the realism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

1) The Materialists.

The Indian Materialists² denied the existence of any spiritual substances, as all Materialists indeed are doing. Therefore no Soul, no God. The spirit only a product of certain material stuffs, just as wine-spirit is the product of fermentation.³ They therefore, first of all, admitted of no other source of our knowledge than sense-perception.⁴ Knowledge consists for them, so to speak, in physiological reflexes.

They, next to that, denied every established order in the Universe, other than a haphazard order. They admitted of no *a priori*, binding, eternal moral law. "The stick", they maintained, i. e. the penal code is the law. They therefore denied retribution, other than a haphazard retribution from the worldly power. To speak Indian, they denied the law of *karma*. It is a noticeable fact that materialism was fostered and studied in India especially in schools of political thought.⁵ Political

¹ Those systems are alone taken into account which have survived in literature. The influence of those contemporaries of Buddha whose work has not survived must have been still stronger. On the influence of the five heretical teachers on Jainism and Buddhism, cf. the very interesting records collected by B. C. Law, *Historical Gleanings*, pp. 21 ff (Calcutta, 1922).

² Mādhyama's account in SDS remains till now our chief source for the knowledge of the arguments of Indian Materialism. Considerable addition to it has been recently done by prof. J. Tucci Professor M. Tubbiansky is at present engaged in a work of collecting information on this subject from Tibetan sources.

³ SDS, p. 7.

⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

⁵ Such as the Bārhaspatyas, the Auśanāsas, etc.

men, having thus freed their conscience from every moral tie, preached a businesslike *macchiavelism* in politics. They supported the established order and the religion upon which it was founded, without caring to be religious themselves.¹ But not only did materialism flourish, so to speak, among the governing class of the Hindu society, it also had its votaries among the popular circles. From among the six successful popular preachers who were wandering through the villages of Hindustan during the life-time of Buddha, two at least were materialists.

A further feature of Indian materialism, which is but a consequence of the foregoing one, is that it denied every higher aim in life other than personal interest. The idea of a self-sacrifice, of a sacrifice of one's interests and even of one's life for a higher aim, thus so prominent a feature of Buddhism, seemed ridiculous to them. To speak Indian, they denied *Nirvāṇa*. «Your death is your *Nirvāṇa*» they maintained,² there is no other!

In the denial of a Soul and of a God Buddhism fell in line with the Materialists. It diverged from them in maintaining Karma and *Nirvāṇa*

2) Jainism.

In Jainism, on the other hand, the Buddhists met with a very developed theory of moral defilement and purification,³ and a theory of spiritual existence extended even to plants and to inanimate, nonorganic things which were also supposed to possess Souls. But the Souls in Jainism were semi-material substances, coextensive with the body, and subject to growth in size together with the growth of the body. Moral impurity was imagined as an influx of a subtle filthy stuff through the pores of the skin into the interior of the Soul.⁴ The Soul was then filled with this stuff as a bag with sand. Moral progress was explained as a shutting up of the openings for the filthy matter to stream in, and as the ultimate purification and elevation of the saintly Soul to a final *Nirvāṇa* in those highest spheres which are the limit of every movement.⁵ Thus the moral law represents in Jainism a hypostasized super-realism. To speak Indian, the *law* of the Jains is matter.⁶

¹ Cp. Kautaliya, I, 89—40

² SDS, p. 7.

³ Jainism can, like Buddhism, claim to be a *sāṃkleśa-vyavādāṃko dharmah*, i. e., a moral preaching

⁴ Cp. the excellent exposition of the Jaina doctrine of Karma in Prof. H. v. Glasenapp's work, devoted to this subject

⁵ Where the element *dharmā* ceases and the element *adharma* begins

⁶ *law* *pauḍgalikam*

Between these two opposed outlooks Buddhism steered along what it itself called the Middle Path. It denied a substantial Soul and a God. It retained mental phenomena and it saved Karma and Nirvāṇa, but in clearing them of every tinge of super-realism.

The ontology of the Jains contains likewise many traits of similarity with Buddhism. The starting point of both systems is the same, it consists in a decisive opposition to the monism of the Āraṇyakas and Upanishads, where real Being is assumed as one eternal substance without beginning, change, or end. The Jains answered, just as the Buddhists, that Being is «joined to production, continuation and destruction».¹ The systems of that time were divided in India in «radical» and «non-radical» ones.² They maintained either that every thing was eternal in its essence, change only apparent, or they maintained that every thing was moving, stability only apparent. To this «radical» class belonged Vedānta and Sāṅkhya on the one side, Buddhism on the other. The second class admitted a permanent substance with real changing qualities. Jainism, the old Yoga school³ and the Vaiśeṣikas or their forerunners adhered to this principle. Since Jainism is considerably older than the origin of Buddhism,⁴ its leadership in the opposition against monistic ideas is plausible. For the defense of their intermediate position the Jains developed a curious dialectical method,⁵ according to which existence and non-existence were inherent in every object, therefore any predicate could be partly true and partly false. Even the predicate of being «inexpressible»⁶ could be asserted as well as denied of every thing at the same time. This method looks like an answer to the Mādhyamika method of proving the «inexpressible» character⁷ of absolute reality by reducing its every possible predicates ad absurdum and thus reducing empirical reality to a mirage.

3) The Sāṅkhya system.

The Sāṅkhya system of philosophy marks a considerable progress in the history of Indian speculation. It could not but influence all

¹ Cp H. Jacobi, ERE, art Jainism.

² *ekānta-anekānta*, cp NS IV. 1, 26, 29.

³ *Svāyambhuva-yoga* cp NK, p. 32

⁴ Cp H. Jacobi, loc cit

⁵ *syūdd-vāda*

⁶ *anivṛtānīya-avaliṅga*.

⁷ *anābhilāpya-anivṛtānīya-śūnya*.

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other Indian circles, whether in the pale of brahmanism or outside it. When the Buddhists, from their critical standpoint, attack brahmanical speculation, they, in the later period, especially direct their destructive critique against the idea of a God like Vishnu and of a substantive Matter like that of the atheistic Sāṅkhyas.¹ In its classical form² the Sāṅkhya system assumed the existence of a plurality of individual Souls on the one side, and of a unique, eternal, pervasive and substantial Matter³ on the other. This Matter is supposed to begin by an undifferentiated condition⁴ of equipoise and rest. Then an evolutionary 'process'⁵ is started. Matter is then never at rest, always changing, changing every minute,⁶ but finally it again reverts to a condition of rest and equipoise. This Matter embraces not only the human body, but all our mental states as well, they are given a materialistic origin and essence.⁷ The Souls represent only a pure, unchanging light which illumines the evolutionary process and the process of thought-reflexes as well. The connection between this always changing Matter and the perfectly motionless Spirit is a very feeble point of the system. The Buddhists destroyed and ridiculed this artificially constructed connection.⁸ The beginning and the end of the evolutionary process remains also unexplicable, the explanation given is very weak. But the idea of an eternal Matter which is never at rest, always evolving from one form into another, is a very strong point of the system, and it does credit to the philosophers of that school, that they at so early a date in the history of human thought so clearly formulated the idea of an eternal Matter which is never at rest.

The Buddhists in this point come very near to the Sāṅkhyas. They also were teaching that whatsoever exists is never at rest, and, therefore, they were constantly on guard⁹ not to lose sight of the

¹ *Īśvara-pradhānādi*, cp TSP, p 11, 181, Tātp, p 388, 14.

² In its early form, as recorded by Garaka IV 1, when *pradhāna* and *brahman* were the same entity, the parallelism with Buddhism is still greater, cp especially IV. 1. 44 where the doctrine of *sāṃhṛīya* is mentioned.

³ *pradhāna*

⁴ *avyakta*

⁵ *parināma*

⁶ *pratiśana-parināma*

⁷ *gaḍa*

⁸ Cp NB and NBT transl. below, vol II, pp 203 ff

⁹ Cp AKB, V 25 ff, and CC, p 80

fundamental difference between both systems, since this characteristic feature brought both systems very close together. There is between them an ascertainable reciprocal influence in the attempts to grapple with the idea of instantaneous being¹. We shall revert to this point when analysing the Buddhist theory of a Universal Flux of Being. But we may mention already now that the Buddhists denied the existence of a substantial matter altogether. Movement consists for them of moments, it is a staccato movement, momentary flashes of a stream of energy. For the Sāṅkhyas movement is compact, it is a legato movement, the momentary changes are changes of a fluctuating substantial stuff with which they are identical. «Everything is evanescent»,² says the Buddhist, because there is no stuff. «Everything is persistent»,³ says the Sāṅkhya, because although never at rest, it represents fundamentally one and the same stuff.⁴

Both systems share in common a tendency to push the analysis of Existence up to its minutest, last elements which are imagined as absolute qualities, or things possessing only one unique quality. They are called «qualities» (*guṇa-dharma*) in both systems in the sense of absolute qualities, a kind of atomic, or intra-atomic, energies of which the empirical things are composed. Both systems, therefore, agree in denying the objective reality of the categories of Substance and Quality,⁵ and of the relation of Inherence uniting them. There is in Sāṅkhya philosophy no separate existence of qualities. What we call quality is but a particular manifestation of a subtle entity. To every new unit of quality corresponds a subtle quantum of matter which is called *guṇa* «quality», but represents a subtle substantive entity. The same applies to early Buddhism where all qualities are substantive⁶ or, more precisely, dynamic entities, although they are also called *dharma*s «qualities».

¹ Cp CC p 42 ff

² «*sarvam anityam*», cp NS, IV. 1. 25 ff

³ «*sarvam nityam*», cp ibid., IV. 1. 29 ff, notwithstanding this distinction both systems are advocates of *Isanilatra*

⁴ The result and the cause are the same stuff — *sat-lārya-tāda*

⁵ Cp S N. Dasgupta, History, I, pp. 243—4, he compares the *gunas* of the Sāṅkhya system with the «Reals» of Herbart, which comparison is, in my opinion, very much to the point. The *gunas*, as well as the *dharma*s, are in fact «*Dinge mit absolut einfacher Qualität*»

⁶ Cp. Yaśomitra's remark: *vāyamānam dravyam* (CC., p. 26 n.), but *dravyam* is here *Isanilam*, a «non-subsisting substance»

The Sāṅkhya system can thus be regarded as the first serious step that the Indian speculation took against naive realism. It became the ally of Buddhism in its fight with extreme realistic systems.

4) The Yoga system.

The yoga practices of concentrated meditation were a very popular feature of religious life in ancient India and all systems of philosophy, with the only exception of the Mīmāṃsakas, and of course of the Materialists, were obliged to adapt their theories so as to afford some opportunity for the entrance of mysticism. Some scholars have exaggerated the importance of those features which Buddhism shares in common with the different schools of Yoga philosophy. The practical side of both these systems, the practice of austerities and of transic meditation, their moral teachings, the theory of *kaṃma*, of the defiling and purifying moral forces are indeed in many points similar, but this similarity extends to the Jains and many other systems. The ontology of the Pātanjala-yoga school is borrowed almost entirely from the Sāṅkhya. But the old Yoga school, the Svāyambhuva-yoga,¹ admitted the existence of a permanent matter alongside with its impermanent but real, qualities, it admitted the reality of a substance-to-quality relation and, evidently, all the consequences which this fundamental principle must have had for its ontology, psychology and theology. It enabled the Yogas to be, without contradiction, the champions of monotheism in ancient India. They believed in a personal, almighty, omniscient and commiserative God. This feature alone separates them decidedly from not only the Buddhists, but equally from the atheistic Sāṅkhyas.² As a «non-radical»³ system the old genuine Yoga school could have but little in common with these two «radical»⁴ schools. But its practical mysticism and its theory of *kaṃma* constitutes the common stock of the great majority of Indian systems. Even the later Buddhist logicians, notwithstanding all their aversion to uncritical

¹ These Svāyambhuva Yogins were not at all *sat-kārya-vādin*s, or they were it only moderately (*an-ekāntatah*), in a measure in which all realists can be so designated. Cp. NK, p. 82 and Tūtp, 428 20 ff. There is no necessity at all to surmise that the Yogas mentioned by Vātsyāyana ad. NS, I, 1, 29 were Pātanjala Yogas as Mr. K. Chattopadhyāya, JRAS, 1927, p. 854 ff. evidently assumes.

² On all the contradictions which arise to the Pātanjalas by assuming a personal God cp. Tuxen, Yoga, p. 62 ff.

³ *an-ekānta*

⁴ *ekānta*

methods of thought, were nevertheless obliged to leave a loop-hole for the entrance of full mysticism and thus to support the religious theory of a Saint and of a Buddha. This loop-hole was a kind of intelligible intuition¹ which was described as a gift to contemplate directly, as if present before the senses, that condition of the Universe which, abstractly and vaguely, appeared as a necessary consequence of logic to the philosopher. In later, idealistic Buddhism this mystic intuition of a rational construction² was the chief remainer of the old mysticism. In early Buddhism it was the last and most powerful stage in the path towards salvation and was destined to achieve supernatural results.

5) The Vedānta.

The interrelations between Buddhism and Vedānta, their mutual influences, their mutual attractions and repulsions at different times of their parallel development, is one of the most interesting chapters of the history of Indian philosophy, it deserves a special study. As has been just stated, Buddhism was sometimes obliged carefully to observe the line of demarcation separating it from the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems, in order not to be confounded with them. But, as regards Vedānta, it really did sometimes fall in line with it, so as to leave no substantial difference, except the difference in phrasing and terminology. In the first period Buddhist philosophy represents the contradictorily opposed part to the philosophy of the Upanishads. Just as the latter declares that the Universe represents a real Unity, that it is One-without-a-Second, that subject and object, the Ego and the World, the individual Soul and the Soul of the Universe, coalesce in the same Unity, — just so does Buddhism emphatically declare that there is no real unity at all, every thing is discrete, it is split in an infinity of minutest elements, the Individual represents a congeries of physical and mental elements without a real Soul behind them, and the external world an assemblage of impermanent elements without any abiding stuff behind. But in the second period, as already mentioned, that Causality which is the only link between the separate elements becomes hypostasized, it becomes the Unique Substance of the Universe in which all the separate elements of the former period are merged and become «void» of any reality in themselves. The spirit of a revolt against Monism, after having produced a most interesting system of extreme Pluralism, did not

¹ *yogi-pratyaśa*, cp. my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 16 ff

² *bhūta-artha*, cp. *NBT*, p. 11. 17.

survive, it could not destroy Indian Monism which remained unshaken, so deeply was it rooted in its brahminical strongholds. On the contrary, Monism took the offensive and finally established itself triumphantly in the very heart of a new Buddhism. Transplanted upon a fresh soil the old Monism produced a powerful growth of various systems. In the schools of Nāgārjuna and Deva it received a dialectical foundation, in the way of a dialectical destruction of all other systems. In the schools of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu it became established dogmatically, as a system of Idealism, and finally, in the schools of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti it was established critically, upon a system of epistemology and logic. This exuberant growth of argumentative defense could not but influence, in its turn, the old monistic circles and we see Gaudapāda founding a new school of Vedānta and directly confessing his followship of Buddhism¹. This feeling of just acknowledgment was superseded, in the person of Śaṅkara-Ācārya, by a spirit of sectarian animosity and even extreme hatred, but nevertheless we find, later on, in the same school a man like Śrīharsa² liberally acknowledging that there is but an insignificant divergence between his views and those of the Mādhyamikas.

Thus it is that Buddhism and Vedānta appear in the history of Indian philosophy as mutually indebted parties.

6) The Mīmāṃsā

The Mīmāṃsakas were the most orthodox theologians of the old brahmanical sacrificial religion. They were averse to any other kind of speculation than that attaining to sacrifice. The Scripture, Veda, was for them nothing but an assemblage of about 70 commands³ enjoining sacrifice and establishing the kind of reward⁴ that was produced by them. No religious emotion and no moral elevation in that religion, all is founded on the principle: pay the brahmin his fee and you will have the reward. However, they were driven by necessity to defend this businesslike religion, and for strengthening the authority of the Veda they imagined the theory of eternal sounds of speech. The ABC⁵ of

¹ Op. Māndūkyop kārīkū, IV, cp. S. N. Dasgupta, History, v I, p. 422 ff.

² Op. Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya, pp. 19 and 29 (Chowkh) — *Mādhyamika-lāg-vyavahāraṇām śārūpāpātāpo na śakyate it!*

³ *utpatti-vidhi*

⁴ *phala-vidhi*

⁵ *gaṇānādi*

and the same entity does not disturb the realistic habits of thought of these philosophers.

The theory of this realistic epistemology was elaborated and defended in the school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

7) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

Buddhist logic was created in a spirit of a decisive opposition to the logic of these Realists, and, since in the course of our investigation we shall have often to refer to their system, it will not be amiss to dwell here on its leading principles.

The Indian Realists maintain that the external world is cognized by us in its genuine reality. There are no innate ideas¹ and no *a priori* principles² Everything comes into the cognizing individual from without. All cognitions are experiences conducted by the apparatus of our senses³ into the cognizing Soul, where they are sifted, ordered⁴ and preserved as traces of former experiences. These dormant traces⁵ are capable under favourable circumstances of being aroused and of producing recollections, which being mixed up with new experiences create qualified percepts⁶ Consciousness is pure consciousness,⁷ it does not contain any images, but it contemplates, or illumines, external reality directly, by the light of cognition. It sheds a pure light of consciousness upon objects lying in the ken. The sense of vision is a ray of light which reaches the object,⁸ seizes its form and communicates it to the cognizing Soul. There are no images lying between external reality and its cognition. Cognition is therefore not introspective,⁹ it does not apprehend images, but it apprehends external reality, reality itself. Self-consciousness is explained as an inferential cognition¹⁰ of the presence of knowledge in oneself or by a subsequent step in the act of perception¹¹ The structure of the

¹ *nirālāraṃ vyākāraṇam*

² *prāñicāḥ pratyayāḥ, na pratyayicāḥ*, NK, p. 267

³ *trividha-sanniharsa*

⁴ *samālākṣya*

⁵ *samskāra = smṛti-janaka-sāmagrī*

⁶ *savikalpalakam pratyakṣam*

⁷ *nirālāraṃ vyākāraṇam*.

⁸ *prāpya-lāṅkā*

⁹ *svasamvedanam nāsti*

¹⁰ *jñātātā-lakṣaṇaḥ*, cp. NK, p. 267 12

¹¹ *anu-vyavasāya*

external world corresponds adequately to what is found in our cognition and in the categories of our language. It consists of substances and sensible qualities which can be picked up by our sense faculties. The qualities are inherent in real substances. All motions are likewise realities *per se*, inherent in corresponding substances. Universals are also external realities, realities connected with particular things in which they reside by a special relation called Inherence. This relation of Inherence is hypostasized and is also a special external reality. All other relations are entered in the catalogue of Being under the head of qualities, but Inherence is a «meaning»¹ which is nevertheless an external reality different from the things related. This makes together six categories of Being: Substances, Qualities, Motions, Universals, Particulars and Inherence, to which a seventh category has been added later on in the shape of «non-existence»,² also a real «meaning» accessible to perception by the senses through a special contact. Causality is creative, that is to say, material causes³ and efficient causes⁴ combine in the creation of a new reality which represents a new whole,⁵ a thing which did not previously exist,⁶ notwithstanding the enduring presence of its matter. The whole is another real entity different from the parts of which it is composed. This entire structure of the external world, its relations and causality—all is cognizable through the senses. The intellect,⁷ or the reason, is a quality produced in the Soul by special agencies, it is not the Soul's essence. Through inferences it cognizes the same objects which have been cognized through the senses, but cognizes them with a higher degree of clearness and distinctness. The whole system represents nothing but the principle of realism consequently applied. If substances are real, the universals residing in them are also real and their relations are external realities as well. If all this is real, it must be equally amenable to sense-perception. The principle is laid down that the sense faculty which apprehends the presence of an object in the ken also apprehends its inherent

¹ *padārtha*

² *abhāva* = *abhāva indriyena grhyate*, cp Tarka-bhāṣā, p. 80, the same admitted by old Sāṅkhya, cp Cakrapāṇi ad Caraka, IV 1. 28, it is a *viśeṣya-viśeṣana-bhāva-sannikarsa*

³ *samavāyī-lāraṇa*

⁴ *nimitta-lāraṇa*

⁵ *avayavin*

⁶ *asat-lāryam* = *pūriam asat lāryam* = *pūriam asat avayavin*

⁷ *buddhi*

universals and relations and the occasional non-existence, or absence, of the object as well.¹

The theory of inference and the form of the syllogism were in the realistic systems in full agreement with their fundamental wholesale realism. No *a priori* notions, no necessary truths, no necessity in deductions. Every deduction founded on former experience, all knowledge casual. All invariable concomitance, being a result of former experience, reaches only so far as experience goes. There is no necessary *a priori* connection between the logical reason and its consequence.² Therefore all invariable concomitance is established on experience, on sense-knowledge. It is established as a summary³ of that experience.

The syllogism is five-membered. It is a deductive step from a particular case to another particular case. Therefore the example plays the part of a separate member. The general rule,⁴ of which the example ought to be an illustration, is included in the example as its subordinate part. The syllogism has five members because it is inductive-deductive. The members are thesis, reason, example (including major premise), application (= minor premise), and conclusion (= thesis), e.g.:

1. Thesis. The mountain has fire.
2. Reason. Because it has smoke.
3. Example. As in the kitchen, wheresoever smoke, there also fire.
4. Application. The mountain has smoke.
5. Conclusion. The mountain has fire.

At a later date the Mīmāṃsakas, probably under the influence of the Buddhist critique, made the concession that either the first three members or the last three were sufficient to establish the conclusion. In the last three, if we drop the example, we will have a strictly Aristotelian syllogism, its first figure.

Beside a theory of sense-perception and a theory of the syllogism with its corollary, a theory of logical fallacies, the text books of early Nyāya contain a detailed code of rules for carrying on disputations, i. e., a teaching of dialectics.

The school of Nyāya had already a developed logic when the Buddhists began to manifest a keen interest in logical pro-

¹ *yena endreyena vastu grhyate, tena tat-samartha-guna-āryā-sāmānyādeḥ grhyate, tad-abhāvaś ca, ibid*

² *yogyatā-sambandhaḥ = sambhāva-sambandhaḥ*

³ *upa-samhārena*

⁴ *yāpī*

blems. The Buddhist doctrine then came to graft itself on the early pre-Buddhist stock. But then a clash supervened at once between two utterly incompatible outlooks. The brahmanical logic was formal and built up on a foundation of naive realism. The Buddhists at that time became critical idealists and their interest in logic was not formal, but philosophic, i. e., epistemological. A reform of logic became indispensable. It was achieved by Dignāga.

§ 7. BUDDHIST LOGIC BEFORE DIGNĀGA.¹

The fundamental treatise of the Nyāya school, the aphorisms composed by Gotama, contains, loosely mixed up together, rules of conducting disputations and a manual of logic. Its logical part, the part devoted to inference and syllogism, is comparatively insignificant. The system of realistic ontology was contained in the aphorisms of the sister school of the Vaiśeṣikas. The major part of the first treatise is occupied by describing the different methods of carrying on a public debate. The *bona fide*² and *mala fide*³ argument are described, the cavilling,⁴ the futile answers,⁵ logical fallacies⁶ and finally all the cases are mentioned where the debater must be pronounced by the umpire to have lost the contest.⁷ It is only in the reformed new brahmanical logic, the logic which emerged from the struggle with Buddhism, that this part is dropped altogether and the theory of syllogism begins to play the central part.

The date of origin of the Nyāya-aphorisms is not known with anything like precision.⁸ In its systematic form the Nyāya system is

¹ Cp on this subject the excellent article of Prof. J. Tucci, JBAS July 1929, p 451 ff It is full of information regarding the logical parts of Asanga's and other works His information on the contents of the Tarka-śāstra fragments however does not agree with the information collected by A. Vostrikov and B Vassiliev.

² *vāda*.

³ *chala*.

⁴ *vitandā*.

⁵ *jāts*.

⁶ *hetu-ābhāsa*.

⁷ *nygraha-sihāna*.

⁸ On the pre-history of the Nyāya system cp H. Jacobi, Zur Frühgeschichte der ind Phil (Preuss Ak, 1911) and S. O Vidyābhūṣana, History of Indian Logic, pp 1—50 On the probable date of the Nyāya-sūtras of Gotama-Akṣapāda cp H Jacobi JAOS, 1911, p 29, H U, The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, p. 16 (RAS), L. Sual, Filosofia Indiana, p 14, W Ruben, Die Nyāya-sūtras, p XII, S. N Dasgupta, History, v I, p. 277 ff and my Erkenntnistheorie u Logik, Anhang II (München, 1924)

later than the other Indian classical systems. But in the form of some manual on the art of debate it is not improbable that it existed at a considerably earlier date. The Buddhist schools of the Hinayana have not preserved any manual of that sort, but it is highly probable that they must have existed. The opening debate of the *Kāthāvatthu* on the reality of a Soul is conducted with so high a degree of artificiality and every kind of dialectical devices that it suggests the probable existence of special manuals in which the art of debate was taught.¹ Syllogistic formulation of the thesis is quite unknown at that time, but dialectical tricks of every kind abound.

The oldest Buddhist compositions on the art of debate that have reached us in Tibetan translations are two tracts by Nāgārjuna, the "Repudiation of Contests"² and the "Dialectical splitting (of every thesis)."³ Both contain the exposition and the vindication of that unique method of conducting a debate which consists in proving nothing positive, but in applying the test of relativity to every positive thesis of the opponent and thus destroying it dialectically. There is indeed absolutely nothing which would not be relative in some respect, and therefore everything can be denied ultimate reality when its dialectical nature is disclosed. The first of these tracts mentions the four methods of proof current in the Nyāya school and the second quotes the initial aphorism of Gotama in which the 16 topics to be examined in the treatise are enumerated. By applying his critical axe of relativity Nāgārjuna establishes that all the 16 topics are relational and therefore ultimately unreal. These facts allow us to assume that the fundamental treatise of the Nyāya school probably existed in some form or other at the time of Nāgārjuna. They also encourage the hypothesis that similar tracts might have been in existence already among the early schools of the Hinayana, and that Nāgārjuna was probably not the first Buddhist to have composed them. Be that as the case may be, Nāgārjuna at any rate either introduced

¹ This is also the opinion of Mrs C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *art. Logic (Buddhist)* in *IMJ*, cp *Vidyākabhūṣana*, *History* pp. 225—250 on the traces of logical works in the Pali canonical literature and, pp. 157—163, in *Sāmaññasamāgāmi* lit.

² *Vigraha-vyāvartanī*, cp *Tanpū*, v. 12a, quoted several times by *Ānandakīrti*. Summary by *Vidyākabhūṣana*, op. cit., p. 230.

³ *Vaidalya-sūtra* and *prakarana*, *ibid*. The 16 padarthas are examined in the *prakarana*; the work is also called *pramāṇa-vibhūṭhana* and *pramāṇa-vibhūṭhana* cp *Vidyākabhūṣana*, op. cit. p. 237. A third work of Nāgārjuna — *ibid* — is probably spurious.

or followed the habit of Buddhist writers to treat dialectics in special, separate manuals. From that time we see that every author of some renown composes his own manual of dialectics containing instructions for carrying on public disputations.

During the centuries that followed, the Buddhists made no progress in logic. And this is quite natural. How could it have been otherwise as long as Nāgārjuna's ideas held the sway? For the cognition of the Absolute all logic was condemned. For practical aims in the empirical domain the realistic logic of the Naiyāyiks was admitted as quite sufficient.¹ The necessity of its critique and improvement did not yet dawn upon the Buddhists of that time. But with the advent of a new age, when Nāgārjuna's standpoint of extreme relativism was forsaken, the brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu took up the study of Nyāya logic and the work of its adaptation to the idealistic foundations of their philosophy.

Asaṅga was probably the first Buddhist writer who introduced the theory of the five-membered syllogism of the Naiyāyiks into the practice of Buddhist circles. He also established a body of rules on the art of debate, not materially different from the rules prescribed in the Nyāya school. He does not seem to have been very original in the domain of logic and dialectics.²

Vasubandhu was a renowned teacher of logic. He himself composed three logical treatises. They have not been translated into Tibetan, but an incomplete Chinese translation of one of them exists.³ Its title

¹ The relation between Gotama and Nāgārjuna seems to be of the sort that obtains between Jaimini and Bādarāyana, who mutually quote one another, cp Vidyābhūṣaṇa, op. cit., p. 46—47. The term *vitandā*, in NS I, 1, moreover, we probably must understand as meaning nothing else than the Mādhyamika-prāsangika method of discussion, Śrīharṣa, Khanḍ. loc. cit., uses the term *vitandā* as a synonym of Mādhyamika. It follows that the Naiyāyika and Mādhyamika schools are evidently much older than Gotama and Nāgārjuna.

² Cp Vidyābhūṣaṇa, History, pp. 268—269. The Saptadaśa-bhūmi-śāstra is ascribed by him to Maitreya Cp J. Tucci, op. cit.

³ On this perplexing problem cp. Sugiyama, op. cit. p. 32; Vidyābhūṣaṇa, op. cit., p. 287; Iyengar JBORS, XII, pp. 587—91, and IHQ, vol. V, pp. 81—86; 13 Keith, IHQ, vol. IV, pp. 221—227; J. Tucci, JRAS, 1928, p. 368, 1929, p. 451 and IHQ, vol. IV, p. 680. Tucci thinks that the Tarkaśāstra has nothing to do with Vādaśāstra. But in a paper read at a meeting of the Buddhist Research Institution at Leningrad (shortly to appear in the press) Mr Boris Vassiliev has established that «Tarka-śāstra» was originally a work on the «science of logic» (*yu-shih-lun-tarka-śāstra*) in three volumes, in its present condition it represents one volume of collected fragments Mr Andrew Vostrikov, in another

Vāda-vidhi means «the art of disputation». To judge by the extant part it very closely agrees with the fundamental textbook of the Naiyāyiks. The crucial points, the definitions of sense-perception, of inference, and of a sound thesis are not to be found in the preserved part of the Chinese translation, but they are quoted by Dignāga.¹ The definition of sense-perception states that by sense-perception that knowledge is understood which comes «from the object itself».² By this emphasis of «itself» the ultimately real object, the efficient reality of the thing, is understood. It is distinguished from the object as constructed in an image, such an object being only contingently real.³ The definition, although in its phrasing very slightly different from that which is current in the Nyāya school,⁴ is nevertheless quite Buddhistic. Dignāga however criticizes it as incorrectly expressed and adds a remark that this definition «does not belong to Master Vasubandhu». This remark has puzzled all subsequent interpretation. Jinendrabuddhi in his *Viśālāmālavatī*⁵ thinks it means that the definition is not what Vasubandhu would have said in his ripe years when his critical faculties attained full development, i. e., that it was composed while he was yet a Vaibhāṣika. Rgyal-tshab⁶ thinks that the definition might be interpreted as implying the reality of the atoms of which the thing is composed and this does not agree with the radical idealism of Vasubandhu. The remark of Dignāga would thus mean that the definition is not what Vasubandhu ought to have said from the standpoint of consequent idealism. In another work *Vāda-vidhāna* — a title meaning the same, but slightly different in form — Vasubandhu is supposed to have corrected his formulations. The definition of sense-perception, in any case, has passed over into many brahmanical works on logic⁷ where it is ascribed to Vasubandhu.

paper read at the same meeting, establishes 1) that the *ju-shih-lun* collection contains at present fragments of two or three different works, one of them is the *Vāda-vidhi* of Vasubandhu, and 2) that Vasubandhu wrote three different works on logic called the *Vāda-vidhi*, the *Vāda-vidhāna*, and the *Vāda-hrdaya*, the second work being an emendation of the first

¹ Pr Samucc, I 15, etc

² Cp the comment of Vācaspati, Tātp, p 99 ff

³ *samvrtti-sat*

⁴ *tato' rthād utpannam* = *arthendriya-sannilarsa-utpannam*, *ibid*

⁵ Tanyur, Mdo, v 115

⁶ In his comment on Pr Samucc, Tshad-ma-btun-dar-tik, f 20 a 5 ff

⁷ N Vārt p 42, Tātp, p 99, Paribuddhi, p 640—650 Prof B. Keith

thinks that this definition does not betray in Vasubandhu a sharp logician (?),

and criticized as such. The syllogism with which Vasubandhu operates is the five-membered syllogism of the Nyāya school, although, as appears from a passage in the supplement to the *Abhidharma-kośa*, he sometimes makes use of the abridged, three-membered form.¹ The three aspects of the logical reason, this Buddhist method of formulating invariable concomitance, appears already in the treatise of Vasubandhu. The classification of reasons and fallacies is different from the one accepted in the Nyāya school and agrees in principle with the one introduced by Dignāga and developed by Dharmakīrti. If we add that the definition of sense-perception as pure sensation which is so characteristic a feature of Dignāga's system is already found in a work of Asaṅga,² we cannot escape the conclusion that the great logical reform of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti was prepared by an adaptatory work of the realistic and formal Nyāya logic to the requirements of an idealistic system, this adaptatory work being begun in the schools of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, perhaps even much earlier.

§ 8. THE LIFE OF DIGNĀGA.

The lives of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, as recorded by the Tibetan historians Tārānātha, Bu-ston and others, are so full of quite incredible mythological details that it becomes a difficult task to extract some germs of truth out of them. There are however facts which with great probability must be assumed as correct. This refers, first of all, to the lineage of teachers, their caste and place of birth. Vasubandhu was the teacher of Dignāga, but he was probably an old and celebrated man when Dignāga came to attend to his lessons. Dharmakīrti was not the direct pupil of Dignāga. There is an intermediate teacher between them in the person of Iśvarasena who was a pupil of Dignāga and the teacher of Dharmakīrti. Iśvarasena has left no trace in the literary history of his school, although he is quoted by Dharmakīrti who accuses him of having misunderstood Dignāga. We have thus the following lineage of teachers—Vasubandhu-Dignāga-Iśvarasena-Dharmakīrti.³ Since Dharmakīrti flourished in the middle of the

cp. *IQ*, vol. IV. All the implications of the laconic expression have evidently escaped his attention

¹ Cp. my *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*, p. 952

² Tucci, in the *IQ*, vol. IV, p. 550. In *Uttara-tantra* IV 88 the «analytical» reason (*sadbhāva-hetu*) is already used

³ Cp. Tārānātha's *History*.

VII century A D, Vasubandhu could not have lived earlier than the close of the IV century¹

Both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were natives of Southern India and born from brahmin parents. Dignāga was born in the neighbourhood of Kāñci. He was at an early age converted to Buddhism by a teacher of the Vātsīputriya sect and took the vows from him. This sect admitted the existence of a real personality as something different from the elements of which it is composed. Dignāga dissented on this point with his teacher and left the monastery². He then travelled to the north in order to continue his studies in Magadha under Vasubandhu whose fame at that time must have been very great. Among the great names of later Buddhism the name of Vasubandhu occupies an exceptional position, he is the greatest among the great. He is the only master who is given the title of the Second Buddha. His teaching was encyclopaedic, embracing all the sciences cultivated in India at his time. He had a great many pupils, but four of them attained celebrity. They became «independent scholars»,³ i.e., they freed themselves from the influence of their teacher and advanced further on, each in the special branch of his studies. These were the master Sthīramati—in the knowledge of the systems of the early 18 schools (*abhidharma*), the saint Vimuktasena—in monistic philosophy (*prajñā-pāramitā*), the master Gunaprabha—in the system of discipline (*vinaya*) and master Dignāga in logic (*pramāṇa*). The works of all these savants are preserved in Tibetan translations. Dignāga seems to have dissented with his teacher on logical questions

¹ M. Noël Péri, in his excellent paper on the date of Vasubandhu, arrives at an earlier date, but this apparently reposes on a confusion of the great Vasubandhu with another author of the same name, Vṛddhacārya-Vasubandhu, quoted in the AK and also called bodhisattva Vāsu, the author of Śata-śāstīa, who was a century earlier. The opinion of V. Smith, Early History, p. 328 (8th ed.) is founded on the same confusion.

² The learned translator of Mani-mekhalai thinks that the Buddhists of the country of Kāñci may have studied logic before Dignāga. Since the sect of the Vātsīputriyas has some affinities with the Vaiśeṣikas, cp. Kamalaśīla, p. 132 &, this is not improbable. The theory of two *pramāṇas* and the definition of *pratyakṣa* as *nirvikalpaka* certainly have existed long before Dignāga in some Hinayāna or Mahāyāna schools. Dignāga gave to these formulas a new signification, but he himself quotes in support of them a passage from the *abhidharma* of the Sarvāstivādins.

³ *rañ-las-mi-las-pa* = *śaśānta-pāṇḍita*

just as he dissented with his first teacher on the problem of a real personality.¹

To the time of his apprenticeship probably belong two early works, two manuals for the use of students. One of them is a condensed summary of the capital work of his teacher under the title of *Abhidharmakośa-marmā-pradīpa*.² The other contains a brief summary (*pañcārtha*) in mnemonic verse of all the topics contained in the *Aṣṭa-sāhasrika-prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra*.³ The first is a manual for the class of early Buddhist philosophy (*abhidharma*), the second a manual for the class of monistic philosophy (*pāramitā*). The remaining works of Dignāga are all devoted to logic.⁴ He at first exposed his ideas in a series of short tracts some of which are preserved in Tibetan and Chinese translations⁵ and then condensed them in a great *oeuvre d'ensemble*, the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, in 6 chapters of mnemonic verse with the author's own commentary. The commentary however is very laconic and evidently intended as a guide for the teacher. Without the very detailed, thorough-going and clear commentary of Jinendrabuddhi⁶ it hardly could be understood. All the previous short tracts on logic were brought to unity in this great work.

The life of Dignāga after he had finished his studies was spent in the usual way, just as the life of every celebrated teacher at that time in India. He won his fame of a powerful logician in a famous debate with a brahmin surnamed Sudurjaya at the Nālandā monastery. After that he travelled from monastery to monastery, occasionally

¹ His remark on Vasubandhu's definition of sense-perception, referred to above, is perhaps a polite way of expressing the fact that he disagreed with his teacher.

² Tanjur, Mdo, v. LXX

³ Tanjur, Mdo, v. XIV

⁴ These are *Ālambana-parīkṣā*, *Trikāla-parīkṣā*, *Hetu-cakra-samarthana* (*Hetu-cakra-hamaru?*), *Nyāyamukha* (= *Nyāya-dvāra*) and *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* with *vr̥tti*.

⁵ It is remarkable that his chief work, *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, has remained unknown in China and Japan. It has been replaced by *Nyāya-praveśa*, a work by Śāṅkara-svāmin, on whose authorship cf. M. Tsubianski, On the authorship of *Nyāya-praveśa* and Tucci, op. cit., M-r Boris Vassiliev in his paper mentioned above establishes that the Chinese logicians knew about *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* only from hear-say.

⁶ Called *Viśālāmalavati*, cf. Tanjur, Mdo, v. 115. A specimen of it is translated in Appendix IV.

fixing his residence in one of them. There he was teaching, composing his works, partaking in public disputations. Such disputations were an outstanding feature of public life in ancient India. They often were arranged with great pomp, in the presence of the king, of his court and a great attendance of monks and laymen. The existence and prosperity of the monastery were at stake. The authorized winner received the support of the king and of his government for his community, converts were made and new monasteries were founded. Even now in Tibet and Mongolia every celebrated teacher is the founder of one or several monasteries, every monastery is a seat of intense learning and sometimes great scholarship.

Dignāga by the celebrity he won in disputations has been one of the most powerful propagators of Buddhism. He is credited with having achieved the "conquest of the world."¹ Just as an universal monarch brings under his sway all India, so is the successful winner of disputations the propagator of his creed over the whole of the continent of India. Cashmere seems to have been the only part of India where he has not been, but he was visited by representatives of that country who later on founded schools there. These schools carried on the study of his works and produced several celebrated logicians.

§ 9. THE LIFE OF DHARMAKĪRTI.

Dharmakīrti was born in the South, in Trimalaya (Tirumalla?) in a brahmin family and received a brahmanical education. He then became interested in Buddhism and adhered at first as a lay member to the church. Wishing to receive instruction from a direct pupil of Vasubandhu, he arrived at Nālandā, the celebrated seat of learning where Dharmapāla, a pupil of Vasubandhu, was still living, although very old. From him he took the vow. His interest for logical problems being aroused and Dignāga no more living, he directed his steps towards Iśvarasena, a direct pupil of the great logician. He soon surpassed his master in the understanding of Dignāga's system. Iśvarasena is reported to have conceded that Dharmakīrti understood Dignāga better than he could do it himself. With the assent of his teacher Dharmakīrti then began the composition of a great work in mnemonic verse containing a thorough and enlarged commentary on the chief work of Dignāga.

The remaining of his life was spent, as usual, in the composition of works, teaching, public discussions and active propaganda.

¹ *āg-vyaya*

He died in Kalinga in a monastery founded by him, surrounded by his pupils.

Notwithstanding the great scope and success of his propaganda he could only retard, but not stop the process of decay which befell Buddhism on its native soil. Buddhism in India was doomed. The most talented propagandist could not change the run of history. The time of Kumāṛila and Śāṅkara-ācārya, the great champions of brahmanical revival and opponents of Buddhism, was approaching. Tradition represents Dharmakīrti as having combated them in public disputations and having been victorious. But this is only an afterthought and a pious desire on the part of his followers. At the same time it is an indirect confession that these great brahmin teachers had met with no Dharmakīrti to oppose them. What might have been the deeper causes of the decline of Buddhism in India proper and its survival in the border lands, we never perhaps will sufficiently know, but historians are unanimous in telling us that Buddhism at the time of Dharmakīrti was not on the ascendancy, it was not flourishing in the same degree as at the time of the brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. The popular masses began to turn their face from that philosophic, critical and pessimistic religion, and reverted to the worship of the great brahmin gods. Buddhism was beginning its migration to the north where it found a new home in Tibet, Mongolia and other countries.

Dharmakīrti seems to have had a forboding of the ill fate of his religion in India. He was also grieved by the absence of pupils who could fully understand his system and to whom the continuation of his work could have been entrusted. Just as Dignāga had no famous pupil, but his continuator emerged a generation later, so was it that Dharmakīrti's real continuator emerged a generation later in the person of Dharmottara. His direct pupil Devendrabuddhi was a devoted and painstaking follower, but his mental gifts were inadequate to the task of fully grasping all the implications of Dignāga's and his own system of transcendental epistemology. Some verses of him in which he gives vent to his deepest feelings betray this pessimistic mentality.

The second introductory stanza of his great work is supposed to have been added later, as an answer to his critics. He there says, "Mankind are mostly addicted to platitudes, they don't go in for finesse. Not enough that they do not care at all for deep sayings, they are filled with hatred and with the filth of envy. Therefore neither do

I care to write for their benefit. However, my heart has found satisfaction in this (my work), because through it my love for profound and long meditation over (every) well spoken word has been gratified».

And in the last but one stanza of the same work he again says, «My work will find no one in this world who would be adequate easily to grasp its deep sayings. It will be absorbed by, and perish in, my own person, just as a river¹ (which is absorbed and lost) in the ocean. Those who are endowed with no inconsiderable force of reason, even they cannot fathom its depth! Those who are endowed with exceptional intrepidity of thought, even they cannot perceive its highest truth».²

Another stanza is found in anthologies and hypothetically ascribed to Dharmakīrti, because it is to the same effect. The poet compares his work with a beauty which can find no adequate bridegroom. «What was the creator thinking about when he created the bodily frame of this beauty! He has lavishly spent the beauty-stuff! He has not spared the labor! He has engendered a mental fire in the hearts of people who (theretofore) were living placidly! And she herself is also wretchedly unhappy, since she never will find a fiancé to match her!»

In his personal character Dharmakīrti is reported to have been very proud and self-reliant, full of contempt for ordinary mankind and sham scholarship³. Tārānātha tells us that when he finished his great work, he showed it to the pandits, but he met with no appreciation and no good will. He bitterly complained of their slow wits and their envy. His enemies, it is reported, then tied up the leaves of his work to the tail of a dog and let him run through the streets where the leaves became scattered. But Dharmakīrti said, «just as this dog runs through all streets, so will my work be spread in all the world».

¹ The Tib. translation points rather to the reading *garid* «a instead of *paya* «a».

² The *śleṣa* which Abhinavagupta finds in these words seems not to have been in the intention of the author. The commentators do not mention it. Cp. Dhvanyāloka comment, p. 217. According to Yamāri's interpretation the word *analpa-dhī-saṁtibhū* must be analyzed in *a-dhī-* and *alpa-dhī-saṁtibhū*. The meaning would be «How can its depth be fathomed by men who either have little or no understanding at all?» and thus would refer to the incapacity of Devendrabuddhi.

³ Cp. Ānandavardhana's words in Dhvanyāloka, p. 217. A verse in which Dharmakīrti boasts to have surpassed Candragomin in the knowledge of grammar and Śūra in poetry is reported by Tārānātha and is found engraved in Barabudur, cp. Krom, p. 756.

§ 10. THE WORKS OF DHARMAKĪRTI.

Dharmakīrti has written 7 logical works, the celebrated «Seven treatises» which have become the fundamental works (*mūla*) for the study of logic by the Buddhists in Tibet and have superseded the work of Dignāga, although they originally were devised as a detailed commentary on the latter. Among the seven works one, the *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, is the chief one, containing the body of the system; the remaining six are subsidiary, its «six feet».¹ The number seven is suggestive, because the *abhidharma* of the *Sarvāstivādins* also consisted of seven works, a principal one and its «six feet». Evidently Dharmakīrti thought that the study of logic and epistemology has to replace the ancient philosophy of early Buddhism. The *Pramāṇa-vārtika* consists of four chapters dealing with inference, validity of knowledge, sense-perception and syllogism respectively. It is written in mnemonic verse and contains about 2000 stanzas. The next work *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* is an abridgment of the first. It is written in stanzas and prose. More than the half of the stanzas are borrowed from the principal work. The *Nyāya-bindu* is a further abridgment of the same subject. Both last works are in three chapters devoted to sense-perception, inference and syllogism respectively. The remaining four works are devoted to special problems. *Hetubindu* is a short classification of logical reasons, *Sambandha-parīkṣā*—an examination of the problem of relations—a short tract in stanzas with the author's own comment, *Codanā-prakaraṇa*—a treatise on the art of carrying on disputations and *Santānāntara-siddhi*—a treatise on the reality of other minds, directed against Solipsism. With the exception of the *Nyāya-bindu* all other works are not yet recovered in their sanscrit original, but they are available in Tibetan translations, embodied in the Tanjur. The Tibetan collection contains some other works ascribed to Dharmakīrti, viz. a collection of verse, comments on Śūīa's *Jātakamālā* and on the *Vinaya-sūtra*, but whether they really belong to him is not sure.²

¹ According to another interpretation the three first works are the body, the remaining four the feet, cp. Buxton, History.

² He is also reported by Tārānātha to have written a work on tantric ritual and the tantrists of Java reckoned him as a teacher of their school. But probably this was only their belief sprung up from the desire to have a celebrated name among their own school. The work is found in the Tanjur.

§ 11. THE ORDER OF THE CHAPTERS IN PRAMĀNA-VĀRTIKA

Dharmakīrti had the time to write a commentary only upon the mnemonic stanzas of the first chapter of his great work, the chapter on inference. The task of writing comments upon the stanzas of the remaining three chapters he entrusted to his pupil Devendrabuddhi. However the latter could not acquit himself of the task to the full satisfaction of his teacher. Tārānātha reports that twice his attempts were condemned and only the third had met with a half-way approval. Dharmakīrti then said that all the implications of the text were not disclosed by Devendrabuddhi, but its *prima facie* meaning was rendered correctly¹

The order of the chapters in the Pramāna-vārtika makes a strange impression. Whereas the order in both the abridged treatises, in Pramāna-viniścaya and Nyāyabindu, is a natural one — perception comes first and is followed by inference and syllogism — an order moreover agreeing with Dignāga, who also begins by perception and inference, — the order in Pramāna-vārtika is an inverted one. It begins with inference, goes over to the validity of knowledge, then comes back to sense-perception which is followed by syllogism at the close. The natural order would have been to begin with the chapter upon the validity of knowledge and then to go over to perception, inference and syllogism. This is much more so because the whole chapter on the validity of knowledge is supposed to contain only a comment upon the initial stanza of Dignāga's work. This stanza contains a salutation to Buddha, who along with the usual titles is here given the title of "Embodied Logic" (*pramāna-bhūta*)². The whole of Mahāyānistic Buddhology, all the proofs of the existence of an absolute, Omniscient Being are discussed under that head.

We would naturally expect the work to begin with this chapter upon the validity of knowledge and the existence of an Omniscient Being, and then to turn to a discussion of perception, inference and syllogism, because this order is required by the subject-matter itself, and is observed in all other logical treatises throughout the whole of Buddhist and brahmanical logic. To begin with inference, to place the chapter on the validity of knowledge between inference and perception, to deal with sense-perception on the third place and to separate infe-

¹ Cp Tārānātha's History.

² *pramāna-bhūtāya jagad-dhātave*, etc cp Dutt, Nyāya-praveśa, Introd.

rence from syllogism by two other chapters, is against all habits of Indian philosophy and against the nature of the problems discussed.

This very strange circumstance did not fail to attract the attention of Indian and Tibetan logicians who commented upon the work of Dharmakīrti, and a great strife arose among them around this problem of the order of the chapters in *Pramāṇa-vārtika*. The arguments for changing the order into a natural one or for keeping to the traditional order have recently been examined by Mr A. Vostrikov. We take from his paper¹ the following details. The main argument for maintaining the traditional order is the fact that Devendrabuddhi, the immediate pupil of Dharmakīrti, supported it, and that Dharmakīrti had himself written a comment only on the chapter on inference. It is natural to assume that he began by writing the commentary on the first chapter, and was prevented by death to continue the work of commenting on the remaining chapters. A further notable fact is that the chapter on Buddhology, the religious part, is not only dropped in all the other treatises, but Dharmakīrti most emphatically and clearly expresses his opinion to the effect that the absolute omniscient Buddha is a metaphysical entity, something beyond time, space and experience, and that therefore, our logical knowledge being limited to experience, we can neither think nor speak out anything definite about him,² we can neither assert nor deny his existence. Since the chapter on Buddhology in the natural run must have been the earliest work of Dharmakīrti, begun at the time when he was studying under Īśvarasena, Mr A. Vostrikov admits a change in the later development of his ideas, a change, if not in his religious convictions, but in the methods adopted by him. Dharmakīrti then, at his riper age, abandoned the idea of commenting upon the first chapter, entrusted the chapter on perception to Devendrabuddhi and wrote the chapter on inference, as the most difficult one, himself.

§ 12. THE PHILOLOGICAL SCHOOL OF COMMENTATORS.

Be that as the case may be, Dharmakīrti's logical works became the starting point of an enormous amount of commenting literature. The works preserved in Tibetan translations may be divided in three groups, according to the leading principles by which the work

¹ His paper has been read in a meeting of the Institution for Buddhist Research at Leningrad and will soon appear in the press.

² Cp. the closing passage of *Santānāntarasiddhi*, and NB, III, 97.

of interpretation was guided Devendrabuddhi initiated the school which can be termed the school of direct meaning. It is, so to speak, a school of "philological" interpretation. It aimed at exactly rendering the direct meaning of the commented text without losing oneself in its deeper implications. To this school belonged, after Devendrabuddhi, his pupil and follower Śākyaabuddhi whose work is extant in Tibetan,¹ and probably also Prabhābuddhi whose work is lost. They all commented on Pramāna-vārtika, leaving Pramāna-viniścaya and Nyāya-bindu unnoticed. Commentaries on these latter works were written by Vinītadeva who followed in his works the same method of simplicity and literalism. Among the Tibetan authors Khai-dub, the pupil of Tsoñ-khapa, must be referred to this school as its continuator in Tibet.²

§ 13. THE CASHMERE OR PHILOSOPHIC SCHOOL OF COMMENTATORS

The next two schools of commentators are not content with establishing the direct meaning of Dharmakīrti's text, they strive to investigate its more profound philosophy. The second school can be termed the Cashmerian school, according to the country of its main activity, and the critical school, according to its main tendency in philosophy. According to that school the Buddha as a personification of Absolute Existence and Absolute knowledge, the Mahāyānist Buddha, is a metaphysical entity, and therefore uncognizable for us, neither in the way of an affirmation nor in the way of a denial.³ Pramāna-vārtika is nothing but a detailed comment on Dignāga's Pramāna-samuccaya which is a purely logical treatise. The initial salutatory verse of the latter mentions, it is true, the great qualities of the Mahāyānist Buddha and identifies him with pure Logic, but this is only a conventional expression of reverential feelings, it has no theoretical importance. The aim of the school is to disclose the deep philosophic contents of the system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, regarding it as a critical system of logic and epistemology. The school aims at development, improvement and perfectness of the system.

The founder of the school was Dharmottara, its seat Cashmere, its active members were often brahmins. Dharmottara is held in high

¹ Tanjur, Mdo, vol 97 and 98

² Khai-dub (Aikhas-grub) has written a detailed commentary on Pramāna-vārtika in two volumes (800 folios) and two minor independent works on logic

³ *deśa-lāla-sābhāva-vyagrasta*, cp NB, III 97

esteem by the Tibetans and reputed as being very acute. Although not a direct pupil of Dharmakīrti he was the sort of pupil the great master was wanting, for he not only accompanied his comments by weighty considerations of his own, but had also independent views and successful new formulations on important topics. Tārānātha does not contain his biography, probably because the field of his activity was Cashmere. He was not, however, a native of that country. He was invited to visit it by the king Jayāpīḍa when the latter saw in a dream that a «sun was rising in the West», as the Cashmerian chronicle reports. This must have happened round the year 800 A. D.¹ Dharmottara must have been by this time a celebrated man. Vācaspatiśiṣya living in the IXth century quotes him several times.²

He did not comment upon Pramāṇa-vārtika, the chief and first work of Dharmakīrti, but he wrote detailed commentaries on the Pramāṇa-viniścaya and Nyāya-bindu, the first being called his Great Comment, the second — his Small Comment.³ Whether he at all had the intention of commenting upon the Pramāṇa-vārtika is uncertain. The order of the chapters in this treatise is not discussed by him. He vehemently attacks Vinītadeva his predecessor in the work of commenting upon the Nyāya-bindu and a follower of the first school, the school of literal interpretation. Besides these two works Dharmottara composed four other minor works on special problems of logic and epistemology.⁴

The celebrated Cashmerian writer on the art of poetry, the brahmin Ānandavardhana composed a subcommentary (*vyūṭhi*) on Dharmottara's Pramāṇa-viniścaya-tīkā. This work has not yet been recovered.⁵

¹ Cp Rājataranginī, IV 498 — «He (the king) deemed it a favourable circumstance that the teacher Dharmottara had arrived in the land, because he then saw in a dream that a sun had arisen in the West (of India)». The translation of this stanza by sir A Stein must be corrected, since the fact that *ācārya dharmottara* is a proper name has escaped his attention. Allowing a correction of about 20 years in the traditional chronology of the Cashmere chronicle we will be about the year 800 A. D. for the time when Dharmottara came to live and teach in that country.

² Tātp, p. 109, 189.

³ Tanjur, Mdo, vol 109 and 110.

⁴ Pramāṇa-parikṣā, Apoha-prakarana, Paraloka-siddhi, Kṣanabhaṅga-siddhi, all in the Tanjur, Mdo, vol 112

⁵ It seems from the passage of Abhinavagupta's Commentary on Dhvanyāloka, p 283 (ed Kāvyaśālā) that Ānandavardhana had written a Pramāṇa-viniś-

Another subcommentary on the same work has been written by the Cashmerian brahmin Jñānaśrī.¹ Its Tibetan translation is preserved in the Tanjur collection. And finally the brahmin Śaṅkarānanda, surnamed the Great Brahmin, undertook to comment on Pramāṇa-vārtika in a comprehensive work (*ñāḥ*) conceived on a very large scale. Unfortunately he did not finish it. The extant part contains only the comment on the first chapter (in the traditional order) and even that is not quite finished. It nevertheless fills up, in its Tibetan translation, an enormous volume of the Tanjur.² The whole work would have filled no less than four volumes, just as the comprehensive work of Yamāri belonging to the third school of commentators.

Among the Tibetan authors Tsoñ-khapa's pupil Rgyal-tshab has some affinities with this school and can be reckoned as its Tibetan continuator. He has made logic his special study and has commented on almost all works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.³

§ 14. THE THIRD OR RELIGIOUS SCHOOL OF COMMENTATORS.

Just as the former one, this school stroved to disclose the profound meaning of Dharmakīrti's works and to reveal their concealed ultimate tendency. It also treated the representatives of the first school, the school of direct meaning, with great contempt. However, both schools

caya-tikā-vivṛti, a subcommentary on Dharmottara's comment on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-viniścaya, and that he sarcastically gave to his work the title of «Dharmottamā». That is the only way to understand the passage without much emendation, otherwise we must read dharmottarāyām, cp G. Bühler, Cashmer Report, p. 65 ff, H. Jacoby, p. 144 of the reprint of his translation of Dhvaṇyāloka, and my «Theory of Cognition of the later Buddhists» (Russian edition, St. Petersburg, p. XXXV n. 2).

¹ This author is usually quoted as Jñānaśrī, cp SDS p. 26 (Poona, 1924), Pariśuddhi, p. 718, but there are two authors which can thus be quoted, Jñānaśrībhadra and Jñānaśrimitra. Cp S. Vidyābhūṣana, History, p. 341 ff. Tārānātha, p. 108 mentions only Jñānaśrimitra who lived during the reign of Nyaṇapāla.

² Tanjur, Mdo, vol. Pe.

³ Great commentaries (*ñā-chen*) by him exist on Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Pramāṇa-vārtika, Pramāṇa-viniścaya, Nyāya-hindu and Sambandha-parikṣā, copies in the Mus. As. Petr. Upon the relation between the two pupils of Tsoñ-khapa, Khai-dub and Rgyal-tshab in their way of commenting upon Pramāṇa-vārtika, cp Loñ-dol (Kloñ-rdol) lama's Gtan-tshigs-rig-pai miñ-gi rnam-sgrāṇs, f. 2a (A. Vostrikov).

differed radically in the definition of what for them was the central part and the ultimate aim of the system. The aim of *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, according to this school, was not at all to comment upon Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, which work was a purely logical treatise, but to comment upon the whole of the Mahāyāna Scripture which establishes the existence, the omniscience and other properties of the Buddha, of his so called Cosmical Body,¹ in its twofold aspect of Absolute Existence² and Absolute Knowledge.³ All the critical and logical part of the system has for this school no other aim than to clear up the ground for a new and purified metaphysical doctrine. The central, most important part of all the works of Dharmakīrti is contained, according to this school, in the second chapter (in the traditional order), of *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, the chapter dealing with the validity of our knowledge and, on that occasion, with religious problems, which for the Buddhist are the problems of Buddhology.

The founder of the school was Prajñākara Gupta, apparently a native of Bengal. His life is not recounted by Tārānātha, but he mentions that he was a lay member of the Buddhist community and lived under king Mahāpāla (? Nayapāla), successor to king Mahipāla, of the Pal dynasty. This would bring his life into the XIth century A. D. However this can hardly be correct, because his work is quoted by Udayana-ācārya living in the Xth century.⁴ He may possibly have been a contemporary of the latter. He commented upon the 2—4 chapters of *Pramāṇa-vārtika* leaving alone the first chapter (in the traditional order) as commented by the author himself. The work fills up, in its Tibetan translation, two large volumes of the Tanjur, the comment on the second chapter fills alone a whole volume. The work is not given the usual title of a comment (*ṭīkā*), but is called an "ornament" (*alanlāra*), and the author is more known and quoted under the name of the "Master of the Ornament".⁵ By this title he wished to intimate that a real comment would require much more space and would also require from the students such extraordinary power of comprehension as is very seldom to be found. He therefore composes a short "ornamentation" in order to elicit the salient points of the doctrine

¹ *dharmakāya*

² *śābhaṇa-lāya* = *ño-bo-ñid-shu*.

³ *jñāna-lāya* = *ye-śes-shu*.

⁴ *Parīśuddhi*, p. 780

⁵ *rgyan-mkhan-po* = *alanlāra-upādhāya*

for the less gifted humanity. He vehemently assails Devendrabuddhi and his method of examining only the direct meaning. He calls him a fool.

The followers of Prajñākara Gupta can be divided in three sub-schools of which the exponents were Jina, Ravi Gupta and Yamāri respectively. Jina¹ is the most decided and spirited follower of Prajñākara Gupta and developer of his ideas. The genuine order of the chapters in Pīamānā-vārtika is, according to him, the following one. The first chapter deals with the validity of knowledge, including Buddhology. It is followed by an investigation of sense perception, of inference and of syllogism occupying the 2d, 3d and 4th chapters. This clear and natural order has been misunderstood and inverted by the simpleton Devendrabuddhi, who has been misled by the circumstance that Dharmakīrti himself had had the time to write only the comment upon the stanzas of the third chapter which he, for some reason or other, probably because it is the most difficult one, had chosen to comment himself in his old age, not feeling himself capable of accomplishing the whole task. Jina accuses Ravi Gupta of having misunderstood his master.

Ravi Gupta was the direct personal pupil of Prajñākara Gupta. The field of his activity, however, seems to have been Cashmere where he lived probably contemporaneously with Jñānaśūri². He is the exponent of a more moderate tendency than Jina. The genuine order of the chapters in Pīamāna-vārtika is, according to him, the one accepted by Devendrabuddhi. Although the latter, in his opinion, was not a very bright man, but nevertheless he was not the fool to confound the order of chapters in the chief work of his teacher. The aim of Dharmakīrti was, in his opinion, the establishment of a philosophical basis for the Mahāyāna as a religion, and only partially also to comment upon the logical system of Dignāga.

The exponent of the third branch of Prajñākara Gupta's school was Yamāri.³ He was the direct pupil of the Cashmerian

¹ Not mentioned by Tārānātha, his name in Tibetan *rgyal-ba-can* suggests a Sanskrit original like *jetavan*. Being later than Ravi Gupta, the pupil of Prajñākara Gupta, he must have lived the XIth century A. D.

² S. Vidyābhūṣana, History, p. 322, has confounded this Ravi Gupta with another author of that name who lived in the VIIth century, cp. Tārānātha, p. 118 and 130.

³ According to Tārānātha, p. 177 (text) he seems to have been a lay-man and a mystic (tantrist).

Jñānaśrī, but the field of his activity seems to have been Bengal. According to Tārānātha he lived contemporaneously with the great brahmin Śaṅkarānanda, the final exponent of the Cashmere school, under king Nayapāla of the Pal dynasty.¹ This would bring both these authors into the XIth century A. D. The conciliatory tendency of Ravi Gupta is still more prominent with Yamāri. His work is full of acute polemics against Jīna whom he accuses of having misunderstood the work of Prajñākara Gupta. Yamāri also thinks that Devendrabuddhi being the personal direct pupil of Dharmakīrti could not have confounded such a fundamental thing as the order of the chapters in the *Pramāṇa-vārtika*.

The work of Yamāri contains a commentary on all the three chapters of Prajñākara Gupta's work. It fills up four great volumes in the Tibetan Tanjur and was evidently conceived on the same comprehensive scale as the commentary of his contemporary, the last exponent of the Cashmerian school, the brahmin Śaṅkarānanda.

It makes a strange impression that all the authors of this third school of commentators were laymen and apparently followers of tantric rites.

This school, for ought we know, has had no special continuation in Tibet. According to a tradition current among the paṇḍits of Tibet, Prajñākara Gupta interpreted *Pramāṇa-vārtika* from the standpoint of the extreme Relativists, of the Mādhyamika-Prāsangika school. Candrakīrti, the great champion of that school, rejected Dignāga's reform altogether and preferred the realistic logic of the brahmanical school of Nyāya, but Prajñākara Gupta deemed it possible to accept the reform of Dignāga with the same proviso as Candrakīrti, viz, that the absolute cannot be cognized by logical methods altogether.

Such is also the position of Śāntirakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Although they studied the system of Dignāga and made a brilliant exposition of it, they were Mādhyamikas and religious men at heart. This clearly appears from their other writings. They belong to the mixt school of Mādhyamika-Yogācāras or Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas.

¹ The passage in Tārānātha's History, p. 188 text, which has been interpreted by Wassilieff, p. 239, as meaning that quotations from Śaṅkarānanda have found their way into the text of Dharmottara, and just in the same way by Schiefner (!), means «as to the fact that passages from Śaṅkarānanda are found in the text of the commentator Dharmottara, it is clear that this is a mistake, produced by the circumstance that these passages were inserted as marginal notes in the copy belonging to the translator Gsham-phan-bzan-po».

A position quite apart is occupied by the Tibetan school founded by Sa-skyā-pāṇḍita.¹ This author maintained that logic is an utterly profane science, containing nothing Buddhist at all, just as medicine or mathematics are. The celebrated historian Bu-ston Rin-poche shares in the same opinion. But the now predominant Gelugpa sect rejects these views and acknowledges in Dharmakīrti's logic a sure foundation of Buddhism as a religion.

The following table shows clearly the interconnection of the different schools of interpretation of the Pramāṇa-vārtika.

TABLE

SHOWING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SEVEN COMMENTARIES AND SUB-COMMENTARIES OF PRAMĀṆA-VĀRTIKA FIVE OF THEM DO NOT COMMENT UPON ITS FIRST CHAPTER.

1st school («philological» school)

Pramāṇa-vārtika

Chapters. I Svārthānumāna II Prāmāṇya-vāda III Pratyakṣa IV. Parārthānumāna

Comments Auto-commentary Commentary by Devendrabuddhi.

Commentary by Śākya-buddhi

To this school we must refer also Vinītadeva who has not commented upon Pramāṇa-vārtika, but upon other works of Dharmakīrti.

Among the Tibetan authors Khaī-ḍub (Mkhas-grub) belongs to this school.

2^d school (critical school of Cashmere)

Pramāṇa-vārtika

Chapters I Svārthānumāna II. Prāmāṇya III Pratyakṣa IV Parārthānumāna

Commentaries Auto-commentary

Sub-commentary by Paṇḍit
Śaṅkarānanda (unfinished)

Tibetan Commentary by Rgyal-tshab

To this school belongs Dharmottara, who has commented upon Pramāṇa-vimścaya and Nyāya-bhūṭi, and Jñānaśrī (bhāḍra) who has commented upon the first of these works. They have not commented upon Pramāṇa-vārtika.

¹ Kun-dgaḥ-rgyal-mtshan, the fifth of the grand lamas of Sa-skyā (= pāṇḍu-bhūmi) monastery

3d school (religious school of Bengal)

Pramāṇa-vāitika

Chapters I. Svārthānumāṇā II Prāmāṇya III Pratyakṣa. IV. Parārthānumāṇa

Commentaries Auto-commentary.

Pramāṇa-vāitika-alankāra
by Prajñākara Gupta

Sub-commentary
by Ravi Gupta

Sub-commentary
by Jina.

Sub-commentary by Yamāli,
the pupil of Jñānaśrī

The school, as far as known, had no continuation in Tibet.

NB. The arrowed lines indicate against whom the attacks are directed

§ 15. POST-BUDDHIST LOGIC AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN REALISM AND NOMINALISM IN INDIA.

The high tide of the Buddhist sway in Indian philosophy lasted, as already mentioned, for about three centuries and constituted an intermezzo after which philosophy continued its historical life in India in the absence of any Buddhist opposition. Although the retired Buddhists were living close by, on the other side of the Himālaya, and Buddhist influence engendered in this new home a great literary activity, nevertheless the intercourse between the two countries was scarce and the atmosphere for mutual understanding unpropitious. India remains the Holy Land for the Tibetans, but only bygone India, the Buddhist India. The new, non-Buddhist India is quite a stranger to Tibetans and they seem to know nothing of what is going on there.

But although victors in the battle with Buddhism, the brahmanical schools of philosophy emerged from the struggle in a considerably changed condition and some of them suffered so much that their survival was very short lived. The Materialists seem to have disappeared as a separate school simultaneously with Buddhism. The Mīmāṃsakas after having been reformed by Prabhākara disappeared together with the old sacrificial religion. The Sāṅkhyas, after a reform which brought them

in the pale of Vedānta, ceased to exist as a separate school. Two schools only survived finally, although in a shape considerably modified by Buddhist influence, Vedānta as a monistic system and as the foundation of many popular religions, and the amalgamated Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a school of ultra-realistic logic. This corresponds to the conditions prevailing in Tibet and Mongolia. We find there reigning the monistic system of the Mūḍhyamīkas which is also the foundation of the popular religion and, on the other hand, Dharmakīrti's system of logic.

During its long life the school of Nyāya always defended the same principle of consequent realism. But its adversaries came from different quarters. Having begun as a naive realism and a formal logic it soon was obliged to cross arms with Sāṅkhya and Buddhism. From the VIth to the Xth century it fought with the school of Buddhist logicians who were nominalists and the most decided opponents of realism.

As indicated above, two independent schools were in India the champions of a most radical Realism. For them not only Universals, but all relations were real things, or real "meanings",¹ having objective reality and validity. They were the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school on the one hand and the Mīmāṃsaka school on the other. Their opponents were the Sāṅkhya system and the Hīnayāna Buddhists at the beginning, the Mahāyāna Buddhists and Vedānta in the sequel. These schools assailed Realism and vindicated a kind of Nominalism which denied the objective reality of the Universals and of the category of Inherence. The effect of the nominalistic critique was not the same in both these schools. The Realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school made no concessions at all to the assailing Buddhists. On the contrary it hardened its realistic position and did not yield a bit to Buddhist influence. Driven by the powerful logic of their opponents these realists retreated into the remotest recesses of consequent realism, into its quite absurd, but logically unavoidable, consequences. They thus with perfect *bona fides* reduced realism *ad absurdum*. They demonstrated practically that whosoever resolves to remain a realist to the end, must unavoidably people the universe with such a wealth of objective realities that life in such a realistic home must become quite uncomfortable. Time, Space, the Cosmical Ether, the Supreme Soul, all individual

¹ *padārtha*

Souls, all Universals, the category of Inherence are ubiquitous external realities. The category of Non-existence, all motions, all relations and qualities, the primary ones, like magnitude etc., and the secondary ones, like the sensible qualities of objects, nay even the relations of relations — all are external realities *per se*, apart from the substances in which they inhere. The more these theories were assailed by the Buddhists, the more obstinately were they defended by the Naiyāyiks. If relations are objective realities *per se*, why should Inherence also not be a reality? If it is a reality, why should it not be a unique and ubiquitous force,¹ everywhere ready at hand to achieve the trick of uniting substances with qualities? This process of stiffening of the realistic point of view did set in as soon as the war with the first Buddhist logicians began.²

During this period the Nyāya school produced two remarkable men, the authors of a commentary and a sub-commentary on the fundamental aphorisms of Gotama Akṣapāda. The first of them, Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin, possibly a contemporary of Dignāga, does not materially deviate from the traditional interpretation of the aphorisms. He simply lays down in a concise comment the interpretations which were current and orally transmitted in the school from the time of its reputed founder.³ This comment was it chiefly which furnished Dignāga the material for his attacks on realism. The second prominent writer of that period, a possible elder contemporary of Dharmakīrti, was the Bhāradvāja brahmin Uddyotakara. In his sub-commentary he defends Vātsyāyana and vehemently attacks Dignāga. This is a writer imbued with a strong fighting temper and most voluble style. He does not mind at all to distort the opinion of his adversary and to answer him by some bluffing sophistry. His aim was not to introduce any changes in the system, but he is responsible for some traits

¹ Op. Praśastapāda on *samarāya*

² There is one point however, in which the Naiyāyiks went through a development offering some analogy with the Buddhist evolution. They forsook, just as the Buddhists, their former ideal of a lifeless, materialistic Nirvāna, and replaced it, not by a pantheistic one, like the Buddhists, but by a theistic eternity. This Nirvāna consists in an eternal and silent contemplative devotion to the Almighty, *īśvara-pranidhāna*, a condition analogous to the one so eloquently described by some European mystics, as, e.g., M. de Tillemont, one of the M. de Port Royal.

³ Dr. W. Ruben in his work «Die Nyāya-sūtras» has however made an attempt to find out material differences between the philosophies of Gotama and Vātsyāyana, cp my review of this book in OLZ, 1929, № 11.

of super-realism¹ to which he resorted in polemical aidour and which after him remained in the system

To the same period must be referred the Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastāpāda. He probably must have been an elder contemporary of Dignāga. In his ontology he remains thoroughly realistic, but his logic is strongly influenced by Buddhists.²

In the IXth century the school of Naiyāyiks produced in the person of Vācaspati-miśra a man who is perhaps the most distinguished among the scholarly philosophers of brahmanic India. His knowledge is overwhelming, his information always first-hand, his exposition, even of the most difficult and abstruse theories, very lucid, his impartiality exemplary. He is not a creator of new philosophic theories. But he is an historian of philosophy imbued with a true scientific spirit. One of his first works the Nyāya-kanikā and his latest and ripest great work Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tikā are almost entirely devoted to the exposition and refutation of Buddhist theories.³

His commentator and follower Udayana-Ācārya is also mainly occupied in several works with the refutation of Buddhism.

These two authors close at the end of the Xth century A.D. the ancient period of the Nyāya school, the period of its struggle with Buddhism.

The creator of the new school of Nyāya logic, in that shape in which it emerged from the struggle with Buddhism, was Gaṅgeśa-upādhyāya. His great work the Tattva-cintāmaṇi is analytical in its arrangement, following the example of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The old loose order of the aphorisms of Gotama is abandoned. The instructions in the art of debate are dropped. The main subject is logic. The adversary instead of the disappeared Buddhists is here very often Prabhākara and his followers.

The second school which professed realism and supported it by a realistic logic, the school of the Mīmāṃsakas, did not make proof of the same adamant fidelity to realistic principles as the first. Under the influence of the Buddhist attacks it became split into two schools, one of which made very important concessions to the Buddhist point

¹ E.g. the theory of a contact (*samikarsa*) between an absent thing and the sense organ — *abhāva indriyena grhyate*

² Cp. my Erkenntnistheorie der Buddhisten, Appendix II (München, 1924)

³ Cp. on him Garbe, Der Mondschein, introd., and my article in Prof. H. Jacoby's Festschrift

of view. These concessions did not go all the length of admitting the ideality, or nominality, of the Universals and denying the category of Inherence, but on a series of very important points they held back from the ultra-realism of the Naiyāyiks. The founder of the school was Prabhākara, a pupil of the celebrated Mīmāṃsaka teacher and antagonist of Buddhism Kumārila-bhaṭṭa.

The chief work of Kumārila, the *Śloka-vārtika*, is an enormous composition of about 3500 stanzas entirely filled with a polemic against Buddhism. The information to be gathered from this work about the teachings of Buddhist logicians is, however, scanty and very often unclear. The author is an ardent controversialist and cares much more for brilliant repartees and witty retorts, than for impartial quotation of his enemy's opinions. His commentator Pārthasārathi-miśra very often fills up the gaps. He is also the author of an independent treatise, *Śāstra-dīpikā*, devoted mainly to the refutation of Buddhism¹.

Prabhākara¹ is a real bastard son of Buddhism. Although a pupil of Kumārila and belonging to the same school, he revolted against the super-realism of his master and deviated from him in the direction of more natural views. According to Kumārila, time, space, the cosmic aether, motion and non-existence were perceived by the senses. Prabhākara denied this. The perception of non-existence,² according to him, was simply the perception of an empty place. In this point he fell in line with the Buddhists. He also agreed with them in the most important problem of illusion as due to a non-perception of difference.³ He admitted introspection⁴ as an essential character of all consciousness. He admitted the fundamental unity of subject, object and the act of cognition⁵ and many others details in which he opposed his master, agreed with Buddhists, and thus was led to found a new branch of the realistic school of Mīmāṃsaka theologians. The logicians of the Nyāya school sided with the old Mīmāṃsakas and combated the followers of Prabhākara. The next centuries witnessed the decline and extinction of both the schools of Mīmāṃsakas. But a new and powerful adversary to realism arose in the shape

¹ On Prabhākara cp. his *Pañcapadārtha* (Chowkhamba), Pārthasārathi-miśra's *Śāstradīpikā* *passim*, the article of G. Jha in *Indian Thought*, and my article in Prof. H. Jacobi's *Festschrift*.

² *anupalabdhi*.

³ *bheda-agraha* = *alīkhyā*.

⁴ *sva-samīdana*.

⁵ *tri-puṭī* = *pramāṇa-pramāṇa-prameya*.

of reformed Vedānta with all its ramifications. One of the most typical aggressors against realism from this side is the celebrated Śrīharṣa. In his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya* he openly confesses that in his fight against realism he is at one with the Mādhyamika Buddhists, a circumstance which Śaṅkara-ācārya carefully tried to dissimulate. Śrīharṣa maintains that «the essence of what the Mādhyamikas and other (Mahāvānists) maintain it is impossible to reject».¹

After the disparition of Buddhism the schools were suspiciously accusing one another of having yielded to Buddhist influences. The Vedāntins accused the Vaiśeṣikas of being Buddhists in disguise,² because that school admitted the momentary character of some entities, like motion, sound, thought etc. In their turn the Vaiśeṣikas accused the Vedāntins of denying, like the Buddhists, the ultimate reality of the external world. Prabhākara was generally accused of being a «friend of Buddhists»³ etc. etc.

When the followers of Gaṅgeśa-upādhyāya migrated from Durbhanga to Bengal and established their home in Nuddea, the fighting spirit of olden times seems to have given way to a more placid attitude. The new school concentrated all their attention on the problems of syllogism and was chiefly engaged in finding new and exceedingly subtle definitions of every detail of the syllogistic process. Logic in India rebecame what it essentially was at the start, a system of formal logic.

Thus the history of logic in India represents a development of more than 2000 years with a brilliant Buddhist intermezzo of more than 300 years and with a continual war against all sort of adversaries.

§ 16. BUDDHIST LOGIC IN CHINA AND JAPAN.

Pre-buddhistic ancient China possessed an original, very primitive teaching regarding some logical problems⁴ but it apparently did not enjoy great popularity, and is in no way connected with the Buddhist logic introduced at a later date by Buddhist missionaries and pilgrims.

¹ Cp. above p. 22 n. 2.

² *pracchanna-bauddha*

³ *bauddha-baddhū*

⁴ Cp. Hu-chih. The development of the logical method in ancient China. Shanghai, 1922. and M. H. Maspero's article in *Toung-Pao*, 1927. Notes sur la logique de Mo-tsen et son école.

This new logic was imported from India twice, the first time in the Vth century A. D. by the Indian missionary Paramārtha, the second time by the Chinese pilgrim Hsuen Tsang in the VIIth century. Paramārtha imported and translated three works ascribed to Vasubandhu, viz Ju-shih-lun (=tarka-śāstra), Fan-chih-lun (=pariṣechā-śāstra?) and To-fu-lun (=nīgraha-sthāna-śāstra).¹ They were entered into the Tripiṭaka collection as three separate items.² The collection contained at that time three further fasciculi of commentary upon these works, compiled by the same Paramārtha. The entries in later catalogues of the Tripiṭaka suggest that these three works in three fasciculi gradually dwindled away into one work in one fasciculus, and the commentaries became lost altogether. But this single fasciculus, although bearing the title of Ju-shih-lun (tarka-śāstra), contains mere fragments, most probably from all the three works.

We moreover can gather from the Chinese commentaries upon the translations of Nyāya-mukha and Nyāya-praveśa compiled by the pupils of Hsuen Tsang that they knew three logical works of Vasubandhu, named Lun-kwei (=Vāda-vidhi),³ Lun-shih (=Vāda-vidhāna) and Lun-hsin (=Vāda-hṛdaya). Some fragments of these works have apparently been preserved in the fasciculus which at present is entered in the catalogue of the Tripiṭaka under the title of Ju-shih-lun (=Tarka-śāstra).

To the same period must be referred the translations of the logical parts of Asanga's works.⁴

This first importation of logic had apparently no consequences. It did not produce any indigenous logical literature, neither in the shape of commentaries, nor in the shape of original works.⁵ The fact that it gradually dwindled away into one single fasciculus, and that this single fasciculus which is preserved up to the present day consists of mere fragments, clearly shows that the work has been neglected.

The second introduction of logic into China and from that country into Japan is due to Hsuen Tsang.⁶ On his return from India he brought with him and translated two logical works, the one is the

¹ Cp Boris Vassiliev, op. cit

² Cp the Chung-chung-mu-lu catalogue, *Bunin Nanjo* № 1808 and Li-tai-san-pao-chi, ibid., № 1504.

³ But not Vāda-vidhāna as assumed by Tucci

⁴ Cp G Tucci, JBAS, July 1929, p 452 ff

⁵ Cp however ibid, p 453.

⁶ Cp S Sugiura, Indian logic as preserved in China, Philadelphia, 1900.

Nyāya-mukha (=Nyāya-dvāra) by Dignāga, the other the Nyāya-praveśa by Śāṅkara-svāmin¹ Both these works are very short tracts containing summaries of the formal part of the logic of Dignāga with unimportant changes and additions by his pupil Śāṅkarasvāmin. The philosophic and epistemological part, as well as all controversies with non-Buddhist systems, are ignored in them. They bear the character of short manuals for beginners from which every difficult problem has been carefully eliminated. Pramāṇa-samuccaya, the fundamental work of Dignāga, as well as the seven treatises of Dharma-kīrti, and the enormous literature of commentaries with their division in schools and subschools is quite unknown in China and Japan² What may have been the reasons which induced Hsuen Tsang, who is believed to have studied the logical system of Dignāga in India under the guidance of the most celebrated teachers of his time, to choose for translation only two nearly identical, short manuals, it is difficult for us at present to decide. The most plausible explanation would be that he himself was much more interested in the religious side of Buddhism and felt only a moderate interest in logical and epistemological enquiries.

However, this second introduction of Buddhist logic in China did not remain without consequences. A considerable growth of commentaries and sub-commentaries on the manual of Śāṅkara-svāmin has been produced. Among the disciples of Hsuen Tsang there was one, named Kwei-chi, who took up logic as his special branch of study. With Dignāga's manual on the one hand and the notes from Hsuen Tsang's lectures on the other he wrote six volumes of commentary on Śāṅkarasvāmin's Nyāya-praveśa. This is the standard Chinese work on logic. It has since come to be known as the "Great Commentary".³

From China Buddhist logic has been imported into Japan in the VIIth century A. D. by a Japanese monk Dōshōh. He was attracted by the fame of Hsuen Tsang as a teacher. He travelled to China and studied there logic under the personal guidance of the great master. On his return he founded in his country a school of logicians which afterwards received the name of the South Hall.

¹ On the authorship of these works cf. the article of Prof. M. Tsubiansky in the Bulletin de l'Acad. Sciences de l'URSS, 1926, pp. 975-982, and Tucci, op. cit.

² Cf. however J. Tucci, JBAS, 1928, p. 10. B. Vassiliev thinks that the Chinese knew about Pramāṇa-samuccaya only from hearsay.

³ Cf. Sugrura, p. 89. On Hsuen-Tsang's school of logic cf. also the information collected by B. Vassiliev, op. cit.

In the next century a monk named Gemboh brought from China the Great Commentary and other logical works. He became the founder of a new school of Japanese logicians which received the name of the North Hall.¹

Of all this literature, which seems to be considerable, nothing as yet is known in Europe as regards the details of its contents and its intrinsic value

§ 17. BUDDHIST LOGIC IN TIBET AND MONGOLIA.

The fate of Buddhist logic in Tibet and Mongolia has been quite different. The earliest stratum, the three works of Vasubandhu, are not known in these countries, apart from a few quotations. They evidently have either never been translated or were superseded by the subsequent literature. But the chief works of Dignāga, the great commentary on *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* by Jñendrabuddhi, the Seven Treatises of Dharmakīrti, all the seven great commentaries on *Pramāṇa-vārtaka*, the works of Dharmottara and many other Buddhist logicians, all this literature has been preserved in trustworthy Tibetan translations. The intercourse between Buddhist India and Buddhist Tibet must have been very lively after the visit of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla to the land of snow. Every remarkable work of an Indian Buddhist was immediately translated into Tibetan. When Buddhism in India proper had become extinct, an indigenous independent production of works on logic by Tibetan monks gradually developed and continued the Indian tradition. The original Tibetan literature on logic begins in the XIIth century A. D. just at the time when Buddhism becomes extinct in northern India. Its history can be divided into two periods, the old one, up to the time of Tsoṅ-khapa (1357—1419), and the new one, after Tsoṅ-khapa.

The first author to compose an independent work on logic is Chaba-choikyī-senge² (1109—1169). He is the creator of a special Tibetan logical style on which some remarks will be made in the sequel. He composed a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* and an independent work on logic in mnemonic verse with his own explanations. His pupil Tsañ-nagpa-tson-ḍuī-senge has likewise written another commentary on the *Pramāṇa-viniścaya*. The classical

¹ Ibid., p. 40.

² *Phy va-pa- chos-kyi-señ-ge*, also written *Cha-pa* ...

³ *Gtsañ-nag-pa-brtson-hgrus-señ-ge*

Tibetan work of this period has been produced by the 5-th grand lama of the Sa-skya territory, the celebrated Sa-skya-pandita Kunga-gyal-mtshan (1182—1251). It is a short treatise in mnemonic verse with the author's own commentary. Its title is *Tshadma-rigspai-gter* (*pramāṇa-nyāya-nidhi*). His pupil *Uyugpa-rigspai-senge* composed a detailed commentary on the whole of *Pramāṇa-vārtika*. This work is held in very high esteem by the Tibetans.

The last writer of this period was *Reñdapa-Zhonnulodol*¹ (1349—1412). He was the teacher of *Tsoñ-khapa* and the author of an independent work on the general tendency of *Dignāga's* system.

The literature of the new period can be divided in systematical works and school-manuals. *Tsoñ-khapa* himself has written only a short «Introduction into the study of the seven treatises of *Dharmakīrti*». His three celebrated pupils, *Rgyal-tshab* (1364—1432), *Khai-dub* (1385—1438) and *Gendun-dub* (1391—1474), composed commentaries almost on every work of *Dignāga* and *Dharmakīrti*. The literary production in this field has never stopped and is going on up to the present time. The quantity of works printed in all the monastic printing offices of Tibet and Mongolia is enormous.

The manuals for the study of logic in the monastic schools have been composed by Tibetan Grand Lamas mostly for the different schools founded by them in different monasteries. There is a set of manuals following the ancient tradition of the Sa-skya-pandita monastery. In the monasteries belonging to the new sect founded by *Tsoñkhapa* there are not less than 10 different schools, each with their own set of manuals and their own learned traditions. The monastery of *Taśiy-lhuñpo*² has alone three different schools³ with manuals composed by different grand lamas of that monastery. The monastery of *Se-ra*⁴ has two,⁵ *Brai-puñ*⁶—two,⁷ and *Galdan*⁸—three.⁹ The schools of all other monasteries follow either the one or the other tradition.

¹ *Ren-mdah-pa-gzhon-nu-blo-gros*

² *Bkai-śus-lhuñ-po*, founded in 1447, in Central Tibet

³ *Thos-bstan-ghñ grva-tshañ*, *Dkyil-khañ grva-tshañ*, and *Šar-rtse grva-tshañ*

⁴ *Se-ra*, in Central Tibet, founded in 1419

⁵ *Se-ra-byas grva-tshañ* and *Se-ra-smad-thos-bstan-nor-bu-ghñ grva-tshañ*

⁶ *Hbras-spuñs*, founded in 1416

⁷ *Blo-gsal-ghñ grva-tshañ* and *Sgo-mañ grva-tshañ*

⁸ *Dgah-ldan*, founded by *Tsoñ-khapa* in 1409

⁹ *Byañ-rtse grva-tshañ*, *Šar-rtse grva-tshañ* and *Mñah-ris grva-tshañ*, the last school was founded in 1842 by the second Dalai-Lama

and introduce the corresponding manuals. All Mongolia follows the tradition of the Goman¹ school of the Brai-puñ monastery, a school founded by the celebrated grand lama Jam-yañ-zhad-pa² (1648—1722). This extraordinary man, the author of a whole library of works on every department of Buddhist learning, was a native of Amdo in Eastern Tibet, but he studied in the Losaliñ school of the Brai-puñ monastery in Central Tibet. He dissented with his teachers, and retired to his native country, where he founded a new monastery, Labrang³ in Amdo. It became celebrated as a seat of profound learning and as the spiritual metropolis of all Mongolia. It is interesting to note that Jam-yañ-zhadpa was exactly the contemporary of Leibniz.⁴

The course of logic in monastic schools lasts for about four years. During this time the 2000 odds mnemonic verses of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārtika* are learned by heart. They are the fundamental work (*mūla*) studied in this class and also the only work of direct Indian origin. The explanations are studied according to the manuals of one of the 10 Tibetan schools. The Indian commentaries, even the commentary of Dharmakīrti himself on the first book of his work, are ignored, they have been entirely superseded by Tibetan works.

The extraordinary predominance given in Tibet to one work of Dharmakīrti, his *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, is noteworthy. It is alone studied by everybody. His other works, as well as the works of Dignāga, Dharmottara and other celebrated authors, are given much less attention and are even half forgotten by the majority of the learned lamas. The reason for that, according to Mr. Vostrikov, is the second chapter, in the traditional order of the chapters of *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, the chapter containing the vindication of Buddhism as a religion. The interest of the Tibetans in logic is, indeed, chiefly religious; logic is for them *ancilla religionis*. Dharmakīrti's logic is an excellent weapon for a critical and dialectical destruction of all beliefs unwarranted by experience, but the second chapter of the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* leaves a loop-hole for the establishment of a critically purified belief in the existence of an Absolute and Omniscient Being. All other works of Dharmakīrti, as well as the works of Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmottara incline

¹ Sgo-mañ.

² Hjam-dbyañ-bzhad-pa Nāg-dbañ-brtson-gus

³ Bla-brañ

⁴ The amazing intellectual activity of both these great men evoked the idea of their omniscience, Jam-yañ's title is «the omniscient (kun-mkhyen) lama», Leibniz is «der All-und Ganzwissende» (E. Du Bois-Reymond)

to a critically agnostic view in regard of an Omniscient Being identified with Buddha.

Substantially logic has hardly made any great progress in Tibet. Dharmakīrti had given it its final form. His position in Tibet can be compared with the position of Aristotle in European logic. The Tibetan logical literature will then correspond to the European mediaeval scholastic literature. Its chief preoccupation consisted in an extreme precision and scholastic subtlety of all definitions and in reducing every scientific thought to the three terms of a regular syllogism. The form of the propositions in which the syllogism can be expressed is irrelevant, important are only the three terms.

The concatenation of thoughts in a discourse consists in supporting every syllogism by a further syllogism. The reason of the first syllogism becomes then the major term of the second one and so on, until the first principles are reached. The concatenation then receives the following form. if there is S there is P, because there is M, this is really so (i. e. there is really M), because there is N, this again is really so because there is O, and so on. Every one of these reasons can be rejected by the opponent either as wrong or as uncertain. A special literary style has been created for the brief formulation of such a chain of reasoning, it is called the method of "sequence and reason"¹ and its establishment is ascribed to the lama Chaba-choiky-senge.

Thus it is that after the extinction of Buddhism in India three different seats remained in the East where logic was cultivated, 1) Nuddea in Bengal where the brahmanical Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system continued to be cultivated in that form in which it survived to the struggle with Buddhism, 2) China and Japan where a system founded on Sankara-svāmī's Nyāya-praveśa was studied and 3) the monasteries of Tibet and Mongolia where the study of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇa-vārtika became the foundation of all scholarship.

Of these three seats the Tibetan is by far the most important. It has faithfully preserved the best achievements of Indian philosophy in the golden age of Indian civilisation.²

The analysis of this system based on Indian and Tibetan sources, as far as our limited knowledge of them at present goes, will constitute the main subject of this own work.

¹ *thal-phyer*. An article on this method is prepared by A. Vostrikov.

² For a more detailed review of the Tibetan literature on Logic, cf. B. Baradzin, The monastic schools of Tibet (a paper read at a meeting of our Institution).

PART I

REALITY AND KNOWLEDGE.

(prāmānya-vāda).

§ 1. SCOPE AND AIM OF BUDDHIST LOGIC.

"All successful human action is (necessarily) preceded by right knowledge, therefore we are going to investigate it."¹ By these words Dharmakīrti defines the scope and the aim² of the science to which his work is devoted. Human aims are either positive or negative,³ either something desirable or something undesirable. Purposive action⁴ consists in attaining the desirable and avoiding the undesirable. Right cognition⁵ is successful cognition, that is to say, it is cognition followed by a resolve or judgment⁶ which is, in its turn, followed by a successful action.⁷ Cognition which leads astray, which deceives the sentient beings in their expectations and desires, is error or wrong cognition.⁸ Error and doubt⁹ are the opposite of right knowledge. Doubt is again of a double kind. It either is complete doubt which is no knowledge at all, because it includes no resolve and no judgment. Such doubt is not followed by any purposive action. But when it contains an expectation of some success¹⁰ or an apprehension of some failure,¹¹ it then is followed by a judgment and an action, just as right knowledge is. The farmer is not sure of a good harvest,

¹ NB, transl p 1

² *abhidheya-prayojane*

³ *heya-upādeya*

⁴ *pravṛtti* = *artha-līṅgā*

⁵ *samyag-jñāna* = *pramāṇa*

⁶ *adhyavasāya* = *niścaya*

⁷ *puruṣārtha-siddhi*

⁸ *mithyā-jñāna*

⁹ *samśaya-viparyayāu*

¹⁰ *artha-samśaya*.

¹¹ *anartha-samśaya*

but he expects it, and takes action.¹ His wife is not sure that she will not be visited by mendicant friars and obliged to give them the food which was intended for others, but she expects that perhaps none will come, and sets her pots on the hearth.²

As it runs the definition of *Dharmakīrti* is not very far from the one accepted in modern psychology. Psychology is defined as the science of mental phenomena, and mental phenomena are those which are characterized by "pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment."³ The scope of this Indian science is but limited to an investigation of cognitive mental phenomena, of truth and error, and to human knowledge. The emotional elements of the mind are not investigated in this science. From the very definition of the phenomenon of knowledge it follows that there always is some, albeit very subtle, emotion in every cognition, either some desire or some aversion.⁴ This fact has a considerable importance in the Buddhist theory of cognition, since the essence of what is called an *Ego* is supposed to consist of just that emotional part. But a detailed consideration of all emotions and of their moral value constitutes the subject matter of other Buddhist sciences⁵ and is not treated in the context of an investigation of truth and error.

As has been stated in the Introduction, Buddhist Logic appeared as a reaction against a system of wholesale skepticism which condemned all human knowledge in general as involved in hopeless contradictions. The fundamental question with which it is concerned is, therefore, the reliability of our knowledge, that is to say, of that mental phenomenon which precedes all successful purposive action. It investigates the sources of our knowledge, sensations, reflexes, conceptions, judgments,

¹ TSP, p. 35

² *Ibid.*, cp. SDS, p. 4

³ W. James, *Psychology*, I 8 (1890)

⁴ This definition of right knowledge, which makes knowledge dependent upon the desire or aversion of man, provoked objections from the realists. They pointed to the fact that there is, e. g., a right cognition of the moon and of the stars which are not dependent upon the will of the observer, they cannot be included neither in the desirable nor in the undesirable class of objects, they are simply unattainable. This objection is answered by the Buddhist in stating that the unattainable class must be included in the undesirable one, since there are only two classes of objects, the one which is desirable and the one which there is no reason to desire, whether it be injurious or merely unattainable. Cp. Tātp, p. 157 ff.

⁵ A full classification of mental phenomena including all emotions is part of the *abhidharma*, cp. CC, p. 100 ff.

inferences and contains also a detailed doctrine of the syllogism and of logical fallacies. It then hits upon the problem of the reality of the cognized objects and the efficacy of conceptual thought. A series of questions arises. What is reality, what is thought? How are they related? What is bare reality¹ and what is mere thought?² What is causal efficacy?³

The subliminal part of consciousness is not a subject to be investigated. Buddhist logic professes to investigate only discursive thought, those cognitions which are the ascertainable source of the following purposive actions. It leaves out of account instinct and animal thought, the latter because it is always more or less instinctive and the purposive act follows upon the incoming stimulus directly, quasi automatically,⁴ the existence of the intermediate members of the causal chain is unascertainable. The new born child and the animals are endowed with sensation and instinct⁵ which is but prenatal synthesis,⁶ but they do not possess full discursive inference.⁷ Dharmottara delivers himself on this subject in the following way:⁸ "Right knowledge is twofold, it either is (instinctive), as reflected in the right way of action (directly), or (discursive), directing our attention towards a possible object of successful action. Of these two only the last variety, that knowledge which stimulates purposive action, will be here examined. It always precedes purposive action, but does not directly appear (in the shape of such an action). When we acquire right knowledge we must remember what we have seen before. Memory stimulates will. Will produces action, and action reaches the aim. Therefore it is not a direct cause (viz, a cause without any intermediate chain of causation). In cases where purposive action appears directly and aims are attained straight off (knowledge is instinctive and) it is not susceptible of analysis".

Thus it is our discursive thought that is analysed in Buddhist logic. This subject is divided in three main parts devoted respectively

¹ *sattā-mūlā*

² *lalpanā-mūlā*

³ *artha-īhiyā-samartha*

⁴ *avicāratah = āpātatah*

⁵ *rāsanā = bhāsanā*.

⁶ *prāg-bhaviyā bhāvanā = avicārita-anusandhāna*. Cp. upon instinct in animals and men NK., p. 232

⁷ *pramāṇa = pramāṇa-bhūṭā bhāsanā*.

⁸ NBT., transl. p. 9—10

analysis, logic has a firm stand upon a foundation of efficient reality, a reality however which is very different from the one in which naive realism believes.

§ 3. COGNITION AND RECOGNITION.

There is another characteristic of a right means of knowledge besides the characteristic of uncontradicted experience. Cognition is a new cognition,¹ cognition of the object not yet cognized. It is the first moment of cognition, the moment of the first awareness, the first flash of knowledge, when the light of cognition is just kindled². Enduring cognition is recognition,³ it is nothing but repeated cognition in the moments following the first flash of awareness. It certainly exists, but it is not a separate source of knowledge. «Why is that?» asks Dignāga,⁴ and answers «because there would be no limit». That is to say, if every cognition is regarded as a source of right knowledge there will be no end of such sources of knowledge. Memory, love, hatred etc. are intent upon objects already cognized, they are not regarded as sources of knowledge. The cognitive element of our mind is limited to that moment when we get first aware of the object's presence. It is followed by the synthetical operation of the intellect which constructs the form, or the image, of the object. But this construction is produced by productive imagination,⁵ it is not a source of cognition. It is recognition, not cognition.⁶

The Mīmāṃsakas have the same definition of what a source of knowledge is, viz, a source of knowledge is a cognition of the object not yet cognized,⁷ but they admit enduring objects and enduring cognition. In every subsequent moment the object as well as its cognition are characterized by a new time, but substantially they are the same, they endure. The Naiyāyiks define a source of right knowledge as «the predominant among all causes producing cognition»,⁸

¹ *anādhiyata-artha-adhigantṛ* = *prathamam avasamāddi* = *gear-du mi-slu-ba*

² NBT, p. 8 11, *yenava jñānena prathamam adhigato 'rthah tad anādhiyata-viśayaṃ pramāṇam*

³ *pratyabhijñā*, cp NBT, p. 4 10—12 — *adhigata-viśayaṃ apramāṇam .. anādhiyata-viśayaṃ pramāṇam*

⁴ *Pr. samucc.*, I 8

⁵ *kalpanā* = *vikalpa*

⁶ *savikalpakam apramāṇam*

⁷ *anādhiyata-artha-adhigantṛ pramāṇam*

⁸ *sādhakatamam jñānasya kāraṇam pramāṇam*

such causes being sense-perception, inference etc. These definitions presuppose enduring, stable causes, enduring cognition and concrete universals, static objects endowed with their general and special characteristics which are apprehended by a mixed cognition through the senses with a great admixture of mnemonic elements.¹ The Buddhist theory admits only objects as moments, as strings of events, and makes a sharp distinction between the senses and the intellect as two different instruments of cognition. The senses apprehend, the intellect constructs. Thus the first moment is always a moment of sensation, it has the capacity of kindling the action of the intellect which produces a synthesis of moments according to its own laws.² There is no concrete universal corresponding adequately to this synthesis in the external world. If an object is perceived, the first moment of awareness is followed by a vivid image.³ If it is inferred through its mark, the latter produces also a first moment of awareness which is followed by a vivid image of the mark and the vague⁴ image of the object invariably associated with it. But in both cases it is just the first moment of awareness which constitutes the source of right knowledge, the source of uncontradicted experience.

It is unthinkable that an object should produce a stimulus by its past or by its future moments of existence.⁵ Its present moment only produces a stimulus. Therefore cognition *quâ* new cognition, not recognition, is only one moment and this moment is the real source of knowledge, or the source of knowledge reaching the ultimate reality of the object.⁶

§ 4. THE TEST OF TRUTH.

Since experience is the only test of truth, the question naturally arises whether the causes which produce knowledge also produce at the same time its reliability, or is knowledge produced one way and its reliability established by a subsequent operation of the mind?

This problem has been first faced by the Mimāṃsakas wishing to establish the absolute authority of the Scripture. Four solutions have

¹ *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*

² TS, p. 390 — *avikalpakaṃ apy jñānam vilakṣyotpatti-śaktimat*

³ *apṛatībhā*

⁴ *asphuta*

⁵ NK., p. 260 4, *na santāno nāma laśeṇā eka utpādalak samasti.*

⁶ The Naiyāyika and the Mimāṃsaka. of course, reject this theory — *latham pūrtam eṣa pramāṇam nottarāṇy api*, op. Tātp, p. 16. 6.

been given¹ and have for a long time remained a point at issue between different schools of Indian philosophy. According to the *Mīmāṃsakas* all knowledge is intrinsically right knowledge, it is reliable by itself *quā* knowledge², since it is knowledge, not error. It can be erroneous only in the way of an exception, in two cases, either when it is counterbalanced by another and stronger cognition³ or when its origin is proved to be deficient,⁴ as for instance when a daltonist perceives wrong colours. The principle is laid down that knowledge is right by itself, its deficiency can be only established by a subsequent operation of the mind.⁵ *Kaṃalaśīla* says,⁶ «in order to establish the authority of Scripture the *Jaiminīyas* maintain that all our sources of knowledge in general are right by themselves, and that error is produced from a foreign cause».

The opposite view is entertained by the Buddhists. According to them knowledge is not reliable by itself. It is intrinsically unreliable and erroneous. It becomes reliable only when tested by a subsequent operation of the mind. The test of right knowledge is its efficacy. Right knowledge is efficient knowledge. Through consistent experience truth becomes established. Therefore the rule is laid down that the reliability of knowledge is produced by an additional cause, since experience by itself it is unreliable.⁷

The *Naiyāyikas* maintain that knowledge by itself is neither wrong nor right. It can become the one or the other by a subsequent operation of the mind. Experience is the test of truth and it is also the test of error.⁸ Thus the rule is laid down that truth as well as error are not produced by those causes which call forth cognition, but by other, foreign causes, or by subsequent experience.⁹

Finally the *Jainas*, in accordance with their general idea of indeterminism and of the dialectical essence of every entity,¹⁰ maintain

¹ Cp. ŚD, p. 74 ff.

² *prāmāṇyam svataḥ*

³ *būdhaka-jñāna*, e. g., when a piece of nacre mistaken for silver is subsequently cognized as nacre.

⁴ *kāraṇa-dosa*

⁵ *prāmāṇyam svataḥ, aprāmāṇyam parataḥ*

⁶ TSP, p. 745 l.

⁷ *aprāmāṇyam svataḥ, prāmāṇyam parataḥ*. This of course refers only to *anabhyāsa-dāśā-āpanna-pratyakṣa*, not to *anumāna* which is *svataḥ pramāṇa*, cp. Tātp, p. 9.4 ff.

⁸ *dosa 'pramāṇyā janakāḥ, pramāṇyā tu guṇo bhavet*

⁹ *ubhayam parataḥ*

¹⁰ *sapta-bhaṅgi-matam* = *syād-vāda*.

that every knowledge is by itself, without needing any test by a subsequent experience, both wrong and right.¹ It is always to a certain extent wrong and to a certain extent right.

The Buddhists insist that if an idea has arisen it is not at all enough for maintaining that it is true and that it agrees with reality.² There is as yet no necessary connection³ between them and a discrepancy⁴ is possible. At this stage⁵ cognition is absolutely unreliable. But later on, when its origin has been examined,⁶ when it has been found to agree with experience,⁷ when its efficacy has been ascertained,⁸ only then can we maintain that it represents truth and we can repudiate all objections to its being correct. As regards verbal testimony it must be tested by the reliability of the person who has pronounced the words.⁹ Such a reliable person does not exist for the Veda, because its origin is supposed to be impersonal and eternal.¹⁰ But since we meet in Scripture with such statements as, e. g., "the trees are sitting in sacrificial session" or "hear ye! o stones", such sentences as only could have been pronounced by lunatics, it is clear that their origin is due to persons quite unreliable and it is clear that Scripture, when tested by experience, has no authority at all.¹¹

§ 5. REALISTIC AND BUDDHISTIC VIEW OF EXPERIENCE.

But although experience is the main source of our knowledge according to the Buddhists, and in this point they fall in line with the realistic schools, nevertheless the discrepancy between them in the way of understanding experience is very great. According to the Indian realists, Mimāṃsakas, Vaiśeṣikas and Nāyāyikas, the act of knowledge is something different from its content. The act of cognition, according to these schools, must be connected, as every other act indeed is,

¹ *ubhayam svataḥ*

² ŚD., p. 76.

³ *anvayāt*

⁴ *vyabhicārāt.*

⁵ *tasyām velāyām*, ibid

⁶ *lāraṇa-guṇa-jñānāt*

⁷ *saṃvāda-jñānāt*

⁸ *artha-līyā-jñānāt.*

⁹ *āpta-praṇītatam guṇaḥ*

¹⁰ *apauruṣeya*

¹¹ ŚD., p. 77

with an agent, an object, an instrument and a mode of procedure.¹ When a tree is cut down in the forest by a wood-cutter, he is the agent, the tree is the object, the instrument is the axe, its lifting and sinking is the procedure. The result consists in the fact that the tree is cut down. When a patch of colour is cognized by somebody, his Soul or Ego is the agent, the colour is the object, the sense of vision is the instrument and its mode of procedure consists in a ray of light travelling from the eye to the object, seizing its form and coming back in order to deliver the impression to the Soul. The sense of vision is the predominant² among all these factors, it determines the character of the cognition, it is called the source of perceptive knowledge. The result for the realist is right cognition. But the Buddhists, keeping to their general idea of causation as functional interdependence,³ repudiate the whole of this construction erected on the foundation of an analogy between an action and cognition. For them it is mere imagery. There are the senses, and there are *sensibilia* or sense-data, and there are images, there is a functional interdependence between them. There is no Ego and no instrumentality of the senses, no grasping of the object, no fetching of its form and no delivering of it to the Soul. There are sensations and there are conceptions and there is a coordination⁴, a kind of harmony, between them. We may, if we like, surmise that the conception is the source⁵ of our knowledge of the particular object falling under its compass. But it is also the result coming from that source. The same fact is the source and the result⁶. It is in any case the most efficient factor⁷ determining the character of our cognition, but it is not an instrument realistically understood. Coordination of the object with its image and the image itself are not two different things, they are the same thing differently viewed. We may imagine this fact of coordination as a kind of source of our cognition, but we may also admit it as a kind of result.⁸ There

¹ This theory is found or alluded to almost in every logical treatise. It is clearly exposed and contrasted with the Buddhist view by Udayana-Ācārya in the extract from *Parīśuddhi*, translated in vol II, Appendix IV.

² *sādhakatama-kāraṇam* = *pramāṇam*

³ *pratītya-samutpāda*

⁴ *sārupya*, cp vol II, Appendix IV

⁵ *pramāṇam*

⁶ *tad eva (pramāṇam)*. . *pramāṇa-phalam*, cp NB, I 18.

⁷ *prakṛta-upakṛta*, cp Tipp, p 42. 8.

⁸ Cp. the remarks in NBT., I 20—21 and vol II, Appendix IV.

is only an imputed difference between a source of knowledge and its content when they are regarded from this point of view. In reality this kind of an instrument of knowledge and this kind of its result are one and the same thing.

We will revert to this interesting theory once more when considering the problem of the reality of the external world. It suffices at present to point out the difference between the realistic view of experience as real interaction and the Buddhistic one which only assumes functional interdependence.

§ 6. TWO REALITIES.

Non less remarkable than the definition of knowledge is the definition of Existence or Reality—both terms are convertible and mean ultimate reality—in the school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Existence, real existence, ultimate existence is nothing but efficiency.¹ Whatsoever is causally efficient is real. The non-efficient is unreal, it is a fiction. Physical causation is first of all meant by efficiency. Existence, reality, being and thing are its names. They are all the opposite of fiction. Whether pure fiction or productive imagination, every vestige of thought construction is fiction, it is not ultimate reality.

A fire which burns and cooks is a real fire.² Its presence is physically efficient and it calls up a vivid image, an image whose degree of vividness changes in a direct ratio to the nearness or remoteness of the physical fire.³ Even reduced to the shape of a remote point-instant of light, it produces a vivid image as long as it is real, i. e., present and amenable to the sense of vision. A fire which is absent, which is imagined, which neither really burns nor cooks nor sheds any light, is an unreal fire.⁴ It produces a vague, abstract, general image. Even if intensely imagined, it will lack the immediate vividness of a real, present fire. The degree of vagueness will change in an inverse ratio to the force of imagination, and not in a direct ratio to its nearness or remoteness. Only the present, the «here», the «now», the «this» are real. Everything past is unreal, everything future is unreal, everything imagined, absent, mental, notional, general, every Universal, whether

¹ NB, I. 15, *artha-kṛiyā-sūmarthyā-lakṣaṇam vastu paramārtha-sat.*

² *agni-svalakṣaṇa*

³ NB, I. 18.

⁴ NBT., p. 14 6

a concrete Universal or an abstract one, is unreal. All arrangements and all relations, if considered apart from the terms related, are unreal. Ultimately real is only the present moment of physical efficiency.

Beside this ultimate or direct reality there is, however, another one, an induct one, a reality, so to say, of a second degree, a borrowed reality. When an image is objectivized and identified with some point of external reality it receives an imputed reality. From this special point of view the objects can be distinguished in real and unreal substances, real and unreal attributes.¹ An example of a real substance is, e. g., a cow, of an unreal substance is, e. g., for the Buddhist, God, Soul and Matter as well, i. e., the primordial undifferentiated Matter of the Sāṅkhyas. An example of a real attribute is, e. g., blue, of an unreal attribute, e. g., unchanging and eternal, since for the Buddhist there is nothing unchanging and eternal. The fictions of our mind which do not possess even this indirect reality are absolutely unreal, they are mere meaningless words, as, e. g., the flower in the sky, *fata morgana* in the desert, the horns on the head of a hare, the son of a barren woman etc.

These objects are pure imagination, mere words, there is not the slightest bit of objective reality behind them. Directly opposed to them is pure reality in which there is not the slightest bit of imaginative construction. Between these two we have a half imagined world, a world although consisting of constructed images, but established on a firm foundation of objective reality. It is the phenomenal world. Thus there are two kinds of imagination, the one pure, the other mixed with reality, and two kinds of reality, the one pure and the other mixed with imagination. The one reality consists of bare point-instants,² they have as yet no definite position in time, neither a definite position in space, nor have they any sensible qualities. It is ultimate or pure reality.³ The other reality consists of objectivized images, this reality has been endowed by us with a position in time, a position in space and with all the variety of sensible and abstract qualities. It is phenomenal or empirical reality.⁴

These are the two kinds of reality of the Buddhist logician, an ultimate or absolute reality reflected in a pure sensation, and a conditioned or empirical one, reflected in an objectivized image

¹ Tātp, 338 13, cp transl, vol I, App. V

² *lāṣaṇa* = *svakāleśana*

³ *paramārtha-sat*

⁴ *saṃvytti-sat*

Wherever there is an indirect connection with reality,¹ we have an uncontradicted experience,² albeit this experience is, from the standpoint of ultimate reality, an illusion.³ Even a correct inference is, from this point of view, an illusion,⁴ although it be correct. It is true indirectly, not directly.

§ 7. THE DOUBLE CHARACTER OF A SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE.

In accordance with the just mentioned double character of reality, the direct, ultimate or transcendental one and the indirect or empirical one, a source of knowledge has likewise the same double character. A source of knowledge is either direct or indirect, it either means a source of cognizing ultimate reality or it is a source of cognizing conditioned reality. The direct one is sensation, the indirect one is conception. The first is a passive reflex,⁵ the second is a conditioned reflex.⁶ The last is strictly speaking a non-reflex, because it is a spontaneous construction or conception, it is not passive, but by way of compromise we may call it a circumscribed reflex.⁷ The first grasps the object,⁸ the second imagines⁹ the same object. It must be carefully noted that there is no real "grasping" in a realistic or anthropomorphic sense in the Buddhist view of cognition, but according to the general idea of causation as functional interdependence there is only such dependence of sensation upon its object. The term to "grasp" is used only in order to differentiate the first moment of cognition from the subsequent construction of the image of the thing grasped. A single moment is something unique, something containing no similarity¹⁰ with whatsoever other objects. It is therefore unrepresentable and unutterable. Ultimate reality is unutterable.¹¹ A representation and a name always correspond to a synthetic unity embracing a variety

¹ TSP, p. 274 24 — *pārampariyena vastu-pratibondhaḥ*

² *arth-samvāda*, *ibid.* (not *asamvāda*')

³ *bhṛāntatāpe*, *ibid.*

⁴ NBT, p. 812 — *bhṛāntam anumānam*

⁵ *pratibhāsa*.

⁶ *kalpanā*.

⁷ *nyāta-pratibhāsaḥ* = *nyāta buddhiḥ* cp. Tātp, p. 12 27 = Tib *bcad-śes* = *parockhinam jñānam*, the term has a different meaning in NBT, p. 8 8 ff.

⁸ *grāhṇāt*.

⁹ *vikalpayati*

¹⁰ *svam asādhāraṇam tattvam*, cp. NBT, p. 12 14

¹¹ *anabhilāpya*.

of time, place and quality, this unity is a constructed unity, and that operation of the mind by which it is constructed is not a passive reflex.¹

Dharmottara speaking of the double character of reality alludes at the same time to the double character of a source of knowledge. He says,² «The object of cognition is indeed double, the *prima facie* apprehended and the definitively realized. The first is that aspect of reality which appears directly in the first moment. The second is the form of it, which is constructed in a distinct apperception. The directly perceived and the distinctly conceived are indeed two different things. What is immediately apprehended in sensation is only one moment. What is distinctly conceived is always a chain of moments cognized in a construction on the basis of some sensation»

Every Indian system of philosophy has its own theory on the number of the different sources of our knowledge, on their function and characteristics. The Materialists, as already mentioned, admit no other source than sense-perception. The intellect for them is not different in principle from sensibility, because it is nothing but a product of matter, a physiological process. All other systems admit at least two different sources, sense-perception and inference. The Vaiśeṣikas remain by these two. The Sāṅkhya school adds verbal testimony, including revelation. The Naiyāyikas moreover distinguish from inference a special kind of reasoning by analogy³ and the Mīmāṃsakas distinguish implication⁴ and negation as separate methods of cognition. The followers of Cāraṇa increase the number up to eleven different sources; among them «probability»⁵ appears as an independent source of knowledge.

The Buddhists from the time of Dignāga⁶ fall in line with the Vaiśeṣikas, they admit only two different sources of knowledge, which they call perception and inference. Verbal testimony and reasoning by analogy is for them included in inference. Implication is but a different statement of the same fact.⁷ However, although the number of two

¹ Tātp., p. 338 15.

² NBT., p. 12 16 ff.

³ *upamāna*

⁴ *arthāpatti*

⁵ *sambhava*, it is interpreted as a kind of knowledge by implication

⁶ Guṇamati, Tanjur Mdo, v. 60, f. 79^a 8, suggests that Vasubandhu accepted *āgama* as a third *pramāṇa*, cp. also AKB ad II 46 (transl. v. I, p. 226)

⁷ NBT., p. 48 12

different sources of knowledge is the same in both systems, the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika, their definition and characteristics are different by all the distance which separates naive realism from a critical theory of cognition. In the course of our exposition we shall have several times the occasion to revert to this feature which is one of the foundation stones upon which the whole system of Dignāga is built, but we may mention already now that the difference lying between the two sources of cognition is, in the Buddhist system, a radical one, a real one, and it is moreover what we shall call in the sequel, a transcendental one. What is cognized by the senses is never subject to cognition by inference, and what is cognized by inference can never be subject to cognition by the senses. When a fire is present in the ken and cognized by the sense of vision, for the realist it is a case of sense-perception. When the same fire is beyond the ken and its existence cognized only indirectly, because some smoke is being perceived, fire is cognized by inference. For the Buddhist there is in both cases a part cognized by the senses and a part cognized by inference. The latter term is in this case a synonym of intellect, of a non-sensuous source of knowledge. Cognition is either sensuous or non-sensuous, either direct or indirect. In every cognition there is a sensible core and an image constructed by the intellect, one part is sensible, the other is intelligible. The thing itself is cognized by the senses, its relations and characteristics are constructed by imagination which is a function of the intellect. The senses cognize only the bare thing, the thing itself, exclusive of all its relations and general characteristics. The Buddhists will not deny that we cognize a present fire by perception and an absent one by inference, but apart from this obvious and empirical difference between the two main sources of our knowledge there is another, real, ultimately real or transcendental, difference. This difference makes it that every one of the two sources has its own object, its own function and its own result. The Buddhist view receives the name of an "unmixed" or "settled"¹ theory, a theory assuming such sources of knowledge which have settled and clear limits, the one never acting in the sphere of the other. The opposite theory of the realists receives the name of a "mixture,"² or "duplication" theory, since according to that theory every object can be cognized in both ways, either directly in sense-perception or

¹ *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*, cp N. Vārt., p. 55, Tātp., p. 12.15 ff; cp vol. II, App. II.

² *pramāṇa-saṃplava*, *ibid.*

indirectly in an inference. It is true that from the empirical point of view it is just the Buddhist theory which would deserve to be called a "mixture" theory, since the two sources are not found in life in their pure, unmixed condition. In order to separate them, we must go beyond actual experience, beyond all observable conscious and subconscious operations of the intellect, and assume a transcendental difference, a difference which, although unobserved by us directly, is urged upon us necessarily by uncontradicted ultimate reality. In that sense it is a theory of "settled" limits between both sources of knowledge. The whole of our exposition of Dignāga's philosophy can be regarded as a mere development of this fundamental principle. Not wishing to anticipate the details of this theory we at present confine it to this simple indication.

The doctrine that there are two and only two sources of knowledge thus means that there are two radically distinct sources of cognition, the one which is a reflex of ultimate reality and the other which is a capacity of constructing the images in which this reality appears in the phenomenal world. But it has also another meaning, a meaning which takes no consideration of ultimate reality. From the phenomenal point of view there are two sources or methods of cognition, perception and inference. In perception the image of the object is cognized directly, i. e., vividly.¹ In inference it is cognized indirectly, i. e., vaguely² or abstractly, through its mark. If a fire present in the ken is cognized directly, it is perception. If its presence is inferred through the perception of its product, the smoke, it is cognized indirectly, by inference. In both cases there is a sensuous core and a constructed image, but in the first case the function of direct cognition is predominant, the image is vivid, in the second the intelligible function is predominant, the image is vague and abstract.³

From this empirical point of view the two sources of cognition are considered in that part of Buddhist logic which deals with formal logic.

§ 8. THE LIMITS OF COGNITION. DOGMATISM AND CRITICISM

It is clear from what has been already stated, and it will be proved by the whole of our subsequent analysis, that Buddhist philosophy had a decidedly critical, anti-dogmatic tendency. Philosophy started

¹ *viśadābhā*

² *asphuṭa*

³ NBT, p. 16, 12 ff.

We find in Dharmottara's work the following very characteristic statement.¹ «When an inference, says he, and the logical construction, on which it is founded, are dogmatically believed,² the foundation of the argument is dogma». Such arguments «are not naturally evolved out of (an unprejudiced consideration of real facts, but) they are produced under the influence of illusive (dialectical) ideas. . .»³ «There are subjects which are the proper place for such arguments, viz, metaphysical⁴ (super-sensuous) problems, problems unaccessible neither to direct observation nor to correct ratiocination, as, for instance, the problem of the reality of the Universals. When the investigation of these problems is tackled, dogmatical argumentation flourishes. . .» «It often happens that promoters of scientific⁵ doctrines, being mistaken as to the real nature of things, ascribe to them features that are contradictory. . .» «But when the argument is founded on the properly observed real nature of real things,⁶ when either a case of necessary succession or of necessary coexistence or of the absence (of an ascertainable object) is thus established, there is no room for contradiction». «Facts are established as logical reasons not by any (arbitrary) arrangement, but by their real nature. Therefore when the facts of coexistence, succession or absence are established as the real condition of real things, there can be no contradiction. An established fact is an ultimately real fact. Properly established is a fact which is established without trespassing (into the domain of fancy). Such facts are not founded on imagination, but they stand as stands reality itself». An example of such a dogmatic assertion is the theory of the objective reality of Universals.

Kamalaśīla⁷ delivers himself to the same effect in the following remarkable passage «Buddha himself was pleased to make the following statement „O Brethren! he exclaimed, never do accept my words

¹ NBT., p. 81, 19 ff (text), transl p. 223 ff

² *āgama-siddha*

³ *avastu-darśana*

⁴ *afindriya*

⁵ *śāstralāra*, *śāstra* is here = *āgama* The term *āgama* can have the meaning of revelation, it then = *āmnāyā* = *śruti* = *dharma* = *sūtra*, or it can mean dogmatic science, as, e. g., the system of the Vaiśeṣikas Its opposite in both cases will be *pramāṇa* In TSP., p. 4 ff it means Buddhist revelation

⁶ This fundamental principle of criticism is expressed with special suggestivity in alliterative language — *yathā-avasthita-vastu-sthiti*.

⁷ In his *Nyāya-bīndu-pūrva-pakṣa-saṅkṣipt* Tanjur Mdo, vol. 112, the passage quoted begins fol. 114^a 8 of the Peking edition, op. TSP., p. 12 19

from sheer reverential feelings! Let learned scholars test them (as goldsmiths are doing by all the three methods) of fire, of breaking (the golden object into pieces) and of the touching stone".¹ In these words the Buddha has declared that there are only two (ultimate sources) of our knowledge, they constitute the essential principles of sense-perception and inference (i. e., sensibility and understanding). This he has intimated by the character of the examples chosen to illustrate (the methods of testing his own words). Sense-perception is suggested by the example of fire with which it is similar (by being a direct proof). Inference is suggested by the example of the touching stone with which it is similar (by being an indirect proof). The ultimate test is the absence of contradiction. This has been suggested (by the example of the jeweller whose ultimate test requires) the breaking up (of the golden object into pieces). This (last method), however, is (not an ultimately different third source of knowledge, it is nothing but a kind of) inference (114. b. 4). In accordance (with these three sources of knowledge) the objects cognized are also of three different kinds, viz, the present, the absent and the transcendental.² Thus when an object spoken of by Buddha is present, it must be tested by direct perception, just as the purity of gold is tested by fire. If the object is hidden (but its mark is present), it must be tested by a (sound) inference, just as the purity of gold when tested by the touching stone. But if the object is transcendental, it must be tested by the absence of contradiction, just as a jewel (when fire and touching stone are not appropriate) must be broken (in order to establish the purity of its gold). Thus even in those cases when we have a perfectly reliable sacred (Buddhist) text dealing with a transcendental subject of discourse, we will proceed (not by believing in the text), but by believing (in reason as the only) source of theoretical knowledge".³

The examples of objects transcendental are, first of all, Moral Duty and Final Deliverance, the laws of karma and of nirvāṇa. These objects are not experimentally known, but they are not contradictory, therefore Buddha's revelation of them can be accepted.

Morality and Final Deliverance, indeed, cannot be founded on experience. The law of karma as the mainspring regulating the world process

¹ According to the Tibetans the passage is from the *Ghāṇa-sūtra*, but we could not trace it.

² = *pratyakṣa*, *parokṣa* and *atyanta-parokṣa* (= *mānasa* *ūlog-pa* and *śmṛti-ūlog-pa*)

³ = *savikalpaka-pramāṇa-bhāve śraddhādhānāḥ pravartante*.

and the law of nirvāṇa as the ultimate aim of that process are assertions which regard the sum total of existence, but they are not dialectical, not contradictory, not «unascertainable as to place, time and quality», they are non-empirical, transcendental reality which a critical theory of cognition must nevertheless assume

Besides, although all our knowledge is limited to the domain of possible experience, we must distinguish between this empirical knowledge itself and the *a priori* conditions of its possibility. The sharp distinction between sensibility and understanding as the two unique sources of knowledge leads directly to the assumption of pure sensibility, of pure object and of pure reason (or understanding).¹ These are things that are not given in experience, but they are not contradictory, they are even necessary as the *a priori* conditions of the whole of our knowledge, without which it would collapse. We must therefore distinguish between the metaphysical and transcendental objects. The first are objects «unascertainable neither in regard of the place where they are situated, nor in regard of the time when they exist, nor in regard of the sensible properties which they possess». The second are, on the contrary, ascertainable as to their presence in every bit of our knowledge, since they are the necessary condition of the possibility of empirical knowledge in general, but they by themselves cannot be represented in a sensuous image, they are, as Dharmottara² says, «unattainable by (knowledge)». Thus it is that metaphysical or transcendental things are constructed concepts, but they are illusions, dialectical and contradictory. Transcendental, or *a priori* things, as e.g., the ultimate particular, the ultimate thing as it is in itself, are not only real,³ but they are reality itself,⁴ although not given in a concept, since by its very essence it is a non-concept. More will be said on this subject at several places in the course of the progress of our investigation

¹ *Śuddham pratyaśam, śuddha-arthaḥ, śuddhā kalpanā*

² NBT, p. 12-19 — *prāpyatūṃ aśakyatē*

³ *śānasya = paramārtha-sataḥ, ibid*

⁴ *śāntānīnaḥ = śānāḥ = eva-lakṣaṇāḥ vastu-bhūtāḥ, ibid, p. 68. 2*

PART II.
THE SENSIBLE WORLD.

CHAPTER I
THE THEORY OF INSTANTANEOUS BEING
(KSANIKĀ-VĀDA).

§ 1. THE PROBLEM STATED.

In the preceding chapter the importance has been pointed out which the Buddhists attach to their fundamental principle that there are two, and only two sources of knowledge, the senses and the understanding, and to the fact that they are utterly heterogeneous, so as to be the one the negation of the other. We thus have a sensuous and non-sensuous, or a non-intelligible and an intelligible source of knowledge.

In the opening words of his great treatise Dignāga makes the statement that in strict conformity with this double source of knowledge the external world is also double, it is either the particular or the general; the particular is the object corresponding to sensuous cognition, the general, or universal, is the object corresponding to the understanding or the reason. We thus have a double world, in India just as in Europe, a sensible one and an intelligible one, a *mundus sensibilis* and a *mundus intelligibilis*, a κόσμος αἰσθητός and a κόσμος νοητός. We will now proceed to examine the Buddhist ideas of the one and of the other.

The sensible world consists of *sensibilia* which are but momentary flashes of energy. The perdurable, eternal, pervasive Matter which is imagined as their support or substratum is a fiction of the Sāṅkhyas and other schools. All things without exception are nothing but strings of momentary events. «This their character of being instantaneous, of being

split in discrete moments, says Kamalaśīla,¹ pervades everything By proving thus our fundamental thesis alone, we could have repudiated at one single stroke² the God (of the theists), the eternal Matter (of the Sāṅkhyas) and all the wealth of (metaphysical) entities imagined by our opponents. To examine them one by one, and to compose elaborate refutations at great length was a perfectly useless trouble, since the same could have been done quite easily.³ Indeed, no one of our opponents will admit that these entities are instantaneous, that they disappear as soon as they appear, that their essence is to disappear without leaving any trace behind⁴ We, indeed, are perfectly aware that by proving the instantaneous character of Being in general, these (metaphysical) entities would have been *co ipso* repudiated We, therefore, will proceed to expatiate upon the arguments in proof of this theory in order (once more) to repudiate those entities which have already been examined, viz God, Matter (Nature, the Soul as it is established in different schools), up to the (half-permanent) «personality» of the Vātsīputriya-Buddhists, and in order also to support the repudiation of those (enduring) entities which will be examined in the sequel, viz the Universals, Substance, Quality, Motion, Inherence, up to the (instantaneous) elements existing in «the three times» (as they are admitted by the Sarvāstivāda-Buddhists),⁵ the (eternal) Matter as admitted by the Materialists,⁶ the eternal Scriptures as admitted by the brahmins⁷ Thus (no vestige of an enduring entity will be left) and the theory of Instantaneous Being will be clearly established A critical examination of the (supposed) stability of existence contains therefore the final outcome of all Buddhist philosophy» Such is the leading idea of Buddhism—there is no other ultimate reality than separate, instantaneous bits of existence. Not only eternal entities, be it God or be it Matter, are denied reality, because they are assumed to be enduring and eternal, but even the simple stability of empirical objects is something constructed by our imagination. Ultimate reality is instantaneous

¹ Cp. TSP, p. 131 17 ff (condensed)

² *eka-prahārena eva*

³ *śraṭpa-upāyena*

⁴ *nirānaya-nirodha-dharmakā*

⁵ *trīṣṭāla-anuyāyino bhāvānaya (dharma-svabhāvānaya)*, cp. GO, p. 42.

⁶ Lat. «the four great elements of the Cārvākas»

⁷ Lit. «the eternal sounds of the Scriptures of the Jaiminiyas»

§ 2. REALITY IS KINETIC.

«It is natural, says the same Kamalaśīla,¹ on the part of a normal human being² who is engaged in the pursuit of his daily aims to enquire about the existence or non-existence of everything³ (he wants).. Not to do it would be abnormal.⁴ Therefore, anything a man avails himself of, whether directly or indirectly, in whatsoever a place, at whatsoever a time, is called by him real.⁵ Now, we (Buddhists) prove that such (real) things, viz things that are objects of some purposive actions,⁶ are instantaneous, (they have a momentary duration) There is no exception to the rule that the capacity of being the object of a purposive action is the essential feature establishing reality. It is a feature conterminous with existence.⁷ But a thing cannot be the object of a purposive action and cannot be efficient otherwise than by its last moment. Its former moments cannot overlap the moment of efficiency in order to produce the effect, still less can its future moments produce the preceding effect. «We maintain, says the same author,⁸ that an object can produce something only when it has reached the last moment of its existence (which is also its unique real moment), its other moments are non efficient». When a seed is turned into a sprout, this is done by the last moment of the seed, not by those moments when it lay placidly in the granary.⁹ One might object that all the preceding moments of the seed are the indirect¹⁰ causes of the sprout. But this is impossible, because if the seed would not change every moment, its nature would be to endure and never to change. If it is said that the moment of the sprout is produced by a «totality» of causes and

¹ TSP, p. 151. 19 ff.

² *preṣaṇ*.

³ *arthatya* (= *vastu-mātrasya*) *astitha-anastithena vicārah*.

⁴ *unmatāḥ syāt*

⁵ *yad eṣa padārtha-jātam . tatraiva vastu-vyavasthā*, note the contrast between *padārtha* and *vastu*; among *padārthas* those alone are *vastu* which are efficient. The realists distinguish *svarūpa-sattā* from *sattā-sāmānya*, the Buddhists deny this distinction, cp. SDS, p. 26.

⁶ *arthā-kriyā-kāri-rūpa*.

⁷ *sādhya* (= *sattayā*) *vyūpti-siddhī*.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 140 19.

⁹ *īśulādi-stho na janayati*, *ibid*.

¹⁰ *na mulhyataḥ*, *ibid*, p. 140.22; the preceding moments are called *upasarpaṇa-pratyaya*, cp. NK, p. 126 8, 135 8 etc

conditions,¹ the same applies to every moment, since every moment has its own totality of causes and conditions owing to which it exists. «This our moment (i. e., the moment which we consider to be real) is the moment when an action (i. e., the run of uniform moments) is finished».² But an action, in this sense, is never finished, every moment is necessarily followed by a next moment. The break in that motion which constitutes the essence of reality is nothing but the appearance of an outstanding or dissimilar moment.³ It is outstanding for our practical requirements, because it is natural for us to disregard the uninterrupted change of moments and to take notice of it only when it becomes a new quality, i. e., sufficient to impress a new attitude on our behaviour or on our thought. The identity of the foregoing moments in the existence of a thing consists simply in disregarding their difference.⁴ The break in this identity is not a break in their motion, it always is something imagined, it is an integration of moments whose difference we are not able to notice. «The essence of reality is motion», says Śāntiraksita.⁵ Reality indeed is kinetic, the world is a cinema. Causality,⁶ i. e., the interdependence of the moments following one another, evokes the illusion of stability or duration, but they are, so to speak, forces or energies⁷ flashing into existence without any real enduring substance in them, but also without intervals or with infinitesimally small intervals.⁸

This theory whose main lines are here briefly sketched, and which is supported by a series of arguments to be examined in the sequel of our analysis, is regarded by the Buddhists themselves, as well as by their opponents, as the keystone of the whole of their ontology.

The idea that there is no stability in the external world and that existence is nothing but a flow of external becoming, is familiar to us from the history of Greek philosophy where in the person of Hera-

¹ *sūmagrī* = *hetu-kāraṇa-sūmagrī*, the totality of causes and conditions of a thing cannot be distinguished from the thing itself, — *sahakāri-sāhāyāṃ na prāptiḥ atiricyate*, Tātp, p. 805

² AKB ad II 46 — *kriyā-parisamāpti-lāṣana eva eso naḥ lāṣanaḥ*, transi vol. I, p. 282.

³ *vijñāna-lāṣana-utpāda*

⁴ *bheda-agraha*.

⁵ TS, p. 1389 — *cala-bhāva-sarūpa* = *lāṣana*, TSP, p. 11717 — *cala* = *anitya*, cp. ibid, 13722

⁶ TS, p. 1 — *calaḥ pratītya-samutpādaḥ*, cp. TSP, p. 13112

⁷ *samskāra*

⁸ *nivartana*

cleitus it marks an episode in its early period, an episode which was soon forgotten in the subsequent development of Greek thought. We find it again in India as the foundation of a system whose roots go back into the VI-th century B. C. But here it is not an episode, it has an incessant development through a variety of vicissitudes, in a series of elaborate systems, and after an agitated life of 15 centuries it forsakes its native soil only to find a new home in other Buddhist countries. Since the same idea reappears in modern European speculation and is even partly supported by modern science, the historian will be interested to gain insight into the arguments by which it was established in India and into the forms in which it has there been shaped.

We are faced in India by two quite different theories of a Universal Flux. The motion representing the world-process is either a continuous motion or it is a discontinuous, although compact,¹ one. The latter consists of an infinity of discrete moments following one another almost without intervals. In the first case the phenomena are nothing but waves or fluctuations² standing out upon a back-ground of an eternal, all-pervading, undifferentiated Matter³ with which they are identical. The Universe represents a *legato* movement.⁴ In the second case there is no matter at all, flashes of energy⁵ follow one another and produce the illusion of stabilized phenomena. The Universe is then a *staccato* movement. The first view is maintained in the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy, the second prevails in Buddhism.⁶ We have here a case, not quite unfamiliar to the general historian of philosophy, of two contrary philosophical systems both apparently flowing from the same first principle.

The arguments brought forward by the Buddhists are the following ones.

¹ *sūndratara*

² *urtti*

³ *pradhāna*

⁴ *parināma-īdā*

⁵ *samskāra-īdā* = *sanghāta-īdā*

⁶ Both theories are rejected by the Realist; they are very pregnantly formulated by Udayana, *Parīśuddhi*, p. 171—172 — *na tīvat pratiksana-īrtamānateam Saugata-mata-vaḍ vastuṇaḥ svarūpotpādaḥ, nāpi Sāṅkhya-vaḍ vastu-svarūpa-sthaurye'pi parināti-bheda eva Mīmāṃsakaḥ svī-kriyats*. It must be added that the Sāṅkhyas nevertheless deny *samavāya* and this fundamental feature distinguishes them also from the Vaiśeṣikas and apparently also from the old Yoga school.

§ 3 ARGUMENT FROM THE IDEALITY OF TIME AND SPACE

The theory of Universal Momentariness implies that every duration in time consists of point-instants following one another, every extension in space consists of point-instants arising in contiguity and simultaneously, every motion consists of these point-instants arising in contiguity and in succession¹ There is therefore no Time, no Space and no Motion over and above the point-instants of which these imagined entities are constructed by our imagination

In order to understand the Buddhist conception of Time, of Space and of Motion we must confront them with the divergent conceptions established in the Indian realistic schools. To this method we will be obliged to recur almost at every step of our investigation We begin with Time and Space

According to the Indian Realists, Time is a substance It is one, eternal and all-pervading² Its existence is inferred from the facts of consecution and simultaneity between phenomena Space is likewise a substance,³ it is one, eternal and all-embracing Its existence is inferred from the fact that all extended bodies possess impenetrability, they are beside each other in space *Praśastapāda* adds⁴ the very interesting remark that Time, Space and Cosmical Ether, being each of them unique in their kind,⁵ the names given to them are, as it were, proper names,⁶ not general terms⁷ Different times are parts of one and the same time When Time and Space are represented as divided in many spaces and different times, it is a metaphor The objects situated in them,⁸ but not Space itself and not Time itself, are divided. They are, therefore, «not discursive of what is called general concepts»⁹ They are representations produced «by a single object» only¹⁰

¹ *anantara-ikāna-utpāda*

² VS, 26—9, cp *Praśastp*, p 63 23 ff

³ VS, 2 10—16, cp *Praśastp*, p 67 1 ff

⁴ p 58 5 ff

⁵ *ekaiśa*

⁶ *parabhāsikyaśaṁ sanjñāḥ*

⁷ *apara-jñty-abhāve*

⁸ *añjāsā ekatīpā upādhi-bhedān nānāvopacārah*

⁹ It is curious that one of the principle arguments of Kant for establishing the unreality of Time and Space is found in an Indian realistic system, without drawing the same conclusion as Kant has done, CPR, p 25

¹⁰ Cp *N Kandalī*, p 59 6—*vyakti-bheda-adhusthāna* Kant, CPR, p 25, has concluded from this fact that time must be an intuition, because «a re-

It is clear that the Indian realists, just as some European rationalists considered Time and Space as two allembracing receptacles containing each of them the entire Universe.

The separate reality of these two receptacles is denied by the Buddhists. Real, we have seen, is a thing possessing a separate efficiency of its own. The receptacles of the things have no separate efficiency.¹ Time and Space cannot be separated from the things that exist in them. Hence they are no separate entities. Owing to our capacity of productive imagination we can take different views of the same object and distinguish between the thing and its receptacle, but this is only imagination. Every point-instant may be viewed as a particle of Time, as a particle of Space and as a sensible quality, but this difference is only a difference of our mental attitude² towards that point-instant. The point-instant itself, the ultimate reality cut loose from all imagination is qualityless, timeless and indivisible.

In the first period of its philosophy Buddhism admitted the reality of Space as one of the elements³ of the universe. It was an empty space imagined as an unchanging,⁴ eternal, allembracing element. But when later Buddhists were confronted by Idealism in their own home, they saw that the reality of external objects does not admit of a strict proof, and the reality of a substantial space was then denied. Substantial time⁵ was likewise denied, but subtle time, i. e., the moment, the point-instant⁶ of efficiency, was not only asserted, it was made, as we shall presently see, the fulcrum on which the whole edifice of reality was made to rest. The notions of substantial time and space were not attacked on the score that they were *a priori* intuitions whose empirical origine it was impossible to conceive, but they were destroyed dialectically on the score that the notions

presentation, which can be produced by a single object only, is an intuition. The Buddhists would never have said that, because for them a single object (*vyakti* = *śālakṣaṇa*) is only the point-instant and the intuition is only the pure sensation (*nirvikalpakam pratyakṣam*) corresponding to its presence.

¹ They are not *artha-kryā-kārin*

² *kālpasāra*; cp the remarks of the translators of *Kathāvatthu*, p. 392 ff

³ Under the name of *ākāśa*, which name denotes in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system the Cosmical Ether serving for the propagation of sound. Kamalaśīla says, TSP, p. 140 10, that the *Vaiśeṣikas*, since they admit the reality of this element, do not deserve to be called Buddhists — *na Sāhya-putrīyāh*

⁴ *asaṃskṛta*.

⁵ *sthūlah kālāh*, in *Kathāvatthu* — *mahākāla*

⁶ *ṣaṇaḥ* = *sūksmaḥ* *īśāh*

of duration and extension as they are used in common life covertly contain contradictions and therefore cannot be accepted as objectively real.

§ 4. DURATION AND EXTENSION ARE NOT REAL

Indeed, if we assume that a thing, although remaining one, possesses extension and duration, we will be landed in a contradiction, so far we consider reality as efficiency. One real thing cannot exist at the same time in many places, neither can the same reality be real at different times. If that were the case, it would run against the law of contradiction. If a thing is present in one place, it cannot at the same time be present in another place. To be present in another place means not to be present in the former place. Thus to reside in many places means to be and at the time not to be present in a given place. According to the Realists empirical things have a limited real duration. They are produced by the creative power of nature or by human will or by the will of God out of atoms. The atoms combine and form real new unities. These created real unities reside, or inhere, in then *causa materialis*, i. e., in the atoms. Thus we have one real thing simultaneously residing in a multitude of atoms, i. e. in many places. This is impossible. Either is the created unity a fiction and real are only the parts, or the parts are fictions and real is only the ultimate whole. For the Buddhists the parts alone are real, the whole is a fiction,¹ for it were a reality, it would be a reality residing at once in many places, i. e., a reality at once residing and not residing in a given place.²

By similar considerations it is proved that a thing can have no duration. If a thing exists at a moment A, it cannot also exist at some moment B, for to exist really at the moment A means not to have any real existence at the moment B or at any other moment. If we thus admit that the same thing continues to exist at the moment B, this could only mean that it at once really exists and

¹ Cp. *Avayavī-nirākarana* by Jārya Aśoka in the «Six Buddhist Tracts» and *Tītp*, p. 269 ff., NK, p. 262 ff., N. Kandali, p. 41 ff.

² Cp. the words of Leibniz (Extrait d'une lettre 1698) — «extension is nothing but a repetition or a continued multiplicity of that which is spread out, a plurality, continuity and coexistence of parts», and «on my opinion corporeal substance consists in something quite other than being extended and occupying place»; and «extension is nothing but an abstraction».

does not really exist at the moment A. If a thing could have real duration through several moments, it would represent a real unity existing at once at different times. Either is the enduring unity a fiction and real are only the moments, or the moments are fictions and real is only duration. For the Buddhists the moments alone are real, duration is a fiction, for if it were a reality, it would be a reality existing at different times at once.¹ i. e., existing and at the same time non-existing at a given moment.

Thus it is that ultimate reality for the Buddhist is timeless, spaceless and motionless. But it is timeless not in the sense of an eternal being, spaceless not in the sense of an ubiquitous being, motionless not in the sense of an all-embracing motionless whole, but it is timeless, spaceless and motionless in the sense of having no duration, no extension and no movement, it is a mathematical point-instant, the moment of an action's efficiency.

§ 5. ARGUMENT FROM DIRECT PERCEPTION.

The momentary character of everything existing is further established by arguments from perception and inference. The first of them is an argument from direct perception.² That sensation is a momentary flash is proved by introspection. But a momentary sensation is but the reflex of a momentary thing. It cannot seize neither what precedes nor what follows. Just as when we perceive a patch of blue colour in a momentary sensation, we perceive just the thing which corresponds to that sensation, i. e., the blue and not the yellow, even so do we perceive in that sensation just the present moment, not the preceding one, and not the following one. When the existence of a patch of blue is perceived, its non-existence, or absence, is *eo ipso* excluded and hence its existence in the former and in the following moments is also excluded. The present moment alone is seized by sensation. Since all external objects are reducible to sense-data, and the corresponding sensations are always confined to a single moment, it becomes clear that all objects, as far as they affect us, are momentary existences. The duration of the object beyond the moment of sensation cannot be warranted by sensation itself. It is an extension of that sensation, a construction of our imagination. The latter constructs the image of the object, when stimulated by sensation, but sensation alone, pure sensation, points to an instantaneous object.

¹ Cp. Tātp., p. 92.13 ff., translated in vol II, App. I; cp. NK., p. 125

² NK., p. 128. 14 ff; Tātp., p. 92. 15 ff.

§ 6 RECOGNITION DOES NOT PROVE DURATION.

To this argument the Realist makes the following objection¹ It is true, says he, that sensation apprehends only a blue coloured surface and that it does not apprehend at that time something different from it But we cannot go all the length of maintaining that sensation apprehends the precise time of its duration and that this duration is momentary Sensation itself lasts for more than a moment, it can last for two or three moments. It is not at all proved that it lasts only a single moment, and it is not at all impossible that a thing endures and produces gradually a series of sensations the one after the other

The Buddhist answers.² Let us (for the sake of argument) admit that the momentary character of all existence is not reflected directly in our cognition, (but does duration fare any better? is duration reflected directly?) Yes it is! says the Realist. There is a consecrated fact, the fact of Recognition³ which proves the stability and duration of things, it is a cognition of the pattern «this is the same crystal gem (which I have seen before)». This judgment, answers the Buddhist, does not at all prove the stability and duration of the crystal, it does not prove that its former condition is quite the same as its present condition And if this is not proved, nothing lies in the way of our assuming that there is an imperceptible uninterrupted process of change even in the crystal gem It will then be not an enduring substance, but a change of momentary existences following one another Indeed, the judgment «this is that same crystal» is an illicit association of two utterly heterogeneous elements which have nothing in common The element «this» refers to the present, to a sensation and to a real object The element «that» refers to the past, to something surviving exclusively in imagination and memory. They are as different as heat and cold. Their unity cannot be created even by the allmighty god Indra! If such things could be identical, there is no reason why the whole of the Universe should not be composed of identical things. Memory whose function is limited to the past cannot grasp the present moment, nor can sensation, whose function is limited to the present, apprehend the past. When there is a discrepancy in the causes, the effect cannot be identical, or else the result would be

¹ NK, p 123 28 ff

² Ibid, p 124 7

³ *pratyabhyāsa bhagavatī*, cp the same argument in NS, 111 1 2

produced not by the causes, but at haphazard. Memory and sensation have each their respective field of action and their own result, they cannot mix up so as to work the one in the field of the other. Recognition is not to be distinguished from memory, and memory is produced by thought construction, it is not a direct reflex of reality. Therefore the contention of the Realist that recognition proves duration betrays only his desire that it should be so.¹

§ 7. ARGUMENTS FROM AN ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF EXISTENCE.

Although neither immediate perception, nor recognition can prove the stability of the objects of the external world, nevertheless let us, for the sake of argument, says the Buddhist,² concede the point and admit that immediate perception apprehends objects representing some stability. However, this perception is falsified. Stability is an illusion,³ there are cogent arguments⁴ against our admitting stability and duration.

The first argument consists in deducing analytically the fact of constant change from the conception of existence. Existence, real existence, we have seen, means efficiency, and efficiency means change. What is absolutely changeless is also absolutely inefficient, what is absolutely inefficient does not exist. For instance, the Cosmical Ether, even in the opinion of those who admit that it is a stuff, it is supposed to be motionless. But for the Buddhists, the motionless is causally inefficient and therefore does not exist. Motionless and nonexistent are convertible terms, since there is no other means to prove one's existence than to produce some effect. If something exists without any effect at all, its existence is negligible. The Buddhists conclude that whatsoever does not change, does not exist.

The argument is thrown into the form of the following syllogism.⁵

Major premise. Whatsoever exists is subject to momentary change.

¹ *manoratha-mātram*, cp. *ibid.*, p. 124. 24

² *Ibid.*, p. 127. 7 ff.

³ *samāropita-gocaram alāṅkāram*, *ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 128-84

⁵ TS, p. 143. 17 ff.; this syllogism appears in a different form in SDS, p. 26, where it is quoted from Jñāna-śrī, and in NK, p. 127-9.

*Example*¹ As, e. g., a jar (whose ultimate reality is but a point-instant of efficiency)

*Minor premise*² But the Cosmical Ether is supposed to be motionless.

Conclusion It does not exist

That all existing objects are changing every moment is proved by a dilemma. Existing means efficient. The question then arises, is this efficiency perdurable or is it momentary? If it is perdurable, then all the moments the object is supposed to last must participate in the production of the effect. But that is impossible. The preceding moments cannot overlap the last moment in order to participate in the production of the effect. Perdurable means static and static means non efficient, i. e., not producing at the time any effect, inefficient means non existing. Every real object is efficient in producing the next following moment of its duration. The object must therefore produce its effect at once or it will never produce it. There is nothing intermediate between being static and not being static. To be static means to be motionless and eternally unchanging,³ as the Cosmical Ether was supposed to be (by Indian realists as well as by some modern scientists). Not to be static means to move and to change every moment.⁴ Things cannot stop and after taking rest begin to move again, as the naive realism of common life and realistic philosophy assumes. There is motion always going on in living reality, but of this motion we notice only some special moments which we stabilize in imagination.

The deduction of momentariness from existence is called an analytical deduction.⁵ Indeed, the judgment "existence means efficiency" and "efficiency means change" are analytical, because the predicate is implied in the subject and is elicited by analysis. The same thing which is characterized as existent, can also be characterized as efficient and as changing. The terms existence, efficiency and change are connected by "existential identity",⁶ that is to say, they can be without

¹ The example of Jñānaśrī is *yathā jaladharaḥ*, probably for metrical reasons.

² The upanaya in NK. is *samā ca*. *śabdādvay* and in Jñānaśrī's formula *śantā ca bhūtā amī*. In the form quoted by Śāntiraksita and Kamalaśīla the argument is a *prasanga-sādhana*, since the motionless Ether, as well as eternal time and eternal God etc. are assumed to exist by the opponents, they are therefore valid examples only for them.

³ *niṭya* = *apracaya-anutpanna-sthiraika-stabhāva*, Anekānta, f 2 a 10.

⁴ *anitya* = *pralīyā cāksana-sthita-dharma*, ibid.

⁵ *stabhāvānumāna*.

⁶ *tādātmya*.

(342.4). (The Realist) (But then, you are assuming a second, unreal particular) What will be the result of so-assuming a community between an unreal, (imagined) particular and an unreal, (imagined Universal)? No purposive action, (which is the test of reality), could be directed towards it, because an unexisting (object) cannot be the aim of an efficient action

(342.5). The real aim¹ (is the underlying point of efficiency but it) has nothing in common with the unreality (of the image). If there were some *śau d'unon* between them, it would be superfluous to admit a (second, empirical) imagined particular.

(342.6) (The Buddhist). We do not resort to a second, imagined particular. (The burning and cooking efficiency is the only test of a real fire), but this burning and cooking we fictitiously connect with the image of a fire as it is constructed (in our mind).² The latter is not the (ultimately real) particular, because the real particular is a thing shorn of all extensions,³ (it is unique in itself), it is unutterable,⁴ it is unimaginable,⁵ (it is transcendental). (The cooking and burning) which we can name and which we can extend (to every cooking and burning) is not the (real) particular.

(342.10). Thus it is that the function of our empirical conceptions is to call forth human activity with its various aims, by imputing efficiency to an inefficient (image) with its extensions⁶ and distinctions.⁷ (And because our empirical conceptions, constructions though they be, are indirectly⁸ related to reality, (they are to a certain extent real), they therefore lead to successful action in regard of a causally efficient

bhāṣita-anupapattih Usually the terms *grah* and *adhyasāḥ* are used in opposition to one another, the first refers to direct perception by the senses, the second to judgment or thought construction, cp. N. Kan., 257.4 ff (translated above) and MBT, p. 12.16 But in *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* both sources of our knowledge coalesce, *anumānātmatatvād vikalpasya*; the Buddhist will not admit that they coalesce really or transcendentially (*vyāpāra-anubandhitayā*), but they coalesce empirically (*pratyakṣi-anubandhitayā*)

¹ Read *pratyakṣa-viśayasya*.

² i. e., in accordance with the categories of our understanding and with the grammatical categories of language

³ *sarvato vyūrtityā*.

⁴ *abhidāpa-samsarga-ayogyā*

⁵ *vikalpa-jñāna-pratibhāsa-abhāva*

⁶ *sva-antaryāmo = vikalpasya = sāmānyasya*

⁷ *anya-vyūrtti-rūpasya = vyavacchinna-rūpasya*

⁸ through pure sensation (*mūlālpaka-pratyakṣa*).

Corrections to the text of Nyāya-bindu and tīkā.

7.12 before the words *bhrāntam hy anumānam* the following passage must be inserted in accordance with MSS and the Tib. translation: *tathābhrānta-grahaṇen-āpy anumānam nvrastam syāt, kalpanāpodha-grahaṇam tu vipratīpatti-nirā kāranārtham*

11 23 insert *arthasya* after *bhāvyaumānasya*.

13 15 insert *eva* before *vastunah*.

15. 2 insert *grāhyād* before *arthād*

15 3 drop the *cheda* before *sa eva*.

18. 9 *sātrāpy* instead of *atrāpy*

19 2 *jñānotpādāpekṣa* " " *jñānāpekṣa*.

23.16 insert *mātra* before *bhāvinī*.

25.15 *tasya* instead of *tasyā-*.

25.17 insert *na* before *sa*

28.19 " *bhūtale* " *bhāsamāne*

38.19 *bhavābhāvāsiddheḥ* instead of *bhāvasiddheḥ*.

38.21 drop the *cheda* after *siddhyat*

46.4—5 *vyatīkṛtaviśeṣana-* instead of *vyatīkrītam*.

47.13 *katatvam* " " *katakātvam*

50. 1 *vaidharṃmyavataḥ* " " *vaidharmavataḥ*.

50. 1 *upalabdhi-* " " *upalabm-*.

50. 6 drop the *cheda* after *asattva-nivṛttiś ca*

50.16 " " " " *uktah*.

53.18 *etam eva* instead of *evam eva*.

56.18 *etena* " " *etane*.

56.21 *aho-* " " *ohā-*.

65.18 *tathāparasya* instead of *tathā parasya*.

66.1, 3 (bis), 6 *nītyatva* " " *amītyatva*

66. 7 *nītyaḥ* " " *anītyaḥ*

67.10 *samdeha* " " *sadeha*

reality,¹ thus bringing about (the efficacy of thought and) producing consistent human experience.² This, in our opinion, is the right view!

§ 6. THE IMAGES ARE SHAPED ACCORDING TO EXPERIENCE.

(342.12) (The Realist) (You maintain) that there is an imputation of causal efficiency no that⁴ (image of a fire, which being a thought-construction) does not (really) possess any.⁵ (The question arises, whether in so doing) we are influenced by former experience,⁶ or we are doing it (*a priori*), on the basis of a primordial Biotic Force⁷ (hidden in the depth of human Reason)? (342.14). The (real) particular thing, indeed, is a thing shorn of association, being (merely) the faculty of affecting⁸ (our sensitivity), it possesses nothing in common with the image which contains (all kind) of extensions (in space, time and characteristics), and which is absolutely devoid of every kind of causal efficiency. (342.15). (You maintain) that there is a link,⁹ a negative one¹⁰ (in as much as the image of a fire contains a distinction from all non-fire, and the corresponding point of efficient reality also contains the negation of all non-fire). (We answer) that this implies¹¹ a correspondence also on the positive side between (the efficient point

¹ *samartham vastu prāpyanto*.

² *na vasmavādayanti*

³ *Lat*, p. 342. 10—12 «Therefore, by imagining the efficacy of the non efficient, of the self-extended, whose essence consists in the exclusion of the different, the common life ideas proceed in propelling (read *pravartayantaḥ*) the acting beings which are desirous of this and that, in making them reach, through an indirect connection, the efficient thing, they do not deceive people, this we regard as being right».

⁴ *asya* = *ākāśya*

⁵ *atad* = *na tasya* i e., *ākāśya* as *ākāśyā*

⁶ *dr̥ṣṭa-a-ākāśyā-svalāksana-sādharmyena* = «through similarity with formerly experienced particular (cases) of causal efficiency» — It must be clear from the text translated in App I that only the forms of our ideas, the Categories of our understanding, are admitted by the Buddhist to owe their origin, not to experience, but to a spontaneous capacity of our Reason. Their contents are sensations which are even (if we discount the *grāhya-grāhaka-lāpānā*) the very stuff of reality. But here the Realist, evidently for the sake of the argument, imputes to the Buddhist a wholesale rationalism.

⁷ *anāḍa-vāsanā-vāṣṭi*, on *vāsanā* see notes on pp 367—8

⁸ *samarthana*, it is *ākāśa-ādhāyaka*

⁹ *sārvīpya*.

¹⁰ *anya-vyāvṛtīyā* (read so)

¹¹ *prasanga*

- 68.14 *avasthādhāna-yogyo* instead of *avasthāna-yogyo*.
 70. 7 'i^ho " " 'i^ho.
 70 11 insert *ca* after *evam*.
 71. 3 *adīśyasya* instead of *adīśasya*.
 71.14 *vidhīh* " " *vmdhīh*.
 72 1,2 *vāhānasya* instead of *vā hānasya*.
 72 7 *rūpāsiddhi* " " *rūpādisiddhi*.
 72 16—85—86 " " 86
 76. 8 *vyuktam* " " *avyuktam*.
 77 10 *asiddheh* " " *asiddhīh*
 77 10 drop the words *tābhyam na vyatiricyate* and insert them
 77 18 after *asiddheh* (instead of *asiddhīh*).
 78 20 *nāntarīyakatvāt* instead of *-vatvāt*.
 82 6 *svabhāvasyo-* " " *svabhāvo-*
 85 23 insert a *cheda* after *punas tat*
 90 8 *yathāsa vajñah* instead of *yathā sarva-*
 90 16 *ityādī hetuḥ* " " *ityādīhetuḥ*
 92 12 insert *na* before *sa*.
 95.2 *mācayābhāvo* " " *-abhāvanau*.
-

and the image). We have already established that there is no difference between the positive and the negative formulations.¹

(342.16). But if the connection² (between a fire-image and the corresponding focus of efficiency) is produced by an innate capacity³ (of our Reason), then a man arriving from another continent,⁴ (who never has seen a fire), must (*a priori*) be cognizant of its faculty to burn and cook, although he sees it for the first time (in his life)!

(342.17). (The Buddhist). We impute to the unreal (imaged fire) that kind (of burning and cooking), (simply) because we neglect its difference from, (and identify it with), the particular (point-instant, the focus of that energy) which is the real producer of burning and cooking. Is it not so?

(342.18) (The Realist). But is the particular (point instant, the thing in itself) cognized, (at that time) or is it not cognized? The first is impossible, because, as you maintain, (the ultimate reality is uncognizable), it is not an imaginable object!⁵ It produces a momentary sensation⁶ which apprehends the thing itself,⁷ (but nothing *about* the thing), it cannot introduce this its object, (the bare thing without any attributes), into our conceptual thinking.⁸ The one is as different (as possible) from the other, they know nothing about the existence of one another

(342.21). Neither can our conceptual thought seize the (absolute) particular, even if we assume (with the Buddhist) an indirect function⁹ of the immediately preceding sensation,¹⁰ because, as has been stated, (conceptual thought) apprehends only such objects (as are utterable), whose images are capable of being designated by a (connotative) name.

(342.24) (The Buddhist) (The first moment in the cognition of an external object) is pure sensation. The image follows immediately in its track. The particular (momentary thing) is not the object ade-

¹ Op Apohasiddhi, p 6 — *apaha-sadbdena anya-apoha-cisisto vidhir ucyate.*

² *āropa*

³ *anāt-vāsanā*

⁴ Lat. «from Nārīkera-dvīpa»

⁵ *vikalpa-jñāna-gocarata-abhātāi*

⁶ *tat-samaya-bhāva.*

⁷ *tattvam.*

⁸ *vikalpa*

⁹ *vyāpāra-pūramparya 'pi.*

¹⁰ *samanantara-utpanna-nirvikalpa*

Corrections to the text of Nyāya-bin-du-tīkā Tippaṇī.

- 8.13 read *pradarśanam* and *pravartanādānam*
 11. 7 *-avayavyāder* instead of *avayavāder*.
 12. 1 read *svapnajñānena prāptih. prāpti-kāla-bhēdena* . .
 12.12 *-śāntirakṣitābhyām* instead of *-śāntabhadrā-*.
 12.13 *-uttarati āpi* " " *ati āpi*.
 16.16 *trirūpāl* instead of *vi rūpāl*.
 18. 4 read *śūkhā-lakṣaṇam. tathā pratyakṣam anūdyā* . .
 19. 4—5 *yogācāra-matena* instead of *yogācāra-mate. na* .
 19. 8 *abhrānta-śabdo* " " *bhrānta-*.
 19.13 *prasiddha-* " " *siddhi*.
 20.13 *tat āsati abhīnta-* (fat type) " " *tathā sati*.
 20.16 *tathābhrānta-grahaṇenetyādi* fat type.
 21.14 *ity avy odhaḥ* instead of *iti ni odhaḥ*
 22.14 read *yathā caḥsur-vijñānam*.
 22. 5 *yaḥ* instead of *ya*.
 26. 6 *bhrānta* " " *bhrānte*.
 27. 5 *na santi* " " *na samprati*
 29.16 *sarvam indriyā-* " " *sarvendriyā-*.
 30.15—16 read *yathendriya* . . *bhinnatvam na tatha* . .
 37. 5 insert *na* before *bhāvati*.
 37. 3 *nīla-* instead of *nīlam*.
 40.12 *abhinnatvam* " " *bhinnatvam*.
 42. 4 *nimitta-bhāvo* " " *nimittābhāvo*.
 42.14 *evāṁśāmsītayā* " " *evāṁśamśītayā*.
-

quate to the image, but it appears as though it were its object, because *indirectly* (the image) is produced from it,¹ (the image is the indirect function of some focus of external efficiency) ²

(342.25) (The Realist). (Quite right!) This is possible,³ but only (on the empirical hypothesis, i.e., if you admit that our images are constructed) from traces left in our consciousness by former experience,⁴ (and that our images thus correspond exactly to external reality). It becomes, on the contrary, (quite impossible on the hypothesis of rationalism, i.e., if we admit that the forms of our thoughts) have nothing corresponding to them in the external world, that they are created (by our Reason) which is a Force producing the (transcendental) Illusion (of an empirically real world).⁵

(342.26). And even if you admit that (our conceptions are partly) produced by the force of (former) impressions,⁶ the illusion that we perceive in them (a genuine reality), this illusion cannot be explained simply by the fact that they are (indirectly) produced from a (sensory stimulus), if reality itself continues to remain uncognizable.⁷

(342.27). (We also cannot admit the principle of Identity) through Neglecting the Difference.⁸ If the fire as an ultimate particular remains uncognized and our image of a fire is nevertheless (wrongly) identified with it, because their difference is neglected, then the whole Universe might also be identified with it, because there is no reason for limitation.⁹

¹ Lat, p 342 24—25 «Since it is produced from sensation (*avikalpāt*) as its immediately preceding homogeneous cause (*sam-anantara-pratyayāt*), through the medium of its function, although not its object, it appears as though it were its object».

² But the external objects are nevertheless really moments of a motion not stable substances having attributes and duration

³ *bhaved apiyam gatih*

⁴ *anubhava-cāsanā-prabhavēṣu* (read thus), i.e., *samskāreṣu*, cp above notes on *tāsanā*, p. 367—8

⁵ Lat, p 342. 25—26 «But not is it possible (with concepts) merged in transcendental non-existence, originating in the Force of (transcendental) Illusion».

⁶ *anubhava-tāsanā*

⁷ Lat, p 342 26 «Moreover even for (the image) originating from the force of experience, the illusion of the objectivity of it, (i.e. of the particular), while it is not cognized, simply because it is produced by it, (i.e., the image by the particular) cannot arise»

⁸ *bheda-agraha* = *alhyāt*

⁹ Lat, p 342 27. «But if the particular essence of fire is not grasped, if its form is imputed through not apprehending the difference from it, the consequence

(343.1). If the fire as a thing in itself¹ is not cognized at the time when (we have its image present to us), the whole Universe is in the same position. If the limitation consists merely in the fact of the origin of the image, (in its origin) from the sensation produced by the real fire, well then, there will be no limit at all, there will be no reason why the ideas of a God, of Matter (as it is imagined in the Sāṅkhya-system) etc, these ideas which also have their origin in a (congenital) Force of Illusion, (should also not be identified with the point-instant representing the real fire, through neglecting their difference). And we have just mentioned that to explain the correspondence of the image to the point-instant of external reality by the principle of Neglected Difference is inadmissible. Consequently it is idle talk to assume that the object corresponding to our conceptions is (an objectivized mental image) and that its presence in the external world is not true.²

§ 7. THE BUDDHIST THEORY REDUCED AD ABSURDUM.³

(343.5) (The Realist) And further, (you maintain that our concepts, and the names expressing them, are not intent on external reality, but upon our objectivized images. We answer), neither is the objectivized image the object on which our conceptual thinking is intent. (It fares not better than the uncognizable) thing in itself or the (relational and negative universal) image.⁴ It depends, indeed, upon an act of our productive imagination. When this act is produced, it (viz, the concept) *quasi* arises; when the act is over, it *quasi* vanishes. It apparently changes with every change in the activity of our conceptual imagination. (Hence it changes constantly), and can never be conceived⁵ as a unity (in the shape one idea having relative stability).

will be the imputation of the form of the three worlds, since there is no cause for limitation.

¹ *śūnyatā-lakṣaṇa*, it must be clear from all this context that the transcendental cause affecting our sensitivity is meant

² *ālambya bāhyatvam*.

³ The Buddhist theory is that reality, being a constant flow of momentary events, cannot be named and grasped by conceptual thought, or by imagination, because images or concepts require stability and duration. Vācaspati now turns the Buddhist argument against itself. He says that imagination also consists of momentary events, hence the images or concepts having no stability cannot be named.

⁴ *ākāraṇat* = *pratibhāsaṇat* = *na tu niscayaṇat*

⁵ Read *pratipattum*

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(The Buddhist). By neglecting the difference (a relative stability is produced)

(The Realist). But then its essence, (the unity of this objectivized image) will equally be neglected?

(The Buddhist) O yes! it will!

(The Realist). Then it neither will be imagined, (since the image is a unity)

(The Buddhist). But the discontinuity of the image is not real. (When we talk of an object as a string of momentary events) we mean reality, its discontinuity or continuity, but not (the discontinuity) of the objectivized image.

(343.10). (The Realist) We can concede the point. The discontinuity of the image is not ultimately real. But you must admit that the objectivized image depends upon an act of our imagination. It changes whenever there is a change in the latter, or else it would not depend¹ on it. (343.11) The dependence of the image upon the act of imagination consists just in the fact that it follows every change, or non-change, in the latter. If it did not so depend,² it would not be imagined, and it would not be an image erroneously (projected into the external world). (343.13). Therefore let us leave alone the question about the reality of the continuity or of the discontinuity of the image. However, what depends on a changing imagination cannot appear to us as a unity, it must appear as being discontinuous, (as split into discrete moments).

(343.15). Consequently (the following syllogism can be) established,

(Thesis) The objectivized image (being a unity) is *not* the object upon which our conceptual imagination is intent.

(Reason). Because that image (must be) unutterable

(Example). Just as a momentary feeling of pleasure³ or (pain is unutterable).

(Major premise). (Whatever is unutterable is a moment which is not the object upon which our conceptual imagination is intent)

¹ Read *tañ-anādhinatva-āpatteh*

² Read *tañ-anādhinatve*

³ *śukhādi-svalakṣaṇavat*

(343.16). It is indeed impossible to give it a name, because it is impossible to agree (upon its connotation), just as it is impossible (to express in speech) what the momentary feeling¹ of pleasure or (pain) is.

(343.17) We can really give a name to something when we can agree on its connotation. (The name) is concomitant with (such an agreement), otherwise we would be landed in the over-absurdity (of every name meaning anything)

(343.18) Since there is no such (possibility of agreement) upon the import of an objectivized image which changes with every (moment of) our imagination, there neither can be any possibility of giving names (to the objectivized images constituting the external empirical world). It is thus proved that whatsoever is conceived is unutterable, (i e., just the contrary of the Buddhist idea that whatsoever is transcendently real is unutterable)²

§ 8. A FINAL ARGUMENT AGAINST THE BUDDHIST THEORY.

(343.20). (The Realist). (You maintain that the genus «cow» is an objectivized image and is relative, being merely the negation of all non-cows. We then ask), this negation of all non-cows is it the image itself³ or only its attribute? If the essence (of the image) is a negation of non-cows, this cannot be understood without assuming the reality of (the positive counter part), the cow. Non-cow is but a negation of cow. Its reality depends upon the reality of the cow. You cannot escape being accused of a hopeless circle, (cow being dependent upon non-cow, and non cow upon cow).

(343.22) But if it is only an attribute (of the image), the genus «cow» must be positive, and its attribution also positive. And thus an end is made of the objectivized image which is (supposed to be) nega-

¹ Read *svālakṣaṇat*

² Lit p. 343 18—19 «This (impossibility of agreement) being excluded from the spurious externality (of the image) which is different with every (moment) of imagination, produces also an exclusion of the possibility of coalescing with a name, thus the connection is established» — This is a negative deduction formulated according to the 3^d figure of negation (*vyāpaka-anupalabdhi*), cp. NBT, p 32, text.

³ Cp Lotze, Logik § 40, according to whom «non-cows» would be «ein wider-sinniges Erzeugnis des Scholwitzes».

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tive in essence. And we have (*eo ipso*) discarded the theory that its attributes are identical with it, (i. e., the theory that there is no substance-attribute relation which would be transcendently real) That such a Universal can be (alternately) asserted and denied we have already explained.

(343.24). Wishing to escape redundancy we are afraid to have fallen in still greater verbosity! We must nevertheless have an end with this process of tempering the arrogance of the Nihilists!

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contradiction applied to one and the same point of reality, to a real fact. There are other characteristics which are connected with them by the same tie of Existential Identity, viz «whatsoever has an origin is always changing»,¹ «whatsoever is produced by causes is impermanent»,² «whatsoever is variable in dependence on a variation of its causes is subject to momentary change»,³ «whatsoever is produced by a conscious effort is impermanent»⁴—all these characteristics, although they may have a different extension, are called «existentially identical», because they may without contradiction be applied to one and the same reality. A jar which is produced by the effort of the potter may also be characterized as variable, as a product, as having an origin, as changing, efficient and existent. In this sense the deduction of momentariness is an analytical deduction

§ 8. ARGUMENT FROM AN ANALYSIS OF THE NOTION OF NON-EXISTENCE

The foregoing argument in favour of the theory of Instantaneous Being was drawn from an analysis of the notion of existence as meaning efficiency. The present one is also analytical,⁵ but it is drawn from the opposite notion of Non-existence⁶ as meaning Annihilation.⁷ What is annihilation to the thing annihilated? Is it the annihilated thing itself or it is something else,⁸ a separate unity, being added to a thing in the course of its annihilation? Is the non-existence of a thing something real or is it a mere idea?

Here again in order to understand the Buddhist view we must contrast it with what it is opposed to, we must take into consideration the opinions of the Indian Realists. Just as Time and Space are for them real entities in which the things are residing; existence—something inherent in the existing things, efficiency is something additional to a thing when it becomes efficient; causality—a real relation uniting cause and effect, motion—a reality added to the thing when it

¹ NB, III 12

² Ibid, III. 13.

³ Ibid, III 15

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ *śābhhāta-anumāna*

⁶ *abhāva*

⁷ *vināśa*

⁸ *arhāntaram*

begins to move, a Universal — a reality residing in the particular, the relation of Inherence — a reality residing in the members of that relation, — even so is Non-existence for the Realist something valid and real, it is something over and above the thing which disappears

The Buddhist denies this, Non-existence cannot exist. He denies ultimate reality to all that set of hypostasized notions. They are for him mere ideas or mere names, some of them even pseudo-ideas. A mere idea, or a mere name, is a name to which nothing separate corresponds, which has no corresponding reality of its own. A pseudo-idea is a word to which nothing at all corresponds, as, e. g., «a flower in the sky». Thus existence is for the Buddhist nothing but a name for the things existing, efficiency is the efficient thing itself, Time and Space are nothing besides the things residing in them, these things again are nothing over and above the point-instants of which they represent an integration, Causality is dependent origination of the things originating, these things themselves are the causes, there is no real causality besides their existence, motion is nothing beyond the moving thing, a Universal is not a reality «residing» in the particular thing, it is a mere idea or a mere name of the thing itself, Inherence is an unreality of a second degree, since it is admitted in order to unite the particular thing with the Universal which itself is nothing but a name. Finally Non-existence or the annihilation of a thing is also a mere name, nothing over and above the thing annihilated.¹

The controversy between Buddhists and Realists on this subject of Non-existence is a natural outcome of their different conception of reality. For the Buddhist the only reality is the efficient point-instant, all the rest is interpretation and thought-construction. The Realist, on the other hand, distinguishes between 3 categories of «existence»² (substance, quality, motion), and 4 categories of valid «meaning»³ (universals, differentials, inherence and non-existence), which also have objective reality. Non-existence is valid since it is produced by its own causes.⁴ The non-existence of a jar, e. g., is produced by the stroke of a hammer. It is not a mere name like a «flower in the sky».⁵ But the

¹ TS, p. 184-25

² *sattā* = *astitva*

³ *padārtha* = *bhāva*

⁴ TSP, p. 185.1, cp. NK, p. 142.1-2

⁵ According to Vātsyāyana, NBh, p. 2, existence and non-existence are two sides of reality. Everything can possess existence and non-existence as well. For this reason the amalgamated Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school has added a seventh category, non-

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Buddhist answers that existence alone can have a cause, non-existence cannot be produced.¹ If we understand by the non-existence of a thing its replacement by another thing,² this non-existence will not be something different from the replaced thing itself. If we understand by it its simple non-existence,³ then its cause will produce nothing and cannot be called a cause. To do nothing means not to do anything; to be a non-producer means not to be a cause. Hence non-existence will have no reality and no validity.

But then, the Realist asks again, what indeed is annihilation to the thing annihilated, is it something or is it nothing? If it were nothing, argues the Realist, the thing would never be annihilated and would continue to exist. It therefore must be something valid. If it is something separate,⁴ added to the thing in the course of its annihilation, answers the Buddhist, it will remain separate, although added, and the thing will also remain unaffected,⁵ notwithstanding the vicinity of such an uncomfortable neighbour. Let the "venerable gentleman"⁶ of such a thing remain intact after destruction, retorts the Realist, it will be your "Thing-in-Itself",⁷ a thing deprived of all its general and special properties and efficiencies.⁸ In so saying the Realist hints at the Buddhist theory of ultimate reality which is but a bare point-instant. This point, he says, will indeed remain even after the thing be destroyed. "This your realistic non-existence is empty and

existence, to the six categories of the old Vaiśeṣika school. But this opinion did not prevail in the realistic camp without strong opposition. Prāśastapāda among the Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākara among the Mīmāṃsakas rally in this point to the Buddhists, cp. Prāśast, p. 225. and ŚD. p. 322 ff. Śāntiraksita, p. 135. 6 ff., simply accuses the realist of assuming that non-existence is an effect, like the plant produced by the seed. But Kamalaśīla remarks, p. 135 16, that this is not quite correct, since the Naiyāyikas and others do not assert that non-existence "exists" like a substance (*dṛavyādvaitat*), it is "a meaning" (*padārtha*), but not a substance (*dṛavya*)

¹ TSP, p. 135 10

² Ibid, p. 135 23

³ Ibid, 136 3 ff.; cp. NK p. 132. 8 ff.

⁴ TSP, p. 133 20 ff. NK. p. 132. 3 ff.

⁵ NK., p. 139 15—*asmin (pradhānasya) bhūna-mūrtau kim āyātam bhāvasya? na kimcit!* The realists who assume real non-existence, real relations, real annihilation are ridiculed by the Buddhist. If these things are real, they say, they should possess separate bodies, then we shall have "non-existence in person" — *vigraha-cān abhāvaḥ. vīgraha-cān sambandhaḥ, bhīna-mūrtir vānāśaḥ.*

⁶ *āyasmān bhāṣaḥ*, ibid.

⁷ *svaśāṣṇa*, ibid.

⁸ *nirasta-samasta-arthahīnya*, ibid.

ni, says the Buddhist to the Vaiśeṣika, because it is outside the disappearing thing», it has nothing of its own to support it in the external world «Just the contrary, answers the Vaiśeṣika, your non-existence, i. e. nominalistic non-existence, is empty and ni, because it is included in the disappearing thing and does not represent any separate unity by itself»¹ That existence as well as non-existence must be separate unities added to some thing is clear, because there is between them a possessive relation which finds its expression in speech The Genitive case in the expressions «existence of a thing», «non-existence of a thing» points to the fact that a thing can possess existence or non-existence These expressions, answers the Buddhist, are nothing but perverse language, just as the expression «the body of a statue», while the statue itself is the body, there is nothing that possesses this body. The Genitive case «of» has here no meaning at all² Existence and non-existence are not different appurtenances of a thing, they are the thing itself

There are indeed two kinds of annihilation,³ empirical annihilation called destruction⁴ and a transcendental one called evanescence⁵ or impermanence⁶ The first is the annihilation of the jar by a stroke of the hammer. The second is, so to speak, the destruction of the jar by time; an imperceptible, infinitely graduated, constant deterioration or impermanence which is the very essence of reality. Śāntiraksita⁷ therefore says «reality itself is called annihilation, viz. that ultimate reality which has the duration of a moment» It is not produced by a cause⁸ like the stroke of a hammer, it arises by itself,⁹ since it belongs to the-essence of reality,¹⁰ reality is impermanent The fact that the annihilation of a thing always follows upon its previous existence¹¹ does not apply to such reality.¹² This reality is dynamic¹³ in its

¹ Cp NBT, transl, p 88 n 4

² TSP, p 188. 27, 142 27 etc

³ TSP, p 187. 21, 156 11

⁴ *pradhvaṃśa*

⁵ *vināśa* = *vināśavaratva*

⁶ *anitya* = *lāṇīla*

⁷ TS, p 187. 26—*yo hi bhūvaḥ lāṇa-sthāyī vināśa itī gīyate*

⁸ TSP, p 188.2—*ahetula*, cp ibid, p 188 18

⁹ TS, p. 182 12, NK, p 181 28

¹⁰ *vināśavara-svabhāva* = *vastu* = *cala-vastu-svabhāva*, TSP, p 188 10

¹¹ *vastu-anantara-bhāvīti*, ibid, p 188. 11.

¹² *na. tādṛśi* = *na cala-svarūpa*, ibid, p 188 10

¹³ *cala-bhāva-svarūpa*, ibid., p 188 9.

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does not exist, being is necessarily instantaneous. As already mentioned above, the first view is advocated in the Sāṅkhya system, the second in Buddhism. There can be nothing in the middle, there can be no eternal matter with changing qualities, as naive realism and the realistic systems assume. The transcendentalist, on the other hand, assumes that ultimate reality cannot be divided in substance and quality, it must be indivisible and instantaneous.

This kind of annihilation, transcendental annihilation, is not produced by occurrent causes.¹ Since existence itself is constant annihilation, it will go on existing, i. e., being annihilated and changing, without needing in every case any cause of annihilation. The elements of existence are automatically evanescent,² they do not want any additional circumstance³ in order to produce that change which is going on always and by itself.

Just as the totality⁴ of causes and conditions of every event is necessary followed by that event, because the totality is present,⁵ nothing else is needed, the totality is the event itself,⁶ just so everything is evanescent by its nature, no other cause of annihilation or change is needed. Reality has been characterized as efficiency, it can also be characterized as evanescence or annihilation.

§ 10. CHANGE AND ANNIHILATION

The conception of a change⁷ is a direct corollary of the conception of annihilation. Having repudiated the realistic view of annihilation, the Buddhist naturally also repudiates the realistic conception of a change. What is the exact meaning of the word "change?" It means, as already mentioned, either that one thing is replaced by another thing, or that the thing remains the same, but its condition, or quality, has changed, i. e., has become another quality. If it means the first, the Buddhist will not object.⁸ But since there is a change at every moment, the thing will be at every moment replaced by another thing.

¹ TSP, p. 140 25 — *kim nāśa-hetunā tasya kriam yena vinaśyeta*

² *svarasa-anāśmah* (same *dharmāḥ*)

³ Ibid, p. 141 9 — *sarvathā ahimsat-kara eva nāśa-hetur it*

⁴ *sāmagrī*

⁵ TSP, p. 132 17

⁶ Cp. Tātp, p. 80 5 — *sahajāre-sūksmāyam na pīṭṭer atireciyate*

⁷ *sthity-anyathātva* or *anyathātva*, cp. TSP, p. 140 25 ff

⁸ *siddha-sūdhyaṭā*, ibid, p. 137 23

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 śānūdhya, 7, 69
 śānūdhya, 62
 śānūdhya-viśeṣa, 92, 377.
 śānūdhya = prakṣa = śānūdhya-viśeṣa,
 357.
 śānūdhya, 376
 śānūdhya, 123.
 śānūdhya, 18, 92
 śānūdhya, 104, 104

is other». The causes producing destruction, fire etc, cannot annihilate the matter, but they destroy its condition and produce a change.¹ The thing disappears not absolutely, but conditionally, in functional dependence upon causes which produce the change. But this is impossible. The thing must either remain or go, it cannot do both at once, changing and remaining. If it has changed, it is not the same.² The example of melted brass proves nothing. Melted brass and solid brass are «other» objects.³

§ 11 MOTION IS DISCONTINUOUS

Just as existence is not something added to the existing thing, but it is this thing itself, and just as annihilation, evanescence or change are not something real in superaddition to the thing changing or destroyed, but they are the thing itself, — just so is motion nothing additional to the thing, but it is the thing itself «There is no motion, says Vasabandhu,⁴ because of annihilation» Things do not move, they have no time to do it, they disappear as soon as they appear. Momentary things, says Kamalaśīla, cannot displace themselves «because they disappear at that very place at which they have appeared».⁵

This statement, i. e. the statement that there is no motion, that motion is impossible, seems to stand in glaring contradiction with the former statement according to which reality is kinetic, everything is nothing but motion. Indeed when it is maintained that reality is kinetic, it is implied that everything moves and there is no real stability at all, and when it is maintained that there can be no real motion, it follows by implication that reality consists only of things stabilized and enduring. However these two apparently contradictory statements are only two different expressions of the same fact. The so called stability is the stability of one moment only,⁶ and the so

¹ Ibid, p. 140 27 — *anyathāntam kṛiyate*

² Ibid, p. 141 1 — *na hi sa eva anyathā bhavati*, p. 141 9 — *naviśasya anyathāntam asti*

³ Ibid, p. — 141 10 — *na asiddho hetuḥ*, i. e. the *hetu* of the realist is *asiddha*

⁴ AK, IV. I — *na gaur nāsāt*, cp. Tātp, p. 383 13 — *lagna-apātāpa-nibandhanaḥ hy ayam śāṇika-vādaḥ*

⁵ TSP., p. 282 90 *tasya (śāṇikasya) janma-dēśa eva cyuteḥ, nāsāt, deśānta-prāpti-asambhavāt*

⁶ *eka-śāṇika-sīkṣā*

svabhāva, 8, 59, 60, 64, 65, 69, 70, 72, 76, 87, 98, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 217, 224, 234, 239, 251, 288, 289, 290, 423

svabhāva = sūdhya, 136

svabhāva-abhāva-avyabbhicāram, 194

svabhāva-pratibandha, 69, 122, 289.

svabhāva-pratibandha = vyāpti, 145

svabhāva-linga, 61, 70, 407.

svabhāva-vitarka, 20, 327

svabhāva-viśista, 64.

svabhāva-viśesa, 64, 125, 301

svabhāva-viśesa-rakita, 108.

svabhāva-hetu, 120, 122, 125, 126, 127, 129, 186, 288, 417

svabhāva-sambandha, 267, 268, 287, 290, 295, 420

svabhāva-sambandha = viśesana-viśesya-bhāva, 267

svabhāva-numāna, 70

svabhāva-nupalabdhi, 82

svabhāva-āntaram, 94.

svamata, 346.

svayam-prakāśa, 29

sva-rasa-vināśa-svabhāva, 134

sva-rasakāñ, 48.

svarūpa, 15, 23, 60, 87, 112, 154, 267, 364, 387, 418

svarūpa-apoha, 419

svarūpa-abheda = svabhāva-anatirikta = svabhāva-sambandha, 290.

svarūpa-mātra, 296

svarūpa-lūbha = svabhāva-lūbha = ātma-bhāva, 122

svarūpa-vitarka, 17.

svarūpa-vedana-anupapatti = 365

svarūpa-sambandha, 191.

svarūpa-numbhava, 364.

svalaksana, 14, 15, 22, 23, 32, 41, 51, 68, 87, 89, 121, 129, 172, 179, 192, 194, 264, 289, 302, 303, 304, 305, 312, 316, 320, 327, 361, 397, 405, 406, 412, 413, 414, 415, 428

svalaksana = ananya-bhāk = asadhārana, 414.

svalaksana-ālambita, 312.

svalaksana-avagāhita, 424

svalaksana = ksana, 121, 291, 304, 422, 423.

svalaksana = ksana = artha - kriyā - kārin = paramarthasat = vastu, 274.

sva-laksana-paramārtha-sat, 7, 111, 292.

svalaksana = prathamā visaya-ksanah, 320.

svalaksana-bheda, 406.

svalaksana-sūrūpya, 368.

svalakṣaṇa-sūlakṣaṇa, 368.

svalaksana = vastu = vidhi-svarūpa, 80.

svalakṣaṇa = vidhi-rūpa = vastu = artha-kriyā-kārin, 78.

svavacana-mirūkrta, 170

svavacana-virodhm, 170.

sva-vīcayā, 276

svavisaya-sarva-gata, 404

sva-samvitti, 364, 386

sva-samvidita, 410, 393

sva-samvedana, 83, 104, 327, 355, 383, 386, 392, 393, 394, 395, 409

sva-samvedana-anurūpa-artha, 388.

sva-samvedana = anuvyavasāya, 43

svasamvedana-pratyakṣa, 391.

sva-samvedana-pratyakṣa-jñāna-siddha, 88

sva-samvedana-rūpa, 394.

sva-sattā-mātra, 66.

sva-sattā-mātra-bhāva, 65, 66

sva-sattayā, 48, 53.

sva-santāna-mātra - prabhava = ālaya-vijñāna-prabhava, 370.

sva-sadrśa-ākāra-ādhyakṣatva, 264

sva-sūdhya, 417.

sva-svabhāva-dhārana, 120

svāgocara, 410.

svāpekṣa, 410.

svābhāvika, 291, 295, 420.

svābhāsa, 363.

svārtha, 149.

svārthanumāna, 48, 70, 149, 166

svānga, 271.

hāna-upādāna, 5.

hānopādāna-buddhi, 386

hetu, 2, 4, 10, 48, 53, 62, 66, 82, 127, 133, 136, 141, 159, 212, 213, 244, 249, 303.

hetu = kāraṇa = rgyu, 209, 211, 212.

hetu-kāraṇa-sāmagrī, 296

hetu = gtaṇ-things, 212.

hetu-cakra, 171

hetu-drstānta, 154.

on the contrary, impressed motion is also split into momentary motions, each generating the one that succeeds it. In this respect the Nyāya view falls in line with the Buddhist one. But the idea of an absolute moment as a single point-instant of reality was distasteful to all Realists, even in those cases where they accept constant change, they, as has been already mentioned, compose it of three-momentary or six-momentary durations. When a body falls to the ground, the force acting on it is gravity in the first instance and impressed motion in the succeeding moments, but gravity continues to operate.¹ This affords some explanation of the accelerated motion of falling bodies, as will be stated later on.

The Buddhist view is distinguished from these speculations by the fundamental theory which denies the existence of any substance. There is therefore no motion in the things, but the things themselves are motion. When Vasubandhu, therefore, declares that "there is no motion, because of annihilation", it is this realistic idea of a real motion which he denies. Motion exists empirically. If the Realists would simply maintain that this empirical motion has some cause behind it, the Buddhist would not object.² But this cause, according to his theory, consists of momentary fulgurations succeeding one another in contiguous places without any abiding stuff in them. These flashes arise not out of the same stuff, but, so to speak, out of nothing,³ since the foregoing flash is totally extinct⁴ before the succeeding one arises. "There is, says Kamalaśīla,⁵ not the slightest bit of some particle of a thing which survives" in the next succeeding moment.

The picture which the Buddhists made themselves of the real condition of the world is best of all elicited in the manner in which

¹ *ādyaṃ guruvādā, dvitīyādāne tu gurutva-samskāraḥ* ibid, p. 804. 17 "Why do we not assume one movement in the interval between its beginning and its end?" asks Praśasta, p. 302. 11, i. e., why do we not, like the Buddhists and Nāgārjuna, maintain that it is instantaneous? and answers "because of many conjunctions", i. e. motion being by its very definition conjunction-disjunction with a place, there are as many conjunctions as there are places through which, e. g., an arrow passes in its flight. Cf. H. Bergson's idea that such motion is indivisible. According to the Vaiśeṣikas motion is infinitely divisible, but the force (*samskāra*) or momentum is one.

² The «existence» of the preceding moment is the cause *sattava vyāptih*, TS kār 1772.

³ *niravaya*.

⁴ *niruddha*.

⁵ TSP, p. 188—*na hi svalpīyaso'pi vastu-amśasya kasyasid anvayo'sti*.

hetu-pratyaya, 62, 134
 hetu-pratyaya-samagri, 62
 hetumat, 394.
 hetu-sattā, 127.
 hetutva, 65.

hetukṛtya, 122, 160.
 hetu-antara, 93.
 hetu-antarāpekṣatva, 369
 hetu-ārtha, 191
 hetvābhāsa, 179.

§ 12 ANNIHILATION CERTAIN A PRIORI

Thus the argument which proceeds by an analysis of the notions of non-existence and annihilation leads to the establishment of the theory of momentariness just as the argument drawn from the analysis of the notion of existence as causal efficiency. We have pointed out that both arguments are analytical, hence the conclusion appears with logical necessity. There is a third argument which differs but very slightly from the second. It starts from the fact that everything necessarily¹ must have an end. There is nothing at all that would have no end. This trivial truth which is known to every body, when minutely examined, cannot mean anything else than that evanescence is the very core of existence. If everything is evanescent, it is always evanescent, a thing cannot be severed from its own essence, there is therefore no duration at all. The evanescence of everything is *a priori* certain.

Thus it is that the momentary character of all existence is something which can be established *a priori*.²

Vācaspati-miśra³ informs us that the early Buddhists deduced the idea of Momentariness by an induction from observation, it was for them an *a posteriori* idea. They at first noticed that such objects, as fire, light, sound, thought, were changing at every moment. A little more attention convinced them that our body is also changing constantly, so that at every consecutive point-instant it is "another" body. Then by a broad generalisation from observation, in an inductive way, they concluded, "just as this our body, so also the crystal gem", it also is older of a moment in every succeeding point-instant. This way of reasoning was followed by the early Buddhists. But the later Buddhists did not prove momentariness by a generalisation from induction. They had found that annihilation, i.e., an end, was necessary, unavoidable, *a priori* certain, no need of proving it by observation. The realists answered by the following reasoning⁴ "Please, said they to the Buddhists, consider the following dilemma: does the continuity

¹ *dhruva-bhāva* = *avasyam-bhāva*, NK, pp. 182.14 ff, Tātp, p. 888.19 ff, TS, p. 182.15 ff, NBT, 11.37.

² *a priori* in the sense of non-empirical, literally *a priori* could be translated as *pratyakṣaḥ pratyayāḥ*, cp. NK, p. 267.18, *parākṣaḥ* = *a posteriori*, Tātp, p. 84.18.

³ Tātp, p. 880 ff.

⁴ Ibid., 886.14 ff.

ERRATA

		Printed	Correct
Page	line		
34	6	<i>perceptue ina</i>	<i>ina perceptue</i>
35	18	<i>lragā</i>	<i>lriyā</i>
65	88	<i>sannatāh</i>	<i>sannihitāh</i>
78	5	entalle	entailed
80	17	ist	its
82	16	<i>vyavahṛta</i>	<i>vyavahṛta</i>
91	26	<i>log-log</i>	<i>log-riog</i>
104	37	<i>virodhasya</i>	<i>virodhasya</i>
140	24	<i>sādhaya</i>	<i>sādhya</i>
207	39	<i>vipralasāt</i>	<i>vipralasāt</i>
217	38	<i>vyacchidyā</i>	<i>vyacchidyā</i>
218	28	Non-existence	Non-existence
241	25	from of the	from the
225	35	<i>sambandhyante</i>	<i>sambandhyante</i>
227	26	<i>tog-pa</i>	<i>riog-pa</i>
329	24	<i>tog</i>	<i>riog</i>
384	3	vol 98	vol. 95
384	36	<i>togs</i>	<i>riogs</i>
386	2	vol 95	vol 115

of other things, it is a mere name for those other things, or a construction of our imagination. E.g., the whole does not exist separately from its constituent parts, time and space do not exist apart from point-instants, the Soul does not exist apart from mental phenomena, Matter does not exist apart from sense-data etc., etc. Since they are not apart, they do not exist at all.

Now, what is the thing which is really something quite apart from all other existing things, which is something quite unique?¹ It is the mathematical "point-instant".² Its only relation to other existents is "otherness". It is numerically other, not qualitatively. Every relation and every quality is something belonging to two realities at least, and therefore something unreal itself, as something having no existence of its own, apart from these two realities.

The formula of this "law of otherness" runs thus. A thing is "other", if united to incompatible properties.³ Difference of quality involves a difference of the thing, if the qualities are mutually exclusive. Two qualities are not incompatible if the one is under the other, the one a part of the other, e.g. colour and red. But they are incompatible if they are both under the same determinable, as, e.g., red and yellow or, more properly, red and non-red. If the determinable is very remote or if there is no common determinable at all, the incompatibility is still greater.⁴ It is obvious that this statement of the law of otherness is but a negative form of the law of contradiction as expressed in European logic by Aristoteles: nothing can possess at the same time, in the same place and in the same respect two mutually exclusive properties. This European formula of the law of contradiction presupposes the existence of the relation of substance and quality, or of "continuants and occurrents". In India we are faced, as mentioned above, by two systems which deny the objective reality of this relation. The Sāṅkhya admits a continuant only and the Buddhists admit merely the occurrents. A thing is then another thing whenever its determinations are other. These determinations are Time, Space and Quality.⁵ A thing is other when its quality is other, e.g., the same thing cannot be at once red and yellow, i.e., red and non-red. It is other when its position in space is other, e.g., the radiance of a jewel in one place and its radiance in another place are two different things.

¹ *sarvato vyāvṛtta, trailokya-vyāvṛtta*.

² *ksana* = *avakāśa*.

³ NBT, p. 4—*vraddha-dharma-samsargād anyad vastu*.

⁴ Cf. below on the law of contradiction and on *apoha*.

⁵ *desa-kāla-ākāra-bhedaś ca vraddha-dharma-samsargah*. NBT, ibid.

essence, it is indivisible,¹ it cannot be divided in parts so that non-existence should follow upon existence,² its evanescence arises simultaneously with its production,³ otherwise evanescence would not belong to the very essence of reality.⁴ Existence and non-existence are thus different names given to the same thing «just as a donkey and an ass are different names given to the same animal.»⁵

§ 9. ŚĀNTIRAKṢITA'S FORMULA

The formulation of the theory of Instantaneous Being as laid down by Śāntirakṣita in the dictum that «the momentary thing represents its own annihilation»⁶ is remarkable in the highest degree. It shows us clearly the kind of reality we have to deal with in Buddhist logic. It is evidently not the empirical object that can be called its own annihilation. Nobody will deny that when a jar has been broken to pieces by a stroke of the hammer it has ceased to exist. But beyond this obvious empirical change there is, as stated above, another, never beginning and never stopping infinitely graduated, constant change, a running transcendental ultimate reality. The creation of the jar out of a clump of clay and its change into potsherds are but new qualities, i. e., outstanding moments in this uninterrupted change. There is nothing perdurable, no static element in this process. An everlasting substantial matter is declared to be pure imagination, just as an everlasting substantial Soul. There is, therefore, as Śāntirakṣita says, in every next moment not the slightest bit left of what has been existent in the former moment. The moments are necessarily discrete, every moment, i. e., every momentary thing is annihilated as soon as it appears, because it does not survive in the next moment. In this sense everything represents its own annihilation. If something of the preceding moment would survive in the next moment, this would mean eternity, because it would survive in the third and following moments just in the same way as it did survive in the second. Static means eternal;⁷ if matter exists, it necessarily is eternal, if it

¹ *niraṃśa*, *ibid.*, p. 138. 10.

² *yena tad-anantara-bhāvatam asya bhavati*, *ibid.*, p. 138. 11.

³ *nāstasya tan-nispatitv eva nispannatvāt*, *ibid.*

⁴ *anyathā . . . (cala)-śabdhitam . . . na syāt*, *ibid.*, p. 138. 12.

⁵ *TS.*, p. 139. 7.

⁶ *TS.*, p. 137. 26.

⁷ *ntiyatam = aśāsthāna-mātram* *Tātp.*, p. 239. 24, cp *TSP.*, p. 140. 24 — *yady atpāda-anantaram na vinasyet, tadā paścād apī . . . tad-avasthāḥ (syāt)*

§ 14. IS THE POINT-INSTANT A REALITY? THE DIFFERENTIAL CALCULUS.

In the preceding exposition it has been sufficiently established that empirical Time and Space are, for the Buddhist, fictions constructed by our understanding on the basis of sensible point-instants which alone are the ultimate reality. Against this theory which reduces the reality to the "this", the "now", the "here", and converts all the rest of our knowledge into imaginative and relative differentiation, the Realists raised the very natural objection that the point-instant itself is no exception to the general rule, since it is also nothing but a construction in thought a mere name without any corresponding reality. "In assuming, says Uddyotakara¹ to the Buddhist that time itself is nothing but a name, you evidently also must assume that the shortest time, the time-limit is likewise nothing but a name". The Buddhist retorts that the shortest time, the mathematical point-instant is something real, since it is established in science.² The astronomer makes it the basis of all his computations. It is an indivisible time particle, it does not contain any parts standing in the relation of antecedence and 'sequence'.³ The Indian astronomers made a distinction between "time grossly measured,"⁴ and a "subtle time,"⁵ measured with precision. The motion of a thing during a single moment they called instantaneous motion, or the "motion of just that time" ⁶ i. e., not of another time, not of another moment. This time is nothing but the differential of a planet's longitude. Such a moment is no reality, says the Realist, it is a mere mathematical convenience.⁷ "Just the contrary, says the Buddhist, we maintain that the instantaneousness of being is the ultimately real thing". The only thing in the universe which is a non-construction, a non-fiction is the sensible point-instant, it is the real basis of all constructions.⁸ It is true that it is a reality which cannot be represented in a sensuous image,⁹ but this is just because it is

¹ NY., p. 418 15.

² NYT., p. 337 1-*vyatir-vidyā-siddha*

³ *pūrva-apara-bhāga-vikāśa* Ilād., cp. NK p. 127. 12

⁴ *sthūla-lāla*, *Lāla-piṇḍa*

⁵ *subtīma-gatī*.

⁶ *tat-lāla-gatī*

⁷ *sanjñā-mātram*

⁸ *cāstaviṣayāṅgā ātā abhīmatā*

⁹ *ṛṣṇasya (jñānena) prāpayitum atā yāvāt*, cp. NBT., p. 12 19 (*prāpti* = *sarvāṅgalam jñānam*)

If it means the second, then a series of difficulties arise for the Realist. He assumes the existence of real substances along with real qualities. But ultimate reality cannot be so divided,¹ it cannot represent a stable stuff with real moving qualities situated upon it, as though it were a permanent home for passing visitors. This conception of naive realism cannot stand scrutiny. From the two correlative parts one alone must remain as ultimately real. It can be called a substance, but then, it will be a substance without qualities. Or it may be the qualities, but these qualities will be absolute qualities, without belonging to any substance. "Whatsoever exists, says Yaśomitra,² is a thing", it neither is a quality nor a substance. Reality, existence, thing and momentary thing are synonyms. If qualities are real, they are things. The categories of substance and quality are relative, they therefore do not reflect ultimate reality,³ they are created by our intellect.

In this denial of a real substance-to-quality relation the Buddhists, as already mentioned, were at one with the Sāṅkhyas, but on the positive side both schools parted in opposite directions. The Sāṅkhyas assumed as ultimately real eternal matter alone, which itself is constantly changing, they denied the separate reality of its passing manifestations. The Buddhists, on the contrary, denied the separate reality of the perdurable matter and stuck to the reality of the passing qualities alone, thus converting them into absolute qualities, qualities not belonging to any substance.

Moreover, the Realist must face in regard of the reality of change the same difficulty with which he was confronted in regard of the reality of annihilation.⁴ Does change represent something different from the thing changing or is it this thing itself? If it is nothing different, nothing will happen to the thing, the thing will remain as it was, there will be no change. If it is something apart, it will remain apart and there again will be no change. There is no other issue left than to assume that the words "the change of a thing" contain a perverse expression⁵ and that in reality, in ultimate reality, there is another thing at every consecutive moment. When brass is changed from a solid into a liquid condition, the realist assumes that the matter is "the same", but its condition

¹ Ibid., p. 134 3

² Cp CC, p. 26 n, cp. TSP., p. 128 17—*vidyamānam* = *vastu* = *dravya* = *dharma*

³ *dharma-dharma-bhāvo na sad-asad apēśate* (Dignāga)

⁴ Cp TSP., p. 141 2 ff

⁵ Ibid., p. 142 27

Śāharaṭakya, I

that they applied it in the field of general philosophy they were not the only school to do it¹

§ 15. HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF MOMENTARINESS.

The origin of the theory of Instantaneous Being is most probably pre-Buddhist.² Its vicissitudes in Buddhism are interwoven with the history of different sects. Since the literature of the majority of these sects is lost beyond recovery, we must be content to point out some salient features which will allow us tentatively to draw the main line of its development. We may at present distinguish between 1) the initial form of the doctrine when it was laid down with considerable precision, 2) a series of deviations and fluctuations in the schools of Hinayāna, 3) a crisis of the doctrine in the schools of Mahāyāna when it seemed to be given up altogether, 4) its reintroduction in the school of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and 5) its final form in the school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

This final form, we have seen, implies that ultimate reality belongs to the mathematical point-instant, to a time-unit which contains no parts standing in the relation of antecedence and sequence or, more precisely, to the infinitesimal differential points of reality, out of which our intellect constructs the empirical world as it appears to our understanding in manifold images. The theory is at that time founded on epistemological investigations. It is then the direct consequence of the theory of two heterogeneous sources of our knowledge, the senses which supply merely the detached point-instants of pure reality and the intellect which constructs of these infinitesimals a manifold and ordered world.

At the opposite end of this historical process, at the starting point of Buddhism, we find a theory which is essentially the same, although

Dharmakīrti viśāṅgī, te sarve jyotiḥ-vādyū-prasiddhāḥ pratīkṣaṇam utpadyante vinasīyante ca. This being the precise rendering of Bergson's words, sounds like a quotation from an Indian text. It is also noteworthy that one of the synonyms for thought or constructive thought is computation (*samkalāna*). Thus thought, productive imagination and mathematics become closely related, cp vol II, p 292 — *samkalālaye = vikalpayet = utprakāśate*

¹ The Sāṅkhya-Yoga in this point, as in many others, comes very near to the Buddhist view, cp Vyāsa on III 52—*Lālo vastu-śūnya-buddhi-nirmāṇah sarvajñāna-amūṣā, śāśanas tu vastu-patitah* . . . , cp B N Seal, op cit, p 80 Vj-jñāna-bhikṣu points out time has no real, or objective, existence apart from the moments, but the latter is real, being identical with the unit of change in phenomena—*guṇa-pariṇāmanasya śāśanāvacanāt* Ibid

² Cp CC, p 65 ff

called motion is nothing over and above the consecution of these moments arising without interruption in close contiguity the one after the other¹ and thus producing the illusion of a movement. Movement is like a row of lamps sending flashes the one after the other and thus producing the illusion of a moving light. Motion consists of a series of immobilities «The light of a lamp, says Vasubandhu,² is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, we say that the light has moved, but in reality other flames have appeared in other contiguous places».

Thus the Buddhists by purely speculative methods came to envisage Motion in a way which bears some analogy with modern mathematical physics.

In order better to understand the position of the Buddhists in this problem we must here again, first of all, contrast the Buddhist views with the views of Indian Realists. This will lead us to another distinction, the distinction between motion considered empirically and motion considered transcendently.

According to the realistic school of the Vaiśeṣikas, motion is a reality, it is one of the three things in which the genus Existence inheres, the other two being Substance and Quality.³ Motion is something different from the thing moving, it consists in the fact that the conjunction of the thing with its place has been destroyed and a new conjunction of it with a new place has been produced. Praśastapāda⁴ defines motion as the real non-relative⁵ cause, producing the change of position of a particle in space. It is instantaneous in the first moment and persistent, impressed motion or momentum,⁶ in the following ones, up to the moment when the body is again at rest. The Vaiśeṣikas accept one impressed motion as duration, lasting till the cessation of the motion.⁷ For the Naiyāyikas,

¹ *nirantara-lāṣaṇa-utpāda*

² AK, IX, cp my transl in *Soul Theory*, p 938

³ The highest genus «existences», *sattā*, inheres, according to the Vaiśeṣikas (VS, I 2. 7—8), in things belonging to the categories of substance, quality and motion. The other categories are «meanings» *padārtha*, they have «*Geltung*» which sometimes is called *svarūpa-sattā*, but they do not «exist».

⁴ Praśastp, p 290 ff

⁵ *anapeksa*, i e. not merely relative to rest (?)

⁶ *samālāra*

⁷ *bahūni karmāṇi. eka tu samālāro'ntarāle*, ibid, p 302 11

Now just in the middle between this initial and the final form of the doctrine it underwent a dangerous crisis.

The school of the Mādhyamikas bluntly denied the reality of the supposed point-instants of existence. Against the theory they appealed to common sense. Who is the man of sense, they thought, who will believe that a real thing can appear, exist and disappear at the same moment¹. However this denial has no special bearing upon the theory of instantaneousness, since that school declared every separate object and every notion to be dialectical, relative and illusive.

The history of the theory of instantaneous reality during the first period proves clearly how difficult it is for the human mind to grapple with the idea of pure change i. e. the idea of a reality in which there is no *sub*-stance at all. The categories of an abiding substance with changing qualities is so deeply rooted in all our habits of thought that we always become reluctant to admit pure change, even when it is urged upon us by logic.

The school of the Vatsīputrīyas were the first among the early schools which admitted the existence of a certain unity between the elements of a living personality. Their position in this problem is highly instructive. They dared not readmit the spiritual substance of a Soul, so strong was the opposition against this idea in Buddhist circles. But they also were reluctant to deny any kind of unity between the separate elements of a personality and admit that the separate elements constituting a personality hold together only by causal laws. They therefore adopted an intermediate course. The personality was declared to be something dialectical, neither identical with its elements, nor different from them. It was not given the reality of an ultimate element, nor was that reality denied altogether². This course of admitting dialectical reality and neglecting the law of contradiction reminds us of the dialectical method very popular among the Jains and consisting in assuming everywhere a double and contradictory real essence. It proves at the same time that the doctrine of a radical separateness of all elements and their exclusive link in causal laws was anterior to the rise of the school of the Vatsīputrīyas.

Another attack against the theory of absolute change originated in the schools of the Sarvāstivādins and of the Kāśyapīyas. The theory

¹ Cp. Candrakīrti in the Mādhy. vṛtti, p. 547.

² Cp. Vasubandhu's exposition of that theory, AK IX transl. in my Soul-Theory.

they tried to explain the phenomenon of acceleration in a falling body¹ or the phenomenon of the rising smoke² They found in these phenomena a striking confirmation of their idea that at every moment of its existence the falling body is really "another" body, because it is differently composed. Its weight is different at every moment Every material body is a composition of four fundamental elements, which are conventionally called earth, water, fire and wind. Under the name of "earth" the solid element is understood, "water" is the name for the force of cohesion or viscosity, "fire" means temperature, and "wind" means weight or motion. All these elements or forces are present in whatever piece of matter, always in the same proportion. If the bodies are sometimes solid and sometimes liquid, sometimes hot and sometimes moving, this depends on the greater amount of intensity³ in the energy representing the elements, not on its quantitative predominance. That the element of solidity is present in water is proved by its capacity of supporting a ship on its surface. That the "liquid" element is present in fire is proved by the fact that the particles of fire are holding together in a flame It is clear that the fundamental elements of matter are rather forces or momentary quanta of energy than substantial atoms. They accordingly fall under the category of "cooperators" or "cooperating forces" The fourth element is called "motion", but also "lightness", i. e., weight.⁴ Thus every material object is the meeting-point of the forces of repulsion, attraction, heat and weight. When a body falls, its movement in every point is accelerated, i. e., is "another" movement It is also another weight and another quantum of the force of gravitation. The Buddhist philosopher concludes that the falling body is another body in every consecutive moment of its motion, because the quantum of energy is different in every moment and the material bodies in general are nothing over and above the quanta of energy which enter in their composition.⁵

¹ AKB, ad 11 46, de la vaxpess trefn. I, p. 229—280.

² Ibid.

³ *utkarsa* It thus appears that ancient Indian had something in the kind of a dynamical theory of matter, as opposed to a mechanistic one, cp below.

⁴ *laghuita* = *īraṇāitmaḥa*, ср. АKB, ad I 12

⁵ On the motion in a falling body cp. NV, p. 420.

elements representing mental phenomena or moral forces. This decidedly was a back door for the categories of substance and quality partly to reenter into their usual position out of which they were ousted by Buddhism at its start¹. Therefore the division of the momentary elements into primary and secondary did not remain without protest. Vasubandhu informs us that Buddhadeva did not admit neither the central position of pure consciousness among the mental elements of a personality nor the fundamental position of the tangibles among the elements of matter².

The Ceylonese school preserved faithfully the original doctrine, viz, that every element is instantaneous, it cannot last even for two consecutive moments, because nothing survives in the next moment from what existed in the previous one. But in its mediaeval period this school invented a very curious theory according to which the moment of thought was much shorter than the momentary sense-datum³. A kind of preestablished harmony was supposed to exist between the moments of the external world and the moments of their cognition, a momentary sense-datum corresponding to 17 thought-moments. In order clearly to apprehend a momentary sense-datum thought must have passed through 17 consecutive stages, from the moment of being evoked out of a subconscious condition up to the moment of reverting into that condition. If the series for some reason were incomplete, the cognition would not attain clearness. These 17 moments are the following ones: 1) subconsciousness,⁴ 2—3) first movement of thought and its disappearance,⁵ 4) choice of one of the 5 senses⁶ (doors), 5) the sense chosen,⁷ 6) sensation,⁸ 7) presentation,⁹ 8) its affirmation,¹⁰ 9—15) emotions,¹¹ 16—17) two moments of reflexion,¹² after which the series corresponding to one moment of the external sense-datum is at an end.

¹ Cp my CG, p 35 ff

² Op AK, IX, cp my Soul Theory

³ Abhidhammatthasamgaho, IV 8 (Kosambi ed, p 18)

⁴ *asita-bhavamga*

⁵ *bhavamga-calana, bhavamga-uecheda*

⁶ *pañcūdāturājjana-cittam*

⁷ *calāhu-viññānam*

⁸ *sampaticchana-cittam*

⁹ *santīrana-cittam*

¹⁰ *vyūthapana-cittam*

¹¹ *javanam*

¹² *īdārammanam*

of existence of the potsherds necessarily follow upon the continuity of the existence of the jar, or not? If not, then the end of the jar is not at all necessary. We may indeed open our eyes as much as you like, we do not arrive at perceiving the end of the jar otherwise than at the moment of its change into potsherds.¹ Thus the necessary end of the jar is not really proved. Now let us admit that it is (*a priori*) necessary, nevertheless when it really happens, we observe that this necessary end depends upon the stroke of a hammer, that is to say, an adventitious cause, it is not necessary at all. The end is not concomitant with unconditional (*a priori*) necessity, you must prove that it does not depend upon a special circumstance. Therefore, since your proof of momentary change is thus repudiated, you really must admit that the recognition of the same jar in consecutive moments of its existence proves that it is one and the same jar (and not "another" jar in every moment). But the Buddhist answers, "Whatsoever is not (*a priori*) necessary, depends upon special causes, just as the colour of a cloth depends upon the dye which has been applied, it is not necessary. If all existing things were likewise dependent for their end upon special causes, then we would have empirical objects which never would have an end, we would have eternal empirical objects. But this is impossible. The necessity of an end points to the fact that the things are so born that they go at the same moment as they are born, they go by themselves, without a special cause, they do not continue in the next moment. Thus it is proved that they change at every moment"

§ 13. MOMENTARINESS DEDUCED FROM THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION.

Whatsoever exists, exists separately ² from "other" existing things. To exist means to exist separately. What exists really has an existence of its own; to have an existence of its own, means to stand out from among other existing things. This is an analytic proposition, since the notion of "apartness" belongs to the essential features of the notion of "existence".³ If something is not apart from other existing things, if it has no existence of its own, if its existence coalesces with the existence

¹ NK, p. 189 21 ff.

² *sarvam prthak*, NS, IV. 1. 36

³ *bhāva-lāṣana-prthakāḥ*, *ibid*

was imagined to replace the cancelled external reality. All the traces of former deeds and all the germs of future thoughts were stored up in that receptacle. In compliance with Buddhist tradition this consciousness was also assumed as instantaneous, but it was evidently nothing but a Soul in disguise and as such was repudiated in the school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.¹ Saint Asanga, the founder of Buddhist Idealism, apparently fluctuated between this theory of a store of consciousness and the mystic idea of the *Mādhyaṃkas*, for whom the individual was but a manifestation of the Absolute or of the Cosmical Body of the Buddha. This manifestation under the names of "Buddha's progeny",² "Buddha's seed",³ "Buddha's womb",⁴ the "element of Buddhahood"⁵ was again nothing but a Soul in disguise corresponding to the *jīva* of the Vedāntins, just as the Cosmical Body of Buddha corresponds to their "Highest Brahma".

In the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti the theory of Instantaneous Being was finally laid down in the form and with the arguments which have been here examined, but it did not exclude the unity of the elements on another plane, from the standpoint of the highest Absolute, as will be explained later on.

§ 16 SOME EUROPEAN PARALLELS

Leibniz declares in the preface to his *Théodicée* that one of the famous labyrinths, in which our reason goes astray, consists in the discussion of continuity and of the indivisible points which appear to be its elements. To reconcile the notion of substance as continuous with the contrary notion of discontinuous elements, he devised his theory of Monads which are not extensive, but intensive and perceptive units. Some remarks on the analogies between Leibnizian and Buddhist ideas will be made later on.

The similarity with the views of Heraclitus has already been pointed out. We have also had several occasions to draw the attention of the reader on some remarkable coincidences between them and the views

¹ Cp. vol II, p. 329, n.

² *tathāgata-gotra*.

³ *sarvagā-bīja*.

⁴ *tathāgata-garbha*.

⁵ *tathāgata-dhātu*. On this problem as well as on the development of Asanga's ideas cp. E. Obermiller's translation of *Uttara-tantra*.

Since an extended body involves position in at least two points of space, extension is not something ultimately real, in every point the thing is ultimately another thing. The same applies to time. The same thing cannot really exist in two different moments, in every instant it is a different thing.¹ Even the moment of sensation and the moments of a thing's apperception refer, in ultimate reality, to two different things. Their unity in the presentation is a constructed or imagined unity.

Thus every reality is another reality. What is identical or similar is not ultimately real. The real is the unique,² the thing in itself, the unrelated thing. All relations are constructed, relation and construction are the same. Ultimate reality is non-constructed, non imagined, non-related reality, the thing as it strictly is in itself, it is the mathematical point-instant.

We will revert to this problem when considering the Indian formula of the laws of Identity and of Contradiction. It is sufficient at present to point out the connection between the law of Contradiction and the theory of Instantaneous Existence. Many philosophers in Europe have laid down the dictum that identity implies difference. A is different from B even if they are identical, and *a fortiori*, when they are only similar. Buddhist philosophy operates with the (transcendental) notion of absolutely dissimilar and non-identical realities which are discrete point-instants.³ Leibniz's principle that there are no two absolutely identical things in nature, the identity of indiscernibles being resolved in a continuity of qualitative change is, to a certain extent, comparable with the Buddhist view, with that capital difference that the discontinuous, unique and discrete thing is the limit of all continuity and is converted into an absolute ultimate existence of the mathematical point-instant.⁴

¹ The example given NBT, p. 4. 6, is evidently chosen with the intention to be approved both by the Buddhist and the Realist, but the real meaning of the Buddhist appears from the remark, *ibid*, p. 4. 8 ff.

² *śalaksanam* = *paramārtha-sat*.

³ Cp. below on the history of the idea of *ksanikāteva*.

⁴ Among modern authors I find the «law of otherness» thoroughly discussed in W. E. Johnson *Logic*, I. ch. XII. The coincidences with Indian speculations are often striking. But the idea that «the real» must be «one» real, and that real being means one being is already familiar to the schoolmen who maintained that «*ens et unum convertuntur*»; it has been enlarged upon by Leibniz and led him to the establishment of the ultimate reality of his Monads.

Dependent Origination,¹ i e., the doctrine which substitutes causal laws for the permanent substratum of passing phenomena

The cause of growing old, continues Bergson,² are not the phagocytes, as the realist imagines, it must lie deeper, "properly vital in growing old is the insensible, infinitely graduated, continuance of the change of form in everything existing". "Succession is an undeniable fact even in the material world."³ The Buddhist, we have seen, also directs his attention to the human body after having noticed the constant change which constitutes the quasi duration of a fire, of sound, of motion or of a thought. The human body is also nothing but constant change. He concludes, "just as the human body, so is also the crystal gem", existence is nothing but constant change; this is a general law, what does not change does not exist, as, e g., the Cosmical Ether. The reason why our thought converts motion into stability is, according to Bergson, the fact that we are "preoccupied before everything with the necessities of action". Out of that duration which constantly "makes itself or it unmakes itself, but never is something made"⁴ "we pluck out these *moments*"⁵ that interest us,"⁶ thought prepares our action upon the things. The Buddhist, we have seen, likewise defines thought as a preparation to purposive action upon things, and reality as a thing, or a point-instant, which experiences this action.

But still more remarkable is the coincidence in the arguments which both the Buddhists and Bergson have drawn in favour of their theories from an analysis of the ideas of non-existence and annihilation. The idea of non-existence is closely related to the problem of the essence of a negative judgment. This problem has been solved in European logic by Ch. Sigwart: negation is but a special kind of affirmation.⁷ This is exactly the Buddhist view, as will be shown in a later chapter. Bergson devotes some of his most eloquent pages⁸ to the development of this theory. On this occasion he establishes that annihilation is a pseudo-idea, that "we speak of the absence of a thing sought for whenever we find (instead of it) the presence of another

¹ *pratītya-samutpāda-vāda*

² *Ibid.*, p. 19—20

³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 287

⁵ *Ital. mine*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

⁷ Cp. *Creative Evolution*, pp. 804, 812

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 287—314

not a thought-construction. The absolutely unique point-instant of reality, as it cannot be represented, can also not be named ¹ otherwise than by a pronoun "this", "now" etc. Consequently it is not a mere name, it is no name at all, it has no name, ultimate reality is unutterable. What is utterable is always more or less a thought-construction. ² Thus it is that the mathematical point-instant is a fiction for the Realist and a reality for the Buddhist, and *vice versa* empirical time or "gross time", ³ "substantial time" ⁴ is a reality for the Realist and a fiction for the Buddhist. Just as the mathematician constructs his velocities out of differentials, so does the human mind, a natural mathematician, construct duration out of momentary sensations.

That space likewise contains no other ultimate reality than the momentary sensation has already been pointed out. ⁵ Dharmakīrti says ⁶ "an extended form exists in the (real) object not (more) than in its idea. To admit that (the extended body) exists in one (unextended atom) would be a contradiction, and to admit that (the same extended body being one) is present in many (atoms) is an impossibility". The extended body being thus a fiction, there is no other issue left than to admit the ultimate reality of the point-instant. ⁷

Whether the honour of having discovered the Differential Calculus must really be attributed to the Hindu astronomers we must leave it for others to decide, ⁸ but in any case they were unquestionably the discoverers of the mathematical zero. The idea of a mathematical limit, therefore, must have been familiar to Indian scholars. ⁹ It is no wonder

¹ TSP, p. 276.

² *śabdā vikalpa-yonayah, vikalpāh śabda-yonayah* (Dignāga).

³ *sthūla-lāla*

⁴ *lāla-pinda*.

⁵ Cp. above, p. 85 ff.

⁶ Cp. NYTT, p. 425 20—*tasmān nārthe na vyñāne*.

⁷ The Thing-in-Itself has been compared with a "Differential of Sensibility" by S. Maimon.

⁸ Dr. B. N. Seal asserts it and Mr. Spottiswoode, the Royal Astronomer, to whom the facts have been submitted, admitted it with reservations, cp. P. G. Ray's *Hindu Chemistry*, v. II, p. 160 ff. (where Dr. B. N. Seal's article is reprinted from his *Positive Sciences of the Hindus*).

⁹ M. H. Bergson asserts that the world of the mathematician is indeed an instantaneous world, it is also *lāṇika* as the world of the Buddhist. He says (Cr. Sr., p. 23—24)—"the world the mathematician deals with is a world that dies and is reborn at every instant, the world which Descartes was thinking of when he spoke of continuous creations". This idea is indeed quite Buddhistic, it sounds as if it were put in Sanskrit—*ye bhāvā niraṇtaram ārabhyanta ite mahāpandita-śrī-*

motionless, for it cannot have time to move, that is, to occupy at least two successive positions, unless at least two moments are allowed it.¹ Is it not just the same as Vasubandhu telling us that there is no motion, because (in the next moment) the thing is no more?² Or Śāntiraksita telling that there is in the second moment not the slightest bit left of what existed the moment before?³ But this instantaneousness, according to Bergson, is an artificial construction of our thought. He thinks that every attempt to "reconstitute change out of states" is doomed, because "the proposition that movement is made out of immobilities is absurd".⁴ However the Buddhist, we have seen, when challenged to explain the construction of motion out of immobility, points to mathematical astronomy which also constructs the continuity of motion out of an infinite number of immobilities.⁵ Our cognitive apparatus is not only a cinematograph, it also is a natural mathematician. The senses, indeed, even if continuity be admitted, can pluck out only instantaneous sensations, and it is the business of the intellect to reconstitute their continuity. Bergson thinks, that if the arrow leaves the point A to fall down in the point B, its movement AB is simple and indecomposable, a single movement is, for him, "entirely a movement between two stops".⁶ But for the Buddhists there are no stops at all other than in imagination, the universal motion never stops, what is called a stop in common life is but a moment of change, the so called "production of a dissimilar moment".⁷ In short, duration for the Buddhist is a construction, real are the instantaneous sensations, for Bergson, on the contrary, real is duration, the moments are artificial cuts in it.⁸

¹ Ibid, 325.

² AK., IV 1

³ TS, p. 173 27, cp TSP. p 183 12

⁴ Op cit, p 325

⁵ Cp above, p. 106

⁶ Op. cit., p 326

⁷ *vyākhyāna-śāstra-utpāda*

⁸ In order to complete the comparison in this point we ought to have considered the Bergsonian Intuition of the artist with the Buddhist theory of an intelligible, non-sensuous, mystic Intuition of the Saint, but this is a vast subject which deserves separate treatment.

it is then bereft of its epistemological foundation. All reality is split in separate elements which are instantaneous. The theory of momentariness is implied in the pluralistic theory of the separate elements of existence. As soon as Buddhism made its appearance as a theory of elements, it was already a theory of instantaneous elements. Having arisen as a spirited protest against the Monism of the Upanishads¹ and of Sāṅkhya, it did not stop half the way, it asserted straight off the exclusive reality of the minutest elements of existence.² These elements were not mathematical points however, they were momentary sense-data and thought-data, linked together in an individual life only by the laws of causal interdependence. It would have been natural to assume that the Buddhists arrived at this precise formulation gradually, and that the starting point of the development was the general and very human consideration of impermanence as it naturally suggests itself to the mind in common life. However it seems that at the time when the fundamental principles of Buddhism were laid down, the formula «no substance, no duration, no other bliss than in Nirvāṇa» already referred not to simple impermanence, but to the elements of existence whose ultimate reality was confined to the duration of a single moment, two moments being two separate elements.³

¹ Just as in the history of Vedānta we have here mutual indebtedness. The early Buddhists were influenced by Sāṅkhya ideas, but later on the Pātañjala-Yogas were very strongly influenced by the formulas of the Sarvāstivādins, cp my CC, p. 47.

² If we accept the highly ingenious suggestion of the late M. E. Senart, that the term *sattāya-drsti* is initially a corruption of *sattārya-drsti*, we will see that the fundamental tenet of the Sāṅkhyas becomes a fundamental error for the Buddhists. The Sāṅkhyas (and Ājīvikas) maintain that everything, although constantly changing, exists eternally, nothing new appears in the world and nothing disappears, the Buddhists, on the contrary, maintain that everything exists instantaneously, it appears out of nothing and reverts at once into nothing, there is no *sub*-stance at all. Both these theories are radical (*ekānta*), they deny the categories of Inherence, Substance and Quality, deny the eternal atoms and maintain infinite divisibility, they are both opposed in these points by the Vaiśeṣikas. The central point at issue seems to have been the problem of Inherence. Vaiśeṣikas, and probably the early Yogas, admitted it, Sāṅkhyas and Buddhists rejected it, although from opposite sides. The «radical» standpoint of the Buddhists seems to have been their original view. The character of the deviations from it in the schools of the Vātsīputriyas, Sarvāstivādins, Kūśyapīyas and others clearly shows that the «radical» view of separate and momentary elements lies at the bottom.

³ CC, p. 38

Not even two moments of duration are allowed them. Just as there is no real motion, because there is no duration, just so there can be no real production, because time is needed for that production. The realistic idea of motion, as has been pointed out, implies «a connection of contradictory opposed predicates, for instance, the being and not being of one and the same thing in one and the same place».¹ The realistic idea of causation, likewise, implies the simultaneous existence of two things of which the one operates or «works» in producing the other. Cause and effect must exist simultaneously, during some time at least, in order that the action of the one upon the other should take place. According to the realist the potter and the pot exist simultaneously. But for the Buddhist the potter is only a series of point-instants. One of them is followed by the first moment of the series called a pot. The run of the world-process is impersonal. There are no enduring Ego's who could «work». Therefore the cause can exist no more when the effect is produced. The effect follows upon the cause, but it is not produced by it. It springs up, so to speak, out of nothing,² because a simultaneous existence of cause and effect is impossible.

The *Vaiṣṇavikas*³ among the Buddhists admit the possibility of simultaneous causation, when two or more coexisting things are mutually the causes of, i. e., dependent on, one another. But this evidently is a misunderstanding, because of the following dilemma.⁴ Does the one of the simultaneously existing things produce the other when it is itself already produced or before that? It clearly cannot produce it before having been produced itself. But if it is produced itself, the other thing, being simultaneous, is also produced, it does not need any second production. Efficient causation becomes impossible. Simultaneous causation is only possible if cause and effect are static and their causation is imagined as going on in an anthropomorphic way,⁵ for instance, the pot can then exist simultaneously with the potter. But the cause does not seize the effect with a pincer,⁶ and does not pull it into existence. Neither does the effect spring up into existence out of

¹ *OPR*, of Time, § 5 (2 ed.), cp. above p. 86

² *abhiññā bhavati*

³ *TSP*, p. 175. 24. There are the *sahabhū-hetu* and *samprayukta-hetu*, cp. *CO* p. 30 and 106

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 176. 1

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 176. 6

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 176. 12

of absolute change implies the idea that only the present exists. The past does not exist, because it exists no more, and the future is not real, because it does not yet exist. To this the Sarvāstivādins objected that the past and the future are real, because the present has its roots in the past and its consequences in the future. The Kāśyapīyas divided the past into a past whose influence has been exhausted and a past whose influence has not yet been exhausted. The second they maintained was real, the first was not real. This theory involved the danger of shifting into the pale of Sāṅkhya with its permanent stuff and its changing manifestations. In fact some Sarvāstivādins divided the elements in a permanent essence and momentary manifestations.¹ They nevertheless protested against the accusation of drifting into Sāṅkhya. All elements, they maintained, were instantaneous, they appeared and disappeared just at the same moment.²

Vasubandhu informs us³ that the theory of the Sarvāstivādins was an innovation of the «exegetical literature», i. e., it was introduced by the ābhidharmikas, and it is not found, according to him, in the genuine Discourses of the Buddha. The school of the Sautrāntikas, that is to say, that school which proclaimed on its banner a return to the genuine doctrine of the Discourses, denied therefore the permanent essence of the elements and reestablished the doctrine that reality consists of momentary flashes, that the «elements appear into life out of non-existence and return again into non-existence after having been existent» for a moment only. «When a visual sensation arises, says Buddha in one of his discourses, there is absolutely nothing from which it proceeds, and when it vanishes, nought there is to which it retires»⁴. But although arising «out of nothing» the elements are interdependent, i. e., connected by causal laws which evoke an illusion of their stability.

A further deviation from the principle of separate, momentary and equal elements consists in the division of Matter into primary and secondary elements and in the difference established between a central element of pure consciousness as separate from the secondary

¹ Cp. Vasubandhu's exposition, transl. in CC, p. 76 ff., cp. O. Rosenberg, *Problems*.

² It is clear that the Sarvāstivādins tackled the same problem which occupies our modern *Geltungs-philosophie*: the past, just as the universal, does not «exist», but it is real, since it is valid (*es gilt, es hat Bedeutung*).

³ CC, p. 90.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

there is a change in the result.¹ The full meaning and all the implications of these formulas disclose themselves when we consider that they are intended to repudiate and replace other theories which existed at the time in India and which Buddhism was obliged to fight. There were the theories of the Sāṅkhya school, of the Realists and of the Materialists. According to the Sāṅkhya school, as already mentioned, there is no real causation at all, no causation in the sense of new production, no «creative»² causation. The result is but another manifestation of the same stuff. The so called production is no production at all, because the result is identical, i. e., existentially identical, with its causes; it is a production out of one's own Self.³ The Realists, on the other hand, consider every object as a separate whole,⁴ a whole which is an additional unity to the parts out of which it is composed. When causation operates, this whole receives an increment,⁵ produces an outgrowth, a new whole is produced. Between the two wholes there is a bridge, the fact of Inherence,⁶ a link which again is a separate unity. Every case of causation is therefore not a causation out of its own Self, but a causation *ex alio*, out of another Self.⁷ A third theory admitted haphazard production⁸ and denied all strict causal laws. To these three theories the Buddhist answer is: «not from one's own Self, not from another Self, not at haphazard are the things produced. In reality they are not produced at all, they arise in functional dependence upon their causes».⁹ There is no causation in the sense of one eternal stuff changing its forms in a process of evolution, because there is no such stuff at all, this stuff is a fiction. There is also no causation in the sense of one substance suddenly bursting into another one. Neither is there haphazard origination. Every origination obeys to strict causal laws. It is not a form of any abiding stuff, of any *sub-stance*, it is an evanescent flash of energy, but it appears in accordance with strict causal laws.

¹ *tad-bhāva-bhāvītra, tad-cil āra-cil āvītra*

² *ārambha*

³ *svata utpādaḥ.*

⁴ *arayanin.*

⁵ *aiśārya-ādhāna.*

⁶ *samarāya.*

⁷ *parata-utpādaḥ*

⁸ *adhītya-samutpāda = yādrecchā-vāda.*

⁹ *na svato, na parato nāpy ahītyaḥ, pratītya tat samutpannam, notparanari tat svabhāvatam*

This theory seems to be quite unknown in all other schools. But the fundamental idea of no duration and no substance has evidently guided those who invented it.

In the first period of Mahāyāna the theory of Instantaneous Being lost every importance, since in the empirical plane the school of the Mādhyamikas had nothing to object against naive realism¹ and in regard of the Absolute it admitted only a cognition through mystic intuition.

However the theory of Instantaneous Being was reasserted in the second period of the Mahāyāna, in the school of the Yogācāras, in Buddhist Idealism. This school began by maintaining the reality of thought on the principle of *cogito ergo sum*.² The elements of thought were assumed as instantaneous, but the school at the same time aimed at maintaining the reality of the whole without denying the reality of the parts. The ultimate elements were divided in three classes: pure or absolute existence,³ pure imagination⁴ and a contingent reality between them.⁵ The first and last class were admitted as two varieties of reality, the second, pure imagination, was declared to be unreal and non-existent. In this threefold division of the elements we have already the germ of that radical discrimination between sensible reality and imaginative thought which became later on, in the school of Dignāga, the foundation stone of his theory of cognition.

But although the theory of Instantaneous Being has been reintroduced by Buddhist Idealism, it did not enjoy an unconditioned sway. Just as in the Hmayāna period the categories of substance and quality although officially banned, always tended to reappear through some back-door,⁶ just so in the idealistic period the notion of a Soul, although it continued to be officially repudiated — Buddhists still remain the champions of Soullessness — nevertheless haunted the domain of Buddhist philosophy and tended to introduce itself in some form or other into the very heart of Buddhism. At first a "store house of consciousness" ⁶

¹ Cp above, p 12

² *pari-nispanna*.

³ *pari-kalpita*.

⁴ *para-tantra*.

⁵ Cp CC, p 35

⁶ *ālaya-vijñāna* On the rearrangement of the system of the elements of existence by Asanga cp. L de la Vallée Poussin, Les 75 et les 100 dharmas, Museon, VI, 2, 178 ff The system of Asanga includes *ālaya-vijñāna* among the *samskṛta* and *tathatā* among the *asamskṛta-dharmas*

empirical cognition¹ that we do not perceive the distinctness of "similar" moments² and assume that they represent substance and duration³

Thus it cannot be doubted that we have in Buddhism a very sharply expressed theory of causation, in the sense of Functional Interdependence

§ 3. CAUSATION AND REALITY IDENTICAL

Thus it is that, according to the Buddhists, reality is dynamic, there are no static things at all. "What we call existence, they are never tired to repeat, is always an action".⁴ "Existence is work" — says Śāntirakṣita Action and reality are convertible terms "Causation is kinetic".⁵ It is an anthropomorphic illusion to suppose that a thing can exist only, exist placidly, exist without acting, and then, as it were, suddenly rise and produce an action. Whatsoever exists is always acting.

The conclusion that whatsoever really exists is a cause, is urged upon the Buddhist by his definition of existence quoted above. Existence, real existence, is nothing but efficiency.⁶ Consequently what is non-efficient, or what is a non-cause, does not exist. "A non-cause, says Uddyotakara,⁷ addressing himself to the Buddhist, is double, it is for you either something non-existing or something changeless". Kamalaśīla⁸ corrects this statement of Uddyotakara and accuses him of not sufficiently knowing the theory of his adversaries, "because, says he, those Buddhists who are students of logic⁹ maintain that a non-cause is necessarily a non-reality".¹⁰ Thus

¹ *ajñādivad-arvag-ārśa* NK., p 138 5

² *śāśra-parāpara-utpatti-vilabdhā-buddhayaḥ* (na labdhā-buddhayaḥ), *ibid.*

³ To save the principle of "homogeneous causation" (*sayāsiya-ārambha*), the schools of Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya, as well as the medical schools, in order to explain the formation of new qualities in chemical compounds, have devised very complicated and subtle theories. A very illuminating account of them is given by B N Seal, *op cit*

⁴ *sattava vyūpti*, TS, p 177 2

⁵ *calaḥ . pratītya-samutpādaḥ*, *ibid*, p 1

⁶ *artha-līyā-kārtvam* = *paramārtha-sat*, NBT, I 14—15

⁷ NY, p 416

⁸ TSP, p 140 7.

⁹ *nyāya-vāda* *Bauddhāḥ*, *ibid*

¹⁰ *ālāraṇam asaḍ eva*, *ibid*

of a modern philosopher, M. H. Bergson. It will perhaps not be amiss to reconsider this point once more, in order better to understand, by way of a contrast, the Buddhist point of view. There is indeed much similarity in the form in which the idea of an universal flux has taken shape in both systems, but there is also a divergence in the interpretation of this fact. There is an almost complete coincidence in some of the chief arguments used for its establishment, and there is a capital difference in the final aims of both systems.

The final aim of Bergson is to establish a real duration and a real time, he is a realist. The ultimate reality of the Buddhist is beyond our time and beyond our space, he is a transcendentalist.

The arguments for the establishment of the fact of a universal flux of existence are drawn on both sides 1) from introspection, 2) from an analysis of the notion of existence as meaning constant change and 3) from an analysis of the notion of non-existence as being a pseudo-idea.

"What is the precise meaning of the word „exist“, asks Bergson¹ and answers, "we change without ceasing, the state itself is nothing but a change",² "change is far more radical as we are at first inclined to suppose".³ The permanent substratum of these changes, the Ego, "has no reality",⁴ "there is no essential difference between passing from one state to another and persisting in the same state", it is an "endless flow".⁵

In these words Bergson makes a statement to the effect that 1) there is no Ego, i. e., no permanent substratum for mental phenomena, 2) existence means constant change, what does not change does not exist, 3) these changing states are not connected by a permanent substratum, ergo they are connected only by causal laws, the laws of their consecution and interdependence. The coincidence with the fundamental principles of Buddhist philosophy could not be more complete. Buddhism is called 1) the no-Ego doctrine,⁶ 2) the doctrine of impermanence, or of Instantaneous Being,⁷ and 3) the doctrine of

¹ Creative Evolution (London, 1928), p. 1.

² Ibid, p. 2

³ Ibid., p. 1.

⁴ Ibid., p. 4

⁵ Ibid., p. 3

⁶ *anātma-vāda*

⁷ *ksanika-vāda*

efficacy,¹ the cause and the thing are different views taken of one and the same reality. "The relation of an agent to the instrument and (to the object of his action) is not ultimately real, says Kamalaśīla,² because all real elements are momentary and cannot work at all." If we identify reality and causal efficiency, we can say that every reality is at the same time a cause. If we separate them, we must say that efficiency is impossible, because it involves us into a proposition with two contradictorily opposed predicates, since one thing then must exist at two different times in two different places, i. e. exist and not exist in the same time and place. A jar, e. g., is for the realist a real object consisting of parts, having extension and duration up to the moment when it is broken by the stroke of a hammer. There is causation between the clump of clay and the jar, between the jar and the potsherds, between the potter and the jar, between the hammer and the potsherds. But for the Buddhist a thing, i. e., a moment, which has vanished a long time since, cannot be the cause, cannot produce directly, a thing which will appear a long time hence. "An enduring object, says the Buddhist,³ which should represent a unity (so compact that) its members would cease to be different moments owing to a unity of duration, (such a compact unity) is unthinkable as a producer of an effect". To this an objector remarks⁴ that we cannot maintain that the efficiency of an object changes in every moment of its existence. Experience shows that a series of moments can have just the same efficiency. Otherwise, if the first moment of a blue patch would produce the sensation of blue, the following moments could not do it, they necessarily would produce different sensations. The image of the blue colour would not arise at all, if different moments could not possess together one and the same efficiency. The answer is to the effect that just as in every moment of the blue object there is an imperceptible change, just so there is a constant change in every moment of sensation and in every moment of the image. It is only by neglecting that difference that a seemingly uniform object and a seemingly uniform image are produced.⁵

¹ *sattava vyūprīṣṭiḥ*

² TSP, p. 599 12 — *na pāramārthikāḥ karīḥ-lāraṇāḥ-bhāvo'stī, laṇalāṭanaḥ*
ntroyāpārataḥ sarva-dharmāṇām

³ NK., p. 240, Vācaspati quotes here a Yogācāra Buddhist

⁴ *Ibid*

⁵ *Ibid*

reality».¹ He establishes that annihilation is not something «in superaddition» to a thing, just as production is not something in superaddition to nothing. Bergson even maintains that the nothing contains not less, but more than the something.² Is it not the same as Śāntirākṣita declaring that «the thing itself is called annihilation?»³ Both the Buddhists and Bergson reject as absurd the every day conception of change, of annihilation and motion. Change is not a sudden disaster ushered into the placidly existing thing, neither is annihilation something that supersedes existence, nor motion something added to a thing. Both systems deny the existence of an enduring substance. So far they agree. Bergson's dynamic conception of existence, his idea that existence is constant change, constant motion, motion alone, absolute motion, motion without any stuff that moves⁴—this idea which it is so difficult for our habits of thought to grapple with—is, on its negative side, in its stuff denial, exactly the same as the Buddhist contention. There are, we have seen, on the Indian side three different systems which maintain the theory of constant change; the Sāṅkhya system which maintains that matter itself is constant change; the Yoga system which maintains the existence of a perdurable stuff along a constant change in its qualities or conditions and the Buddhist system which denies the reality of an eternal matter and reduces reality to mere motion without any background of a stuff.

But here begins the capital divergence between both systems. Bergson compares our cognitive apparatus with a cinematograph⁵ which reconstitutes a movement out of momentary stabilized snapshots.⁶ This is exactly the Buddhist view. He quotes the opinion of Descartes that existence is continuous new creation.⁷ He also quotes the paralogism of Zeno who maintained that «a flying arrow is

¹ Ibid., p. 312.

² Ibid., p. 291; and p. 302—«however strange our assertion may seem there is more in the idea of an object conceived as „not existing“, than in the idea of this same object conceived as „existing“». Bergson, p. 290, reproaches philosophers «to have paid little attention to the idea of the nothing», but this by no means refers to Indian philosophers. Some Hegelians also thought that the Nothing is more than the Something; cp. Trendelenburg, *Log. Untersuch.* I 113

³ Cp. above, p. 95.

⁴ Cp. especially his lectures on «La perception du changement».

⁵ Ibid., p. 322 ff.

⁶ Ibid., p. 322, 358

⁷ Ibid., p. 24; cp. above p. 107, n. 9.

one unity produces the other. The Buddhist objects that a real unity, as experience shows, can never produce another unity. A single atom, for instance, is not "capable" of producing anything else than its following moment. A number of units is always needed in order that a "capacity" should be engendered. The realist does not deny that the seed is only the "matter", a material, i. e., passive cause.¹ There are acting or efficient causes, whose "help"² or efficiency is needed, in order really to produce the effect. The Buddhist answers that if a cause is passive non-efficient, doing nothing,³ it can safely be neglected. The other causes which alone are efficient should then be capable to produce the effect alone.⁴ Thus moisture, heat, soil etc. should produce the sprout without the seed, since the seed is doing nothing.

The point of the Buddhist is that the whole conception of causality by the realist is anthropomorphic. Just as a potter takes a clump of clay and transforms it into a pot, just so are the causes of a sprout working. In order to be efficient they help one another.⁵ This help is again imagined on the anthropomorphic pattern. Just as when a great weight does not yield to the efforts of a number of persons, help is called in, and the weight is then moved, — just so is it with the cooperating causes, they produce the effect when sufficient help is given them.⁶ The material cause "takes them up in itself."⁷ The efficient causes introduce themselves into the middle of the material cause, they destroy or annihilate the latter, and out of the material left they "create"⁸ a new thing, just as masons pull down an old house and construct a new one out of the old bricks.

According to the Buddhist, there is no destruction of one thing and no creation of another thing, no influx of one substance into the other, no anthropomorphic mutual help between the causes. There is a constant, uninterrupted, infinitely graduated change. A result can indeed be compared with something produced by human cooperation. It is then called by the Buddhist "anthropomorphic" result.⁹ But

¹ *samavāyī-kāraṇa*

² *upahāra* = *himat-karati*

³ *akimeti-kara* = *anupalārin*

⁴ SDS, p. 28

⁵ *paraspara-upalārin*

⁶ AK, II. 56

⁷ *sahajāri-samavādhāna*

⁸ *ārabhate himeti nūtanam*

⁹ *purusa-kāra-phalam* = *purusena na kriyam*

CHAPTER II

CAUSATION

(PRATĪTYA-SAMUTPĀDA).

§ 1. CAUSATION AS FUNCTIONAL DEPENDENCE.

„Among all the jewels of Buddhist philosophy its theory of Causation is the chief jewel“, says Kamalaśīla.¹ It is marked by the name of Dependent Origination or, more precisely, „Combined Dependent Origination“. This term means that every point-instant of reality arises in dependence upon a combination of point-instants to which it necessarily succeeds, it arises in functional dependence upon „a totality of causes and conditions“ which are its immediate antecedents. In the preceding chapter the theory of Instantaneous Being was characterized as the foundation, upon which the whole of the Buddhist system is built. The theory of Dependent Origination is but another aspect of it. Reality, as ultimate reality, reduces to point-instants of efficiency, and these point-instants arise in functional dependence upon other point-instants which are their causes. They arise, or exist, only so far as they are efficient, that is to say, so far they themselves are causes. Whatsoever exists is a cause, cause and existence are synonyms.² An ancient text delivers itself on this subject in the following famous words — „All (real) forces are instantaneous (But) how can a thing which has (absolutely) no duration, (nevertheless have the time) to produce something? (This is because what we call) „existence“ is nothing but efficiency, and it is this very efficiency which is called a creative cause“³. Just as real existence is only a point-instant, just so a real cause is only this same point-instant. In other words, existence is dynamic, not static, and it is composed of a sequence of point-instants which are interdependent, i. e., which are causes.

Thus the Buddhist theory of Causation is a direct consequence of the theory of Universal Momentariness. A thing cannot be produced by another thing or by a personal will, because other things or persons are momentary existencies. They have no time to produce anything.

¹ TSP, p. 10, 19

² *yā bhūtiḥ saiva kṛyā*, an often quoted dictum.

³ TSP, p. 11, 5, the stanza is there ascribed to Buddha himself.

"Every variety of cause
 Which brings about the glittering shine
 In a single eye of a peacocks tail
 Is not accessible to our knowledge.
 The Omniscient knows them all".¹

Nevertheless some fairly dependent regularities of sequence can be cognized by us in different lines of causation. Thus two sets of four main "conditions" and of "six causes" with "four kinds of result" have been established in the school of the Sarvāstivādis.² Among them there is a cause which is characterized as "cause in general,"³ a cause which cannot be distinguished by a specific name, because it embraces all the active as well as all the passive (i. e., comparatively passive) circumstances conditioning a given event. The passive circumstances are not absolutely passive, they are also active in a way, viz, they do not interfere with the event, although they could do it. Their presence is a constant menace to it. Vasubandhu⁴ gives a very characteristic example of what a passive cause is.⁵ The villagers come to their chief and in making their obeisance they say "Owing to you, Sir, we are happy". The chief has done nothing positive for the happiness of the villagers, but he has not oppressed them, although he could have done it, therefore he is the indirect cause of their happiness. Thus it is that every real circumstance in the environment of an event, if it does not interfere with its production, becomes its cause. An unreal thing, as e. g., a lotus in the sky, could not have any influence. But a real thing, existing at the moment preceding the production of the thing has always some, direct or indirect, near or remote, influence on it. Therefore the definition of a "cause in general" is the following one. "What is a cause in general?", asks Vasubandhu,⁶ and answers with all the expressive force of the scientific Sanskrit style — "With the single exception of one's own self, all the elements (of the universe) are the general cause of an

¹ AK IX, cp my Soul Theory, p 940

² Cp below, p 138

³ *lāraṇa-hetuḥ viśeṣa-samyāyāṁ nocyate, 'sāmānyam hetu-bhūtam (apeliya) sa lāraṇahetuḥ* (Yaśomitra)

⁴ AKB, ad II 50

⁵ Cp Sigwart, op cit, II 162 — "auch die Ruhe erscheint jetzt als Ausfluss derselben Kräfte, denen die Veränderung entspricht, sie ist in Bedingungen gegründet, welche keiner einzelnen Kraft eine Action gestatten"

⁶ *etam viśvā saris dhatuḥ svato'nye lāraṇa-hetuh* cp. AK, II 50

a tight embracement by its cause, just as a girl escaping to the tight embracement of her lover.¹ Neither the cause nor the effect really do any work, they are «forceless», «out of work», «unemployed».² If we say that a cause «produces» something, it is only an inadequate conventional³ expression, a metaphor.⁴ We ought to have said: «the result arises in functional dependence upon such and such a thing».⁵ Since the result springs up immediately after the existence of the cause, there is between them no interval, during which some «work» could be done. There is no operating of the cause, this operating produces nothing.⁶ The mere existence of the cause constitutes its work.⁷ If we therefore ask, what is it then that is called the «operation» of a cause producing its effect, and what is it that is called the «dependence» of the effect upon its cause, the answer will be the following one: we call dependence of the effect upon its cause the fact that it always follows upon the presence of that cause and we call operation of the cause the fact that the cause always precedes its effect.⁸ The cause is the thing itself, the bare thing, the thing cut loose of every extension, of every additional working force.⁹

§ 2. THE FORMULAS OF CAUSATION.

There are three formulas disclosing the meaning of the term «Dependent Origination». The first is expressed in the words «this, being, that appears».¹⁰ The second says — «there is no real production there is only interdependence».¹¹ The third says — «all elements are forceless».¹² The first and more general formula means that under such and such conditions the result appears, with a change of conditions

¹ Ibid., p. 176 13

² *nirvāṇapūram eva*, ibid

³ *saṃketa*

⁴ *upalakṣaṇam*

⁵ *tat tad āśrītya utpadyate*, ibid, p. 176 24

⁶ *akimbat-lāra eva vyūpārāḥ*, ibid., p. 177 3.

⁷ *sattāna vyūprītiḥ*, TS, 177. 2.

⁸ TSP, p. 177, 11

⁹ Ibid., p. 177 3 — *castu-mātram vīlakṣaṇa-vyūpāra-rahitam hetuḥ*, ibid, p. 177. 23

¹⁰ *asmiṃ sati idam bhavati* cp CC, p. 28. ff

¹¹ *pratītya tat samutpannam notpannam tat svabhāvataḥ*.

¹² *nirvāṇaparāḥ (akimbat-larāḥ) sarve dharmāḥ*.

indicated. According to a tradition which we have no reason to disbelieve, the Special Theory of Causation¹ has been established by Buddha himself in defense of Free Will and against a theory of wholesale Determinism. This problem, which has always perplexed almost all the human race, was also vehemently discussed at the time of Buddha. He had singled out for special animadversion the doctrine of one of his contemporaries, Gosāla Maskariputra, who preached an extreme determinism and denied absolutely all free will and all moral responsibility. According to him all things are unalterably fixed and nothing can be changed.² Everything depends on fate, environment and nature. He denied all moral duty and in his personal behaviour indulged in incontinence. Buddha stigmatized him as the "bad man" who like a fisherman was catching men only to destroy them. He rejected his philosophy as the most pernicious system. "There is free action, he declared, there is retribution", "I maintain the doctrine of free actions".³

But on the other hand we are confronted by the statement that nothing arises without a cause, everything is "dependently originating". Vasubandhu, the second Buddha, categorically denies free will. "Actions, says he, are either of the body, or of speech or of the mind. The two first classes, those of the body and of speech, wholly depend upon the mind, and the mind wholly depends upon unexorable causes and conditions". We are thus at once landed in a full contradiction.

As against determinism the Buddhists maintain free will and responsibility. As against liberty they maintain the strictest necessity of causal laws. Buddha is represented in tradition as maintaining the paradoxical thesis that there is Liberty, because there is Necessity, viz, necessity of retribution which reposes on Causality.

The solution of the puzzle seems to lie in a difference of the conception of Liberty. For the Buddhist empirical existence is a state of Bondage comparable to a prison. Life by its own principle of kinetic reality is constantly moving towards an issue⁴ in Final Deliverance. It is this movement which the Buddhist imagines as subject to strict causal laws. Movement or life is for him a process.

¹ The twelve membered *pratitya-samutpāda*

² Cp Hoernle, art *Ājīvika* in ERE, cp V. C Law, *Gleanings*

³ *aḥam kṛyāvādin*, cp *ibid.*

⁴ *nibhavana* = *mokṣa*.

It is clear that this theory of causation is a direct consequence of the No-Substance theory,¹ a theory which admits no duration and no extension as ultimate realities, but only a continual and compact flow of evanescent elements, these elements appearing not at haphazard, but according to laws of causation.²

The problem of a psycho-physical parallelism which led in the Sāṅkhya system to the establishment of two substances only, a Matter including all mental phenomena *minus* consciousness itself and a pure Consciousness separated from Matter by an abyss — this problem was very easily solved in Buddhism. Consciousness is a function of such and such facts. Being given a moment of attention, a patch of colour and the sense of vision, visual consciousness appears.³ This interdependence is obvious, because if a change supervenes in one of the causes, a change in the result follows, if the eye is affected or destroyed, the visual consciousness changes or disappears.

The very much discussed question, in India as well as in Europe, whether light can be produced by darkness, whether the day is the effect of the preceding night, is very naturally solved on the Buddhist theory of causation: the last moment of the series called night is followed by the first moment of the series called day. Every moment is the product of the «totality» of its antecedents, it is always different from the preceding moment, but, from the empirical point of view, it can be both, either similar or dissimilar. The moments of the sprout are dissimilar to the moments of the seed. Experience shows that dissimilar causation is as possible as the similar one.⁴ It is a limitation of our

¹ *anātma-vāda*.

² A mediaeval author thus summarizes the four main theories of Causation in a celebrated stanza (Sarvajñātamuṇi, in his *Saṅkṣepa-śāstraka*, 1. 4) —

*ārambha-vādaḥ Kaṇabhakṣa-pakṣaḥ,
saṅghāta-vādas tu Bhāṇanta-pakṣaḥ,
Sāṅkhyādi-pakṣaḥ pariṇāma-vādo
Vivarta-vādas tu Vedānta-pakṣaḥ,*

which may be rendered thus

Creative Evolution is the Realist's contention
The Buddhist answers, «'tis a mass (of moments)»,
«One ever changing stuff», rejoins the Sāṅkhya,
Vedānta says: Illusion!

³ *caḥ suh pratyīya rūpam ca caḥ sur-vyākṣānam utpadyate*

⁴ *vyatītyād apy utpatti-darśanāt*. Tipp., p. 30 18.

either by reward or punishment. The law according to which a moral, resp. immoral, deed must necessarily have its fruition, is the law of *karma*.

If something happens as a consequence of former deeds,¹ it is not *karma*, that is to say, it will have no further consequence, it is quasi-automatic. In order to have a consequence the action must be free,² i. e., it must be produced by a strong effort of the will.³

The law of *karma* has been revealed by Buddha. It cannot be proved experimentally. It is transcendental.⁴ But when critically examined it will be found to contain no contradiction and therefore it can be believed even by critical minds. The so called Free Will is nothing, but a Strong Will and the law of *karma*, far from being in conflict with causality, is only a special case of that causality.

Thus it is that the Buddhist Free Will is a freedom inside the limits of Necessity. It is a freedom to move without transgressing the boundaries of causation, a freedom inside the Prison of Dependent Origination. However this prison has an issue. Another postulate of Buddhism, besides the law of *karma*, seems to be the firm conviction that the sum-total of good deeds prevails over the sum-total of bad deeds. The evolution of the world process is an evolution of moral progress. When all good deeds will have brought their fruition, Final Deliverance will be attained in Nirvāṇa. Causation is then extinct and the Absolute is reached. Nāgārjuna says — "having regard to causes and conditions (to which all phenomena are subjected, we call this world) phenomenal. This same world, when causes and conditions are disregarded, (the world *sub specie aeternitatis*) is called the Absolute."⁵

§ 8. THE FOUR MEANINGS OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION.

In all the phases of its historical development Buddhism remained faithful to its theory of Causation. But successive generations, in the

¹ *vipākā* = *karma-phala*

² *svavipākā* = *karma*

³ Cp. AKB, ad II. 10 ff. Macrocosmically regarded, since we cannot know all causes and conditions of a given action, it seems as though it were free, but every single moment of the will (*cetanā*), microcosmically regarded, cannot but appear in strict conformity to the totality of all preceding moments. Apparent freedom consists in our ignorance of all the minutest influences.

⁴ Cp. above, p. 77.

⁵ Cp. my Nirvāṇa, p. 48. On the difficult problem of vindicating the Moral Law in a phenomenal world. cp. ibid., p. 127 ff.

means that to be real is nothing but to be a cause, whatsoever exists is necessarily a cause. This discussion between the Realists and the Buddhists refers to the problem of the reality of space, whether it be an empty space or a *plenum*, a space filled up by the cosmical ether. The early Buddhists, those that were not students of logic, assumed an empty space¹ which nevertheless was for them an objective reality, an element, a *dharma*, an unchanging and eternal reality, similar to their unchanging and eternal Nirvāṇa. The realists filled this space with an eternal motionless and penetrable substance, the cosmical ether.² The later Buddhists, those that studied logic, discarded the reality of such an unchanging motionless and eternal stuff, on the score that what does never change, and does not move, does not exist; existence is change.

In this instance as in many others the historian of philosophy will, I believe, find it noteworthy that the Buddhists went through a course of argumentation that offers some analogy to modern physics.

§ 4. TWO KINDS OF CAUSALITY.

However, there are two different realities, a direct one and an indirect one. The one is ultimate and pure,—that is the reality of the point-instant. The other is a reality attached to that point-instant, it is mixed with an image artificially constructed by the faculty of our productive imagination. That is the reality of the empirical object. Consequently there are also two different causalities, the ultimate one and the empirical one. The one is the efficiency of the point-instant, the other is the efficiency of the empirical object attached to that point-instant. And just as we have pointed to a seeming contradiction between the two assertions that "reality is kinetic" and that "motion is impossible", just so are we faced by another contradiction between the two assertions that "every point of reality is efficient" and that "efficiency is impossible". Indeed, as has been stated above, all elements of reality are "inactive",³ because being momentary they have not the time to do anything. The solution of the contradiction lies in the fact that there is no separate efficiency, no efficiency in superaddition to existence, existence itself is nothing but causal

¹ AK., I 5

² *ālāso nityaś ca akriyāś ca.*

³ *nityāpāra*

mixed them up, as though they were the same theory,¹ or the one a part of the other

The special theory aims at explaining the notorious and puzzling fact that Buddhism assumes a moral law, but no subject of this law. There are good deeds and a reward for them, there are bad deeds and punishments. There is a state of Bondage and a state of Final Deliverance. But there is no one who commits these deeds, no one who abides in a state of Bondage and no one who enters into Final Deliverance, no Soul, no Ego, no Personality. There are only groups of separate elements, physical and mental, which are interrelated, which form themselves and which unform themselves. They are subject to a Moral Law, the law of a progressive development towards Final Eternal Quiescence. But a personal agent, an abiding spiritual principle, the subject of the moral law, is not at all necessary. «I declare, said Buddha, that there are voluntary deeds and there is a reward for them, but the perpetrator of these deeds does not exist at all

¹ Abhidhammatthasamgaho, VIII 3 (D. Kosambi's ed.) - Anuruddha evidently reproves those *ācāryas* who have, like Buddhaghosa in the *Visuddhimaggo*, mixed up the *paticca-samuppāda-nayo* with the *pañhāna-nayo*. Here the term *pratitya-samutpāda* is attached to the special theory, and the general goes under the name of *pañhāna*. It is the reverse with Nāgārjuna who calls the general theory by the name of *pratitya-samutpāda* and indicates the special one by the name of the 12 *nidānas*. Śāntiraksita (kar 544) apparently understands both theories by the term of *pratitya-samutpāda*. The SDS, p 40 ff, basing upon some Yogācāra-sources, distinguishes between a *pratitya-upanibandhana* *pr s. utp* in the sense of causes cooperating blindly, without any conscious agent, and a *hetu-upanibandhana* *pr s. utp* in the sense of an immutable order of causal sequences including the 12 *nidānas* of the Hinayāna and the *dharmatā* of Mahāyāna, both theories implying also the denial of a conscious agent. The term thus implies 1) strict determinism, 2) cooperation, 3) denial of substance, 4) denial of an agent. Its synonyms are *pratitya-samutpāda* = *samskṛti* = *sambhūti* - *kāritva* = *samskāra-vāda* = *eka-līyā-kāritva* = *kaṇa-bhanga-vāda* = *mahāvāha-vāda* = *anātmavāda* = *puṇyā* (Hinayāna) = *sāra-dharma-sūnyatā* (Mahāyāna) = *paraspara-apeka-vāda* (Relativity). The opposite theory of the Vaiśeṣika is characterized by the following synonymic terms — *paraspara-upakāra-vāda* = *ārambha-vāda* = *sahakāra-samavādhāna-vāda* = *sthira-bhāva-vāda* = *asat-kārya-vāda* = *parata-utpāda-vāda*. The theory of the Sāṃkhya is called *sat-kārya-vāda* = *svata-utpāda-vāda* = *prakṛti-vāda* = *parimāna-vāda*. The theory of the Vedāntins is called *avarta-vāda* = *māyā-vāda* = *brahma-vāda*. The theory of the Materialists is called *adhītya-samutpāda-vāda* = *śūdrachā-vāda*. The Buddhists deny the Sāṃkhya (*na satatā*), the Vaiśeṣika (*na parata*) and the Materialist (*nāpy ahetutā*) theories. But the Mādhyamika theory can also be called *māyā-vāda*.

There are thus two causalities, the one real ultimately, the other real contingently or empirically, just as there are two realities, the transcendental reality of an instant and the empirical reality of a thing of limited duration. Dharmottara,¹ answering an objector who remarks that if causation is only imagined, it cannot be real, says, "Yes, but although serial existences, (i. e. objects having duration) are not realities, their members,² the point-instants, are *the reality*..."³ "When an effect is produced, we do not really experience causation itself as a sensible fact (separately from the effect). But the existence of a real effect presupposes the existence of a real cause, therefore (indirectly) the relation of causality is also necessarily a real one",⁴ i. e., empirical causality is contingently real

§ 5. PLURALITY OF CAUSES.

A further feature of the Buddhist theory of causation consists in the contention that a thing never produces anything alone. It is followed by a result only if it combines with other elements which are therefore called co-factors.⁵ Therefore the term "Dependent Origination" becomes synonymous with the term "Combined Origination".⁶ This contention is expressed in the following formula,

«Nothing single comes from single,
Nor a manifold from single»,

or with a slight modification,

«Nothing single comes from single,
From a totality everything arises».⁷

This totality is composed of causes and conditions and different classifications of them have been attempted almost in every Buddhist school.

For the Realists causation consists in the succession of two static things. In this sense causation is for them a one-to-one relation,

¹ NBT., p. 69 l ff

² *santāninas*

³ *vastu-blūta*

⁴ Ibid., p. 69. 11.

⁵ *samśāra*.

⁶ *samśrītatvam = prāpīya-samutpānatvam = sambhūya-lāritva = dharmatā*

⁷ *na kīncid ekam ekasmāi, nāpy ekasmād anekam, or na kīncid ekam ekasmā samagryāḥ sarīra-sampattēḥ, passim.*

arises in mutual dependence on the former. The fact of memory is also sufficiently explained by causal laws without assuming a "store house" of former impressions. Neither are bondage and deliverance the properties of some one who is being bound up and then delivered. But the elements of ignorance, of birth and death produce the run of phenomenal life, they are called bondage; when these elements disappear in the face of an absolute knowledge, the ensuing pure consciousness is called deliverance, for it has been said "consciousness itself, polluted by passions and ignorance, is phenomenal life, that very consciousness when freed from them is called deliverance".¹

The generalized theory of causation applies the same principles of denying the existence of any permanent element and of assuming exclusively an interdependence between separate impermanent elements to all phenomena in general, i. e., to all sense-data, to sensations, ideas and volitions. Every individual fact, every point-instant of reality is conditioned, according to this theory, by a sum total of causes and conditions; this totality can then be analysed in some special lines of causal dependence.

The different lines of such causal dependence are differently represented in the schools of the Hīnayāna. This alone could be a sufficient proof of the later origin of the doctrine. The school of the Sarvāstivādins distinguishes between four conditions and six kinds of causes. There is no hard and fast line of demarcation, at that stage of the doctrine, between what a cause and what a condition is. The list of six causes seems to be a later doctrine which came to graft itself upon the original system of four "conditions". These conditions-causes are the following ones:

1. Object-condition,² this cause embraces everything existing. All elements,³ so far they can be objects of cognition, are object causes.

2. The immediately preceding and homogeneous condition;⁴ it represents the immediately preceding moment in the stream of thought and is thus intended to replace the Ego or the inherent cause⁵ of the Vaiśeṣikas. It originally referred only to mental causation,

¹ Ibid., p. 184

² *ālambana-pratyaya*.

³ *sarvā dharmāḥ* = *chos* *thams-cad* (*dmigs-rgyu*)

⁴ *śamanantara-pratyaya*

⁵ *śamavāya-lāraṇa*

instead of explaining every causation as a process resembling human cooperation, he regards even this human cooperation as a kind of impersonal process. All cooperating causes are convergent streams of efficient moments. They are called "creeping" causes¹ since there movement is a *staccato* movement. In their meeting-point² a new series begins. Material, static and passive causes do not exist at all. Cause, efficiency or *moment* are but different names for the same thing. When the soil, moisture heat and seed series of moments unite, their last moments are followed by the first moment of the sprout. Buddhist causality is thus a many-one relation. It receives the name of a "one-result-production" theory³ and is contrasted with the "mutual-help", or "mutual-influence"⁴ theory of the Realists.

Dharmottara⁵ says: "Cooperation can be of a double kind. It either is (real) mutual influence or it is the production of one result (without real mutual influence). (In Buddhism), since all things are only moments, the things cannot have any additional outgrowth. Therefore cooperation must be understood as one (momentary) result produced by, (i. e., succeeding to, several simultaneous moments)". That is to say, cooperation which is indispensable in every act of causation must be understood as a many-one relation.

§ 6. INFINITY OF CAUSES.

If causality is a many-one relation, the question arises whether these "many" are calculable, whether all the causes and conditions of a given event can be sufficiently known in order to make that event predictable. The answer is to the negative. As soon as we intend to know all the variety of causes and conditions influencing, directly or indirectly, a given event, causation appears so complicated that it practically becomes unrecognizable. No one short of an Omniscient Being could cognize the infinite variety of all circumstances that can influence the production of an event. Vasubandhu says (quoting Rāhula):

¹ *upasarpana-pratyaya*, cp. NK., p. 135

² *sahakāri-melana*

³ *eka-kārya-kāritva*, or *eka-kriyā-kāritva*.

⁴ *paraspara-upakāritva*; *upakārin* = *kimcit-kārin*

⁵ NBT., p. 10. 11, transl. p. 28.

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together with organic development or with the «cause of growth»¹ which constitutes the vanguard or the rampart, behind which the forces of merit or demerit influence the formation of life²

6) Immoral or «all-powerful» cause;³ under this name the different passions⁴ and habitual ways of thought of the ordinary man are understood, which prevent him from seeing the origin and essence of empirical reality and thus prevent him from becoming a Saint.

The result can be of four different kinds, either «automatic»⁵ or «anthropomorphic»⁶ or «characteristic»⁷ or «Final Deliverance»⁸ The first two have already been explained, the third corresponds to our usual idea of a result, e. g., a visual sensation in regard to the organ of vision. The last is Nirvāṇa, as the final result of all life

The Ceylonese school, as already mentioned, has mixed up the special form of the law of causation in twelve consecutive stages of a revolving life with the general law which distinguishes 21 different lines of causation. These 21 lines are easily reducible to the four and six lines of the Sarvāstivādin.

In the Mahāyāna period the doctrine of Dependent Origination is emphatically proclaimed as the central and main part of Buddhism. But its interpretation is quite different. Interdependence means here Relativity⁹ and relativity means the unicity¹⁰ of the separate elements. They are relative «as the short and the long»¹¹ i. e., they are nothing by themselves. The doctrine of the twelve stages of life is declared to refer to phenomenal, unreal, life only.¹² The general theory of causation, the theory of the «four conditions», is denied likewise, as conditional and unical.¹³ But the idea of «Dependent Origination» itself which here means the idea of the Cosmos, becomes the central idea of the New Buddhism.

¹ *upacaya-hetu*.

² Cp. AKB, I 87, cp. CC; p. 84

³ *sarvatra-hetu*.

⁴ *kleśa*.

⁵ *nisyanda-phala*.

⁶ *purusakāra-phala*

⁷ *adhipati-phala*

⁸ *visamyoga-phala*

⁹ *parasparā-a-pekṣatva = pratitya-samutpannatva = śūnyatā = śāli matā*.

¹⁰ *śūnyatva = svabhāva-śūnyatva*

¹¹ *dīrgha-hrasva-ant*

¹² Cp. my Nirvāṇa, p. 134

¹³ Ibid. The doctrine of the «six causes» seems unknown to Nāgārjuna.

event». That is to say, there is no *causa sui*, but with that single exception all the elements of the Universe are the general cause of an event. As soon as the early Buddhists began to analyse existence into an infinity of discrete point-instants, they called them inter-related or cooperating elements.¹ The idea of their mutual inter-dependence was alive to them so as to convert the term «all» into a kind of technical term.² «All» means all the elements as classified under three different headings of «groups», of «bases of cognition», and of or «component parts of an individual life».³ In the theory of causation this idea of the universe as an interconnected whole of discrete elements reappears. It reappears again in the idea of a «totality»⁴ of causes and conditions. The actual presence of an event is a guarantee that the totality of its causes and conditions is present. The effect itself, indeed, is nothing but the presence of the totality of its causes. If the seed and the necessary quanta of air, soil, heat and moisture are present in it, all other elements not interfering, the sprout is already there. The effect is nothing over and above the presence of the totality of its causes.⁵ In this totality the «general cause» is included. That means that nothing short of the condition of the universe at a given moment is the ultimate cause of the event which appears at that moment, or that there is a constant relation between the state of the universe at any instant and the change which is produced in any part of the universe at that instant.⁶

Therefore it is that the inference of the existence of the cause when an event takes place is much safer than the inference from the existence of the cause to the possible advent of its result. The accomplishment of the result can always be jeopardized by some unpredictable event.⁷

§ 7. CAUSALITY AND FREE WILL.

In connection with the theory of Causation the Buddhist attitude relating the great question of Liberty and Necessity must be briefly

¹ *samskāra* = *samskṛta-dharma*

² CC, p. 5 and 95

³ *sarvam* = *skandha-āyatana-dhātavaḥ*.

⁴ *hetu-lāraṇa-sāmagrī*

⁵ Cp. Tātp., p. 80.5—*sahakāri-sāhāyam na prāpter atirecyate*

⁶ Cp. B. Russel. On the Notion of Cause, in *Mysticism*, p. 195.

⁷ Cp the concluding passage of the second chapter of the NBT.

of scholars imagined for it every meaning, possible and impossible, except the meaning of dependent origination. The reason for this partly lies in the circumstance that it seemed highly improbable, too improbable beside sheer logical possibility, that the Indians should have had at so early a date in the history of human thought a doctrine of Causation so entirely modern, the same in principle as the one accepted in the most advanced modern sciences.

The framer of this theory in Europe S. Mach went through a course of reasoning somewhat similar to the Buddhist one. When speculation is no more interested in the existence of an Ego, when the Ego is denied, nothing remains instead of it, said he, than the causal laws, the laws of functional interdependence, in the mathematical sense, of the separate elements of existence. Buddhism has pushed the separateness of these elements to its extreme limit, to the mathematical point-instants, but the formula of interdependence is always the same — "this being that appears".

Since the Buddhist theory of Causation is conditioned by its denial of the objective reality of the category of substance, it naturally must coincide, to a certain extent, with all those European theories which shared in the same denial. The objective reality of substance has been denied in Europe, e g., by J. S. Mill, for whom substance is nothing but "a permanent possibility of (impermanent, i e., momentary) sensation"; by Kant, for whom substance is but a mental Category; in our days by Bertrand Russell, for whom substances are not "permanent bits of matter", but "brief events", however possessing qualities and relations. For the Buddhist, we have seen, they are instantaneous events without qualities and relations in them. For the early Buddhists they are instantaneous flashes of specific energies, for the later Buddhists they are mathematical point-instants. There either is stability in the world or no stability, either duration or no duration. There cannot be both. A "short duration" is very simple from the empirical point of view, but from the point of view of ultimate reality it is an "unending duration". Things are evanescent by themselves, in their nature they can have no duration at all. This is the kind of an answer Dharmakīrti probably would have given to Mr. Russell.

Against the Kantian idea that substance is a category forced upon us by the general nature of our reason and constructed by the reason on the basis of a "manifold of sensibility" — against this the Buddhist would have probably nothing to object, since it implies the

characterized in all its details by the strictest necessity, but it is a necessary movement towards a necessary final aim. Causality does not differ here from finality. For Gosāla necessity evidently means static necessity, a changeless reality, no Bondage and no Final Deliverance. For the Buddhist, on the contrary, necessity is a constant change, a running necessity, steering unavoidably to a definite aim. Thus interpreted the words of Vasubandhu are not in conflict with the declaration ascribed to Buddha.

But the Buddhists were always obliged to defend themselves against the stricture that there is in their outlook no place neither for Bondage nor for Deliverance, since the Ego, the Agent who could be bound up and then delivered does not exist at all. This the Buddhist concedes, but he maintains that the passing stream of events is the only Agent¹ which is required. «There is (free) action, there is retribution, says Buddha, but I see no Agent which passes out of one set of momentary elements into another one, except the Consecution of these elements.² This Consecution has it, that being given such and such points, such other ones will necessarily appear».

There is indeed not a single moment in the mental stream constituting the run of the individual's volitions which would appear at haphazard³ without being strictly conditioned, i. e., «dependently originating». But volition which precedes every bodily action can be either strong or feeble. If it is feeble the action is *quasi*-automatic. It then will have no consequence, it will entail neither reward nor punishment. Such are our usual animal functions or our usual occupations.⁴ But if the volition is strong, the following action will have an outspoken moral character, it will be either a virtuous deed or a crime. Such actions will be necessarily followed by retribution,

¹ *kāraṇas tu nopalabhyate ya imān skandhān vyahāty anyāmē ca skandhān upādattē*, cp TSP, p. 11 13.

² *anyatva dharma-samketam*, «other than the theory of dharmas».

³ In Sāṅkhya karma is explained materialistically, as consisting in a special collocation of minutest infra-atomic particles or material forces making the action either good or bad. In Hīnayāna the will (*cetanā*) is a mental (*citta-samprayukta*) element (*dharma*) or force (*samskāra*) representing a stream of momentary flashes, every moment of which is strictly conditioned by the sum total (*sāmagrī*) or preceding moments. Apparent freedom consists in our ignorance of all the conditions of a given action. Garbe thinks that the Sāṅkhya doctrine contains a contradiction, but it probably must be explained just as the Buddhist one. Determinism means that it is impossible to escape retribution.

⁴ *avijyapathika*.

exact coincidence between Buddhist views and the views recently expressed by Mr. Russell.¹ The same must be said regarding the repudiation of a series of prejudices connected with the common-sense realistic idea of causation. The prejudice that causes "operate,"² that they "compell,"³ the result to appear, the inclination to consider a causal relation on the anthropomorphic pattern,⁴ the prejudice, further, that the result must be "similar,"⁵ to the cause—in all these cases the coincidence is striking. On the negative side the coincidence is almost complete.

On the positive side there is all the difference which lies between a point-instant and a brief event. From the standpoint of ultimate reality there is but very little difference between a brief event and a long event, these characteristics are quite relative. But there is a great difference between duration and no duration. The point-instant is for Mr. Russell a mere "mathematical convenience." For the Indian realists of the Nyāya school it is also, we have seen, a mere idea or a mere name. But for the Buddhist it represents transcendental or ultimate reality. As a limit of all artificial constructions of our reason, it is real, it is *the reality*. There is no other reality than the point-instant, all the rest, whether brief or long, is constructed by our reason on this basis.

We must leave it to the general philosopher to appreciate the value and determine the place which these Buddhist speculations deserve to occupy in the general history of human thought, but we cannot refrain from quoting the eloquent words which the late Professor T. W. Rhys Davids has devoted to this subject. He thus summarizes the impressions of a life-long intimacy with Buddhist ideas: "Buddhism stands alone among the religions of India in ignoring the Soul. The vigour and originality of this new departure are evident from the complete isolation in which Buddhism stands, in this respect, from all other religious systems then existing in the world. And the very great difficulty which those European writers, who are still steeped in animistic preconceptions, find in appreciating, or even understanding the doctrine, may help us to realize how difficult

¹ On the Notion of Cause, in *Mysticism* (1921), p. 187 ff

² *Ibid.*, p. 192

³ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁵ *Ibid.*

measure in which they strove to penetrate deeper into the idea of Interdependent Elements, arrived at different interpretations of it. We accordingly, can distinguish between four main shapes of the theory of Dependent Origination, two of them belonging to the Hinayāna and agreeing with its extreme Pluralism in philosophy, while the two others belong to the Mahāyāna and agree with its extreme Monism.

In early Buddhism there are two different theories of Interdependence, a special one and a general one. The generalized theory is a later development of the special one. That part of the literature of early Buddhism which goes under the name of the Discourses of the Buddha mentions only the special theory, the general theory is contained in the philosophic treatises which are appended to it and are of a later origin. This historical development was clear to the Buddhists themselves. Vasubandhu tells us¹ that the Discourses, because of their popular, intentional character, do not mention the general theory, although it is implied in them. Its clear statement is a creation of the doctors of the Small Vehicle, of the Abhidharmikas.² He accordingly treats the two aspects of the law of causation quite independently. The general laws of causation are expounded by him in the second book of his great compendium, as a conclusion to the detailed enumeration, classification and definition of all the elements of existence.³ Having done with the explanation of all elements, it was natural for him to conclude by explaining their interdependence according to different lines of causation. But the special law of Dependent Origination, which has a special, mainly moral, bearing, is treated by him in the third book, where the different spheres of existence are described. The individual lives or, more precisely, the assemblages of elements, form themselves in these spheres according to the merit or demerit, acquired in former lives, and the special law of moral causation is developed in this context. Both doctrines, the general one and the special one, must be distinguished, and were distinguished even in the later Mahāyāna,⁴ although the problem was tackled there from another side. However they were also often confounded, in olden as well as in more modern times. Anuruddha testifies that many masters of the doctrine (and Buddhaghosa seems to be in the number) have

¹ AK., III. 25, cp. O. Rosenberg, *Problems*, p. 223, and my GC., p. 29.

² Ibid.

³ AK., III

⁴ Cp. my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 134 ff.

CHAPTER III.

SENSE-PERCEPTION
(PRATYAKṢAM).

§ 1. THE DEFINITION OF SENSE-PERCEPTION.

The definition of what a thing really is, according to the Buddhists, can never be given. «If the thing is known, they maintain, its definition is useless, and if it is not known, it is still more useless, because it is impossible».¹ This of course does not mean that the Buddhists themselves did not resort to definitions on every step of their investigations and did not strive to make them as sharp and clear cut as possible, but it means that what a thing is *in itself*, what its essence is, we never can express, we know only its relations. The Indian Realists, just as their European consorts, the schoolmen and Aristoteles their master, believed that the things possess «essences», which it is important to point out. The definition of the element fire, e. g., with them was — «the element which possesses fireness (or the essence of fire) is fire».² This «fireness» was for Indian Realists the essence³ of fire and the definition an abridged syllogism which can be fully expressed in a mixed hypothetical form *modo tollente*,⁴ as, for instance,

Whatsoever does not possess the essence of fire, cannot
be named fire, (e. g., water)
This element possesses fireness,
It is fire⁵

The Buddhists contended that such definitions are useless, since the «essences» do not exist. For them the characteristic feature of all

¹ N. Kandalī, p. 28-22.

² Ibid., p. 28. 15 where the definition of *prthivī* is given.

³ *svarūpa*

⁴ *kevala-vyavrtke-anumāna*.

⁵ For the Buddhists this will be a defective syllogism

No one there is who assumes these elements, who is the bearer of them, who throws them off and assumes a new set of them.¹ They appear and disappear, according to the formulas, "This being, that appears". "They appear not out of one self, or out of another self, nor at haphazard, they are not really produced, they appear in interdependent apparitions".²

The whole of phenomenal life is represented as a wheel in twelve parts. It is conditioned, i. e., the whole series is conditioned, by the central element of our limited knowledge (1). When the element of absolute knowledge is developed, the mirage of phenomenal life vanishes and eternity is attained. In phenomenal life prenatal forces (2) produce a new life (3) which develops gradually its physical and mental constituents (4), its six senses (5), five outer and one inner sense, sensations (6) and feelings (7); a conscious life is produced in the full grown person with his desires (8), free actions (9) and occupations (10), after which comes a new life (11), a new death (12) and so on without interruption, up to the moment when the element of Ignorance which dominates the whole series is extinct, and Nirvāṇa is reached. There is no strictly logical proportion in the twelve stages into which scholasticism has framed the special theory of interdependent elements. One of them rules over the whole of the series (1), another (2) refers to a former, eight (3—10) refer to a present life and the two last (11—12) to a future life.³ The present is attached to the former and is the source of the future, according to the laws of interdependence, without any necessity to assume an abiding principle in the shape of an eternal Soul or an Ego. Kamalaśīla says:⁴ "There is no contradiction at all between the denial of a real personality and the fact that former deeds engender a capacity of having a consequence", neither does it interfere with the fact that "there is not the slightest bit of reality which does survive in the next⁵ moment; nothing survives, the next

¹ TSP., p. 11. 13

² Cp. above, p. 133.

³ Two members of the series — *avidyā*, *samskāra* — refer to a former life, two — *jāti* and *jarā-maraṇa* to a future one, the remaining 8 members to a present life. In Mahāyāna the 12 *māṇas* are called *samkleśa*'s "great impediments" and are distinguished into three classes: three *kleśa-samkleśa* — *avidyā*, *trsnā*, *apādana*, two *karma-samkleśa* — *samskāra*, *bhava*, — and the remaining seven members are styled *jāti-samkleśa*.

⁴ TSP., p. 182. 19.

⁵ Ibid., p. 183. 12.

of knowledge is "non-constructive" which is only another way to state that it is direct, or not indirect. The name for inference in sanscrit means literally "subsequent measurement", it is indirect knowledge by its very name.¹ The existence of things can either be perceived directly or inferred indirectly, there is no other way of cognizing them. The exact measure of what is here direct and what is indirect must be established by the theory of cognition, but we will know it only when we have established what is direct without containing a bit of the indirect, and what is indirect without containing a bit of the direct, in other words, when we have established what is pure sensibility² and what is pure understanding.³ "It is useless, says Dharmottara,⁴ to mention such things as are unanimously admitted by everybody. There is no quarrel about understanding the term "sense-perception" as a direct cognition by an observer whose attention is aroused, of an object lying in his ken. But this simple and obvious fact has given rise to many different interpretations, and the right view will be established through a critique and rejection of the wrong views. Thus it will be established negatively, *per differentiam*. The characteristics given to sense-perception by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti have thus a double aim, 1) to distinguish this source of knowledge from other means of cognition,⁵ and 2) to distinguish the Buddhist conception of it from the conflicting views of other schools.⁶ Thus sense-perception will be established negatively and this is the only way to define it.

The usual definition of sense-perception as that kind of cognition which is produced by the senses, or by a stimulus exercised by an object upon the senses,⁷ is defective in many respects. It, first of all, takes no notice of the general feature of every real cognition *quā* cognition, that is to say, as a new cognition,⁸ cognition of something new, not recognition. And such is only the first moment of

¹ *anumāna* There is an *anumāna-vilāpa* and a *pratyalāsa-vilāpa*, but as a contrast to *nirvilāpala* = *lalpanā-apoḥa*, *anumāna* is the representative of *vilāpa*.

² *śuddham pratyalāsam* = *nirvilāpalam*

³ *śuddhā lalpanā*

⁴ NBT, p. 6. 19 ff

⁵ *anya-cyāvṛtī-artham*.

⁶ *apratyapatti-nirālāsanārtham*

⁷ *artha-indriya-sannilāsa-utpannam*, NS I. 14

⁸ Cp. above. p. 64

but later on, under the name of a «creeping cause»¹ or *causa repens*, it came to replace the *causa materialis* or the inherent cause in general.

3. The efficient, decisive or «ruling» condition,² as its name indicates, is the cause which settles the character of the result, e. g., the organ of vision in regard of visual sensation.

4. The «cooperating condition»,³ such as light etc., in regard of visual sensation. With the preceding one they include together all things existing, since all elements are more or less interdependent.

The set of «six causes» is the following one:

1) The general cause;⁴ it has already been explained above, it also includes all elements of existence.

2) and 3) «Simultaneous»⁵ cause and «interpenetrating»⁶ cause are defined as mutual causation. The second refers only to mental elements, viz, to the fact that the element of pure consciousness,⁷ although a separate element, never appears alone, but always in company of other mental elements,⁸ feelings, ideas and volitions. The first refers predominantly to the law according to which the fundamental elements of matter,⁹ the tactile elements, although they are also assumed as separate elements, never appear singly and without the secondary elements¹⁰ of colour etc. Both these causes are evidently intended to replace the category of inherence assumed by the Realists.

4) The «homogeneous cause»¹¹ with its corresponding «automatical result»¹² are intended to explain the homogeneous run of point-instants which evokes the idea of duration and stability of all objects.

5) «Moral cause» or Karma;¹³ it refers to every deed having a pronounced, either good or bad, moral character. It works predominantly

¹ *upasarpana-pratyaya*.

² *adhipati-pratyaya*.

³ *sahajāri-pratyaya*

⁴ *kāraṇa-hetu*.

⁵ *sahabhū-hetu*

⁶ *samprayukta-hetu*

⁷ *vyākāṇa-citta*.

⁸ *caitta*.

⁹ *mahā-bhūta*.

¹⁰ *bhautika*

¹¹ *sabhāga-hetu*

¹² *niṣyanda-phala*.

¹³ *vipāka-hetu* = *karma*

and it amounts to the contention that only the first moment is really sense-perception, the subsequent image is mimetic. The final outcome of the Buddhist definition is something quite simple, viz, perception is sensation followed by conception, for conception is nothing but the image in a special context. The emphasis however is put on the word "followed", and this makes the definition not simple at all, since the implications of this "followed" are many and deep

§ 2. THE EXPERIMENT OF DHARMAKĪRTI.

But, is not this single moment of pure sensation, just as its corollary the mathematical point-instant, a mere convention? Although produced by a stimulus coming from an external object, but from an absolutely propertyless pure object, is it indeed a reality? It is supposed to be absolutely stripped off from every vestige of an imaginative or constructive element. But is it not itself pure imagination? This question, as is well known, has been asked not only in India. The answer of the Buddhists is the same as their answer to the question regarding the reality of the mathematical point-instant. A single moment, just as an absolute particular, is not something representable in an image, it cannot "be reached by our knowledge",¹ that is to say, it is not something empirically real. But it is the element which imparts reality to all the others. It is the indispensable condition of all real and consistent knowledge. It is transempirical, but it is not metaphysical, it is not a "flower in the sky".

It is not a metaphysical entity like the God of the Nāgārjūniks, the Matter of the Sāṅkhyas, the Universals and the Inherence of the Vaiśeṣikas, or the Soul of all these systems. Dharmakīrti proposes to prove its reality by an experiment in the way of introspection. The metaphysical entities are metaphysical just because they are pure imagination, just because there is no point of reality, no moment of pure sensation to which they could be attached. They are "unattainable as to place, time and sensible quality". But this point and this sensation are present, directly or indirectly, in every act of empirical reality and empirical cognition. Thus we can indirectly prove by introspection.² Dharmakīrti says—"That sensation

¹ NBT, p. 12 19

² *pratyakṣam laipyanāpodham pratyakṣenaiva sādhyate*, *Pram. Vārt.*, III, 126, cp. *Anekānta*, 207, cp. *TS*, p. 874 7 ff

The meaning of the term "Dependent Origination" has changed once more in the latest, idealistic, school of Mahāyāna. It does no more refer to a motionless Cosmos the parts of which have merely an illusive reality. Dependent Origination, on the contrary, means here Motion,¹ a Cosmos which is essentially kinetic.

The contrast between the two interpretations of the principle of "Dependent Origination" in Manāyāna is clearly shown in the initial verses of the treatises of Nāgārjuna and Śāntirakṣita which can be viewed as the exponents of the ideas which prevailed in the first and in the second period of the Mahāyāna respectively. These initial verses contain, as usual, a reverential salutation to Buddha, and praise him as the creator of the doctrine of "Dependent Origination". This doctrine is at the same time shortly but pregnantly characterized. Nāgārjuna says²—"I salute the Buddha who has proclaimed the principle of Dependent Origination, according to which there is no plurality, no differentiation, no beginning and no end, no motion, neither hither nor thither". Śāntirakṣita says—"I salute the Buddha who has proclaimed the principle of Dependent Origination, according to which everything is kinetic, there is no God, no Matter, no Substance, no Quality, no (separate) actions, no Universals and no Inherence; but there is strict conformity between every fact and its result..."

§ 9. SOME EUROPEAN PARALLELS.

Although the Buddhist doctrine of causation has attracted the attention of scholars at the very outset of Buddhist studies in Europe, its comprehension and the knowledge of its historical development have made till now but very slow progress. There is perhaps no other Buddhist doctrine which has been so utterly misunderstood and upon which such a wealth of unfounded guesses and fanciful philosophizing has been spent. We neither have any knowledge of its pre-Buddhist sources, which are probably to be sought in Indian medical science, nor do we know much about the vicissitudes of interpretation it received in the schools of early Buddhism. Nay, although the literal translation of the Sanscrit and Pāli words which have been framed for its designation cannot be anything else than Dependent Origination, the majority,

¹ *Calah pratītya-samutpādaḥ*, TS, p. 1.

² For a more literal rendering cp. my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 69.

Kamalaśīla refers to the same experiment in the following passage.¹ "At the very first moment² when an object is apprehended and it appears in its own absolute particularity, a state of consciousness is produced which is pure sensation.³ It contains nothing of that content which is specified by a name. Thereupon, at a subsequent moment, when the same object has been attentively regarded, the attention deviates⁴ towards the conventional name with which it is associated. After that, after the object has been attentively regarded according to its name, the idea of its (enduring) existence⁵ and other (qualifications) arise; we then fix it in a perceptual judgment.⁶ Now, when these ideas, designating that same attentively regarded object by its name, are produced, how (is it then possible to deny that they) are nothing but mnemonic... (since at that time the object has been not only perceived by the senses, but judged by the understanding). And where is the proof that the consecution of mental states which is here described is rightly observed?⁷ It lies in the (known fact) that when our attention is otherwise engaged, we can cognize (only) the bare presence of something undifferentiated by any of its qualifications. Indeed, because the ideas of an (enduring) substance arise just in the manner here described, therefore, when the attention of the observer is otherwise engaged, when it is directed towards another object, when it is fully absorbed by another object, then, although he sees the object standing before him, but, since his attention is detoured from (the content) of the conventional name of the object he is facing, there is (at that time and) at the very first moment (of every perception) a mere sensation of something (quite indefinite), devoid of every possible qualification.⁸ If this were not the case and if every conscious state would refer to an object containing (in itself) all the qualifications suggested by its name, how could it then happen that the observer who is absent-minded (and who apprehends the object by his senses only), sees a bare thing, a thing devoid of all qualities".

¹ TSP., p. 241. 5 ff.

² *prathamataram*

³ *ākāśhṛtam upajñyate*

⁴ *samaya-ābhoga*

⁵ *sad-ādi-pratyayāḥ*.

⁶ *tad-avyavasthāyī*.

⁷ *ālākṣaṇaḥ*

⁸ *sarva-upādhi-vimūḍha-vastu-mātra-darśanam*

acceptance of a double reality, the ultimate reality of the things by themselves and the constructed reality (i. e., unreality) of empirical things. Empirical causation, but not the transcendental one, is a category.

The standpoint of J. S. Mill would probably have been shared, in the main, by the early Buddhists, since their moments are impermanent sense-data, sensible qualities without any substance. Stability and duration are for the Buddhist nothing but "chains of moments" following one another without intervals. The notion of a "chain of moments" corresponds very nearly to the modern notion of a "string of events". According to Mr. Russel the "string of events" is called one piece of matter,¹ and the events are "rapid, but not instantaneous changes",² they are separated by "small time like intervals".³ "The common-sense thing, says he, is a character which I should define as the existence of a first order differential law connecting successive events along a linear route".⁴ This reminds us of the Buddhist view, with that difference that the events are instantaneous and succeed without intervals or with infinitesimal intervals. If, as Kamalaśīla⁵ puts it, "not the slightest bit of what was found in the former moment is to be found in the next following moment", the change must be instantaneous.

The interpretation of causal laws as laws of functional interdependence, the principle "this being that becomes", we have seen, is also a direct consequence of the theory of "Instantaneous Being". Causality obtains between point-instants, not between stabilities or durations. This is likewise the opinion of Mr. Russel, although we would expect him to assert that they obtain between small pieces of stability and small bits of duration. In the doctrine of a plurality of causes, in the contention that causality is a many-one relation, and in the doctrine of the infinity of causes, the doctrine, namely, that to every particular change there is a corresponding state of the Universe of Being — in these two doctrines there is, it seems to me, an almost

¹ Analysis of Matter, p. 247.

² Ibid., p. 245

³ Ibid. On p. 372 the possibility is admitted that the interval between two points of one light-ray is zero. The interval nevertheless remains for the realist "something mysterious and unaccountable", *ibid.*, p. 375.

⁴ Ibid., p. 245

⁵ TSP, p. 182 12.

eye-disease, owing to which every object appears to them as double, their knowledge will be consistent with one another without being true, i. e., without being consistent with the knowledge of all other people. When one of them pointing to the moon will say, "there are two moons", the other will answer, "yes, indeed, there are two". Their knowledge is consistent with one another, although limited by the condition of their sense-faculties.¹ All empirical knowledge is just in the same position, it is limited by the condition of our sense-faculties.² If we would possess another intuition, an intelligible, non-sensuous intuition which the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas alone possess, we would know everything directly and would be omniscient. But we cognize only the first moment of a thing directly, the operations of our intellect which thereupon constructs the image of the object are subjective. All images are thus transcendental illusions, they are not ultimate realities. In introducing the characteristic "non-illusory" Dharmakīrti had in view, according to Dharmottara, to indicate that in pure sensation, in that differential of all our knowledge, we are in touch with ultimate reality, with the uncognizable Thing-in-Itself.³ The subsequent images, concepts, judgments and inferences

¹ Cp. *Santīnāntarasiddhi*, my translation

² The term illusion *bhṛānti* = *vibhrama* is ambiguous, because it means both the transcendental (*mukhyaḥ bhṛāntiḥ*) as well as the empirical one (*prātibhāsikā bhṛāntiḥ*). Inference, e. g., is illusory from the transcendental point of view (*bhṛāntam anumānam*), but it is consistent (*samvādam*) from the empirical one, cp. TSP, p. 890 14 — *samvāditte'pi* (read so) *na prāmānyam iṣam*. But in TS, p. 894. 16 — *vibhram'e'pi pramānatā* the term *pramāna* is used in the sense of *samvāda avasamvāditva* means *upadarśita-artha-prāpana-samarthya*. When sensation (*upadarśana*), attention (*pravartana*) and conception (*prāpana*) refer to the same object, there is consistency (*samvāda*). The moon and the stars are *deśa-lāla-ālāra-nyatāḥ* and therefore efficient, real and consistent, *samvāda artha-kṛyāsu vyākāra-utpāda-ādisu samarthāḥ*, but they are illusions from the standpoint of transcendental reality, when point-instants alone are real. Cp. NK, p. 193. 16 ff. and NBT, p. 5 ff. The laws of Identity, Contradiction and empirical Causality are the necessary conditions of logical thought or consistent thought, but this logical consistency goes along with transcendental illusion (*bhṛānti, aprāmānya*). No other problem has so deeply interested the Indian philosophers, as the problem of illusion. The theories relating to it are numerous and very subtle. Vācaspati-tīrthī has devoted a special work to that problem, the *Brahma-tatva-samīkṣā*, but it has not yet been recovered. An abridged statement of the principle theories is found in his Tīp, pp. 53—57.

³ NBT, p. 7. 13 — *pratyakṣam grāhye rūpe (=paramārtha-satī) aviparyastam, bhṛāntam hy anumānam sapratibhāse anarthe (=samvrti-satī)*

it must have been for the originator of it to take so decisive and so farreaching a step in philosophy and religion, at so early a period in the history of human thought. . . The doctrine of impermanence of each and every condition, physical or mental; the absence of any abiding principle, any entity, any *sub*-stance, any "soul", is treated, from the numerous points of view from which it can be approached, in as many different Suttas".¹

¹ T. W. Rhys Davids Dialogues, v. II, p. 242.
Scharzhelky, I

intellect, not a reflex of the senses.¹ In criticizing the definition of sense-perception produced by the school of the Naiyāyika, who included the characteristic of non-illusiveness into their definition of sense-perception,² Dignāga remarks that the «object of an illusive cognition is the object constructed by the intellect».³ «Sense-perception, *quā* pure sense-perception, i. e., pure sensation, does not contain any judgment, neither the right one nor the wrong one, because it is non-constructive. Therefore it cannot contain any illusion at all. This consideration of Dignāga falls in line with the above interpretation of Dharmottara, but, according to Dignāga, it makes the mention of «non-illusiveness» superfluous, because non-illusiveness transcendently, means nothing but non-subjective and non-constructive. The second characteristic would be a repetition of the first.

A further consideration of Dignāga for omitting non-illusiveness is the following one. He wanted his logic to be acceptable to both the Realists who admitted the reality of an external object and to the Idealists who denied the reality of an external world. He thought apparently, like some modern logicians,⁴ that logic is not the proper ground to decide these metaphysical problems. The division of cognition into direct and indirect and the logical functions of judgment remain just the same in both cases, whether external reality is admitted or denied. Dignāga rejected Vasubandhu's definition formulated in the *Vādaśāstra*, «sense-perception is that knowledge which is produced by the (pure) object itself»,⁵ because it could be given a realistic interpretation. He, for the same reason, resolved to drop the characteristic of non-illusiveness; it could be interpreted as excluding the view of the *Yogācāras* for whom all empirical cognition was a hopeless illusion. The definition which means that pure sensation is passive, non-constructive, is acceptable for both parties. Jinendrabuddhi⁶ says, «Although convinced that there is no possibility of cognizing the external object in its real essence, (Dignāga) is desirous so to formulate his view of the problem of the resulting phase in the process of

1 According to Dharmottara the part «tree» is a right perception, the part «moving» is an illusion, cp NBT., p 7. 5 ff, and Tipp, p 20 14

2 NS, I 1 4 (*pratyakṣam*). *avyabhicāri*.

3 Pr samucco vṛtti, ad I 19 — *yid-kyi yul m hāhrul-pa yul yin* = *mano-vṛtayo he cāhīraṇa-viśayaḥ*

4 Cp, e g, Sigwart, op cit, I, p 106 and 409

5 *tato arthād utpannam jñānam*, cp Tātp, p

6 Cp. vol. II, p 387 ff, cp Tipp, p 19, and TSP, 392 6

our conceptual knowledge and of language, of all namable things and of all names. is that they are dialectical. Every word or every conception is correlative with its counterpart and that is the only definition that can be given. Therefore all our definitions are concealed classifications, taken from some special point of view.¹ The thing defined is characterized negatively.² What the colour «blue» is, e. g., we cannot tell, but we may divide all colours in blue and non-blue. The non-blue in its turn may be divided in many varieties of colour, according to the same dichotomizing principle. The definition of blue will be that it is not non-blue and, *vice versa*, the definition of non-blue that it is not the blue. This Buddhist theory of names, which can be called Buddhist Nominalism³ or the Buddhist Dialectical Method, will be treated later on. We mention it now, because the definition of sense-perception is framed with an evident reference to it.

What knowledge is in itself we never will know, it is a mystery. But we may divide it in direct⁴ and indirect.⁵ The direct will be the not indirect and the indirect will be not the direct. We may take a view of knowledge which reduces it to physiological reflexes,⁶ we nevertheless will have a division into reflexes direct and indirect, simple and conditioned,⁷ i. e., reflexes and non-reflexes.

The whole science of epistemology is built up on this foundation of a difference in principle between a direct and an indirect knowledge. We may call the direct source of knowledge sensibility and the indirect one—intellect or understanding, but the meaning of these terms will be that sensibility is not the understanding and that understanding is not sensibility.

After having stated that there are only these two kinds of knowledge,⁸ which he conventionally calls perception and inference. Dignāga⁹ turns to perception and says that this source

¹ *apelṣā-vaśāt*

² *yārtti-vaśāt*.

³ *apoha-cāda*

⁴ *sūśāt*.

⁵ *parokṣa*.

⁶ *pratibhāsa (ādarśavat)*.

⁷ *niyata* — resp. *anyata* — *pratibhāsa* (in the sense in which those terms are used in NBT. p. 8. 8 ff).

⁸ Pr. samucc, I. 2

⁹ Ibid., I. 3

being rapidly turned, of a moving tree by a passenger on a boat etc., etc., be alone illusions?¹ «The Master (Dignāga) has dropped the characteristic of non-illusiveness, says Vācaspati-miśra, since that non-illusiveness is suicidal (for the whole system).»²

Dignāga, of course, does not deny that there are illusive or wrong perceptions, but they must be treated separately. Just as there are logical fallacies³ or illicit inferences, just so are there fallacies of perception,⁴ or cognitions illicitly put on the account of the senses, whereas they are produced not by the senses, but by the intellect. These would-be sense-perceptions are of four different kinds.⁵ They are 1) illusions proper, as, e. g., *fata morgana*, they must be put on the account of the intellect, because they consist in mistaking by the intellect of some rays of light for water in the desert; 2) all empirical perception⁶ is a transcendental illusion, for it consists in mistaking an objectivized image for external reality, 3) all inference and its result is illicitly treated as sense-perception, when we, e. g., say, «this is smoke, the mark of fire», «there is fire indicated by the presence of smoke», these judgments are really mnemonic, though illicitly given the form of perceptual judgments; and 4) all memory and all desires, since they are called forth by former experience,⁷ are produced by the understanding, though they often are illicitly given the form of sense-perceptions.

Dignāga thus generalizes the conception of an illusion and puts on the same line the empirical illusion, like *fata morgana*, and the transcendental one, represented by the whole of our empirical knowledge. His sense-perception is pure sensation laid bare of all mnemonic elements. The characteristic of non-illusive in regard of pure sensation is out of place, because such sensation is neither wrong nor right. The real definition of Dignāga means that sensibility must be

¹ Ibid., p. 194 16.

² Ibid., p. 194 17 — *tañ syam abhīrātātā bhāratv eva praharati sty upelāsītā ācāryena*

³ *hetu-ābhāsa*.

⁴ *pratyakṣa-ābhāsa*

⁵ The *kārikā* Pr. samucc. I. 8 can be thus restored — *bhīrātāḥ samvrtti-saṃjñānam anumānānumeyam ca; smrtir abhīlāsāś ceti pratyakṣābham sataumram*, cp. TSP, p. 394 20, where *sataumram* is explained as *ajñānam*, it is also explained as *taumrika-jñānam*, Jīnendrabuddhi contains both explanations

⁶ *samvrtti-saṃjñāna*

⁷ *pūrva-anubhāva*

every cognition. Sense-perception, real sense-perception, or cognition by the senses, is only the first moment of perception. In the following moments, when the attention is aroused, it is no more that pure sense-perception which it was in the first instant. Moreover that usual definition contains a concealed confusion between the proper function of sense-perception and the function of other possible causes of it. For sense-perception has its own function, its own object and its own cause. Its function is to make the object present to the senses,¹ not of course in the sense of forcibly² attracting it into the ken, but by the way of knowledge. Its object is the particular thing,³ since this alone is the real object which, being real and efficient, can produce a stimulus upon the senses. The cause, or one of the causes, is again the particular thing. The general feature of all knowledge is that one of the causes producing it is at the same time its object. How this cause is to be distinguished from other causes or, in other words, what is the fact of being an object, what is objectivity,⁴ will be examined later on. Our main point at present is to determine the exact function of sense-perception. This function consists in signaling the presence of an object in the ken, its mere presence and nothing more. To construct the image of the object whose presence has thus been reported is another function, executed by another agency, a subsequent operation which follows in the track of the first. Therefore the salient feature of sense-perception is that it is not constructive. It is followed by the construction of the image, but it is itself non-constructive. It is sense-perception shorn of all its mnemonic elements. It is pure sense-perception. We would not call it sense-perception at all. It is sensation and even pure sensation, the sensational core of perception. Thus the function of sense-perception is sharply distinguished from the function of productive imagination. The first is to point out the presence of the object, the second — to construct its image. The full definition of sense-perception will accordingly account for this difference. It runs thus: perception is a source of knowledge whose function of making the object present in the ken is followed by the construction of its image.⁵ This definition is very often repeated

¹ *sākṣāt-kāritva-vyūpāra*.

² *na hāthāt*, NBT, p. 8 8

³ *svalakṣaṇa*, NBT, p. 12 13.

⁴ *viśayatā* (*tad-utpatti-tat-sārūpyābhyām*)

⁵ NBT, p. 8 13; 10 12

It would lead us too far, if we would go into all the details of this exceedingly interesting discussion on the nature of illusion and hallucinations.¹ Dharmakīrti maintains that there are illusions which must be put on the account of sensibility and that the characteristic of being non illusive is not superfluous in the definition of sense-perception as a source of right knowledge. Dharmottara concludes the debate with the following statement.² «The causes of illusion are various. They may lie in the external object or in the observer; they may be called forth by a disease of the sense-organ, but they also may be entirely psychical,³ as the visions of mentally diseased people. But in all cases of illusion the sense-faculties are necessarily involved, they are in an abnormal condition».

Thus it is true that the senses do not judge, they contain no judgment at all, neither the right one nor the wrong one, but the senses being in an abnormal condition can influence the faculty of judgment and lead the understanding astray.

This conclusion reminds us of Kant's view when he maintains⁴ that «the senses cannot err, because there is in them no judgment at all, whether true or false. Sensibility, if subjected to the understanding as the object on which it exercises its function, is the source of real knowledge, but sensibility, if it influences the action of the understanding itself and leads it on to a judgment, is (can be?) the cause of error».

Dharmakīrti seems moreover to have disagreed with Dignāga in the appreciation of the understanding in our cognition. According to the latter the understanding is a source of illusion, since it constructs images of reality instead of a direct intuition of it. Although Dharmakīrti shares in this opinion, intuition is for him much wider in extension than sensation. Sensation or sensible intuition is not the only variety of direct cognition. The opposition is for him not between sensation and conception, but between direct and indirect cognition, or between intuition and conception. Sensible intuition is not the

its transcendental limit, it will be fatal for logic, as thinks Dignāga, cp NK., pp. 191—194

¹ A summary of them is found in TS and TSP, pp. 892—896, and by Jmendraśuddhi ad Pr. samucco, I. 8

² NBT, p. 9. 14 ff.

³ Ibid, p. 9. 18 — *vātūdisu lśobham gatesu... adhyātmagatam vibhrama-lāraṇam*

⁴ CPR, p. 239.

is something quite different¹ from productive imagination — can be proved just by introspection.² Indeed, everyone knows that an image is something utterable (capable of coalescing with a name).³ Now, if we begin to stare at a patch of colour and withdraw all our thoughts on whatsoever other (objects), if we thus reduce our consciousness to a condition of rigidity,⁴ (and become as though unconscious), this will be the condition of pure sensation.⁵ If we then, (awakening from that condition), begin to think, we notice a feeling (of remembering) that we had an image (of a patch of colour before us), but we did not notice it whilst we were in the foregoing condition, (we could not name it) because it was pure sensation». ⁶

This experiment of Dharmakīrti offers a remarkable coincidence with the one proposed by M. H. Bergson.⁷ «I am going, says the French philosopher, to close my eyes, stop my ears, extinguish one by one the sensations... all my perceptions vanish, the material universe sinks into silence... I can even, it may be, blot out and forget my recollections up to my immediate past; but at least I keep the consciousness of my present, reduced to its extremest poverty, that is to say, of the actual state of my body». This consciousness, «reduced to its extremest poverty», is evidently nothing but Dharmakīrti's moment of pure sensation, the present moment. Bergson adduces it as a proof that the idea of a nought is a pseudo-idea. The Buddhists refer to it exactly for the same purpose.⁸ But it is at the same time a proof that there is a minimum limit of empirical reality and empirical cognition, and this is just pure sensation.

¹ There is concomitance (*tad-bhāva-bhāvātā*) between a point of external reality (*svaīkāṣana*) and sensation (*pratyakṣa*). The concomitance is positive and negative: when there is a reality there is sensation, when there is no sensation there is no reality. The absence of sensation may be due to the absence of the object, or to its absolute unreality. The first is the case '1' when there is an intermediate space (*vyavāhāna*) preventing sight, i. e., when the object is not in the ken, 2) when the object is absolutely unreal, i. e., metaphysical, unaccessible in time, space and sensible quality (*āśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprahṛsta*), cp. TSP., p. 378 17—18

² *pratyakṣena=sva-samvidstena*

³ *vikalpo nāma-samīrayah.*

⁴ *stūptena cetasā.*

⁵ *akṣa-jñ matih*

⁶ *indriyā gatau.*

⁷ *Creative Evolution*, p. 293.

⁸ Cp. above, p. 93

understanding was imagined as analogous to pure sensation. It was also direct, intuitive, non-conceptive. The first moment of perception is thus, so to speak, a "sensuous sensation", the second an "intelligible sensation". We may call the first a moment of pure sensation and the second a moment of "mental sensation", in order to reserve the term of "intelligible intuition" for the mystic intuition of the Saint. Since this "mental sensation" is an intermediate step between pure sensation and the work of the understanding, it will be mentioned once more in the sequel, when dealing with the problem of judgment.

b) The intelligible intuition of the Saint
(yogi-pratyaksa).

Our intuition is all the while sensuous. It is limited to a moment of vivid and bright reality which is immediately followed by the understanding, trying to explain it in vague and general images, or concepts, vague because general. If we would possess the other intuition, the intuition by the intellect, which would understand reality as directly as we feel it in the first moment of sensation, our knowledge would be illimited. We would know the remote as the near, the past and the future just as the present. We may imagine beings which are free from the limitations of our sensibility. Their cognition will not consist in a weary collaboration of two heterogeneous sources. They will have no need to cognize reality by a circuit of dialectical concepts, they will have only one method of cognition—direct intuition. Of their omniscience we cannot judge, because in order to judge of omniscience we must be omniscient ourselves, but we can imagine that this reality which we have such infinite pains of approaching in our limited constructions they would contemplate directly by an intelligible intuition. Productive imagination, we have seen, is a transcendental illusion, an illusion inherent in all our knowledge. Free from this illusion is only the intelligible intuition of the Saint.

It seems that the theory of the two sources of knowledge and of their limited character, the inanity of imagination and the blindness of the senses were in need, as a counterpart, of a free intuition, in order to characterize our limited cognition by an illuminating contrast. Such must be the logical value of the theory of an intelligible intuition. The agnostic attitude of Dharmakīrti is expressed with great decision and all logical sharpness. His Omniscient Being is the unapproachable limit of human cognition.

Dignāga quotes from the Abhidharmasūtra a passage to the same effect.¹ «A man who is absorbed in the contemplation of a patch of blue, perceives the blue, but he does not know that it is the blue; of the object he then knows only that it is an object, but he does not know what kind of object it is». This quotation which is very often repeated by later authors would indicate that Dignāga had found the germ of his ideas of pure sensation already in the works of the Sarvāstivādins. However, that school admitted three kinds of constructive thought and one of them «natural construction»,² being a germ of constructive thought, was supposed by them to be present even in every rudimentary sensation or sense-perception.

§ 3. PERCEPTION AND ILLUSION.

The second characteristic feature of sense-perception, considered as one of the two sources of right knowledge, is that it must not contain any sense-illusion.³ Indeed sense-perception can be reckoned as a source of trustworthy knowledge⁴ only under the condition that the knowledge produced by a sensation does not represent an illusion of the senses. However it seems quite superfluous to mention this second characteristic of right sense-perception, because, according to the classification of the system, sense-perception is a variety of right, i. e., non-illusory, cognition. Dharmottara⁵ says that the definition would then have the following meaning — «that consistent knowledge which is direct, is consistent,» a perfectly useless repetition of the term consistent through the term non-illusory.

But the term «illusion» is not univocal. There are different kinds of illusions. There is a transcendental illusion,⁶ according to which all empirical knowledge is a kind of illusion, and there is an empirical illusion⁷ which affects only some exceptional cases of wrong cognition. Knowledge can be empirically right, i. e., consistent, without being right transcendently. E. g., when two persons are affected by the same

¹ Pr. samucco vṛtti ad I. 4. The passage is very often quoted (with the variations — *samsargī*, — *samangī*, — *sangī*), cp TSP., 11—12.

² *svabhāva-vitarka*, cp AK., I. 33.

³ *abhrānta*.

⁴ *pramāṇa*.

⁵ NBT., p. 7. 16

⁶ *mūḷhya-vibhrama*.

⁷ *prātibhāsikī bhrāntiḥ*.

Yogācāra school all the importance which usually devolves upon them in Indian philosophy. Some actions are *quasi*-automatic, because the incoming stimulus is followed straight off by a purposeful action¹. But this only seems so, because the intermediate complicated process, being habitual and very rapid, escapes discursive introspection. That does not mean that it is unconscious or not self-conscious altogether. The action of a new-born child when it stops crying and presses its lips on its mother's breast is self-conscious in that sense.² Self-consciousness in this sense is a synonym of life.

The full connotation of this theory of self-consciousness can be elicited only by contrasting it with the doctrines of other schools and after considering its history in India and Tibet. This however is a vast subject wanting special treatment. The following brief indications will be sufficient at the present place.

The standpoint of the Sāṅkhyas and the medical schools has been already mentioned. Self-conscious is only the Soul of the Individual, as a separate, eternal, unchanging substance. All the process of cognition, all its forms as well as feelings and volitions are unconscious in themselves. There are five outer senses and their respective objects, and there is an inner sense³ with the threefold functions of an unconscious feeling of individuality,⁴ an unconscious feeling of the desirable and undesirable⁵ and an unconscious function of judgment.⁶ These functions become conscious through the light thrown upon them by the Soul. Similarly the perception of external objects by the senses is a process unconscious in itself, but receiving consciousness through a reflection in the Soul. Introspection is thus explained on the pattern of external perception. The sixth or inner sense is the organ of the Soul for perceiving special objects, just as the five outer senses are also the organs of the Cognizer, or of the Soul, for perceiving external objects.

The triad of Soul, Organ and Object is retained in the realistic schools, as well as the principle of interpreting introspection on the pattern of external perception. They also assume a sixth organ or

¹ NBT., p. 4. 17

² Ibid., p. 8. 12

³ *antaḥ-karāṇa*

⁴ *āhankāra*

⁵ *manas*

⁶ *buddhi*

transfer us into the empirical, artificially constructed, subjective world and, in order to indicate this difference, Dharmakīrti has introduced the characteristic of non-illusiveness into his definition of sense-perception. In the light of this interpretation «non-illusiveness» will mean 'non-subjective, non-constructive, non-empirical, transcendental, ultimately real'.¹ The characteristic of being non-illusiveness would thus distinguish sense-perception from inference and the operations of the non-sensuous intellect, which are illusions from the transcendental point of view. The second characteristic would then become almost a synonym of the first: Pure sensation is passive or «non-constructive», therefore it is non-subjective, transcendently true, non-illusiveness.

So far Dharmottara. His interpretation, however, is evidently in conflict with the examples of illusions given by Dharmakīrti. They are all examples of empirical illusions produced by an abnormal condition of the sense-faculties.²

The necessity of mentioning the characteristic of non-illusiveness was indeed controversial among the followers of Dignāga, in the «own herd» of the Master.³ It was at first mentioned by Asaṅga, although we do not know with what intention;⁴ it was dropped by Dignāga, then reintroduced by Dharmakīrti,⁵ dropped again by some of his followers⁶ and finally established for all the subsequent generations of Buddhist logicians by Dharmottara.

In dropping the characteristic of non-illusiveness Dignāga was led by three different considerations. First of all, illusion always contains an illusive perceptual judgment. But judgment does not belong to the sensuous part of cognition. If we think to perceive a moving tree on the shore when the tree is stable, the cognition «this is a moving tree» is a judgment, and every judgment is a construction of the

¹ Dharmottara thinks that if the first characteristic, *nirvikalpakā*,¹ is interpreted as contrasting with inference, the second, *abhrānta*, must be taken as repudiating misconceptions. But the contrary is also possible; *abhrānta* will then prevent confusion with inference and *kalpanāpodha* be directed against those who, like the Naiyāyikas, deny the fundamental difference between sensibility and understanding, cp NBT, p 7, cp also TSP, p 392 9.

² NB and NBT, p 9 4 ff.

³ *śa-gūṭhyāḥ*, TSP, p 394 20

⁴ Cp Tucci, op cit It might have been a simple borrowing from NS., I 1 4.

⁵ Cp NK, p 192

⁶ TSP, loc cit

Ego itself is cognized in the same manner. When the cognition of the Soul is produced by the inner sense in the form of an Ego, this cognition is a new quality arising in the previously unconscious Soul.¹ In this process the organ is the internal organ, the object is the unconscious Soul, its cognition is a new quality produced in that Soul.

In *Hinayāna Buddhism* the Soul as a substance, as well as its qualities disappear. But the triad of Consciousness, Organ and Object is retained, as well as the interpretation of self-perception on the pattern of external perception. There is also a «sixth» organ,² in regard of which all mental phenomena are its «objects».³ It represents a passing stream of pure consciousness, it cognizes the mental phenomena as its own objects directly, and the external objects indirectly, in association with the five outer senses, according to the rules of Dependent Origination.

To all these doctrines *Dignāga* opposes an emphatic denial. He says,⁴

No objects are the feelings,
No (sixth) sense is the intellect.⁵

There was no universal agreement between the schools of the *Hinayāna* in regard of the position of the sixth sense. Some of them, like the *Sarvāstivādins*, identified this sense with the intellect. For them pure consciousness, inner sense and intellect or understanding are the same thing.⁶ But others, like the *Theravādins*, assume a sixth or inner sense⁷ along with the element of consciousness. In his controversy on this point with the *Naiyāyiks* *Dignāga* calls attention to the fact that they themselves mention only five sense-organs in the aphorism in which the senses are enumerated.⁸ But *Vātsyāyana*⁹ sticks to the rule that the Cognizer, i. e. the Soul, cannot cognize otherwise than through the medium of an organ.

¹ Ibid.

² *mana-māndriya* = *āyatana* No. 6

³ *visaya* = *dharma* = *āyatana* No. 12

⁴ On the theory of cognition in *Hinayāna* op. my CO, p. 54 ff

⁵ *Pr samucc*, I. 21, op. NVTI., p. 97. 1 — *na sukkhāde' pramasyam iā, mano vāstīndriyāntaram.*

⁶ AK., II. 84 — *cittam, mano, vyñānam clāriham*

⁷ *hadaya-dhātū.*

⁸ NS, I. 1 12

⁹ NBh, ad I. 1 4, p. 16 2 ff

cognition that it should satisfy both the Realists who maintain the existence of an external world and the Idealists who deny it».

Kamalaśīla¹ contains a statement to the same effect, although he speaks of Dharmakīrti's definition which contains non-illusiveness. «The term non-illusory, says he, must be understood as referring to consistent knowledge,² not to that form which is the (ultimate) reality of the object. Because, if it were not so, since, according to the opinion of the Yogācāras, the external objects do not exist at all, the definition which is intended to satisfy both theories would be too narrow, (it would exclude the idealistic view)».

In order to satisfy both the Realists and the Idealists Dignāga dropped the characteristic of non-illusory, and Dharmakīrti, although he reintroduced it, gave it an interpretation which did not militate against the idealistic view.

Dignāga had a third and decisive consideration for avoiding the characteristic of non-illusiveness. Since this term admits of many interpretations, its introduction could in his opinion prove dangerous and even suicidal to the whole system.

The system is founded upon a sharp distinction between two heterogeneous sources of knowledge. The senses, according to this principle, cannot judge. But if illusions, or wrong judgments, are put on the account of the senses, there is no reason why right judgments should not equally be put on the same account, as the Realists indeed maintain. The foundation of the system then will be exploded. The perception of every extended body is a sense-illusion, because «extension is never a simple reflex».³ The duration of a thing will likewise be an illusion, because only instantaneous reality corresponds to a simple reflex. The unity of a body, the unity of its parts consisting of a multitude of various atoms, will be an illusion,⁴ just as the perception of one forest at a distance instead of the variety of trees of which it is composed is an illusion. If, on the contrary, these are declared to be right perceptions, where is the limit? Why should the perception of a double moon, of a fiery circle when a firebrand is

¹ TSP., p. 892. 5 ff.

² *samvāditva*.

³ NK., p. 194. 8 — *apratibhāso dharmo'sti sthāulyam*. Vācaspati explains — *pratibhāsa-kāla-dharmah, pratibhāsa-dharmah*, i. e., a point-instant is not extended

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 194. 12

we perceive a patch of blue and at the same time experience a feeling of ease, this feeling of ease is not the image corresponding to the sensation produced by the patch of blue. But when some external object, e g., a patch of colour, is perceived, we at the same time¹ are conscious of another thing, of something pleasant. This feeling is a feeling of the condition of our Ego. «Indeed, this form in which the Ego is felt,² is a direct self-perception,³ consisting in being self-conscious. Thus at the time of experiencing a visual sensation we simultaneously experience something else, something additional, something accompanying every mental state, something different from the perceived external object,⁴ something without which there is absolutely not a single mental state,⁵ and this something is our own Ego.

There is therefore an awareness of knowledge. It is unquestionably a mental fact,⁶ a feeling of the Ego, it is direct, it is not a construction⁷ and not an illusion, it therefore falls under the definition of sense-perception, as one of its varieties.

In this connection the theory must be mentioned which denies the existence of indifferent, disinterested states of consciousness. The Ego is always emotional in some, be it very slight, degree. Objects are either desirable or undesirable, there are no indifferent ones. They are either to be attained or to be shunned. The indifferent which are assumed in realistic schools are only seemingly indifferent, they fall in the class of those that are to be shunned, since not to be desired means to be shunned. Neither are there interruptions in the stream of consciousness in a living being. Even in the state of deep sleep and in the cataleptic trance there is some kind of conscious life going on. Moreover consciousness is always a preparation for action,

¹ *tulya-kālam*, NBT, p. 11. 9

² *yena rūpena ātmā vedya*, *ibid*, p. 11. 8, *ātmā* is here, of course, not the substantial *ātma* of the Spiritualists and Realists

³ *taḍ rūpaṃ ātma-samvedanam pratyakṣam*, *ibid*

⁴ *nūlādy-arthād anyat*, *ibid*

⁵ *nāsti sū kānti cūta-avasthā yasyām ātmanah samvedanam na pratyakṣam syāt*, *ibid*

⁶ *jñānam eva*

⁷ This self-consciousness is *nirvikalpa* only in respect of *laipañā* = *śabdā-samsarga-yogyatā*, but evidently not in respect of the other primordial or transcendental *laipañā* = *grāhya-grāhaka-laipañā*. Some Tibetans on this score maintain that self-consciousness is already a construction of our imagination

distinguished from consistent thought-construction, which construction is the real guide of our purposeful actions.¹

So far Dignāga. But Dharmakīrti diverges in this point from his master. He reintroduces the characteristic of non-illusiveness into the definition, and his reasons are the following ones.

We must distinguish between a sense-illusion and an illusion of the understanding. When we, e. g., mistake a rope for a snake, this illusion is produced by the wrong interpretation by the understanding of the matter presented to the senses. This illusion ceases, as soon as we have been convinced that the object is a rope and not a snake.² But if a man sees a double moon because, owing to an eye-disease he sees everything double, this illusion will continue, even if he be convinced that the moon is single.³

There are moreover hallucinations⁴ and dreams where the visions are present with all that vividness which is the characteristic feature of direct sense-perception.⁵ They lack that vagueness and generality which is the characteristic feature of conceptual thought.⁶ They cannot be understood as a misrepresentation by the intellect of one thing for the other, because this thing is totally absent. If we stick to the definition that all conceptual thought is an illusion because it consists in mistaking one thing for the other, we must come to the absurd conclusion that hallucinations are right perceptions, because they do not consist in mistaking one thing for another.⁷

¹ *kalpanā-apōdha* = *avisamādi-kalpanā-apōdha*, cp. TSP., 394. 21

² TS., p. 392 13 and TSP., p. 392. 23

³ Ibid., p. 394 5 ff

⁴ *niradhisṭhānam jñānam* = *leṣoṇḍrādi-vyñānam*, cp. NK., p. 192 20. and TS., p. 392 8.

⁵ TSP., p. 392 23.

⁶ Ibid — *na hi vikalpānuviddhasya spaṣṭārtha-pratibhāsāt*, cp. NK., p. 265. 15.

⁷ Since the «constructiveness» (*kalpanā* = *yogānā*) which is the essence of the spontaneity of the understanding is defined as «the cognition of a real thing, i. e. of a particular, in the guise of a general image» (*sāmānya-ālārā pratītiḥ evaṣṭuḥ kalpanā*), such constructiveness will be absent in a hallucination, because there the particular external thing is absent. It will then be «non-constructive», it will fall under the definition and will be a right sense-perception. The same may happen to the «flower in the sky» and to vivid dreams. They are not constructions on the basis of a real sensation, therefore as «non-constructive» they may fall under the definition of right sense-perceptions. To guard against these fatal consequences the addition of the qualification «non-illusiveness» is necessary, as thinks Dharmakīrti. But if this «non-illusiveness» is carried up to

mentioned above,¹ all the variety of changing perceptions are physiological reflexes, unconscious by themselves but receiving a borrowed consciousness from the light reflected upon them by the Soul. The Internal Organ² is one of the first evolutes of primordial matter, it is called the Great Principle,³ because it is illimited in its action, it embraces everything cognizable. It is assisted by five outer senses, every one having its own respective limited field of objects. These agents assume in the act of cognition each its own part; the outer sense perceives, the internal organ judges, the Soul illumines.⁴

The medical schools likewise assume a Soul, an Internal Organ, and five outer organs of sense. The stuff, out of which these five organs are composed, corresponds to the five kinds of external matter. Every organ is active only in its own limited field, because of the principle that similar can be apprehended only by similars, a principle, as is well known, also assumed by the philosophers of ancient Greece. The organ of sight, e. g., can apprehend only colours, because both the organ and the colours are of the nature of the element fire, etc.⁵ The internal organ is likewise physical, it consists of a single atom⁶

¹ Cp above, p 164

² *buddhi* = *antah-karana*, its function being *adhyavasāya* «judgment», the functions of *ahamkāra* and *manah* are associated with it.

³ *mahat*

⁴ According to the definition of Iśvarakṛṣṇa, kār. 5, perception is perceptual judgment (*prativisaya-adhyavasāya*), but according to Varṣaganya (Tātp, p. 105 10), it is mere sensation (*ālōcanā-mātram*), produced by the senses «assuming the form of the object» (*indriyānām artha-ālāreṇa parinālānām*). The Sāṅkhya-sūtras assume both the indefinite sensation (*nirvikalpaka*) and the definite judgment (*savikalpaka*), with evidently only a difference of degree between them, the real perception is for them the definite one

⁵ In the Sāṅkhya system the five sense-organs and the five corresponding elements of matter are produced in a parallel evolution from a rudimentary personality (*ahamkāra*), they are therefore called products of a personality (*ahamkāriṇām indriyāni*). In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the early Yoga, the Mīmāṃsā and the medical schools this principle is dropped, and the sense-organs are composed of the same atoms as the corresponding elements of matter (*bhautikām indriyāni*). The Buddhists assume as the seats of the five outer sense-faculties five special kinds of a translucent stuff (*rūpa-prasāda*)

⁶ *anutam aha caikatvam deṇaḥ gunau manasaḥ smṛtau*, cp Oṣkrapāṇi ad. I 8 5 The Realists therefore, just as the medical schools, denied the possibility of two simultaneous feelings or ideas since the internal organ could not at the same time be present in two different places

only way of direct knowledge, there is moreover an intelligible intuition.¹ A moment of it is present in every sense-perception.

§ 4. THE VARIETIES OF INTUITION.

a) Mental sensation;

(*mānasa-pratyakṣa*).

The Sanscrit term for perception therefore contains more in extension than sense-perception alone, it means direct knowledge or intuition, as contrasted with indirect knowledge or knowledge by concepts. Sense-perception is only one variety of intuition. There is another intuition, an intelligible one. Ordinary humanity does not possess the gift of such intuition, it is the exclusive faculty of the Saint who, according to theory, is not a human, but a superhuman being. A moment of this intelligible intuition is admitted to be involved in every perception in its second moment, the moment following on pure sensation.² It is evidently nothing more than the element of attention following upon the moment when the incoming stimulus has affected the sense-faculty. The theory of cognition, after having established a radical distinction between the two sources of knowledge, the senses and the intellect, was in need of some explanation of their collaboration. After having separated them, the theory felt obliged to reunite them. In early Buddhism the origin of a perception was explained as an interdependent appearance of three elements, e. g., one element of colour (external), one element of the organ of sight (internal and physical), and one element of the sixth sense (internal and mental). The three together produced the sensation, or sense-perception, of a coloured surface. By establishing the radical difference between sensibility and understanding Dignāga was led to abolish the sixth sense, and to replace the physical sense-organ by pure sensation. Thus the perception of a patch of colour was explained as a moment of pure sensation followed by the construction of an image by the intellect. It became the business of the understanding to find out for the given sensation a place in the range of colours and other impressions. But the first moment of this work of the

¹ *mānasam yogi-jñānam*, TSP., p. 892 17.

² *Op* vol II, Appendix III, this theory is not explained in detail in the TS, and TSP, but it is mentioned there, p 896 2.

own special sphere of a non-sensuous reflecting organ. But in other parts of his work Caraka includes the intellect among the sense-faculties and reckons, like the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṅkhyas, six (resp. eleven) sense-faculties and organs.¹

The realistic systems, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Jaina, likewise assume a Soul, an inner sense and five outer senses, but their parts in producing cognition are otherwise distributed.

The function of judgment, i. e., real cognition, is shifted from the internal organ to the Soul. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika it is a property of the Soul occasionally produced on it by a contact with the internal organ.² According to the Mīmāṃsā it is consciousness itself.³ Cognition is thus a judgment by the Soul through the organs. It is employed about external sensible objects through a double contact of the Soul with the internal organ and of the internal with the external one, and about internal objects, feelings, ideas and volitions, through the intermediate link of the internal organ. The internal organ loses here its function of judgment, but retains the functions of assisting the outer senses and perceiving, the operations of the mind itself. Sense-perception therefore includes a perceptual judgment. Indefinite sensation, although admitted, is but a feeble degree of perception.

The Hinayāna Buddhists dropped the Soul altogether, but spiritualized the internal organ. The whole business of cognition was then thrust upon this internal organ. It was supposed to assist the outer senses in apprehending external objects and to cognize directly the internal operations of the mind. The intellect then became the sixth organ coordinated to the five external organs and having its own special objects in cognizing the internal world. "According to the Vaiśeṣikas the eye sees, says Vasubandhu, the intellect cognizes"⁴

¹ In Sāṅkya *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, *manas* are three different internal organs having each its own function. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *buddhi*, *upalabdhi*, *jñāna* (not *manas*) are synonyms, NB, I. 1 15. In Buddhism *citta*, *manas*, *viññāna* are synonyms denoting pure sensation, but *buddhi* = *adhyavasāya* = *nirvāṇa* = *samyak*, mean conception, which is then an object of *manas*. In the idealistic schools of Mahāyāna pure sensation is termed *pratyakṣa* and *viññāna* becomes *sāṃhāra*, i. e., an image or conception.

² The *ātman* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is *svato'vid rūpam nityam, sarvagatam, cetanā-yogād cetanam, na svarūpataḥ*, TS, p. 79-80.

³ The *ātman* of the Mīmāṃsakas is *cantanya rūpam cantanyam buddhi-lakṣanam*, ibid., p. 94.

⁴ AKB, I 42

c) Introspection

(sva-samvedana)

It is a fundamental thesis of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school that all consciousness is self-consciousness.¹ Every cognition of an external object is at the same time a cognition of that cognition. Every feeling and every volition are, on the one side, connected with some object, but they also are, on the other side, self-conscious. We are thus possessed of «an awareness of our awareness» Knowledge is self-luminous.² Like a lamp which illumines the neighbouring objects and its own self at the same time, not being dependent on a foreign source of light for its own illumination, just so is knowledge self-luminous, since it does not depend on any other source of conscious light in order to be known. The Sāṅkhyas and the medical schools maintained that knowledge consists of something like physiological reflexes, unconscious in themselves, but receiving a borrowed consciousness from the Soul. For the Buddhists consciousness is not divided between a Soul and an inner sense; the inner sense, the «sixth» sense, is itself pure consciousness. The Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school brushes this «sixth» sense away, just as the Soul was brushed away by their predecessors of the Hīnayāna. They maintain, that «if we did not know that we perceive a blue patch, we never would have perceived it»,³ «All (simple) consciousness, as well as all mental phenomena, are self-conscious», says Dharmakīrti.⁴ That is to say, simple consciousness,⁵ the mere fact of our awareness of something quite indefinite in the ken, and all constructed, complicated mental phenomena,⁶ images, ideas, as well as all feelings and volitions, in short all mental phenomena *quā* mental, are self-conscious in themselves.

This does not interfere with the fact that there are instinctive thoughts and actions.⁷ Instinct, habit, *karma* retain in the Sautrāntika-

¹ *jñānasya jñānam* = *jñāna-anubhava*.

² *svayam-pralāṣa*

³ Cp. SDS, p. 30, where Dharmakīrti's verse is quoted, *apratyakṣo-
palambhasya nārtha-dṛṣṭih prasādhyaṭi*.

⁴ NB, I. 10, p. 11

⁵ *citta* = *vyjñānam* = *manas*.

⁶ *cavita* = *citta-samprayukta-samskāra*

⁷ *āśanā* = *samskāra* = *karma* = *cetanā*.

Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as a Soul in disguise¹ They then finally established in Buddhist logic the two heterogeneous elements of a non-constructive pure sensation and a constructive or conceptual synthesis This together with the theory of introspection and the theory of images and names are the fundamental features of Buddhist epistemology

The lesson to be derived from this historical development is that the idea of a pure, imageless consciousness has always been alive in Indian philosophy. We meet it in the "Soul" of the Sāṅkhyas and the medical schools, in the imageless cognition of the Realists, in the "group of consciousness" or the "sixth sense" of Hinayāna, and in the "pure sensation" of the Logicians But the latter alone maintain that "sense perception is pure sensation", devoid of every mnemonic or every intelligible element. For all the other schools who have introduced into their doctrine the difference between an indefinite and a definite perception the difference is only one of degree, sensation is an incomplete perception, real cognition is produced by the definite perception. But for the Buddhists it is just the contrary, real cognition is pure sensation, because it is non-constructive and therefore not subjective, not artificial. It is the point where we come in touch with ultimate reality, with the Thing-in-Itself, with the pure object or pure existence. This is also the reason why the later Vedāntins rallied in this point to Buddhist logic Utilizing a dictum of the Upanishads they defined sense-perception as the "not-indirect,"² knowledge which, as we have seen, is the real meaning of the Buddhist definition They identified it with the direct feeling of the Absolute, the One-without-the-Second, the undifferentiated pure Brahma

The definition of the Realists mentions that sense-perception is produced by a sensory stimulus and that it includes the perceptual judgment

The definition of Asanga is verbally the same as the one by Dharmakīrti, but it did not contain all its implications

Vasubandhu apparently had produced two definitions The first is the one he inserted in his "Vāda-vādhī". It states that "sense-perception is that cognition which is produced from the object itself". By this emphasis of "itself" the ultimately real object, the mere efficiency of a point-instant is meant. This definition has been severely

¹ Cp. vol. II, p. 329, ff.

² *pratyakṣa* = *aparokṣa*, cp my Nirvāṇa, p. 159, n. 2

inner sense,¹ coordinated to the five organs of the outer senses. But the Soul is no more an unchanging substance consisting of pure consciousness. It possesses «qualities» which are passing mental phenomena inhering in the eternal Soul. They cannot, however, be cognized by the Soul directly, because cognition, being an action, cannot become its own object, just as the edge of a knife cannot cut its own edge. For the Mimāṃsakas Soul and consciousness are synonyms, consciousness is not a quality of the Soul, but its essence.² In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika consciousness is only a passing phenomenon produced in the Soul through an interaction with the inner sense-organ. By itself it is unconscious «as a stone».³ This difference in the conception of the Soul in the two realistic schools involves a difference in their respective explanations of introspection. For the Mimāṃsaka self-consciousness is an inference, for the Naiyāyik it is a separate perception. When a jar is perceived by vision, the Mimāṃsaka maintains, a new quality arises in the jar, the quality of «cognizedness».⁴ The presence of this quality in the jar allows us to infer the presence of a cognition in the Ego.⁵ In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the rule that the Soul cannot cognize otherwise than through the medium of the senses holds good for the outer as well as for the inner objects.⁶ When the perception of an external object, say, a jar is produced in the Soul in the form of the judgment «this is a jar», the perception of that perception, i. e., self-perception, follows in a new judgment⁷ of the form «I am endowed with the perception of this jar». «When pleasure and pain, which are qualities inherent in the Soul, are grasped, the interaction between the inner organ and the quality of pleasure is the same as the interaction between the organ of vision and the quality of a colour inherent in the jar».⁸ Nay, the

¹ *manas*, which is here quite different from the *manas* of the Buddhists

² *jñāna-svarūpo, na tu jñāna-guṇatām ātmā*

³ Cp my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 54 ff.

⁴ *jñātatā*, cp NK, p. 267 12

⁵ There is thus a remarkable coincidence between the extreme Realists of India and the American Neo-realists and behaviourists. On both sides images are denied (*nirākāram jñānam*) as well as introspection. B. Russell (*An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth*, p. 112) thinks, just as the Mimāṃsaka, that «the relation to the (inner) object is inferential and external». Prabhākara rallies to the Buddhists (*ātmā svayam-prakāśaḥ*)

⁶ Cp. NBh., p. 16. 2

⁷ *anu-vyavasāya*.

⁸ Cp *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 28.

unutterability is its characteristic mark. We therefore have called it the transcendental element of our knowledge, since although uncognizable empirically in itself, uncognizable in a sensible image, it is the indispensable condition of every empirical perception, and of all real knowledge in general.

Others will be more competent to judge whether the history of European philosophy contains a doctrine partly or even completely coinciding with the Buddhist one. Our task is to represent the Indian theory also by the way of contrast in order to make it as clear as possible. Its fundamental principle seems to be quite clear, the senses and the understanding are different sources of cognition, different not in degree, but in substance, mutually the one the negation of the other. However both sources interact, and it is not always easy to disentangle their reciprocal parts in actual, i. e., empirical, cognition. Since the whole system is founded upon that distinction we shall have in the course of our investigation several occasions to revert to it and to point out the difficulties into which its consequences and implications are involved. Would European thought, in a similar juncture, appear to be involved in analogous difficulties, this indirectly would prove that the difficulties are essential and belong to the problem itself.

Among European philosophers Reid is prominent by his sharp distinction of sensation from perception and from ideal revival. The word «sensation» connotes with him only a subjective state without implying any awareness of an external object. To have a sensation is only to have a certain kind of feeling due to an impression on the organs of sense, pure sensation would be purely affective consciousness. On the other hand, to have a perception is to be aware of an object by means of a present sensation. When sensation conveys a meaning it is no more a pure sensation, it becomes perception. Its meaning comes not from sensation, but from another source which is the same as remembrance and imagination. This theory seems to come very near the Indian distinction of pure sensation—*nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam*, perception as a sensation coupled with imagination—*savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam*, and ideal revival or pure imagination—*kalpanā-mātram*. However the distinction, though sharply formulated, did not lead in the hands of Reid to far reaching consequences and became half effaced in the hands of his successors.

Neither Locke's «idea», as a definite imprint made by outward things, nor the «idea» of Hume, which is a «feeling grown fainter»,

«In every case of sense-perception, says he, the Cognizer¹ judges² through the medium of a sense-organ, because if the sense-organ is destroyed, the corresponding subsequent judgment³ (in the form «I am endowed with the cognition of this jar») does not arise». «But then, says an objector, you must explain the perception of one's own Self, and one's own feelings and ideas?» «This is done, answers Vātsyāyana, through the inner sense-organ, because the inner sense is surely an organ, although (in the aphorisms of Nyāya) it is reckoned separately, since it differs in some respects (from the other organs).. There is (in this aphorism) no special denial (of a sixth organ, and this silence) is the sign of approval». «But then, says Dignāga, if the absence of a statement to the contrary is a sign of approval, neither would it have been necessary to mention the (five outer) senses (since in regard of them there is universal agreement)».⁴

Dignāga denies the existence of an inner sense, and replaces it by his «mental or intelligible sensation».⁵ All cognition is divided into subject and object, an apprehending part and an apprehended part. But the apprehending part is not further divided into another subject and another object. Consciousness is not split into two parts, the one watching the other. It is a mistake to interpret introspection on the pattern of external perception.

Dharmottara's argument in favour of a genuine and constant introspection is the following one. What is perception in the sense of direct sense-perception? It is a process in which the first moment of indefinite sensation is followed by the construction of an image of the perceived object.⁶ «That form of the object, says he, in respect of which the direct function of sensation, that merely signalizes the presence of something in the ken, is followed by the construction of its image,⁷ is sense-perceived». We have unquestionably a feeling of our personal identity, of our own Self. But is this feeling followed by the construction of an image of the Ego? Decidedly not. This feeling merely accompanies every state of our consciousness. When

¹ jñātr.

² vyavasāya.

³ anu-vyavasāya

⁴ Pr samucc., I 21, cp. NVT., p. 97. 28. — *anisedhād upātām ced, anyendriya-rūpam vṛthā.*

⁵ mānasa-pratyakṣa.

⁶ NBT., p. 11. 12

⁷ rūpāpena anugamyate.

knowledge of any object remains, because nothing can be thought by mere intuition», says Kant «Pure sensation, without any perceptual judgment, says Dharmottara, is as though it did not exist at all».¹ «Intuitions without concepts are blind,»² says Kant «Without concepts, says the Buddhist, with pure sensation alone we would never know neither where to move nor where to abstain from moving». «These two powers or faculties cannot exchange their functions, says Kant.³ The understanding cannot see, the senses cannot think. The same has been said and repeated hundreds of times by the Buddhists «By their union only can knowledge be produced», says Kant.⁴ «Both these (united) ways of cognition are right means of cognition, says the Buddhist, only in respect of successful purposive action (i. e., in the empirical field).»⁵ «Neither of these (two) faculties is preferable to the other», says Kant.⁶ «Sense-perception, says the Buddhist, is not the predominant' among them Both sense-perception and inference (i. e. sensation and understanding) have equal force»⁷ «Pure intuitions and pure concepts are only possible a priori», says Kant.⁸ Dharmottara¹⁰ gives to this idea the following turn «Pure sensation,¹¹ says he, is the source of our knowledge in that point¹² where the perceptual judgment,¹³ neglecting (as it were) its own (conceptual) function, assumes the function of sensation, i. e., points to the presence of an object in the ken». The interpretation of such a pure sensation is then made over to concepts and judgments

These coincidences in the fundamental principle as well as in some of its expressions must, for aught I know, be regarded as highly remarkable.

Modern psychology, as well as modern epistemology, have forsaken the standpoint of a «genetic» difference in kind between sensation and

¹ *asat-kāpa*, NBT., p. 16 6

² GPR, p. 41

³ *Ibid.*, p. 41

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41

⁵ *Op. vol. II*, p. 362

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 41

⁷ TSP, *pratyakṣam na jyeṣṭham pramāṇam*

⁸ *tulya-bala* NBT., p. 6 12

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 41

¹⁰ NBT., p. 16 16

¹¹ *kevalam pratyakṣam*

¹² *yatīrthe*

¹³ *pratyakṣa-pūriṣṭi o'dhyavasāyas.*

by its very essence it is such. It can consequently never be absolutely disinterested. The Ego as an element of interestedness accompanies every conscious state.

Thus the Ego of Indian philosophy after having been enthroned as the Highest Brahma in the Upanishads, is constituted as a pure substance in Sāṅkhya and as a qualified substance in the Realistic schools. It then descends in Hinayāna to the position of a simple stream of thought with the functions of a sixth sense. It loses even that position in the logical school and becomes an accompanying element of every mental state, a kind of "transcendental apperception", transcendental because the bifurcation of consciousness into subject and object precedes every possible experience. It then belongs to the *a priori* conditions of a possible experience. However, as will be seen later on,¹ at the end of its career, in the reformed Vedānta, in the Mādhyamika school and the mixed schools of Mādhyamika-Svāntarika-Sautrāntika and Mādhyamika-Prasangika-Yogācāra it again soars up and reasserts its position of the Highest Brahma.²

§ 5. HISTORY OF THE INDIAN VIEWS ON SENSE-PERCEPTION.

The earliest systematical view of perception is represented by the theory of the Sāṅkhyas. According to this system, as already

¹ Cf. on this point E. Obermiller's translation of Uttara-tantra in the latest Acta Orientalia

² This, of course, is only a very brief account of the Indian views in respect of what "ever since Hume's time has been justly regarded as the most puzzle in psychology" (W. James). It will be noticed however that the Hinayānists, since they describe the self (*puṅḡala*) as an aggregate (*samskāra-samūha*), of which each part, as to its being, is a separate fact (*dharma*), fall in line with the Associationists in England and France and the Herbartians in Germany; Vedānta, Sāṅkhya and the Indian Realists favour a Spiritualist theory, compared with which the theory of the Buddhist logicians can be characterized as a kind of Transcendentalist theory. Kant, as is well known, had besides his theory of a Transcendental Apperception, a theory of an "inner sense", which can be stimulated by our internal objects (*«der innere Sinn von uns selbst affiziert werden»*), just as the outer senses are stimulated by external objects. This part of Kant's theory coincides almost completely with the Nāyāyika view. Nay, even the perception of the Ego is on both sides produced through the inner sense — *«der Gegenstand des inneren Sinnes. das Ich»*, (CPR, p. 472). This must be rendered in Sanskrit as *ātma āntaryasya adhyakṣya arthah*, and we find this stated exactly in the Tarka-Bhāṣā, p. 28

According to Sigwart, the perception of the form "this is gold" contains an inference, "*sobald ich sage „dies ist Gold“, interpretiere ich das Phaenomen durch einen allgemeinen Begriff und vollziehe einen Subsumptions-Schluss*".¹ This would mean that every perception contains an inference, but Sigwart thinks that pure sensation (*das im strengsten Sinne injectiv direct Wahrgenommene, von jeder Interpretation losgemachte*)² conveys the perception of colours only, "who sees a rainbow can only tell that he sees colours arranged in a certain manner". The Buddhist maintains that by pure sensation "we really perceive the blue, but we do not know that it is blue" (*nīlam vijānāti, na tu "nīlam ita" vijānāti*). As soon as we tell that it is blue, we have already compared it with the non-blue, and this the senses alone cannot achieve. A consistent sensationism must be speechless.

Among modern philosophers H. Bergson has attempted to reestablish the barrier between the senses and the understanding "The capital error, says he, consists in seeing but a difference of intensity between pure perception and memory instead of a difference in nature".³ "There is in perception something that does not exist at all in memory, and that is an (ultimate) reality intuitively grasped".⁴ This seems to coincide with the Buddhist theory, the theory, namely that pure sense-perception grasps the ultimately real.⁵ The difference, however, is that for the Buddhist this ultimate reality is transcendental, it is only felt, it is unutterable and uncognizable by discursive thought, it is just the contradictorily opposed part of everything utterable.⁶

¹ Logik, II, p. 395

² Ibid, p. 398.

³ Matière et Mémoire, p. 60

⁴ Ibid, p. 71.

⁵ *nirvikalpakam pratyaksam paramārthasat grhṇāti*

⁶ That Bergson's perception is not at all pure, that discursive thought constantly intervenes in it, that in every empirical sensation conceptual relations are present, has been pointed out by O Hamelin and R Hubert, *op. Revue de Metaph.*, 1926, p. 847

of a special stuff. It moves with infinite speed inside the body from one seat of an organ to the seat of another organ, everywhere establishing a connection between the Soul and the organ of the outer sense. It may be therefore likened to a nervous current¹ imagined as something intermediate between the intelligent Soul and the physical organ.

Besides assisting the outer senses in apprehending external objects, this internal organ has its own special field of action. It is employed not only about external sensible objects, but also about the internal operations of our minds,² perceived and reflected on by ourselves. Internal or intelligible objects are: the Soul, the Judgment, the internal organ, and its special objects, feelings ideas, volitions etc.³ They are apprehended by the internal organ directly.

We thus have the following arrangement. The outer senses assisted by the inner sense apprehend external objects. The inner sense⁴ reflects upon the operations of our minds and instinctively⁵ distinguishes between the desirable and undesirable objects. The judgment,⁶ another internal organ, or another function of this organ, produces a clear and distinct perception, but the whole process wants to be illuminated by the light coming from the Soul which alone makes it conscious. This arrangement does not differ substantially from the Sāṅkhya theory. The Intellect is sometimes reckoned as a sixth organ, but sometimes only the five outer sense-organs are mentioned.⁷ On this occasion Cakrapāṇi remarks⁸ that this is not a contradiction. The medical science, says he, being the foundation of all other sciences,⁹ can occasionally admit and approve of apparently conflicting opinions, for it does it always in a special context. In the chapter devoted to the sense-faculties their special features are indicated¹⁰ and therefore they are distinguished from the intellect in its

¹ Prof Garbe compares the *indriyas* of the Sāṅkhyas with our ideas of the functions of the nervous system, Sāṅkhya Phil., p 285.

² *manasas tu cintyam arthaḥ*, ibid, I. 8. 16.

³ *mano, mano'rtho, buddhī, ātmā ca ity adhyātma-draṣṭṛya-guṇa-samgrahaḥ*. ibid, I. 8. 12

⁴ *manah*, ibid.

⁵ *āha-mātreṇa = nirvikalpalakṣaṇa*, ibid., ad IV. 1. 20.

⁶ *buddhiḥ = adhyavasāya*, ibid.

⁷ ibid, IV 1 37 — 40.

⁸ Ad I. 8. 3.

⁹ *sarva-pārasam idam sūśrīam*, ibid.

¹⁰ *adhikā-ākarma-yogitayā*, ibid.

2) every such object is «unique» in all the three worlds;¹ it is absolutely separate,² i. e., unconnected in whatsoever a way with all the other objects of the universe;³

3) it is therefore an exception to the rule that every object is partly similar and partly dissimilar to other objects, it is absolutely dissimilar,⁴ only dissimilar, to whatsoever objects,

4) it has no extension in space⁵ and no duration in time,⁶ although an indefinite sensation produced by an unknown object can be localized in time and space, but this localization is already the work of the understanding which locates the object in a constructed space and in an imagined time.

5) it is the point-instant of reality,⁷ it has no parts between which the relation of preceding and succeeding would obtain, it is infinitesimal time, the differential⁸ in the running existence of a thing:

6) it is indivisible,⁹ it has no parts, it is the ultimate simple;

7) it is pure existence;¹⁰

8) it is pure reality;¹¹

9) it is the «own essence» of the thing¹² as it is strictly in itself.

10) it is the particular¹³ in the sense of the extreme concrete and particular;

11) it is the efficient,¹⁴ is is pure efficiency, nothing but efficiency;

12) it stimulates the understanding and the reason to construct images and ideas;¹⁵

¹ *trailokya-cyārtita*

² *prthak*

³ *savvato vyārtita*

⁴ *atyanta-vikalāsa*

⁵ *dēśa-ananugata*

⁶ *kālā-ananugata*

⁷ *īśana = śāśalāśana*

⁸ *pūrrūpara-bhāga-īkālā-kālā-īālā = īśana*

⁹ *an-avayavin = niramśa*

¹⁰ *satīti-rūtram*

¹¹ *rasu mātram*

¹² *śāśalāśana*

¹³ *īyakti*

¹⁴ *artha-kriyā-kāraṇ*

¹⁵ *śāśalāpa-utpatti-śakti-mat*

According to the principle of Dependent Origination, cognition is interpreted in early Buddhism as the compresence¹ of at least three elements: pure consciousness, an object and a sense-organ. This produces sensation.² An image, conception³ or judgment are produced by the addition of the element of conception, but the element of pure consciousness is present in every cognition. It is entered into the system of elements as a sixth organ,⁴ but Vasubandhu⁵ remarks that it is not an organ at all in the sense in which the other organs are understood to be organs; nevertheless for the sake of symmetry the intellect is reckoned as a sixth organ, because there is an analogy between, e. g., the organ of sight apprehending a coloured surface and pure consciousness employed in watching the operations of our mind perceived by ourselves. These operations are the special objects of the "sixth sense", while in the perception of the external sensible objects it only assists the work of the other senses. We thus have in early Buddhism already that sharp division between pure sensation and conception which, although in another arrangement, is so an outstanding a feature of Buddhist logic. The "sixth sense", which replaces here the sixth sense of the Sāṅkhyas, of the medical and realistic schools together with their Soul, is entered into the system of elements as the "group of pure consciousness"⁶ and distinguished from the "group of concepts"⁷ and the other groups.

In Mahāyāna this arrangement is radically changed. The school of the Mādhyamikas must be left out of account, because of their negative attitude to logic in general.⁸ But the early Idealists, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, when denying the reality of an external world converted the whole of cognition into a process of watching the operations of our own minds. Instead of an external world they assumed a "store of consciousness".⁹ This however was repudiated by:

¹ *sannipātaḥ*.

² *sparsaḥ* = *trayāṇam sannipātaḥ*.

³ *sanyñā*.

⁴ *mana-āyatana* = *sasthendriya* = *indriyāntara*, cp. CC., p. 96.

⁵ AK I 16, cp. CC., p. 64.

⁶ *vyñāna-skandha*.

⁷ *sanyñā-skandha*.

⁸ Cp my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 141, n.

⁹ *ālaya-vyñāna*.

will not be particulars, the particular is here only the underlying¹ sensible point-instant of efficient reality. The general image constructed by thought with reference to this point-instant is a universal. Only this sensible point-instant, is the real particular, it alone represents the ultimately real Thing-in-Itself. «The particular which is (empirically) cognized, says the Buddhist,² is not the ultimately real thing». A fire which burns and cooks is a real fire, that is to say, its burning and cooking is real. But the fire, which we extend mentally to all fires, to all burning and to all cooking, represents its general shape, it is not at all real.³ This general fire can neither burn, nor cook, it can only be imagined.

The Indian Realists assume a three-fold real existence expressible in words. A word can express an individual, a species or form and an abstract universal.⁴ The two first classes, the individual and its form, correspond to the Buddhist particular,⁵ but from the Buddhist standpoint they are not particulars at all, just because, as the Naiyāyikas maintain, they can all be expressed in speech by connotative names. From the Buddhist point of view, whatsoever can be expressed in speech by a name, is a universal. The particular is unexpressible,⁶ since it is the ultimate particular, the Thing-in-Itself.⁷

Thus it is that the Particular and the Universal may be mutually defined as the negations of one another, they are correlated as the real and the unreal,⁸ as the efficient and the non-efficient,⁹ as the non-constructed and the constructed,¹⁰ the non-artificial and the artificial,¹¹ the non imagined and the imagined,¹² the uncognizable and the cognizable,¹³ the unutterable and the utterable,¹⁴ the own essence and the gene-

¹ *upādānam*

² *adhyavasāyamānam svalāśanam na paramārtha-sat*, cp Tātp, p 341 26

³ *Ibid*, cp vol II, p 424

⁴ *vyakti-ākṛti-jāti*, cp NS, II 2. 63, cp TSP, p 281 4 ff

⁵ TSP, p 282 5

⁶ *abhilāṣa-samsarga-yogyasya antaymo (a)svalāśanāt*, Tātp, p. 342 9

⁷ *svalāśanam = paramārtha-sat*

⁸ *vastu, avastu*

⁹ *samārtha, asamārtha*

¹⁰ *nirvikalpa, kalpa*

¹¹ *akṛima, kṛima*

¹² *anāropita, āropita*

¹³ *ajānena aprāpya, prāpya*

¹⁴ *anābhilāṣya, abhilāṣya*

criticized by Dignāga, since it too closely resembles the first part of the definition of the realists, "produced from a contact between object and sense-organ", and is apt to be misinterpreted in a realistic sense. In a subsequent work, *Vāda-vidhana*, Vasubandhu probably corrected his definition and made it consonant with the one of Dignāga, but since the work is lost, we cannot know it exactly.

§ 6. SOME EUROPEAN PARALLELS.

We have seen that the main point at issue between the Buddhist theory of knowledge and its opponents in India is whether sense-perception in its strict meaning, *quā sense-perception*, includes also the perceptual judgment or not. This question can also be asked in the form: is pure sense-intuition, or pure sensation, a reality? And that question is intimately connected with the further question: are there really two and only two separate sources of knowledge, sensibility and understanding? We have seen that the doctors of the school of the Sarvāstivādins who were great masters in the psychology of trances had noticed that our senses may be intensely absorbed in the contemplation of a blue patch, absorbed to the exclusion of any other incoming stimulus, while our understanding does not know anything about it, and we are not able to assert the judgment "this is blue". We have seen that Dharmakīrti invites us to repeat an experiment in introspection which proves the reality of an element of pure sensation. We have also seen that the Indian realists concede the point to a certain extent, in so far as they admit a double sense-perception, an indefinite, confused one and a definite one which includes a perceptual judgment. The Buddhist point is that there is a pure sensation, or intuition, which is followed¹ by a perceptual judgment. The contrary point is that there is a confused as well as a definite sense-perception and that the latter includes² a perceptual judgment. The difference seems to be very slight, yet it is fundamental, the whole edifice of Buddhist philosophy stands and falls with it. It is intimately connected with Buddhist ontology, the theory of Instantaneous Reality. Pure sensation in the ordinary run has no duration, i. e., it lasts for one moment only and is therefore empirically uncognizable and unutterable,

¹ *vikalpena anugamyate*.

² *vijñaptasāyātmake*, KS, I 1.4

In the first moment a sensation is produced, it is the real moment of a fresh cognition. We have cognized the blue, but we as yet do not know that it is the blue.¹ The sense of vision which alone has produced this cognition is by itself incapable of imparting to it any definiteness. It therefore commits, so to speak, all further work to its associate, the understanding, which operates upon the material supplied by the senses and constructs with the help of mnemonic elements a conception. This conception alone is capable of being expressed in speech. The thing as it is in itself, its unshared essence, can never receive such a name, it is unexpressible. A conception and a name² thus always refer to many moments. The pure reality of a single moment is unutterable. A reflex whose scope is strictly limited to the objective reality of one moment is susceptible neither of conceptual determination nor of linguistic expression.

To maintain that ultimate reality, the thing as it is in itself, can neither be conceived nor named means that it cannot be cognized by consistent logical methods, in this sense the Thing-in-Itself is uncognizable.

§ 4. REALITY PRODUCES A VIVID IMAGE.

A further characteristic of ultimate reality, whose mark is causal efficiency, also refers to the element present in the ken. It consists in the fact that it produces a sensation followed by a vivid image,³ whereas only a vague image⁴ is produced in memory by the thought of an absent object or by its name in speech. Moreover, according to another interpretation,⁵ the degree of vividness changes in an inverse

¹ TSP., p. 12-22 — *caṣur vyākāṇa-saṅgi* (or *saṁangi*, or *samsaṅgi*) *nīlam vyākāṇi, na tu nīlam it*, already quoted by Dignāga in *Pr. samucc.* viii from the *Abhidharma-sūtra*.

² *dhī-dhīvaṇī* cp. TS, p. 274 ff. 18.

³ *sphuṭa-pratibhāsa* = *sphuṭa-nirbhāsa* = *sphuṭābha* = *viśada* = *viśadābha* = *spasta* not to be confounded with *spasta* in the sense of logically clear and distinct, it then = *nīśata* = *nīyata*.

⁴ *asphuṭa* = *aviśada* = *lalpita* = *nīśata*.

⁵ Dharmottara's interpretation, NBT, p. 18 2 ff., is probably wrong, for the same object cannot produce presentations vivid and vague, or also it must be understood as referring to the sameness of one consecutive line of existence. Vinitadeva's interpretation of *saṁvidhāna* as presence is preferable, cp. vol. II, p. 35, n. 1-2; cp. TSP., p. 169. 21, 510. 13, 176 23 — *saṁvidhāna sadbhūtaṁ*, cp. Tātp., p. 13 8 — *saṁvidhānam sad bhūtaṁ api . pramāṇam*.

make any sufficient distinction in kind between pure sensation and full perception.¹

Although Leibniz clearly saw that perception was inexplicable on mechanical grounds² and was puzzled to find its transcendental origin, nevertheless sensation was for him but a confused perception.

But Kant, at the beginning of his critical period, as is well known, reestablished the distinction. He thought that it had been «very much detrimental» for philosophy that this essential and «genetic» difference became almost fully abolished. Imagination is for Kant a necessary ingredient of empirical perception. In this point there is a coincidence of his theory with the one of Reid and with the Indian one. But the question of pure sensation and pure imagination presents difficulties. The first is complicated by Kant's distinction of sensation and intuition and the forms of an *a priori* pure intuition which are the forms of Time and Space. We have seen that, for the Buddhists, the forms of Time and Space are not an original possession of our mind, but are constructed by our faculty of productive imagination, just as all other sensible and abstract forms are. Sensibility as pure sensibility is by itself absolutely formless. As to productive imagination (*vikalpa*), it is in Buddhist logic a term which embraces everything which is not sensibility. It thus includes Kant's productive imagination together with his understanding, judgment, reason and inference. It could not be otherwise for the dichotomizing principle alone, since it divides all that is cognition in a sensible, purely affective consciousness and an intelligible, purely spontaneous and imaginative one. Sensation and imagination, says the Buddhist, have each of them their own object and their own function. The function of the senses is to make the object, the pure object, present, and nothing more. The function of imagination is to construct its image. The object of pure sensation is the pure object, the object of imagination is its image. Without sensation, says the Buddhist, our knowledge would be «empty of reality».³ «Without intuition, says Kant,⁴ all our knowledge would be without objects, and it would therefore remain entirely empty».⁵ «If all thought (by means of categories) is taken away from empirical knowledge, no

¹ On the contradictions to which Locke was led by his want of decision on this point cp. T. H. Green, Introduction to Hume's Treatise.

² *Monadology*, 17.

³ *vastu-sūnya*

⁴ CPR, p. 50 and 41.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 50

the senses directly. In support of his view he refers to the Buddhist interpretation of the phenomenon of vividness. He quotes Dharmakīrti¹ and says that if the extended body would have been a thought-construction, it would never have produced any vivid representation, because, says he, «imagination (or abstract conceptual thinking)² cannot produce a vivid image of the object». The Buddhist then answers that there is here no direct vividness, the representation of an extended body is constructed by conceptual thought, it is vague, general and abstract. However it receives an indirect vividness through a simultaneous sensation, the vividness belongs to the sensuous substrate.³ He apparently thinks that as long as conceptual abstract thought or productive imagination has not started to operate, the vivid reflex is a simple moment, the momentary object has neither extension, nor duration. But this again the Realist rejects. He says that the extended body, according to the Buddhist, has not been apprehended by sensation, and it is only in that case, viz. if it would have been apprehended by the senses directly, that it could have produced a vivid image.

The same problem is discussed by Śāntiraksita and Kama-lāśīla.⁴ We find in their work the following considerations. A vivid image and a non-vivid or vague one⁵ are two quite different things different in kind, as different as a visual sensation is from a gustatory one. If therefore a name, or a concept, refer to a vague and general image, it does not in the least refer to that genuine reality which is affected in a pure sensation. A person who has one of his limbs burnt by fire, has of this fire quite a different representation than a person who knows fire only in the way of a general concept or a name. Just so is the sensation of heat vividly felt when it is an object of sensuous actual experience, whereas it is not felt at all, if nothing but the name of heat is pronounced, because the name can evoke only the general and vague idea of heat.⁶

¹ Ibid, p. 268 12, the passage has not yet been identified, but belongs most probably to Dharmakīrti.

² *viśalpa-anubandha*, ibid.

³ *tad-upādhi*, ibid.

⁴ cp TS and TSP pp 280 — 281

⁵ *spāsta*, *aspāsta*

⁶ *śvalakṣaṇam avācyaṃ ca*, ibid. p. 280 4, *avyapadeyaṃ śvalakṣaṇaṃ* ibid, p. 280 9

conception, and have reverted to a difference of degree and a difference of complexity. W. James delivers himself on this subject in the following way.¹ "It is impossible to draw any sharp line of distinction between the barer and the richer consciousness, because the moment we get beyond the first crude sensation all our consciousness is a matter of suggestion, and the various suggestions shade gradually into each another, being one and all products of the same machinery of association. In the directer consciousness fewer, in the remoter more associative processes are brought into play". James says, "the moment we get beyond the first crude sensation". The Buddhist would have rejoined that just this first moment of crude sensation is pure sensation. That all the rest is a matter of suggestion, does not contradict, but only corroborates the proposition that the first moment is not a matter of suggestion, it is pure sensation. Since the essence of reality is instantaneous, the circumstance that pure sensation lasts for a moment only, does not speak against its reality, on the contrary, it supports it. This reality is uncognizable in discursive thought and therefore unutterable, but such is the character of ultimate reality as revealed in sensation. Therefore, as Plato long ago taught — though the lesson seems to require to be taught anew to each generation of philosophers — a consistent sensationalism must be speechless".²

According to B. Russel,³ "theoretically, though often not practically, we can, in our perception of an object, separate the part which is due to past experience from the part which proceeds without mnemonic influences out of the character of the object", "sensation is a theoretical core in the actual experience, the actual experience is the perception". This would fall in line with the opinion of the Indian Realists for whom "definite perception" is the real sense-perception. B. Russel adds that "there are grave difficulties in carrying out these definitions". The fundamental difficulty is of course this, that when a momentary sensation is separated from every vestige of mnemonic elements, it is, as Dharmottara says, no knowledge at all, "as if non-existent" (*asat-lakṣa*); it is, as Kant thought and as the Indian Realists were forced to admit, not knowledge, but a "transcendental" (*añindriya*) source of knowledge

¹ Psychology, II, p. 76

² T. H. Green, *Intro. to Hume's Treatise*, p. 86 (1893).

³ *Analysis of the Mind*, p. 181.

reality is just only its capacity to be efficient¹ Under reality we can understand nothing over and above the bare fact of efficiency² The image is not efficient. The fire is not the flaming object of a definite shape and extension which we deem present before us, but it is merely a moment of caloric energy, the rest is imagination³ The jar is not the extended body having definite colour, shape, tactile qualities and duration, which is present in our imagination, but it is an efficient moment represented, e g, in the fact of pouring water, the rest is imagination.⁴ And again not the general picture of pouring water, but the particular fact

When a leg is broken by the stroke of a stick, real is only the fact that it is broken; stick, stroke and leg are our interpretation of that fact by imagination,⁵ they are extended, general and imagined, real is only the particular point

External reality is only the force which stimulates imagination, but not the extended body, not the stuff, not the matter; the energy alone. Our image of an external thing is only an effect of,⁶ it is produced by, external efficient reality

Thus reality is dynamic,⁷ all the elements of the external world are mere forces

§ 6 THE MONAD AND THE ATOM.

Since the ultimate particular is thus an infinitesimal external reality, how is it related to the atom which is also an infinitesimal external reality? The Buddhist theory of Matter has been mentioned above⁸ According to this theory, physical bodies consist of molecules and a molecule consists at least of eight atoms They are divided in four fundamental and four secondary atoms. The fundamental are the solid, the liquid, the hot and the moving atoms The secondary are the atoms of colour, smell, taste and touch. Secondary matter is

¹ NB, p 13 15

² *yā bhūtiḥ saiva līyā ri*, cp above

³ *ananyam eva agnīḥ*

⁴ *bauddhānam kṣana-pādena ghaṭṭān eva padāḥ tho vyavahāryate na tu tadatvāḥ kṣaṇa-kṣana-nāmā lālo'sti* (Brahmavidyābhāṣana, 12 II 2 30)

⁵ TSP, p. 134 18

(Ibid *upalambho eva lāryam*)

⁶ *sattvaṇa vyāpītiḥ*, calah *pratītyav-samutpādaḥ*, cp above

⁸ Cp above p 101, cp my Soul Theory, p 958, n. 11

CHAPTER IV.

ULTIMATE REALITY

(PARAMĀRTHA-SAT).

§ 1. WHAT IS ULTIMATELY REAL.

The two preceding chapters and the introduction must have elicited with sufficient clearness the manner in which the Buddhists of the logical school have tackled the problem of Ultimate Reality.¹ Positively the real is the efficient,² negatively the real is the non-ideal.³ The ideal is the constructed, the imagined, the workmanship of our understanding. The non-constructed is the real. The empirical thing is a thing constructed by the synthesis of our productive imagination on the basis of a sensation.⁴ The ultimately real is that which strictly corresponds to pure sensation alone. Although mixed together in the empirical object, the elements of sensation and imagination must be separated in order to determine the parts of pure reality⁵ and of pure reason⁶ in our cognition. After this separation has been achieved it has appeared that we can realize in thought and express in speech only that part of our cognition which has been constructed by imagination. We can cognize only the imagined superstructure of reality, but not reality itself.

It may be not amiss to repeat here all the expressions with the help of which this unexpressible reality has nevertheless been expressed. It is —

1) the pure object,⁷ the object cognized by the senses in a pure sensation, that is to say, in a sensation which is purely passive,⁸ which is different in kind from the spontaneity of the intellect;⁹

¹ *paramārtha-sat*.

² *artha-kriyā-lārin*

³ *nirvikalpaka*

⁴ *vikalpaṇa anugataḥ saḥsāt-lārah*

⁵ *sattā-mātram*

⁶ *śuddhā kalpanā*

⁷ *śuddha-arthaḥ*

⁸ *sva-rasika*

⁹ Thus spontaneity is called *jñānasya prāpako vyāpārah*, cp. NBT, p 152

molecules and higher aggregates according to a canon of complicated rules.¹

Thus the Buddhist theory of matter is in full agreement with its definition of reality as efficiency and with its theory of causation as kinetic. The ultimate reality is dynamic, pure existence is nothing but efficiency. The Thing-in-Itself is nothing but the way in which our sensitivity is affected by external reality.²

Dharmottara says,³ "we apply the term „ultimately real to anything that can be tested by its force to produce an effect... This indeed is the reason why purposive actions are realized in regard of objects directly perceived, not in regard of objects constructed (by imagination) . A really perceived object, on the other hand, produces purposive action. Consequently real is only the particular (i. e., the unique point of efficiency,⁴ the thing-in-itself), not the constructed (empirical) object".

§ 7. REALITY IS AFFIRMATION.

Ultimate reality is also styled the affirmation or the essence of affirmation⁵ Dharmottara says,⁶ "affirmation (viz, that affirmation which is the contrary of negation) is the thing", and "the thing is the synonym of ultimate reality",⁷ "ultimate reality is in its turn the ultimate particular"⁸ or the thing as it is strictly in itself

In order to understand this identification of a thing with a judgment, i. e., with a function of thought, especially in a system of logic whose leading principle is to establish a radical distinction between reality and every kind of thought-construction, we must bear in mind that for the Buddhist logician the fundamental act in cognition is not the concept, but the affirmation. There is consequently no difference between

¹ Cp the excellent analysis of Dr B. N. Seal, in *Hindu Chemistry*, II, p 185 ff.

² NB, I. 12 — 15, *vastu* = *paramārthasat* = *artha-kriyā-sāmarthyo-lakṣaṇam*

³ NTB, p 18 19, transl, p 37

⁴ "Cognition is an effect, just as the fetching of water in a jar, or the heaving of legs", cp TSP., p 134 15

⁵ *sra-lakṣaṇam vidhū-rūpam*. Tātp, p 340. 13 341. 16, cp. *bāhyam vidhū-rūpam ego-vyūrtitam*

⁶ NTB, p 24 16 — *vastu-sādhanaṁ* = *vidheh sādhanaṁ*

⁷ Ibid p 18. 18

⁸ Ibid. p 18 11.

13) it is non-empirical, i. e., transcendental;¹

14) it is unutterable.²

What is it then? It is something or it is nothing? It is just something, only something, something «I know not what». It is an X, it is not a zero. It could be at least likened to a mathematical zero, the limit between positive and negative magnitudes. It is a reality. It is even *the reality*,³ the ultimately real element of existence. There is no other reality than this, all other reality is borrowed from it. An object which is not connected with a sensation, with sensible reality, is either pure imagination, or a mere name, or a metaphysical object. Reality is synonymous with sensible existence, with particularity and a Thing-in-Itself.⁴ It is opposed to Ideality, generality and thought-construction.⁵

§ 2. THE PARTICULAR IS THE ULTIMATE REALITY.

All objects of cognition are divided into general or universals and individual or particulars.

The particular alone is the real object, the universal is an unreal object⁶ or a non-object,⁷ a mere name.⁸

Familiar as this theory is to the student of logic from the times of Guillaume d'Occam who also maintained that «the only thing that exists is the individual», it has in Buddhist logic a special bearing. The difference between individual and universal is here much more radical than it was assumed by the schoolmen. A man, a cow, a jar etc.

¹ *na samīti-sat = paramārtha-sat, jñānena prāpyitum aśakyam*. The idea of «transcendental» would be *atyanta-paroḥsa*. The *mānasa-pratyakṣa* which is the next moment and equally *nirvikalpaka* is so designated, cp. vol. II, p. 388; it is not present to me that the term should be used with reference to *indriya-pratyakṣa*. But the Naiyāyikas, cp. Tarka-dīpikā, characterize the *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* as *atīndriya*, and *atīndriya = atyanta-paroḥsa*.

² *anabhīkāpya = atīndriya = anupālhyā = anirvacanīya*, from those four terms which mean the same, the third is preferred by the Mādhyamikas and the last by the Vedāntins, they then carry corresponding connotation.

³ *astu-bhūta = astu eva*, cp. NBT, p. 69. 2.

⁴ *astu = sattā = svalakṣaṇa = paramārtha-sat*

⁵ *avastu = anartha = sāmānya = āropita = parikalpita*

⁶ *avastu*.

⁷ *an-artha*.

⁸ *saṃjñā-mātram*.

school of the Mādhyamikas, is quite natural. It could not be otherwise, since this theory summarizes as in a focus the doctrine of Buddhist Criticism. For the Mādhyamikas the repudiation of the theory was an easy work. For them not only our logical conceptions of finite and infinite, of divisible and indivisible etc. were dialectical and contradictory, but all conceptions without exception were relational, contradictory and therefore unreal. The «Thing-in-Itself» means that there is a thing which is characterized by, its own self. If this relation were real, it would be similar to a knife cutting its own edge. But it is logical and therefore dialectical and unreal.¹

The Jains assailed the theory of a Thing-in-Itself by arguments which did not substantially differ from the arguments of the Mādhyamikas in method, although the method was resorted to for a different aim.² According to them Relativity does not mean at all that the relative things are not real, they are real and relative at the same time. The nature of reality itself, not of logic alone, is dialectical. Reality is permanent and impermanent at the same time, it is finite and infinite, it is particular and universal simultaneously. This contradiction lies in the nature of reality itself and must be acquiesced in.³

The contention that the Thing-in-Itself is cut loose of every general feature as being the ultimate and absolute particular, is untenable. As every other thing it is particular and universal at the same time.⁴ The notion of a Thing-in-Itself embraces all things in themselves, it is a universal.⁵ Moreover every particular is distinguished from all other particulars, it possesses «otherness», and otherness is a category of the understanding. The supposed «purity» of the Thing-in-Itself is a phantom. It is as dialectical as every other logical notion, it is particular and general at the same time. But this feature does not interfere with its reality, because, the Jains maintain, reality itself is dialectical.⁶

¹ Cp my Nirvāṇa, p 142 ff

² The argument of the Jains against the Thing-in-Itself is summarized by Śāntirakṣita, TS, p 486 ff

³ Ibid, p 486 23

⁴ Ibid, p 486 25 ff and 490 11

⁵ Ibid, p 487.22

⁶ The reciprocal position of the Mādhyamikas and of the Jains in this problem can be, to a certain extent, likened to the reciprocal position of Hegel's idealistic dialectic and the dialectic of his materialistic followers, Marx and Engels, who also were ready to assume that reality itself is dialectical and contradictory

ral essence,¹ the thing shorn of all its extensions and the thing containing albeit quite rudimentary extension,² the unique and the non-unique,³ the non-repeated and the repeated⁴ in space-time, the simple and the composite,⁵ the indivisible and the divisible,⁶ the transcendental thing and the empirical thing,⁷ the essence unshared by others and the essence shared by others,⁸ the external and the internal,⁹ the true and the spurious,¹⁰ the non-dialectical and the dialectical,¹¹ the significant and the insignificant,¹² the unformed and the form,¹³ the Thing-in-Itself and the phenomenon.¹⁴ Thus to exist means to be a particular or, as Leibniz expressed it, "to be a being is to be one being", to be a monad.

§ 3. REALITY IS UNUTTERABLE.

Ideality or thought-construction, being by its very definition something that can be expressed in a name,¹⁵ it is clear that reality, as pure reality, the contradictorily opposed thing to ideality, must be something that cannot be expressed in speech. A reality which is stripped off from every relation and every construction, which has neither any position in time and space¹⁶ nor any characterizing quality, cannot be expressed, because there is in it nothing to be expressed, except the fact that it has produced a quite indefinite sensation. If a patch of blue has produced a visual sensation, we must distinguish in this mental occurrence two radically different facts.

¹ *svaśāśana, sāmānya-lāśana.*

² *sarvato vyāvṛtta, avyāvṛtta*

³ *traiśūlya-vyāvṛtta, avyāvṛtta.*

⁴ *deśa-kāla-anugata, ananugata*

⁵ *anavayavin, avayavin.*

⁶ *abhinna, bhinna*

⁷ *paramārtha-sat, samvrti-sat*

⁸ *asādhāraṇa, sādāraṇa-lāśana*

⁹ *bāhyam, abāhyam*

¹⁰ *anāvikam, avikam*

¹¹ *viruddha-dharma-adhyastam, anadhyastam.*

¹² *atuecha, tuocha.*

¹³ *nirālāra, sālakā*

¹⁴ *svaśāśana = paramārtha-sat, samvrti-sat = sāmānya-lāśana*

¹⁵ Op NB, p 7 20 — *abhūta-samsarga-yogya-pratibhāsa-pratīti lalpanā*

¹⁶ Although the point-instant is the reality, but its position in time and space are constructed by our intellect

objects and their constant change, under the influence of a central force called *kaṃma*. Nirvāṇa is the cessation of this evolution for ever.

In early Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika the ultimate elements are four kinds of atoms which, under the influence of *kaṃma*, create¹ the worlds and their evolution. The cessation of that process in Nirvāṇa is Eternal Death, since consciousness becomes extinct as well as the world's evolution. In later Nyūya-Vaiśeṣika Eternity or Nirvāṇa consists in an eternal mystic and still contemplation of God.

In Hīnayāna the three kinds of Reals and the four kinds of atoms are replaced by three kinds of elements or energies.² Eternity is here also unconscious, a condition of Eternal Death as a consequence of the extinction of the force of *kaṃma*.

In the first period of the Mahāyāna the force of *kaṃma* becomes a Force of Illusion.³ Eternity is the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, a condition attained through the destruction of this Illusion. The same position is accepted in Vedānta.

Finally in the second period of Mahāyāna the ultimate reality is the Thing-in-Itself. Its differentiation into subject and object⁴ by the intellect under the influence of *kaṃma* constitutes the world process. Its non-differentiation is Nirvāṇa. It is an unspeakable Eternity of Pure Existence⁵ and Pure Consciousness⁶ where subject and object have coalesced.

Thus the Thing-in-Itself is, on the one hand, an external object, the ultimate cause of cognition. On the other hand, it is also the point where subject and object coalesce in the Final Absolute.

Jinendrabuddhi⁷ says — "From the standpoint of 'Thisness', (i. e., the absolute Reality or the Thing-in-Itself) there is no difference at all (between subject and object), but hampered as we are by Transcendental Illusion... all that we know is exclusively its indirect appearance as differentiated by the construction of a subject and an object".

The notion of "Own Essence", an essence which is strictly its own in every element, appears already in the Hīnayāna. The element of

¹ *ārabhante*.

² *dharma* = *samālāra*

³ *māyā*

⁴ *grāhya-grāhaka-lalpanā*

⁵ *śābhhāva-lāya*

⁶ *jñāna-lāya*

⁷ Cp vol. II, p. 396

ratio to the distance at which the object is situated. This obvious and simple fact, the fact namely that a present and near object produces a vivid image and that a remote or absent one produces a dim or vague one has received a special interpretation in the light of the theory of Instantaneous Being. According to this theory, we have at every moment «another» object. One and the same real object cannot produce a vivid image in one case and a vague one in another case. It would be a contradiction, for in the light of this theory this would mean that it produces both at once. The Realist contends that the vividness and vagueness are in the cognition, not in the object.¹ The same object can produce different impressions at different times in the same observer, or at the same time in different observers, because, says the Realist, images arise *a posteriori*, not *a priori*,² they correspond to external reality, for him they are not subjective creations superimposed upon a heterogeneous reality.

The vividness of the sensuous image, however, is something quite different from the clearness and distinctness of an abstract thought or of a mnemonic representation.³ It is apparently just the contrary of it. Vācaspati-mīśra records an interesting controversy on the question of the origin of our representation of an extended body.⁴ According to the Buddhist this representation is a construction of productive imagination, or of abstract thought,⁵ and therefore illusive. Reality does not consist of extended and perdurable bodies, but of point-instants picked up in momentary sensations and constituting a string of events. Our reason then by a process of synthesis, so to speak, computes these moments and produces an integrated image, which is nothing but an imagined mental computation.⁶ The Realist objects that a unity would never be produced in this way. He therefore maintains that the extended body exists really and is apprehended by

¹ *sphuṭatvam* 'api jñeyatva-viśeṣa eva, na samvedana-viśeṣa, cp NK., p. 267. 14.

² *parāñicāḥ pratyayāḥ*, na *pratyāñicāḥ*, cp. NK., p. 269. 19. With the meaning of *parāñicāḥ* and *pratyāñicāḥ* in this context cp Tāt., p. 84. 18, where *parāñi* is likewise used in the sense of *a posteriori* in a controversy with the Vāyākaraṇas who assume that the names logically precede and give shape to ideas.

³ *nyatā ākāra* = *nirvāṇa-ākāra* = *nyatā buddhī* = *paricchinnaṃ jñānaṃ* = = *bead-śeṣ*

⁴ *sthūlatva*, cp NK., p. 262 ff.

⁵ *cikāṭpa*, ibid., p. 263. 9.

⁶ *saṃkalpanātmaka*, ibid., p. 263. 10

individual objects, (but only the Whole or the Absolute, therefore the Vedāntins assume that pure sensation)¹ apprehends pure Existence² (or the Absolute Brahma)».³

§ 10. SOME EUROPEAN PARALLELS.

To summarize. The conception of Ultimate Reality as it is established in the critical school of Buddhism implies that it represents 1) the absolute particular, 2) pure existence, 3) a point-instant in the stream of existence, 4) it is unique and unrelated, 5) it is dynamic, not extended, and not enduring, 6) it possesses the faculty of stimulating the intellect for the production of a corresponding image, 7) it imparts vividness to the image, 8) it constitutes the assertive force of judgments, 9) it is the Thing-in-Itself, unutterable and incognizable.

Philosophy in its more than bimillenary search for an ultimate reality has sometimes travelled on parallel lines, repeated, totally or partially, the same arguments, drawn from them the same or quite different conclusions, without however arriving at the same final result.

The term designating an ultimate reality in Buddhist logic literally means «Own Essence».⁴ This «Own Essence», to a certain extent, coincides with Aristotle's First Essence. Its formulation as *Hoc Aliquid* coincides exactly with the term *hinc idem* by which the «Own Essence» is explained. In Buddhism it is absolutely unrelated, since it is something strictly by itself. «Whether any Substance or Essence can be a *Relatum* or not, Aristotle is puzzled to say; he seems to think that the Second Essence may be, but that the first Essence cannot be so. He concludes however by admitting that the question is one of doubt and difficulty».⁵ The Indian denial is very categorical.

However «that which is most peculiar to Aristotle's Essence is, that while remaining *Unum et Idem Numero*, it is capable by change in itself of receiving alternately contradictory Accidents».⁶ Thus, we

¹ *nirvikalpa*.

² *sattā-mūlā*.

³ Cp. ŚD. p. 126. Vedānta-paribhāṣā, p. 81 ff., explains «*tat itam anu*» as *nirvikalpa*, and Nyāya-makaranda, p. 168 ff. assumes a *tattva-sākāt-lāra* as a direct knowledge of the Absolute. The mystic Yogi only perceives every thing by *nirvikalpa* directly, for him *mānasa-pratyakṣa* or intelligible intuition is the only *pramāṇa*.

⁴ *svatalsanam* = *paramārtha-sat*.

⁵ Cp. Grote Aristotle, p. 72.

⁶ Ibid., p. 69.

The vagueness is thus not a matter of degree, but it is an intrinsic property of all mental constructions which can never seize the object in its concrete vividness.¹

§ 5. ULTIMATE REALITY IS DYNAMIC.

Dharmakīrti says² «the object cognized by sense-perception is the particular essence of that object». The particular essence, he then explains, is that essence which produces a vivid image.³ The image is either vivid or vague. Only the vivid is produced by the presence⁴ of the particular essence of the object. We cannot even say that it is an image, because we do not yet realize its features, it is simply a vivid impression which, as it fades away, will be replaced by a clear and distinct image. This clear and distinct image is the workmanship of the understanding which has been led to construct it by the impression, i. e., by a stimulus coming from the object. But the image is an internal, subjective construction called forth by a point-instant of external reality. This reality is by no means similar to the object, it is only the cause stimulating our intellect. Cause and effect, as has been sufficiently proved by our examination of the Buddhist theory of causation, need not at all to be similar.

The question is then raised, why is it that this «particular» alone, this essence which is not similar to the image, is nevertheless the exclusive object cognized in pure sense-perception?⁵ Are we not firmly convinced in seeing a fire, that it is before us in the external world just as it is represented in our image internally?⁶ No, says Dharmakīrti, the particular essence alone is in the external world, because it alone is the ultimately real element.⁶ Why is that? Why is it that the particular essence is alone the ultimately real element? Because, says Dharmakīrti, it alone is efficient, the essence of

¹ This also seems to be the opinion of B. Russell, when he says, *Analysis of Mind*, p. 222, «our images even of quite particular occurrences have always a greater or less degree of vagueness. That is to say, the occurrence might have varied within certain limits without causing our image to vary recognizably».

² NB, p. 12. 18.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12. 1. 8. We here accept the interpretation of Vinītadeva, according to which *sannidhāna* means presence in the ken.

⁴ NBT, p. 18. 8.

⁵ *Ibid.* *vahnir drśyātmalā eva atasiyate.*

⁶ NB, p. 18. 10

just as Aristotle's «First Essence», is an *Entelechy*, it is a Soul. In Buddhism it is an external point-instant

Omitting a series of philosophers who have assumed a difference between the contingent reality of the empirically cognized object and its transcendental unknown source of final reality, we may be allowed to dwell somewhat longer on Kant, because here, as it would seem, we meet not only with some parallel lines and detached bits of similar argument, but with a similarity of the whole conception. The following points attract our attention .

1) Kant assumes, just as Dignāga, two and only two sources of our knowledge and a radical difference between them.

2) Although radically different and theoretically separable these two sources appear empirically always as mixed up. The difference between them is, consequently, not empirical, but transcendental.

3) In all other systems clear and distinct thinking has been assumed as a guaranty of truth. Through the senses phenomena alone are confusedly cognized, through the understanding, or the reason, ultimate reality, the things, as they really are in themselves, are clearly cognized. Kant, in his critical period, has reversed this relation. Clear and distinct cognition refers only to phenomena, but «that which in the phenomena corresponds to sensation, constitutes the transcendental matter of all objects, as Things by themselves (Reality, *Sachheit*)» According to the Buddhists, we have seen, the Thing-in-Itself is cognized in pure sensation. The things cognized clearly and distinctly are objectivized images

4) The Thing-in-Itself is incognizable, says Kant, we cannot represent it in a sensuous image, it is the limit of cognition. The ultimate particular, says the Buddhist, cannot be reached by our cognition

5) It nevertheless exists and is efficient, says Kant, it is nothing but the way in which our sensitivity is affected by external reality. The ultimate particular, says Dharmakīrti, is the ultimate reality, because alone it has efficiency.

6) There is a double reality and double causality, the ultimate reality-causality of the Thing-in-Itself and the indirect reality-causality of the empirical object. The thing-in-itself is but another name for ultimate reality-causality, it is nothing but the fact of this reality-causality. This point which is expressed by the Buddhists with sufficient precision, has puzzled the interpreters of Kant, because Reality is conceived by him as a synthetic Category, as a Reality

translucent. Every secondary atom wants four fundamental atoms for its support, so that the molecule consists really of twenty atoms, if the body does not resound. If it resounds, a secondary atom of sound is added. The molecule will then consist of nine or 25 atoms respectively. But these atoms are of a peculiar kind. First of all they are not indivisible. The Buddhists strongly object to the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas who assumed indivisible, absolutely hard atoms. If two atoms are contiguous, they asked,¹ do they touch one another on one side only or totally on all sides. In the latter case the two atoms will coalesce and all the universe will consist of a single atom. But if they touch one another on one side only, then every atom will be surrounded by at least six other atoms, four on every side of the horizon, one above and one beneath. It will then have at least six parts. A further characteristic of these atoms is that they are not 'particles of some stuff. The hard atom is not an atom of stuff characterized by hardness, and the fiery atom is not a stuff characterized by heat. The so called fiery atom is nothing but the energy of heat;² the atom of motion nothing but kinetic energy. The hard atom means repulsion and the liquid means attraction or cohesion. The term matter, *rūpa*, is by a fanciful etymology explained as meaning not stuff, but evanescence.³ A further characteristic of these atoms is that all bodies consist of the same molecules. If a physical body appears as a flame, and another body appears as water or some metal, this is not due to the quantitative predominance of the corresponding element, but to its intensity.⁴ We may thus call the Buddhist theory of matter a dynamic theory. This theory which was elaborated in the school of the Sarvāstivādins, was retained in the idealistic schools. It was opposed to the Sāṅkhya theory which can be characterized as a mechanical theory, because it assumed a ubiquitous uniform matter and a uniform principle of motion by which all changes, all evolution and all the variety of the empirical world were explained.

Both the Sāṅkhyas and the Buddhists were opponents of the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas, who assumed atoms of four kinds endowed with original, specific and real qualities. These atoms were possessed of a creative force producing the specific characters of

¹ AK., I 43, cp SDS, 31. 1

² *śābhr anuśyaṃ eva*

³ Cp. CC, p 11, n 2.

⁴ *utkarsa*, cp AK., I, CC, p 29, n

construction¹ But pure sensation and the corresponding pure object are not two things existing on equal terms of reality They are one Ultimate Reality dichotomized into Subject and Object by that same faculty of constructive imagination² which is the architect of the whole empirical world and which always works by the dichotomizing or dialectical method The external «Own-Essence» is the Ultimate Reality on the logical plane only. Since all philosophy must finally be monistic, there is in the very final translogical plane a Final Absolute in which Subject and Object coalesce This is, as Dharmakīrti says, a Thing which we can neither cognize nor express in speech That is to say, it is still more remote from the empirical plane than the incognizable point-instant of external reality, it is the Final Absolute, personified as Buddha in his Cosmical Body.

The Buddhist Thing-in-Itself as pure sensation is a bit nearer the empirical world than the Kantian one. Kant protested against this half-empirical interpretation of the Thing-in-Itself which, according to him, is transcendental. As a single moment, the Buddhist Thing can hardly be said to be empirical.

That part of the Buddhist argument which consists in an identification of Existence with the essence of Affirmation strikes us by its similarity with some ideas expressed by Herbart. Existence means for this philosopher «absolute positing», «acknowledgment of that something which cannot be denied in thought», whose essence is not to admit negation³ The notion of existence is a sort of positing which means that it is the simple positing of something and nothing more «Objects are being posited, says he, and they can be doubted so as to disappear completely But they do not disappear. The positing of something remains, it is only changed, it is directed towards something different from what it was directed to precedently. The quality (i. e., the general) is sacrificed to doubt, but that something which is posited (i. e., the extreme particular) is different, it is something incognizable»⁴ «This Absolute Positing» is contained in every pure sensation, without being noticed by us.⁵ Nobody will believe that the Nothing exists, since it would then become apparent. The characteristic of existence is to be

¹ *nirvikalpa*

² *grāhya-grāhaka-kalpanā*

³ «Absolute Position, Anerkennung von dem, dessen Setzung nicht aufgehoben wird», cp. Met. II, § 201

⁴ *Ibid*

⁵ *Ibid*, § 204

affirmation and what is affirmed, conception and concept, perception and percept, between cognition as an act and cognition as a content. The conception of a cow is understood as the judgment "this is a cow". In this judgment the essence of affirmation consists in the presence of a visual sensation produced by a point-instant of external reality, this sensation stimulates the intellect for the synthetic construction of a cow. In the judgment "this is a flower in the sky" there is no real affirmation, because there is no visual sensation which would not be an illusion or hallucination. The essence of affirmation consequently is not included in the concept of a cow or of a flower in the sky, but in a moment of sensation which is the direct reflex of external reality. In this sense Reality means Affirmation. Even the negative judgment "there is on this place no jar", although it is negative in its form, contains an affirmation, because it refers us to a visual sensation.¹ Concepts may attain to the highest degree of clearness and distinctness, they never carry the fact of existence in themselves. We can say "there is a cow" and "there is no cow". If the concept of a cow did imply existence, the judgment "the cow is" would be superfluous, it would contain a repetition, and the judgment "the cow is not", i. e., "there is here no cow", would contain a contradiction.² But a particular sensation, a point-instant, is existence. We cannot say "existence is", it would be a repetition, neither can we say "existence is not", this would be a contradiction. Thus the Buddhists have hit on the same problem which has occupied so long the European rationalists and their adversaries in their controversies on the validity of the ontological argument. Reality cannot be deduced from the clearness and distinctness of a conception. On the contrary, a clear and distinct conception is a guaranty for its being a thought-construction and, consequently, a non-reality, an imputation on reality.³ The reality of every concept and of every judgment is a borrowed reality, it is taken from a corresponding sensation. In this sense it is said that affirmation, the essence of affirmation, is the Thing-in-Itself

§ 8. OBJECTIONS.

That the theory of a Thing-in-Itself was vehemently assailed by all non-Buddhist schools, and among the Buddhist themselves by the

¹ Ibid., p. 22. 18.

² Tātp., p. 340. 10 ff., 18 2 ff.

³ NBT., p. 48 7 — *niscaya-ārūḍham rūpam-samāroptam = buddhy = aśaṁtam*, ibid., p. 51. 8.

PART III

THE CONSTRUCTED WORLD

CHAPTER I

JUDGMENT

§ 1. TRANSITION FROM PURE SENSATION TO CONCEPTION

Having excluded from the realm of Ultimate Reality every bit of imagination, having reduced it to mere point-instants which include no synthesis, the Buddhist logicians were landed in the same difficulty which must befall every system endeavouring to establish a difference in kind between the two sources of our knowledge of the external world, the passive receptivity of the senses and the spontaneous productions of imagination. In Ultimate Reality, we have seen, there is no duration and no extension, no quality and no motion, no universals, no concrete individuals, etc. On the other side, in the imagined empirical world, there is an imagined time, there is a constructed space, there are manifold imagined qualities, motions, universals, particulars, etc. Both realms, the transcendental unimagined reality and the imagined or empirical one, are absolutely dissimilar.

There is between them no other connection than a causal one. The point-instants are points of efficiency, they possess the capacity of stimulating the understanding to construct in imagination illusive pictures which by ordinary men are mistaken for reality itself. This case of causality is a glaring challenge to the prejudice shared by all realistic systems that the effect must be similar to its cause. The effect is here absolutely dissimilar to its cause. There is between the point-instant and the image, or conception, constructed by imagination on its instigation, a "conformity",¹ or correspondence, which we may,

¹ *sārūpya*, cp vol II, App IV.

A Jain philosopher surnamed Ahrika¹ is reported to have adopted in this discussion a line of argument not unknown to the historian of philosophy. Everything, he maintained, includes at the same time some similarity and some difference, the similarity is the universal, the dissimilarity is the particular. If there were such a thing as the absolute particular, that would be unrelated and absolutely different from all other existing things, it would be non-existing, it would be nothing, a "flower in the sky".² And on the other hand, if it would not include some difference, it would coalesce with all other things and there would be no manifold altogether. It is wrong to maintain that an Ens must be a unity, an Ens is always double, it is existent and non-existent, moving and at rest, general and particular at the same time. The essence of reality is dialectical, i. e., always double. The Buddhist answers, that if the general and the particular are identical, then they will coalesce in the same unity and the unity will not be double. But if they are not identical, they will be different, and there will be two realities, the Ens again will not be double.³ If it be assumed that the Ens is the same, but its conditions or qualities are different, the question will arise whether these qualities are real or imagined.⁴ If they are imagined, the Buddhist will not quarrel. But the Jaina assumes real qualities, and real qualities cannot be contradictory, because an Ens is always a unity. If a thing could be another thing, it would lose its identity and become other. No one short of a lunatic⁵ can deny the law of contradiction and this law, we have seen, establishes the reality of the ultimate particular or of the particular thing as it strictly is in itself.

§ 9. THE EVOLUTION OF THE VIEWS ON REALITY.

All Indian systems of philosophy are at the same time doctrines of Salvation. The problem of Ultimate Reality has therefore a double aspect. It is either the ultimate element of life's evolution in Samsāra, or it is the eternal cessation of this evolution in Nirvāṇa.

In Sāṅkhya the ultimate elements of evolution are three kinds of infra-atomic Reals⁶ whose different collocations create the manifold

¹ Ibid, p. 486 25

² Ibid, p. 487 5, 487.20 and 495 12

³ Ibid, p. 489 7—10.

⁴ Ibid, p. 490 14

⁵ Ibid, p. 491 9

⁶ *guṇa*

from "pure sensation" or sensation by the outer sense-organ. During this second moment of sensation the object is present in the ken, so that intelligible intuition is the joint product of the cooperation of the first moment of sensation with the second moment of the object.¹ In the next, third, moment of cognition the mnemonic elements become aroused, the sensations fade away and the intellect constructs an abstract image according to its own laws.

This second moment of sensation, although it, from the empirical point of view, is nothing but a moment of attention, is, from the epistemological point of view, a direct, non-synthetical, unique moment, a moment which, although characterized as a moment of intelligible intuition, nevertheless lacks the most characteristic feature of being intelligible, it is as unimaginable and unutterable as the first, it is therefore half-intelligible, something intermediate between pure sensation and the corresponding intelligible image.

Only this kind of intelligible intuition, conditioned as it is by the presence of the object in the ken, is accessible to ordinary mankind.²

If we would possess real intelligible intuition not limited by a preceding moment of sensible intuition, we would be omniscient, we would not be what we are, we would cease to be human beings and become super-men.

The theory of the existence of a moment of intelligible intuition which follows on the mnemonic image was first hinted by Dignāga in opposition to the theory of the Realists who imagined a Mind in the shape of a nervous current as a running atom establishing a connection between the organs of the outer senses and the Soul, the subject of cognition. It was developed by Dharmakīrti and received its final precision at the hands of Dharmottara. Pure sensation, according to Dharmakīrti, although it is also a necessary condition of all empirical knowledge, is a palpable reality, its existence is established, as we have seen, in the way of an experiment in intro-

¹ Cp. vol II, App. III

² The Yogī and the Buddha cognize everything *sākṣāt*, they have only one *pramāṇa*. With the attainment of *āśīti-mārga* the man becomes *ārya* and that is a different *pudgala*, TS. and TSP, p. 301—302, cp. p. 306, 1—2. The Sarvāstivādins maintained that the Yogī omniscience proceeded by supernaturally clever inferences, since direct sense-perception applies only to the present point-instant. But the Sautrāntika school objected and maintained that the Yogī possessed intelligible (*mānasa*) intuition which cognizes the things in themselves (*svākāśana*) not by inference, but directly, cp. NB, p. 11, 17 ff.

existence, the central conception of that period, is defined as the «bearer of its own essence».¹ However this notion differs from the later one in many respects. There is as yet no hard and fast line between reality and ideality, the elements of existence are divided into physical and mental, or into physical, mental and forces,² they all are equally real.³ Reality is not defined as efficiency. All attention is concentrated upon the denial of the reality of every combination of elements. Matter, considered dynamically, is made so subtle and the elements of mind are so mutually exteriorised that the difference between matter and mind almost dwindles away, both are forces.⁴

The schools of the Hinayāna fluctuated in the definition of the «Own essence» as a point-instant. Each had its own list of elements. However the differences were not essential.

The distinction of all elements in the three classes of pure imagination,⁵ pure reality⁶ and the «interdependent»⁷ class between them — this distinction which is characteristic for the early Yogācāra school — already implies a sharp demarcation between reality and ideality. Dharmakīrti gave to the theory its final shape by defining reality as efficiency and opposing it radically to every kind of ideality. The real then became synonymous with pure existence, with the extreme particular and the Thing-in-Itself.⁸ It was distinguished and opposed to the «non-existence», ideality and generality of every mental construction.

The idea that the Absolute can be cognized as the Thing-in-Itself by pure sensation has been borrowed by the later Vedānta from the Buddhists. «Since the differentiation of objects is cognized by judgment,⁹ and since without the cognition of that differentiation there are no

¹ *sva-lakṣaṇa dharaṇād dharmah*, cp Yaśomitra ad AK. I. 3 and CG, p. 26, n = *atītaṃ paṇa sabhāṭān dhareṇī ti dharmā*, Atthasūlinī, p 39 § 94, cp Mil. 205 & Nettī 20.

² *rūpa-jñāna-cittaviprayukta-saṃskāra*

³ *bhāva = dharma = sat = anitya*.

⁴ Cp. CG., p. 84

⁵ *pari-kalpita*.

⁶ *pari-niṣpanna*.

⁷ *para-tanti*

⁸ *astu = satīd = paramārtha-sat = svalakṣaṇa*

⁹ *svāikalpaka*.

senses and by the understanding at once. The commentator Prajñākara Gupta inclines towards the same view.¹ But Jñānagārbha and others maintained² that the theory of a moment of intelligible intuition was devised in order to have something intermediate between pure sensation and a corresponding conception. How could it otherwise happen that a pure sensation should be comprehended under a conception with which it has no point of connection, from which it is "absolutely dissimilar"? There must be some third thing, homogeneous, on the one side, with pure sensation, and, on the other, with the intelligible conception in order to render the application of the latter to the former possible. Such is the intelligible intuition. It is a pure intuition and this feature makes it homogeneous with pure sensation. On the other hand, it is an intelligible intuition, and this feature makes it homogeneous with the intelligible conception.³ The transition from sensation to conception is thus facilitated and the principle of homogeneous causation saved.

However Dharmottara rejects this interpretation.⁴ Causation as Functional Interdependence can exist between absolutely heterogeneous facts. Sensation can call forth an image directly, without any intermediate operation. The intellect begins to operate when the operation of the senses is finished. If that were not the case, there could be no sharp distinction between sensation and conception, there would be between them only a difference of degree, sensation would be a confused conception, in other words, there would be no pure sensation at all.⁵

To maintain the simultaneous existence of two pure intuitions, the one sensible, the other intelligible, is absurd, but on the principle of Functional Interdependence, the intelligible intuition arises just at the moment when the outer sensation having achieved its function disappears.⁶ The hard and fast line between sensibility and understanding can be saved only on the assumption that the one has finished its task when the other begins.

¹ Ibid. p. 315 ff

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. p. 314

⁴ Ibid. p. 316, ff

⁵ Cp. NBT, p. 10 22 — *ītarathā caksur-āśrūtātra-anupapattih laasyad aya*

vyākhyāsyā

⁶ *uparata-vyāpāre caksur-*, NBT, p. 10 21

have seen, is quite different in Buddhism. Every change is here a change of essence. Moreover Aristotle assumes ten varieties of *Ens*, while the Buddhist «Own Essence» is the only *Ens*, all other categories are non-*Ens* by themselves. They can be indirectly an *Ens* only when a first Essence lies at the bottom, they then have a borrowed reality. This Aristotle seems to recognize by maintaining that his «First Essence is alone an *Ens* in the fullest sense». Just as the Buddhist «Own Essence» it is «indispensable as Subject or Substratum for all other Categories».

Passing by a multitude of comparisons which naturally suggest themselves in the course of examining the endless theories which have been formed by philosophers regarding the notions of Reality, Existence, Substance, Essence, etc, we may stop at Leibniz's Monadology since here the points of analogy are more numerous. We have already called attention to the analogy between the position of Leibniz and Dharmakīrti as against their monistic, mechanistic and atomistic adversaries. Just as Leibniz's dynamic reality denies 1) the Monism of Spinoza, 2) the Mechanism of Descartes and 3) the indivisible Ultimate Reality of the atomists—just so does Dharmakīrti deny 1) the Monism of Mādhyamika-Vedānta, 2) the Mechanism of the Sāṅkhya who regards all changes in nature as due to the variations of distribution of one constant quantity of moving matter, and 3) the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. The Own Essences just as the Monads are dynamic and instantaneous «While motion, says Leibniz, is a successive thing, which never exists any more than time, because all its parts never exist together... force or effort, on the other hand, exists quite completely at every instant and must be something genuine and real». It is interesting in the highest degree that duration, extension and motion are denied reality by Leibniz exactly on the same grounds as in Buddhism, viz, because they cannot exist completely in a single point-instant. «Substances, says Leibniz, cannot be conceived in their bare essence without any activity, activity is of the essence of substance in general». This is exactly the Buddhist principle «existence is work», «efficiency is reality». A further, most remarkable, analogy consists in the contention that «as the Monads are purely intensive centres or (dynamic) units, each must be absolutely exclusive of all others, no Monad can influence another or produce any change in it. Just so the Buddhist units, we have seen, although they are nothing but efficiency, cannot really produce any thing, they are «unemployed». But here stops the analogy. The Monad,

direct sensation¹ After that the mind begins to «murmur»² The sensation is either pleasant or unpleasant, and this engenders volition³ The external object becomes either desirable or undesirable. The mind then begins to «understand»,⁴ and constructs the object according to the five fundamental notions or categories which are its own method of procedure⁵ It then forsakes the method of «murmur» It speaks, and says «this», i. e., this reality, is «something blue», a quality, «this is a cow», i. e., a species, etc

Dignāga's table of categories will be examined later on Here we call attention to the fact that the mind's spontaneity is described, just as some European philosophers describe it, as will associated to understanding⁶ But besides containing the double operation of volition and understanding, consciousness in the stage of awakening contains moreover the double operation of a searching⁷ and a fixing⁸ mind

This double operation is, according to Vasubandhu, present in the subconscious, as well as in the state of full conscious cognition There is always, previously to the formation of a concept, some running of the mind through the manifold of sensuous intuition⁹ The Synthesis of Apprehension precedes the Recognition in a concept

These two operations are already present in sub-consciousness. Under the threshold¹⁰ of consciousness they are a «murmur» of the will Emerging above the threshold of consciousness¹¹ they become understanding Yaśomīti¹² explains the double operation of a Synthesis of Apperception and a Recognition in a Concept by the following illustration. When a potter has manufactured a series of pots, he examines their quality by the pitch of the sound which they produce on being struck He goes through the series in giving a slight

¹ *jñāna-anubhava*, cp NBT, p 11 14

² *mano-jalpāh*

³ *cetanā*

⁴ *prayñā*

⁵ *pañcavāda-kalpanā*

⁶ *cetanā-prayñā-viśeṣa*

⁷ *anvato mano-jalpāh = vitarā*

⁸ *pratyaveśaṇo mano-jalpāh = vicaṛa*

⁹ It is again absent in *dhyāna* = *nirvitarā-nirvicaṛa-prayñā*

¹⁰ *anatyūha-avasthāyām cetanā, ūha = nirvikalpā*

¹¹ *atyūha-avasthāyām prayñā, atyūha = über der Schwelle des Bewusst-*

seins

¹² Ad AKB, II 38

which is not ultimate, as an enduring and extended reality, *realitas phaenomenon*.¹

The fundamental difference between the Kantian Thing-in-Itself and Dharmakīrti's «Own Essence» consists in the clear identification of the latter with a single point-instant of Reality which corresponds to a moment of sensation. The Indian Thing is transcendental in the measure in which a single point-instant, as being outside every synthesis, cannot be empirically cognized.² Otherwise Kant's characteristic «what in the phenomena corresponds to sensation is the transcendental Thing-in-Itself»³ fully applies to the Indian first Essence. A further difference may be found in the clear identification by the Buddhists of the Thing-in-Itself with pure existence.⁴ This existence is not a predicate, not a category, it is the common Subject of all predication. In connection therewith is the logical use made of the conception of Ultimate Reality by the Buddhists. Ultimate Reality is also the Ultimate Subject⁵ of all judgments and, as we shall see in the sequel, of all inferences. A further important difference between the Kantian Thing-in-Itself and the Buddhist «Own-Essence», consists in this, that Kant assumes an internal Thing-in-Itself behind every empirical Ego, just as he assumes an external Thing-in-Itself at the bottom of every external object. There are thus, it would seem, two sets of Things-in-Themselves, the one facing the other. This is different in Buddhist philosophy. The «Own-Essence»⁶ is the external Thing as it is strictly in itself, shorn of all relations. The corresponding internal Thing is pure sensation shorn of all

¹ This evidently must mean that there is another a non-synthetic, ultimate Reality, the reality, not of the continuum, but of the point-instant, cp. CPR., p. 187. It is just the Thing-in-Itself. The term «thing» already implies existence and is explained by Kant as meaning Reality (*Ding = Sachheit = Realität*). Nevertheless a host of interpreters have accused him, and are still accusing him, of the most glaring contradiction by imputing him the theory of a thing which is not a thing, a thing which does nothing, although it is the ultimate thing, i. e., reality and efficiency itself, pure reality and «pure» efficiency.

² *Leśanasya (jñānena) prāpyatūm asākyatvāt*, NBT, p. 12 19

³ CPR., p. 117 (Ch. on Schematism)

⁴ *sattā-mātra*.

⁵ *dharmen*, the common subject for all *dharma*s. Cp. Kant's words (in the same chapter) — «a substance, if we leave out the sensuous conditions of permanence, would mean nothing but a something that may be conceived as a subject, without being the predicate of anything else».

⁶ *sva-laiṣana = bāhga-artha*.

This judgment of perception is the fundamental act of the understanding. All the operations of the understanding can be reduced to judgments, the understanding may be defined as the faculty of judging, but its fundamental act is that which is included in the negative definition of pure sense-perception,¹ it is a non-sensation, it is a thought-construction,² it is the perceptual judgment of the pattern "this is a cow". Since the element "this",³ the sensational core, has been characterized above as referring us to the incognizable Thing-in-Itself, such a judgment can be expressed in the formula $x = a$. The judgment is thus a mental act uniting sensation with conception with a view to knowledge. For neither sensation alone, as pure sensation, affords any knowledge at all, nor conception alone, i. e., pure imagination, contains any real knowledge. Only the union of these two elements in the judgment of perception is real knowledge. Sensation, we have seen, imparts to knowledge reality,⁴ particularity,⁵ vividness⁶ and efficient affirmation.⁷ Conception, or the constructed image, on the other hand, imparts to it its generality,⁸ its logic,⁹ its necessity,¹⁰ its clearness and distinctness.¹¹

The sanscrit term which we thus translate as judgment means in its common application, a decision.¹² It is just a judgment, a verdict, a volitional act, it is rendered in Tibetan as "volition".¹³ More especially it is a decision regarding the identification of two things.¹⁴ It is also used as a technical term in another very developed Indian science, the theory of poetical figures.¹⁵ These are divided into simple comparisons and identifications. Identification means there a poetical assertion of identity of two things which are by no means identical,

¹ *lalpanāpodha*

² *lalpanā = adhyavasāya*

³ *īdamitā*

⁴ *āstacatā*

⁵ *śalaksanatā*

⁶ *spṛhīṭḍhatā*

⁷ *vidhī-sarīpātā*

⁸ *sāmānya-laksanā = sārūpya*

⁹ *saṃtīdhitā*

¹⁰ *niscaya*

¹¹ *nyatā-ākāratā*

¹² *adhyavasāya*

¹³ *shen-pa*

¹⁴ *clatīādhyavasāya*

¹⁵ Cp. *Alamkāra-sarvasva* p. 56 and 65

the ultimately simple. Existence is not liable to negation. This identification of pure existence with the sensible core of reality, its characterisation as the unknowable object, as the simple, i. e., the extreme particular, as the essence of affirmation which allows of no denial, its contrast with the quality, i. e., with the general, which is no affirmation in itself,¹ but can be doubted, i. e., alternately affirmed and denied — all this argumentative speculation strikes us by its similarity with Buddhist ideas.²

That part of the Buddhist theory which compares the point-instant of Ultimate Reality with a Differential and the job of the intellect with mathematical computation³ is also not left without a parallel in the history of European philosophy. The post-Kantian philosopher Solomon Maimon is known for his theory of «Differentials of Sensibility». «The Differentials of the Objects are the Noumena, says he, the Objects constructed out of them are the Phaenomena».⁴

¹ We can say both «the cow is» and «the cow is not», but the *Hoc Aliquid* always is, it cannot be denied because its denial would be the affirmation of the Nothing, or, as Vācaspati-miśra puts it, it would be «non existence in person», *vigrahaṭvān abhāva*; cp. Tātp. 389. 22 — *na tv abhāvo nāmo kaścid vagrahaṭvān asti yāḥ p atpati-gocarah syāt*

² Absolute Position = *vidhi-sarūpa* = *śvalāsana* = *sattā-mātra* = *vastu-mātra* = *niramśa-vastu* = *anarayanam*.

³ *saṃkalana*

⁴ Cp. R. Kroner: Von Kant bis Hegel, I, p. 354.

difference, to synthesize in a (fictitious) unity a variety of time, place and condition.¹ The expression of this synthesis is the judgment of the form "this is that",² in which the non-synthetic element "thisness"³ is coupled with the synthetic element of "thatness".⁴

Consequently there is no substantial difference between a perceptual judgment and a conception, on the one hand, and between a conception, an image, productive imagination and a general notion on the other. Particular conceptions, images and notions do not exist. There are images referred to particulars and they may be metaphorically called particulars, but in themselves they are always general.

The cognizing individual has indeed a faculty of sense-perception and a faculty of imagination. Vācaspatimiśra⁵ makes a following statement of the Buddhist view regarding this subject. "When the cognizing individual thinks that he perceives by his senses an image which he has really constructed himself, he simply conceals as it were his imaginative faculty and puts to the front his perceptive faculty. This imaginative faculty is the mind's own characteristic, its spontaneity, it has its source in a natural constructive capacity by which the general features of the object are apprehended (i. e., constructed). Since the image is called forth by a reflex, he naturally thinks that he perceives the image as present in his ken, but it is really constructed by his own productive imagination"

§ 5. JUDGMENT AND NAMEGIVING.

However not every kind of the conceiving activity of the mind is taken into account when the two sources of knowledge are characterized as the non-conceptive and the conceptive. Some of the fundamental varieties of this differentiating and uniting activity are left alone. The original differentiation of sensation into subject and object,⁶ the initial stage of the synopsis in the chaos of manifold impressions, the operation of running through⁷ these impressions and

¹ *sa (sic) ca vikalpānām gocaro yo vikalpyate, deśa-kāla-avasthā-bhedaṁ śat-
vacaṁ anusandhīyate*, cp Tātp, p 338, 15

² "īd eva idam" iti, ibid

³ idamā

⁴ tattvā

⁵ Tātp, p 88, 8, transl in vol II, App I, pp 260 ff (lit. transl. ibid, p 261 8)

⁶ grāhya-grāhaka-kalpanā

⁷ ciktāṛka

if we like, also call a kind of similarity, but it will be a «similarity between things absolutely dissimilar».¹ The Buddhist law of causation as Functional Interdependence does not militate against the dissimilarity between cause and effect. Given a point of reality and a receptive consciousness a sensation arises. The corresponding image likewise arises in functional dependence on a moment of sensation and a moment of objective reality.

However, some of the Buddhist logicians were puzzled to fill up the gap between pure sensation and the following mnemonic image and thus to reestablish the unity of knowledge which they themselves have destroyed by assuming a radical distinction of the two sources of cognition. The solution of this fundamental problem, it is clear, would at the same time bridge over the abyss between ultimate and empirical reality and, since reality is nothing but efficiency and constructive imagination nothing but logic, it would also establish a link between logic and its efficacy.

Two explanations were propounded, a logical and a psychological one. The logical problem will be examined later on, on the occasion of Buddhist Nominalism and the Buddhist theory of Universals.² The psychological one is nothing else than the theory of attention or «mental sensation» already mentioned.³

The moment of pure sensation or sense-intuition is immediately followed by a moment of mental sensation or intelligible intuition. In one and the same stream of thought there are then two consecutive moments which are related as cause and effect. They are homogeneous in so far as they belong to the same stream of thought,⁴ but they are heterogeneous in so far as the first is a sensation by the outer sense, the second a sensation by the inner sense or by the mind. From the standpoint of empirical psychology it is simply the moment of attention or of attending to the preceding moment of pure sensation. The mind which in early Buddhism was a special, sixth,⁵ organ of cognition, and in the realistic systems identified with a nervous current, is here identified with a moment of attention⁶ which is called «mental sensation» or sensation by the inner sense, in distinction

¹ *atyanta-viśeṣaṇānām sālāsanyam*, cp. NYTT, p. 340 17.

² *apoha-vāda*

³ *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, cp. above p and vol. II, App. III.

⁴ *eka-santāna-patita*

⁵ *mana-āyatana*, *āyatana* № 6, cp CC, p 8.

⁶ *manasi-kāra*, resp *yomiso-manasi-kāra*, cp. vol. II, App. III. p. 328, p. 3.

the name indicates, predicable or utterable. It is contrasted with the non-predicate, the subject, which is always, *quæ* pure subject, unutterable. If all thinking reduces to judgments and all judgments are, directly or indirectly, perceptual judgments, our cognition can be characterized as the union of an utterable element with an unutterable one, or as a reference of a conception to its corresponding pure object. And just as the reality of pure sensation is established by *Dharmakīrti* in the course of an experiment in introspection, just so the narrow association of conceptions with words is also proved by introspection.¹ On such occasions when we freely indulge in fancy and allow our imagination a free play,² when we are engaged in pure imagination, we notice that the play of our visions and dreams is accompanied by an inward speech. "Nobody can deny that imagination is interwoven with speech", says *Śāntirakṣita*.³ Pure imagination is an imagination without reality; pure reality is reality without imagination. A judgment, or cognition, is imagination with an objective reference to reality and, this is always something utterable associatively referred to something unutterable.

§ 6. CATEGORIES.

A classification of judgments is therefore a classification of names. Since all cognition reduces to judgment and a judgment is an (illicite) combination of a non-synthetic element with a synthetic one, of an unutterable element with a name or a predicate, the question arises, what are the ultimate kinds or categories of predicates or of names? It is not a question about the categories of all namable things, since there is only one ultimate thing and that is the Thing-in-Itself. This ultimate reality cannot be dichotomized or classified, it is essentially one. Neither can it be named, it is a non-name, a non-predicate, it is the necessary subject in every judgment, for every description of predicates. However the manner of conceiving it and its names can be various, since all names are, directly or indirectly, names of its different attributes. Thus the most general relation, that which is continuous with judgment or cognition in general, is the substance-to-quality relation, in the sense of the relation of a First Essence to all other categories of attributes.

¹ *pratyakṣataḥ*, cp TSP, p. 368, 1

² *āntotpṛeṣādi-kāle sū (lālpanā) śabdānustādānā*, cp TS, p. 368 2-3

³ Ibid

spection.¹ But the moment of intelligible intuition is entirely transcendental.² There are no facts³ and no possible experiments in order to prove its existence empirically. According to Dharmottara it is simply the first moment of the constructive operation of the understanding. It is a different moment, because its function is different. The function of pure sensation, we have seen, is to signalize the presence of the object in the ken, the function of intelligible intuition consists in "evoking the image of its own object".

Intelligible sensation is a middle term which is supposed to unite sensation with conception with a view to knowledge. But the Realist objects that it is impossible to unite two so absolutely heterogeneous things as a point-instant of sensibility with a clear image. If two such things could be made similar by something intermediate, says he, then "a fly could be made similar to an elephant through the medium of a donkey".⁴

Thus the objections against this theory of a moment of intelligible intuition came first of all from the side of the Realists who denied the sharp distinction between sensation and understanding and denied the theory of Instantaneous Existence. "The senses, says Vācaspatimiśra, do not reflect separate moments, therefore it is not possible that the intellect should grasp the moment following upon the moment which has produced the simple reflex; but, on the contrary, the intellect grasps just the same object as has been grasped by the senses".⁵

Among the Buddhist logicians themselves the theory has produced a variety of interpretations. The opposition against the hard and fast separation of sensation from the understanding as maintained by Dharmottara seems to have arisen in the school of Mādhyamika—Yogācāras who partly inclined, towards a realistic logic and were partly steeped in the prejudice that the effect must be similar to the cause. Jamyan-zhadpa testifies⁶ to the fact that the school of the Extreme Relativists, the Mādhyamika-Prasangika school, did not object against the possibility of a simultaneous cognition by the

¹ Cp above, p. 150

² *atyanta-parokṣa*, cp vol II, p. 333, n 3

³ NBT., p 111 — *na tv asya pravūḍhalam asti pramānam*

⁴ Tātp., p 341. 26 — *hasti-maśakāv epī rāsabhaḥ sūrūpayet*, cp transl. vol II, p 423

⁵ Cp vol. II, p 321, NK., p 122

⁶ Cp vol. II., p 327

no connotation,¹ they are entered into the system as a separate item. "Besides the words like cow are generally known in common life as class names, but such words as *Citragadā* are known in life as proper names".² Therefore, because not everybody knows that all names are general and that the proper names are no exception to the rule, they have been distinguished from the others

Consequently the category of names, as understood by Dignāga, includes all other categories. We must conceive his fivefold division, according to the Indian method of counting only the final items in a classification, as a division into names and non-names, and then as a division of the names in four different kinds of names

The category of substances is illustrated by the examples of "the possessor of a stick", "the possessor of horns" or "horny". We would call them possessive adjectives.³ They are indeed secondary substances, such substances as characterize other substances. Only the First Essences of things can never become predicates, all other substances can become attributes in regard of other objects. They are thus not substances in their essence, but secondary or metaphorical substances, they can be both substance or attribute. Substance then means the possessor of an attribute. The ultimate and real possessor of all attributes is the Thing-in-Itself. All constructed objects, being attributes in regard of it, can be metaphorically called substances when they are characterized as possessing other substances

Compared with the categories of the Vaiśeṣikas we find in the table of Dignāga, with the *proviso* that they are not realities (*sattā*), but mere names (*nāma-kalpanā*), the three fundamental categories of Substance, Quality and Action. The category of Universals has disappeared from the list as a separate item, because all categories are Universals. The category of Differentials, in the sense of ultimate Differentials, has also disappeared, because it is a non-category, the unutterable element at the bottom of every object.⁴ Inherence and Non-existence are also not to be found in this table of Dignāga.

¹ Ibid, p. 370 27 — *ta eva bheda āvalokita bhedaḥ sāmānyam it*

² Ibid, p. 370 2 ff

³ *daṇḍa, visāṇī*

⁴ J. S. Mill, *Logic*, I 79 calls attention to the fact, that "all the attributes of bodies which are classed under Quality and Quantity are grounded on the sensations which we receive from those bodies." This could mean that all classes are nothing but sensation differently interpreted by our imagination in its function of name-giving or judging

The moment of intelligible intuition is not empirically cognizable, because it is a moment, a single moment is always transcendental, it cannot be represented in an image, it is unutterable, but its assumption is urged upon us by the whole system which is built up on a radical distinction of the two sources of knowledge.¹

§ 2. THE FIRST STEPS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

The understanding is characterized as the active, spontaneous part of cognition. Its business is to construct the manifold of the empirical world out of that poor pure reality which is presented it by the medium of a merely receptive sensibility. It begins to give form to this material. The ultimate reality, the thing as it is in itself, is characterized as an external point-instant. But, strictly speaking, even that cannot be said, because in the first moment it is a simple sensation which is internal and nothing more. But as soon as the understanding is awaked, it at once dichotomizes this simple sensation in an internal something and its source. It is differentiated into subject and object; into a sensation proper and its external cause. This is the first mind-construction, a kind of «transcendental apperception», a feature owing to which every further cognition is accompanied by the consciousness of an Ego. According to early Yogācāras it is already a thought-construction.² According to the logicians, as we have seen,³ it is still a

¹ Kant was also puzzled to find «a third thing homogeneous on the one side with the category, and on the other with the phenomenon». This intermediate thing must be «intelligible on the one side and sensuous on the other». So far the problem is similar. But for Kant the gap to be filled lies between the empirical concept or image and the corresponding pure *a priori* concept. E. Caird (*The crit. Phil. of I. Kant*, v I, p 423, 2-d ed.), addresses to Kant's theory of schematism a criticism which *mutatis mutandis* could be applied to Dharmottara's views. «By taking thought as purely universal and perception as purely particular, says he, the middle term is made impossible, but if perception is taken as the apprehension of individual things (empirically), the middle term is unnecessary, for in such perception the individual is already a particularized universal». Dharmottara would have probably answered that a critical philosophy cannot abandon the principle of a difference in kind between sensibility and understanding, for to abandon it means either returning to the naive realism of the Naiyāyikas or to loose oneself in the wholesale skepticism of the Mādhyamikas.

² *grāhya-grāhaka-lāpānā*

³ Cp. above, p. 163

thought in our cognition was interpreted in Buddhist Logic as the faculty of judgment uniting a point-instant of ultimate reality with a constructed image, a judgment of which the subject corresponds to reality and the predicate to its image — then this kind of a conceiving or judging attitude of the mind was represented as a dispersion of the original reality into so many views that can be taken of it. The intellect indeed can take of the same reality an infinite variety of views, it can interpret the object called "jar" as an extended body, a solid body, a thing, a substance, possessing such and such colour and shape etc. etc., while the real core of these constructions is a moment of efficiency, it is always the same. The fire likewise may give rise to an infinite variety of interpretations and theories, while its ultimate reality is but a point-instant of heat-sensation. These views may be represented as so many rays dispersed by a single point of the real object. The thing as it is in itself becomes then the lively play of the fancy of our productive imagination. The Buddhist says ¹ "the indivisible Thing-in-Itself is then analysed, or imagined, as being such and such". It then receives all its general and special features "That is the field of thought-construction which is (differently) constructed,² or differently imagined". Then the dispersed rays are as it were made to converge in the same thing as their focus. Thus the function of the understanding in judgments may be described as analytic-synthetic and likened to the dispersion of the rays from, and collecting them in, the same thing which is this focus.

§ 8. JUDGMENT AS OBJECTIVELY VALID

When the perceptual judgment of the pattern "this is a cow" is characterized as the mental act of uniting an extreme concrete and particular thing with a general conception, or of bringing a momentary sensation under the head of a constant conception, the Buddhist logician does not deny that such a definition contains a contradiction. It consists in establishing "a similarity between two things absolutely dissimilar". What is general and internal cannot be assimilated to

Mādhyamikas and the Yogācāras is that for the latter there is a foundation of reality in itself upon which the dialectical, artificial constructions of our mind are erected, whereas for the Mādhyamikas there is only relativity, nothing real in human cognition cp Tsoñ-khapa's *Legs-bśad-sūiā-po*

¹ Tātp, p 89, 12 — *eram avibhāgam svalāṅ sanam . tathā tathā vālpayen'*

² Tātp, p 89 15 *sa ca cīl alpānām gocaro yo cīl alpyate*

stroke to each pot and when he thus finds out the defective one, he says, «there it is!» The examination of the pots is like the operation of the mind's running through the manifold of sensibility. The finding out of the defective pot is like the mind's fixation before the formation of a concept. The first operation is sometimes characterized as the mind's «grossness»¹ or primitivity, the second as its «subtility»² or «elaborateness».³ Thus the Synthesis of Apprehension precedes the Recognition of the object in a concept.

§ 3. A JUDGMENT WHAT.

From among the two sources of our knowledge sense-perception has been defined above as the sensational core of perception, that part of it which remains when every bit of thought-construction and imagination has been eliminated. But this is only a transcendental source of knowledge.⁴ Empirical perception is that act of cognition which signalizes the presence of an object in the ken⁵ and is followed by the construction of an image of that object⁶ and by an act of identification⁷ of the image with the sensation. Such identification is made in a perceptual judgment of the pattern «this is a cow», where the element «this» refers to the sensational core incognizable in itself, and the element «cow» to the general conception expressed in a connotative name and identified with the corresponding sensation by an act of imputation. According to the Realists who do not admit any transcendental source of knowledge, this judgment is included in every sense-perception, it is sense-perceived, it is also a sensation.⁸ But according to the Buddhists it is excluded from it, although it follows in its track. The senses alone could never arrive at a judgment.⁹

¹ *audanikatā*

² *sūlmatā*

³ The medical schools have carried the analysis of the subconscious mind into further details, cp Caraka, IV 1 18 ff

⁴ *atīndriyam nirvikalpalam.*

⁵ *sāksāt - kārta - vyāpāra.*

⁶ *vikalpena anugamyate* Therefore the seemingly conflicting statements TSP, p 899 16 — *sūlāram eva pramānam*, and *ibid*, p. 890. 14 — *samūdātre'pi* (sic) *na pramānyam.*

⁷ *elakṣa-ādhyasāya.*

⁸ *ādhyasāyātmaḥam pratyaḥsam = savikalpalam*

⁹ *yebhīyo hi cakṣurādibhīyo vyāñnam utpadyate na tad-caśāt taj-jñānam .*
śalyate arasthāpayitum (= avasāntum) NBT, p. 15. 17

as non-different from its counter-part (the thing as it is in itself), is our idea, it is not external.

The verbal expression of this externalisation consists in the copula "is", the *verbum substantivum*. It means to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective.¹ The verb "is" refers directly to a point-instant of external reality, to the bare thing as it is in itself. "If I consider, says Kamalaśīla,² the meaning of the verb „is“, no other meaning enters the province of my understanding than the meaning of the Thing as it is in itself.

To summarize the judgment is first of all —

- 1) a judgment, i. e., a decision of our understanding,
- 2) this decision consists in giving an objective reference to a conception,
- 3) it does not differ from a conception, in as much a conception *quā* real knowledge must also contain an objective reference,
- 4) it contains a double synthesis, the one between the thing and the image, and another between the varieties of sensation which are brought to unity in conception,
- 5) it can be viewed also as an analysis, in as much as the concrete unity of the thing appears in it in the different aspects of its predicates,
- 6) it is an illusive, although necessary, objectivisation of the image.

As regards quantity, this judgment is always singular, it is even the extreme singular in its constant subject, which is the element "this". Its predicate is on the other hand, always a universal.

As regards quality, it is affirmative. The negative and limited judgments are founded on a special principle. They belong to a later derivative stage of thought and cannot be coordinated to the perceptual judgment. As regards relation it is categorical. The hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are also derivative and will be examined in another context. As modality it is apodictic. The assertory is not distinguished from the apodictic and the problematic is no judgment at all. For expressing this necessity Dharmakīrti resorts to the same term³ which expresses also the necessary connection of subject and predicate in an analytical judgment. "In every judgment which

¹ CBR, p. 762 (§ 19)

² TBP p. 287, 17 — *svalakṣaṇādi-vyavahārena anyo artho-artho nirūpyamāno na buddhār gocaratām avataraṭi*

³ *nirūcya*

as, e g., of the moon with a damzel's face. Just so is the perceptual judgment here characterized as an assertion of similarity between two things absolutely dissimilar¹ This judgment is synthetical in so far it brings together two parts which are quite different. The point-instant of reality receives in such a judgment its place in a corresponding temporal series of point-instants, it becomes installed in concrete time and becomes a part of an object having duration.² Owing to a special synthesis of consecutive point-instants it becomes an extended body³ and owing again to a special synthesis of these moments it gets all its sensible and other qualities, it becomes a universal.⁴

§ 4. JUDGMENT AND THE SYNTHESIS IN CONCEPTS.

Besides the synthesis examined above, the synthesis, namely, which consists in referring an image to a sensation, there is in every perceptual judgment another synthesis⁵ which consists in bringing under the head of a synthetic image, or of a general conception, of a manifold of single impressions, sensations and experiences "What is a judgment?" asks a Buddhist in the course of a discussion regarding the reality of the external world.⁶ That is to say, what is the volitional act by which I decide that an image must be identified with a point-instant of external reality? He answers, "to judge means to conceive".⁷ Both inference and sense-perception contain judgments, but an inference deals with conceptions (directly), it is "in its essence an act of conceiving",⁸ whereas perception, or a perceptual judgment, is an act of conceiving (indirectly), because it is a sensation which "calls forth a conception".⁹ Now, if a judgment, besides being a judgment, i. e., a decision, is also an act of conceiving, what does the term "conception" properly mean? The answer is that to conceive means to imagine, or to construct an object in imagination. The object conceived is an object imagined. To imagine productively means to produce unity in

¹ *atyanta-vilakṣanānām sālaksanyam = sārūpyam*

² *santāna.*

³ Cp Praśast., and N Kandalī, p 63 ff where time and space are represented as realities, but their parts as constructed in imagination

⁴ *sāmānya-lakṣana = kṛatva-adhyavasāya*

⁵ *kṛatva-adhyavāsāya.*

⁶ NK. p 257

⁷ *vikalpo adhyavasāyah*

⁸ *anumānam vikalpa-rūpatīti tad-viśayam*

⁹ *pratyalakṣyam tu vikalpa-jananaṁ*

of sensuous reality under one of the categories,¹ but simply as the faculty of names-giving.² The categories are but a further detail of naming. The phrasing of Dignāga admits both interpretations.³ Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and their followers rallied to Dignāga's own opinion. They define the constructive intellect, or the perceptual judgment, as the capacity of apprehending an utterable image.⁴ Utterability is thus made the characteristic mark of the act of judging. The judgment becomes, to a certain extent, an "outspeaking"; but not a simple outspeaking, it is an outspeaking establishing the necessary connection between logical thought and transcendental pure reality.

In post-Buddhist Indian logic, the theory of judgment naturally disappears,⁵ since it is a corollary from the theory of pure sensation. Prof. H. Jacobi⁶ in giving an account of this system rightly remarks that it has no doctrine of judgment, as something different, on the one hand, from sense-perception and, on the other hand, from inference.

Just as the Buddhist logic itself, its theory of judgment appears as an intermezzo in the history of Indian philosophy.

§ 10. SOME EUROPEAN PARALLELS

When the student of Indian philosophy is faced by the task of finding an equivalent for a conception which is familiar to him, because he meets it often used in his texts, he may nevertheless be often quite perplexed about how to render it in translation because there is no corresponding term available. In philosophy and logic all European languages form common stock, because they have a common ancestor in the writings of Aristotle. But Indian philosophy has developed independently from this influence. It has its own Aristotle and its own Kant. It constitutes an independent line of development which runs parallel to the European one. It is therefore of the highest historical interest to note the cases when both currents agree on a common conception or a common theory. It may be an indirect, partial proof of its truth, because truth is one, and error is many. When the subject of dis-

¹ *jñāyāt-kalpanā* = *līpti-ñetuh*, cp TS, p 866 24 ff

² *nāma-kalpanā* = *artha-ñānyah śabdair eva viśistā*, Fr Samucc. Tr., I 3

³ TSP, p 868 25 ff

⁴ NB, I 5

⁵ Cp however above, p 224 n 6

⁶ In his article in GGN, quoted above

stopping¹ at some of them as long as they are not yet stabilized enough in order to be definitely fixed by receiving a name—have no importance in a system of logic.²

That conceiving activity which comes directly into play when a perceptual judgment is formed can be clearly distinguished by its mark: this mark consists in the capacity of being expressed in speech. Conceptions are utterable, just as sensations are unutterable. A mental construction which implies a distinct cognition of a mental reflex which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation—this variety of the spontaneous activity of the mind is meant when sensation is contrasted with conception, says Dharmakīrti.³ Thus the Indian "conception" coincides more or less with the European, since its association with a name and its generality are assumed as its principal characteristics on both sides. Just as the European science⁴ establishes a mutual influence, of conceptions on the formation of names and *vice versa* of names on the formation of conceptions, just so, says Dignāga, "the names have their source in concepts and the concepts have their source in names"⁵

Pure sensation and its corresponding Thing-in-Itself have been characterized above⁶ as being unutterable. It follows from it that conception and judgment can be defined as that element which is utterable, which receives a name.

Thus it is that conception comprehends every thought capable of being expressed in words⁷ and excludes pure sensation whose content cannot be so expressed. Thus the predicate in the normal type of a judgment is always a concept. A predicate is just a predicate; it is, as

¹ *racāra*.

² Cp. TSP., p. 367. 8 ff

³ *abhūṭirī pratītiḥ kalpanā*, TSP., pp. 369. 9, 371. 21, cp NB. I. 5

⁴ Cp. Sigwart. *Logik*, I. p. 51.

⁵ *kalpa-yonayaḥ śabdāḥ, śikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ*.

⁶ Cp. p. 185.

⁷ *jñānā-yojanā=kalpanā* is admitted by some adversaries. The true opinion of Dignāga (*śra-prasiddha*) is *abhūṭirī pratītiḥ kalpanā=nāma-yojanā kalpanā*. He nevertheless in *Nyāya-mukha* (TSP. p. 372. 22 ff, cp. Tucci, transl., p. 50), and in the *Pr. samucc* I. 2, has expressed himself so as to satisfy both opinions. Cp. TSP., p. 368. 25 ff. This has been criticized by Śaṅkarasvāmin and others, *ibid.*, p. 367. 4 ff. But if we interpret the passage of Dignāga as meaning *nāmāḥ jñāni-guṇa-kriyā-dravya-kalpanā* the criticism will be cleared away, since *kalpanā* will then be *nāma-kalpanā* in general, and the other 4 *śaṅkarā* will be its subordinate varieties. cp *ibid.*, p. 369. 28 ff.

perceptual one. In this connexion an interesting remark of Prof Sigwart¹ deserves to be mentioned. He calls attention to the fact that, as a rule, only the predicate of a judgment must be named, the subject or "the subject-presentation can be left without any expression in speech" It can be expressed by a mere demonstrative pronoun or by a gesture. "It is with such judgments, says he, that human thought begins. When a child recognizes the animals in a picture book and pronounces their names, it judges" From the Buddhist point of view this statement must be generalized. All judgments consist in connecting an element which cannot be named at all with another element which is necessarily capable of being named. Thus the impersonal judgment is the fundamental form of all judgments.

As to Kantian ideas, the coincidence with his view of the understanding as a non-sensuous source of knowledge and of judgment as the function of the understanding has already been mentioned. Kant has moreover repudiated the definition of his predecessors who maintained that a judgment is a relation between two concepts, because, says he, "we are not told in what that relation consists".² The judgment, according to him, is "nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions into the objective unity of apperception, this is what is intended by the copula „is“". That definition points to a synthesis and a projection of our images into the external world as the most characteristic features in a judgment. If we add the theories of a synopsis of sensuous intuition³ and of the fixation⁴ of it on one point, which theories correspond to Kant's Apprehension in intuition and Recognition in concepts, we can hardly deny that there is a strong analogy between some Kantian ideas and the Buddhist theory, although Kant's examples, following the Aristotelian tradition, are always given in the form of a judgment with two concepts

The essential feature of a decision, assent or belief contained in every judgment, has been first pointed out in European philosophy by the Mills, father and son, and Brentano following on them. According to James Mill it is "necessary to distinguish between suggestion to the mind of a certain order among sensations or ideas . . . and the indication that this order is an actual one".⁵ "That

¹ Logik, I, p. 64, cp. ibid. I, p. 142.

² CPR, § 19

³ *intuitus*

⁴ *visura*.

⁵ Anal. of the Phen. of the Human Mind, I, p. 162 (2d ed.)

But from all European theories of judgment Bradley's and Bosanquet's analysis of the perceptual judgment comes perhaps nearest to the Buddhist view. For these scholars that fundamental variety of judgment also consists in connecting together pure reality with a constructed conception. The subject represents something "unique, the same with no other, nor yet with itself",¹ but alone in the world of its fleeting moment",² something that can merely be expressed by the pronoun "this".³ The predicate is "an ideal content, a symbol", or a conception.³

¹ Bradley, *Logic*, p. 5

² Bosanquet, *Logic*, p. 76, cp. 18 Russell *Outline*, p. 12, call words, even proper names, are general, with the possible exception of "this"

³ It is interesting to note that, according to the opinion of Hegel (*Geschichte der Phil.*, II, p. 145), the idea that sensation or "thisness" (*das Diese*) is unutterable and that the Universal alone can be expressed in speech, this idea which he found in Greek philosophy, possesses a high philosophic value. "This is a consciousness and an idea, says he, to which the philosophic development of our own times has not yet arrived."

We will find them, or their corresponding functions, in another table of categories, which owes its origin not to the perceptual judgment, but to the inferential judgment. It will be examined in connection with the theory of inference.

§ 7. JUDGMENT VIEWED AS ANALYSIS.

The same sanscrit term which has been interpreted above as meaning synthesis in a conception means, curiously enough, also analysis or division in the same conception. It is a *vox media*. The uniting tie of these both meanings seems to have been the idea of construction which is also the meaning, of the verbal root from which the world is derived.¹ The idea of construction naturally developed into the idea of mental construction, of putting together in imagination.² It was then admirably suited to express the idea of rationalism, i. e., a consciousness which itself constructs the images of objects and projects them into the external world. It then began to connote the idea of artificiality, unreality, wrong imputation and illusion. On the other hand, another word derived from the same root, received the meaning of binary construction, division in two, dilemma, the dialectic tendency of thought in general, and finally analysis.³ Both terms coalesced in the meaning of conception which represents a unity in difference.⁴ When the unity is put to the front it is a synthesis, when its component parts are attended to, it is an analysis. Viewed as a judgment referring a constructed image to a point of reality, the conception contains both the elements. When we consider the movement of thought from the point to the image, we have a differentiation or analysis of the unity to a plurality. But when we consider the judgment as the reverse movement, from the image to the point to which it is being referred, we have a movement from plurality to unity, i. e., synthesis. The first step of conceptive thought, productive imagination or judgment—all three terms mean here the same—is the division of the original unity of the moment of sensation into a subject and an object, the construction in this original unity of the part "grasped" and the part "grasping".⁵ But when the initiative of

¹ कल्प.

² *kalpanā* = *yogānā* = *ekīkārana* = *ekatādhyarasyā*.

³ *kalpanā* = *vilāpa* = *dvaidhīkārana* = *vibhāga*.

⁴ *ta eva bheda anukṣipta-bhedāḥ sāmānyam*, TSP. p. 370, 27.

⁵ On the dichotomizing, dialectical movement of thought in general cp. the words of Candrakīrti, *Mādh* vr. p. 350, 12 ff. The difference between the

its presence will be necessarily understood without any formal expression. In that case the two interrelated elements or qualities A and B will represent the whole inference or the whole inferential judgment. This judgment will then apparently consist of two conceptions only, but related as reason and consequence, the one being the necessary ground for predicating the other.

The inferential judgment will then become a judgment of concomitance.¹ Inference, or the object cognized in an inference, says Dharmottara, is either "a complex idea of the substratum together with its inferred property, or, when the invariable concomitance between the reason and the inferred attribute is considered (abstractly), then the inferred fact appears as this attribute (taken in its concomitance with the reason)."² In the first case we just have an inferential judgment, in the second case a judgment of concomitance. The first corresponds to a combination of the minor premise with the conclusion, the second corresponds to the major premise of the Aristotelian syllogism.³ Indian logic treats them as essentially "one cognition", the cognition, e. g., of the fire as inferred through its mark.

The judgment "fire produces smoke" or "wherever there is smoke there is fire", or "there is no smoke without fire", just as the judgments "the *śimśapā* is a tree", or "the blue is a colour", "the cow is an animal", so far they are cognitions of the real and have a hold in reality, must be reduced to the form "there is *here* a fire, because there is smoke", "*this* is blue which is a colour", "*this* is a tree because it is a *śimśapā*", "*this* is an animal, since it is a cow", etc. Without the element "thus" or "here", either expressed or understood, they would not be cognitions of reality.

However not every cognition containing three terms of which one is the substratum for the two others, will be an inference. Only such

¹ *yūṣṭi* = *sāhacarya* = *avinābhāva*

² NBT, p. 20 16 ff., transl., p. 58

³ It is clear that those European logicians who explain the relation of subject and predicate in a normal judgment as the relation of reason and consequence, like Herbart and others, especially N. O. Lossky, reduce the normal judgment to a judgment of concomitance. But it is also clear that the judgment of concomitance belongs rather to inference, than to judgment proper, it is the major premise according to the first figure. The subject of such judgments is always the reason of the inference. The judgment "smoke is produced by fire" is reduced in India to the form "wherever there is smoke, there necessarily is some fire", the judgment "the *śimśapā* is a tree" means "if something is characterized as *śimśapā* it is necessarily also characterized as a tree", etc. They are hypothetical judgments.

what is external and singular. This is one of the reasons why the realistic schools denied the existence of images. They transferred the image into the external world and made of it a reality. They preferred this conceptual realism to the incongruity of uniting an internal image with an external thing. They objected to those realists who maintained the reality of both the image and its external pattern. They answered that in this case we must cognize in the judgment «this a blue patch» a double patch, we must perceive two blue patches at once, an internal one and an external one.¹ The difficulty is solved by the Buddhist by pointing to the fact that absolute similarity does not exist in the world: on the contrary, all things are absolutely dissimilar. They can however be made similar to a certain degree by neglecting their difference. Then all things will be similar to that amount to which their difference will be neglected. This is the Buddhist corollary from the law of Identity of Indiscernables. All cows are absolutely dissimilar with each another, but if we neglect this their dissimilarity, they will appear as similar when compared with horses and lions. The image of a thing is identified with an external point-instant only so far as the difference is neglected. The judgment thus becomes a necessary projection of an image into the external world, its necessary identification with a corresponding point-instant of external reality. The judgment «this is a cow» necessarily brings the synthesis of our understanding into objective reality.

Now what is this necessary objectivisation contained in every judgment? asks the Buddhist. Dharmottara² answers—to judge «means to deal with one's own internal reflex, which is not an external object, in the conviction that it is an external object». This identification is neither a «grasping» of an external object by its image, nor a converting of the image into an external object, nor is it a real uniting of two things, nor a real imputation, or placing of one thing in the place of another one.³ It is our illusion, a wrong imputation.⁴ The image is internal, but owing to an intrinsic necessity of our understanding the image is projected into the external world. Dharmottara⁵ says that form of the object, which is cognized by productive imagination

¹ *ārocāne itī syāt.*

² *NB.* p. 7. 13, cp. *NVT.* p. 389 s.

³ *na gūḥyaḥ* i. e. *na jātanaḥ, na yojanā nāpi samāropaḥ*, cp. *NVT.* p. 389. 10.

⁴ *ārocāne* etc. *ibid.* p. 389. 21 ff

⁵ *ibid.* p. 389. 22 ff

subject "mountain" replaces the real subject or substratum, it is itself partly inferred.

"The subject of such inferences, remarks Dharmottara¹ consists of a particular place actually perceived and of an unperceived (inferred) part. It is a complex of something cognized directly and something invisible, (something inferred). The word "here" (or "thus") points to the visible part" The subject (or the substratum) of an inference is thus a combination of a part perceived directly and a part not actually perceived also in all cases where the conclusion represents not a singular, but a universal judgment. E g, when it is being deduced that all sound represents a compact series of momentary existences, only some particular sound can be directly pointed to, others are not actually perceived. The subject of an inference represents a substratum, an underlying reality, upon which a conception corresponding to the predicate is grafted and thus has been shown to consist (sometimes) of a part directly perceived and a part unperceived (i. e. inferred).²

Thus the subject of an inference corresponds to Aristotle's Minor Term. As ultimate Subject it corresponds ontologically, to his First Substance or First Essence, "which is a Subject only, it never appears as a predicate of anything else. As *Hic Aliquid* or *Hoc Aliquid* it lies at the bottom (either expressed or implied) of all the work of predication".³

According to Dignāga, says Vācaspati-miśra,⁴ sense-perception (the true voucher of reality) does not refer to an extended place upon which the smoke is situated. According to his theories, there is no such thing called mountain as a whole consisting of parts (having extension) Such a mountain is a construction of our imagination. Therefore the true or ultimate Subject in every inference, whether expressed or merely understood, just as in every perceptual judgment, is "thisness", the point-instant, the First Essence, the *Hoc Aliquid*, which is the Subject by its essence, and never can be a Quality or a Predicate

The second Term of an inference is the logical Predicate otherwise called the *probandum* or the logical Consequence⁵ It represents that

¹ NBT, p 81. 21

² Ibid

³ Grote, Aristotle, p 67

⁴ NVTT, p 120 27 ff Vācaspati says that the mountain must be substituted by atoms But atoms are also denied by Dignāga, they must be understood as dynamical point-instants, *Kraftpunkte*

⁵ *sādhya*

is affirmed with full consciousness the necessity of its affirmation is included»¹ VācaspatiMiśra² quotes the Buddhist maintaining that «judgment (or decision), conception (or synthesis) and necessity (or apodictic necessity) are not different things».

A judgment has thus been described. Now what is a non-judgment? Dharmakīrti says,³ it is a reflex.⁴ «Sensation, says he, does not carry any necessity (of knowledge) for anybody. If it apprehends an object, it does it not in the way of a categorical necessity, but in the way of a (simple) reflex. In so far the sensation is capable of producing a subsequent categorical assertion, in so far only can it assume (the dignity) of a source of right cognition».

§ 9. HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF JUDGMENT.

Sensation and conception are always present on the stage of Indian philosophy, but at different times. In different systems, they appear as different *dramatis personae* in the drama of cognition. The sharp distinction between pure sensation and the act of judgment, the idea that the judgment is a volitional act of decision, and that the whole of our cognition consists in an illicite connexion⁵ of pure consciousness and semi-unconscious reflexes — these features belong already to the earliest stratum of philosophy in India. We meet them in the Sāṅkhya system and the medical schools.⁶ Indeed, pure sensation appears there in the rôle of a separate spiritual substance,⁷ whereas all mental phenomena and, the foremost among them, the judgment as a decision,⁸ are reduced to the rôles of physiological reflexes, unconscious by themselves, but «mirrored» in the pure motionless Ego.

¹ Sigwart, op. cit. I, 236

² NVTT., p. 87, 25.

³ Cp. Anekānta, p. 177

⁴ *pratibhāsa*

⁵ *sārūpya*, cp. CC, p. 64.

⁶ Gaṇaka, IV 1. 37 ff

⁷ CC, p. 68 ff

⁸ *buddhi* «cognition» is here the Great Principle (*mahat*), because it embraces everything cognizable. It is the first evolute of the Chief Principle (*pradhāna*) which is Matter (*prakṛti*) and at the same time it is the internal organ whose function is described as «decision» (*adhyakṣāya*). But this «decision» is by itself nothing but a special momentary collocation of infra-atomic particles of matter and energy. They become *quasi* conscious when «mirrored» in the pure light of the Soul.

§ 3. THE VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF INFERENCE.

Thus inference can be defined as a cognition of an object through its mark ¹ This definition, says Dharmottara, ² is a definition not of the essence of an inference, but of its origin The cognition of the concealed fire is revealed by its mark The mark produces the cognition of the object which it is the mark of The origin of the cognition lies in its mark.

Another definition takes inference from the objective side Inference is the cognition of an inferred, i. e., invisible, concealed object All objects can be divided in present and absent. The present are cognized by perception, the absent by inference ³

A third definition lays stress upon the inseparable connexion which unites the mark with the inferred object and defines inference as a consequence or an application of an inseparable connexion between two facts by a man who has previously noticed that connexion ⁴ Thus in our example, the cognition of the concealed fire is a consequence of that inseparable causal tie, which unites smoke with its cause, the fire, and which has been cognized in experience

A further definition takes it as the most characteristic feature the fact that inference cognizes the general, whereas the object of sense-perception is always the particular

This is, in a certain respect, the most fundamental definition, since Dignāga opens his great treatise by the statement that there are only two sources of knowledge, perception and inference, and, corresponding to them, only two classes of objects, the particular and the universal The universal is thus cognized by inference, whereas the particular is grasped by the senses

However it is clear that the fire whose presence is inferred is as much a particular fire as the one whose presence is perceived by vision Without the general features which constitute the object fire and are the property of all fires in the world, the particular fire never

¹ It is always said «through its threefold mark», i. e., through its concomitant mark, through the mark which is concomitant with the *probandum* This is the definition of Dignāga, *Pr samucc*, II 1 and NB II 1

² NBT., p 18

³ Cf the passage from Kamalaśīla quoted above, p 18 2

⁴ This is the definition of Vasubandhu in the *Vāda-vādhī sanantariyāla-artha-darśanam tad-vidō'numānam*

course consists in a deduction of one proposition from two or several others, all containing only three terms, we have no doubt that it is a syllogism. But when we are faced by the necessity of deciding whether a characteristic act of our understanding is to be rendered as judgment, we must know what a judgment is. And here we find an illimited variety of opinions. Suffice it to consult a dictionary of philosophic terms in order to be astonished by the amazing contradictions on this problem between the leading philosophers in Europe. The majority thinks that judgment is a «predicative connexion between two concepts», but Brentano emphatically denies this. He thinks that judgment is something quite different from conception. However Schuppe decidedly asserts the contrary¹. According to the majority the judgment is an act of synthesis, according to Wundt it is, on the contrary, an act of separation, etc etc. The problems of the existential, the perceptual and the impersonal judgments are admittedly so many puzzles. However in examining the Buddhist descriptions of the act of judging, and its different characteristics from different points of view, we cannot but recognize in them some of the features which we find scattered piecemeal in different European doctrines. Thus we apparently find in Locke's Essay some of our perceptual judgments under the name of simple ideas. The perceptual judgments «this is white», «this is round» are interpreted as a reference of a present sensation to a permanent object of thought.²

The chief difference between the Buddhist and all European views of judgment consists in the circumstance that the latter founded their analysis on the pattern containing two conceptions without any regard to their objective reference, whereas the Buddhist analysis starts with the pattern containing only one conception and its objective reference. The judgment with two conceptions, as will be shown later on, is an inferential judgment, or an inference. The judgment proper is the

¹ Erkenntnisthe Logik, p 123 «beide sind dasselbe, und nur vor den genannten verschiedenen Standpunkten der Reflexion aus verschieden».

² These «ideas» «in the reception whereof the mind is only passive» (II, 12, § 1) contain nevertheless distinction from other ideas and identity with themselves. Although instantaneous, «each perishing the moment it begins» (II, 17, § 2) they contain a comparison «of the thing with itself» They moreover are self-conscious, since «it is impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive» (ibid., § 9) This corresponds exactly to Dharmakīrti's *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārtha-ārśtū prasīdhyati*, which he puts on the account of passive sensation (*anuḍhāra*) However generally Locke identifies sensation with perception and thus falls in line with the Naiyāyikas

assume that the inferred part consists in the substratum itself as characterized by the inferred quality?» That is to say, the thing cognized in an inference is neither the major term nor the connection of the major with the minor, but it is that point of reality which is characterized by its deduced symbol. The definition is the same for *Dignāga* and *Dharmakīrti*. The definition of *Vasubandhu* is not materially different, but its phrasing in the *Vādaavidhī* is severely criticized by *Dignāga*.¹

§ 4. INFERRING AND INFERENCE

Since inference is represented as one of the sources of our knowledge, we are again faced by the problem of a difference between a source and its outcome, between the act of cognition and its content.² What is the difference between inferring as the act, or the process, of cognition and inference as its result? Just as in sense-perception the Buddhist denies the difference. It is the same thing differently viewed. Inference means cognition of an object through its mark. This cognition is «one cognition»,³ i. e., one act of efficient knowledge which can be followed by a successful action, on analysis it contains an image and its objective reference. Just as in sense-perception there is «conformity»⁴ or correspondence between the subjective image and the objective reality. We may, if we like, consider the fact of this conformity as the nearest cause producing knowledge. Conformity will then be the source of cognition and its application to a given point of reality the result. But the conformity of knowledge and knowledge itself are just the same thing, only regarded from different standpoints.

The realistic schools admitted no images and consequently no conformity between the image and external reality. The act of cognition, as every act, is inseparable from an agent, an object, an instrument, its method of procedure, and a result. In inference the result is the conclusion. The procedure and the instrument, according to one party, consist in the knowledge of concomitance between the Reason and the Consequence. According to others, it consists in the cognition

¹ *Pr samucc*, II 25 ff

² *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala*

³ *anumāṇam ekaṃ vjñānam*, cp *NK*, p 126.

⁴ *sārupya*

distinction, says J. S. Mill, is ultimate and primordial." "There is no more difficulty in holding it to be so, than in holding the difference between a sensation and an idea to be primordial."¹ We have seen that according to the Buddhists the real "primordial distinction" is between pure sensation and pure understanding and the judgment is a decision to connect both these elements with one another. Therefore the real act of judgment contains only one conception and its objective reference. This is also the opinion of Brentano "It is not right to maintain, says he, that every judgment contains either a connection or a separation of two representations..... A single representation can be also the object of belief or disbelief" Brentano moreover thinks that the copula, "is," represents the most important part in every judgment. It therefore can always be reduced to the form of an existential judgment, "A is". "This man is sick" reduces to the form "this sick man is". Such a judgment however does not consist in establishing a predicative connexion between the element A (the conception) and the notion of Existence,² but, Brentano insists, "A itself is believed to exist."³ For the Buddhist, we have seen, all judgments must be reduced not to existential, but to perceptual judgments. Existence is never a predicate, it is the necessary Subject in all real cognition. Existence is just the Non-Predicate,⁴ "Pure Position"⁵ the Thing as it is in itself, shorn of all predicative characteristics or relations

¹ Ibid, p 412

² According to Sigwart (Logik, I, p 92) the existential judgment and the perceptual judgment are two different classes of judgments, distinguished by the inverted position of their subject and predicate. The judgment "this is a cow" is perceptual or namesgiving. The judgment the "cow is" represents an existential one. Both classes exist in their own equal rights. Existence is the subject in the one, it is the predicate in the other. In both cases the judgment asserts a relation between two concepts. From the Buddhist standpoint this is quite wrong. Existence is never a predicate, never a name, it is unutterable. The judgment "the cow is" differs from "this is a cow" only grammatically.

³ Psychol, II, p 49 "*Nicht die Verbindung eines Meiſtens Existens mit «A», sondern «A» selbst ist der Gegenstand den wir anerkennen*"

⁴ In this respect there is some similarity between the subject of the Buddhist perceptual judgment and Aristotle's category of First Substance. the *Hoc Aliquid*. The *Prima Essentia* is indispensable, we are told, as a Subject, but cannot appear as a Predicate, while all the rest can and do so appear. The Second Substance or Essence, when distinguished from the First, is not Substance at all, but Quality (Grote, p 91). Therefore all knowledge is nothing but a process of ascribing an infinite number of Predicates to Reality. or to First Substance.

⁵ Cp above, p 192

therefore be free from every subjective, mnemonic or imaginative feature.¹ We have seen that in sense-perception only its first moment, which is pure sensation, satisfies to that condition. But such sensation alone, since it is quite indefinite,² cannot guide our purposeful actions. Therefore imagination steps in and imparts definiteness to the crude material of sensation.

The perceptual judgment³ is thus a mixed product of new and old cognition, of objective reality and subjective interpretation. It assumes the dignity of a source of right new cognition, although, strictly speaking, it has not the full right to do it. Inference is still more remote from pure sensation. If the perceptual judgment is not quite new cognition,⁴ inference has still lesser rights to pose as a source of right knowledge. Dharmottara therefore exclaims, "Inference is illusion!"⁵ It deals with non-entia which are its own imagination and (wrongly) identifies them with reality!

From that high of abstraction from which pure sensation alone is declared to represent ultimate right knowledge attaining at the Thing-in-Itself, the perceptual judgment is, intermingled as it is with elements mnemonic, subjective and imaginative, nothing but half-knowledge. Inference which is still more steeped in thought-constructions—two thirds, so to speak, i. e., two of its three terms being imagination—certainly appears as a kind of transcendental illusion. The fact that Dignāga begins by stating that there are only two sources of knowledge and only two kinds of objects, the particular and the universal, as if the two sources existed in equal rights and the two kinds of objects were real objects, i. e., objective realities, this fact is to be explained only by the might of tradition coming from the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. For after having made this statement at the beginning of his work, Dignāga is obliged to retract step by step all its implications. The universals are, first of all, no realities at all, but pure imagination and mere names. Inference, obliged to manipulate these constructed conceptions, becomes, not a source of right knowledge, but a source of illusion. Nay, even the perceptual judgment is right only at a half, for although it reaches the Thing-in-Itself directly, it is obliged to stand still, powerless before its incognizability. Men must

¹ *nirvikalpa*

² *amśata*

³ *savikalpa* = *adhyavasāya*.

⁴ *savikalpam na pramānam*

⁵ *dhvāntam anumānam*, cp. NBT, p. 7. 12

CHAPTER II

INFERENCE.

§ 1. JUDGMENT AND INFERENCE.

From the perceptual judgment or judgment proper, we must distinguish another variety of judgment, the inferential one ¹ Since all real cognition, i. e., all cognition of reality, reduces to judgments, i. e., to interpretation of sensations in concepts, and since cognition can be distinguished as a direct and indirect one, the judgment can also be divided in a direct and an indirect one. The direct one is perception, the indirect one is inference. The direct one, we saw, is a synthesis between a sensation and a conception, the indirect one is a synthesis between a sensation and two concepts. The direct one has two terms, the indirect one has three terms. The direct one reduces to the form «this is blue» or «this is smoke». The indirect one can be reduced to the form «this is smoke produced by fire», or «there is some fire, because there is smoke». The smoke is perceived, the judgment «this is smoke» is perceptual and direct. The fire is hidden, the judgment «there is here fire» is inferential and indirect. All things may be divided in perceived and unperceived. The cognition of a non-perceived through a perceived is called inference. It is an indirect cognition, a cognition, so to speak, round the corner, a cognition of an object through its «mark». The hidden object has a mark, and this mark is, in its turn, the characteristic, or the mark of a point of reality. The cognition of a point of reality, as possessing the double mark, as possessing the mark of its mark, is inference — *nota notae est nota rei ipsius*. In a perceptual judgment we cognize the object X through its symbol which is the conception A. In an inferential judgment we cognize the object X through its double symbol A and B.

The symbols A and B are related as reason and consequence. When one of them, the element A, is cognized, the cognition of the other, of the element B, necessarily follows. Since the element X, the Substratum of the Qualities A and B, or the Subject of both these Predicates, is indefinite, always the same, its expression can be dropped;

¹ *śārthānumāna*.

divided into two classes of objects, fire-like and fire-unlike. There is nothing in the middle¹ between them, both groups are contradictorily opposed to each another. The laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle begin to operate. Two judgments are produced at once, a judgment of affirmation and a judgment of negation, viz "this is fire", "this is not a flower etc.", i.e., it is not a non-fire.

In inference the operation of the understanding is more complicated. When we infer the presence of fire from the presence of smoke, the universe of discourse is dichotomized in a part where smoke follows on fire and a part where non-smoke follows upon non-fire. Between these two groups there is nothing intermediate, no group where smoke could exist without having been produced by fire.

This dichotomizing activity of the mind belongs to its every essence and we will meet it again when analysing the Buddhist theory of Negation,² its theory of Contradiction³ and its doctrine of Dialectic⁴.

§ 6. THE THREE ASPECTS OF THE REASON.

Although there is no difference between the process of inferring and its result, nor is there any difference between the perceptual and the inferential judgments, since both consist in giving an objective reference to our concepts, nevertheless there is a difference in that sense that the inference contains the logical justification of such an act of reference. When, e.g., we unite a given point-instant with the image of a fire, which is not perceived directly, we are justified to do it, because we perceive smoke. Smoke is the certain mark of the presence of fire and justifies the conclusion.

This justification, or the Reason, is thus the distinguishing, outstanding feature which points to the difference between a perceptual and an inferential judgment. Nevertheless in both cases cognition is a dichotomy.

Cognition in so far as it is the function, not of passive sensation, but of the constructing intellect, is a dichotomizing act. It always begins by dividing its object into two parts, the similar and the dissimilar. It always operates by the method of assement with the

¹ *trīṇya-pralāra-abhāvaḥ*

² *anupalabdhi*

³ *virodha*

⁴ *apoha-vāda*

a combination of them, where the two attributes are necessarily interrelated, the one deducible from the other, represents an inference. The judgment "there is a fiery hill" contains three terms, however they are not necessarily interrelated. But the judgment "there is here a fire, because there is smoke" "there is no smoke without a fire" are inferential, since smoke is represented as necessarily connected with its cause, the fire.¹

Of what kind this necessary relation is — will be told later on.

§ 2. THE THREE TERMS.

Every inference therefore contains three terms which are the logical Subject, the logical Predicate and, between them, the Reason or Mark, which unites them.

The Subject can be the ultimately real Subject or the metaphorical one. The ultimately real is always nothing but a point-instant of pure reality. It represents that substratum of reality which must underlie all thought-construction. It is the element "this", that "thisness" which we already know from the theory of the perceptual judgment. It is the non-subsistent substance with regard to which all other categories are qualities.

The metaphorical or secondary Subject is itself an inferred entity, a quality, with regard to the ultimate subject. But it serves as a substratum for further inference, and appears therefore as an enduring thing possessing qualities, as a substitute for the ultimately real Subject. In the inference "this (place) possesses fire, because it possesses smoke", the element "this" represents the real Subject. In the inference "the mountain possesses fire, because it possesses smoke", the

¹ The difference between a judgment of perception and a judgment of inference is, to a certain extent, similar to the difference which Kant draws between a judgment of perception and a judgment of experience, *cp* *Proleg.*, § 20. The observation that the "sun warms a stone" is not yet a judgment of experience. But the universal and necessary synthesis between sun's rays and the calcification of the stone is what Kant calls experience. It is an inference of the form "this stone is warm, because it is sunlit", or "whatsoever is sunlit becomes warmed, this stone is sunlit, it becomes warmed". Generally speaking it seems better logic to treat cognition under the heads of perception and inference, or sensibility and understanding, than to treat it under the heads of judgment and syllogism, as the Aristotelian tradition does. A judgment of concomitance surely belongs much more to the process of inference — it is its major premise — than to the process of simple judgments.

taught by the Buddhists and rejected by all other schools of Indian logicians except the reformed Vaiśeṣikas.

This threefold aspect of the Reason is—

1. Its presence on the Subject of the Inference.
2. Its presence in Similar Instances.
3. Its absence in Dissimilar Instances

In order to give to this formulation more precision Dharmakīrti utilises a remarkable feature of the Sanscrit language which consists in putting the emphasizing particle «just» either with the copula or with the predicate. In the first case it gives to the assertion the meaning of the impossibility of absence,¹ in the second case it means the impossibility of otherness.² The three aspects then are thus expressed.

1. The presence of the Reason in the Subject, its presence «just», i. e., never absence.

2. Its presence in Similar Instances, «just» in similars, i. e., never in dissimilars, but not in the totality of the similars

3. Its absence from Dissimilar Instances, its absence «just», i. e., never presence, absence from the totality of the dissimilar instances.

It is easily seen that the second and the third rule mutually imply each the other. If the reason is present in the similar instances only, it also is absent from every dissimilar case. And if it is absent from every dissimilar case, it can be present in similar instances only, although not necessarily in all of them. Nevertheless both rules must be mentioned, because, although in a correct inference the application of the one means the application of the other, in a logical fallacy their infringements carry sometimes different results. Dharmakīrti moreover adds the word «necessary» to the formulation of each rule. Their final form will thus be

1. The necessary presence of the Reason in the Subjects totality.

2. Its necessary presence in Similars only, although not in their totality.

3. Its necessary absence from Dissimilars in their totality.

Expressed with all the pregnant laconicity of the Sanscrit and Tibetan tongues

1 In Subject wholly.

¹ *ayoga-vyavaccheda*

² *anyā-yoga-vyavaccheda*. A third case would be *atyanta-yoga-vyavaccheda*, op. NVT, p. 218.

quality of the subject which is cognized through the inference, the quality which is inferred. It may be expressed as a substantive by itself, e. g. "fire", but with respect to the subject it is its quality, the "fireness" of a given place. Together with the subject this quality represents the "object" cognized through the inference.¹ Dharmottara says,² that the object cognized through the inference may be 1) either the substratum³ whose quality it is intended to cognize or 2) the substratum together with that quality,⁴ or 3) that quality alone, when its relation to the logical reason, from which it is deduced, is considered abstractly, e. g. "wheresoever there is smoke, there also is fire", or, more precisely, "wheresoever there is smokeness, there also is fireness". "All inferential relation, says Dignāga,⁵ is based upon a substance-to-quality relation, it is constructed by our understanding,⁶ it does not represent ultimate reality".

Indeed the Reason as well as the Consequence must be regarded in respect of their substratum of ultimate reality as its constructed qualities.⁷ Taken abstractly the quality deduced through inference, or the logical Predicate, corresponds to Aristotle's Major Term.

The third term is the logical Mark of the Reason already mentioned. It is also a Quality or a mark of the Subject and is itself marked off by the Predicate. It corresponds to the Middle Term of Aristotle and represents the most important part of the inference. The inference can thus be represented in the formula "S is P, because of M", "here there is fire, because there is smoke", "here there are trees, because there are *śimśapās*". It has been already mentioned that in common life the expression of the real subject is usually omitted and these inferences appear in the form of judgments of concomitance, such as "the *śimśapā* is a tree", "the presence of smoke means presence of fire", or "smoke is produced by fire."

¹ *anumeya*

² NBT, p 20 16

³ *dharma*

⁴ *dharma*

⁵ Cp NVT, p 89 18 and 127. 2.

⁶ *buddhy-ārūha*

⁷ Cp Bradley, Logic, p 199 — the categorical judgment S—P (which is also the conclusion of inference), "attributes S—P, directly or indirectly, to the ultimate reality", whereas the major premise which expresses a necessary connection is hypothetical, "it is necessary when it is, because of something else". Necessity is always hypothetical. We will see later on that this is also the opinion of Sigwart, cp Logic³, I 261 and 484

would have been cognized as fire. Nor would the inferred fire without having been referred in imagination to a certain point-instant of reality ever been cognized as a reality. But still, there is a difference in the generality of the features which are attended to in ratiocination and the particularity of the object which is present to the senses.

According to Dharmottara, inference has an imagined object, e. g., an imagined fire, as its own object, since inference is a cognition of an absent thing which cannot be grasped, which only can be imagined. But its procedure consists in referring this imagined object to a real point and thus its final result is just the same as in sense-perception, the cognition of a point of reality through a constructed symbol.¹ The difference consists in the movement of thought which is the one the opposite of the other. In perception cognition grasps the particular and constructs the symbol. In inference it grasps the symbol and constructs the particular. In this sense only is the general the object of inference, and the particular the object of sense-perception. Otherwise there is no difference in this respect between a perceptual and an inferential judgment. Both, as the Buddhist says, are "one cognition", representing a synthesis "of sensation and non-sensation, conception and non-conception, imagination and non-imagination."² That is to say, it contains a sensible core and its interpretation by the understanding. The difference between sense-perception and inference at this depth of Buddhist investigation is the same as between sensibility and understanding. We are told that there are two sources of knowledge, perception and inference. But the deeper meaning is that the two sources are a sensuous one and a non-sensuous one. It is clear from what has been said that inference is not regarded as a deduction of a proposition or judgment, out of two other propositions or judgments, but as a method of cognizing reality which has its origin in the fact of its having a mark. What really is inferred in an inference is a point of reality as possessing a definite symbol, e. g., a mountain as possessing the unperceived, inferred fire. "There are some, says Dignāga, who think that the inferred thing is the new property discovered in some place, because of its connection with a perceived mark of that property. Others again maintain that it is not this property itself, but its connection with the substratum that is cognized in inference. Why not

¹ NBT, 19, 20; transl, p. 56

² NK, p. 125

who buy goods without ever paying any equivalent. They indeed pretend to acquire perceptiveness, but possess no shape of their own which they could deliver to consciousness as a price for the acquisition of that perceptiveness. If a thing is a separate unity, it must have a separate shape which it imparts to consciousness in the way of producing a representation. But relation has no shape apart from the things related. Therefore, says Vinitadeva,¹ a relation in the sense of dependence cannot be something objectively real. Neither, says the same author, can a relation be partially real,² because to be partially real means nothing but to be real and non-real at the same time, "because reality has no parts, what has parts can be real empirically, (but not ultimately)."

Thus there is nothing real apart from the ultimate particular,³ or the point-instant which, indeed, is also a cause, but an ultimate cause. It alone is unrelated and independent upon something else.

§ 8. TWO LINES OF DEPENDENCE

However inference has nothing to do with this ultimate independent and unrelated reality. Inference is founded upon relations which are a superstructure upon a foundation of ultimate reality. "All inference, says Dignāga, (all relation between a reason and its consequence) is based upon relations constructed by the understanding between a substrate and its qualities, it does not reflect ultimate reality or unreality."⁴

Since ultimate reality is non-relative and independent, its counterpart, empirical or imagined reality, is interrelated and interdependent. But a relation is not a fortuitous compresence of two facts, it is a necessary presence of the one when the other is present. There is therefore in every necessary relation a dependent part and another upon which it depends. One part is tied up to the other. There is a part which is tied up and another part to which it is tied up.⁵ All empirical existence is dependent existence. Now, there are two and only two ways in which one fact can be dependent upon another fact. It either is a part of the latter, or it is its effect.

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Cp. *Sambandhap*, Kār XXV.

⁴ Cp. *Tātp*, p. 127, 2.

⁵ NBT, p. 23.

of the Mark as present on the Subject of the inference. This step coincides partly with the Minor Premise ¹ It contains more, since it is described as containing the concomitant mark, i. e., a combination of the minor with the major premises. It is the step upon which the conclusion immediately follows. According to Uddyotakara, ² both these steps represent the act of inferring, they are both the immediately preceding, proximate cause producing the conclusion. The Buddhist, of course, does not deny the existence and importance of these premises. But for him they are cognitions by themselves. What he denies is the difference of *noema* and *noesis* inside every knowledge. The intentness of knowledge upon its object and the knowledge of this object are the same thing. Dharmottara says that supposing we have cognized through an inference the presence somewhere of a patch of blue colour, the result in this respect will be the same as if we had cognized it through sense-perception "Thus (imagined) image of the blue, says he, ³ arises (at first indefinitely); it is then settled as a definite self-conscious idea of a blue patch, (by the way of its contrast with other colours which are not blue). Thus the coordination of the blue (its contrast with other colours which are not blue, may be regarded) as the source of such a (definitely circumscribed image), and the imagined distinct representation will then appear as its result, because it is through coordination (and contrast) that the definite image or the blue is realized."

Thus "the blue" and "the coordination of the blue" are just the same thing. The blue means similarity with all the things blue in the universe and it means also dissimilarity with all the things not-blue in the universe Both these similarity and dissimilarity constitute the intentness of our knowledge upon the blue and the cognition of the blue. Whether the presence of the blue patch is perceived or inferred, that makes no difference. There is no difference between the act and the content of knowledge

§ 5. HOW FAR INFERENCE IS TRUE KNOWLEDGE?

A source of knowledge has been here defined ⁴ as a first moment of a new cognition which does not contradict experience. ⁵ It must

¹ Cp Tātp., p 112

² NY, p. 46 6

³ NBT, p 18 11 ff, transl, p 51

⁴ Cp above, p 85

⁵ *prathamam avasamūdā = gār-āu mi-śus-pa*

Smoke and fire are not related by Identity, since their objective reference is different. They refer to two different, though necessarily interdependent, points of reality. Since causality, we have seen, is nothing but Dependent Origination or dependent existence, there can be no other real relation of dependence than causation. Dependence, if it is not merely logical, is Causation.

Thus we have a division of inference, or of inferential judgments, into those that are founded on Identity and those that are founded on non-Identity. The first means Identity of Reference, the second means Causation. The division is strictly logical as founded on a dichotomy.

Dharmottara¹ says, "The predicate (in a judgment) is either affirmed or denied.... When it is affirmed (through a mark, this mark) is either existentially identical with it, or when it is different, it represents its effect. Both possess the three aspects", i. e., in both cases there is a necessary dependence.

§ 9. ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS.

It becomes thus apparent that the Buddhist Logicians, while investigating inference, have hit upon the problem of the analytic and the synthetic judgments. That inferential judgments, founded on experience, or on the law of Causation, are synthetic—has never been disputed. Neither has it been disputed, that there are other judgments which are not founded on Causation, judgments in which the predicate is a part of the subject, in which the mere existence of the subject is sufficient to deduce the predicate. Whether this division is exhaustive and the line of demarcation sufficiently clear cut, whether the problem coincides more or less completely with the Kantian one, we need not consider at present. The problem appears in India under the head of inference. That the Indian inference is an inferential judgment, a judgment uniting two fully expressed and necessarily interdependent concepts has been sufficiently pointed out. The two interdependent concepts have either one and the same objective reference or they have two different, but necessarily interdependent, objective references. Between one and two—there is nothing in the middle. At the first glance the division seems to be logically unimpeachable.

¹ NBT, p. 2118, transl., p. 60

resort to imagination in order to move in a half-real world. Inference from this point of view is a method subservient to sense-perception and to the perceptual judgment. Its office is to correct obvious mistakes. When, e. g., the momentary character of the sound has been apprehended in sensation and interpreted in a perceptual judgment, the theory of the Mimāṃsakas must be faced according to which the sounds of speech are enduring substances, manifesting themselves in momentary apparitions. Inference then comes to the front and deduces the instantaneous character of these articulate sounds, first from the general character of Instantaneous Being, and then from the special rule that whatever is the outcome of a conscious effort is not enduring.¹ Thus inference is an indirect source of knowledge when it serves to correct illusion. Dharmakīrti says.² "Sensation does not convince anybody. If it cognizes something, it does it in the way of a passive reflex, not in the way of judgment. In that part in which sensation has the power to engender the following right judgment, in that part only does it assume (the dignity) of a right knowledge."³ But in that part in which it is powerless to do it, owing to causes of error, another source of knowledge begins to operate. It brushes away all wrong imagination and thus we have another source (viz. inference) which then comes to the front."

We find the same train of reasoning with Kamalaśīla.⁴

A source of knowledge has indeed been declared to consist in uncontradicted experience. But from that experience its sensational core has at once been singled out as the true source of the knowledge of ultimate reality. The rest, although representing also uncontradicted experience, appears to be a transcendental illusion. "Although it is uncontradicted (empirically), says Kamalaśīla,⁵ we do not admit that it represents (ultimate) truth". As soon as a sensation⁶ has been produced by an external object which in the sequel will be sensed, conceived and named, as, e. g., a fire, attention is aroused and the understanding, after having determined its place in the time and space order, produces a dichotomy. The whole universe of discourse is

² *ṛṇy-ṛṇ-ancr-ṛ-ly-katād anityah śabdah.*

* Cp. the reference in AnekĀntaj. p. 177, a part of which has been quoted above, p. 223.

*** प्रमाण्युक्तः अमर-कुरुते**

⁴ TSP., p. 590. 10 E.

⁷ TSP., p. 390. 14.

6 *ni-rākrīpaḥ*.

§ 10. THE FINAL TABLE OF CATEGORIES.

From what has been said above it is easy to represent to one self the final table of Buddhist categories, a table which corresponds to both the Aristotelian and the Kantian tables.

The synthesis which is contained in every act of the understanding, as has been pointed out, is double. It is first of all a synthesis between a particular sensation and a general concept, and it is also a synthesis of the manifold gathered in that concept. This last synthesis, we have seen, is fivefold. The five kinds of the most general predicates correspond, more or less, to the ten Aristotelian Categories, if the partial correspondencies and inclusions are taken into account. This table contains also the logical aspect of Ontology which analyses *Ens* into a common Subject and its five classes of Predicates. It finds its expression in the perceptual judgment in which the five classes of names are referred to this common Subject. It contains in addition to the five classes of names, or namable things, one general relation, just the relation of all these Predicates to a common Substrate.

But the synthesis of the understanding not only contains the manifold of intuition arranged under one concept and its reference to a common Subject, it moreover can connect two or several concepts together. This synthesis is no more a synthesis of the manifold of intuition, it is a synthesis between two interdependent concepts or facts. Thus in addition to the table of the most general names, we shall have a second table of the most general relations. This second table is directly connected with inference, since inference is a method of cognizing founded upon necessary relations between two concepts, of which one is the mark of the other. This point constitutes the principal difference between the Buddhist and the European tables of categories. The table of names and the table of relations are two different tables in Buddhist Logic, while in both the European tables relations and names are mixed up in one and the same table. The relation of Substance to Quality, or, more precisely, of the First Essence to all Predicates, is the most general relation which, being continuous with judgment and the understanding itself, includes in itself all the other items of both tables. This relation covers all the varieties of connection whether it be the connection of one concept with its objective reference or whether it be the connection of two different concepts.

similar and disagreement with the dissimilar, i. e., by the Mixt Method of Agreement and Difference. If the method of agreement alone is expressed, the method of difference is also understood. If the method of difference is expressed, the method of agreement is also understood. For the sake of verification and precision both can be expressed.

What is a similar case in an inference? and what a dissimilar case? Dharmottara¹ says — an object which is similar to the object cognized in the inference "by the common possession of a quality which is the logical predicate represents a similar case". In our example all cases possessing "fireness" will be similar cases. "It is the predicate, the thing to be proved, the *probandum*, continues the same author, since as long as the inference is not concluded it is not yet proved; and it is a quality, because its existence is conditioned by a substratum, from which it differs. It is thus a predicated (or derived) quality". Dharmottara adds, "No particular can ever make a logical predicate. It is always a universal. That is the reason why it is stated that the thing to be cognized in an inference is a common property. It is a predicated property and it is general. The similar case is similar to the object cognized through an inference, because both are comprehended in the universality of the predicated quality".

It follows from this statement that a particular predicate can never enter into an inferential process otherwise than by an unnatural and perverse method of expressing it

What is a dissimilar case? The dissimilar is the non-similar, it is the reverse of the similar. All instances in which the property cognized in the inference cannot be present, e g, water in which fire cannot exist, are dissimilar cases. They are either the simple absence of that property, or the presence of something different, or of something contradictorily opposed. Thus absence, otherness and opposition constitute together the dissimilar cases, absence directly, otherness and opposition by implication.²

The relation of the logical Reason to the Substratum of the inference, on the one side, and to the similar and dissimilar cases, on the other side, is expressed in the three rules of Vasubandhu, which have been endorsed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. They constitute the celebrated Three Aspects of the Logical Reason as

¹ NBT, p 21 1, transl., p. 59.

² NBT, p 21 10, transl., p 60.

TABLE OF CATEGORIES


I

Categories or kinds of synthesis under one Concept or one Name (*pañcaviṁśa /alpanā*)

1. Individuals — Proper Names (*nāma-lalpanā*)
2. Classes — Class Names (*jāti-lalpanā*)
3. Sensible Qualities — Their Names (*guṇa-lalpanā*)
4. Motions — Verbs (*karma-lalpanā*)
5. (Second) Substances — Substantives (*dravya-lalpanā*)

II

Categories of Relations (between two concepts)



According to the Indian method of counting the ultimate items in a classification, there are only three Categories of Relation, viz Negation, Identity and Causality. The subordinate and derivative kinds are not counted, neither is that Affirmation which embraces both Identity and Causality counted

§ 11. ARE THE ITEMS OF THE TABLE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

Does this table of Categories satisfy to the principles of a correct logical division? Are its parts exclusive of one another? Does it not contain overlapping items? Is the division exhaustive? ¹ We know that both classifications of Aristotle and of Kant have been found to contain flaws in this respect. Does the Buddhist table fare any better? Dharmottara asks ² with respect to the three ultimate items of the division which are Identity, Causality and Negation — "These are the

¹ On the problem of *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti* cp besides Fr. vārt. first chapter, and NBT second chapter, Tātp, p. 105 ff, and N. Kandalī, p. 206 17 ff

² NBT, p. 24, 13, transl., p. 68

2. In Similar only.

3. In Dissimilar never.

If the reason were not present in the totality of the Subject, a fallacy would result. E. g., the Jaina inference "trees are sentient beings, because they sleep" is a logical fallacy, since the sleep which is manifested by the closing of the leaves at night is present in some trees only, not in their totality.

If the rules of inference required that the reason should be present in all similar cases, then one of the arguments directed against the *Mīmāṃsakas* viz "the sounds of speech are not eternal entities, because they are produced at will", would not be correct, since produced at will are only a part of the non-eternal things, not all of them.

The same argument when stated in a changed form, viz. "the sounds of speech are produced at will, because they are impermanent" will contain an infringement of the third rule since "the mark of impermanence is present in one part of the dissimilar cases, such as lightning etc., which, although impermanent, are not voluntarily produced.

If the third rule would have been formulated in the same phrasing as the second, i. e., if it would require the absence of the reason from the dissimilar instances only, then the inference "the sounds of speech are non eternal, because they can be produced at will" would not be correct, since voluntary production is absent not in dissimilar instances only, but also in some of the similar, non eternal, instances, such as lightening etc

It is easy to see that the second and third rule correspond to the major premise of Aristotle's first and second figure, and the first rule is nothing but the rule of Aristotle's minor premise.

The order of the premises is inverted, the minor occupies the first place and this corresponds to the natural procedure of our understanding when engaged in the process of inference. Inference primarily proceeds from a particular to another particular case, and recalls the general rule only in a further step of cognition. The general rule is here stated twice in its positive and negative or contraposed form, as will be stated later on when examining the Buddhist theory of the syllogism.

§ 7. DHARMAKĪRTI'S TRACT ON RELATIONS.

We have so far established that inference consists in a) a necessary connection between two concepts or two facts and b) in the reference

it is just the same. On the other hand, a concept may be the same, or the difference between them undiscernible, yet the real thing to which they refer will be different. E.g., this same *śmṣapā* at two different moments of its existence. According to the Buddhists, two moments of the *śmṣapā* are two different things, causally related. In the concepts of fire and smoke both the concepts and the real things are different. But the same relation of causality obtains between two consecutive moments of smoke as between the first moment of smoke and the preceding moment of fire. Thus the term synthetic refers to a synthesis of two different things, the term analytic to a synthesis of two different concepts.

Thus interpreted synthetic and analytic judgments are exclusive of each another and we cannot maintain, as has been done in European logic, that a synthetic judgment becomes analytic in the measure in which its synthesis becomes familiar to us.

It is thus proved that the Buddhist table of categories possesses order and systematical unity, since its parts are exclusive of one another. It remains to examine whether the table is exhaustive.

§ 12. IS THE BUDDHIST TABLE OF RELATIONS EXHAUSTIVE?

Dharmottara asks,¹ "Are there no other relations representing valid reasons?" "Why should only these three relations (viz. Negation, Identity and Causality) represent valid reasons?" The answer is that, according to Dharmakīrti, relation means here dependence. "One thing can convey the existence of another one only when it is essentially dependent on the latter,"² i.e., such relations which are reasons, which are the foundation of inference, are relations of necessary dependence. Dharmottara explains,³ "When the cause of something is to be (synthetically) deduced, or an essential quality is to be deduced (analytically), the effect is essentially dependent on its cause (and the analytically deduced) quality is by its essence dependent upon the conception from which it is deduced. Both these connections are Essential Dependence." Leaving alone Negation which is founded on a special principle to be examined later on, there are only two relations of necessary Dependence. They are either the logical interdependence of two conceptions having one and the same objective reference,

¹ NBT, p. 25 B, transl., p. 69

² NB. II 20, transl., p. 69

³ Ibid

Dharmakīrti attached so much importance to this problem that, besides incidentally treating it in his great work, he singled it out for special treatment in a short tract of 25 mnemonic verses with the authors own commentary, under the title of «Examination of Relations».¹ In a sub-comment on this work Śaṅkarānanda, surnamed the Great Brahmin, thus characterizes its aim and content—«This work considers the problem of Reality. By one mighty victorious stroke, all external objects whose reality is admitted (by the Realists) will be repudiated, and, in contrast to it, that ultimate reality which the author himself acknowledges will be established» Indeed, if all relations are cancelled, the Unrelated alone emerges as the Ultimate Reality. In the first stanza Dharmakīrti states that conjunction or relation necessarily means dependence. Therefore «all relations in the sense of ultimate (or independent) reality do not really exist.» Vinitadeva, in another sub-comment, states that the expressions «related to another», «dependent on another», «supported by another», «subject to another's will» are convertible. Causality, Contact, Inherence and Opposition are not realities by themselves. There are no «possessors» of these relations otherwise than in imagination. A reality is always one reality, it cannot be single and double at the same time. Dharmakīrti states,²

Since cause and its effect
Do not exist at once,
How can then their relation be existent?
If it exists in both, how is it real?
If it does not exist in both, how is it a relation?³

Therefore Causality is a relation superimposed upon reality by our understanding, it is an interpretation of reality, not reality itself.⁴ Vācaspati-miśra⁵ quotes a Buddhist who remarks that these relations considered as objective realities are, as it were, unfair dealers

¹ *Sambandha-parīkṣā*, to be found in the Tanjur with the commentaries of the author and two subcommentaries of Vinitadeva and Śaṅkarānanda. The Buddhist theory of relations is analysed by Vācaspati-miśra, in his NK, p 289 ff, where a *samārga-parīkṣā* is inserted

² *Sambandha-parīkṣā*, VII

³ A similar line of argument is found in *Pr samucc*, II. 19'

⁴ This, of course, refers to empirical causation alone, a causation between two constructed objects is itself constructed. Ultimate causation of the point-instant, we have seen, is not a relation, since it is synonymous with ultimate reality.

⁵ NK, p 289 The same comparison, but in another connection, is quoted by the same author in *Tātp*, p 269 9

because we know from experience that this kind of flavour is invariably concomitant with a definite colour. This invariable connection cannot be treated as founded on causality, because both phenomena are simultaneous, whereas causality is a relation of necessary sequence. To this the Buddhists answer that all these relations are traceable to causality, if causality is rightly understood. Indeed, every instant of a gustatory sense-datum is dependent on a preceding complex of visual, tactile and other data of which alone this stuff consists. The colour which exists simultaneously with the flavour is related to the latter only through the medium of the preceding moment in which visual, tactile and other sense-data represent that complex of causes, in functional dependence on which the next moment of colour can arise. What the realist calls a stuff is for the Buddhist a complex of momentary sense-data. Thus the inference of colour through flavour is really founded on simultaneous production by a common cause. The Buddhist considers causality microscopically, as a sequence of point-instants. Every real thing is resolvable into a stream of point-instants, and every following instant arises in necessary dependence upon a complex of preceding moments. To this Ultimate Causality, or Dependent Origination, every real thing is subject. Vācaspati-miśra¹ seems indirectly to concede this point. «The inference of colour from the presence of a certain flavour, says he, is made by ordinary people. They have eyes of flesh (i.e., coarse sensibility) which cannot distinguish the mutual difference between point-instants of ultimate reality. Nor is it permissible for critical philosophers to transcend the boundaries of experience and to change the character of established phenomena in compliance with their own ideas,² because, if they do it, they will cease to be critical philosophers».³ This sounds like an indirect confession that for a philosopher all real interdependence must be ultimately traceable to Causality. The Buddhist concludes that because one fact can convey the existence of

«conjoined properties» is similar to «coherent properties» or to «identical reference» of two concepts. Thus Prof. A. Bain appears to accept, though in a timid way, the theory of the two exclusive modes of relation, Identity of Reference and Causation (*īdāntya-tadutpatti*). He also quotes, *ibid.*, p. 52, an example of co-existence of scarlet colour with the absence of fragrance (= *gandhābhāvāḍ rūpānu mānam*) which is similar to the Buddhist explanation of *rūṣāḍ rūpānumānam*, *op. cit.*, p. 106 18 ff.

¹ *Tātp.*, p. 107 18 ff.

² Or «in compliance with the theory of the Thing-in-Itself», the term *śāstra* having here probably a double meaning.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 108 14. *tesām tathā* (= *parikṣatā*) *anupapattā*.

There is no third possibility. The division is founded on the dichotomizing principle, and the law of excluded middle forbids to assume any third coordinated item. Thus gives us two fundamental types of reasoning or of inference. The one is founded on Identity. We may call Identity the case when of the two necessarily related sides the one is the part of the other. They both refer to the same fact, their objective reference is identical. The difference between them is purely logical.

The other type of reasoning is founded on Causation. Every effect necessarily presupposes the existence of its cause or causes. The existence of the cause can be inferred, but not *vice versa*, the effect cannot be predicted from its causes with absolute necessity, since the causes not always carry their effects. Some unpredictable circumstance can always jeopardize their production.¹

The first type of reasoning may be exemplified by the following inferences —

This is a tree,
Because it is a *śimśapā*,
All *śimśapās* are trees.

Another example —

The sound is impermanent,
Because it is produced at will.
Whatsoever is produced at will is impermanent

Impermanence and willful production are two different characteristics which refer to the same objective point, to the sound. The *śimśapā* and the tree likewise refer to the same reality. The difference between them is a difference of exclusion.² The tree excludes all non-trees, the *śimśapā* excludes in addition to all non-trees moreover all trees that are not *śimśapās*. But the real thing to which both terms refer is the same. We therefore can say that they are related through Identity, or by an identical objective reference.

An example of the other type is often quoted —

There is here some fire,
Because there is smoke.
There is no smoke without fire.

¹ Cp. NBT., p 408

² *vyāvṛtti-bheda*

§ 13. UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY JUDGMENTS.

"Experience, positive and negative,¹ says Dharmakīrti,² can never produce (a knowledge) of the strict necessity of inseparable connection.³ This always reposes either on the law of Causality⁴ or on the law of Identity.⁵" That is to say, experience, positive and negative, furnishes to our understanding all the materials for the construction of concepts. But by itself sensible experience is but a chaos of disordered intuition. The understanding, besides constructing the concepts, arranges them so as to give them order and systematical unity. It arranges them, so to speak, either along a vertical line in depth or along a horizontal line in breadth. It thus produces synthesized bits of reality arranged as cause and effect along a vertical line, and it produces a system of stabilized concepts delimitated against one another, but united by the law of Identical Reference. The law of Contradiction is not mentioned by Dharmakīrti in this context, but it evidently is implied as the principle of all negative judgments. Thus the laws of Contradiction, of Causality and of Identical Reference are the three laws which are the original possession of the Understanding. They are not derived from experience, they precede it and make it possible. They are there-

a synthesis of units, and all understanding is either consciously or unconsciously a synthesis of units. Thus the Buddhist table is made according to Nan's own principle that "all division *a priori* by means of concepts must be dichotomy" (CPR, § 11). For the same reason Similarity or Agreement as well as Dissimilarity or Difference are not Categories, as some philosophers have assumed. They are coextensive with thought or cognition. They are *notive* principles even in every perceptual judgment. They are just the same in Induction. The first aspect of a logical reason, viz., its presence in similar cases, or cases of agreement, corresponds to the Method of Agreement. Its third aspect corresponds to the Method of Difference. Prof. A. Bain, *Logic*, II, p. 51, says, "The Method of Agreement is the universal and fundamental mode of proof for all connections *whiterer*. Under this method we must be ready to admit all kinds of conjunctions, reducing them under Causation when we are able and indicating pure coexistence when the presumption inclines to that mode." This sounds like Dharmakīrti, p. 21 18, trans., p. 60, telling us that "Relations are either Causation or Identity and that both possess the three marks", i. e., the methods of Agreement and Difference serve to establish both Causation and Coherence.

¹ *daśāna-adaiśana*

² Quoted from *Piṃ vārtika*, I 33 in *Tātp*, p. 103. 13, N. Kandali,

p. 207 8

³ *avipākābhāva-mayama*

⁴ *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-mayama*

⁵ *svabhāva-mayama*

Strictly speaking both kinds of judgment are synthetic, because understanding itself, and its function the judgment, is nothing but synthesis. The conception of a *śimśapā* is synthesis, the conception of a tree is synthesis, their union is likewise a synthesis. The same refers to the conceptions of smoke, of fire and of their union. The intellect can dissolve only where it has itself previously united.¹ But in one case the predicate is a part of the subject and is seemingly extracted out of it by analysis. In the other case it is not a part of it, it must be added to it, and can be found out by experience only.

The so called synthetic judgment is always experimental. The so called analytic judgment is always ratiocinative. The use of the understanding is double, it either is purely logical and consists in bringing order and system into our concepts, or it is experimental and consists in establishing causal relations by observation and experiment. Causality in this context, says Dharmottara,² "is a conception familiar in common life. It is known to be derived from experience of the cause wherever the effect is present, and from the negative experience of the absence of the effect when its cause is absent". The Identity upon which the so called analytic judgment is founded is not a familiar concept. Therefore its definition is given by Dharmakīrti. He says,³ "Identity is a reason for deducing a predicate when the subject alone is by itself sufficient for that deduction", i. e., when the predicate is part of the subject. It is therefore not absolute Identity, it is, as some European philosophers have called it, a partial Identity. Dharmottara explains,⁴ "What kind of logical reason consists in its merely being contained in its own predicate? This predicate possesses the characteristic of existing wheresoever the mere existence of the reason is ascertained. A predicate whose presence is dependent on the mere existence of the reason, and is dependent on no other condition beside the mere existence of the fact constatuting the reason, such is the predicate which is inseparable from the reason (and can be analytically deduced from it)". Some remarks on the difference between the European, Kantian, treatment of the problem of synthetic and analytic judgments and the Buddhist conception will be made in the sequel.

¹ Cp. CPR., § 15(2-d) The perceptual judgment is analytic also (Sigwart, I 142)

² NBT, p 24. 11, transl, p. 67.

³ Ibid, p 28. 16, transl, p. 65.

⁴ Ibid.

and Sāṅkhya share in the realistic view that the understanding represents initially *a-tabula rasa*, comparable to the pure light of a lamp, that it contains no images and that there are no principles in the intellect before accidental experience comes to fill it up with more or less accidental facts and rules.

The Buddhists, on the other hand, maintain that there is a set of necessary principles which are not revealed by the lamp of experience, but represent, so to say, this lamp itself. The law of Contradiction, the law of Identity and the law of Causality are the three weapons with which our understanding is armed before it starts on the business of collecting experience. If we were not sure, before every experience, that the smoke which we see has necessarily a cause, or, more precisely, that every moment of smoke depends upon a set of preceding moments, we never could infer the presence of fire from the presence of its effect. No one short of an Omniscient Being could then make inferences. If, as the Realist maintains, the *śmṣapā* and the tree are two different realities whose simultaneous inherence in a common substrate has been revealed by an accidental, though uncontradicted, experience, no one again, short of an Omniscient Being, could maintain that the *śmṣapā* is necessarily and always a tree.¹ That the same object being blue cannot also be non-blue is certain before any experience, albeit the blue and the non-blue are known to us by accidental experience.

Thus the fact that we possess Universal and Necessary truths is intimately connected with the fact that we possess principles of cognition preceding every experience and that we possess a definite number of Categories of them, neither more nor less.

§ 14 THE LIMITS OF THE USE OF PURE UNDERSTANDING.

But although the laws of Contradiction, of Identical Reference and of Causality are the original possession of our understanding and

¹ Or to take another example, no one could maintain that the straight line is necessarily and always the shortest distance between two points. Subject and Predicate in this universal judgment are united not, of course, by Causality, but by the law of Identical Reference. All mathematical judgments are judgments founded on the principle of Identical Reference. A straight line and a shortest distance are known to us from sensible experience, but the judgment "this is the shortest distance, because it is a straight line" is necessary and not subject to the accidents of experience. It is analytical in this sense that it is not founded on Causation.

We shall thus have two different tables of Categories, a table of the Categories of namable things and a table of the Categories of Relations between two concepts

First Substance is not entered into the list, because, as has been explained, it is the common substratum for all categories, it is not a Category, it is a non-Category. Neither is Quality in general to be found in it, because Quality in general embraces all categories, it is coextensive with the term Predicate or Category. Simple qualities are ultimate sense-data, as appears in the perceptual judgment «this is blue» or, more precisely, «this point possesses blueness». Complicated qualities are classes; e. g., in the perceptual judgment «this is a cow» which means as much as «this point of reality is synthesized as possessing cowness». Second Substances are metaphorical First Substances. On the analogy of a reality «possessing cowness», the cow itself appears also as a substance when it is conceived in its turn as something possessing attributes, e. g., «horn-ness». As an example of such substances Dignāga gives «the possessor of horns» or «horny», which for us would be a possessive adjective. We thus arrive at the following two Tables of judgments and their corresponding Categories.

TABLE OF JUDGMENTS

I

Perceptual judgment (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*).

- 1 *Its Quantity* — Extreme Singular (*śaikhya-śaṅka ādhyasīyamānam*)
- 2 *Its Quantity* — Affirmation-Reality (*vidhi = iasti*)
- 3 *Its Relation* — Conformity (*sārupya*)
- 4 *Its Modality* — Apodictic (*mścaya*)

II

Inferential judgment (*anumāna-vikalpa*).

1

Quantity

Universal (*sāmānya-lakṣanam ādhyasīyamānam*)

2

Quality

Affirmation (*vidhi*),
Negation (*pratishedha*)

3

Relation.

Synthetic = Causal (*kārya-anumāna*)
Analytic = non-Causal (*svabhāva-anumāna*).

4

Modality

Apodictic (*mścaya*)

itself (as a sensible fact), but the existence of a real effect always presupposes the existence of its cause. Therefore this relation is real (indirectly)¹, i. e., it is constructed by the intellect on a basis of reality. But the principle of Causality itself is an original possession of the understanding.² This Dharmakīrti has expressed in his celebrated and often quoted stanza translated above²

§ 15. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE VIEWS OF INFERENCE.

The Science of Logic (*nyāya-śāstra*) developed in India out of a Science of Dialectics (*taśka-śāstra*). Inference appears in the latter as one of the methods of proof, but its part is insignificant, it is lost in a multitude of dialectical tricks resorted to in public debates. Its gradual rise in importance runs parallel with the gradual decrease in the importance of dialectics.³ During the Hīnayāna period the Buddhists seem to know nothing about either syllogism or inference. But with the advent of a new age, at that period of Indian philosophy when the teaching of the leading schools were put into systematical order and their fundamental treatises composed, inference appears in the majority of them as one of the chief sources of our knowledge, second in order and in importance to sense-perception. At the right and at the left wings of the philosophical front of that period we have two schools which, although for contrary reasons, deny inference as a source of real knowledge. The orthodox Mīmāṃsakas deny it because neither sense-

¹ Of course that Causality, or efficiency, which is synonymous with existence itself, with the Thing-in-Itself, is not a category of the understanding, it is the non-category, the common substrate for all predicates or for all categories of the understanding.

² Pramārt, I 35, cp. above, p. 260

³ The origin of the Indian doctrine of inference and syllogism must be indigenous. I find no unmistakable proofs of its foreign descent. Its whole conception as one of the «sources of knowledge» (*pramāṇa*) gives it from the start an epistemological character. S. O. Vidyabhusana, *Indian Logic*, p. 497 ff., assumes the influence of Aristotle «whose writings were widely read in those days». But he also thinks that the introduction of different parts of the Greek Prior Analytics «must needs have been gradual, as these had to be assimilated into and harmonized with Indian thought and language». Although an intercourse between Greek and Indian scholarship is highly probable, the Indian doctrine seems to me to have followed its own line of development. The similarities are easily explained by the subject-matter and the divergence must be explained by the originality of the Indian standpoint.

different varieties of those relations upon which inference is founded. But why do we reckon only three (final) items? The varieties may be innumerable?" To this the answer of Dharmakīrti is the following one—"Inferential cognition is either Affirmation or Negation, and Affirmation is double, it either is founded on Identity or on Causality." This answer means that, since the division is made according to the principle of dichotomy, the parts are exclusive of each another, there can be nothing between them, the law of Excluded Middle precludes any flaw in this respect. Indeed the fact that all judgments are divided in Affirmation and Negation is firmly established in logic since the times of Aristotle who even has introduced this division into his definition of the judgment. It is therefore wrong to coordinate the parts of this division with other items, belonging to other divisions, because the parts will then necessarily be overlapping.

The affirmative judgment again can either be analytic or synthetic, in other words, either founded on Identity or on non-Identity. The latter, i. e. the interdependence or the synthesis of non-identical facts, is nothing but Causality. Thus the division into Identity and Causality or, which is the same, the division of all judgments into analytic and synthetic is also founded upon the dichotomizing principle and must be deemed logically correct in accordance with the law of Excluded Middle, provided analytic and synthetic are understood in the sense which is given to this division in Buddhist logic. Dharmotara insists¹ that, the division is strictly logical. He says, "The predicate in judgments is sometimes positive and sometimes negative. Since affirmation and negation represent attitudes mutually exclusive, the reasons for them both must be different. Affirmation again can only be either of something different or of something non-different. Difference and non-difference being mutually opposed by the law of contradiction, then justifications (in judgments) must also be different."

We must not forget that what is here called Identity is an identity or objective reference, the union of two different concepts which may be identical in extension or the one possess only a part of the extension of the other, but both referring to the same objective reality. Two concepts may be different, yet the objective reality to which they are referred may be the same. E. g., the concepts of a tree and of a *śamśapā* are different, yet the particular thing to which they refer is identical,

¹ KBT, p. 24-19, transl., p. 69.

through the senses»¹ Inference deals with concepts, i. e., with the general and «the general cannot be seen»;² it cannot enter into us through the senses This view is a direct consequence of the definition of sense-perception as pure sensation Sense-perception is not the «eldest» or chief source³ of knowledge, in regard of which inference would be a subordinate source, second in order and in importance. Both sources have equal rights⁴ Inference in this context means understanding in general as contrasted with sensibility⁵ The senses alone yield no definite knowledge at all Jinendrabuddhi says that the «non-Buddhists alone think that the senses can yield definite cognition» On the other hand, the understanding alone is powerless to produce any knowledge of reality Both sources are equally powerless alone, and equally efficient together. But the understanding or inference with its own principles which exist in it previously to all experience contains the possibility of our knowledge of necessary truths This seems to have been the view of Dignāga, a view which he did not succeed to formulate definitely and which was later formulated by Dharmakīrti. Dignāga objects to the contention of the Naiyāyikas that the results are predictable when we know the causes, and that we can infer the future result⁶ from the presence of its causes «The result is not established by the presence of the cause, says he, the cause may be present, but an impediment may interfere, and another (secondary) cause can fail, and then the result will not appear»⁷ He also objects to the theory of the Sūnkyas when they

¹ Pr. samucc, II 28 — *hbrei-pa dbañ-bas gcuñ-bya-min=na sambandha indriyena grhyate* This coincides almost verbatim with Kant's words, CPR, § 15, «the connection (*conjunctio=sambandha*) of anything manifold can never enter into us through the senses (=na indriyena grhyate)»

² Ibid, II 29 — *spyi mthoñ-ba yañ min=na sāmānyam dīśyate.*

³ *pratyaksam na jyeshtam pramānam*, TSP, p. 161 22.

⁴ *tulya-balam*, cp NBT, p. 6 12

⁵ Cp NB, I 12—17, where the principle is laid down that the senses apprehend the individual, i. e., the thing as it is strictly in itself, shorn of all its relations, whereas inference apprehends, resp. constructs, the general, cp Pr. samucc. II 17, as well as the *mti*, and the remarks of Jinendrabuddhi, op. cit., f. 115 b 2 f

⁶ From this standpoint the future is altogether uncognizable, cp Viśālāmalavati, fol. 124 a 3, cp NBT, p. 40 8, transl. p. 108 When we deem to predict the future it is only an indirect consequence of the law of Causation, the law namely that every thing depends on its causes. The result necessarily depends on its causes, but the cause does not necessarily carry its result, since an unexpected impediment can always interfere

⁷ Pr. samucc, II. 80 — *rgyu-las hbras-bu hgrub-pa min=na lāryam lā-ranñtī sidhyat*

or, if the objective reference is not the same, it is an interdependence of two real facts of which the one is the effect of the other. The effect is necessarily dependent upon its cause. Causality is for the Buddhist nothing but Dependent Origination. Apart from these two kinds of necessary dependence, the one logical, the other real, there is no other possible interdependence.

The Indian Realists reject both these Buddhist contentions, viz., they reject that there are analytical judgments which are founded on Identity, and they reject that all necessary synthetical judgments are founded on Causality. The classification according to them is not exhaustive. The analytical judgment founded on Identity, first of all, does not exist at all. When two conceptions are identical, the one cannot be the reason for deducing the other, the deduction will be meaningless. If it be objected that the reality is the same, but the superimposed conceptions alone are different, the Realist answers that if the conceptions are different, the corresponding realities are also different. "If the concepts were not real, says he, they would not be concepts."¹ The judgment *taru* is *ṛkṣa* (which both terms mean a tree) would be founded on Identity, but not the judgment "*śimśapā* is a tree", because *śimśapā* and tree are for the Realist two different realities, both cognized in experience which teaches their invariable concomitance and the inherence of the tree in the *śimśapā*.

Nor are all real relations traceable to Causality. There are a great number of invariable concomitances ascertained by uncontradicted experience which are not reducible neither to Identity nor to Causation. E.g., the rising of the sun is invariably connected with its rising the day before; the appearance of a lunar constellation on one side of the horizon is always accompanied by the disappearance of another constellation on the opposite side, the rising of the moon is concomitant with high tide in the sea etc. All these are examples of invariable concomitance which is not founded on causation.² When we experience the flavour of some stuff we can infer the presence of its colour,³

¹ Tāp. p. 105 M—*āpāraṇaḥ : arāṇaḥ tattva-arupapattih*

² Cf. Pr. Sūtr., p. 293, and Tāp., p. 107

³ Prof. A. B. B. is inclined to admit that Causality is the only relation of necessity among real facts. He says Logic, II, p. 11, "Of Uniformities of Coexistence, no single regularity may be traced to Causation. It remains to be seen whether there is any : so traced, however, they are all results of causation starting from some regular arrangement." "In recognized Properties of Kinds, he further states (p. 52), there may be laws of Coexistence without Causation." The

high tide in the sea . . , the clear water in the ponds in autumn is simultaneous with the rise of the planet Agastya, etc etc All these instances fall under the aphorism which mentions the four kinds of relations, (although they are not included under one of them in particular), because its meaning (is not to give an exhaustive classification of relations) but to indicate (and exemplify) concomitance in general.

The natural tendency to give an exhaustive table of relations has thus been abandoned as soon as it was realized that experience which is always to a certain extent accidental, cannot furnish by itself neither any necessary truths, nor a definitely fixed number of them

The words of Praśastapāda are likewise an indirect indication that at the time of Dignāga the question was already debated whether there are any real relations not traceable to Causality.

But although Dignāga seems to have had in his head the system of relations which we find clearly stated in the works of Dharmakīrti, he was not sufficiently categorical in expressing it and it was left to his great follower to give to this theory its final formulation. In the time between the two masters there was a fluctuation in the school. Iśvarasena, the pupil of Dignāga, denied the possibility of strictly necessary and universal principles in our knowledge. According to him,¹ no one short of an Omniscient Being could possess a knowledge strictly universal and necessary. He in this point allied to the Vaiśeṣikas. He evidently was convinced that the works of Dignāga did not contain the theory which was found in them by Dharmakīrti and so it was left to the latter to clear up all doubt in this respect and finally to establish the Buddhist table of the Categories of Relations.²

¹ Mahāpandita Iśvarasena's opinions are referred to in the commentary of Śākya-buddhi and he is quoted by Rgyal-tshab in his *Thar-lam*. He maintained that ordinary men (*tskur-mthoñ-ba-rnams=arag-darṣinak*) can never know that the reason is totally absent in the dissimilar cases, exceptions to the general proposition are always possible. This was rejected by pointing out, six cases in which this opinion conflicts with different passages of the *Nyāya-mukha* and *Pr samucc* — *hgal-ba-drug-gi ego-nas pan-chen Dban-phyug-sde-la thal-ba phens-theul-ni*. The commentator Prajñākara Gupta however seems to have reverted to the view that necessary truths are discovered by supernatural intuition, cp vol II, p 130 n

² It is therefore clear that the *stabhātānumāna* which already appears in the *Uttaratantra* and other writings of Asanga cannot have the same meaning as with Dharmakīrti

but the definition of inference and to separate it from syllogism, as Dignāga has done in India.

As to the line of demarcation between Judgment and Inference, it is settled in India on altogether different lines from what it is in the majority of European systems. Since Judgment, Synthesis and Understanding are equivalent terms, all inference is contained under the head of judgment. But the judgment can either contain the statement of one fact, or the statement of a necessary interdependence between two facts. The first is always reducible to a perceptual judgment, the second is an inference. Dignāga, whose leading principle is a difference between Sensibility and Understanding, distinguishes between pure sensation, perceptual judgment and inference. His real aim is to distinguish sensibility from the understanding, but in compliance with tradition he treats of them under the heads of sense-perception and inference. That the synthesis of the manifold of intuition in one concept and the synthesis of two interdependent concepts are two quite different operations of the understanding is occasionally hinted by Kant, when he says that there is a synthesis in all acts of the understanding, "whether we connect the manifold of intuition or several concepts together."¹

The usual form of a judgment which is defined in European Logic as a predicative relation (i. e. synthesis) between two concepts applies, from the Indian standpoint, to inferential judgment or syllogism. In fact it is always the major premise of a syllogism in which the interdependence of two concepts (the middle and the major terms) are expressed. The common substrate for both these concepts, or the minor term, when it is not expressed, is understood, it is the common Subject of all Predicates, the First Essence of all things. Thus the major premise can really contain the whole inference. This is just the opinion of Prof. A. Bain² when he says that "in affirming a general proposition, real Inference is exhausted". "When we have said „All men are mortal“ we have made the greatest possible stretch of inference. We have incurred the utmost peril of inductive hazard." This hazardous step of a universal judgment is explained, we have seen, by the Vaiśeṣikas, to whom Īśvarasena seems to have alluded, as a super-human intuition. But Dignāga and Dharmakīrti have offered another explanation.

¹ CPR., § 15 (2-3 ed.)

² Logic, I, p. 208

fore in safety against the accidents of experience, they are necessary and universal truths.

All this is denied by the Realists. They deny all strict necessity and universality in knowledge and they deny that the understanding can be dissected into a definite number of its fundamental and necessary principles. All knowledge comes from experience which must be carefully examined. It then can yield fairly reliable uniformities but we are never warranted against a new and unexpected experience which can come and upset our generalizations. Since all our knowledge without exception comes from experience, we cannot establish any exhaustive table of relations. Relations are innumerable and various as life itself.¹ Therefore, says Vācaspati-miśra,² we must carefully investigate whether (an observed uniformity of sequence) is not called forth by some special (additional) condition, and if we don't find any, we conclude that it does not exist. (This is the only way) to decide that (the observed uniformity) is essential.

We thus find in India a parallel to the discussion which so long occupied the field of philosophy in Europe, on the origin of necessary truths. The great battle between Realism and Idealism raged round the problem whether our understanding represents by itself, as pure understanding, a *tabula rasa*, a sheet of white paper upon which experience inscribes its objects and their relations, or whether it is not rather an active force having, previously to all experience, its own set of principles which constitute its necessary modes of connecting together the manifold of intuition. In Indian phrasing the question is asked, whether right cognition in general and inference in particular represents a pure light, comparable to the light of a lamp,³ which is in no way necessarily connected with the objects upon which it accidentally happens to shed its light, or whether cognition, and the logical reason in particular, are necessarily connected with the cognized object. In the latter case the understanding must consist of some definite principles, which are not accidental as all sensible experience is; they must precede that experience and must make it possible. Our knowledge in that case will have a double origin. Its frame work will be due to the understanding and will consist of a definite set of fundamental principles: its contents will be due to all the accidents of sensible experience. The Indian systems of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Jaina

¹ *Sambandho lo ca etā rā, cp. Tātp.*, p. 109 23.

² *Tātp.*, p. 110. 12.

³ *Pratīkṣa*, cp. NBI, p. 19 2, 25 19, 47. 9: cp. Vātsy. *Śāstra*, p. 24.

If something new is added to such a concept, the judgment will be synthetical, e g, the judgment "all bodies are heavy", because heaviness is not contained in the old concept of a body and has been added as a result of some new experience. But for the Buddhist all ancient features and all new characteristics which may be added to a ready concept are united by the Identity which is contained in that unity of the concept. The Identity of two non-identical concepts consists in the identity of their objective reference. The *śimśapā* and the tree are not two identical concepts, but the real thing to which both these concepts refer is identical. One and the same thing which is called *śimśapā* may also be called a tree. The judgment which we have, because of its partial analogy with Kant's terminology, called analytical, is really meant to be a judgment of Identical Reference. "Even in those cases, says Dharmottara,¹ where inference is founded on Identity (i e on identity of objective reference), (there is a dependent and an independent part). It is the dependent part that possesses the power to convey the existence of the other. The independent part, that part to which the other part is subordinated, is the deduced part."

The *śimśapā* and the tree, although they both refer to the same identical object, are not identical by themselves. They are interdependent, so that where one of them, the dependent part, is present, the other part, the independent one, is necessarily present also, but not *vice versa*. The tree is not dependent on the *śimśapā*. There can be trees which are not *śimśapās*, but all *śimśapās* are necessarily trees.²

The judgment "all which happens has its cause" is according to Kant synthetical, because "the concept of cause is entirely outside that concept (of something that happens)" and is "by no means contained in that representation." This is quite different on the Indian side. It has been sufficiently established above that all that happens, i e, all that exists is necessarily a cause, the non-cause does not exist, reality is efficiency, efficiency is cause. The judgment will be

¹ NBT, p 26 8, transl, p 73

² Kant says "in every analytical proposition all depends on this, whether the predicate is really thought in the representation of the subject." The criterion is psychological. Dharmakīrti would have said (cp NB. II) "in every analytical proposition all depends on this, whether the predicate must or can be thought in the representation of the subject, as logically flowing out of the latter." The criterion is logical necessity, and its establishment sometimes very complicated.

although they are independent in their origin from any sensible experience, they cannot extend their sway beyond the limits of experience. Those objects which by their nature lie beyond every possible experience, which are metaphysical, which are «unattainable neither as to the place in which they exist, nor as to the time at which they appear, nor as to the sensible qualities which they possess», — such objects are also uncognizable by the pure intellect «Their contradiction, says Dharmottara,¹ with something else, their causal dependence upon something else, then subalternation (or identical reference) to something else, it is impossible to ascertain. Therefore it is impossible to ascertain what is it they are contradictorily opposed to, and what are they causally related to. For this reason contradictory facts, causes and effects are fit to be denied (as well as affirmed) only after their (positive and negative) observation has been recurrent... Contradiction, Causation and Subalternation of (interdependent) concepts are (in every particular case) necessarily based upon non-perception of sensible», i. e., upon positive and negative experience, upon perception and non-perception.

As to causal relation every particular case of it is known when it is established by five consecutive facts of perception and non-perception,² viz —

- 1) the non-perception of the result, e. g. of smoke, before its production,
- 2) its perception, when —
- 3) its cause, the fire, has been perceived,
- 4) its non-perception, when —
- 5) its cause is not perceived.

There are thus a) in respect to the result two cases (1 and 4) of non-perception and one case (2) of perception; b) in respect of the cause — one case (3) of perception and one case (4) of non-perception. The facts which constitute a causal relation we cognize through sense-perception or through the perceptual judgment, but that they are indeed causally related we cognize only in an inferential judgment or a judgment of concomitance, because causality itself, the causal relation, cannot enter into our mind through the senses, it is added by the understanding out of its own stock. Dharmottara³ says «when an effect is produced, we do not really experience causality

¹ NBT, p. 28 20 ff; transl., p. 105.

² Cp. N. Kandalī, p. 205 22 ff

³ NBT, p. 69, 11; transl., p. 192.

The division of all judgments into synthetical and analytical is, therefore, on the Indian side, an integral part of the system of all Categories of necessary relations, while in Kant's system this division stands completely outside his table of Categories which includes synthetical judgments only.

It is not our business at present to make a detailed statement and a comparative estimate of the Indian and European achievements in this part of the science of logic. More competent pens will no doubt do it some time. We however could not leave without notice a remarkable partial coincidence, as well as the great difference, in a special point of epistemological logic, between India and Europe. It is more or less unanimously admitted that Kant's table of Categories and his manner of treating the analytical and synthetical judgments have proved a failure. But Kant's system still stands high as the Himalaya of European philosophy. A host of respectable workers are trying to undermine it, without as yet having been successful neither in pulling it down completely, nor, still less, in replacing it by another system of the like authority. Although Kant's table of Categories is a failure in its details, nevertheless his obstinate belief 1) that our understanding must have principles of its own before any experience, 2) that these principles are the foundation of universal and necessary judgments and 3) that there must be an exhaustive table of such principles, neither more nor less, — this his obstinate belief which induced him to introduce his twelve-membered table even where there was absolutely no need for it, — this belief finds a striking support in the parallel steps of Indian philosophy. As regards the problem of analytical and synthetical judgments the perusal of the more than hundred pages of Vaihinger's Commentary devoted to a mere summary of the amazing variety and mutual contradictions in the views of post-Kantian philosophers, will convince the reader that the problem has been merged in a hopeless confusion. Although it remains a problem, it has not been neither solved nor removed and Kant must still be credited with the merit of having first approached it in European logic. We must now wait till some professional philosopher will enlighten us as to the relative value of its Indian solution¹

¹ There are thus according to Dharmakīrti two different Necessaries (*niscaya* = *anābhāva-mayama*) or two kinds of *a priori* certainty, the one is concerned about the necessary conjunction of two concepts inhereant in one and the same substrate of reality, the other about two concepts inhering in two different, but necessarily interdependent, concepts. The first can be called analytical, the second is evidently

perception nor inference is a source of cognizing religious duty.¹ The Materialists, on the other side, deny it because direct sense-perception is for them the only source of knowledge.² Between these two extremes we have the schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya which in the period preceding Dignāga framed their definitions of inference as the second source of our knowledge of the empirical world. With Vasubandhu the Buddhists enter into the movement and produce in the *Vāda-vidhī* then own first definition. All these definitions, beginning with the definition of his Master Vasubandhu, the definitions of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya schools, as well as the negative attitude of the Mīmāṃsakas, are mercilessly criticized and rejected by Dignāga. The Nyāya school defines inference as a cognition "preceded by sense-perception".³ This is interpreted as meaning a cognition whose first step is "a perception of the connection between the reason and its consequence".⁴ The Sāṅkhyas maintain that "when some connection has been perceived the establishment (on that basis) of another fact is inference".⁵ The definition of the Vaiśeṣikas simply states that inference is produced by the mark (of the object).⁶ Finally Vasubandhu in the *Vāda-vidhī* defines it as "a knowledge of an object inseparably connected (with another object) by a person who knows about it (from perception)".⁷

Dignāga, besides severely criticizing every word of these definitions⁸ from the standpoint of precision in expression, opposes to them the general principle that "a connection is never cognized

¹ *Mīm. Sūtra*, I, 1 2 Later Mīmāṃsakas, Kumārila etc, define inference as a step from one particular case to another one

² A certain Purāṇḍara attempted to justify the position of the Materialists by maintaining that they deny only the supra-mundane use of inference in metaphysics and religion, but the Buddhists retorted that they also admit inference as a source of empirical knowledge only, cp. TSP, p. 491 26

³ NS, I 1 5

⁴ NV, p. 46 8

⁵ This definition is quoted by Dignāga in *Pr. samucc. - vṛtti* ad I. 35, and repeated in NV, p. 59 17

⁶ VS. IX 2 1. *laṅgīlam=rtaga-las hbyuṇ-ba*

⁷ Quoted in *Pr. samucc.* and NV., p. 56 14 ff

⁸ In the second chapter of *Pr. samucc.* the stanzas 25—27 are directed against the *Vāda-vidhī* view, the stanzas 27—30 against the Nyāya, the stanzas 30—35 against the Vaiśeṣikas, the stanzas 35—45 against the Sāṅkhyas and 45 ff against the Mīmāṃsakas.

and major premises of Aristotle's syllogism and to its conclusion. They are virtually the same in syllogism, but their order is different. An inference is essentially a process of inferring one particular case by its similarity to another particular case. The general rule uniting all particular cases and indicated by the quotation of some examples, intervenes subsequently as a uniting member between the two particular cases. A syllogism, on the contrary, starts by proclaiming the general rule and by quoting the examples which support it, and then proceeds to a deduction of the particular from the general. The order of the premises in the Buddhist syllogism is therefore the same as in the Aristotelian First Figure. It begins with the major premise and proceeds to the minor one and the conclusion.¹

The difference between the inference "for one self", or, more precisely, "in one self" and the inference in the sense of a cause which produces an inference in the head of a hearer, is thus considerable. The first is a process of cognition containing three terms. The second is a process of communicating a ready cognition and consists of propositions.

In order to understand the position of Dignāga in this point, we must keep in mind his idea of what a source or right knowledge is. It is the first moment of a new cognition, it is not recognition.² Therefore only the first moment of a fresh sensation is a right cognition in the fullest sense. A perceptual judgment is already a subjective construction of the intellect. Inference is still more remote from that ultimate source of right knowledge. When knowledge is communicated to another person, the first moment of a new cognition in his head can, to a certain extent, be assimilated to a fresh sensation whose source, or cause, are the propositions of which a syllogism consists.

The following three examples will illustrate the difference as it appears in the three types of the inference "for one self" and in the corresponding three types of the inference "for others."

¹ Cf. with this the indecision of Prof. B. Erdmann (*Logik*³, p. 611) regarding this very point. In the last edition of his *Logic* he made the important step of changing the Aristotelian order of premises and putting the minor premise on the first place. He found that this order renders more faithfully the natural run of our thought; i. e., he envisaged syllogism as an inference "for one self." Sigwart thinks that the order in real life can be the one or the other, both are equally possible.

² *pramāṇam* = *prathamatarām* *vyākhyānam* = *anadhigata-ārtha-adhyanta*, cf. above, p. 65.

instinct and reveals itself only when duly attended to.¹ We have retained the name of Inference for the individual thought-process, because it more closely corresponds to the natural process of transition from one particular case to another one. We have given the name of Syllogism to inference "for others" because of its outward similarity with Aristotle's First Figure. As a matter of fact it is very difficult always to distinguish between what belongs to inference as a thought-process and what to its expression in speech, since we cannot deal with the thought-process without expressing it in some way. The problem is solved in practice so, that the definition of the inferential process, its "axioms", its canon of rules and the capital question of those fundamental relations which control the synthetic process of thought are treated under the head of inference "for one self". On the other hand, the problem of the Figures of the syllogism and the problem of logical Fallacies are dealt with under the head of "inference for others". But even this division of problems cannot be fully carried through. *Dharmakīrti*² treats the important problem of the Figures of a Negative Syllogism under the head of inference "for one self", because, says he, the repeated consideration of Negation through all its different aspects and formulations brings home to us the essence of the Negative Judgment itself.

But although it seems quite right to put in the first place the general proposition as the foundation of the reasoning, nevertheless that form of the syllogism which has survived in the practice of all monastic schools of Tibet and Mongolia belongs rather to the abbreviated form of inference "for one self". The debate, whether didactic or penastic, does not begin by putting forward the universal proposition, nor are propositions as such used at all. The Respondent begins by stating his three terms, the Subject, the Predicate and the Reason (or Middle term), without caring to put them in the form of propositions. The Opponent then considers two questions, 1) is the Reason (R) really present in the Subject (S) wholly and necessarily, and 2) is the Reason (R) necessarily and universally present in the Predicate (P). Thereupon begins the debate. The two questions if reduced to the phrasing of modern English formal logic will mean, 1) is the Middle distributed in the Minor,

¹ This psychological fact is probably the real cause why some European logicians, as J S Mill and others, have characterized the major premise as a kind of collateral notice, which helps the mind in its transitions from one particular case to another, cp Sigwart, op cit, I 480

² NB, II 45 and NBT, p 37, 11 ff, transl., p 100 ff

§ 16. SOME EUROPEAN PARALLELS.

What the Buddhist Logic treats as inference, the European Logic treats partly as judgment, resp. proposition, and partly as syllogism. Dignāga has established a hard and fast line between inference, or reasoning "for one self" and syllogism, or inference "for others". The latter, as will be seen later on, is a fully expressed form of inductive-deductive reasoning. It is not at all a process of cognition, it can be called a source of knowledge only by the way of a metaphor¹

On the other hand much of the material which is treated in Europe as immediate, incomplete or apparent inference (*enthymema*) is treated by the Buddhists as inference proper. The Conditional proposition which in the first instance applies to cause and effect is treated in Europe either as a judgment or a Hypothetical Syllogism, or as an immediate inference. If there is an effect, there necessarily is a cause, if the cause is absent, the effect is necessarily absent De Morgan thinks that "this law of thought connecting hypothesis with necessary consequence is of a character which may claim to stand before syllogism, and to be employed in it, rather than the converse". As will be shown later on, this is exactly the Buddhist view. The reason for this lies just in the fact that syllogism gives a deductive formulation to every observation of a causal sequence. One half of our inferential thinking is founded on the law of Causality and the respective judgments are always inferential in the part in which they are not directly perceptual. Prof. A. Bain remarks that "the same conditional form holds when one thing is the sign of another", i. e., not only when the effect is the sign of the existence of a cause, but also when another sign than the effect is "constantly associated with that other object". Since all inference and all syllogism reduces to the fact that "one thing is the sign of another" (*nota notae*), we can interpret the remark of Prof. Bain as a hint to the fact that all inference is either causal or non-causal and this, as we have seen, is just the Buddhist view. The cognition of an object through its sign or mark is treated in European Logic as the axiom upon which the syllogism is founded, *nota notae est nota et ipsis*. Axiom here evidently means that essential character which our thought possesses in every inferential cognition. It would consequently have been more proper to call it not the axiom,

¹ NBT. III 2

and Dharmakīrti enlarge upon the definition of a correct thesis. Evidently this was a point at issue between the schools of their time. They maintain that a thesis in a public debate should be correctly formulated. But they at the same time maintain that the thesis is not at all an indispensable member of every deduction. It can be safely dropped even in a debate when in the course of debating it is clearly understood without special mention. A thesis according to them cannot be something absurd or contradictory, something which it is not worth the while of proving, and it must be a proposition, which the disputant himself believes, which he *bona fide* really intends to prove. It would be bad logic if a philosopher attempted to make capital out of ideas which he does not share himself. Vācaspati remarks that if a philosopher who is known to be an adherent of Vaiśeṣika principles would suddenly take for his thesis the theory of his adversaries, the Mīmāṃsakas, regarding the eternity of the sounds of speech, if he would do it at a public meeting in the presence of authorized judges, he would not be allowed to go on, his defeat would be pronounced at once before listening to his arguments.

Thus a series of rules were established to which an acceptable thesis must satisfy.¹ But later on this chapter on a correctly formulated thesis gradually sunk into insignificance, since all fallacies of a thesis became merged in the doctrine of false reasons.

According to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, real members of a syllogism, the necessary members of the logical process, are thus only two, the general rule and its application to an individual instance. The first establishes a necessary interdependence between two terms, the second applies this general rule to the point in question. The first is called Inseparable Connection.² The second is called Qualification of the Subject (by the fact of this Inseparable Connection).³ Its formula, accordingly, is the following one—

R possesses P,

S possesses R + P

The conclusion, indeed, as has been noticed also by some European logicians,⁴ cannot be separated from the minor premise in the same

¹ Cf. my notes to the translation, v. II, p. 180 & ff.

² *avinābhāva* = *anantariyākatva* = *avyabhicāra* = *vyāpti*.

³ *pakṣa-dharmatā*, also called *pakṣa* simply, cf. N. mukha, p. 12.

⁴ Sigwart *Logik*, I 478 n.

Remains the problem of the synthetical and the analytical judgments. The term which we translate as "analytical judgment" following Kant's terminology, literally means "own-essence inference". This term implies that the predicate of the judgment belongs to the "own essence" of the subject and can be inferred "from the existence of the subject alone", i. e., the subject alone, without betaking oneself to another source, viz., to experience, is sufficient for inferring the predicate. The predicate can be easily inferred from the subject, because it already is contained in it. The judgment "a *śimśapā* is a tree" would certainly have been characterized by Kant as an analytical one. As a matter of fact it means that "the *śimśapā*-tree is a tree".

Since all acts of the understanding in general and all judgments in particular are synthesis, an analytical judgment seems to be a *contradictio in adjecto*. In fact Kant does not treat it as a new cognition¹. It is a secondary act of dissolving what we ourselves have connected and then reuniting it in a judgment which has no cognitional value at all.² "Analytical affirmative judgments, says Kant, are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is conceived through Identity, while others, in which the connection is conceived without Identity, may be called synthetical". Compare with this statement the words of Dharmottara³ "Affirmation (i. e., the predicate that is affirmed) is either different (from the subject) or it is identical with it". The so called analytical judgments are synthetical, but founded on Identity. The purely synthetical contain a synthesis without Identity. The coincidence between the Indian and the European view extends here even to terminology.

However the connotation of the term Identity with Kant seems to be not at all the same as the meaning of this term in Buddhist Logic, and the importance given to the so called analytical judgment on the Indian side is quite different from the negligible part it plays in European Epistemology. Kant believed in the preexistence or ready concepts⁴ which can be dissolved by us in their component parts.

¹ According to the Indian terminology a purely analytical judgment would not be a *pramāṇa* in the sense of *anādhyata artha-adhyanta*. Indeed the *śābhaśānu-māna* in the writings of Asaṅga is not coordinated with *kāryānumāna*.

² As B. Russell puts it, no one except a popular orator preparing his audience to a piece of sophistry will resort to an analytical judgment, cp. *Problems*, p. 128.

³ NBT, p. 24-20, transl., p. 63.

⁴ Although he says that "we cannot represent to ourselves anything as connected in the object, without having previously connected it ourselves" (GPR., § 15 (2-d ed)).

from the major premise, it is not a separate member, it is inherent in the general rule and in fact identical with it.

The Indian syllogism indeed is not only the formulation of a deductive reasoning, it also contains an indication of that Induction which always precedes Deduction. The general rule, or major premise, is established by a generalization from individual facts which are "examples", they exemplify and support it. An example is an individual fact containing the general rule in itself. Without the examples there is no general rule, nor can the individual facts be considered as examples if they do not contain the general rule. Thus example and general rule, or major premise, are practically the same thing. In order to safeguard against incomplete Induction the examples must be positive and negative. That is to say, that the joint method of Agreement and Difference must be applied. When either no positive examples at all, or no negative ones can at all be found, no conclusion is possible, the result can then be only a fallacy. But the Naiyāyikas regard the example as a separate member of the syllogism, as a separate premise, and give its definition. This, according to Dharmakīrti, is perfectly superfluous. Because if the definition of the Logical Reason is rightly given, the definition of what an example ought to be is also given, they cannot be given separately. The Logical Reason is something that is present in similar instances only and absent in dissimilar instances always. These instances and the reason are correlative, as soon as the reason is defined they also are defined by their relation to the reason. Dharmakīrti delivers himself on this point in the following way¹ "The essence of a logical reason in general has been defined by us to consist in its presence only in similar cases, and its absence from every dissimilar case. Further, we have specified that the Causal and the Analytical Reasons must be shown to represent, the first an effect (from which the existence of its necessary cause is inferred), (the second a necessarily coexisting attribute) which alone is sufficient for deducing (the consequence). When the reasons are so represented, it is then shown that 1) e.g., wherever smoke exists, fire exists also, like in the kitchen etc., there is no smoke without fire, like in the pond and in all dissimilar cases, 2) wheresoever there is production, there is change, like in a jar etc., if something is changeless, it is not a product, like Space. It is, indeed, impossible otherwise to show the existence of the reason in similar

¹ NB, III 128, transl., p 181

by implication the positive one. The mixed method of Agreement and Difference controls the whole domain of cognition, but since there is an equipollency between the positive and the negative part of it, it becomes quite sufficient to express one side alone, either the agreement or the difference. The counterpart of it will necessarily be implied. This is the reason why we have two figures of every syllogism. Figure in this context does not mean a twisted, unnatural and perverse verbal arrangement of the terms of an inference, where the real core of every inference, the universal and necessary interdependence of two terms, becomes quite obliterated, but it means two universal and equipollent methods of cognizing truth on the basis of a necessary interdependence between two terms. We have seen that the perceptual judgment "this is fire" is nothing but a cognition of an object as similar with all fires and dissimilar with all non-fires. The cognition of an invisible fire through its mark, the smoke, is likewise a cognition of its similarity with all places possessing the double mark of smoke and fire, and its dissimilarity with all places where this double mark is always absent. Nay, even the negative judgment "there is here no jar", notwithstanding it is a negative, or, according to Indian phrasing, an inference through "non-perception", can be expressed according to both these methods, the positive and the negative one. Indeed, we may express this judgment in the following way—

Whatsoever, all conditions of perceptibility being fulfilled,
is not perceived, is absent.

On this place no such jar is perceived
It is absent.

Or we may express the same idea by the method of Difference. We then will obtain the following propositions—

Whatsoever is present, all conditions of perceptibility being
fulfilled, is necessarily perceived.

But on this place no such jar is perceived
It is absent.

The absence of a jar on a definite spot is cognized either through its similarity with other instances of negation, or through its difference from the positive instances of its presence. The same two methods can be naturally applied to inductions and deductions founded on Causality and to those founded on Identity of objective reference.

CHAPTER III.

SYLLOGISM
(PARĀRTHĀNUMĀNAM).

§ 1. DEFINITION.

The aim of Buddhist logic is an investigation of the "sources" of our knowledge with a view to finding out in the cognized world its elements of Ultimate Reality and of separating them from the elements of Imagination, which in the process of cognition have been added to them. Syllogism is not a source of knowledge. It consists of propositions which are resorted to for communicating ready knowledge to others. It is therefore called by Dignāga an inference "for others". When an inference is communicated to another person, it then is repeated in his head and in this metaphorical sense only can it be called an inference. Syllogism is the cause which produces an inference in the mind of the hearer. Its definition is therefore the following one² — "a syllogism consists in communicating the Three Aspects of the Logical Mark to others".

What the so called Three Aspects of the Logical Mark are — we know from the theory of Inference. They correspond to the minor

synthetical. We may contrast with this attitude the views of Aristotle and all Rationalists, according to whom every *a priori* necessary knowledge is analytical, and of Kant for whom it is always synthetic. (the analytical judgment being mere identical explanations) By a quite different definition of the Category of Identity (*tādātmya*) Dharmakīrti succeeds in giving to the propositions of pure logic and pure mathematics an altogether different basis from the propositions of pure physics. By keeping separate these two specific kinds of knowledge Dharmakīrti comes nearer to Hume, but he differs from him and comes nearer to Kant by establishing the *a priori* necessity of causal relations. The terms analytical and synthetical are very much misleading. First of all synthesis and analysis in the perceptual judgment should be distinguished from those of the inferential (with two concepts). They are confounded, e.g., by Sigwart *Logik*, I 141 ff. It would have been better to contrast the two Necessities as static and dynamic. That the really primordial division of the procedure of the human mind must be established in the way of a dichotomy (as every division of concepts *a priori*) dawned upon Kant in the second edition of his Critique (§ 11). He then calls the one class dynamical, the other — mathematical. The dynamical evidently corresponds to Causation, the mathematical — to Coherence or Identity (of substrate). Kant's attempt to force his twelve-membered division into this double one is by no means clear.

¹ *upacārit*.

² NB., III. 1; transl., p. 109

presence of fire on a remote hill where only smoke is perceived can be established either by its agreement with the places where both phenomena have been observed to occur, or by its difference from all places where both phenomena have never been observed to occur. The method of Agreement will be then expressed in the major premise of the syllogism, the method of Difference in its Contraposition. They are the two aspects of the Logical Mark as it appears in the syllogism. The first aspect of the Logical Mark in a syllogism is expressed in the positive form of the major premise, its second aspect is expressed in the Contraposition of that premise. But there is no necessity of expressing both figures, because, as already mentioned, "from a formula of Agreement the corresponding formula of Difference follows by implication."¹ Dharmottara² says, "When a formulation directly expresses agreement (or the necessary concomitance of the reason with its consequence), their difference, i. e., the contraposition (or the general proposition) follows by implication." "Although the contraposition is not directly expressed, when the concomitance is expressed in its positive form, it nevertheless is understood by implication", "because, says Dharmakīrti,³ if that were not so, the reason could not be invariably concomitant with the consequence." Both methods equally establish the same circumstance of a necessary tie of dependence between two facts or notions. "And it has been established, says Dharmakīrti,⁴ that there are only two kinds of dependent existence, whatsoever the case may be. The dependent part represents either a reference to the same identical thing, or the effect (of another thing which is its cause)". The contraposed general proposition always expresses the same necessary interdependence of two facts following one another, or the necessary connection of two notions referring to one and the same fact. This interdependence (causal or analytical) is "nothing but the general proposition in its positive form." "Thus it is that one single general proposition, either directly or in its contraposed form, declares that the logical mark is present in similar and absent in dissimilar cases."⁵

Thus it is that every syllogism can be expressed in two figures, the one of which corresponds to the "anum" *nota nota est nota et*

¹ NB, III, 28, transl, p. 142

² NBT., p. 51, 4, transl, p. 148

³ NB, III, 29, transl, p. 148

⁴ Ibid., III, 38

⁵ Ibid., III, 84

Inference for one self —

1. The sounds of speech are impermanent entities.
Because they are produced at will, just as jars etc.

This is an inference founded on Identical Reference of two concepts. «impermanence» and «production».

2. There is fire on the hill.
Because there is smoke, just as in the kitchen etc

This is an inference founded upon a Causal Relation between two facts.

3. There is no jar on this place
Because we do not perceive any, just as we perceive no flower growing in the sky.

This is an inference founded on Negation.

The corresponding three types of a syllogism will have the following form.

1. Whatsoever is produced at will is impermanent, as, e. g., a jar etc.
And such are the sounds of our speech.
2. Wheresoever there is smoke, there must be some fire, as in the kitchen etc.
And there is such a smoke on the hill
3. Whenever we don't perceive a thing, we deny its presence.
as, e. g., we deny the presence of a flower growing in the sky
And on this place we do not perceive any jar, although all the conditions of its perceptibility are fulfilled.

The difference between Inference and Syllogism is thus a difference between that form of the Inferential Judgment which it usually has in the natural run of our thinking and acting process, and another form which is most suitable in science and in a public debate. In a public debate the universal proposition is rightly put forward as the foundation of the reasoning to which should follow the applying proposition, or the minor; whereas in the actual thought-process the universal judgment is never present to the mind in its necessity, it seems hidden in the depths of our consciousness, as though controlling the march of our thought from behind a screen.

Our thought leaps from one particular case to another one, and a reason seems to suggest itself to the mind. Its universal and necessary connection with the predicate lies apparently dormant in the

used it the sense of necessary dependence of one term upon another and a necessary interdependence can exist either between two coexisting or two consecutive facts. A necessary coexistence of two different things, we have seen, is always traceable to a necessary consecution or causality between them, so that coexistence proper, coexistence not reducible to causality, coexistence not between two different facts is a coexistence of two necessary conceptions inside the compass of a single fact. It is coexistence, or coinherence, reposing on the Identity of the common substrate of two different concepts. Now the empirical content of this necessary coexistence of two concepts in one substrate, coexistence founded on Identity, is also established by experience, but not by a syllogism. The offices of the latter even in ratiocination are limited to correct formulation and communication. "Indeed a logical reason, says Dharmottara,¹ does not produce cognition of some fact accidentally, as, e. g., a lamp (producing knowledge of such objects which it accidentally happens to illumine) But it produces knowledge by logical necessity, as an ascertained case of invariable concomitance. The function of a logical reason is, indeed, to produce a cognition of an unobserved fact, and this is just what is meant by ascertainment of the reason's invariable concomitance with the latter. First of all (as a preliminary step) we must be certain that the presence of our logical reason is necessarily dependent upon the presence of the predicated consequence, we must do it (in an analytical judgment founded on Identity) by applying the law of contradiction² which excludes the contrary. We then will proceed to syllogize, and avail ourselves of the general proposition recorded in our memory, the proposition intimating that its subject is invariably concomitant with its predicate, e. g., "whatsoever is a product is not eternal." After that we can connect this general record with a particular case, "the sounds of speech are non-eternal." Between these (two premises, the major) contains the mnemonic record, it represents the knowledge of the logical reason (and its concomitance) The syllogism (proper is contained in the next step when we in the minor premise), recollect that the causal origin which is inherent in the particular case of the sound is necessarily coexistent with the attribute of non-eternity. If that is so, then the cognition (or communication) of an unobserved thing is, as a matter of fact, nothing but a cognition of invariable concomitance. It is

¹ NBT, transl, p 129

² *bādhakena pramāṇena*

and 2) is the Middle distributed in the Major. This form of stating the Syllogism has been found through centuries of assiduous practice to be the most convenient for detecting fallacies. The real work of logic begins only when the three terms are clearly and unambiguously singled out. In the diffuse propositional form the real terms are often so concealed as to be difficult of detection.

§ 2 THE MEMBERS OF A SYLLOGISM.

As is seen from the above examples, the syllogism consists of two propositions only. When Dignāga started on his logical reform he was faced by the theory of a five-membered syllogism established in the school of the Naiyāyiks. This syllogism was supposed to represent five interrelated steps of an ascending and descending reasoning. It started by a thesis and ended in a conclusion which was nothing but a repetition of the thesis. The members were the following ones:

1. Thesis. There is fire on the hill.
2. Reason. Because there is smoke.
3. Example. As in the kitchen etc; whenever smoke, there fire.
4. Application. And there is such smoke on the hill
5. Conclusion. There is fire on the hill.

From these five members Dignāga retained only two, the general rule including the examples, and the application including the conclusion. Indeed the main point in every syllogism, just as in every inference, is the fact of the necessary interrelation between two terms as it is expressed in the major premise. The second point consists in the application of the general rule to a particular case. This is the real aim of an inference, i. e. the cognition of an object on the basis of the knowledge of its mark. When these two steps are made, the aim of the syllogism is attained, other members are superfluous. It thus consists of a general rule and its application to an individual case.¹

But the syllogism of the Naiyāyiks contains much more details. It first of all contains a separate thesis and a separate conclusion, although by its content the conclusion is nothing but the repetition of the thesis at the end. The syllogism thus resembles a mathematical demonstration, it begins by proclaiming the *probandum* and concludes by stating that its demonstration has been made. Dignāga

¹ Cp. Bain Logic, I. 146. — «The essential structure of each valid deduction is 1) a universal ground-proposition, affirmative or negative, and 2) an applying proposition which must be affirmative».

not a tree. He will then be taught that the tree is the general term, and the Aśoka a special kind under it. If he then is informed that a certain country-place consists of bare rocks without a single tree on them, he will know that if there are no trees, there are also no Aśokas. The subalternation of all concepts is thus established by "perception and non-perception", i.e., by positive and negative experience, just as the relation of cause and effect between two phenomena, or the relation of their mutual incompatibility. An analytical relation between two concepts can be sometimes established by a very complicated train of argumentation. If the consequence is contained in the reason, this should not be understood psychologically, as a fact really always present to the mind. The analytical relation is logical and capable of infinite extension, it lies sometimes concealed at a great depth. Every case of an analytical relation must be established by corresponding proofs suitable to it, says Dharmakīrti.¹ The principle that all existence is instantaneous has been established by the Buddhists in a long effort of argumentation which is capable of further extension. The connection between these two concepts is analytical, it is protected under the law of Contradiction. If Existence would not be changing every instant, if it would be unchanging like the Cosmical Ether, or like Space, it would not be Existence. But this does not mean that every one who has the idea of Existence present in his mind, has at the same time present the idea of it being instantaneous. An analytical relation means a necessary relation which is not causal, since necessary relations are only two, Identity or non-Causality, and Causality or non-Identity. One and the same thing is called Existence and also a Point-instant. They are connected by Identity. With regard to the necessarily preceding point-instant it will be its effect. There is no third instantaneous relation possible, either Identity or Causality. Every separate instance of such relations, whether analytical relations of concepts or causal relations of point-instants, must be established by experience or, as Dharmakīrti puts it, "by its own proofs". A syllogism will add nothing to our cognition of them, except correct formulation.

§ 6. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SYLLOGISM VIEWED AS INFERENCE

FOR OTHERS

Dharmottara testifies² that "the Master", i.e. Dignāga, was the first to draw a hard and fast line between inference and syllogism

¹ *yathā-viśam-pramāṇaś*, NBT, p. 47. 3 ff

² NBT, p. 42. 3 Cp Keith, *Ind Log*, p. 106, and Randle, *Ind Log*, p. 160

degree, as the major premise from the minor. If we give it the rank of a separate member, there is no sufficient reason to deny this rank to the thesis, i. e. to the repetition of the conclusion at the beginning in the guise of a *probandum*, as the Naiyāyikas indeed maintain. "I refute the theory of those logicians, says Dignāga,¹ who consider the thesis, the application and the conclusion as separate members of the syllogism".

Dharmottara² says, "There is no absolute necessity of expressing separately the conclusion. Supposing the reason has been cognized as invariably concomitant with the deduced property, (we then know the major premise). If we then perceive the presence of that very reason on some definite place, (i. e., if we know the minor premise), we already know the conclusion. The repetition of the deduced conclusion is of no use".

Thus the real members of the syllogism are the same as the Three Aspects of the Logical Reason which have been established in the inference "for one self", but their order in the inference "for others" is changed

They are:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. In Similars only, | } = Inseparable Connection. |
| 2. In Dissimilars never, | |
| 3. In Subject wholly = Application | |

The first two aspects, as will be established presently, represent only a difference of formulation, essentially they are equipollent.

§ 3. SYLLOGISM AND INDUCTION.

"But then, says Dignāga,³ (if neither the thesis, nor the application, nor the conclusion are separate members), the formulation of the example does not represent a different member, as it merely declares the meaning of the reason?" The answer of Dignāga is to the effect that "it is necessary to express separately the positive and the negative examples", (in order to show that the reason possesses its two other conditions, besides the condition of being present on the subject of the minor premise). But the example is not to be separated

¹ N. mukha, Tucci's transl., p. 45

² NBT., 58. 16; transl., p. 150.

³ N. mukha, transl., p. 45

(*padārtha*) It seems as though the innovation of Dignāga were simply borrowed, or extracted, out of these rules of Gotāma. However the five-membered syllogism is regarded in the Nyāya school not as an inference evoked in the head of the hearer, but as a faithful and adequate description of the gradual steps of our thought in a process of inference. These steps must be repeated when an inference is communicated to somebody else. The five-membered syllogism is itself already an abbreviation of another, ten-membered, syllogism which was in vogue in that school previously to the establishment of the five-membered one. It aimed at describing all the gradual steps of our inferential cognition, beginning with the first moment of inquisitiveness (*jñāṣā*) and ending in an inferred conclusion. The same psychological standpoint prevails in this school in regard of the five-membered syllogism.

According to the psychological views of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school every thought has a duration of three moments. In the third moment it becomes extinct and inoperative, it wants to be aroused anew in order to become efficient. The inferential process begins by a moment of inquisitiveness which gives rise to the thesis as a first member of a syllogism. The reason and the example follow in its track. The moment of the thesis is extinct and inoperative when the moment of the example appears. The concomitance as a thought contained in one moment would be extinct and inoperative for the conclusion from which it is separated by the moment of the minor premise, unless it would be repeated in that premise. This repetition is called "Reconsideration",¹ or "Third evocation of the Mark".² The first consideration of the mark is, e.g., the perception of smoke in the kitchen, the second—its perception on the hill, and the third—its reconsideration at the time of the minor premise. To this "reconsideration", in the form "here is that very smoke which always is concomitant with fire", is assigned the office of being the proximate and immediate cause of the conclusion—"there must be some fire present on the hill."

It is clear that the Naiyāyikas did not regard at first their five-membered syllogism as consisting in mere propositions intended to communicate ready knowledge to some audience. Dignāga's view was however accepted by Uddyotakāra.³ The Naiyāyikas followed

¹ *parāmarsa*, cp. NV, p. 46, 10 ff.

² *trītiya-linga-parāmarsa*.

³ NV, p. 18, 10—*vipratipanna-purusa-pratipādalakṣaṇam*.

and its absence from all dissimilar cases.... (it is impossible to exhibit these general features otherwise than by showing) that 1) the causal deduction of the existence of a cause necessarily follows from the presence of the effect, and that 2) the analytically deduced property is necessarily inherent in the fact representing the analytical reason. When this is shown, it is likewise shown what an example is, since its essence includes nothing else».

§ 4. THE FIGURES OF THE SYLLOGISM.

Since the syllogism is nothing but the expression of an inference in propositions, it is clear that there will be as many different kinds of syllogism as there are kinds of inference. Inference has been defined as the cognition of an object through its mark, and the mark, or the so called Three-Aspected Logical Mark, is nothing but a case of necessary interdependence between two terms. There can be, accordingly, as many varieties of syllogism as there are varieties of conjunction between two terms. We have seen that there are three, and only three, varieties of necessary relation between two terms which allow us to cognize one thing through its necessary connection with the other. We can either cognize a thing through its Effect, or through its being an Inherent Property, or through its Negative Counterpart. There will be accordingly three kinds of syllogism, the Causal, the Analytical and the Negative. They have been exemplified above.

These differences however are founded on the content of the syllogism, not on its form. They are founded upon a difference of logical relations of which a strictly definite table of Categories has been established by Dharmakīrti. There is another difference which affects the mere form of the syllogism. The same fact, the same cognition of an object through its logical mark can be expressed in two different ways. We can call this difference a difference of Figure. Every logical mark indeed has two main features, it agrees with similar instances only and it disagrees with all dissimilar ones. Dignāga insists that it is one and the same mark, not two different ones.¹ A mark cannot be present in similar cases only, without at the same time being absent from all dissimilar cases. But practically, just because the mark is the same, we may attend to its positive side and understand the negative one by implication, or we may attend to the negative side and understand

¹ Cp. *N mukha*, transl., p. 22.

- 1 If the effect did not preexist, it never could be created out of nothing
However it is created
Therefore it does preexist (in its material cause).
2. If the effect did not preexist in its material cause, it would not be homogeneous with it
But cloth is homogeneous with threads, and not with the weaver (who also is a cause)
Therefore the effect preexists in its material cause
- 3 If the effect did not preexist in its material cause and if it did preexist elsewhere, then the cloth would not be produced out of thread, but could be produced out of straw etc
However the cloth is produced out of threads and is not produced out of straw (like a matt)
Therefore it preexists in the threads
4. The capacity to produce something requires an object upon which it is directed; if this object does not preexist, the force cannot be efficient.
However the forces are efficient.
Hence their objects preexist (in their material cause).
5. A cause is relative to an effect, if the effects did not preexist, there would be no causes altogether
But the causes exist.
Hence the effects must preexist (in their causes).

These five Mixed Hypothetical Syllogisms expressed *modo tollens* are according to the Sāṅkhyas an independent way of proof. According to Dignāga¹ they are not independent, since every *modus tollens* presupposes the existence of a *modus ponens* with which it is virtually identical. Dharmakīrti proves convincingly that the syllogism of Agreement and the syllogism of Difference are but two figures of the same syllogism, the one establishing exactly the same thing as the other. Every syllogism and every inference are thus positive and negative at the same time.²

The «purely positive» and the «purely negative» syllogisms are an invention of Uddyotakīrti.³ Animated by his extreme hatred of

avāta cp NV., p 128, Sāṅkhya—Kaum 5, H Jacob: in *Ans Indiens Kultur*, p 8 ff

¹ Cp N mukha, p 22.

² Cp *definitio est omnis negatio*

³ NV, p 48 10 ff

An analytical deduction expressed according to the method of Agreement is, e. g., the following one—

- Whatsoever is variable in functional dependence on a variation of its causes is non-eternal, like jars etc.
- The sounds of speech are variable,
- They are non-eternal.

The same deduction expressed according to the method of Difference will be thrown in the following syllogistic form—

- Whatsoever is eternal is never variable in functional dependence on a variation of its causes, like, e g., Space.
- But the sounds of speech are variable,
- They are non-eternal.

There are likewise two different figures of every Causal deduction. Expressed according to the method of Agreement is the following causal syllogism—

- Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen.
- Here there is smoke,
- There must be some fire.

The same expressed according to the method of Difference—

- Wherever there is no fire, there neither is smoke, as in water.
- But here there is smoke,
- There must be some fire.

The methods of Agreement and Difference are thus in Indian Logic not only «the simplest and most obvious modes of singling out from among the circumstances which precede a phenomenon those with which it is really connected by an invariable law»,¹ but they are the universal methods for establishing every kind of connection, and even every kind of judgment.² The one consists «in comparing together different instances in which the phenomenon occurs», the other consists in comparing them with instances in which it does not occur.³ Dignāga insists that these are not two different methods, but one mixt method of Agreement and Difference, which can either be expressed by attending to its positive or to its negative side. The

¹ J S Mill, *Logic*, I. p 448

² Cp A Bain, *Logic*, I 8 and II. 46.

³ J S Mill, *Logic*, I. p. 448.

of a Syllogism, 5) its real Figures, 6) its Axiom and the import of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism

a) Definitions by Aristotle and by the Buddhists.

According to Aristotle a Syllogism is "a speech in which, some positions having been laid down, something different from these positions follows as a necessary consequence from their having been laid down".¹ This definition implies that the syllogism consists of three propositions (at least), and one of them (the conclusion) follows necessarily from the two others (the premises). It is clear however that the syllogism is not only "a speech". Apart from the expression in "a speech" there is, the thing to be expressed in that speech. The contents of a syllogism has been characterized by Aristotle in the *Dictum de omni et nullo*, meaning that "Whatever is affirmed or denied of a class, is affirmed or denied of any part of that class". According to this rule the Syllogism must always contain a deduction of the particular from the general. There is also another way of stating the contents, or, as it is called, the "axiom" of the Syllogism. It is the principle *nota notae est nota rei ipsius* with its correlative *repugnans notae repugnat ei ipsi*. According to this "Axiom", the syllogism contains the cognition of an object through an intermediate mark. It represents an indirect cognition as distinguished from the direct cognition through the senses. We have already mentioned that the Buddhist definition of Inference as cognition of an object through its mark coincides with the principle *nota notae*. Its expression in a sequence of propositions will therefore correspond to Aristotle's "speech". We thus find in the European theory something corresponding to the Buddhist distinction of the Inference "for one self" from the Syllogism "for others". But in this point lies also the great difference between the two theories.

In the Buddhist Inference-for-One-Self there are, properly speaking, no propositions at all, at least no such propositions as always are present in the Aristotelian Syllogism. The cognition of the form "sound is impermanent, because it is a product, like a jar" is laid down in a single proposition. The important part is not the proposition, but its three terms, or, if the Example is counted, its four terms. We thus are faced by two quite different definitions of Syllogism. The one says that it is a "speech" in which the concluding

¹ Grote's translation, op cit p 148

ipsius, the other to the second axiom *repugnans notae repugnat ei ipsi*. These are the only real logical figures.

That the particular judgments have no place in the syllogism follows from the definition of inference as founded on a necessary and universal connection between two terms, and on the necessary presence of the logical mark in the whole compass of the Subject. As to the negative syllogism, so far Contraposition is not to be regarded as negative in substance, they will be treated and their figures analyzed separately, in a subsequent chapter, together with an analysis of the Law of Contradiction.

§ 5. THE VALUE OF THE SYLLOGISM.

It is clear from what has been stated above that the syllogism is a valuable method only for a correct formulation and communication of ready knowledge to another person. It is not a genuine source of knowledge, its value for the acquisition and expansion of new knowledge is nil. This is first of all quite clear in the syllogism of Causality. «We can assert that the effect represents the logical reason for deducing its cause, says Dharmakīrti,¹ only when the fact of their causal relation is already known». By no effort of ratiocination can we arrive at a deduction of the cause producing an observed smoke, if we do not already know that it is fire. But «in the kitchen and similar cases it is established by positive and negative experience, that there is between smoke and fire a necessary invariable connection representing a universal causal relation». The inference proper consists in applying this general rule to a particular point, and the syllogism communicates this fact to another person. But the essential part of what is communicated by a syllogism is the fact of a necessary dependence² of the effect upon its causes. How the principle as well as the particular content of this relation, how its empirical and its *a priori* parts are established, has been explained in the theory of inference,³ and a syllogism adds nothing but its correct formulation in two or three propositions.

All human knowledge is of relations, and necessary relations, we have seen, are only two, Identity and Causation. The negative relation is here left out of account. Relation, as has been explained, is here

¹ NBT., transl., p. 127.

² Ibid., p. 129.

³ Cf. above, p. 222 ff.

always included in the Example. From this point of view one must admit that the five-membered Syllogism of the Naiyāyikas alone does full justice to this double march of the ratiocinative process. Indeed its three first members contain four terms. The order of the premises is inverted. The Syllogism starts at its conclusion which is also the thesis. It then mentions the minor premise. The third member is the Example. The major premise is not a separate member. We then have the following syllogistic form —

1. Thesis. Sound is impermanent.
2. Reason. Because it is produced by effort.
3. Example. Like a jar.

This represents the natural march of the intellect when it leaps from one particular to another. The major premise is not fully realized, but it lies buried somewhere in the depths of consciousness and emerges to the surface when the next step, or deduction, is taken. The Syllogism then receives the following shape:

1. Thesis. Sound is impermanent.
2. Reason. Because produced at will by an effort.
3. Example. Like a jar. Where an effort there impermanence.
4. Application. Sound is produced at will by an effort.
5. Conclusion. It is impermanent.

This seems to be exactly the Syllogism which Aristotle had in view in establishing his Syllogism from Example. He refers it to the class of inferences for one self, *notiora quoad nos*. For the Naiyāyikas however — only its three first members, with the suppressed major premise, represent inference for one-self. Its full five members they consider as inference for others or as a full Syllogism to be used in a public debate.

It seems that the celebrated modern theory of J. S. Mill who considers Syllogism as a process of inferring particulars from particulars with a suppressed collateral major premise, which is the result of passed experience, corresponds in its main points to the theory of the Naiyāyikas.

c) Inference and Induction

That the universal or the major premise must be established by Induction from particulars is equally maintained by the Buddhists and by Aristotle. Syllogism presupposes and rests upon the process of

therefore stated that analytical deductions (founded on the laws of Contradiction and Identity) can be resorted to when the deduced feature is already known necessarily to be present wherever the presence of the reason is ascertained, not in any other cases. The predicate is contained in the reason, the logical consequence therefore necessarily follows out of the mere fact of the presence of the reason.

But if that is so, if the deduced predicate of an analytical judgment is known to be contained in its subject and automatically flows out of the latter, its deduction is worthless.

"Why is it then, asks Dharmottara,¹ that something already quite certain, should be sought after?" "Why should we have recourse to logical reasoning for deducing from the reason what is already given in the reason?"

The answer is that, although the reason and the consequence of an analytical deduction (or the subject and the predicate of an analytical judgment) are connected through Identity, we nevertheless can start on such a deduction, or on such a judgment, albeit we already know that they are necessarily connected through Identity. Just as in the case of deducing the cause from an effect, we must beforehand know from experience that the phenomena are necessarily related as cause and effect, just so must we know from experience, or other sources, that two different features belonging to one and the same reality are connected through Identity. Their Identity is an identity of the common substratum, it is co-substrateness, or co-inherence.²

Although all our concepts are constructions of our understanding, their comprehension, their intention, their subalternation, their mutual exclusion are cognized from experience. It has been established above³ that the laws of Identity, Causality and Contradiction are the original possession of our understanding, but their application is limited to the domain of sensuous experience. Dharmottara gives the following example.⁴ Supposing a man having no experience about trees in general perceives a very high Aśoka tree and is informed that it is a tree. He might think that the height of the Aśoka is the reason why it is called a tree. Looking at a small Aśoka he might think that it is

¹ NBT, p. 47. 17; transl. p. 131.

² or Agreement. *Uebereinstimmung*, as Sigwart (Logik, I. 110). puts it

³ Cp. p. 218 ff.

⁴ NBT, p. 24. 3 ff.; transl. p. 67.

⁵ *Chetanaśāstra*, I

Such a syllogism is not only a process ascending from the particular to the universal, it contains moreover an unwarranted jump from the observed totality of a class to its absolute totality. However Aristotle conceives repeated and uncontradicted Induction as carrying with it the maximum of certainty and necessity.¹ The Universal (*notus natura*) is thus generated in the mind by a process of Induction out of particulars which are *notiora nobis*.

Both Dignāga and Aristotle, it is true, content themselves with barely recognizing the inductive part of ratiocination, while they both bestow elaborate care upon the analysis of the deductive part and of the canon of rules regulating it.

Some critics have impugned the procedure of Aristotle in his converting Induction into a peculiar form of Syllogism and thus effacing the great contrast between the ascending and descending process in ratiocination. For them the capital difference between both processes lies in the constraining force or necessity inhering in Syllogism, a necessity which Induction never can attain.² Every Induction, according to them, includes a jump, and an unwarranted, risky jump, from particular cases to the universal assertion. But there is no unwarranted jump, there is strict necessity in syllogistic deduction. The distinction between the totality of particulars and the meaning of the class-term, these critics maintain, is incorrectly employed by Aristotle to slur over the radical distinction between Induction and Syllogism. Aristotle says «you must conceive the minor term in the Inductive Syllogism as composed of all the particulars, for Induction is through all of them».³ According to these critics the unwarranted jump from particulars to the class can be admitted in Induction without spoiling it. But its admission into Syllogism must be refused, because it would degrade the dignity of that method. It seems that in this question as in many others the Indian view deserves to be considered. The difficulty is inherent in knowledge itself. It cannot be slurred over by dividing the full ratiocinative process in two halves and relegating it to one half only, thereby getting another half which becomes quite innocent of the flaw of the first half. The universality and necessity of judgments is the core of all logic, it must be explained in some way or other. As long as it is not explained, neither Induction nor Syllogism will appear innocent, an internal disease, a «cancer».

¹ Ibid, p. 192 ff

² Ibid, p. 197

³ Ibid, p. 260

He envisaged inference as a process of cognition, one of the two «sources» of our knowledge, and called it inference «for one self», or «in one self»; the second was regarded by him not as a source of knowledge at all, but as a method of correctly and convincingly expressing it in a series of propositions for the benefit of an audience. This doctrine, we have seen, is but a consequence of the theory of a difference in principle between the two sources of our knowledge. There are two, and only two, sources of knowledge, because there are two, and only two, kinds of cognized «essences». The senses apprehend the extreme concrete and particular only, inference apprehends the general alone.¹ Regarded as a source of knowledge which stands in a contradictory contrast with sensibility, inference and understanding are convertible terms. Indeed our analysis has shown that inference is nothing but a variety of judgment and judgment is but another name for the procedure of the understanding; inference deals with the general, just as pure sensibility cognizes the absolute particular, or, the thing as it is strictly in itself. Such an inference must be separated from a series of propositions used for conveying a thesis to an audience. We thus not only have a direct testimony of an authoritative author to the effect that the theory of an inference «in one self» and an inference «in others» is due to Dignāga, but we can account for the *rationale* of such a separation, since it is a direct outflow of the fundamental principle of his philosophy.²

The statement of Dharmottara is supported by all what we at present know on the history of Indian Logic. We find in the works preceding the reform of Dignāga no mention of the inference «for one self» and «for others». Neither Gotama, nor Kanāda, nor Vātsyāyana, nor, for ought we know, Vasubandhu refer to it. But almost every post-Dignāgan work on logic contains it. Praśastapāda who most probably was a contemporary of Dignāga was the first to introduce it in the logic of the Vaiśeṣika school.


Somewhat different was the fate of Dignāga's innovation³ in the school of the Naiyāyika. It must be noticed that the original aphorisms of Gotama already contain a distinction between inference as one of the «sources» of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and the «five-membered syllogism» which is treated not under the head of the four «sources», of cognition, but under the head of one of the 16 Topics of Discourse

¹ Cp. above, p. 71 ff

² Cp. my article *Rapports* etc. in the *Muséon*, V, p. 168 ff

the fact that the reason, or middle term, is present in similar instances only and absent in dissimilar instances always. These are the two rules of the major premise which imply one another, because if the reason is present in similar instances only, it is *eo ipso* absent in dissimilar instances always. But in order to express the necessary dependence of the reason upon the predicate both must be stated, either expressedly or by implication. The presence of the reason in similar instances only is the Position¹. Its absence in dissimilar instances always is the Contraposition².

The position is established by the inductive method of Agreement. The Contraposition is established by its corollary, the method of Difference. Both express one and the same fact. They are two manners of expressing the same idea. The logical value and validity of contraposition is easy to understand. It is clear that if the middle term is necessarily dependent upon the major, it is included in the latter. The compass of its negation must therefore exceed the compass of the negation of the major in exactly the same proportion in which the compass of the major exceeds the compass of the middle. In circles this can be represented so —



E g., "whatsoever is a product (M) is non eternal (P)" and "whatsoever is eternal (non-P) is not a product (non-M)", or "wheresoever there is smoke (M), there is fire (P)", and "without fire (non-P) there is no smoke (non-M)". The whole compass of M is included in the compass of P. The non-P remains outside the greater circle. And because non-P is outside, non-M is still more outside. Thus the whole of non-P is embraced by the non-M.

That the universal negative can be converted is equally clear. If there is no connection at all between subject and predicate, this disconnection is mutual.

But the universal affirmative cannot be converted. It expresses the necessary dependence of one term upon the other. This relation can-

¹ *anvaya*

² *vyatireka*

the example of the Vaiśeṣikas and incorporated the theory of an inference "for others" in their logical teaching. We meet with the distinction between an inference for one self and for others in the works of Gaṅgeśa and in all the works which followed.

The same remark must be *mutatis mutandis* applied to another characteristic feature of the Indian Logic, its doctrine of syllogistic figures. That there are two, and only two, real figures and that all particular judgments have no place in a syllogism was admitted by the schools long before Dignāga, but the discovery of the real meaning of this fact must be credited to him.

The positive and negative figure or, more precisely, the *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*, just as they are admitted by the Naiyāyikas probably have been admitted by the Sāṅkhyas before them. But for the realistic schools they are two independent forms of syllogism, whereas for the Buddhists every syllogism can be expressed either in the one or in the other form, since both forms are equipollent. As a proof of their independence the Naiyāyikas adduced the fact that there are deductions "purely positive"¹ which have no negative counterpart and there are also deductions "purely negative"² which have no positive counterpart. Thus the Buddhists denied and maintained that every deduction is positive and negative, just as all names and all judgments are necessarily in their essence, positive and negative.

The name "fire" and the judgment "this is fire" means that there is a real point which on the one side is similar with all fires and, on the other side, is dissimilar from all non-fires. The middle is excluded,³ there is no third thing possible between being a fire and being a non-fire. Just the same applies to all inferences and syllogisms.

The Sāṅkhyas, it would seem, were the first to make an extensive use of the *modus tollens* for the establishment of their theory of Causality. They maintained the essential identity of cause and effect, i. e., the preexistence of the effect in its cause. Their aim was to support in this way their favorite idea of an Eternal Matter and the inclusion of all the universe of effects in this unique and universal Cause. They produced for its proof a canon of five syllogisms expressed *modo tollente*.⁴ They are the following ones —

¹ *īśvara-anvayin*

² *kevala-vyativṛtān*

³ *trītiya-prahāra-abhāva*.

⁴ *avīta-pañcāśam*, cp. NK, p. 50, the term *avīta* is rendered in Tibetan by *bsal-bar hoṅ-pa* "arrived in the way of exclusion" = negative, or *tollens*. On the

Grammatically the middle term can be subject in the major and predicate in the minor, or *vice versa*, subject in the minor and predicate in the major, or subject in both, or predicate in both. One of the premises can be moreover either particular or negative. By combining each of the four positions of the middle term with the possibility of one of the premises being either particular or negative, a scheme of 19 valid moods is constituted. Only one of them, the first mood of the first figure (*Barbara*), is regarded by Aristotle as "final" or genuine. All others can be by a complicated process of reduction converted into it.

Of all this complicated doctrine which forms almost the entire edifice of mediæval and modern Formal Logic we find on the Indian side not a whisper. Particular conclusions are, first of all, excluded altogether from the domain of logic in India. A particular conclusion means that the Reason is not present in the whole compass of the Subject. This is a violation of the first rule of the canon and produces a fallacy. Negative conclusions are relegated by the Buddhists to a special class and altogether separated from universal affirmative conclusions. The third and fourth syllogistic figures are thus excluded from the domain of syllogism. The complicated rules for their reduction and validity become therefore quite superfluous. Neither can the grammatical principle of converting the Middle Term into the predicate of the major premise and into the subject of the minor be rightly introduced into logic. Among the three terms of an inference one (the minor) is the Subject, it is the real Subject, the logical Subject. It cannot be converted into a predicate otherwise than in a confused and perverse expression. The subject of the minor premise and the subject of the conclusion are the same thing and must occupy in a correct expression the same position, it is the subject of the applying proposition. The subject of the grounding or major proposition is necessarily the Middle term, because this proposition expresses the necessary dependence of the middle on the major, and this fact is expressed linguistically by bringing it under the predication of the major. "Let the predicate be what predicate is", says Sigwart.¹ Every change in his position is superfluous and useless. We are thus left with one of the moods of the first figure (*Barbara*),

¹ Sigwart, op cit, I 451. In the first mood of the second figure (*Camestres*) the Middle term is supposed to be the predicate of the major premise. But the middle which is a predicate in the major premise is *contradictio in adjecto*. This is

Buddhism and all things Buddhist he most vehemently assails Dignāga's definition of inference, his theory of the Three-Aspected Logical Reason, his doctrine of syllogistic figures, his system of logical fallacies, etc. He pours upon them a stream of quite artificial, falsely subtle criticisms in order rather to bewilder than to convince the reader. The greatest part of these inventions were dropped in the sequel, but the theory of the purely-positive and purely-negative reasons remained for ever as a part of the Naiyāyika syllogistic teaching. The favourite syllogism of the Buddhists, e. g., "everything having a cause is impermanent", will, according to the Naiyāyiks, be purely positive, or a logical fallacy. There are no uncaused things for the Buddhists, since every thing existing has necessarily a cause. Uncaused things do not exist. But the Buddhists maintain that there is a negative example, viz, the ubiquitous, unchanging, motionless Cosmical Ether, or the Space. A negative example need not be a reality. For logical purposes, serving as a contrast, such an example as eternal Space is quite sufficient¹

An inference like "the living body possesses a Soul, because it possesses animal functions" is an instance of "purely negative" inference. There are no positive examples to prove this concomitance of a living body with a Soul, but there are a lot of examples where these two attributes are both absent. According to the Realists these examples have the force to prove the invariable connexion of the living body with a Soul. According to the Buddhists they prove nothing, the deduction is a fallacy. The negative examples are a corollary from the positive ones. If there are no positive ones, neither can there be any real negative ones.

§ 7. EUROPEAN AND BUDDHIST SYLLOGISM.

In the present condition of our knowledge of the Indian Syllogism it may seem premature to attempt a full comparative statement and estimate of the Buddhist theory as against the European. Nevertheless some hints in that direction will not be amiss as a help for a better understanding of the Indian position, of that independent and original view which the Indian logicians took in dealing with Syllogism. The following points of the Aristotelian theory deserve to be considered, 1) Aristotle's idea of the Syllogism in general, 2) his idea of a Syllogism from Example, 3) his idea of Induction, 4) the real members

¹ N mukha, p 27, NBT. p 87 s.

Now if the field of the Syllogism is divided in European formal logic in 19 moods and in the Indian system in only two moods, the questions naturally arise, 1) what is the correspondence, if any, between the 19 European moods and the 2 Indian ones, 2) what is the comparative logical value of both these divisions. As already stated, the third and fourth figure of the European Syllogism need not to be considered in this context, since they yield only particular conclusions, which by themselves without reduction are logically valueless. For the same reason are the third and fourth moods of the first and of the second figure to be excluded, since they also give only particular conclusions. The first mood of the second figure represents a perverse expression concealing a real fallacy.¹ From the moods of the second figure remains the second mood (*Cesaro*) which is the contraposition of the first mood of the first figure (*Barbara*) and therefore corresponds to Dignāga's positive or direct figure. As to the second mood of the first figure (*Celarent*), its negation is nothing but linguistic. All really negative conclusions, we shall see, are reducible to the type-instance "there is here no *jai*, because we do not perceive any". But since all names, as will be shown later on, are positive and negative names, it is always possible to disguise a positive conclusion in a kind of negative judgment. E. g., we can say—

All men do not live eternally,
Socrates is a man,
He does not live eternally.

This conclusion differs from the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" only linguistically. Or take the Indian type-instance—

All products are not eternal,
Sounds are produced,
They are not eternal

It has no sense at all to erect this linguistic difference into a separate mood. Since every judgment and every name can be expressed both ways, positively and negatively, it seems more convenient, as the Indians have done, to treat the problem of Negation separately as a feature of our thought which may appear everywhere instead of doubling all figures and moods, without ever considering the real nature of Negation.

The same critique applies to the distinction between the moods with a general and particular conclusion, since the second is included

¹ Since the Middle cannot be the predicate of the major premise

proposition necessarily follows from two premises; the other says that it is a "speech" which expresses the Three-Aspected Logical Mark,¹ i. e. the mutual relation of the three terms.

Thus it is that, notwithstanding the identity of the "axiom" of the Syllogism, there is a great difference between both theories in the importance given to the "speech" in which it is laid down. For Aristotle Syllogism is, first, a series of three propositions, next, a *Dictum de omni et nullo*; for Dignāga Syllogism (and Inference) is, first, three interrelated terms, next, a sequence of two propositions, expressing a general rule and its application.

b) Aristotle's Syllogism from Example.

Apart from this distinction between what a Syllogism is and the fact which it essentially expresses, there is in the Aristotelian theory another distinction which Aristotle himself characterizes as a difference between Syllogism for us (*pro nobis*) and Syllogism in its own nature (*notius natura*). The designation "for us" suggests some similarity with the Buddhist Inference "for one-self".

The antithesis between *notiora natura* and *notiora nobis* (or *quoad nos*) is recognized by Aristotle as a capital point in his philosophy. The first is nearer to perception, more within the apprehension of mankind generally and constitutes Experience. The second is nearer to final or perfect knowledge and constitutes Science.

Aristotle counts several varieties of Syllogism which he brings under the head of knowledge for one-self. The principle are the Syllogisms from Example and the Syllogism from Induction.

The nearest to the Indian Inference-for-One-Self is the Aristotelian Syllogism from Example. The Example is here, just as in India, considered as a fourth term, besides the three terms, the major, middle and minor.² The inference is from one particular case to the general and through the general to another particular.

Example includes not all, but only one or few particulars; inferring from them, first, to the entire class, next, to some new analogous particular belonging to the class. The ratiocinative process consists of two parts, an ascending one and a descending one. Inference proceeds from one particular instance to other similar instances through an intermediate general premise which is, if not expressly stated,

¹ *trirūpa-linga*

² Grote, op. cit., p. 191.

consequence to the absence of its necessary antecedent ground." These two figures coincide with the *modus ponens* and the *modus tollens* of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism

This is also admitted by J. N. Keynes.¹ After having made a statement of the two moods of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism, he remarks — "These moods fall into line respectively with the first and the second figures of the categorical syllogism. For we have seen that in the figure 1 we pass from ground to consequence and in figure 2 — from denial of consequence to denial of ground"

According to Kant² the rule of the second figure is this, that "what contradicts the mark of a thing contradicts the thing itself", i e, *repugnans notae repugnat rei ipsi*. He then shows that the second figure can always by contraposition be converted into the first. This again falls in line with the Buddhist theory according to which the two figures of the syllogism are nothing but the major premise and its contraposition, or the two rules requiring the presence of the reason in similar instances only and its absence in all dissimilar ones

If we summarize the critique which has been bestowed upon the Aristotelian scheme of figures and moods, we find 1) that it was an unhappy idea of Aristotle to change the natural positions of Subject and Predicate in the premises, 2) that it was inconvenient to introduce in it other negative moods than the *modus tollens* or Contraposition, 3) that it was useless to introduce particular conclusions which could be valid only as far as reducible to the first figure "It cannot be denied, says Kant,³ that valid conclusions are possible in all the four figures. But it is the aim of logic to disentangle and not to entangle, to enunciate every thing openly and simply, and not in a concealed and perverse manner." "It is easy to discover the first inducement to the false subtlety (of the Aristotelian figures) The man who was the first to write down a Syllogism in three propositions, the one above the other in three lines, considered it as a chess-board and tried to change the positions of the middle term and to observe the consequences. When he saw that valid conclusions emerged, he was struck just as when an anagram is found in a name. It was as childish to rejoice about the one as about the other."⁴ Kant therefore

¹ Formal Logic, p. 352

² In his small tract "Von der falschen Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren".

³ Ibid

⁴ Ibid

Induction. Aristotle declares unequivocally that universal propositions are obtained only from Induction.¹ The particular facts remembered and compared constitute Experience with its universal notions and conjunctions.² "Conjunctions, says Dharmakīrti, (or the major premise) must be established by corresponding (particular) facts".³ If this really is so, it seems impossible or quite artificial to cut the natural inductive-deductive process of thinking into two different halves, Induction and Deduction. Both are complementary of one another and cannot be separated otherwise than in abstraction. This is, as we shall see, the substance of the Indian view. We shall see that the link between Induction and Deduction is so strong that the figures or moods of Deduction can be rightly established only when the principle methods of Induction are taken into account. There is between the two parts a natural antithesis, inasmuch as we in life sometimes concentrate our attention on the inductive process and suppress, as it were the deductive one. This is called inference for one self. Or we presuppose the process of Induction as already achieved and direct all our attention to the second part of the process, to deduction. This is called inference for others by the Indians, or the real, genuine Syllogism (*notus natura*) by Aristotle. But the name of Syllogism is applied by Aristotle to both Induction and Deduction. The Syllogism from Induction is in his treatment a very special kind of Syllogism in which there is no real middle term, because the supposed middle reciprocates with the major. The order of the premises is inverted just as in the Syllogism from Example. The conclusion in which it results is the first or major proposition. Aristotle adds that the genuine Syllogism, which demonstrates through a middle term, is *notus natura*, it is prior and more effective as to cognition; but that the Syllogism from Induction is to us (*pro nobis*) plainer and clearer.⁴

The Syllogism from Induction, as imagined by Aristotle, must have the following form—

Conclusion (=thesis). One man and all observable humanity are mortals.

Minor premise. They represent the totality of humanity.

Major premise (=conclusion). All men are mortal.

¹ Grote, op. cit., p. 187.

² Ibid., p. 193.

³ *yathā-svam-pramāṇaish*, NBT, p. 47.1 ff., on the meaning of *pramāṇa* in this context cp NBT, p. 64 l. 81.1.

⁴ Grote, op. cit., p. 191 and 196.

if it were not a tree, it would not be itself. We would have an object which would be at once a tree and a non-tree. If the qualities (or concepts) are incompatible, the reality of which they are, the qualities cannot be identical,¹ says the Buddhist law of Contradiction. It is a logical law between concepts, but it also is a law of reality.² Identity thus understood is as much a real relation³ as Causality, it is the necessary corollary from Causality. In Identity the objective reference is one, in Causality it is double, but interdependent.

Now, what is the essence of law of Causality? Its formula, we have seen, is "this being, that appears." It is a law of necessary dependence of every point-instant of reality upon its immediate antecedent point-instants; its expression is a Hypothetical Judgment. Since to every point-instant of reality corresponds some concept and the point-instant cannot be cognized otherwise than through a concept, there must be between the concepts corresponding to reality a logical relation similar to that real relation which obtains between the point-instants to which they correspond. Smoke is produced by fire, i. e., there is causal tie between a sequence of uninterrupted moments, a part of which is subsumed under the head of the concept of fire, and the following part of which is united under the concept of smoke. However the logical relation of these concepts is the reverse of the real relation between the corresponding points of reality. For logic means necessity and a cause is not necessarily followed by its result. Something can always appear which will prevent⁴ the production of a given result. There is absolutely no causal judgment about the necessity of which one could be sure directly.⁵ But the reverse relation is characterized by necessity. A result is necessarily the result of its cause, it could not exist if it were not a result and it could not be a result if it were not the necessary result of its cause. Therefore the logical law of Causation is really the law of the Effect. This is also the name which Dharmakīrti gives it.⁶ He calls it inference "through the Effect".⁷

¹ *virrūḍha-dharma-samsargād (āharnā) nānā*

² *vastum avastum ca*, cp NBT, p 70 22

³ Sigwart, op cit, I. 442

⁴ *geg-byed-pa erid-pa-phyir = pratibandha-sambhavarit.*

⁵ Sigwart, op cit, I. 418

⁶ *kārya-anumāna = kāryena anumāna*

⁷ Necessity between the very last moment of the cause and the first moment of the result is apparently also admitted cp NBT, p 39 72, transl, p 68

as the Hindus say, will be lurking in them. The Buddhist solution is explained by us in the chapter on Inference and will be considered once more later on.

d) The Buddhist Syllogism contains two propositions.

It follows from the Aristotelian definition that the Syllogism must consist of three propositions, two of them exercising a similar function and united by the common characteristic of being «premises» to the Conclusion. From the Buddhist definition it follows that the Syllogism must consist of only two indispensable propositions, the one expressing the general rule of invariable concomitance between the reason and its consequence, and the other expressing the application of the rule to a given instance. Indeed the connection between the minor premise and the conclusion is much narrower than between the two so called premises. Lotze and Sigwart remark rightly that the «minor premise presupposes the conclusion».¹ The minor with the conclusion together constitute the Application or Qualification of the Locus.² It is easy to see that the two indispensable members of a Syllogism represent nothing else than Induction and Deduction. The real evidence whereby the conclusion of a Syllogism is proved, is the minor premise together with, not the major premise itself, but together with the assemblage of particular facts from which by Induction the major premise is drawn.³ Example and Application are the two members of the Buddhist syllogism, as stated above.⁴

e) Contraposition.

The Indian theory deals with conversion and obversion of subject and predicate in propositions merely in connexion with inference and syllogism. Conversion is possible only in the major premise, or grounding proposition. In the applying proposition, which is a combination of the minor premise and the conclusion, the subject has a fixed position which cannot be changed. The grounding proposition expresses

¹ Lotze, *Logik*, p. 122; Sigwart, *op cit*, I 478, — «Socrates could not be a man, as stated in the minor premise, if we were not already sure that he is mortal»

² *pakṣa-dharmatā*

³ Grote, *op cit*, p. 199.

⁴ Cp above, p. 279

a hypothetical judgment or a hypothetical Syllogism The Position and the Contraposition¹ of this law corresponds to the *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism Since the universal law of Sufficient Reason is equally realized in deductions founded on Identity, as in those founded on Causation, we can maintain that all our arguments are founded on these two great principles and the syllogism of Causation exists in equal rights with the analytical syllogism

The European syllogistic theory has never admitted causal deductions as a special variety of syllogism The modern theory assumes that Causality, or the principle of Uniformity in nature, the principle namely that the same causes produce the same effects, is the fundamental principle of Induction and Induction is the opposite of Deduction or Syllogism The latter are based on the principle of analytic Identity Induction can never attain strict universality and necessity in its conclusions, whereas syllogistic deduction is characterized by necessity

This was not the opinion of Aristotle For him Induction was also a Syllogism and Causation was also founded upon the principle of analytic Identity His causal Syllogism is a deduction of the effect from its cause The cause is brought in line and identified with the middle term,² the effect occupies the place of the major term in the conclusion But this deduction founded on Causality is not, as with the Buddhists, a second variety³ coordinated with the analytic deduction of the particular from the universal, it is subordinated to it, or, on the contrary, the analytic deduction is subordinated to the causal one, since the Universal is regarded as a kind of cause For Aristotle the cause is always the Universal of which the effect is the particular The research of a cause of something is the research of a middle term.⁴ The universal connection of cause and effect becomes known to us through induction from particular cases All the four varieties of cause assumed by Aristotle are so many middle terms from which

¹ *anvaya-yatirāḥa*.

² Aristotle, it is true, also admits that often the effect is more notorious, so that we employ it as a middle term (cp Grote, p 223), and conclude from it to its reciprocating cause But in this case the syllogism is supposed to be not causal, it is knowledge of the Ens, not of the *śakti*

³ However Aristotle also admits that the *quaestum* is sometimes the Quiddity or essential nature of the thing itself and sometimes an extraneous fact (*Analyt Post. II. 2*, a 31, cp Grote, op cit p 290) In this place Aristotle seems to admit that the two exclusive ultimate grounds for every inference are either Coincidence (= Identity) or Causation (= dependence on an extraneous fact)

⁴ Grote, op. cit, p 240.

not be reversed. The subject has a fixed position just as the subject of the conclusion. A great many fallacies owe their origin to the neglect of that rule. E. g., if we have the proposition "whatsoever is produced by an effort is non-eternal" and convert it simply, we shall have "whatsoever is non-eternal is produced by an effort". This will be a fallacy of Uncertain Reason, since the reason "non-eternal" will be equally present in similar instances like jars etc and in dissimilar ones like lightning etc.

Aristotle's dealing with the problem of Conversion is formal and grammatical. He tries to change the mutual positions of subject and predicate. He then sees that the same operation is possible in some instances and, quite incomprehensively, impossible in other cases.

Among the European logicians Sigwart holds views which fall in line with the attitude of the Indians. He insists that the position of being a predicate must be "left to what really is the predicate".¹ "All the meaning of Contraposition, says he, becomes at once clear when we put the connection into the form of a hypothetical proposition, and instead of maintaining that „all A are B“ express that „if something is A it is also B“. It follows that „if something is not B, it neither is A“. „A good sense and a (logically) valuable sense have only these two cases, pure Conversion (of the negative) and Contraposition. They from all sides express the meaning of the assertion that a predicate belongs, or does not belong, necessarily to its subject. All other cases which result merely in particular propositions, demonstrate therewith that no definite conclusion is possible“.

That is the reason why the Indian theory excludes particular propositions from the domain of logic altogether. Logic is the province of universal and necessary propositions.

f) Figures.

The Aristotelian Logic distinguishes between the Categorical and Hypothetical Syllogism and divides the Categorical in 4 Figures and 19 Moods. On the division in Categorical and Hypothetical, on the question, namely, how far this division affects the grammatical form alone or belongs to the essence of inference, some remarks will be made later on. But the division into 4 figures and their 19 moods, just as the theory of Conversion, is founded on the grammatical principle of the position of the Middle term in both premises.

¹ Op. cit., I 451.

arguments: We can call it the law of the Reason or of the Sufficient Reason or, as the Buddhists call it, of the Threefold Logical Reason. It is expressed in the hypothetical judgment and means that, being given the reason the consequence necessarily follows, and if the necessary consequence is absent, the reason is also absent. Another name for this law is the law of Position and Contraposition.¹ It corresponds to the *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism. Its canon of rules consists of these three—in subject presence wholly, in similars only, in dissimilars never. This corresponds to the principle *nota notae est nota rei ipsius* and to the *dictum de omni*.² It is equally applicable to both the "great principles" upon which all our arguments are founded, the principle of Identity and the principle of Causation. Indeed, take the Indian type-instance—

If something is a product, it is not eternal, as a jar etc.

If it is eternal, it never is a product, like Space etc.

The sounds are products.

They are not eternal.

Or take the corresponding European type-instance—

If some being is a man, he necessarily is mortal, as this one and that one,

If he is immortal, he cannot be a man, like God.

This one is a man,

He is mortal.

The mathematical deductions reduce to the same form, e. g.,

If something is a straight line, it necessarily is the shortest distance between two points, as this and that straight lines.

If it is not the shortest distance, it is not straight, as the curve etc.

This is a straight line,

It is the shortest distance.

These deductions do not differ in form from the causal one. Indeed, take the Indian type-instance³—

Wheresoever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen etc.

¹ *anvaya-vyatiśeka*

² That these both formulas are the same, has been proved by Kant, cp. *Yon der falschen Spitzfindigkeit*.

³ The hypothetical character of this judgment is expressed in Sanscrit by the words *yatra yatra dhūmah* or *yo yo dhūmavān*, this corresponds to the Latin *quis quis*, cp. Sigwart, I 288.

and one of the moods of the second figure (*Cesare*), the last corresponds to the contraposition of the first. We have already explained that in a contraposition the middle can really exchange its place with the major, because both these forms are two different but equipollent ways of expressing one and the same fact. This double expression is not the result of arbitrarily changing the places of subject and predicate, but they represent the two universal procedures of knowledge, inductive as well as deductive.

The Buddhist theory divides Syllogism and Inference in three kinds according to its content. They are the Analytical, the Causal (=Synthetical) and Negative deduction. From the formal side each of them can be expressed either according to the method of Agreement or according to the method of Difference; the first will be a *modus ponens*, the second a *modus tollens*, of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism.

There are according to Dignāga these two, and only two, figures in Syllogism, accordingly as the major is expressed in the form of a Position or in the form of a Contraposition. Both forms are always possible, they are complementary of one another, they both express the same thing and when the one is expressed the other is implied, even if it is not expressed. They correspond to the second and third rule of the syllogistic canon, viz., the presence of the reason in similar instances only and its absence in dissimilar instances always. Dharmottara says,¹ "The meaning is the aim of the syllogism, the real fact which must be expressed by it, it is the fact concerning which both the syllogisms (of Agreement and of Difference) are drawn. There is no difference whatsoever in the fact which they aim at establishing. Indeed, the aim is to express a logical connection... Although they represent two different methods, they express just the same fact of one logical connection... The expressions differ so far the *prima facie* meaning is concerned, but regarding the aim for which they are used, there is no difference. Indeed, when the direct or positive concomitance has been expressed in the major premise, its contraposition follows by implication... And likewise, when the contraposed concomitance has been expressed, its positive form follows by implication".

only possible by transposing the premises Bain says (op cit, p 140) — "A much greater variation from the standard negative (*Celarent*) is observable here (in *Camestres*). The grounding proposition which must be universal is the minor premise: so that there is an inversion of the normal order of the premises"

¹ NBT., p 48 2 ff; transl, p. 115.

through a superstructure of two necessarily interdependent concepts

4. The fact that Syllogism contains an internal process of inferential cognition is not unknown in European science, but it is treated as an imperfect and incomplete form of what is fully expressed by the formulation in three propositions with an interchangeable position of their subjects and predicates. The Indian Syllogism, on the contrary, being subservient to internal Inference, is a method of formulating in propositions the mutual necessary interdependence of the three terms which therefore have a logically fixed position in corresponding propositions.

5. Although in Aristotle's intention Syllogism is the general form of all Deductions as well as Inductions, it became in the hands of his followers restricted to Deduction alone, and as soon as Induction raised its head in modern times, the position of the Syllogism, restricted to mere deductions, became endangered. By many philosophers it is declared to represent futile scholasticism worthless for the progress of knowledge. On the Indian side Deduction is inseparable from Induction, they mutually contain each the other, the one is the justification of the other. Deduction not preceded by Induction is impossible. Even purely deductive sciences have an inductive foundation like the rest. On the other hand Induction without an application to further particular instances would be quite worthless.

6. There is therefore in the Buddhist Syllogism only two members, an Inductive one and a Deductive one, which correspond to a grounding and an applying march of thought.

7. The Buddhist System contains a Causal Syllogism which in European logic was at first merged in the analytical one and later excluded from the domain of syllogism altogether.

8. The Buddhist System coordinates Causation and Identity (Coincidence) as the two great principles upon which all our arguments and their expression, the syllogisms, are founded.

9. The formal unity of these two great principles is expressed in a Universal law of Sufficient Reason or, as it is called, the Threefold Reason.

In European science the problems of a law of Sufficient Reason, of the analytic and causal relations and the allied problem of the analytic and synthetic judgments are mostly treated outside the theory of syllogism. In India they are its integral parts. The Intellect is but another name for Reason and the Reason is nothing but the Sufficient Reason or the principle representing the formal unity of the two great

in the first. Dharmottara¹ delivers himself on this subject in the following way—"The subject of an inference is a combination of a (singular) part perceived directly and a part not actually perceived... E. g., when it is being deduced that the sound represents an instantaneous Ens, only some particular sound can be directly pointed to, others are not actually perceived". That is to say, that in the above type-instance the term "sound" means "all sounds", "some sounds" and "one sound". But it has no sense to constitute these three possibilities into three different items in a classification, because the difference is unimportant and its distinction a useless subtlety.

Thus it is that the two moods of Dignāga correspond to the first mood of the first figure (*Barbara*) and to the second mood of the second figure (*Cesare*) of the Aristotelean syllogism.

We may now touch upon the question of the comparative value of the statement that there are only two figures of syllogism and the theory which conceals these two real figures in an artificial scheme of 19 moods.

Some writers have assumed that the comparative simplicity of Dignāga's table is a sign of inferiority. Others, on the contrary, have preferred the simple theory to the complicated one. Sigwart² says—"If we reduce the necessary rule according to which a deduction is made (in the first figure) to its corresponding formula, we shall have—if something is M it is P. If we then assume that S is M, the result will be that S is P."

"The same rules, he continues, must underlie the second figure, because there can be no other consequence from the simple relation of concepts. But we conclude here from the absence of the (necessary) consequent to the absence of its (necessary) antecedent". "Therefore, says the same Sigwart,³ the first two figures of Aristotle coincide exactly with what we have stated in a former section", i. e., that the real moods of the syllogism are only two, the *modus ponens* and the *modus tollens*.⁴ "The connection and the difference between the first and the second figure is elicited by the simple fact that in the first we conclude from the validity of the antecedent ground to the validity of its necessary consequence (positive or negative), whereas in the second figure we conclude from the absence of the necessary

¹ NBT, p. 31, 21, transl., p. 89

² Op cit, I 465

³ Op cit, I 466

⁴ Op ibid., p. 465.

CHAPTER V.
LOGICAL FALLACIES.

§ 1. CLASSIFICATION.

Dignāga clearly saw that having established a strict canon of the rules of syllogism, he at the same time has solved the problem of a strict canon of Logical Fallacies. For a fallacy is nothing but the infringement of a rule. If the rules are definite in number and are arranged in systematical order, their infringements must be likewise definite in number and capable of being arranged in systematical unity. The logical import of every proposition is double, it has a positive and an implied negative meaning. A rule always affirms something and at the same time excludes the opposite. Every syllogistic rule condemns a corresponding fallacy.¹

The rules of a logical inference are, we have seen, three

1. The presence of the Reason in the Subject of the conclusion, viz., its necessary presence in the whole compass of the Subject,

2 Its necessary presence in similar instances only, i e., in instances similar by the presence in them of the deduced Predicate,

3 Its necessary absence in *all* dissimilar instances, i e., in instances which are contrary to those in which the deduced property is present.

Now, a fallacious reason will run either against the first or the second or the third rule. But we must distinguish between the fallacies against the first rule and the fallacies against the combined second and third rules. It is indeed impossible to infringe the second rule without, at the same time, infringing the third one. The second and the third rules are only two aspects of one and the same rule.² If the reason is not present in similar instances only, it *eo ipso* is present, either wholly or partially, in dissimilar instances also. We thus will have two main classes of fallacies, the one against the first rule of the syllogistic canon and the other against its combined second and third rules. Reduced to the language of European logic this will mean a class of fallacies against the minor premise and another class

¹ NBT., p. 61 18, transl., p. 171

² NBT., p. 20 5, transl., p. 57

calls the Aristotelian doctrine "false subtlety", and Sigwart falls in line by characterizing it as "superfluous specification". The two figures established by these two leaders of European science are exactly those that are established by Dignāga. "False subtlety" and "superfluous specification" are also found in India and even in a much higher degree than with Aristotle. We have seen that Uddyotakīra, wishing to overdo Dignāga's computation of the nine positions of the Reason between instances Similar and Dissimilar, has adopted the method of superfluous and irrelevant specification and false subtlety. He then easily reached the total number of 2032 middle terms, right and wrong together!

g) The Causal and Hypothetical Syllogisms.

Our arguments, according to Dharmakīrti, are founded upon two great principles, the principle of Identity and the principle of Causation.¹ We speak only of positive arguments, leaving the negative ones for special consideration. The Identity, we have seen, is not the logical identity of two concepts. The Identity which Dharmakīrti has in view is the identity of that reality which underlies two different concepts. These concepts are united by the identity of their objective reference. A conception is not a fiction of pure imagination, but real knowledge only as far as it possesses an objective reference. Dharmakīrti's principle could also be expressed thus — all logical connection of two concepts is founded either upon Identity of their one and the same objective reference, or upon Interdependence of their two different references.

The objective reference of two interdependent concepts can be either the same or, if it is not the same, it must consist of two different, but necessarily interdependent, things. The judgment "*śimśapā* is a tree", or the inference "this is a tree, because it is a *śimśapā*", contains three terms of which the one is the point of reality underlying the two others. There is between the two concepts also a kind of identity, an indirect identity or, as some of the European logicians have preferred to call it, a "partial identity",² in that sense that they are not contradictory, not incompatible. A single reality could not possess at once two incompatible concepts. They are identical in so far they are not incompatible and belong to the same identical thing. The *śimśapā* is necessarily a tree, it cannot be a non-tree, because

¹ *tādātmya-lakṣaṇa*

² Sigwart, op. cit., I 110 ff

the dissimilar ones, or it embraces all the similar as well as the dissimilar ones, or finally it is strictly confined to the mere subject, and is not to be found neither in any similar nor in any dissimilar instance. In the latter case the reason is «exclusive» or «over-narrow»¹ and therefore leads to no consequence. If the reason, on the contrary, embraces all similar as well as all dissimilar instances, it becomes «over-wide» or «too general»² and therefore allows of no conclusion. These two reasons, the «over-wide» and the «over-over-narrow», are evidently of seldom occurrence in practice, but then theoretical importance should not be underestimated, since they clearly indicate the maximum and the minimum limits between which the right reason is to be found. Remain only three uncertain reasons, uncertain in the strictest sense, since the reason overlaps into the forbidden domain of the dissimilar instances, either partially or wholly.³ Thus among all possible nine positions, of the logical reason between instances similar and dissimilar two will be right, two inverted, i. e., contrary to right, two representing the maximum and the minimum limits of comprehension, and the three remaining ones will be overlapping into the forbidden domain and uncertain.

This is represented in Dignāga's table situated on the following page. We indicate in it the presence of the reason in similar instances by the sign S. Three cases are then possible — its presence in all S, its presence in no S (= absence), and its presence in some S. The presence of the reason in dissimilar instances we will indicate by the sign D. Three cases are then possible — its presence in all D, its presence in no D (= absence), and its presence in some D. By combining each of the first set of three positions alternately with each of the set of the second three positions, we shall have a total of nine combinations of the reason's position between instances similar and dissimilar, neither less nor more.

In this table the item «in all S» is found 3 times (in 1, 4 and 7)				
»	»	»	»	» «in no S» " " 3 " (" 2, 5 " 8)
»	»	»	»	» «in some S» " " 3 " (" 3, 6 " 9)
»	»	»	»	» «in all D» " " 3 " (" 1, 2 " 3)
»	»	»	»	» «in no D» " " 3 " (" 4, 5 " 6)
»	»	»	»	» «in some D» " " 3 " (" 7, 8 " 9)

¹ *asādhārṇa-hetv-ābhāsa* = *avyāpaka-anāḥātika*

² *sādhārṇa-anāḥātika* = *atītyāpaka*

³ *asādhā-vyatichin*.

In this sense the logical law of Causation is the reverse of the real law of Causation. A cause is not a reason. The cause is not a sufficient reason for predicating (or predicting) the effect. But the effect is a sufficient reason for affirming apodictically the preceding existence of its cause. In this sense the law of Causation is also a law subaltern to the law of Contradiction in the same degree as the law of Identity. Every thing would not be a thing if it were not the result of some other thing.

It is therefore wrong to coordinate the law of Causation with the law of Contradiction. The latter is a universal law which equally governs all generalities or concepts and all realities or point-instants. But Causality governs the production of point-instants alone.

Sigwart thinks that it was a mistake on the part of Leibniz to coordinate the law of Contradiction and the law of Sufficient Reason as the only two great principles of all our arguments. For, according to him,¹ Leibnizens law of Sufficient Reason is nothing but the law of Causation and it was wrong to coordinate the logical law of Contradiction with the not logical, but real law of Causation.

Now, from Dharmakīrti's standpoint we have a law of Sufficient Reason which is the universal law of all our arguments and of which the two great principles of Identity and Causation are mere specifications. This law is called simply the Reason,² or the law of the Threefold Logical Mark.³ Its formula, we have seen, is 1) in Subject presence wholly, 2) in Similar only, 3) in Dissimilar never. According to its two main figures the law is also called the Law of Position and Contraposition.⁴ Its formula is this that the reason being posited its necessary consequence is likewise posited and in the absence of the necessary consequence the reason is likewise absent.

The Buddhist law of Causation, viewed as Dependent Origination, is expressed in a hypothetical judgment, «this being that appears». The Buddhist law of Sufficient Reason is likewise expressed in

¹ Op cit, I 254 — „Wenn ich den realen Grund einer tatsächlichen Wahrheit (*vérité de fait*) angebe, nenne ich die Ursache. . Ebendaraus erhellt wie wenig Recht man hatte nun daraus ein schlechthin allgemeines logisches Gesetz zu machen, das neben dem Gesetze des Widerspruchs, inbetreff derselben Sätze gälte, welche auch unter dem Gesetze des Widerspruchs stehen, und in dem Leibniz'schen Satze einen logischen Grund zu suchen, der von der realen Ursache verschieden wäre“.

² *hetu* = *gtan-things*.

³ *trirūpa-lnga* = *theul-gsum-rtags*.

⁴ *anvaya-vyatireka*.

Together, 18 items arranged in 9 combinations. Two combinations (No. 4 and 6) represent the reason and consequence situated firmly and travelling regularly on the right rails. All other combinations deviate from the right rails. Two (No. 2 and 8) contain the maximum of deviation, the deviation is catastrophic, it is the inverted reason. Two of them (No. 1 and 5) have a theoretical interest, showing the limits of the overlapping capacity of the reason and in the three remaining ones (No. 3, 7 and 9) the overlapping capacity is normal. In two cases only the concomitance is all right, in seven cases the concomitance is falsified, there is no invariable concomitance. In all these 7 cases the fallacy will be in the major premise. If the reason will be over-wide, over-narrow or overlapping, it will be inconclusive or "uncertain." If it is contrary, it is, although definite, but definite in the undesirable sense, representing the contradictorily opposed part of the right one.

Thus it is that every logical fallacy corresponds to some rule of the syllogistic canon, every fallacy is nothing but the infringement of that rule.¹

It is evident that the same mathematical method could also be applied in respect of the first rule of the syllogistic canon. The reason can be present in the Subject wholly, partially or not at all. Combining each of these three possibilities of reality, resp. unreality, with the nine varieties of consistency, we will get 27 kinds of reason, out of which only four will be right reasons, i. e., real and consistent. By introducing further subtleties the table of reasons could be increased *ad infinitum*.² Some of Dignāga's imitators have indulged in that useless occupation, but he abstained from it. The most useful principle may be reduced *ad absurdum* by senseless exaggeration. Important and useful are only the fundamental distinctions established by Dignāga—a reason is either 1) right, i. e. real and consistent, or 2) it is unreal, or 3) it is inverted, or 4) uncertain, i. e., non-concomitant and inconsistent.

To summarize. An inference, of which the syllogism is but the verbal expression, is a complex relation between three terms. One of them is the substratum or Subject (S). It represents, or contains, a point of ultimate reality to which the superstructure of the two

¹ Cp. NB and NBT, p. 80 §; transl., p. 220.

² Cp. Stasiak, Fallacies and their classification according to the Early Indian Logicians, art. in Rocznik Orientalistyczny, t. VI, pp. 191—198.

the effect, or the major, is deduced¹ The essence of the cause is to produce its effect, just as the essence of a triangle is the cause, or the ground, for having its three angles equal to two right angles²

The conception of Causality as an analytic relation was inherited from Aristotle by the schoolmen and by modern philosophy. It culminated in Spinoza's identification of *causa sive ratio*. Its result has been that the causal syllogism was ignored as a separate variety and neglected as a subordinate species, it did not exist at all. When the analytic theory of causation was destroyed by Hume psychologically and by Kant transcendently, the causal syllogism was nevertheless not acknowledged as a second variety having equal rights with the analytical. Hume denied the necessity and universality of all causal sequences, and Kant, although he established them upon a transcendental basis, identified them with the hypothetical judgment and left the categorical syllogistic form to analytic deductions exclusively.

In connection with Kant's deduction of the category of causation from the hypothetical judgment, it is interesting to note a theory for which Kant himself is not directly responsible, but which is a consequence of his deduction and which deserves to be mentioned in the light of its Indian parallel. According to this theory the relation of Comherence is expressed in the categorical judgment, "all A is B"; but the relation of Causality is expressed in the hypothetical one "if there is A, there necessarily was B". This theory seems to admit that there are only two great principles upon which all our arguments are founded, the principle of Comherence and the principle of Causality. It is then easily shown that the hypothetical form is equally applicable to both, it is not exclusively adapted to the causal relation.³ The universal premise "*omne A est B*" really means that if something is A, it necessarily is B. The necessity of the relation is expressed by the hypothetical form⁴ in this case, just as in the case of causation. The universal premise "A is always produced by B" means that "if there is A, there necessarily preceded some B". With these corrections and additions the theory would correspond to the Indian one. Indeed there is a general law controlling all our

¹ Ibid. p. 246

² Ibid.

³ Op. Sigwart, op cit, p 207, cp also Bain, Logic, I 117; cp. J. S. Mill, Logic I, 92. he seems to have been the first to express the opinion that the hypothetical judgment does not differ very substantially from the categorical one.

⁴ In sanscrit *yo yo dūmarān sa so'gnamān*.

one A fallacy is really produced only when its character is concealed by an obscure phrasing. When the phrasing is elucidated, the crude form of the fallacy appears. A fallacy in which there is absolutely no connection neither between M and S, nor between M and P, a *net-plus ultra* fallacy, is the following one — "all sheep are horses, because they are cows". Such a syllogism has never occurred to anybody, because, as stated by Vācaspati, the human mind has a bias for truth. But celebrated arguments in which there neither is reality nor concomitance, neither any whatsoever tie between M and S, nor any tie between M and P, have been produced in a concealed form.

The following examples will illustrate, in crude form, the instances where either 1) both relations are right, or 2) the reason lacks reality, or 3) there is no concomitance.

1. The subject of discourse (S) is a jar.¹ The logical predicate (P) "a non-eternal Ens". Reason (M) — "because it exists". We shall have the following syllogism:

Whatsoever exists is a non-eternal Ens

The jar exists

It is a non-eternal Ens

Answer — all right!

2. The subject of discourse (S) is a jar. The logical predicate (P) is a "non-Ens". Reason (M) — "because it does not exist". We then shall have the syllogism —

Whatsoever does not exist is not an Ens

The jar does not exist

It is not an Ens

Answer — reason unequal. The fault is in the minor premise, since the jar does exist.

3. The Subject of discourse (S) is a jar. The logical predicate (P) "an eternal Ens". The reason (M) — "because it exists". We then shall have the following syllogism —

Whatsoever exists, is an Eternal Ens

The jar exists

It is an Eternal Ens.

Answer — no concomitance! The major premise is wrong, since there are non-eternal things.

Reduced to a schematized form these relations between S, M and P can be represented thus —

¹ Dignāga's example is "sound".

Where there never is fire, there can be no smoke, as in water etc.

There is here smoke

There is also (or there was) fire.

No formal difference exists between the two sets of instances. Both come under the head of the law of Position and Contraposition or of the threefold logical mark, or of the two moods of the Hypothetical Syllogism.¹ The difference consists only in this, that universality of the causal sequence is not the same as the universality and necessity of a connection founded on Identity. What the Indian solution of this problem is and how far it coincides with the Kantian one has been mentioned in the chapter on Inference.

h) Summary.

In summarizing our comparison of the European, chiefly Greek, and the Indian, chiefly Buddhist, system we find

1. There is in the human intellect a fundamental procedure constituting its very essence, with the investigation of which both the Greek and the Indian science have busied themselves, with a view to a clear definition of its substance and forms. This procedure is Inference or Syllogism. Inference for Buddhists is the same as thought in general, since there are only two sources of knowledge, sensation and inference, the same as the senses and the understanding.

2. On both sides the investigation is conditioned by the general philosophic outlook. The Greek philosopher surveys the world as an ordered system of realized concepts whose total and partial connections and disconnections are laid down in Syllogisms.¹ The Indian philosopher surveys the world as a running stream of point-instants out of which some points are illuminated by stabilized concepts and reached by the striving humanity in their purposive actions.

3. The Greek science defines syllogism as a series of three propositions containing together three terms and capable of yielding 19 different moods of valid judgments according to a change of the grammatical position of these terms in these propositions. The Indian science defines it as a method of cognizing and reaching reality, not directly as in sense-perception, but indirectly

¹ The importance given to of the Hypothetical Syllogism is also an outstanding feature of the logic of the Stoics, cp Paul Barth, *Die Stoa* 2, p. 74.

Not only doubt regarding the reality underlying the inferential judgment makes the Reason Unreal, its established unreality will *a fortiori* convert every reason referred to it into a fallacy of Unreality. E. g., the Soul as a separate spiritual substance is denied by the Buddhists; it is an unreal object. Consequently whatever predicate be connected with it as a reason, will be an unreal reason.

The Vaiśeṣikas, e. g., conceive the Soul of the individual as an ubiquitous substance, unconscious by itself and motionless; motionless because ubiquitous. The feelings, pleasant and unpleasant, although inherent properties of the Soul are not ubiquitous. They appear only in that part of it which coincides with the presence of the body and its internal organ. A special interaction between the internal organ and the Soul produces at a special moment in a definite part of the ubiquitous Soul the feeling of something pleasant or unpleasant. When the body displaces itself, the feelings are accordingly produced in other parts of the motionless Soul of the same individual.

These ideas may be thrown in the form of the following syllogism¹—

Major premise. A substance whose properties can be apprehended anywhere is ubiquitous, like Space.

Minor premise. The Soul is a substance whose properties can be apprehended anywhere.

Conclusion. The Soul is ubiquitous.

The invariable concomitance of the Reason with its Consequence is established beyond any doubt. The major premise is all right. But not the minor. The reasoning lacks reality, because the point of application, the point of reality to which the logical superstructure of two interdependent concepts ought to have been referred is a phantom. The Soul as a separate ubiquitous substance does not exist, at least for the Buddhist. The reasoning therefore represents a fallacy of unreality, a fallacy against the first rule of the Buddhist syllogistic canon.

Although the Soul as a separate substance is, in the opinion of the Buddhist, a non-entity, and every predicate connected with the Soul will be equally unreal, nevertheless it will be "unreal" only when the Soul occupies the position of the minor term, the Subject of the conclusion, because here is the point of contact between logic and reality. If the point of reality, the Substratum or the reality underlying the whole reasoning is absent, the fallacy will be one of unreality. Other syllogisms, in which the Soul will not occupy the place of the

¹ NB and NBT., p. 63 18: transl., p. 178

principles of Identity and Causality. There is no difference between Reason in general and the Syllogistic Reason with its canon of three rules.

10. The second and third of these rules correspond to the *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism. There is therefore only two real syllogistic figures, the positive and the contraposed one. The fundamental principle of all Syllogism is the principle of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism, the principle namely that «the ground is followed by the necessary consequence and the denial of the necessary consequence is logically followed by the denial of the ground».

11 The law of Sufficient Reason, since it is expressed in the canon of the three syllogistic rules is also expressed in the equipollent principle of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism, or in Position and Contraposition. They express the law of logical necessity. The Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism, which in the majority of European logics is treated as an additional, secondary, not genuine syllogistic process, appears in Buddhist logic as its fundamental principle.

There is thus a great difference between the European and the Buddhist syllogistic theory. However both theories are grouping after one and the same central problem, the problem, namely, of the principles of human knowledge. The solution proposed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is, in some respects, nearer to Kant and Sigwart, than to Aristotle.

The opinion of Kant upon the «False Subtlety» of the Aristotelian figures has already been mentioned. But this is not the only point of agreement between the Kantian and the Buddhist theory. The following Kantian ideas must in this connection attract our attention. «To compare a thing with its mark, says Kant, is to judge» «A judgment through an intermediate mark (i. e., through the mark of the mark) is our reason's inference (*Verunft-schluss*)». He then calls attention to the principle of Contraposition and gives to those Syllogisms where the conclusion is arrived at through Position and Contraposition of the major the name of *ratrocinium hybridum*.¹ He then identifies the syllogism of Position with the first Aristotelian figure and the syllogism of Contraposition with its second figure, declaring the rest to be useless and false subtlety. By giving such importance to the fact of Position and Contraposition Kant has virtually (although he does not state it

¹ Cp. *anaya-tyatveka anumānam*.

trees close their leaves at night, but only some special kind of them. It is again a fallacy of the minor premise. No particular judgment is admissible in a correct syllogism. The judgment "some trees close their leaves at night" does not lead to any definite conclusion.

But the contrary may also happen. It may happen that the minor premise will be unreal for that philosopher who himself quotes it. This may happen in those instances when he, albeit he does not accept the opinion of his adversary, nevertheless quotes it in order to extract out of it some advantage for his own theory. This method of taking advantage from a foreign and disbelieved theory is condemned by Dignāga.

The Sāṅkhya philosopher, e.g., holds that all feelings of pleasure and pain are unconscious by themselves, since conscious is only the Soul. But the Soul is changeless and can only illumine, it cannot contain any feelings. The feelings are, for the Sāṅkhya philosopher, evolutes of eternal Matter, and in this sense they are for him eternal,¹ because their stuff is eternal Matter. But in order to prove that they are unconscious, he wishes to take advantage from the Buddhist theory which denies the existence of any enduring substance. Feelings come and go without being inherent in some enduring substance. The Sāṅkhya then argues—if feelings are impermanent, they cannot be self-conscious, because conscious is the eternal substance of the Soul alone.

This method of taking advantage from the theory of an adversary is condemned by Dignāga. It is a fallacy of unreality, since the reason is unreal just for that philosopher himself who nevertheless seeks support from it.

A combined fallacy of unreality and inconsistency is, of course, possible, but in such cases it is usually referred to the Unreal class, because the reality of the reason, its presence in a real Subject, is the first condition to which it must satisfy.²

§ 3. FALLACY OF A CONTRARY REASON.

This is a fallacy of consistency, or of concomitance. The reason, or middle term, is represented as invariably concomitant, not with its natural consequence, but with the inverted consequence, with the

¹ *lārona-avasthāyām nityam*

² Dignāga counts four *asiddhas* *ubhaya*, *anyatara*, *sandigdha* and *ābraya* (*dharma*)-*asiddha*. By subdividing the second and the last *Dharma-kirti* apparently counts six. Cf. *Nyāya-mukha*, p. 14.

therefore establishes the general principle, that the composite exists for the sake of the simple, *ergo* the sense-organs exist for the sake of the Soul. The real character of this argument is concealed by the ambiguity of the term "to exist for the sake" of somebody. As a matter of fact, to exist for the sake of somebody means to affect him directly or indirectly. And to affect him means to produce a change in him. But a change can be produced only in a composite substance, a simple substance cannot change.

Thus it is that the argument of the Sāṅkhya that the sense-organs exist for the sake of the Soul runs against his fundamental principle that the Soul is a simple, uncomposite, unchanging substance.


This variety of a concealed contrary reason is of no unfrequent occurrence in philosophy. It is already established as a special fallacy in the Aphorisms of the Nyāya school. Dignāga admits it as a variety of his contrary reason, but Dharmakīrti refuses to consider it as a special variety.¹ He maintains that it is included in the two varieties of the contrary reason as established by Dignāga, and occupying the positions Nos. 2 and 8 of his Wheel.

§ 4. FALLACY OF AN UNCERTAIN REASON

In Dignāga's Wheel of Logical Reasons the centre is occupied by the reason which possesses the minimum of comprehension.² This reason is ascertained as being present neither in the similar nor in the dissimilar instances. It is continuous with the subject, and therefore inconclusive. It is no reason at all. If we say that the sounds of the Veda are eternal substances because they are audible, the reason audibility will be present in the subject, sound, exclusively; it will be absent in all similar as well as in all dissimilar instances. It will be over-narrow and therefore inconclusive. Its establishment has evidently a merely theoretical importance, when it is stated in such crude un-concealed and pure manner. But it can receive considerable practical importance, just as the "contrary" reason, when it is concealed behind some not sufficiently analysed and unclear concepts or expressions, as will be seen later on. In any case it represents the minimum of conclusiveness, its conclusive force is equal to 0.

¹ NB and NBT., p. 73.8 ff; transl., p. 203 ff

² *asādhāraṇa*.



At the left upper corner of the table of reasons we find the over-wide fallacy. This is a reason which is inconclusive because it is present in all similar as well as in all dissimilar instances. It is uncertain in the same degree as the over-narrow reason. If we say that "the sounds of the Veda are eternal entities, because they are cognizable",¹ the reason cognizability is equally found in eternal entities, like Space, and in the impermanent ones, like jars etc. It is inconclusive because of being over-comprehensive. Its theoretical importance is considerable, as showing the maximum limit of an over-lapping reason, just as the "over-narrow" one shows its minimum limit. In its crude form it could hardly be met with in practice. In a concealed form its occurrence is not only possible, but European philosophy exhibits cases when far-reaching, important conclusions have been drawn from the logical mark of cognizability and a long effort of generations was needed to detect the crude fallacy of the argument.

The second uncertain variety, situated in the under left corner of the table, is produced by a reason which is present in some similar instances, but overlaps into the dissimilar domain and covers it entirely. Dharmakīrti gives the following example² — "The sounds of speech are not produced by a conscious effort, because they are impermanent." The reason impermanence is partially present in the similar cases like lightening which is not a human production. It is absent in the other part of the similar cases, like Space which is also not a human product. On the other hand, this reason of impermanence is present against the third syllogistic rule, in all dissimilar instances, like jars etc. which are human productions and impermanent. Wheresoever there is production by a human effort, the character of impermanence is also present. This fallacy comes very near to the contrary one and will hardly occur in its crude form. However the right mutual position of the three terms of 1) "sounds", 2) "eternity" or "unchanging existence" and 3) "causal production" or changing existence, with its subaltern notion of "voluntary production", will be clearly established only by excluding all those their mutual positions which are not right. Their right logical position can be clearly and definitely established only *per differentiam*. If the logical theory can clearly show what in this case is excluded, only then will it definitely show what is

¹ NB and NBT.

² NB. and NBT, p. 668 ff, transl p 182

other interdependent terms is referred. Of these two, one is the dependent part, and the other the part upon which it necessarily depends. The dependent part, because it is necessarily dependent, possesses the force to convey the presence of the part upon which it depends. The latter is therefore called the logical Consequence, or the logical Predicate or Major Term (P). The dependent part must moreover be present upon the substratum in order to connect the predicate with that substratum. It is therefore the reason or middle term (M) through which P is connected with S. There is thus a double relation between these three terms. M is dependent upon P, universally, necessarily, logically; and M is present upon S wholly and really, as a fact. The presence of M upon S carries as its consequence the presence of P upon S. The form of the Buddhist syllogism as practised in our days in Tibet and Mongolia is the following one —

My S is So and So

My P " " " "

My M " " " "

Is it right or is it wrong? That is to say, is the presence of M on S right or wrong? And is the dependence of M on P right or wrong? If both are right, the reason is conclusive and the syllogism unimpeachable.

If it is wrong, what is wrong? Is the presence of M on S wrong? Or is the necessary dependence of M on P wrong? In the first case the reason will lack Reality, in the second it will lack Consistency.

Thus, three answers are only possible when the validity of a syllogism is tested. The examined pupil will answer either —

1. Reason all right. I accept it! (*h dod = kāmam*).
2. Reason unreal! (*rtags-ma-hgrub = asiddho hetuh*).
3. No concomitance! (*lhyab-pa-ma-lbyun = vyāptir na bhavati*).

The classification is exhaustive. No other answer than these three is possible. That the disputants understand what they say and that the terms used by them are not ambiguous is a self-evident condition.

The fallacy may be concealed under terms unsufficiently clear. It must be analysed and made clear beyond the possibility of doubt. In a crude form a fallacy will never, or very seldom, occur. The human mind, says Vācaspati-miśra, has a natural bias for truth. It will not go astray, if the fallacy is clearly shown to him. For didactical purposes it is therefore useful to practice on propositions which are quite wrong, so strikingly wrong that they will never occur to any

the analogy of atoms we would conclude that sounds are unchanging. On the analogy of motion we would conclude that they are changing. The position of the reason is quite uncertain, the uncertainty is here at its maximum.

The maximum of inconsistency is found in the contrary reason, the maximum of comprehension in the over-wide fallacy, the minimum of comprehension in the over-narrow one, and the maximum of uncertainty in its fourth variety. The easiest and most natural fallacy is found in the third variety.

§ 5. THE ANTINOMICAL FALLACY.

Independently from the 9 positions of the middle term, in respect of instances similar and dissimilar, Dignāga mentions a special fallacy which he refers to the uncertain class, although it has no place in his table. The table is supposed to be exhaustive and its items exclusive of each another. That supplementary reason however, if it is to be inserted in the table, would simultaneously occupy two positions, the positions of the right reason (No 4 or 6) and of the inverted or contrary one (No 2 or 8). For it is right and inverted at the same time, it is counterbalanced. Every uncertain reason contains a fluctuation between two opposite possibilities. The characteristic of such uncertainty is the absence of any decision, the mental attitude is doubt. But when the two opposed solutions are asserted with equal strength, the mental attitude is not doubt, but certainty. There are at once two certainties, both stand, although, on consideration, they ought to exclude one another according to the law of contradiction. The Vaiśeṣikas theory of the reality of Universals and the opposite theory of their unreality are quoted as an instance of antinomy. The problem of the infinity and finiteness of Time and Space, which are formulated already in the earliest records of Buddhism, could perhaps have afforded a better example. Dignāga states that such antinomies are possible predominantly in metaphysics and religion and adds the remark¹ that "in this world the force of direct perception and of authority of scripture is (sometimes) stronger than any argument." Notwithstanding this limitation, Dharmakīrti accuses his Master of having introduced into the domain of logic a translogical element. "The proper domain of inference, says he, is the threefold logical tie, (i. e., the necessary

¹ Nyāya-mukha, p. 85 of Tucci's translation

1. When P is right in respect of S, the answer is: yes!
 2. When P is not right in respect of S, it is asked: why?
 3. When M (the reason) is not right in respect of P, albeit it is right in respect of S, the answer is: no concomitance!
 4. When M (the reason) is not right in respect of S and right (or also unright) in respect of P, the answer is: reason unreal!
- This is only the crude schema, examples will be given in the sequel. Every fallacy is reducible to one of these crude forms.

§ 2 FALLACY AGAINST REALITY (ASIDDHA-HETV-ĀRHĀSA).

What a Fallacy against Reality is, has been stated. We have said, that when the invariable connection of the Reason with the Consequence is established beyond any doubt, but the presence of the Reason in the Subject is either denied altogether or doubted; in other words, when the First Aspect of the Reason is not realized, or the first rule of the syllogistic canon is infringed,—we shall have a logical fallacy of an Unreal Reason.

We have also said that in the phrasing of the European theory this could be called a fallacy of the minor premise. When the presence of the Reason upon the Minor Term is either impossible or doubtful, the conclusion will be a fallacy. The simplest example of such a fallacy will appear, when there is not the slightest doubt of the invariable connection between two facts, but the place to which it must be applied in a given instance is uncertain.

Supposing we hear the cry of a pea-cock.¹ There is no doubt that this cry is the mark of its presence. And there are several caves before us among which the pea-cock is hidden, but we cannot decide in which. The conclusion, which requires certainty, is impossible. Indeed we shall have—

Major premise. Wherever there is a pea-cock's cry, it is present.

Minor premise. The cry comes (probably) from that cave.

Conclusion. The pea-cock is present in that cave (probably).

The conclusion is only probable, it is not certain, and, in this sense, it is a fallacy. It is a fallacy of Unreality. It is not a fallacy of uncertainty. We shall see later on that the name of an Uncertain Reason is restricted to other kinds.

¹ NE and NBT., p. 64 17; transl., p. 177

But logic evidently cannot remain absolutely disinterested before metaphysical and religious problems. Having emphatically closed the very modest entrance which was left for it by Dignāga, Dharmakīrti reintroduces it by a kind of back door in the shape of two additional fallacies which, he thought, could be forced into the accepted scheme. The religious problem of the Omniscient, the mahāyānistic divine Buddha and the counterproblem of the Soul receive each of them from Dharmakīrti an additional item in the final scheme of fallacies.

The problem of the Soul is formulated in the following Syllogism:¹ "The living body possesses a Soul, because it possesses breath and other animal functions". The reason is not unreal, since it is found in the subject. But its concomitance is uncertain. The Realists maintain that the concomitance is proved in a "purely negative" way. Animal functions being admittedly absent in things which possess no Soul, their presence becomes a valid reason for establishing *per differentiam* the presence of a Soul wherever they be present. The treatment of the problem by Dharmakīrti is purely logical. He does not appeal to the Buddhist dogma of Soul denial.² But in logic he does not admit any "purely positive" or "purely negative" reason. He, for the sake of argument, admits that there are similar and dissimilar instances, objects possessing a Soul and objects not possessing it, and that this feature is present somewhere among living and unliving things. But the necessary connection of one class with the presence of the Soul and of the other class with its absence is not established. Both the second and the third rules of the canon are infringed, because, even admitting that the Soul exists somewhere, the presence of the reason in similar instances *only* and its necessary absence in *all* dissimilar instances are uncertain. Therefore the reason is uncertain. "Neither can we affirm on such grounds, says he, the necessary connection of a Soul with a living body, nor can we deny it."³

In connection with the theory of an Omniscient Absolute Being Dharmakīrti has added another fallacy which is slightly distinguished from Dignāga's reason No. 7. It is present in similar instances, but

¹ NB, p. 75 20; transl, p. 208 ff

² Śrīdhara quotes the argument of Dharmakīrti and rejects it, cp. K. kandali, p. 204.3, thus introducing into the Vaiśeṣika system the *śānta-cyavāda*, *hetu* which Praśastapāda ignores, cp. p. 201

³ NB and NBT, p. 79 23, transl, p. 219

minor term, will be regarded from the standpoint of logical consistency without referring to the special theory of the 'Buddhist, Soul-denial. E. g., the inference of the form "the living body possesses a Soul, because it possesses animal functions" will be analysed, as will be shown in the sequel, from the standpoint of pure logic, quite independently from the opinion of the contending parties on its reality or unreality. The fallacy of Unreality is a fallacy concerning the reality or uncertainty of the minor term and of the minor premise.

It is a matter of course that in all public debates, as well as in all ratiocination, the terms used by the contending parties must have a definite and identical meaning. If one party understands a term in one sense and the adversary understands it in another sense, there can be between them no regular *bona fide* debate.

But when one party *bona fide* uses a term in a meaning which is unacceptable for its opponent, it may happen that the deduction will be all right for that party, but unacceptable and unreal for its opponents. E. g., when the Jaina argues¹—

Major premise. An organism which dies when its covering texture is stripped off is a sentient being.

Minor premise. The trees are such organisms.

Conclusion. They are sentient beings.

This argument can be considered as right by the Jaina from his point of view, since he has his own views on what death and a sentient being is. But for the Buddhist the reason will be unreal, because he has other definitions of what death and sentient beings are. According to his views the trees are not the real point where they can be found. The fallacy will be for him a fallacy of unreality, a fallacy of the minor premise. The Buddhist can also object against the major premise, viz. against the rule that "whatsoever dies when its covering texture is stripped off is a sentient being", but that is another question. In the present instance this rule is neither denied nor doubted. But supposing it is all right, its application to trees is impossible from the Buddhist point of view, because the term death has for him a different meaning. Death means for him — cessation of conscious life and this is not really found in trees.

A similar argument of the Jainas,² "the trees sleep because they close their leaves at night" will be denied as unreal, because not all

¹ NB. and NBT, p. 62 13, transl. p. 173.

² NB and NBT., p. 19.7, transl, p. 54

As stated above, these two new varieties of the "uncertain" fallacy introduced by Dharmakīrti in replacement of Dignāga's antinomical fallacy differ from the latter but very slightly. All such fallacies are concerned with metaphysical objects and are problematic for that very reason. They are not strictly logical, because they transfer us beyond the sphere of logic

§ 7. HISTORY

a) Manuals on Dialectics

Logic, the science of truth, in its beginnings in India, is much more concerned about the classification of error than about an investigation of truth. "Manuals on the Respondent's Failures"¹ were apparently in vogue at a date when the theory of the methods of right cognition² was not yet elaborated. The Aphorisms of the Nyāya-school contain such a manual appended to them, which evidently was originally an independent treatise

When the Buddhists in the age of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu took up the study of Logic, they also composed such manuals which did not differ substantially from the one appended to the Nyāya-aphorisms. This manual contains an enumeration of 22 instances where the respondent committing a mistake deserves to be rebuked by his opponent and the contest is then declared lost for him by the presiding judge. The regular debate required the presence of a respondent,³ a questioner or opponent⁴ and an impartial judge⁵ who was also entitled to pass remarks and put questions. The Manual on the Respondent's Failures was evidently a manual for the judge, its composition the result of a long experience in the practice of the art of debating, which resulted in the establishment of a system of type-instances and laws regulating the debate. The shortcomings which can be really or intentionnally imputed to the respondent are the following ones —

- 1) annihilation of one's own thesis (by an unsuitable example),
- 2) shifting to another thesis (during the same debate),
- 3) a contradictory thesis,

¹ *nigraha-sthāna-sūtra*

² *pramāṇa*.

³ *pūrvā-pakṣin*

⁴ *uttara-pakṣin* = *prati-pakṣin* = *pratidāndin*

⁵ *madhyastha* = *prāśnaka* = *sabhyā*

contradictorily opposed part to the natural consequence. In Dignāga's systematical table it occupies the 2-d and 8-th positions. Its importance is chiefly theoretical as showing the maximum of inconsistency which a logical reason may incur. In practice its occurrence in an unconcealed, pure form is hardly possible. The natural «bias of the human mind» for truth and consistency will too strongly revolt against such a «reason». But when concealed behind an uncertain, unclear or unsufficiently digested terminology, it happens frequently that this fallacy is found at the bottom of some specious argumentation. The difference between the position No. 2 and the position No. 8 is that in the first the reason is present in all dissimilar cases and in the second it covers only one part of that forbidden domain. Their common feature is the total absence of the reason in all similar cases, where it ought to have been necessarily present. Such a concealed contrary-reason is founded whenever a philosopher produces an argument which, on analysis, is found to run against the fundamental principles admitted by himself. The unconcealed form of the contrary argument is found in the two following examples.

1. The sounds (of the Veda) are eternal entities,
Because they are produced by causes

-Whatsoever is a product is an eternal entity, like Space.

The reverse of the expressed concomitance is true. Therefore the reason adduced is a reason to the contrary. It occupies the position No. 2 since it is absent in all similar, i. e., eternal objects, like Space etc.; and it is present in all dissimilar, i. e., non-eternal objects, like jars etc.

2. The sounds (of the Veda) are eternal entities,
Because they are produced at will.

Whatsoever is produced by human will is an eternal entity.

This reason is likewise absent in all similar, i. e., eternal objects. But it differs from the former one in that it is present not in the whole forbidden domain of the dissimilar instances, it is present only in some non-eternal things, like jars etc. It is absent in another part of the dissimilar objects, like lightning etc.

An example of a concealed contrary reason is the following one¹. The Sāṅkhya philosopher wishes to establish that the sense-organs are the organs of somebody, viz., the organs of the Soul. The Soul is a simple substance, the sense-organs are composite physical bodies. He

¹ NB and NBT, p. 63 18; transl, p. 175.

matter which does not belong to the province of logic at all.¹ The chapter disappears completely in post-Dignāgan logic.

Just as this chapter, or separate manual, on the Failures of the Respondent, the early literature possessed manuals, or chapters, on the Failures of the Opponent called Wrong Refutations, or Refutations, having the semblance of refutation without the reality. Such refutations are mostly counter-arguments founded on false analogy. E. g., when the respondent asserts that "sound is non-eternal, because it is the effect of some effort, like a jar", the opponent meets him by the counter-argument "sound is eternal, because it is not a body of limited dimensions, like limited Space. Whatsoever is not a body of limited dimensions must be eternal, etc." The Nyāya-aphorisms contain a separate chapter enumerating 24 varieties of such Sophistical Refutations. Vasubandhu likewise composed a manual on them in which he reduced their number. Dignāga has not dropped this chapter altogether, but he has made a further reduction of type-instances to 14 varieties. He nevertheless does not attach much importance to this subject and says that the varieties of such wrong refutations are infinite,² they cannot be digested in any classes. Post-Dignāgan logic likewise drops this chapter altogether. Wrong refutations are wrong syllogisms and are nothing but logical fallacies of which an exhaustive system has been established by Dignāga.

Ambiguous speech, this most prolific source of fallacies and sophisms, is not mentioned neither among the Failures of the Respondent, nor among the methods of wrong Refutation. It is relegated to another chapter where the different types of debate are considered. Three sources of ambiguity are here mentioned Homonymy³ or equivocal words, Amphibolia or equivocal propositions⁴ and metaphors.⁵ Ambiguous speech is used by a dishonest aggressor who aims at being victorious at all cost.

The debate was in India, just as in Ancient Greece, either didactic and *peirastic*,⁶ or dialectical and *sophistic*.⁷ In a *bona fide* debate between two honest debaters or between a teacher and a pupil, in

¹ Cp. N. mukha, transl, p 71.

² N. mukha, transl, p 71

³ *vāl-chala*

⁴ *sāmānya-chala*

⁵ *upacāra-chala*

⁶ *vāda*

⁷ *jalpa-vitandē*

Above and beneath this central fallacy are situated the two right reasons; at the right and at the left side of it the two contrary ones; and at the four corners are situated four «uncertain» reasons. «Certainty is one issue, says Dharmottara,¹ it is the aim of the syllogism which becomes then conclusive. Inconclusive is uncertain. It is a case when neither the conclusion nor its negation can be ascertained, but, on the contrary, the only result is doubt. We call uncertain a reason which makes us fluctuate between a conclusion and its denial».

The common feature of all these uncertain reasons is that the contraposition of the major premise is either wrong or doubtful.² It is an infringement of the third rule of the syllogistic canon. The total absence of the reason in dissimilar instances is either falsified or doubtful. Although the third rule of the syllogistic canon is but another aspect of the second rule, nevertheless it is this aspect of the rule which is directly attended to in all fallacies of uncertainty. It was therefore necessary for Vasubandhu and Dignāga to distinguish between these two rules, just as it was incumbent upon them to make a distinction between the syllogism of Agreement and the syllogism of Difference or between the *modus ponens* and the *modus tollens* of the mixed Hypothetical Syllogism.

The four varieties of the uncertain reason which contain a direct infringement of the third rule of the syllogistic canon are situated, we have said, in the four corners of Dignāga's table. Those two of them which are situated to the left side, in the upper left corner and in the under left corner, have that feature in common that the overlapping reason is present in the whole forbidden field of dissimilar instances. The other two, situated in the right upper and in the right under corners, have a reason which overlaps only a part of the forbidden domain.

If we shall draw across Dignāga's table two diagonal lines, they will cross in the centre occupied by the «over-narrow» reason, and will unite it with all four corners where the four «uncertain reasons» reside. At the same time these diagonal lines will separate the uncertain reasons from the certain ones. The four certain ones are, we have seen, either the two which are certain and right, situated in the upper and in the under centre; and the two which are certain invertedly, they are situated in the left and the right centre. It is indeed a «magical wheel».

¹ NBT, p. 65 18, transl., p. 180.

² *asiddha-vyatirekaṁ, sandigdha-vyatirekaṁ vā*

can always be done. The human mind is always in contradiction with itself, it is intrinsically dialectical. If a realistic philosopher who believes in congruence of logic with objective reality resorts to this kind of negative procedure, he is untrue to himself, his method is dishonest cavil. But for Buddhists reality is something quite different from logic. For a certain class of Buddhists truth consists in the negation of logic. Truth according to the conviction of these men will emerge from the destruction of all logic. This truth is the world of the mystic. It is cognized by the logical Method of Residues,¹ as a residue from the destruction of logic, it is translogical. The school of the Mādhyamikas identified itself with this method. Candrakīrti delivers himself in the following way²—

“It is indeed a general rule that the opponent should be at length induced to agree with that very line of argument which the respondent himself has set forth in order to prove his thesis. But (the case of the Mādhyamika is quite different) He does not vindicate any assertion in order to convince his opponent. He has no *bona fide* reasons and examples (of which he himself is convinced). He sets forth a (contra)-thesis of his own, and undertakes to prove it only so far it runs parallel and destroys the argument of his opponent. He thus brings assertions that cannot be proved. He is in conflict even with himself. He certainly cannot convince his opponent (of this imagined thesis). But can there be a more eloquent refutation of an opponent than the proof that he is not capable of establishing his own thesis? Is there really any necessity to produce any further argument?”

Every syllogism according to this school³ is a fallacy, because it entails a contradictory syllogism, called “entailed inference, or counter-syllogism,”⁴ of the same force. The school received from this feature its second name as a school of the counter-syllogism (*Prāsangika*).

Buddhist Monism was thus established in the school of the Extreme Relativists (Mādhyamika-Prāsangika) not on logical grounds, but on a wholesale destruction of all logic. However this utter disregard for logic soon gave way to another attitude in the same school. A new branch of it was founded by Bhavya, (Bhāva-viveka), who

¹ *pārisāsyāt*, cp. Tātp, p. 226

² Cp. my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 95

³ As mentioned above p. 29, the later Vedāntins have made this method their own. Śrīharsa bluntly calls himself a *vaitāṇḍika* and says that the Mādhyamika method cannot be upset by logic.

⁴ *prasaṅga-anumāna*

included. If we make the same transpositions with the three terms of the Aristotelian example, «Socrates is mortal, because he is a man», if we try every kind of position for the three terms Socrates, mortal and man, in order to exclude the fallacious positions, we will have a corresponding fallacy of the second uncertain reason in the following form «Socrates is not a man, because he is mortal». Such a reason is very near to the contrary one. The reason mortality covers the whole field of dissimilar cases, since all men are not immortal, but mortal. However it is not a contrary-reason, because it is present in a part of the similar cases also. Mortality is present among non-human beings, just as it is, present in mankind.

The third variety of the uncertain reason, the one situated in the table at the right upper corner, consists in its presence in the entire domain of the similar instances and its partial overlapping into the contrary domain of dissimilar instances. This fallacy is the nearest to the right reason. It is of the most frequent occurrence. It is mostly a result of an illicit contraposition. If all things produced by an effort are impermanent, it does not follow that all impermanent things are produced by an effort. If smoke is always produced by fire, it does not follow that fire always produces smoke. If all men are mortal, it does not follow that all mortal beings are men. This fallacy has been taken notice of by Aristotle and christened as the fallacy of inverted order (*Fallaciâ Consequentis*), that is of an illicit conversion between the reason and its logical consequence. Its full importance and meaning, of course, becomes clearly elicited when its position among the nine other positions, i. e., in the whole system of all possible positions of the reason, is clearly shown in a table.

The fourth fallacy of an uncertain reason, the one occupying the under corner to the right in Dignāga's table, consists in its partial presence on both sides, in one part of the similar as well as in one part of the dissimilar instances. Dignāga gives the following example¹—«the sounds of speech are eternal entities, because they are not bodies». A body is a physical entity of limited dimensions. In the similar field, among eternal entities, we find the eternal atoms of the Vaiṣeṣikas which are bodies and are eternal. But we also find Space which is eternal and not a body of limited dimensions. In the dissimilar field of non-eternal, changing entities we find jars etc. which are bodies, and we find motion which is not a body. On

¹ NB and NBT, p. 86. 12, transl, p. 188.

tell, since there is no old commentary available, but we can guess with great probability from their names that these fallacies corresponded to the two main classes of Dignāga, the Unreal and the Uncertain one. In this point, as well as in some others, the Vaiśeṣikas, notwithstanding their realism, seem to have been the precursors of the Buddhist reform.¹ Whether this or some other reasons encouraged Praśastapāda to read into the text of Kanāda the full blown syllogistic theory of Dignāga without, of course, its epistemological foundation it is difficult for us to decide.² He begins by enunciating the exact Buddhist canon of the three syllogistic rules and by stating that the violation of one of these rules, or of a pair of them, produces a "non-reason" which will be either unreal or uncertain or contrary. He bluntly asserts that this doctrine belongs to Kākyapa, i e, to Kanāda himself, although nothing but the double division of fallacies (in unreal and uncertain) can be detected in them as partly similar

¹ The VS, II 2 22 contains moreover a definition of an uncertain reason which in its substance coincides with Dignāga's definition of uncertainty as presence both in the similar (*śūlyagādīya*) and dissimilar (*arthāntara-bhūth*) instances Praśastapāda, p 289 14, mentions this sūtra in connection with the varieties of fallacies

² The dependence of Praśastapāda upon Dignāga has been established in my paper *Rapports entre la théorie bouddhique de la connaissance et l'enseignement des autres écoles de philosophie de l'Inde* (Museum, V, p. 129 ff) He has borrowed from Dignāga 1) the division of *anumāna* in *svārtha* and *parārtha*, 2) the *śatrūpa-linga*, 3) the 4 inadmissible theses, 4) the fallacious examples, 5) the three classes of fallacies which he rearranged in four classes by adding the hybrid class of *anādhyavasāya*. — Prof H N Randle (Ind Logic, p 81) ascribes to me an opinion which I have never expressed, at least in the form in which he puts it, viz, «that Dignāga's logic is derived through Vasubandhu from Praśastapāda». Neither have I ever assumed that «there was no development in the Vaiśeṣika school between the Sūtra and Praśastapāda». We now know that the *śatrūpya* theory was already contained in Vasubandhu's works. It is true, I have pointed to some suspicious similarities between Vasubandhu and Praśastapāda, as well as to some affinities between Buddhists, especially of the Vātsīputīya school and the Vaiśeṣikas. We cannot here deny the possibility of mutual influencing and borrowing at an early date. But the developed *śatrūpya* theory is essentially Buddhist. Its aim is the establishment of necessary inseparable connection, which the Realists deny. The relation of logical necessity (*niśāyā*) to transcendental reality (*paramārtha-set*), is involved. This was perfectly understood by the Realists Vācaspati, NYT, p 127, introduces the Buddhist theory by quoting Dignāga who says that a logic (*anumāna-anumeya-bhāra*) is a part from reality (*na sad-asad-apeksate*). That is also the reason why Uddyotakara attacks *śatrūpya* so vehemently. He hardly would have displayed so much animosity against a Vaiśeṣika or a Sāṅkhya theory.

presence of the reason upon the subject, its necessary presence in similar and absolute absence in all dissimilar instances). This threefold logical connection, as far as it is established by positive facts... produces inference. Therefore we call it the domain of inference.. Since real inference alone is our subject matter, we cannot deal with a reason which is at once right and wrong... A double reason which is right and contradictory is not something established on real facts». ¹ Since inference is founded on the three laws of Identity, Causality and Negation only, he then continues — «therefore in order that there should be a real contradiction, the effect must exist altogether without its real cause, or a property must exist somewhere beyond the concept under which it is contained. Negation then should also be something different from what has been established by us». These three relations — and there are no others — afford no opportunity for contradiction or antinomy. «When the argument is founded on the properly observed real condition of real things... there is no room for antinomy». ² In the dialectic syllogism which borrows its principles from dogmatic beliefs of some sort and does not deduce its conclusion from principles obtained by Induction, such fallacies are possible. Therefore the antinomical argument must be distinguished from the real or demonstrative syllogism.

§ 6. DHARMAKĪRTI'S ADDITIONS.

The opposition of Dharmakīrti against the antinomical reason is remarkable. As a matter of fact Dignāga does not seem to insist upon this kind of fallacy and does not differ substantially from Dharmakīrti's estimate of it. But the latter, seized this opportunity to insist on the strict correspondence between the canon of syllogistic rules and the varieties of fallacy. «There are only three kinds of fallacy, says he, the Unreal, the Contrary and the Uncertain. They are respectively produced when either one rule singly or a pair of them simultaneously are either wrong or uncertain». «Respectively, says Dharmottara, means that each fallacy is determined by the unreality or the doubt which is inherent in the unreality or the doubt concerning the corresponding rule». ³ The antinomic or counterbalanced fallacy being outside this scheme is repudiated.

¹ NBT, p. 80, 21 ff., transl. p. 221.

² Ibid., transl. p. 222.

³ NB, p. 80, 6; transl. p. 220.

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one another, doubt arises and the reason is uncertain. But we will prove that such a reason is "null and void",¹ just as the "over-narrow",² reason. *Praśastapāda* apparently thinks that when two reasons are mutually destructive, they may be reasons if considered singly,³ but they are "non-reasons" if they combine in one subject, since their combination is found in the subject only. There are neither similar nor dissimilar instances where this combination could be met with.⁴ This forcible and artificial interpretation *Praśastapāda* puts in an aphorism of *Kanāda* which has nothing to do with it. The domain assigned by *Dignāga* to antinomical reasoning are metaphysical and religious problems. They are translogical and always uncertain. Both contradictory reasons have equal strength, a decision is impossible. But for *Praśastapāda* contrary to religion means contrary to truth. He therefore divides *Dignāga*'s antinomical reason in two halves. The one he refers to the "contrary" class and the other to the "null and void" class. In the domain of religion an argument contradicting an established dogma is a fallacy. It is repudiated and referred to the "contrary" class, the class containing fallacy at its maximum. But in profane metaphysics when two conflicting arguments have equal strength they nullify the reasoning and must be referred, together with the "over-narrow" class, to the "null and void" variety.⁵

¹ *anādhyavasita*

² *asādhārana*

³ The real ground why these two disparate reasons are thrown into the same bag in order to form a class of hybrid descent may, however, be another one, cp. the second note below.

⁴ VS, III 1 14, cp. *Praśastap*, p 239 18

⁵ It is clear from *Nyāya-mukha*, transl pp 31—34, that some opponents of *Dignāga* excluded the *asādhārana* (which is in the Wheel) and the *vraddha-avyabhicārīn* (which is not in the Wheel, or must occupy in it simultaneously the positions Nos 2 and 4) from the number of six *anavikāntika*'s, thus reducing their number to four items situated at the four corners of the table (Nos 1, 3, 7 and 9). They thus threw the *asādhārana* and the *vraddha-avyabhicārīn* into the same bag as "non-reasons", as not even inconclusive reasons. This is exactly what *Praśastapāda* is doing in referring them both to the "null and void" (*anādhyavasita*) class. Does that mean that *Dignāga* in this passage combats *Praśastapāda* or some of his predecessors? In the first case the passage would be a confirmation of Faddeson's and my hypothesis that both these authors were contemporaries, cp the "Nachtrag to the German transl of my Erkenntnistheorie u Logik (München, 1920). Tucci (Buddhist Logic before *Dignāga*, p 468) thinks that *Praśastapāda* borrowed from some predecessor of *Dignāga*, but he seems to have changed his opinion, cp *Nyāya-mukha*, transl, p 31, 68.

its absence in dissimilar ones is uncertain.¹ In the preceding fallacy there was uncertainty regarding both the 2-d and the 3-d rule of the canon. In the present one the 2-d rule is not infringed, but the third contains a problem that cannot be solved. The formulation is the following one: «Some human being is non-omniscient, because he possesses the faculty of speech and other (attributes of a human being)». The presence of the faculty of speech in that human being is ascertained. The first rule is realized. The reason is not «unreal». Its presence in similar instances, i e, in non-omniscient ordinary people, is also ascertained. The 2-d rule is thus realized. But its absence in the dissimilar instances, i e, the absence of the faculty of speech in omniscient beings, remains for ever a problem, since an omniscient being is a metaphysical and translogical entity. We cannot with certainty maintain that he does not exist altogether, because a negative judgment depends on experience. It is no use to deny a thing that never has been experienced. The denial will be void of any sense, as will be shown in the section on the negative judgment. Since the 3-d rule of the canon is thus infringed, the reason is uncertain. The origin of the example is probably due to the consideration that Absolute Reality, being something unutterable, the Omniscient Being will not express it in human language which is fitted to express only the general and vague notions constructed by imagination.² It coincides with the idea expressed by Dharmakīrti in other works,³ the idea namely that we can neither cognize nor express omniscience. The Omniscient Being just as the Absolute Truth or Ultimate Reality is unutterable because incognizable, and every predicate referred to it, whether positive or negative, will remain problematic and uncertain. The formulation of the example may be due to purely formal combinations of three notions in different arrangements. It is not impossible that this example, just as the foregoing one, contain a point against the Naiyāyika theory of a purely negative reason. Since all ordinary people are non-omniscient, the non-ordinary being must be omniscient. This deduction is rejected on the score that omniscience and speech are not contradictorily opposed. The presence of one of these attributes does not justify the conclusion denying the presence of the other.⁴

¹ NB and NBT, p. 66 16 ff: transl, p 184 ff.

² Cp NK, p 112 24—*upadeśo... buddhādātām sarvajñatā-abhāva-sādhanam*.

³ Cp the concluding passage of *Santīnāntara-siddhi*, p 49 of my Russian translation

⁴ NB and NBT, p. 71.1 ff. transl, p. 198

these realistic schools are doing the same thing, they borrow without acknowledging. But the Vaiśeṣikas are reticent and polite, the Naiyāyikas, on the contrary, are clamorous and abusive. Uddyotakara rejects Dignāga's theory of the Three Aspects of the Logical Mark. He vehemently assails its phrasing as well as its substance. He says the theory looks as if it were formulated by a fool. According to him the logical mark is not at all bound to have always three aspects. Some valid conclusions can be drawn from positive examples alone, the negative being absent. Other conclusions need only negative examples, the positive being lacking. This means supplementing Dignāga's reason which always has examples positive and negative (it always has them because both sides mutually imply one another), by two other classes, the one with merely positive examples, the other with merely negative ones. Indeed Uddyotakara is the originator of the Naiyāyika division of logical reasons in purely positive, purely negative and hybrid, positive-negative. His vehement assault thus results in a tacit acceptance of Dignāga's scheme with the addition of the purely-positive and purely-negative reasons.

However when the author of the Uddyota faces the problem of logical fallacies, he again makes a show of rejecting Dignāga's principle of classification, but in reality he surreptitiously and with additions introduces it into his own system.¹

Vātsyāyana comments upon a fivefold division of fallacious reasons established in the aphorisms of Gotama — the uncertain,² the

¹ To the 9 positions of Dignāga among similars and dissimilars, Uddyotakara adds 1) five positions with no dissimilars at all, 2) three positions with no similars at all, 3) one position where both the similars and the dissimilars are absent, since the subject embraces the sum-total of existing things (as in the pattern *sarvam-antīyam līlālatīāṭī*, the subject embraces everything existing, there neither are similars nor dissimilars). This makes together 16 varieties of concomitance. Multiplying it by three varieties of the minor premise (in subject wholly, in subject partly, in subject absence) we shall have 48 varieties. Now in every one of these 48 varieties the reason can be either true (*siddha*) or untrue (*asiddha*), either relevant (*samartha*) or irrelevant (*asamartha*). By taking from the 48 varieties the first two sets of 16 varieties and by multiplying them by 4 we shall arrive at the number of $64 + 64 = 128$, and adding to them the 48 original varieties with unqualified reasons, we shall get the number 176. But that is only the beginning of the play. By introducing further differentiations we arrive at the final number of 2032 reasons.

² *savyabhicāra*, NS, I 2 5, is by the meaning of its name and by its substance the same as *anākāntīla*. It is a fallacy of concomitance (*vyāptir na bhavati*).

- 4) abandoning one's own thesis,
- 5—6) changing the reason or the topic,
- 7—10) a meaningless, unintelligible, incoherent or inopportune argument,
- 11—12) insufficiency or redundancy in expression,
- 13) repetition,
- 14) silence,
- 15) confession of ignorance,
- 16) failing to understand (the question),
- 17) stopping the debate under the pretext of going to attend another business when seeing that the defeat is inevitable,
- 18) (indirect) admission of a charge,
- 19—20) neglecting to rebuke the questioner when it is necessary or doing so when it is not necessary,
- 21) not keeping faithfully to one's own principles,
- 22) fallacious logical reasons.

The position of the last item is remarkable. It does not seem to be the principle shortcoming, but its fate has been to oust and supersede all the others. Moreover it is repeated in another place of the same Nyāya-aphorisms where in connection with the theory of the syllogism five varieties of a fallacious logical reasons are established.¹ This is an indirect proof of the hybrid origin of the treatise known under the name of the Nyāya-aphorisms. Its composition evidently belongs to that period in the development of Indian logic when the importance of a clear theory of the syllogism begins to dawn. The earliest commentator Vātsyāyana already characterizes syllogism as true logic, the tip-top of logical science.² The right application of the *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*, he says, is the characteristic feature of a first class scholar.³

Nevertheless the part devoted to inference and syllogism in the Nyāya-aphorisms is meagre as compared with the chapters on dialectical failures which, in compliance with tradition, are treated in detail. Vasubandhu, it seems, composed a manual on the Respondent's Failures, but Dignāga resolved to drop the corresponding chapter altogether, on the score that it includes either such points which must be formulated in a refutative syllogism or quite irrelevant

¹ NS, I. 2. 4

² *paramo nyāyaḥ* NBh, p. 5. 5.

³ *paññita-rūpa*. ibid. p. 48. 7.

naive reader by an exhibition of extraordinary cleverness. Dignāga has established according to a mathematical principle 9 positions of the reason «Well nigh, I will establish mathematically 2032 positions!» But he confesses that this number is unimportant, it is a mere modification of the fundamental number. Important is, on the contrary, the principle that the purely logical fallacies must exist in a fixed number and are capable of being arranged in a systematical table. This fundamental idea is borrowed by Uddyotakara from Dignāga and the figure of 176 or 2032 is nothing but an artificial derivative and amplified, bluffing form of Dignāga's 9 items. Uddyotakara admits 1) that a purely logical fallacy is produced by the overlapping of the middle term in the forbidden domain of dissimilar instances, when the overlapping is complete, the reason becomes contrary, 2) that the possible positions of the middle term regarding the instances similar and dissimilar can be mathematically computed, and 3) that the number of fallacies thus arrived at must agree with the number of syllogistic rules determining the position of the reason between these similar and dissimilar instances. In the Buddhist system the rules are three and the classes of fallacies also three. Uddyotakara was not free to change the number of five classes of fallacies, since this number was consecrated by the authority of Gotama and Vātsyāyana, but he changed completely their interpretation and constructed in accordance with this new interpretation the number of five rules instead of three. The proportion between the number of injunctions and the number of prohibitions was thus saved. The five rules are the following ones:

- 1) presence in the subject,
- 2) presence in similar instances,
- 3) absence from dissimilar instances,
- 4) being non-antinomic,
- 5) being not repudiated (from the start)

The first three rules coincide with the Buddhist canon, the fourth is constructed in accordance with Dignāga's «antinomical» reason and the fifth replaces his fallacious theses, which are dropped as theses, but introduced as reasons, according to the new principle that every fallacy is a fallacy of the reason. The corresponding five classes of fallacious reasons are 1) the uncertain, corresponding to Dignāga's uncertain, 2) the contrary corresponding to Dignāga's contrary, 3) the unical corresponding to Dignāga's unical, 4) the antinomic corresponding to the same of Dignāga, 5) the «repudiated» corresponding to the four impossible theses of Dignāga.

the presence of impartial judges, a thesis and a contra-thesis must be defended only by honest means, by facts and hypotheses.¹ But in a dialectical or sophistic debate the opponent eager for victory at all cost does not care for truth at all and has recourse to ambiguous speech, false refutations and false accusations² with the only object of imposing upon the audience and attaining victory. Ambiguity, sophistical accusations and sophistical refutations were also allowed to the *bona fide* debators, but not as a principle method of proof. If he had succeeded in establishing his own thesis by facts and sound hypotheses, but was nevertheless assailed by dishonest aggressors, he was allowed to answer in the same spirit, not indeed in order to prove what has already been established in a normal way, but to protect truth against aggression and to exhibit the manly of the latter. Just as seeds are protected from birds by a layer of thorny twigs, just so is the honest debator allowed to use the thorny arguments of sophistry in order to dispel the semblance of victory on the part of an unscrupulous sophist

b) The refutative syllogism of the Mādhyamikas

Thus the dialectic debate which Dignāga found current in India allowed the use of ambiguity, unreal accusations and unreal refutations, albeit not for the final and peremptory establishment of truth, but for its test and defense against sophistic aggressors. The dialectic procedure is from its beginning intrinsically contentious. It is permissible to make use of sophistry against the Sophist. There are however two different kinds of sophistical debate. Their common feature is ultimate disregard for logic and eagerness to gain victory at all cost. But in doing so the one sophist proposes to defend a real thesis while defending a semblance of it by dishonest means. The other proposes openly not to defend any real thesis at all, he simply undertakes it to destroy whatever argument be advanced against him. He is honest in a way, because he does not behave in logic altogether. Sophistry then ceases to be sophistry, because its most characteristic feature, dishonesty of purpose and of expedients, is absent. The object of a dialectical discussion is to convict an opponent of inconsistency. The assailant has gained his point if he can reduce the defendant to the necessity of contradicting himself. This according to a class of philosophers

¹ *pramāṇa-tārka*

² *chala-jāti-nigrahasthāna*

illogical and new arrangements have been proposed, nevertheless his enumeration has not been materially increased.¹ Archbishop Whately who has done his best to improve it by an arrangement more logical, is led to confess that «it must be often a matter of doubt, or rather of arbitrary choice, not only to which genus each kind of fallacy should be referred, but even to which kind to refer any individual fallacy». Nay Aristotle himself, after having distinguished and classified Fallacies under thirteen distinct heads, proceeds to show that they are all reducible to one of them the *Ignoratio Elenchi*—the misconception or neglect of the conditions of a good *Elenchus*. The *Elenchus* is nothing but a counter-syllogism advanced against some given proposition.² Every fallacy, whatever it be, transgresses or fails to satisfy the canons or conditions which go to constitute a valid *Elenchus*, or a valid Syllogism. The rules of a valid counter-syllogism are just the same as the rules of a valid syllogism. The natural consequence of that confession would have been to admit that there must be just as many kinds of fallacies as there are kinds of rules. This is, we have seen, the Indian view. Since the attention is here directed not to the propositions, but to the three terms and, most of all, to the middle term or Reason, a logical fallacy is defined as the violation either of one of the three rules of the Logical Reason singly, or of a pair of them together. All other fallacies which are not infringements of some rule of the syllogistic canon may be infinite, they are not logical fallacies in the strict sense of the word. Dharmottara indeed in dealing with each of the rules of the canon takes care to indicate the corresponding errors which are excluded by it.³ In introducing the chapter on Logical Fallacies he says,⁴ «If someone wishes to formulate in speech (a case under the canon of the rules of Syllogism, i. e.,) the Three Aspects of the Logical Reason, he should do it with precision, and precision is attained when the negative counterpart (of every rule) is likewise stated. When we know what is to be excluded, we then have a better knowledge of what is to be accepted». Syllogism is the verbal expression of a fact under the three rules of the Logical Reason. If one of the rules singly or two of them conjointly are violated, we shall have a logical fallacy.

¹ Bain, *op. cit.*, I. 278.

² Grote, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

³ KBT., p. 19 6, 19 8, 19.10 etc.; transl., p. 53, 54 etc.

⁴ KBT., p. 61. 18 ff; transl., p. 171.

maintained that it was impossible to escape from logical methods altogether. Even if you intend to establish that all syllogisms are fallacies you must do it by a sound argument thrown into the form of a correct syllogism.¹ In distinction from the school of the Counter-syllogism the new school was called a school of the Independent Syllogism.² Asanga was the first to introduce dialectic and logic among the subjects studied by a Bodhisattva, without forsaking the principles of Monism,³ and Vasubandhu followed by taking up the study of dialectic according to the Nyāya system. He thus initiated that reform which was brought to its full development by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

What the system of logical fallacies established by Vasubandhu has been, we do not know precisely. But since the canon of syllogistic rules has been established by him, and since Dignāga's system of fallacies is established in strict correspondence with this canon, and since we already find the main items of this system in the Vaiśeṣika school, we may presume that Vasubandhu's system was probably either the same or slightly different from the one of Dignāga.

Dignāga's system influenced the teaching of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya schools and we will now proceed to examine that influence on their doctrine of logical fallacies

c) The Vaiśeṣika system influenced by the Buddhists

The Aphorisms of Kanāda do not concern themselves about the rules of debate and dialectic. But they contain a definition of inference,⁴ an enumeration of relations upon which inference is founded⁵ and the statement that the connection of the Logical Reason (with the Subject and Logical Consequence) must be "well known", i. e. definitely established.⁶ If it is not definitely established, it is a non-reason,⁷ or a Logical Fallacy. Fallacious reasons, they then proceed to state, are "either unreal or uncertain".⁸ What the precise implications of these terms were at the time of Kanāda we are not able to

¹ *śāntāntra-anumāna*

² *śāntāntrika*.

³ Cp. Obermiller's translation of the *Uttaratantra* of Maitreya-Asanga

⁴ VS., IX. 1 1

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, III. 1 13

⁷ *Ibid.*, III. 1 14

⁸ *Ibid.*, III. 1 15.

non-linguistic, *extra Dictione*, but only three of them are logical in the strict sense of the term,¹ the rest are psychological or material.

Archbishop Whately divides Fallacies into Logical and Non-Logical. But, strangely enough, his logical class includes, under the title of semi-logical, all Aristotelean linguistic fallacies, such as Equivocation, Amphibolia, etc. As to his non-logical kinds it is clear from the title that they are not logical. Whately refers to it all cases of begging the conclusion (*petitio principii*) and of shirking the question (*ignoratio elenchi*). These are indeed not logical fallacies, i.e., they are not failures in the position of the middle term in regard of the major and in regard of the minor. They are failures to have three clearly determined terms. In the *petitio principii* there is no major term at all, since it reciprocates with the middle. In the *ignoratio elenchi* the middle term is not fixed.

There is however some seed of truth in Whately's division, if we understand it as meaning that the fallacies may be divided into two main classes, the uncertain and the unreal. The first alone will be strictly logical and refer to failures in the major premise. The second will be material or semi-logical, and will refer to the failures against the minor premise. It is nearly the same principle as appears in the Vaiśeṣika sūtras² and is the foundation of Dignāga's system. It has the great merit of drawing a hard and fast line between the natural mistakes of the human mind and the purposeful cavil of the sophist. There was apparently some similarity in conditions which prevailed in ancient Greece and in ancient India in so far they engendered in both countries the prosperity of the professional debater. In both countries public debating was very much in vogue and this feature of public life has produced a class of professional debaters who for pecuniary profit³ exploited the natural liability of the human mind to be baffled by unscrupulous sophistry. The human mind, says Vācaspati Miśra,⁴ has a natural bias for truth. But, at the same time, error is rampant⁵ in it. When sham learning⁶ seeks to inculcate sophisms⁷ for the sake

¹ *Fallacia Accidentis, Fallacia Consequentis, Fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.*

² VS., III. 1.15—*asau sandigdhas ca.*

³ NV, p. 15 2—*lābha-piṇḍa-lābhāt-lāma.*

⁴ NK, p. 151 15—*buddher bhūtārtha-palapaṭāḥ*

⁵ NV, 21. 21—*purusa-dharma eva bhrañtār ita = errare est humanum*

⁶ *paṇḍita-vyākhyāna*, NYTT, p. 29 7

⁷ *śrītha-pratirūpakāḥ pravādaḥ*, NV, p. 15 2

to the Buddhist scheme.¹ He then supplements this double division by two other classes which correspond to Dignāga's «contrary» and «antinomic» fallacies. In order to ascribe this innovation likewise to Kanāda he performs a surgical operation² in the text of the aphorisms and artificially constructs in them four classes instead of the two which are actually to be found. He thus adds to the unreal and uncertain reason the contrary one and the «null and void» reason. The «contrary» reason is an inverted reason, it proves the contradictorily opposed fact with respect to the fact it was intended to establish. It is a fallacy at its maximum, e. g., «this is a horse, because it has horns» instead of «this is not a horse, because it has horns». The «null and void» reason is of a hybrid descent. It includes, first of all, Dignāga's «over-narrow» fallacy, the fallacy of the type «sound is non-eternal (or eternal), because it is audible». This reason, we have seen, occupies in Dignāga's table the central position (No. 5) as the limit or the null point of deductive force³. With this poorest shape of all reasons Praśastapāda identifies the antinomical reason which Dignāga refers to the «uncertain» class.⁴ There are some philosophers, says Praśastapāda,⁵ (and Dignāga is evidently aimed at), who maintain that when two reasons (of equal strength) contradict

¹ It is striking that Praśasta after having perverted sūtras III. 1. 14—15 justifies himself in saying, p 204, that thus the Sūtrakāra will have the same system of fallacies as Kāśyapa (*etad eva āha*). But he does not care at all to connect the *trairūpya* with some sūtra. The position is such that the *trairūpya* is derived entirely from Kāśyapa, but his system of fallacies can be found also in the sūtras, if an alteration is introduced. Who is this mysterious Kāśyapa? After all is it not Dignāga or Vasubandhu?

² This operation which is very much in vogue among grammarians is technically called *yoga-tibhāna*, it consists in artificially either uniting two sūtras into one or dividing one into two and thus creating a new sense. By uniting VS, III 1 14 with the following sūtra the sense is created that the *anapadeśa* (= *ahetu*) is either *aprasiddha* or *asen* or *sandigdha*, cp Praśast, p 204. 26. By interpreting *aprasiddha* as meaning *iruddha* we have Dignāga's threefold division. But p. 298 9 ff Praśasta adds a fourth class which includes Dignāga's *asādhārana* and *iruddha-avyabhicāri* and is called by him *anadhyarasta*. This term we can translate as «null and void», since *adhyatascārya* means judgment, *anadhyarasta* is «non-judging». Cp on this point Jacob, Ind. Logik, p 481, Keith, Ind. Logic, p. 183, 189, Faddeson, Vaiśeṣ. syst., p 302.

³ On the reasons which compelled Dignāga to include it cp Nyāya-mukha, transl., p. 33.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 81, 85, 60.

⁵ p 289.

the real connection, but it cannot in the natural run do both, represent it rightly and wrongly together. Therefore there can be no actually antinomical Fallacy.

It remains for us to consider in detail the correspondence between the Aristotelian and the Indian classes of Fallacies. But at first we must consider those instances when a valid Aristotelian Syllogism would be viewed as a fallacy by Dignāga. E. g., the Syllogism "Socrates is poor, Socrates is wise, *ergo* some poor men are wise" would be a valid syllogism according to the third figure. There are three propositions, three terms, and the middle term is distributed in both premises. But for Dignāga the judgment "some poor men are wise" is not an inferential judgment at all. All that it could be is an perceptual judgment, a judgment of observation. For what is inference? It is a fact of necessary and universal dependence of one term upon the other and the necessary compresence of both these terms conjointly upon a place. Now, if the syllogism had the following form "Whosoever is wise is always poor, Socrates is wise, he necessarily must be poor"—this would be in its form a real, i. e., necessary deduction. But stated in that form its fallacy becomes evident. Although the minor premise is all right,—wisdom is present in Socrates,—but on this ground we cannot decide whether Socrates must necessarily be poor, because there is no invariable concomitance. The reason "wisdom" is in the position No. 9 of Dignāga's table. It is present both in some similar—poor men—and also present in some dissimilar instances—rich men. The reason is uncertain, no conclusion on its basis is possible. That poverty may sometimes be compresent with wisdom is a fact which has no importance at all, because "sometimes" poverty may be compresent with everything except its contradictorily opposed richness. Particular judgments have no place in a regular syllogism.

Professor A. Bain¹ also thinks—on grounds somewhat different—that on examining such cases as "Socrates is poor, Socrates is wise, *ergo* some poor men are wise", we may see good reason for banishing them from the syllogism. There is here "no march of reasoning", there are "Equivalent Propositional Forms or Immediate Inference". The same opinion is expressed by Dharmottara² regarding the standard Indian example³ "The fat Devadatta does not eat at

¹ Logic, I 159; cp. Keynes, op cit, p 299

² NBT, p 48. 12; transl, p 115

³ The Mīmāṃsikas regard it as a proof by implication (*arthāpatti*), Prāsaṅga-pūṭa (p. 228)—as an inference, the Buddhists—as an equivalent proposition

Thus Praśastapāda, the second legislator of the Vaiśeṣika system, has transformed its logic by trying to imbibe in it some principles of Dignāga's formal logic. As fallacies he borrowed 1) the four fallacious theses, and 2) the threefold scheme of fallacious reasons, which he however remodeled into a fourfold division. In the unified Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, we shall see, the fallacious theses have been dropped, and the system of fallacious reasons changed into a five-fold division.

The following table illustrates the influence of Dignāga upon Praśastapāda and the influence of the latter upon Bhāsarvajña.

Table showing the influence of Dignāga on the Vaiśeṣika system of Fallacies

<i>Vaiś. Sūtra</i>	<i>Dignāga</i>	<i>Praśastapāda</i>	<i>Bhāsarvajña</i>
1. asat	1. asiddha	1. asiddha	1. asiddha
2. sandigdha	2. anaikāntika (<i>excl</i> asādhāraṇa and viruddha- avyabhicārin)	2. sandigdha (<i>excl</i> asādhāraṇa and viruddha- avyabhicārin)	2. anaikāntika (<i>excl</i> asādhār and vir-avyabhic)
	3. viruddha	3. viruddha	3. viruddha
		4. anadhyavasita (= asādhāraṇa + viruddha-avyabhi- cārin)	4. anadhyavasita (= asādhāraṇa)
	4. pakṣābhāsa	5. pakṣābhāsa	5. sat-pratipakṣa (= viruddha-avya- bhicārin)
			6. bādhitā (= pakṣā- bhāsa)

d) The Nyāya system influenced by Dignāga.

The attitude of the Nyāya school towards the Buddhists is quite different from the attitude of the Vaiśeṣikas. In substance both

The union of such disparate items as the *asādhāraṇa* and the *viruddha-avyabhicārin* would hardly be comprehensible if it were not preceded by the polemics alluded to in Nyāya-mukha, p. 81 ff

dependence of the reason upon the predicate. It follows that the predicate is not deducible from such a reason. They are all reasons which Dignāga refers to the Uncertain and Contrary Classes.

The relation of these fallacies to the corresponding classes of Dignāga is the following one—

1. *Fallacia Accidentis*. Aristotle gives the example «Koriskus is not a man, because he is not Socrates who is a man», or «this one is not Koriskus, because he is a man, while a man is not Koriskus». Both these cases cannot be classified as «unreal» reasons, because the reason is present upon the subject. But the invariable concomitance of the reason with the predicate is not established. The respondent to whom these syllogisms are submitted must answer «no concomitance!» The fallacy is in the major premise. In the first example Koriskus is the Subject, non-man is the Predicate, non-Socrates is the Reason. The concomitance «whosoever is a non-Socrates is a non-man» is uncertain. There are non-Socrates'es among non-men (similar) and also among men (dissimilar). The reason is in the position No. 9, it is present in some similars as well as in some dissimilars. No conclusion is possible. In the second example the Subject is «this one», the predicate is «non-man», the Reason is Koriskus. There also is no concomitance. The concomitance implied is that «whosoever is Koriskus, (all events united under this name) is non-man». The contrary is true, the reason is incompatible with the predicate. It is an inverted reason and therefore must be referred to the «contrary» class, its position is in No. 8, Koriskus is never present in non-men (similar) and always present in some man (dissimilar).

Aristotle singles out these not quite similar fallacies and puts them in the first place evidently because the trick of arguing from and accident (Koriskus is not Socrates) to a general rule (Koriskus is not a man) was very much in vogue among Sophists.

2. The second fallacy, *extra Dictione*, is hardly distinguishable from the first. Aristotle's example is «the Ethiopian is white in his teeth and black in his skin, therefore he is simultaneously black and non-black». The reason «black in the skin and white in the teeth» is in the position No. 2, it belongs to the contrary class. It is never

total coincidence» (Bain, op. cit., I 168). Stated in this form it represents the only or universal logical fallacy. It is curious that some European logicians have imputed to Aristotle the total omission of this, the only truly logical fallacy, cp. Bain, *ibid.*, p. 278.

contrary,¹ the unproved,² the undecided³ and the mis-timed⁴. From these five items the first two evidently correspond to the uncertain and contrary classes of Dignāga. But the three remaining ones, in the interpretation given them by Vātsyāyana, overlap the whole field of fallacies, since every fallacy is more or less unproved, undecided and mis-timed. Uddyotakara asks, what for is the fivefold division introduced, and answers that the aim is to give an exhaustive classification of logical fallacies. «But how many are the varieties of reasons false and right which are current (among human kind)?» he continues to ask, and gives the following answer, «The varieties which are conditioned by circumstances of time, individual character and (every kind of) object are infinite; but the varieties of right and wrong reasons in their connection with the deduced facts (i. e., the varieties of the purely logical connection of reason and consequence), when systematized, are generally speaking one hundred and seventy six». And even when the computation of new varieties produced by new qualifications be continued we will easily arrive at the number of 2032 varieties of possible reasons, says Uddyotakara.⁵

Now what is the aim of this ridiculous exaggeration? Uddyotakara well knows that every sound principle can be reduced *ad absurdum* by exaggeration. His aim is to overdo Dignāga and to bluff the

¹ *viruddha*, NS, I. 2 6, is the reason contradicting one's own principles. It corresponds to the *istavighātakārti* of Dignāga, it is a special case of the *viruddha* as stated by Dhārmakīrti, cp NB, p. 78, 10, transl., p. 208.

² *sādhya-sama*, NS, I. 2 8, is, according to Gotama and Vātsyāyana, *peñito* principle. But U converts it into Dignāga's *asiddha*, since it includes according to him the *āśraya-asiddha*. According to Dignāga, Gotama's sūtra refers to an inference where the example does not differ from the *probandum* (Tātp, p. 288. 27), but U objects and converts it into the threefold *asiddha-āśraya*, *prayñāpanāntya* (= *sādhya*) *asiddha* and *anyathā-siddha*. In later Nyāya it roughly corresponds to Dignāga's *asiddha*.

³ *prakaraṇa-sama*, NS, I. 2 7, is easily converted in the *sat-pratipaksa* «counterbalanced» or «antinomic» reason.

⁴ *kalātyaya-apañāsta*, NS, I. 2 9; its meaning was very differently understood at Vātsyāyana's time (cp p. 54. 11). Vācaspatiśiṣṭra explained that «mis-timed» means a reason which is not even worthy of being considered, since it is beyond «the moment when it could be affecting our inquisitiveness» (*saṃśaya-lālam atyapātāh*). It is thus identified with the inadmissible theses of Dignāga and includes the same varieties in later unified Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

⁵ Cp upon the system of Uddyotakara the very interesting remarks of Prof S Stasiak in his article «Fallacies and their Classification according to the Early Hindu Logicians» in *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, t. VI, p. 191 ff.

then only be either "yes!" or "reason unreal!" or "no concomitance!" The latter is then divided in two contrary or inverted reasons (position Nos 2 and 8), four uncertain ones (positions Nos. 1, 3, 7 and 9) and one over-narrow (position No. 5). The antinomic reason which at once occupies two positions in the table (Nos 2 or 8 combined with 4 or 6) may be added. No other position is possible. Dignāga's table is exhaustive; it brings order and systematical unity into the problem of fallacies. There never can be any doubt regarding the class to which a fallacy should be referred.

Aristotle comes very near Dignāga's solution when he states that a respondent to whom a false refutative Syllogism has been presented must examine "in which of the premises and in what way the false appearance of a syllogism has arisen".¹ Had Aristotle remained by this principle and had he set aside all linguistic and psychological causes, he would have probably arrived at a system like the one of Dignāga.

¹ Grote, op cit, p 406

The following table illustrates the development of the system of Fallacies in the Nyāya school. It will be noticed that the borrowings of Bhāsarvajña presuppose the borrowings of Praśastapāda.

Table showing the influence of Dignāga on the Nyāya system of Fallacies

<i>Nyāya Sūtra and Bhāṣya</i>	<i>Dignāga</i>	<i>Uddyotakara</i>	<i>Bhāsarvajña</i>	<i>Gangeśa</i>
1. savyabhicāra	1. anaiikāntika	1. savyabhicāra	1. anaiikāntika	1. savyabhicāra
2. viruddha	2. viruddha	2. viruddha	2. viruddha	2. viruddha
3. prakaraṇa-sama	—	—	—	—
4. sādhyā-sama	—	—	—	—
5. kalātita	—	—	—	—
	3. asiddha	3. sādhyā-sama (= asiddha)	3. asiddha	3. sādhyā-sama (= asiddha)
	4. asādhārana (included in anaiikāntika)	—	4. anadhyavasīta (cp Praśastapāda)	—
	5. viruddha-avyabhicāra (included in anaiikāntika)	4. prakaraṇa-sama	5. sat-pratipakṣa	4. sat-pratipakṣa
	6. pakṣabhāsa	5. kalātita	6. bādhitā	5. bādhitā

§ 8. EUROPEAN PARALLELS.

There is perhaps no other chapter of European Logic in which such helpless confusion reigns as the chapter on Logical Fallacies. The opinion of the majority of modern authors seems to be that truth may have its norms, but not error. The sources and kinds of error, according to them, are infinite as life itself and cannot be digested into any coherent system. They therefore resolved to drop the chapter on Logical Fallacies altogether. Neither Sigwart, nor B. Erdmann, nor Schuppe, nor Wundt, nor Bradley, nor Bosanquet etc. devote any consideration to this capital problem. The Aristotelian classification survives in some modern works. Its principle has been pronounced

always the work of the understanding which calling in mnemonic representations interprets a given sensation on its negative side. If we have a cognition of the type "there is here no jar", or "the jar is absent", the direct cognition, the visual sensation is produced by the empty place, not by the absent jar. The absent jar is a representation called forth by memory and constructed by the intellect, it is not perceived by the senses. So far the Buddhist view seems unimpeachable and the Realists have the greatest difficulties in combating it. However the necessity of repudiating it is urged upon them by their extreme realism. They cannot admit the pure ideality of the absent. They therefore imagine that the absent thing is somehow really connected with the empty place.¹ The Buddhists having established a hard and fast line between reality and ideality, between sensation and imagination, had no necessity of fluctuating between reality and unreality in assuming the ideality of negation. They had no difficulty of repudiating the direct perception of the absent thing through the senses. But the question remained whether the negative judgment of the form "there is no jar" was to be classed as a perceptual judgment just as the judgment "this is a jar", or that it was to be referred to the inferential class of judgments, where an absent thing is cognized on the basis of its visible mark; for inference, we have seen, is essentially the cognition of something not present in the ken. However the line of demarcation between a perceptual judgment and inference is not so sharp, since every perception, as distinguished from pure sensation, contains a great amount of mnemonic elements and a synthesis of the understanding. On the other hand every inference may be viewed as a single operation of the understanding, as a single conception² erected on the basis of a pure sensation. It will then contain a part visible and a part invisible, a non-constructed and a constructed part, a non-imagined and imagined part. The inference "there is fire on the hill, because I see smoke" may be viewed as one synthetically constructed image of smoke-fire whose basis is a sensation. There is no difference in principle, there is only a difference of degree; imagination is predominant in an inference. In the negative judgment "there is here no jar, because I do not perceive any", imagination is likewise predominant. Therefore negation must be referred to the class of inferential cognition, although it also can be viewed as a single conception, containing a part visible and a part invisible, a part imagined and a part non-imagined.

¹ Connected by *svatīpa-sambandha* = *visesana-visēya-bhāva*

² *clām vṛttānam anumānam*, cp. NK, p. 125

«A fallacy is what has the semblance of a syllogism», without having the reality. «It is a fault consisting in some of the three rules being infringed».

That Aristotle has failed to keep to this simple and evident view is easily explained by his aim. His treatise, which is sometimes represented as an investigation of logical fallacies, is really devoted to the detection and proper refutation of sophisms. A sophism is rarely founded on a fallacy of reasoning. Its sources are multifarious. They may be logical, but they also may be psychological or linguistic. Aristotle's treatise on Sophisms corresponds to the Indian treatises on the «Failures of the Opponent»¹ and on the «Failures of the Respondent» in which the logical fallacies, or the fallacies of the Reason, are mentioned only as a part, and a comparatively small part, of all possible failures.²

The title of Aristotle's treatise is *Sophistical Refutations*. The *sophistical refutation* is the counterpart of the Socratic *Elenchus* which consists in putting questions to a respondent for the sake of eliciting truth. A *sophistical refutation*, on the contrary, consists in questioning for the sake of producing confusion. It is «a delusive semblance of refutation which imposes on ordinary men and induces them to accept it as real».³ This corresponds exactly to the sanscrit term *jāti* explained as *dhūṣaṇa-ābhāsa*, semblance of refutation. We have seen that 24 varieties of such refutations are enumerated in the *Aphorisms of Nyāya* and 14 have been admitted by *Dignāga*. The exact coincidence, however, is only in the title. The Indian «apparent refutation» really represents an *Elenchus*, i. e., a counter-syllogism. A fallacious counter-syllogism is a syllogism founded on a false analogy, it corresponds to the *Ignoratio Elenchi* in its narrow sense. But Aristotle's linguistic fallacies, *Fallacia in Dictione*, correspond to the Indian category called *chala*, i. e., ambiguous speech. They are treated quite separately, as fallacies founded on ambiguity. That all the 6 kinds of such fallacies enumerated by Aristotle are not logical fallacies, is clearly seen from the fact that they disappear as fallacies, as soon as you attempt to translate them into a foreign language. They are in the opinion of Aristotle himself linguistic, founded in *Dictione*. The remaining 7 varieties are characterized by him as

¹ *jāti-sūtra*.

² *nigraha-śhāna-sūtra*.

³ Grote, op cit, p 376

Thus a fancied perceptibility is imparted to the object. The non-cognition of such an object is called 'negation,' but it is a negation of a hypothetical visibility. Therefore that very spot from which the jar is absent and that cognition which is intent upon it, are both understood as a negation of a possible visibility, since they are the real source of the negative judgment. Negation is the absent thing, as well as its cognition; or its bare substratum and the corresponding perception. Every cognition, *quâ* cognition, is a cognition of reality, "consequently, continues Dharmottara,¹ negation *quâ* cognition is not simple absence of knowledge, it is a positive reality and an assertory cognition of it. The simple, unqualified absence of cognition, since it itself contains no assertion at all, can convey no knowledge. But when we speak of negation whose essence is a negation of hypothetical perceptibility, these words may be regarded as necessarily implying the presence of a bare place from which the object is absent and the cognition of that same place; in so far it is a place where the object would have been necessarily perceived, perceived just as well as its empty place is perceived, if it were present».

Negation is thus taken ontologically, as well as logically. It means the presence of a bare spot, as well as the fact of its cognition.

§ 2. NEGATION IS AN INFERENCE.

It has been found so far that Negation is no exception to the general rule that all cognition is cognition of reality. The un-reality or non-existence, which at first glance seems to be cognized in negation, discloses itself as an imagined unreality. Reality, existence, thing, are synonyms, we must not forget; they are contradictorily opposed to ideality, non-existence, image or conception, which are all different names of unreality. But there is a wrong ideality, as, e. g., the "flower in the sky", which is an ideality out of touch with reality, and a consistent or trustworthy ideality which is in touch with reality, as, e. g., a real flower which is in touch with some point-instant of ultimate reality, as revealed in a sensation. Negation is an unreality of the latter kind. It is an idea, it is imagination, but it is a trustworthy idea, it is productive imagination, it is a source of knowledge capable of guiding our purposive actions.

But if Negation is nothing but a cognition of a point of reality followed by a mental construction, it does not differ in principle from

¹ NBT, p. 22, 17 ff.; transl., p. 63.

of profit, of honours or fame, logic is doomed, says Uddyotakara.¹ The honest debate should be didactic.² It must not be sophistic and contentious.³ It must continue until the respondent be convinced.⁴ A logical fallacy under these conditions is not an intentional sophism, it is the natural counterpart of logical truth.⁵ We must therefore distinguish real logical fallacies which are incidental on the human intellect from mere traps laid down by Sophists and litigans. Aristotle's main object is to expose the Sophist. Therefore the true logical fallacies occupy a very small part in his enumeration.

Since the European logic has not succeeded to free itself in this respect from the Aristotelian ban, it has failed to establish a strictly logical system of Fallacies.

We have seen, that Dignāga, on the contrary, has established his system of Logical Fallacies in strict conformity with his canon of syllogistic rules and thus clearly distinguishes them from all sophisms founded on ambiguous speech and psychological shortcomings.

Dharmakīrti made a further step in the same direction. He objected, we have seen, to the Dignāgan Antinomical Fallacy, because in his opinion such a fallacy is impossible in the natural run of logical thought.⁶ Thought may deviate from the right path regulated by the canon of rules, but it cannot do both, deviate and non deviate, so as to be right and wrong simultaneously. The argument of Dharmakīrti in this particular instance is highly instructive. It fully discloses his theory of syllogism or, which is the same, of the Reason. What indeed is a Reason? It is presence in subject wholly, presence in similars merely and absence in dissimilars always. These rules establish its necessary connections in two directions, towards the Subject and towards the Predicate. One rule singly or two of them conjointly can be unintentionally violated in the natural run of human thought, but not any of them can be at once violated and non-violated. What is syllogism according to its content? It is either an instance of Identity, or of Causation, or of Negation.⁷ There is no other necessary and universal connection. The human intellect can by a mistake misrepresent

¹ NV., p. 15. 2 — *nyāya-viplavo'sau*.

² Ibid., p. 21. 18 — *vādaya śisyūdi-visayatvāt*.

³ Ibid. — *na śisyūddibhūḥ saha apratibhād-deśanū lāryā*.

⁴ *yūtvad asau bodhito bhavati*, ibid.

⁵ *pramāna-pratirūpalatvād dheto-abbhāsūnām avirodhak*, ibid.

⁶ NB, III. 112—113, transl., p. 220 ff

⁷ Ibid., transl., p. 222

Buddhists Non-existence of being nothing and *niḥ*, since it is nothing by itself, nothing apart from its substratum, no different unity, it is included in its positive counterpart. The Buddhists, on the contrary, accuse the Realists of assuming a real non-Ens,¹ a hypostasized non-Ens, a bodily non-Ens,² a separately shaped non-Ens,³ a, so to speak, Right Honourable non-Ens,⁴ which, on being critically examined, reveals itself as mere imagination. However the unreal non-Ens imagined on a basis of a positive perception does not differ in principle from simple perception, which consists of a sensation followed by an image constructed through the understanding. It is not something to be deduced⁵ out of another fact, it is an ultimate fact itself,⁶ it is not an inference. The fact of not perceiving the hypothetically assumed object cannot be resorted to as a middle term, from which its absence could be deduced, because its absence is nothing over and above its imagined presence on a place which is empty. However, since *Digvāḍa* and *Dharmakīrti* define sense-perception as the purely sensuous element in the process of perception, and since negation *guḍa* negation is not sensation at all, they nevertheless refer negation to the domain of inference, as a source of knowledge in which the part of the constructive function of the understanding is predominant.

Moreover, if the absence of the object, say, of a jar, is something perceived, not something inferred, the practical consequences of such a perception of a bare place are so different from the direct sense-perception of the object, that this justifies our referring negation to the class of indirect cognition. «The absence of the jar, says *Dharmottara*,⁷ is not really deduced, deduced are much more the practical consequences of that negation». What are these consequences? They are the negative propositions and the respective purposive activity, as well as its successful end, when they are all founded upon a negative perception of the described type.⁸ There is however another negation, a negation which is not the negative cognition of an imagined presence, but, a negative cognition of absence, of an unimagined or unimaginable

¹ *āśtavo'bhāvaḥ*.

² *vigrahaḥān abhāvaḥ*.

³ *bhinnā-mūrtir abhāvaḥ*.

⁴ *āyusmān abhāvaḥ*.

⁵ *sādhya*.

⁶ *vidhā*, cp NBT, p. 29 9, transl, p. 84, n. 4, cp TSP, 479 22, and 481 2.

⁷ NBT, p. 29 10, transl, p. 83.

⁸ NBT, p. 29 22, transl, p. 84.

day-time, ergo he eats at night». Those are equivalent propositions, there is no change of meaning. If the meaning were to establish a universal and necessary connection between two terms and its application to a given instance, only then could it be brought under the head of syllogism.

On the other hand some of the fallacies counted by Aristotle as logical (*extra Dictione*) are dropped by Dignāga as not belonging to the domain of fallacious reasons, since they do not affect the right position of the middle term, neither in respect of the minor nor in respect of the major. Such is the fallacy of *petitio principii*. Reduced to its crude form and applied to the type-instance of the problem of eternal, resp. non-eternal, sounds, this fallacy will appear in the form «sounds are non-eternal, because they are non-eternal» or «eternal because eternal». According to the Buddhists there is here no reason at all.¹ The respondent accordingly must answer by a question: Why? Give me a reason! Sound is non-eternal because it is non-eternal is equivalent to saying «sound is non-eternal» simply. It may be a fallacy in practice, when it is concealed and difficult to detect. As such it is very often mentioned by Indian logicians², but theoretically, in a strictly logical system of all positions of a reason, it has no place, since there is in it no reason at all. Even the over-narrow reason «sound is non-eternal, because it is audible», representing the absolute minimum of a reason, is nevertheless a reason. It supposes the existence of a major premise «whatsoever is audible is non-eternal». But in a *petitio principii* fallacy, the major premise would be reducible to the form — «whatsoever is non-eternal is non-eternal», and that means total absence of a reason and the natural retort «give me a reason!»

Strictly logical are only three of Aristotle's fallacies: 1) *Fallacia Accidentis*, 2) *Fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter* and 3) *Fallacia consequentis*.

They have that feature in common that they are all due to an erroneous conversion of an universal affirmative. The contraposition is not established,³ as the Buddhist would have said. They are fallacies of the major premise.⁴ There is no universal and necessary

¹ Such is the definition of Aristotle: the premise is identical with the conclusion. But the German manual *Antibarbarus Logicus* defines — *die Beweisgründe sind entweder falsch oder bedürfen eines Beweises*. Such a definition would permit us to regard every fallacy as *petitio principii*.

² *sādhya-sama, siddha-sādhana*.

³ *asiddha-vyatireka*.

⁴ Or in other words they correspond to the Fallacy of Undistributed Middle, since «Distribution or Universal Quantity in the middle term is essential to its

§ 3. THE FIGURES OF THE NEGATIVE SYLLOGISM THE FIGURE OF SIMPLE NEGATION.

So far the essence and the function of Negation have been established. Its essence always reduces to some hypothetical perceptibility. There is no Negation in the external world: Negation is never a direct cognition of reality. However, indirectly there is an external reality corresponding to negation, it is the reality of its substratum. This substratum and its cognition may also be characterized as the essence of Negation. Owing to this its feature, Negation, although appertaining to the domain of imagination, has "meaning and validity". Its function is to guide our purposive actions in a special way. It is an indirect valid source of knowledge, a knowledge of the inferential type, the fact of hypothetical visibility taking the office of the middle term connecting the substratum with negation. The denial of hypothetical perceptibility is thus the essence or the general form of Negation, a form which is present in every particular instance of it. When thrown into a syllogistic form we, as in every inference, have the choice between the Method of Agreement, or the Method of Difference. We thus shall have Negation expressed through agreement with the denied fact and Negation expressed through disagreement with the denied fact: i. e. Negation expressed positively and Negation expressed negatively. The negative method of expressing Negation will result in deducing it from an Affirmation, since every double negation always results in an affirmation. The patterns of these syllogisms will be shown presently. They are only formal varieties, differences in formulation or in expression. We are as yet not told what are the objects upon which negation is intent.

Negation can be intent either upon a thing or upon a relation. The things are subdivided, we have seen, in five categories; the relations in only two, Existential Necessary Identity and Existential Necessary Sequence; the last also called Causality. The five categories of things, viz., the Individuals, Classes, Qualities, Motions and Substances, can be the content of simple negation. They afford no ground for a classification of Negation *quâ* Negation. But the Relations, being relations of interdependence, can be differently viewed as a relation of the dependent part to that upon which it depends, and *vice versa*, as that of the independent to the dependent, as the cause to the effect and *vice versa* as the effect to the cause; as the inclusive to the included and of the included to the inclusive terms. They can moreover inter-

found in similar instances (black and non-black wholly) and always present in all dissimilar (partly black and partly non-black) ones.

8. *Fallacia Consequentis* is the most natural fallacy; the reason overlaps a little bit into the dissimilar province. It is the nearest to a right reason, its sophistical value is not very great. The major premise represents a wrong conversion of an universal affirmative. The reason is either in the position No. 7, when it is present in the whole compass of the similar and moreover in some dissimilar instances; or in the position No. 9, when it is present on both sides partly, in a part of the similar and a part of the dissimilar province. Example «this one is a thief, because he walks out by night». The position is No. 9; since people walking out by night are partially met on both sides, in the thievish as well as in the non-thievish department.

4. The fallacies of *Ignoratio Elenchi* or wrong answer, of *Non-Causa pro Causa*¹ or drawing a conclusion from something what is not really an essential premise thereof, and of *Plurium Interrogationum ut Unius* are not strictly logical fallacies, they repose on misunderstandings.

Although all fallacies repose on misunderstandings, all are, as Aristotle says, more or less *Ignoratio Elenchi*, nevertheless strictly logical are those which are produced 1) either by a wrong position of the Middle Term between instances similar and dissimilar, these are fallacies of the major premise, 2) or by a wrong position of the Middle Term regarding the Subject of the Conclusion, these are fallacies of the minor premise. Therefore in order to make an estimate of the strict logical value of a syllogism its three terms should be singled out and the relation of 1) M to S and 2) M to P should be tested. The fallacies of answering beside the point, of adducing an unessential premise and of a plurality of questions cannot occur when the three terms are presented in their unambiguous expressions. These fallacies very often occur in practical life, but they are psychological, not logical. It is therefore advisable to formulate a syllogism not in propositions which can easily mislead, but to single out the three terms S, M and P, expressing them without a shade of ambiguity. This is the method adopted in the schools of Tibet and Mongolia. The relation of M to S and of M to P becomes apparent. The answer of the respondent can

¹ This would correspond to the *anyathā-siddha*, a very often occurring mistake, but more psychological than logical.

Conclusion. On this place we will not find it

The minor term is represented here by the conception "on this place". It is the substratum of reality underlying the whole ratiocination. The major term is represented by the conception of the respective negative behaviour, "we will not find it here". The middle term consists in the abolition of the hypothetical presence of the denied object. The major premise points to their concomitance. Indeed, as M. H. Bergson puts it, "from abolition to negation, which is the more general operation, there is but one step!" "This means, says Dharmottara, that a representable object not being perceived, this circumstance affords an opportunity for a negative purposive action in respect of it".¹ Non-perception is the included² part, the dependent part, the Reason Negation or negative behaviour is the inclusive³ part, the more general operation, the part on which the former depends,⁴ the necessary Consequence⁵

The statement that the logical reason is necessarily associated with its consequence is a statement of invariable concomitance. This is according to the canons of the rules of syllogism, viz., Invariable Concomitance between the Reason and its necessary Consequence (or between its subject and predicate) consists in 1) the necessary presence (never absence) of the predicate upon the subject and 2) in the presence of the subject exclusively in the sphere of the predicate, never beyond it.⁶

The example points to the individual instances, of which the general proposition expressing concomitance is a generalization by Induction. Every imagined object, an object existing as present only in imagination, is an instance of an object which does not exist in reality, i. e., in the objective world. By this reference to the facts proving the general law, concomitance is fully established.

After having established the general rule, the syllogistic process proceeds to indicate its application to a particular instance in the minor premise "on this place we do not perceive any representable jar". The manner in which a non existing jar is placed by representation or imagination, hypothetically, in all the necessary conditions

¹ NBT., p. 44 1; transl, p. 117.

² *vyāpāra*.

³ *vyāpaka*.

⁴ *pratibandha-visaya*.

⁵ *niścita-anubandha*.

⁶ NBT., p. 44 4 ff, transl, p. 118.

PART IV. NEGATION.

CHAPTER I. THE NEGATIVE JUDGMENT.

§ 1. THE ESSENCE OF NEGATION.

Since every cognition is regarded by the Buddhists as a direct or indirect cognition of some point of external reality, and the interest which they take in logic is not formal, but epistemological, the problem of Negation contains for them special difficulties. It is therefore treated with extraordinary thoroughness. Indeed, what is Negation? Is it cognition? Is it cognition of reality? Is it direct or indirect cognition, i. e., is it to be treated under perception or under inference? At first glance it seems to be non-cognition, the cancellation of cognition; or, if it is cognition at all, it must be a cognition of a non-reality, that is to say, of nothing. It nevertheless exists and seems to be a kind of cognition and a cognition not of nothing, but of something. The solution proposed by the realistic schools has already been mentioned above, incidentally, when considering the Buddhist analysis of our notion of Existence. For them Negation is either a special mode of cognition or a mode of existence.

Quite different is the position of the Buddhists. Existence for them, we have seen, refers to the ultimate reality of a point-instant, and its cognition is the corresponding pure sensation. A non-existing or absent thing is imagination, it can produce no sensation directly; but the positive thing which has produced the sensation can be interpreted by the intellect as involving the absence of another thing whose presence is thus denied. Negation is therefore never a direct or original attitude of the mind, as pure sensation always is.¹ It is

¹ Pure sensation is *vidhā* = *bgrubs-byed*, pure affirmation.

of the object, which is hypothetically visible, as situated in all the necessary conditions of perceptibility; that one condition which occurs only in the former instance and does not occur in the latter is the cause, or the indispensable part, of the phenomenon of Negation. It is thus proved that the essence of Negation consists in the abolition of a hypothetical visibility. The same result, we have seen, can be arrived at by the Method of Agreement. We then compare an instance where an imagined jar is pronounced to be absent from a given place, because if it were present it would have been perceived. We compare it with the other instances, where the objects must be surely pronounced to be absent, because they are merely imagined, as, e. g., a flower in the sky, the horns on the head of a hare, the son of a barren woman, etc. etc. The circumstance alone, in which these instances agree with the first, is the imagined presence of the absent thing. That circumstance is the cause or the indispensable part of Negation. Thus the essence of Negation consists in an abolition of a hypothetical presence. The Method of Difference states here that with the abolition of the consequence the reason is also abolished. It is a Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism, expressed *modo tollenti*. Indeed the major premise states that—

If the object is present, it is perceived, supposing there is no other impediment for its perception. But on the given place it is not perceived. Consequently it is absent (not present).

The universal proposition expresses that the existence of something perceivable, the totality of the indispensable conditions being fulfilled, is invariably followed by perception. Existence is the negation of non-existence, and cognition—the negation of non-cognition. Hence we have here a contraposition of the universal premise expressed according to the Method of Agreement (where non-perception was represented as concomitant with non-existence). The negation of the subject is made the predicate, and the negation of the predicate is made the subject. Thus the universal proposition expresses that the negation of the consequence is invariably concomitant, with the negation of the reason, because

causes, which are contained in the formulation of J. St. Mill. If Mr. Mill would have said: «the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is either the effect or the indispensable part of the phenomenon», his statement would have then fallen in line with the Buddhist view, according to which there are only two kinds of relation between objects, those founded on Identity (= law of Contradiction), and those founded on Causality, the contents of every single case is established in both cases by Induction from similar and dissimilar cases.

Negation is thus predominantly imagination. In marked opposition to the realists, who maintain that negation is based on the positive perception of an absent thing, (the *absence* is present), the Buddhists assert that it is founded on the negative perception of a present thing (the *presence* is absent). The perception of an absent thing is impossible, it is a contradiction. If it is perception, the thing is present, it cannot be absent. But how is it present? It is present in imagination and that means that all the conditions necessary for its perception are fulfilled. It would be necessarily perceived if it were present; but it is absent and therefore it is only imagined, but not perceived, it is perceived in imagination. Sigwart¹ calls our attention to the fact, that from the ordinary, realistic, point of view the proposition "there is here no fire" or "the fire does not burn" contains a contradiction. If it does not burn, how is it a fire? The person, asked to look in the stove and not finding there the fire which he expected to find, answers that there is no fire, meaning really that the expected fire is not there. The negation is thus directed on an imagined fire, its imagined visibility. Dharmottara² gives the following explanation. "How is it possible for an object, say a jar, to be perceptible, when it is absent? It is said to be perceptible, although it is absent, because its perceptibility is imagined! We imagine it in the following way: „If it were present on this spot, it certainly would have been perceived“. In this case an object, although absent, is *ex hypothesi* visible. And what is the object which can so be imagined? It is the object whose empty place is perceived, since all conditions necessary for its perception are fulfilled. When can we decide that all necessary conditions are fulfilled? When we actually perceive another object included in the same act of cognition. (When we perceive the counterpart of our negation, the empty place on which the denied object is imagined "as present"): We call „included in the same act of cognition“ two interconnected objects amenable to the same sense-faculty, an object upon which the eye or another organ can be simultaneously fixed with attention. Indeed when two such objects are before us, we cannot confine our perception to one of them, since there is no difference between them as regards possibility of perception. Therefore if we actually perceive only one of them, we naturally imagine that if the other were present, we should likewise perceive it, because the totality of the necessary conditions is fulfilled.

¹ Logik, I. 168

² NBT, p. 33 8 ff., transl.; p. 62.

Major premise: Wheresoever there is no smoke, there are no efficient causes of it.

Minor premise There is here no smoke.

Conclusion. There are here no efficient causes of it.

The place pointed to by the word "there" corresponds to the minor term. The fact of the presence of efficient causes producing smoke corresponds to the major, and the fact "no smoke"—to the middle term. If we take the term "no-smoke" as a positive one, the syllogism will be Celarent. Otherwise it will consist of three negative propositions and there is no other escape to save the Aristotelian rule than to admit that the major premise as containing a double negation is affirmative, the figure will then be Camestres.

The inference from the presence of causes to the necessity of their effect is not supposed to be safe in Buddhist logic, since the causes do not always produce their effects. Up to the last moment some unexpected fact may always interfere and the predicted result will not happen. Therefore only the last moment, as we have seen when examining the Buddhist theory of causation, is the real cause, the real moment of efficiency, the ultimate reality. In an inference from an absent effect to the absent cause the cause refers therefore to the efficient cause, i. e. to the last moment preceding the effect.

This figure of ratiocination is resorted to in cases when the causes are invisible. Their assumed hypothetical visibility is denied.

The next, third figure is also a case when the negation of one fact is deduced from the negation of another fact, but the connection between them is not founded on Causation. It is founded on the Identity of the substratum. It consists in a negation of the inclusive term from which the negation of the included term logically follows, e. g.—

Major premise. Wheresoever there are no trees at all, there naturally are no Aśoka-trees.

Minor premise There are there no trees at all

Conclusion. There also are no Aśoka-trees.

The minor term is expressed by the term "there", the major by the term "no Aśoka-trees", and the middle by "no trees". Just as in the preceding case the figure consists of three negative propositions and may be pressed either into Celarent or Camestres. The absence of the inclusive term is here ascertained by simple negation. The absence of the included one is founded on the law of Identity.

In this and the following figures the realistic schools are satisfied in establishing an invariable connection between two facts or concep-

perception, which is also a sensation immediately followed by an image of the thing perceived. It is not a cognition of a thing absent, whose mark alone is perceived. It is not a cognition through a mark, of «that which it is a mark of», that is to say, it is not an inference, it does not contain any movement of thought from the known to the unknown? And since there are no other sources of knowledge than these two, the direct one and the indirect one, it will not differ in principle from perception, it will be coordinated to perception. There will be a positive and negative perception, an affirmative and negative perceptual judgment, as maintained by the Realists? Indeed, if Negation has no other real meaning as the presence of an empty place and of its cognition, then the inference «there is here no jar, because I do not see any» has no other meaning than «there is here no jar, because there is none» or «I do not perceive here any jar, because I do not perceive it». Dharmottara¹ says, «an absent jar is called present, because it is imagined as present, as being cognized in all the normal conditions of perceptibility, on a place where it is expected to reside, a place which is the counterpart of the absent-jar and which is connected with it in the same act of cognition, but which is empty». Therefore² what we call negation or cancellation of perception, is nothing but the positive existence of an object connected with it and the cognition of that object ... that is to say³ «what is called non-existence of a present jar, (i. e. what is an absent jar), is nothing but a positive perception of a reality».⁴ «If it would have been real, says Dharmakīrti,⁵ negation would be impossible». That is to say, if absence, or non-existence, would have been a reality, as the realistic schools assume, then negative cognition could not be possible, it would then be an absence of cognition, an absolute blank. But it is imagined, imagined not as a «flower in the sky», but on the basis of a real perception of an existent object. This is why it is a variety of trustworthy knowledge and a reason for successful purposive action.

The mutual accusations of Buddhists and Realists regarding the problem of Non-existence have been already mentioned when considering the Buddhist views respecting reality. The Realists accuse the

¹ NBT, p. 28. 18 ff, transl, p. 80.

² Ibid., p. 28. 20.

³ Ibid., p. 28. 22.

⁴ *artha-giāna eva*, *ibid.*

⁵ NB., p. 27. 17.

senses, this figure, i. e., the figure of the Affirmation of Incompatible Effect is applied.

The next, sixth figure of Negation consists in an Affirmation of an Incompatible Subordinate. It introduces a further complication, but is, nevertheless, founded on an analytical connection of two facts, the one being the part of the other, e. g. —

Major premise. What depends on discontinuous causes is not constant.

Minor premise. The evanescence of empirical things depends on special causes.

Conclusion. It is not constant.

This is the argument of the Realists against the Buddhist theory of Instantaneous Existence or Constant Evanescence. The Buddhists maintain that the destruction of everything is certain *a priori*, because it is the very essence of existence. Existence and destruction are connected by Identity; whatsoever exists as real and has an origin, is *ex ipso* constantly evanescent. The realists appeal to the fact that every destruction has its cause, as for instance, the jar is destroyed not by time, but by the stroke of a hammer. This accidental causation is the contradictorily opposed part of non-causation and non-causation is subordinate to constancy or eternity. Eternity is thus denied by pointing to a subordinate feature which is incompatible with eternity. The connection of the notions of causality, non-causality and eternity is founded upon the laws of Contradiction and Identity.

Since we evidently have to deal in this instance with abstract notions, the question arises whether the principle of the negation of hypothetical perceptibility can here be maintained as being always the essence of every negation. "When denying the reality of the predicate or major term „constancy“, says Dharmottara,¹ we indeed must argue in the following manner: if the fact before us were permanent, we would have some experience of its permanent essence; however no permanent essence is ever experienced, therefore it is not permanent. It follows that when we deny permanence (or eternity), this denial refers to something hypothetically placed in all conditions of perceptibility. Even in denying the presence of a ghost, which is supposed to be invisible, we can do it only after trying to imagine it for a moment as something perceptible. It is only thus that we can arrive at the judgments „this is a jar“, „it is not a ghost“. From the Bud-

¹ NBT., p. 88, 10; transl., p. 94

presence. It is not a source of right knowledge, it does not lead to successful purposive action. Some interesting details on such a negative cognition of absence will be considered later on.

On the grounds which oblige us to refer negation to the domain of inference, Dharmottara¹ delivers himself in the following way. "Has it not been stated that the judgment „there is no jar“ is produced by sense-perception, by the perception of a bare place? And now we include this judgment into the practical consequences deduced by inference from this perception: (Yes! We do not deny that!) Since the bare place is cognized by sense-perception, and, since the negative judgment „there is here no jar“ is a judgment produced by the direct function of perception, that function that makes the object present to our senses, therefore it is quite true that the negative judgment immediately following on the perception of the bare place is a perceptual judgment. Indeed the negative judgment, according to what has been precedently explained, is directly produced by sense-perception, because qualified perception (beyond pure sensation) has just the capacity of producing a judgment as to the existence before us of a bare place. However, the proper function of Negation consists in the next following step. Objects might be not perceived, but this only gives rise to doubt, (the question arises as to which of them might be present). So long as this doubt has not been removed, negation has no practical importance, it cannot guide our purposive actions. Imagination then steps in, and it is thus that negation, as a negative deduction, gives practical significance to the idea of a non-Ens.² Since an object, which I imagine as present on a given place, is not really perceived, just therefore do I judge that „it is not there“. Consequently this negation of an imagined presence is an inference which gives life to the ready concept of a non-Ens, it does not newly create this concept itself. Thus it is that the negative judgment receives its practical significance through an inference from challenged imagination, although it is really produced by sense-perception and only applied in life through a deductive process of an inference, whose logical reason consists in the fact of a negative experience. A negative inference therefore guides our steps when we apply in life the idea of a non-Ens“.

¹ *Ibid*, p. 80 1, transl., p. 84

² Cp with this the theory of Windelband, that negation is a second judgment, a rejudgment; cp. below in the part on European Parallels.

opposed to the fact of being susceptible to receive a name. Therefore this latter fact being established, it excludes the possibility for utterable ideas to be simple reflexes.

In this case also, in order to deny that utterable ideas are simple reflexes, we must try to imagine a simple reflex producing such an idea and then bar the progress of imagination by a categorical denial. The interconnection and mutual dependence of the notions of an utterable idea, as a constructed conception, and an unutterable reflex, is founded on the laws of Identity and Contradiction. It is a negative deduction by Existential Identity. The hypothetical perceptibility of the denied fact must be understood as in the sixth figure.

The ninth figure of Negation is founded exclusively on the principle of Causation. It consists in a Negation of Causes, e. g. —

Major premise. Wheresoever there is no fire, there is also no smoke.

Minor premise. There is here no fire.

Conclusion. There is here no smoke.

This figure is resorted to when the effect of a cause cannot be directly perceived. When its presence can be imagined on a place lying in the ken, we will avail ourselves of the figure of Simple Negation.

This same major premise can be used for an Affirmative Syllogism expressed according to the Method of Difference. It will then represent the normal type of the Indian inductive-deductive syllogism, in which the Induction is founded on the Method of Difference and which represents the *modus tollens* of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism. Indeed, we will then have —

Major premise. Wheresoever no fire, there also no smoke.

Minor premise. But there is here smoke.

Conclusion. There is here fire.

The tenth figure of a negative syllogism is again based on a double connection, one founded on Causality, and another founded on the law of Contradiction. It consists in Affirmation of Incompatibility with the Cause of the denied fact, e. g. —

Major premise. Wheresoever there is an efficient fire, there can be no shivering from cold.

Minor premise. There is here such a fire.

Conclusion. There is here no shivering.

This figure is resorted to when cold, although existent, cannot be directly felt, neither can its symptoms like shivering etc. be directly perceived. They are then imagined and the suggestion baffled by pointing to the presence of a good fire. The connection of shivering with

cross, and we can have such instances as the relation of one thing with another when the latter is, say, the inclusive term in regard of the cause of the former. In denying the one or the other, our negation will be based on a double relation of Causation *plus* Identity.

Considering all the possible combinations we will have eleven figures of the Negative Syllogism. Only universal judgments are admitted as members of a syllogism. Particular judgments are regarded either as no logical conclusions at all or as logical fallacies.

The eleven negative figures are the following ones, first of all—

Simple Negation. This figure is contained in every negative perceptual judgment. Nevertheless it is not a perceptual judgment, since the object cognized is invisible. It is cognized through its mark which is non-perception. Since the deduced part does not differ much from that part out of which it is deduced, since non perception and non-presence (or absence) are practically the same thing, it is assumed that the deduced part consists in the special sort of behaviour which is consequent on a negative judgment. Every cognition in general is nothing but a preparation for an action. The figures of Negation are not being distinguished by themselves, their essence is always the same, it is cancellation of hypothetical visibility. But the consequences to which a denial leads are different; the formulae of negation are distinguished according to them. The consequence of simple negation is a corresponding sort of behaviour. The affirmative perceptual judgment can, of course, also be regarded as an inference of the presence of the perceived object from the fact of its perception, and the deduced consequence would then also be the corresponding sort of behaviour. But the difference consists in the immediate vividness of the concrete image, which is characteristic for perception and distinguishes it from the vague image of absent things with which inferences have to deal. It has a different essence, a different function and its figures must be treated separately from the figures of the affirmative syllogism.

As mentioned above, simple negation can be expressed in a formula according to the Method of Agreement, as well as in a formula according to the Method of Difference. The first will be as follows—

Major premise. The non-perception of a representable object is followed by respective negative behaviour.

Example. Just as the non-perception of a flower in the sky, (is *not* followed by the action of plucking it).

Minor premise. On this place we don't perceive a jar, which is representable.

and its cognition is a causal one—positive knowledge is a product of reality—it would be natural to surmise that negative knowledge must be the product of absence of reality. Such is the view of many philosophic schools in India and in the West. But this is an error. Reality does not consist of existence and non-existence. Reality is always existence. The question remains why is a whole half of our knowledge busy in repudiating suggestions, when it could apparently be better employed in direct cognition of reality? The answer to this question is the following one. Although reality does not consist of reality and unreality, and knowledge does not consist of knowledge and non-knowledge, nevertheless every perception consists in a perception preceded by a non-perception of the same object, that is to say, by the absence of its own hypothetical visibility, not by non-perception simply; not by non-perception of something absolutely invisible. Perception which would never be interrupted by intervals of non-perception would not be perception. Perception is always interrupted perception, perception separated by intervals of non-perception of the same object. Therefore non-perception can never transgress the limits of sense-perception. Negation is nothing but non-perception, and non-perception always refers to a possible perception, it must keep our knowledge within the borders of sensuous experience.

Dharmottara delivers himself on this question in the following sentences:¹ "Since every variety of negation refers to such objects which can be placed in the conditions of perceptibility, which, therefore, are *sensibilia*,² for this reason every negation is virtually nothing else but a simple negation of hypothetical perceptibility". All other varieties of Negation are founded moreover either on the law of Contradiction, or on the law of Causation. But both these laws do not extend their sway beyond the sphere of possible experience. If something contradicts the established extension and comprehension of a concept, or if something contradicts the cause or the effect of a thing, we pronounce a judgment of negation "Whosoever we cognize", says the same author,³ "a contradiction with the (established) subalternation of facts, or a contradiction with their (established) causal relation, we must necessarily be aware that "we have had of them a perception, as well as a non-perception preceded by perception. Now those objects, which

¹ NBT, p. 38 6, transl., p. 102

² *dr̥ṣya*

³ Ibid, p. 38. 11, transl., p. 103.

of perceptibility, consists in an hypothetical judgment of the form «if the jar would have been present on this spot, I would have necessarily perceived it, but I do not perceive any, therefore, it is not present».

Thus it is that every negative experience may be regarded as a particular fact containing by implication the general rule; non-existing are only those objects, which we could have perceived under other circumstances. On the other hand, objects which we do not perceive and which we are not capable hypothetically to place in the conditions of perceptibility. objects that are unimaginable by their nature — cannot be denied, because negation is nothing but an abolition of imagination.

That same figure of Simple Negation can be expressed according to the Method of Difference. We then shall have a negative expression of negation, a denied negation, i. e.; an affirmative general proposition, from which negation will follow. Its formula is the following one —

Major premise. A thing present in the ken is necessarily perceived, when all the other conditions of perceptibility are fulfilled.

Example. As a patch of blue etc.

Minor premise. Here no jar is perceived, all conditions of perceptibility being fulfilled.

Conclusion. Here there is no jar.

In order to investigate the problem of the essence of Negation we here resort to the Method of Difference. We compare two instances which have every circumstance in common save one. If an instance in which a phenomenon under investigation occurs, i. e., where Negation occurs, where we can pronounce «this is not here», and an instance in which it does not occur, i. e., where there is no Negation, where we cannot pronounce «this is not here», because it is here — if these two instances have every circumstance in common, i. e., all the conditions of perceptibility are fulfilled, save one,¹ viz the non-perception

¹ *pratyayāntara* = other circumstances, *pratyayāntara-sāḷalyam* = all other circumstances save one, *sāḷalyam* = *sannidhiḥ* = common possession or presence, cp. NBT, p. 22.28—23.1. Non-perception can hardly be characterized as the cause of Negation, since non-existence and its cognition are likewise understood by this term, cp. NBT, p. 28.22 — *artha-gñāna eva pratyaksasya ghatasya abhāva ucyaṭe*. Negation is contained in a denied perception. The relation between denied perception and denial in general is analytical, the first is a part of the second in intention, and contains it in comprehension. Therefore the inferential step from non-perception to non-existence is permissible, because the first is necessarily a part of the second. It is interesting to note that A. Bain in his formulation of the second Canon of Induction has dropped the words «or an indispensable part of the

is established when on the absence of the result, another fact, its cause, is also absent. The Subalternation of concepts is deemed to be established when on the absence of the inclusive term, the included is necessarily absent. We must indeed be alive to the fact that the extension and comprehension of our concepts are founded on Negation. The comparative extension of the terms tree and Aśoka is fixed when we know that if on a certain place there are no trees, there certainly are no Aśokas. And the knowledge of the absence of something is always produced by repelling its imagined presence. Therefore if we remember some instances of Contradiction, of Causality, or of different Extension, we needs must have in our memory some negative experience. Negation of *sensibīlā* is the foundation of our concepts of non-Existence, which is underlying our knowledge of the laws of Contradiction, Causation and Subalternation. "If we do not have in our memory some corresponding negative experience, we will not remember contradiction and other relations, and then, in that case, the non-existence of a fact would not follow from the presence of an incompatible fact, or from the negation of its cause, etc. Since the negative experience, which we have had at the time when we first became aware of the fact of incompatibility or of a causal relation, must necessarily be present in our memory, it is clear that a negative cognition is always founded on a present or former repudiation of imagined perceptibility."¹

§ 7. NEGATION OF SUPERSSENSUOUS OBJECTS.

The Buddhist theory of Negation is a direct consequence of the Buddhist theory of Judgment. The fundamental form of the Judgment, we have seen, is the perceptual judgment, or — what is the same — the name-giving judgment, of the pattern "this is a jar". Such a judgment is contained in every conception referred to objective reality and in this sense conception and judgment become convertible terms.² Negation consists therefore in repelling an attempted perceptive judgment and for this reason every negation is a negation of *sensibīlā*, of such objects which can be imagined as present. The negation of the presence of an invisible ghost, we have seen, is just only a negation of its presence, i. e., of its visible form. But the Realists and Rationahists, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Sāṃkhyaś, speak of super-

¹ NBT., p. 399, transl., p. 106.

² *anukalpa* = *adhyavasāya*

the former negation is dependent upon the latter. If non-existence is denied, i. e. if existence is affirmed, then perception (non non-perception) necessarily follows, wherever no other impediments are in the way. The absence of the consequence (i. e. of non-existence) necessarily involves the absence of the reason (i. e. of non-perception). But the reason is present. Hence its consequence must also be present. That is to say, that the object is not perceived, all necessary conditions having been fulfilled; therefore it is not present, it does not exist on the given place. The negation of the reason always represents the inclusive term¹ to which the negation of the consequence, being the included² term, is subordinate. When the Method of Difference is applied, it always must be shown that with the abolition of the deduced Consequence, which is here non-perception of the hypothetically visible, the abolition of the Reason is necessarily involved.

§ 4. THE TEN REMAINING FIGURES.

The remaining ten figures of the negative syllogism "do not express directly a negation of imagined visibility, but they express either an affirmation or a negation of something else, and this necessarily reduces to a Simple Negation of the hypothetically visible."³ Therefore they, although indirectly, are nothing but disguised formulas of Simple Negation.

The order of the eleven figures is apparently settled according to the progressing complication of the deduction. It begins with the figure of Simple Negation and ends with the figure of Affirmation of an Effect which is incompatible with the cause of the denied fact. The ten figures may be divided in two principal classes. One class comprises all formulas, which consist in deducing Negation from the Affirmation of something Incompatible. It contains the seven figures, IV—VIII and X—XI. The other class contains three figures, II, III and IX, which deduce Negation from another negation, from the negation of something either causally connected with the fact denied, or from the negation of an inclusive term from which the denial of the included term logically follows.

The second figure consists in the Negation of Effect, from which the negation of its causes necessarily follows, e. g. —

¹ *vyāpaka*.

² *vyāpya*.

³ NBT, p. 37. 7, transl., p. 100.

is incognizable in a positive way, neither is it cognizable in a negative way. A metaphysical entity can be neither affirmed, nor denied, it always remains a problem.

Dharmottara gives the following explanation¹ "When a cause is absent, the result does not occur; and when a fact of greater extension is absent, its subordinate fact, the fact of lesser extension, comprehended under it, is likewise absent". There are only two relations of necessary interdependence, Causation and Coinherence. If knowledge is necessarily connected with reality, what kind of relation is it? Is it Causality or is it Identity of reference? If knowledge were the cause of reality or if it did contain reality as a subordinate part, then the absence of knowledge would establish the absence of the corresponding reality. But knowledge is neither the one, nor the other. Therefore its absence proves nothing. The relation between reality and cognition is indeed causal, reality produces cognition. The heterogeneity of the cause does not prove the impossibility of causation. According to the principle of Dependent Origination, it does not prevent causal interdependence. Since every thing real is a result of its causes, we can always legitimately infer the reality of a cause, when we have the result. Therefore the inference from knowledge to the reality of its object is legitimate. The existence of a suitable source of knowledge proves the existence of the corresponding object, but not *vice versa*. The absence of the knowledge of a thing does not prove its non-existence. Dharmottara² says: "The existence of right knowledge proves the existence of real objects, but absence of knowledge cannot prove the non-existence of the corresponding object".

It is true that the absence of the result can prove the absence of the cause according to Dharmakīrti's Second Figure of the negative Syllogism. The Negation of the Effect is possible when, for instance, on the ground of the absence of smoke we deny the existence of its cause, the fire. Dharmottara explains³ that "since causes, indeed, do not necessarily produce their effects, therefore, when we observe the absence of the effect, we can infer only the absence of such causes, whose efficiency has not been interfered with, but not of other ones". And what are these causes? "Causes whose efficiency remains (necessarily) unopposed, are the causes which exist at the ultimate moment

¹ NBT., p. 40. 4 ff; transl., p. 107.

² NBT., p. 40 8, transl., p. 108

³ NBR., p. 81 10; transl., p. 88.

tions, without inquiring into the character of the connection and without telling us what kind of connection exists between the two terms, and on what law it is founded. All the figures of the Buddhist negative syllogism will be brought under one and the same figure of Celarent, some of them perhaps under Camestres. But the Buddhist theory starts from the principle that there are only two kinds of connection between facts and concepts, the one is founded on the law of Contradiction, the other on the law of Causation and from this point of view the practice of syllogizing may offer eleven different combinations, which although all being Celarent in form are different types of the negative reasoning. This division cannot be accused of representing a «False Subtlety of the Syllogistic Figures», but they are a classification of figures founded upon their relation to the two fundamental laws of cognition.

The fourth figure consists in the Affirmation of an Incompatible fact, from which the negation of its counterpart follows, e. g.—

Major premise. Wheresoever there is an efficient fire, there is no cold.

Minor premise. There is there an efficient fire.

Conclusion. There is there no cold.

The figure is in Celarent and refers to facts connected by Identity according to the law of Contradiction. Heat, the contradictorily opposed part of cold, is not felt directly, and fire, excluding heat, is perceived, or else another figure would have been resorted to. This figure is applied in such cases where fire is directly perceived by vision, but heat cannot be felt, because of the distance separating the observer from the fire. An imagined sensation of cold is thus denied.

The next, fifth figure is a modification of the former one by introducing the relation of causality in addition to the relation of contradiction. It consists in an Affirmation of an Incompatible Effect, e. g.—

Major premise. Wheresoever there is smoke, there is no cold.

Minor premise. There is there no smoke.

Conclusion. There is there no cold.

Such smoke is of course meant, which suggests the presence of a sufficiently powerful fire. This figure is resorted to when both the fire and the sensation of cold are not experienced directly. When cold could be felt directly, its Simple Negation would have been used according to the First Negative Figure. Where fire is perceived directly, the Fourth Figure of Negation, the Affirmation of the Incompatible, must be used. But when both are beyond the reach of the

and non-existence, both are perceived by sense-perception. The hypothetical judgment, by which the absence of the object is cognized, is interpreted as a special kind of direct perception through the senses and non-existence as a kind of additional qualification of existence. Between the absent jar and the place from which it is absent there is a relation of the "qualifying to the qualified,"¹ this relation being neither conjunction, nor inherence, but a "simple relation,"² is nevertheless something objectively real, cognized through the senses. There is thus a real interaction³ between the senses and the absent object; absence is a reality.

The Vaiśeṣikas departed at considerable length from their matches in realism, the Nāyāyikas. They admitted that non-existence is not existence, that there is no such category of Being which is called non-existence.⁴ It is therefore not cognized by the senses,⁵ but it is cognized in inference,⁶ e. g., when the non-production of a result is a sufficient reason to infer the absence of its cause. They admitted that this inference consists in the repudiation of a possible perception.⁷ But they nevertheless continued to maintain the reality of the relation of a "qualifier to a qualified," as existing between the absent object and its perceived empty place. The perception of the absent thing was for them not an independent, but a dependent cognition.⁸ On this ground the Vaiśeṣikas somehow made their peace with the Nāyāyikas and the views of the latter school were incorporated into the common stock when the schools amalgamated.

The Mīmāṃsaka school became divided on this problem of Negation, just as on many others, in two subschools. Prabhākara "the friend of the Buddhists"⁹ accepted the Buddhist theory integrally. He maintained that non-Existence is no separate reality, and Negation is not a separate source of knowledge. The empty place is the external reality, the absent object is imagination. The empty place is perceived

¹ *viśeṣya-viśeṣana-bhāva*

² *śaśibhāva-sambandha*

³ *sannikarsa*.

⁴ Cp N Kandall, p. 226. 21, where the Nyāya-vārtika-kāra is quoted with approval, but the direct perception of absence is rejected.

⁵ Ibid, p. 225 16, 23.

⁶ Praśast, p. 225. 14.

⁷ They admit that *yogya-anupalambhaka pratyāśaṅka*, but they do not admit the *bhūtaśayava abhāvasya pratyāśaṅka*, cp. N Kandall, p. 226.

⁸ Ibid, p. 226 23.

⁹ *bauddha-bandhuh* Prabhākara, cp. my article in Jacobi's Festschrift.

direct theory of judgment and its identification with the couple-sensation-conception, it follows directly that there are no totally abstract ideas; every abstract idea is a «flower in the sky», if it is not somehow attached to sensation.

The seventh figure of Negation is again an indirect negation and is founded on Causality, it is an Affirmation of Incompatibility with the Effect, e. g. —

Major premise. Whenever there is an efficient fire, there are no efficient causes of cold.

Minor premise. But there is here an efficient fire.

Conclusion. Therefore there are here no efficient causes producing cold.

There being no possibility of directly perceiving the presence of those factors which are known to produce cold, we imagine their presence and then repel that suggestion by pointing at a distance to the refulgence of a fire directly perceived. We must avail ourselves of this figure when neither the cold itself, nor its causes can be directly perceived. Where the cold could be felt, we would apply the second figure, the figure of denying the result, «there are here no causes producing cold, since there is no cold». And when its causes are amenable to sensation, we would avail ourselves of Simple Negation, the First Figure — «there are here no causes of cold, because we do not feel them». Here the deduction is partly founded on the law of Causation and partly on the law of Contradiction. The presence of fire is connected with the absence of cold by the law of Contradiction. The absence of the causes of cold is connected with the absence of fire by the law of Causation.

The next, eighth figure of negative syllogism, is again founded exclusively on the laws of Identity and Contradiction, it consists in the Affirmation of Incompatibility with an inclusive fact, e. g. —

Major premise. What is associated with a name, is not a simple reflex produced by a sensory stimulus.

Examples Just as the ideas of God, of Matter, etc.

Minor premise. Anyone of our ideas is associated with a name.

Conclusion. It is not a simple reflex.¹

What is here denied is the fact of being produced by a sensory stimulus coming from the object. This feature is subordinate to the fact of not being susceptible to receive a name, and this is contradictorily

¹ Tatp, p 88 17 ff.

Scholastic Vedānta has admitted Negation as a special source of knowledge coordinated to perception, inference and other sources. Its theory of Negation is borrowed from the Buddhists. To maintain that Negation is a source of right knowledge is the same as to maintain that it is assertive, it contains a necessary assertion and, in this sense, it is not negation, but affirmation, affirmation of the Ultimately Real. Indeed according to scholastic Vedānta all its sources of right knowledge are cognitions of brahma, of the only Reality, the One-without-a-Second. Just as sense-perception is a cognition of pure reality in the element "this" of the judgment "this is a jar", just so Negation is also a right cognition of the element, "this" in the judgment "this is no jar" or "this is an empty place". The "this" of these judgments is the transcendental "Thisness". The Thing-in-Itself of Buddhist logic is identified in scholastic Vedānta with the Ultimate Reality of the Eternal Brahma¹.

§ 9. EUROPEAN PARALLELS.

a) Sigwart's theory.

The problem of Negation has been solved in Europe by Sigwart, just as it has been solved in India by Dharmakīrti (and partly Dignāga). There is therefore a certain analogy between the respective position of these two logicians in their respective fields of action, of the one in the VII-th century AD in India and the other in the XIX-th century in Germany. Just as the history of the Indian views on Negation has to consider the conditions before Dharmakīrti, his reform and its repercussion among different schools, just so on the European side we have to consider the condition before Sigwart, his reform and its reaction in modern times.

Aristotle saw no difficulty in treating Negation on the same level as Affirmation. For him both were independent, equally primordial and coordinated modes of cognition. He however did not include neither Negation nor Non-existence among his Categories and thus avoided the necessity of assuming a non-existent Existence. However the fact that negation is not as primordial as affirmation is so obvious, that it could not have escaped his attention altogether. He remarks that "affirmation precedes negation, just as existence precedes non-existence".² This observation did not prevent him from putting negation side by side on the same level with affirmation in the definition of a proposi-

¹ Cp. Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, Nyāyamakaranda, etc. *passim*.

² Anal. Post., I 25, 86 b 33, cp. B. Erdmann, *Logik*, p. 495, n. 4.

That this is really so, «that the negation has a meaning only in the face of an attempted positive assertion, becomes at once clear, when we consider that only a restricted number of positive predicates can be ascribed to a subject, whereas the number of predicates which can be denied is infinite».¹ However actually denied are only those whose presence it is natural to expect. The judgments «there is no fire in the store» or «it does not thunder»² are judgments about non-existing things. How is a judgment about a non-existing thing possible? Only in imagination!—in the way of the non-existing thing being imagined. A negative judgment is concerned about an absent thing which has been hypothetically imagined as present. Therefore the negation of things expected and easily imaginable is natural. But it becomes ridiculous, if the presence of the denied object never could be expected. If someone instead of saying «there is no fire in the store» would have said «there is in it no elephant», although both the fire and the elephant are equally absent, the second judgment would seem strange, because unexpected.

If we compare with this statement of Sigwart the theory of Dharmakīrti, we cannot but find the similarity striking. The Buddhist philosopher begins, we have seen, by dividing all cognition in direct and indirect. Negation is referred to the indirect class, to what he calls inferential cognition.³ Even the simplest case of negation the judgment of the pattern «there is here no jar» is treated not as a variety of perception, but as an indirect cognition, as an inferential non-perception. The full meaning of such a judgment is the following one «Since all conditions of normal perceptibility are intact, the jar, had it been present on this spot, would have been perceived; but it is not actually perceived, therefore we must conclude that it is absent».⁴ The simple judgment of non-perception thus reduces to a full Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism «How is an absent thing cognized on a given spot», asks Dharmottara,⁵ and gives the very natural answer: «it is imagined»: imagined in the way of a hypothetical judgment of the following form: «if a jar would have been present on this spot it would have been perceived, but since it is not perceived, we can deny its presence». The fact of non-perception is the middle term from which the

¹ Ibid., I, 156

² Ibid., I, 168

³ *anumāna* = *anumāna-rīti*.

⁴ XBT., p. 49 17; transl., p. 185.

⁵ XBT., p. 22.8; transl., p. 62

(alternately) have been perceived and non-perceived, are necessarily perceptible. Therefore, in all the figures founded on the law of Contradiction, as for instance, in the fourth figure, the figure of Affirmation of an Incompatible fact; and in all the figures founded on the law of Causation, as for instance, the ninth figure, the figure of Negation of Causes, in all these figures it must be understood that Negation of contradicting facts, (of causes or effects) refers to sensible experience only!

§ 6. CONTRADICTION AND CAUSALITY ONLY IN THE EMPIRICAL SPHERE

It has been thus established that all the possible varieties of Negation are possible only on the basis of sensible facts. On the other hand, it has also been established, that all these varieties are founded on the two fundamental laws, upon which all our knowledge of relations is founded, the laws of Identity and Causality. It follows that the domain, in which these two fundamental laws obtain, must be experience. Beyond that domain, in the sphere of the Absolute, there is no place neither for Negation, nor for Contradiction; for in that sphere there is no non-existence, there is only pure absolute non-relative Existence, and therefore there can neither be any Contradiction, nor any Causality. «The two fundamental laws therefore, says Dharmakīrti,¹ do not extend their sway over objects other than empirical». In explaining this sentence Dharmottara says.² «Objects, different from those that are alternately perceived and non-perceived, are metaphysical objects, which are never perceived. Their contradiction to something, their causal relation with something it is impossible to imagine. Therefore is it impossible to ascertain what is it they are contradictorily opposed to, and what are they causally related to. For this reason contradicting facts, (as well as causes or effects), are fit to be denied only after their positive and negative observation has been found to be recurrent». The impossibility of any other contradiction or any other causality thus being established, the incompatible facts can be denied only when they are *sensibilia*, i. e., open to both perception and non-perception. Indeed³ Contradiction is realized when on the presence of one term we distinctly realize the absence of the other. Causal relation

¹ NB., p. 38, 19; transl., p. 104.

² NBT, p. 38 20, transl., p. 104.

³ Ibid., p. 39 2, transl., p. 105.

Ens, the *Hoc-Aliquid*, as the common subject of all predication and does not assume any category of Non-existence

b) Denied Copula and Negative Predicate.

As a result of the coincidence in the general view of Negation there is a further coincidence in answering the question about the proper residence of the negative particle. Since the judgment consists of subject, predicate and copula, it is natural to enquire whether Negation resides with the copula or with the predicate. It evidently cannot reside in the subject. The subject in the epistemological form of the judgment is the real particular, the element "this" which is existence itself and cannot be non-existence. But the predicate is always a Universal which can be either affirmed or denied. In the type-instance "this is that", the copula can be denied, and we shall have the type "this is not that", or the predicate can be denied and we then shall have "this is non-that". Sigwart maintains that negation affects always the copula. The copula is denied, not the predicate. He remarks that there can be no denying copula, for a denying copula is a *contradictio in adjecto*. There can be only a denied copula. According to this view the judgment with a negative predicate will be positive, because the copula will not be denied. Such is also the opinion of Aristotle¹ for whom the predicates *non-homo*, *non-justus* are positive, although indefinite, and the judgment *non est justus* is negative, but the judgment *est non-justus* affirmative. And such must also have been the opinion of Kant, who called these negative or infinite predicates "limiting" and the corresponding judgment indefinite. The view of Sigwart has been energetically opposed by Wundt,² for whom the judgment with a negative predicate is the predominant class of negative judgments, the judgment with a negative copula, which he calls "separation-judgment", being minor in importance. B. Erdmann,³ after some fluctuation, decides, that the judgment with a negative predicate is "nevertheless" negative, and Bradley⁴ does the same.

Now what is the position of the Buddhist Logic in the face of Sigwart's opinion and the controversy it has provoked?

¹ Cp Grote, op cit, p 122

² Logik² (Erkenntnislehre, p 225, n)

³ Logik², p. 500

⁴ Principles of Logic, p 116 He thinks that the ground for a negation is always some open or latent opposition between subject and predicate, the negative predicate is the opposed predicate.

sensuous¹ objects, objects which are invisible by their nature, objects which never can be present to the senses, which are *non-sensibilia*. The negation or non-perception of such objects is a «non-perception of the unperceivable». Non-perception of imagined *sensibilia* is a source of right knowledge,² because it leads on to successful action. But the non-perception, or negation, of objects whose presence to the senses cannot be imagined is not a source of knowledge, since it cannot lead on to successful purposeful action. Dharmakīrti³ asks what is the essence and what the function of such Negation? And answers that its essence consists «in excluding both the direct and indirect way of knowledge», and its function is the same as the function of a problematic judgment, that is to say, it is a non-judgment. There is no knowledge, neither direct nor indirect, about metaphysical objects, there are only problems, i. e. questions. Metaphysical objects are non-objects, metaphysical concepts are non-concepts, and metaphysical judgments are non-judgments. The problematic judgment is a *contradictio in objecto*. A problem is a question and a judgment; we have seen, is an answer, a verdict.

Dharmottara⁴ explains. «An object can be inaccessible in three respects, in time, in space and in essence». This means that a metaphysical object is beyond time, beyond space and beyond sensible reality. «Negation regarding such objects is a source of problematic reasoning. Now, what is the essence of such reasoning? It is repudiation of both direct and indirect knowledge. This means that it is not knowledge at all, because the essence of knowledge is to be an assertory relation between cognition and its object».

Knowledge is a relation between the cognizable and cognition, between the object and its cognition or between reality and logic. It is therefore asked⁵ «if cognition proves the existence of the cognized, it would be only natural to expect that absence of cognition would be a proof of the absence of a cognized object?»

This question is answered by Dharmakīrti⁶ in the following way: «When there are altogether no means of cognition, the non-existence of the object cannot be established». This means that when an object

¹ *adr̥śya-anupalabdhi*

² *pramāṇa*

³ NB, p. 39. 19, transl., p. 107.

⁴ NBT, p. 39. 21; transl., p. 107

⁵ NBT, p. 40 1; transl., p. 107.

⁶ NB., p. 40 2; transl., p. 107.

Stcherbatsky, I

But although it is true that negation in a negative judgment affects the copula, we must not forget that the verb substantive which expresses the copula, has a double function: 1) to express existence and 2) to serve as a copula in predication. In full accord with this the negative or negated copula has also a double function: 1) to express non-existence and 2) to deny connection, that is, to express separation. It is true, as Sigwart remarks, that a separating copula is a *contradictio in adjecto*, however the copula will then be copula only by name, it will be a sign of separation in the sense of incongruence. And since such separation can only be found between two concepts, such a judgment is always a judgment with two concepts or an inferential judgment, a major premise. It will be no perceptual judgment any more. However, the substitute for the perceptual judgment will then be in the minor premise of the inference, e. g.—

Major premise. Wheresoever there are no trees at all, there can be no *śamśapās*.

Minor premise. There are here no trees at all (= Perception?)

Conclusion. There are here no *śamśapās*.

The conclusion must be taken with the proviso 'if they would be present and nothing interfering with their perceptibility would bar us, we would see them'. Thus in all cases negation must be reduced to non-perception of a hypothetically visible object. It cannot be objected that there are abstract concepts, which cannot be treated as visible or invisible, because, according to the Buddhist view, every concept must be at the same time a perceptual judgment: it must refer to reality, otherwise it will be outside the domain of knowledge.

It can be maintained, as it appears from what has been explained above, that there is in the negative judgment no copula at all, that the substantive verb in these judgments of non-perception has neither the meaning of a copula or conjunction, nor of a negative copula or separation; it is here used in its other sense, the sense of existence. Its negative form means then absence of a given object on a given place, but not separation between two qualities or predication of a

and others not; he wants to have a basis for denial. He says that incompatibility is something 'given' with the actual nature of the contents of our representations and their relation: and Bradley, who follows Sigwart in this research, finds an explanation, p. 118, in a subjective mental repulsion of qualities, that is, a mental impenetrability which is but a metaphor from physical impenetrability. We shall see that, according to the Indians, incompatibility always denotes, directly or indirectly, on the law of Contradiction. No other explanation is needed.

the preceding compact chain of moments), because the possibility of her preceding moments being checked in their efficiency can be excluded». If we then maintain that the Negation as a mental phenomenon must in any case have a cause in external reality, this is right only in the sense that even that Negation is a positive cognition of something, i. e., of an indefinite moment of reality. These considerations are very important, they strike at the heart of Buddhism as a religion. The existence of the Omniscient, of the Buddha, is at stake. He is decidedly a metaphysical entity and according to the principles just laid down nothing can be denied and nothing can be affirmed of him. If he be identified with existence itself, with absolute existence, he then, of course, cannot be denied. Existence cannot be non-existence. But of this kind of existence nothing can be said neither in the way of negation, nor in the way of affirmation.

§ 8. INDIAN DEVELOPMENTS.

The originality of the Buddhist theory of Negation and the arguments by which it was supported could not but produce a kind of revolution in the domain of Indian logic and oblige all schools to consider their own views on the subject, so as to adapt the new theory, as far as possible, to their fundamental principles, which, of course, could not be abandoned. Some of them adopted the Buddhist theory almost entirely, some adopted it partly, others again opposed it with stubborn resistance. The Buddhists, indeed, maintained 1) that reality is not split in existence and non-existence, it consists of existence only, 2) that nevertheless non-existence of a special kind has positive validity, as a method of cognition capable of guiding purposeful actions, 3) that negation is not a direct way of cognizing reality, but a roundabout way and therefore included in inference, 4) that the logical reason in this inference is «non-perception», that is to say, negation is based on hypothetical sense-perception. From all these four points Naiyāyikas admitted only the last one, but they interpreted it so as to deprive it of all its value. Vātsyāyana¹ admits that non-existence is cognized in the way of a hypothetical judgment. If the object is existent, it is cognized, if it is non-existent, it is not cognized, for were it existent it would have been cognized. However, this does not interfere with his fundamental view that reality consists of existence.

¹ NB, p. 2.5

but Brentano and Bergman prefer to call the first step simple presentation and reserve the term judgment for the second step. According to them the first step, when there as yet is neither affirmation nor negation, is no judgment at all. The real judgment is contained in the second step, which has been christened by Windelband as rejudgment,¹ but is, according to them, the real judgment. The latter opinion fully agrees with some views expressed by Dharmakīrti without in the least affecting his view of the negative judgment as an indirect cognition repelling an imagined affirmation.

We have quoted above² his very characteristic utterance about the difference between the two steps in cognition, which correspond to two different faculties of the human mind. "(Simple) sensation, says he, does not convince anybody; if it cognizes something, it does it in the way of a simple reflex, not as a judgment. (*na niscayena, kintarhi, tat-pratibhāsenā*). Only inasmuch (*yathā āmāse*) as it is capable of producing a subsequent judgment (or decision), does it assume (the dignity of a real) source of cognition". The subsequent judgment is really a second step in cognition, but the first step then contains no judgment at all. This fundamental distinction has however nothing to do with the division of judgments into affirmative and negative. Every judgment is a second step with regard to a simple reflex, or a simple presentation; but every negative judgment is a secondary step with regard to an attempted affirmation, which is baffled by it. Windelband's theory clearly appears as untenable, when we apply it to the perceptual judgment, the only real judgment. Indeed on the strength of this theory the judgment "this is a jar" would not contain neither affirmation, nor negation in itself. But a re-judgment, or second judgment, comes, which tells us either that "it is true that there is here a jar", or that "it is false that there is here a jar". This clearly leads to an infinite regress, it at the same time becomes an eloquent proof of the rightness of Sigwart's and Dharmakīrti's theory. Windelband admits³ that the question turns round a right definition of what a judgment is and that, if the opinion of Schuppe and others is taken in consideration, the re-judgment will already be contained in the judgment, since according to this view, — which, we have seen, is also the Indian view, — there is no difference at all between concep-

¹ Cp. the Indian theory about *jñānasya tat-prāmāṇyasya 'an' svataṭstvam paratāṭstvam* mentioned above, p. 65.

² Cp. above, p. 241.

³ Ibid., p. 181.

by the senses, the absent object is denied in a negative judgment which repels its imagined presence.¹ But the main stock of the school, the followers of Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, remained faithful to the letter of their old authority Śabarasvāmin, who had declared that «the non-existence of a means of cognition is a proof of the non-existence (of the object).»² They rejected the Buddhist theory that the non-existent thing is an imagined thing. They not only admitted Non-existence as an external reality, but they admitted a double reality of non-existence, an objective one and a subjective one. Such a view, they thought, was urged upon them by the words of Śabara. The objective Non-existence is the real absence of the object, either before its production, or after its destruction, or mutual non-existence, alias «otherness» of one object in regard of the other, or absolute non-existence. All four kinds of non-existence are objective realities. The subjective Non-existence is the non-existence, or non-efficiency, of all means of cognition. When neither perception, nor inference, nor any other source of knowledge, is available, this absence of a source of knowledge becomes itself a new source of cognition. Thus the real absence of the object becomes cognized by the real absence of all sources of knowledge.³ Non-existence (*abhāva*) is both the non-existence of the object and the non-existence of the corresponding source of knowledge. The school opposed the view of the Buddhists and of Prabhākara by denying that the absent object is imagined. They opposed the Naiyāyikas by denying that non-existence could be perceived through the senses directly. They opposed the Vaiśeṣikas by denying that it could be cognized by inference. They maintained that non-existence itself was a special, primordial source of knowledge, coordinated to inference, but not subordinated to it.⁴

Thus we have here an example of the double influence of a logical theory, positive and negative. One party yields to the influence of a new idea, gives up its own theory and replaces it by the new and foreign one. The other party rejects the novelty, hardens in the old belief and develops it into its most remote, but logically deduced, consequences.

¹ Śūst. Dip., p. 326 ff

² *abhāvoṃ prāmāṇyābhāvo naṣṭīty asya arthasya asannīkṛtasya*

³ Ślokaṇṛt (abhāva), p. 473 ff., Ś. D., p. 322 ff

⁴ The Bhittā-Mīmāṃsaka theory of Negation is criticized in N. Kandalī, p. 227. 5 ff

CHAPTER II.

THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION

§ 1. THE ORIGIN OF CONTRADICTION.

The origin of every judgment and of every conception, as they are understood in Buddhist logic, lies, we have seen,¹ in an act of running through² a manifold of undetermined intuition and in fastening³ upon one point of that manifold, a point with regard to which the rest will be divided in two, usually unequal parts: On the one side we shall have the comparatively limited number of similar things, on the other the illimited, or less limited, number of the dissimilar ones. The similar will be "other" than the dissimilar and the dissimilar will be "other" than the similar; both parts mutually represent the absence of each the other, without any intermediate member.⁴ Every conscious thought or cognition thus represents a dichotomy. The active part of consciousness, its spontaneity in cognition begins with an act of dichotomy. As soon as our intellectual eye begins to glimmer, our thought is already beset with contradiction. The moment our thought has stopped running and has fixed upon an external point, so as to be able internally to produce the judgment "this is blue", at that moment we have separated the universe of discourse into two unequal halves, the limited part of the blue and the less limited part of the non-blue. The definite thought of the blue is nothing more than the definite exclusion of the non-blue, it is the fixation of a point of demarcation, which has nothing blue in itself, but with

is indeed affirmed in a second step, in the minor premise, "this is a rose" and, consequently, a flower. This minor premise appears as a kind of re-judgment concerning the reality, or truth, of the synthesis suggested in the major premise. The confusion between inference and judgment regarding the major premise has led to a confusion regarding the re-judgment contained in the minor premise. At the bottom of the re-judgment we find a function analogous to a minor premise. That is why Windelband's theory appears so strange when it is applied to the perceptual or real judgment. After having said "this is a jar" there is no need to repeat it in the re-judgment "it is true that this is a jar".

¹ Cp above, p 209 ff

² *citarika*

³ *vicāra*.

⁴ *śūnya-prakāra-abhāva*

tion or judgment. This attitude was faithfully preserved, in European logic through all the middle ages and in modern times up to the time of Sigwart. Kant did not depart in this case from traditional logic, although, as it appears from one of his very illuminating remarks,¹ the future theory was present to his mind. He however did not attach much importance to it and it received at his hand no development. For Aristotle Affirmation and Negation are the logical counterparts of Existence and Non-existence, for Kant the affirmative and negative judgments are the patterns from which the categories of Reality and Negation are deduced. They represent two coordinated aspects of the world of mere phenomena.

Sigwart begins by stating that Aristotle and all those logicians who followed him in characterizing judgment as either affirmation or negation and included the division in the definition, were right in so far as all judgments are exhaustively so divided, and that judgment in general is only possible either by affirming or denying a predicate of a subject, but they were not right in coordinating these two modes of cognition as both equally primordial and independent from one another.² "Negation is always directed against an attempted synthesis, and presupposes a suggestion,³ either internally arisen or brought in from without, to connect subject and predicate". Accordingly "a denial has a good meaning only when it is preceded by an attempt which is repelled in a negative judgment". The positive judgment does not require a preceding denial, whereas it is a necessary condition of every negation, that it should be preceded in thought by an attempted affirmation.⁴

¹ He says, OPR., p. 509 (2-nd ed, p 709), "The proper object of negative judgments is to prevent error. Hence negative propositions intended to prevent erroneous knowledge in cases where error is never possible, may no doubt be very true, but they are empty, they do not answer any purpose and sound therefore often absurd: like the well known utterance of a schoolmaster that Alexander could not have conquered any countries without an army."

² Op cit. I. 155

³ *Zusammensetzung* = *Ärepa*.

⁴ A remarkable foreshadowing of Sigwart's theory is found in J. S. Mill's *Logic*, I, p. 44. Treating of privative names, he says that those names are "positive and negative together". Names like *blind* cannot be applied to sticks and stones, albeit they are not *seeing*. They connote the absence of a quality and the fact that its presence might naturally have been expected. Therefore we never would say, except in poetry, that the stones are blind. The example of stones that are not seeing, or not speaking, is then repeated by Sigwart, I 172, Bradley, I 119 and others.

something incompatible with fire and actively opposed to it. The different and incompatible presuppose the idea of simple absence.

The incompatibility or opposition is of a double kind. It is either efficient, aggressive repugnancy of two things that cannot coexist without collision, as the hot and the cold; or it is the simple logical opposition of two things, of which the one is the "complete" negation of the other, as the blue and the non-blue. This is contradiction, it is logical, it is Antiphrasis.¹

§ 2. LOGICAL CONTRADICTION.

All and every thing in the Universe, whether real or only imagined, is subject to the law of "otherness", owing to which it is what it is, viz. it is different, or separate from all other things of the universe. This law could also be called the law of Identity, since it determines that the object is what it is, it is identical with itself. But according to the Buddhists there are altogether no identical real things. A thing is not the same at different moments or in different places. Every variation of time and place makes the thing "another" thing. "If the blue, says Śāntiraksita, were a pervasive reality", i. e. a reality everywhere identical with itself, "there would be no limit assignable for identification, since similarity is found everywhere, the "all" would become the "whole", the universe would become the One-without-the-Second."² Therefore every thing in the universe is separate, every thing is strictly real by itself, every ultimate reality is a Thing-in-Itself. Identity means Identity of Indiscernibles, things are identical or similar only as far as we do not discern their differences.³ The law, according to which two things "are forbidden to be one thing",⁴ is the law of Contradiction. Ultimate reality is, in Buddhist philosophy, the reality of a point-instant, real or ultimate causality is the efficiency of a point-instant, just so ultimate diversity is the diversity of the Things-in-Themselves.

However, this ideal law of Contradiction is of no avail for the practical requirements of our life, it cannot serve us in forming con-

¹ *lāṅkālo vairodhah*

² TS, p. 498 B—4, cp TSP, p. 498 19 ff.

³ *śāntam prithak*

⁴ *bhedāgrahāt*

⁵ *meidāha-śakya*, cp NBT, p. 70 19, transl., p. 197.

absence of the jar is deduced. The negative judgment, even the most simple one, the judgment of non-perception, is an inference. The fact that Dharmakīrti calls it inference, while Sigwart speaks of negative judgments, has no importance, since inference means here indirect cognition. Negation is an indirect cognition and consists in repelling a hypothetical affirmation.

The discovery and the clear formulation of the meaning of Negation must thus be credited to Dharmakīrti in India and to Sigwart in Europe. This coincident solution of a capital logical problem must be regarded as an outstanding fact in the comparative history of philosophy.

Both philosophers seem to have been lead to this discovery in a somewhat similar manner. Sigwart declares it to be impossible to save the independent rank of the negative judgment by defining it, in accord with an occasional utterance of Aristotle, as a separation of subject and object, contrasting with their synthesis in an affirmative proposition. "The predicate of a judgment", says he,¹ "is never an Ens, it never can be conceived as a separate Ens, to be posited as something really separate from the subject". "This separation does not exist in that reality, to which our judgment refers".² "The thing exists only with its quality and the quality only with the thing. Both constitute an inseparable unity". "If we remain by the simplest, the perceptual³ judgment, the congruence of the sensation with the representation is an entirely internal relation and we cannot maintain that the connecting of the elements of a judgment corresponds to a union of analogous objective elements".⁴ This, we know, is exactly the Indian view according to which the real judgment is the perceptual which unites a sensation with a representation, and reduces to a relation of synthesis between a subject which is always an Ens with a predicate which is never an Ens.

If the predicate is always a subjective construction, whether it be affirmed or denied, the difference between affirmation and negation reduces to a difference of a direct and an indirect characterization of the same Ens. Aristotle hints the right point when he posits the real

¹ Ibid., I. 170

² Ibid., I. 104 As all European logicians, Sigwart has that judgment in view which the Indians call analytical (*svabhāva-anumāna*), for in the inferential judgment founded on causation the subject and predicate refer to two different Ens'es.

³ Benennungsurtheil

⁴ Ibid.

of Excluded Middle or of an Excluded Third Part,² since there are only two parts between which the respective whole is divided. It may also be called the law of Double Negation, since the one part is the negation of the other just in the same degree in which the latter is the negation of the former. If A is related to a non-A just in the same way in which a non-A is related to A, it is clear that the negation of a non-A will be equal to A. If there is in the blue nothing more than its opposition to the non-blue, it is clear that the opposition to the non-blue will be nothing else than the blue itself. Since all things are relative, every thing, except the ultimate reality of the point-instant, is nothing but the counterpart of its own negation. The Indian Realists are perhaps in the right when they maintain that every thing consists of existence and non-existence, but they are wrong in hypostasizing both existence and non-existence and forgetting that there are only mental superstructures upon an element of genuine reality, which alone is absolute and non relative. The superstructures are erected by our productive imagination operating upon the dichotomizing principle. Right are also partly the Mādhyamikas and Vedāntins which represent the opposite view, viz., that every thing is relative and therefore unreal, "just as the short and the long", the short being nothing over and above the negation of the long and vice versa. But they again are wrong in denying the reality of the point-instant underlying every relative thought-construction. The critical theory of the Sautāntika-Yogācāra school alone escapes to the defects of both extremities in maintaining an imagined phenomenal world constructed by our productive imagination upon a foundation of transcendental reality.

§ 3 DYNAMICAL OPPOSITION.

The character of complete mutual exclusion or mutual repulsion can be ascribed to the contradictory parts of a couple only metaphorically. They can peacefully exist in close contiguity without interfering with the existence of one another, without the one encroaching upon the territory occupied by the other. It is a logical, but not a real mutual repulsion.

There is, however, a variety of contradiction which, in addition to being logical, is moreover real or dynamical. The diametrically opposed parts are not only the one the negation of the other logically,

² *tritya-piāra-abbhāva*, TSP, p. 330

According to Dharmakīrti Negation is directed against an attempted affirmation of some presence, it is consequently directed against the copula, if the copula means existence and presence. A judgment with a negative predicate will «nevertheless» be affirmative. It may also be negative if the copula is also negative, as e. g., Aristotle's example *non est justus non homo*, or the Indian example «*all things are not im-permanent*», but the judgments *est justus non-homo* and *all things are im-permanent* will be affirmative. In this respect there is full agreement between Sigwart and Dharmakīrti.

There is a divergence in another respect. The Indian theory takes its stand on the perceptual judgment. The negative judgment is accordingly a judgment of non-perception, non-perception of a thing expected to be present on a given place. Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara compare all possible instances of negative judgments and reduce each of them to the non-perception of an imagined visibility. The ground for repudiating a suggested presence is, first of all, direct sense-perception, viz., the perception of the empty place where the denied object is expected to be present. This is simple or direct Negation.¹ But there is also an indirect or deduced Negation. We can through inference ascertain the absence of a thing in a place which is not accessible to direct perception. And that is possible in two ways, viz., we either fail to perceive on a given spot something which would necessarily have been present, if the object of our denial were also there present² or we perceive by positive sense-perception the presence of something incompatible with it.³ But whether the ground be the absence of a necessarily connected thing or the presence of an incompatible thing, whether it be privation or opposition,⁴ in any case negation will be reducible to an instance of non-perception of hypothetical visibility. Thus negation always affects the copula and its ground is either direct perception or the laws of necessary conjunction, which are the three laws of Contradiction, of Identity and Causality. What Figures of Negation are produced by the interaction of the positive laws of Identity and Causation with the negative law of Contradiction, has been indicated above⁵ and need not be repeated here.

¹ NBT, p. 385

² *svabhāvanupalabdhi*

³ Cp Sigwart, op. cit., I 172 — «entweder fehlt das Prädikat, oder .. ist das Subject mit dem Prädicate unverträglich»

⁴ Cp Bradley, *Logic*, p. 117

⁵ Sigwart op. cit., p. 179 ff seems to be seeking for a law, or laws, explaining why some representations (or conceptions) are by their nature incompatible

the following part If one part is opposed to the other, it is at the same time "doing something"¹, it indirectly partakes in its production.

Nor is the contradiction in all the cases of efficient repugnancy complete. Light is the complete contradiction of non-light. There is nothing intermediate between light and non-light. The law of the Excluded Middle fully applies. But between light and darkness considered as real phenomena there is always something in the middle. Even if the change is quite abrupt, even if light appears all of a sudden, on the very place² where the moment before there reigned absolute darkness, nevertheless there is at least one intermediate moment of twilight. The change, if it is produced as quickly as possible, requires nevertheless at least three moments: the ultimate moment of darkness, the initial moment of light and at least one moment between them, for the change to take place.

If the opposition is not complete as regards time, neither is it complete as regards space. When a light is produced in a large room darkness is completely annihilated only in that part of it, which is nearest to the lamp³. In the remaining part there is either twilight or darkness. Light is produced only as far as the efficient forces producing it are capable of doing it.

This is quite different in the case of a logical opposition between light and non-light. This opposition is complete, there is no twilight between light and non-light, twilight is included in the non-light. Neither is this opposition affected by the conditions of space. Light is the repudiation of non-light everywhere and always. The relation of opposition between light and non-light is characterized by logical necessity, which is not the case as regards the relation between light and darkness as real phenomena.

Such is also the meaning of the quai-rel relating to the indifferent feeling. The Hinayāna maintained that between pleasure and pain there is the indifferent feeling in the middle. But the logicians answered that the indifferent feeling, since it is not pleasure, must be reckoned as belonging to the category of pain,⁴ since there are only two mutually

¹ *ārambha-kāra*, cp NBT, p 68 9, cp TSP, p 157 7—*ārambha-kāra* *tirodhā* the meaning is that the given point-instant is efficient as a cause, but not as opposition or contradiction, since the contradiction is constructed by the intellect.

² NBT, p 60 19 ff, transal, p 189

³ Ibid, p 68 16, transal, p 189

⁴ TSP, p 65 1 ff.

negative quality. A negative quality is but a differentiating quality, and all qualities are differentiating, there is not a single one which would not be differentiating and negative in that sense. The Buddhist theory concerning Negative Predicates will be discussed later on, as well as some other important problems, inseparable from the problem of Negation. They will be treated, and their Indian shape compared with the European one, in connection with the Law of Contradiction.¹

c) Judgment and Re-judgment.

Many philosophers, as e. g. Bergson in France, Bradley and Bosanquet in England, accepted Sigwart's theory fullheartedly, others, as e. g. Wundt, rejected it, others, as e. g. B. Erdmann, admitted it with important modifications. It is perhaps worth our while to mention here the attitude of Windelband, because its Indian parallels are apt to throw some light on the problem itself. According to this theory² every judgment is double; it consists of a judgment and a re-judgment (*Beurtheilung*). The second is a judgment about the first (*ein Urtheil über ein Urtheil*). Affirmation and Negation are coordinated and placed on the same footing. But they both belong to the re-judgment class. They are not judgments. The judgment contains initially no decision, it is neither affirmative nor negative. Thus the indirect and subjective character which Sigwart's theory ascribes to the negative judgment as its distinctive feature, is extended by Windelband to affirmation and both these fundamental varieties of cognition become again coordinated as being both secondary and indirect. Lotze calls the second step, which contains a decision about the validity or invalidity of the first, a secondary «by-thought» (*Nebengedanke*); B. Erdmann retains the term «re-judgment» (*Beurtheilung*),

¹ It is thus clear that the Indian philosophers were thoroughly aware of the double function of the substantive verb. It is curious that the Tibetan and Mongolian nations could never had confused the two functions, because their languages provide them with two quite different words for their expression. The verbs *god* and *med* in Tibetan can never be confounded with the *yin* and *min*, the first pair meaning presence, resp. absence, the second pair meaning conjunction and separation. But in Europe the two meanings were always confounded. The first who has clearly and sharply described the distinction, is the French philosopher Laromiguière, and all the acumen of men like Hobbes, James Mill and J. S. Mill was needed fully to bring out and illustrate the confusion. Cp. Grote, op. cit., p. 387.

² W. Windelband, *Beiträge zur Lehre vom negativem Urtheil*, Tübingen, 1921.

but only to constructed phenomena. That the logical law of contradiction does not apply to the Things-in-Themselves, has already been pointed out, it is moreover evident from its characteristic as logical, for logic is thought and thought is imagination, not ultimate reality.

It appears from the words of Dharmottara,¹ that there was a quarrel among Buddhist logicians on the problem as to whether the relation of efficient opposition was real or merely logical, whether it was transcendentially real or only phenomenal. The problem is solved by Dharmottara in that sense, that just as there are two kinds of causality, the one transcendental and real, obtaining between point-instants, the other, being a category metaphorical obtaining between phenomena, just so there are two kinds of efficient opposition. But the one obtaining between point-instants is causation simply, and causation is not contradiction. Kamalaśīla explains² the point in the following manner. "Some entities there are which are causes of curtailment in regard of other entities. They achieve it that the run of these point-instants (which constitute those entities) gradually becomes lower and feeble. E. g., fire in respect of cold. But other entities are not so, they are not causes of shrinkage, as for instance, the same fire in regard of the smoke (produced by it). Now, although there is a relation of (mere) causality between the just mentioned counter-parts between entities producing shrinkage and this shrinking, but common humanity, their faculty of vision being obscured by the darkness of ignorance, wrongly assume here a relation of contradiction (It is opposition). This opposition appears in various forms, e. g., the cold is opposed by fire, the flame of a lamp is opposed by the wind, darkness is opposed by light, etc. In Ultimate Reality there is however no relation of opposition between entities (as Things-in-Themselves). That is the reason why the Master (Dharmakīrti) has delivered himself in the following way: "When one fact has duration as long as the sum-total of its causes remains unimpaired, and it then shrinks as soon as another fact (being opposed to it) appears; it follows that both are (dynamically) opposed, (just as the sensations of heat and of cold) (The Master says) their opposition follows", that means it is constructed (by our intellect) it is not ultimately real"

¹ NBT, p. 69. 11 ff transl p. 192

² TPS p. 156. 27 ff

³ Cp NBT, p. 68 3, transl, p. 187.

tion and judgment «The Existence already contained in the affirmation of every conception is not only a justified form of judgment, it is the purest and simplest fundamental type of every judgment in general». Such is, we have seen, the Indian theory. «The traditional distinction between concept and judgment appears under these conditions as irrelevant for the task, which usually is assigned to logic,¹ viz., the task of establishing a normative system of the forms of thought. The division is grammatical, not logical... Nothing else remains than to interpret every judgment as an existential one for the complex representation which is thought through it». According to the Indians, the real judgment is, however, not the existential, but the perceptual. Existence, i. e. Affirmation, is then contained in every judgment, not as its predicate, but as its necessary subject. If the real judgment is found in the synthesis, identification, objectivization and decision contained in the simple pattern «this is a jar», we shall have the Indian theory.

Windelband likewise comes very near to the other chief point of the Indian theory of judgment, the point which concerns the inferential judgment and the categories of Relation expressed in it.² «The existence, which is understood in the judgment „the rose is a flower“, says he, is quite different from the existence, which is contained in the judgment „lightning produces thunder“. If we change these, both examples into Dharmakīrti's «the *śmṣapā* is a tree» and «smoke is produced by fire», we will see that Windelband makes here an approach to the fundamental and exhaustive division of all relations into those founded on Identity and on Causation. Since in the proposition «the *śmṣapā* is a tree» there are two concepts, there also are included in it two perceptual judgments «this is a *śmṣapā*» and «this is a tree». A similar opinion is expressed by Sigwart³ with regard to Kant's example «a learned man is not unlearned», in which he also distinguishes two perceptual judgments «x is learned» and «x is unlearned».⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 182.

² Cp. Ibid., p. 188—184.

³ Op. cit., I 196

⁴ In this connection we may perhaps venture an explanation of what lies at the bottom of Windelband's somewhat strange theory of «re-judgment». The judgment with two concepts, which is usually regarded as the pattern of all judgments, does not indeed contain any element asserting the reality of the synthesis. If e. g., the judgment «the rose is a flower» is a judgment of concomitance or major premise, which only affirms consistency or congruence of two concepts. Their reality

For Instantaneity (we have seen) is the very essence of every (real thing, of every ultimate reality, underlying) a patch of blue or any other (real object). Therefore by the exclusion (of such an illimited thing as existence in general) nothing representable can be cognized. Dharmottara intends to say that by contrasting a thing with such an all-embracing character as Existence in general nothing definite can be cognized. Cognition is contrasting of a definite thing with an other definite thing, not with something illimited. «But then, continues Dharmottara,¹ is it not that negation (or non-existence) is something by itself (quite) indefinite?» (i. e. the non-A is illimited)? and answers. «why should it be necessarily indefinite? (why should non-A be shapeless?) Inasmuch as Negation (as we understand it) is the negation of an imagined presence, it is an imagined absence which has a definite shape as far as it is limited by the definite form of a (definite) real object». Thus Dharmottara maintains that by illimited negation, just as by illimited existence, nothing really can be cognized. The essence of knowledge is limitation, the law of contradiction is a fundamental law of thought, which says that our thought cannot operate otherwise than by dichotomizing, in every case of existence, in two imagined parts, which represent mutually the complete negation of one another. The law «of Efficient Opposition» and the law of «Otherness» are dependent laws, direct consequences of the law of Contradiction.

§ 5. DIFFERENT FORMULATIONS OF THE LAWS OF CONTRADICTION AND OTHERNESS.

The great importance of the manner in which the Buddhists viewed the laws of Contradiction and Otherness for their ontology has already been indicated.¹ It is one of their chief arguments in establishing the theory of Instantaneous Being. In their endless controversies with their adversaries, the brahmanic schools, the Buddhists appeal to their law of Contradiction almost on every step. It is generally designated as the law of Contradictory Predication,² under which name all its different aspects, such as Efficient Opposition,³ Logical Anti-

¹ Cp. above, p. 108 and 409

² *veruḍḍha-dharma-samsarga* (or *adhyāsa*) = *lāṣanūla-virodha*

³ *saha-anavasthāna-virodha* = *viariya-viariṭa-bhāva*

regard to which we shall have on one side the blue and on the other side the non-blue. Just so in cognizing something as the object "fire", we at the same time think "this here is fire" and "that there is not fire", there is nothing intermediate. That the two parts are merely relative is clearly seen from the fact that a double negation is equal to affirmation; the not non-fire is the fire, because the fire is not the non-fire. When the two parts more or less hold the balance under the same determinable, it becomes indifferent what part will be expressed positively and what negatively, as, e. g., hot and cold, light and dark, permanent and impermanent, or non-impermanent and impermanent. But in the majority of cases the similar part is that part of the couple, to which we attend more than to the other and which we express positively, the correlative part is then expressed negatively. Thus to think actively, to think constructively, means to think dichotomizingly. The terms "construction"¹ and "dichotomy",² in their application to thought, are synonymous and embrace every act of consciousness, except its purely passive part, the pure sensation. Conception, image, representation, presentation, judgment and inference will be comprised under dichotomy, as thought-construction or productive imagination. It will be opposed to pure sensation.

Now the law of Contradiction is nothing but the expression of the fact that all cognition is dichotomizing and relative. We can actively cognize or determine a thing only by opposing it to what it is not.

The negative part of the couple consists of the negation, or non-existence, of the positive part, and this negation in its turn consists either of something merely "other", or of something opposed to it. Non-existence is thus the general conception: otherness and contradiction are subordinated to it. "The different and the contrary, says Dharmottara,³ cannot be conceived so long as the non-existence of the similar is not realized. Therefore, otherness and opposition are realized as representing the negation of the similar, because such is the import of these otherness and opposition. Negation is conceived as the absence of the similar directly, otherness and opposition are conceived as the absence of the similar indirectly. The dissimilar class in regard of fire will embrace 1) the simple absence of fire, 2) the presence of something else instead of fire, and 3) the presence of

¹ *kalpanā=skhāraṇa*

² *vikalpa=śūdrhīlāraṇa*

³ NBT, p. 21, 6, transl, p. 39

Stcherbatsky, I

A thing possessing two different qualities not included the one in the other, is therefore not one thing, but represents two separate things.

Another slightly different formulation says "from union with a contradictory quality the thing becomes other".¹ That is, a thing loses its identity or becomes another thing if it combines with incompatible qualities. And what are incompatible qualities? They are time, space and essence (sensible qualities etc). If a thing exists at one time, it is contradictory to assume that it exists at another time or moment. If it exists in one place, it is contradictory to assume its existence in another place or another point. If the thing has one content or essence, it is contradictory to assume that it is the same as an "other" object with a different content. What is blue itself can never be made un-blue, a thousand of skilled men cannot change the blue itself into the non-blue. This, of course, does not mean that the colour of a thing cannot be changed in common life, but it means that the blue itself cannot be the non-blue. The identity of the blue is not something existing by itself, it is constructed on the basis of its contradiction to the non-blue. The law of contradiction destroys the reality of the blue and at the same time it constructs its ideality on the basis of its opposition to the non-blue.

Still another formulation or proof, of the law of Contradiction comes from the following argument.² Whatsoever "is cleared off"³ must be also "cleared up"⁴ and it is cleared up exactly in the measure in which it is cleared off. E. g. a ruby is cleared up i. e. definitely represented, as soon as it is cleared off i. e. opposed to the non-rubies, topazes etc., and it is cleared up exactly in the measure in which it is cleared off. The contents of the representation, or of the concept of the ruby will be definite exactly to the extent as it will be opposed to the non-rubies and exactly in dependence on the properties included in the non-rubies. However this rule refers also to the time and space conditions of the ruby. For the ruby consists merely of certain time, space and sense-data conditions. The time of the ruby will be settled by the exclusion of all other times, i. e. all other moments except the given one. And so also its space condition. It will thus be reduced to a point-instant of ultimate reality, to the *Hoc Aliquid*, which will have no duration and will disappear as soon as it appears.

¹ NBT, p. 42: transl, p. 8.

² NBT, p. 69-72 ff and Tātp, p. 92-15 ff.

³ *paricchinna* = *nam-par-chad-pa*.

⁴ *yavacchinnā* = *yons-su-chad-pa*.

cepts and in guiding our purposive actions "Any pair of objects, says Dharmottara,¹ unavoidably include mutually the one the negation of the other", and he continues: "But what is it that we can conceive as non-existent in something else? Something distinct. Not something illimited, as, e. g., the fact of being a point-instant (of ultimate reality). Since the very essence of all existent objects, of patches of blue and other (coloured surfaces) consists of point-instants (of ultimate, pure reality, to which they are referred), therefore this fact has no limit. By a contrast with (mere) point-instants, nothing (definite) can be apprehended". Here the Buddhist is saved from the indefiniteness of the infinite judgment, or the illimited conception, by his theory of Negation. "Why indeed, asks Dharmottara, should this non-existence be illimited?" In so far as it has the definite shape of the repudiated object, whose presence has been imagined, it is not illimited. It is an imagined, concrete case of non-existence and therefore when we in a negative judgment distinctly cognize the absence of a definite thing on some definite place, we cognize it not in the shape of an illimited non-existence, but in a definite form, whether this form has been actually experienced as only imagined

Dharmakīrti defines the law of Contradiction as that feature of each thing, whether real or imagined, owing to which everything presents itself in couples of two parts, of which the one is the complete negation of the other. "There is contradiction,"² says he, in a couple whose essence is posited in a complete mutual exclusion, as, e. g., existence and non-existence". Complete³ mutual exclusion means mutual exclusion without anything intermediate. From the ontological point of view the mutual opposition will be called existence and non-existence, from the logical standpoint it will be affirmation and negation of one and the same thing. Viewed dynamically, it can be characterized as mutual repulsion, viewed statically it will be position and opposition; as a relation it is a symmetrical relation or correlation, a relation in which the one fact is related to the other just in the same way as *vice versa* the latter to the former. It is not only a mutual reciprocated relation, it is complete reciprocation. There is, says Śāntisakṣita, on the one part not the slightest bit of what there is on the other.⁴ Therefore this law may also be called the law

¹ Ibid

² NB, p. 69 20, transl 192 ("complete" must be added).

³ *pari hāra* = *pari-tyāga* = *atyanta-tyāga* = *trīṣya-prakāra-abhāva*

⁴ TSP, p. 1 6, cp 486 20.

was in this respect on the same level with the Vaiśeṣika system. We would have expected that the Sāṅkhyas, since they were the allies of the Buddhists in their fight against the Category of Inherence,¹ could have, to a certain extent, shared in their theory of Contradictory Qualification, but we find in their surviving records no traces of such a logical theory.

For the Buddhists, we have seen,² the law of Contradiction affords one of their principal arguments in favour of their theory of Instantaneous Being. If a reality cannot include incompatible, mutually exclusive moments of time and mutually exclusive points of space, it is then reduced to a single point-instant. As an answer to this argument the Naiyāyikas produced their own definition of the law of Contradiction.³ It is the following one: "That is the meaning of contradiction that two things cannot coexist together at the same place and at the same time." It is not different in principle from the formulation that "one and the same feature cannot both appertain and not appertain to the same thing at the same time", or the formula that "in the same place the thing cannot at the same time exist and non-exist". Since existence and non-existence are for the Realist both equally real as objects, their simultaneous presence in the same place and at the same time is impossible. This formulation is based on the principle that it is in general impossible for two different physical things to occupy at once the same place. The logical principle of contradiction is thus founded on the physical principle of the impenetrability of Matter. Dharmottara remarks⁴ that this would not be the right formulation even for that law of dynamical repugnancy, which is but a dependent part of the law of Contradiction, a part which has only a comparatively restricted scope of application. All atoms, he says,⁵ possess that common feature that they cannot occupy the same place, i. e. that the one cannot occupy the place where the other simultaneously resides. But this is not enough. Efficient opposition consists in this, that the "duration" of one thing on a definite place is counteracted, or efficiently opposed by the duration of another thing, which endeavours to dislodge the former out of its position and to occupy its place.

¹ Tāt, p. 181 ff.

² Cp. above, p. 108 ff.

³ Cp. *Jayanta*, p. 60.

⁴ NBT, p. 69 ff.

⁵ *Ibid*.

they are moreover the one the militant adversary of the other. Properly speaking it is not at all a case of logical contradiction as Antiphrasis; it can be called Contrapugnant Causality. In such cases both the opposed parts are mutually endeavouring to oust one another out of their mutual positions. Light and darkness are the one the complete negation of the other, and *vice versa*. In this respect there is between them a logical relation of contradiction. Light is the complete negation of darkness and darkness is nothing but the complete negation of light. However, they cannot peacefully coexist in close contiguity, as the blue and the non-blue. There is a constant warfare between them, the one will be constantly striving to occupy the territory of the other. Dharmakīrti gives the following definition of this kind of contradiction¹ "If a phenomenon is produced by the totality of its causes (and therefore) endures, but (suddenly) disappears on the approach of another phenomenon, there is between both these phenomena a (real) opposition, as, for instance, between cold and hot". In this definition what calls our attention, first of all, is the mention of the "totality of causes of the opposed phenomenon" is the cold, which in some junctures invariably precedes heat, the cause or one of the causes of that heat? Is the light, which in some junctures invariably follows on darkness, the effect of that darkness? Is the invariably preceding night the cause or one of the causes producing the invariably following day? These are the questions which always perplexed philosophers. The Buddhist answer is to the affirmative. We have examined the Buddhist theory of causation. According to this theory, every point of genuine reality, is arising in functional dependence on a sum-total of preceding factors, which all are its causes. In this totality not only positive magnitudes are arrayed, but negative magnitudes are also included, those that do not prevent the following phenomenon to appear.² If a break in the totality of the causes of a phenomenon supervenes and one of the factors that did not prevent its appearance is cutailed, that phenomenon vanishes and the break in the totality of its causes becomes the cause, or one of the causes, of the following phenomenon. In this sense the following light is produced by the preceding darkness, it is produced by the deficiency in the causes sustaining the existence of the preceding darkness. In these cases the preceding part is the cause, or one of the causes, producing

¹ NBT, p. 68. 8, transl, p. 187

² Cp above, p. 129

Themselves, which are objects without any duration. In absolute Reality there can be no Contradiction since here the contradictory parts coalesce

§ 7. SOME EUROPEAN PARALLELS.

Sigwart gives vent to his despair of the terms Identity, Opposition and Contradiction. "These terms", says he,¹ "have become unserviceable in philosophy, since quite a Babylonian confusion of language reigns in their application". The practical Englishman J N Keynes, we have seen, advises us not to touch on the subject of Negation, since "any attempt to explain it is apt to obscure rather than to illumine".² However, this hopeless condition does not deter us, but rather encourages us, in the attempt of a comparison with Indian views, in the expectation that the contrast may possibly contribute to some illumination rather than to an obscuration of the subject.

a) The Law of Excluded Middle

To the three fundamental Laws of Thought of our modern European logic, the laws of Identity, Contradiction and Excluded Middle, we find corresponding on the Indian side only the single law of Contradiction, called the Principle of "Uniting Contradictory Predicates".³ This condition falls in line with the view of Aristotle who singled out the law of Contradiction alone as the Principle (*ἀρχή*), "the most forcible and best known" principle, of all human thought.⁴ The two other laws are for him nothing more than its consequences or aspects. The law of Contradiction is indeed nothing but a law of Excluded Middle, because *ἀντιφάσις* is characterized and distinguished from mere opposition just by the fact of the absence of anything between two contradictory opposites. "Contradiction", says Dharmakīrti,⁵ is complete mutual exclusion.⁶ "Complete" exclusion is just exclusion of everything in the middle. Aristotle says the same "there is nothing in the middle of the opposite parts of a contradiction".⁷ Every cognition, we have

¹ *Logic*, I, p. 167—168, cp. I, p. 109.

² *Formal Logic*, p. 120.

³ *virudhā-āharma-samśarga* = *virudhā*.

⁴ Cp. Sigwart, *op. cit.*, I, 191.

⁵ NBT, p. 69 21, transl., p. 198.

⁶ *paraśpara-pari-kāra* = *pari-tyāga*, *ibid.*, *para* = complete.

⁷ *Metaph.* I, 7, 1057 a 38—*τῶν ὁ ἀντιφάσεων ἀντιφάσεων μὲν οὐκ ἔστι μετὰ τῷ*

exclusive parts, pleasure and displeasure, the desired and the undesired. The Realists objected that if the indifferent feeling must be referred to pain, because it is not pleasure, it could be as well referred to pleasure because it is not pain. The quarrel is solved by pointing to the fact that there are two oppositions between pleasure and pain, the one logical without a middle term, the other real with a transition part.

But if the relation of this kind of contradiction reduces thus to a case of causality, is it not a misnomer to call it contradiction, is it not causality simple? This seems to have been the opinion of the early Vaiśeṣikas, who characterized the relation of contradiction understood as efficient opposition as a relation of the «killer» to the killed»,¹ a natural aversion between two things, as e. g. the natural irreconcilable enmity of the ichneumon and the snake. The Buddhists did not object to the characteristic of the relation of efficient opposition as a relation between «something stopping and something stopped»,² but with the reservation that the stopping and the stopped were «durations».³ Hence the definition of that variety of contradiction, which consists in efficient opposition, includes the characteristic that the disappearing phenomenon must possess duration. This equally applies to the superseding phenomenon, it also must have duration. The causal relation in the sense of Dependent Origination obtains between the disappearing phenomenon, which had some duration and the superseding or the opposed phenomenon, which likewise endures for some time. It is metaphorical causation, not real causation, since, as we have seen, real causation is only that, which exists between efficient point-instants. The last moment of the series called darkness is the cause, in the sense of dependent origination, of the first moment of the series called light. But light and darkness are not mere moments, they become what they are, the phenomena of light and darkness, only when they have endured for some moments. This is consequently the difference between efficient opposition and real causation: real causation, just as real existence, belongs to single moments only, whereas efficient opposition is between one assemblage of moments and another assemblage, it is constructed just as the assemblages themselves are constructed by our intellect. In other words, the relation of efficient opposition is not an ultimate fact, it does not belong to the Things-in-Themselves,

¹ *ghātīya-ghātaka-bhāva*, cp VS, III 1. 11.

² *śāntīya-nivartaka-bhāva*.

³ *bhāvatah* = *prabandhena vartamānasya* NBT., 699

Double Negation nothing else than again this very law of Contradiction itself. Dharmakīrti's definition of the law as 1) «complete» and 2) «mutual» negation simply says that the law of Contradiction is 1) a law of Excluded Middle and 2) a law of Double Negation.

The law of Mutual Negation can also be stated in the following form. Just as $A = \neg(\neg A)$, just so $(\neg A)$, taken as a real co-unit of A , will be $\neg\neg(\neg A)$. It will then be a law of Treble Negation. Śāntirakṣita says¹, when it is said «he desists of not cooking», this means that he cooks. By a third negation (i. e., he does not not-cook) desistence again is implied. By a fourth negation (i. e., he does not not-not-not cook) this desistence is cancelled and the meaning «he cooks» is again reestablished. Thus a negation is implied in every affirmative proposition. The law of Double Negation could indeed also be called the law of Treble, of Quadruple Negation and so on. The important fact is that every proposition is at the same time negative in itself. The Soul of the world is Negativity, says Hegel, and his dictum finds some partial support in the Buddhist theory.

Sigwart however has rightly seen that «just because the cancellation of a negation is affirmation itself, just for this reason is there nothing in the middle between affirmation and negation»². He thus establishes the identity of the law of Double Negation with the law of Excluded Middle. He also rightly remarks that both the principles of Excluded Middle and of Double Negation together with the law of Contradiction only serve to elicit the essence and the meaning of Negation.³ There is only one most general law of thought, that is the law of Negation. Aristotle rightly calls it the «Law of all Laws»⁴. According to Buddhist logicians, this means that human thought is dialectical. Since one of our next chapters will be devoted to an exposition and consideration of the Buddhist Dialectical Method, we may at present limit our exposition to this short indication which was indispensable in connection with the statement of the law of Contradiction and its European parallels.

¹ TS, p. 854 6

² Ibid., I 200

³ Ibid., I 203

⁴ The law of Negation is the same as the law of Contradiction. It is the first axiom. Unfortunately there are as many methods to understand its ultimate value as there are systems of philosophy. Cp. *Metaph. Γ*, § 1005 b. — ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀπὸ αὐτῆς ἀπομύηται

§ 4. LAW OF OTHERNESS.

The law of Otherness is a dependent law, dependent on the law of Contradiction. Indeed the blue and the non-blue are contradictory, because they mutually represent the one the complete negation of the other. But the blue and the yellow are also contradictory, because the yellow is a part of the non-blue. Therefore they are only partially contradictory, i. e., they are merely "other" with regard to one another. Thus the blue and the non-blue are contradictory directly, the blue and the yellow are contradictory indirectly, because the yellow is necessarily non-blue, "it cannot escape from being non-blue"¹ Just as we arrive at the negative judgment "there is no jar on this place", after having hypothetically imagined its presence on this place and after having repudiated that suggestion, just so do we decide that the blue is not the yellow, after having hypothetically assumed the presence of the blue on the yellow patch and having repelled that imagined presence. This is especially clearly elicited when two hardly discernible shades of colour are compared. They must be confronted and the one imagined on the place of the other and then declared to be either different, if their difference is discernible, or identical, if their difference is undiscernible. A difference there will always be, it may be infinitesimal. Identity is only the limit of difference, it is an "identity of indiscernibles". If an object is invisible by its essence, if its essence is such never to be visible, nevertheless it can be declared to be "other", i. e. its presence can be denied, only after having imputed to it a visible presence on a given place. When in darkness seeming standing before us an upright and long object we cannot decide whether it is a post or a man, we arrive at a decision only after having for a moment imagined the presence of the denied object. We then pronounce internally the judgment "it is a post, it is not a man". We have already quoted Dharmottara on this point. He maintains that "Affirmation and Negation (or presence and absence) are in direct contradiction, but two members of a couple of objects are contradictory (or exclusive of one another) as far as they mutually necessarily include the one the negation of the other. Now what is the object whose negation is necessarily included in the other part (of the couple)? It is an object having a definite (representable) shape, not something indefinite (or illimited), as for instance Instantaneousness

¹ NBT. p. 70 3

there is absolutely no change. The Forms, the nature of the general essences superimposed upon reality, are immutable and eternal. There is no power in the world which could change an Ens and convert it into a non-Ens. The allmighty god Indra himself cannot alter the essence of things,¹ their real nature. The whole drama of cognition consists in Buddhist philosophy, just as in the system of Plato, of that contradiction between absolutely changeless forms and always changing reality.

A somewhat different law of Identity is suggested by Sigwart. It is directly connected with his theory of judgment and must be considered here, since it exhibits some interesting traits of coincidence, as well as an interesting contrast, with the theory of judgment of the Buddhist logicians and their law of Identity.

According to Sigwart there must be a law of Identity which is the principle of a union between subject and predicate in a judgment and of imparting to this union objective reality and constancy.² It is a law of Agreement and Objectivization. The realistic theory, he says, which maintains that the connection between the elements of the judgment is the same as between the corresponding objective elements of reality, must decidedly be rejected. Reality is never "congruent", i. e. equal and similar, to logic. In objective reality the subject and the predicate are a united organic whole.³ The understanding separates them in order to reunite them in a judgment. There is no *distinctio realis* corresponding to the *distinctio rationis*.⁴

The so constructed predicate is always a Universal, whereas the subject is always something unique. "The Universal exists only in my head, whereas in objective reality the Unique only exists."⁵ Moreover, whether the external objects exist at all or whether they do not exist, is a metaphysical problem with which logic is not directly concerned.⁶ The judgment "this is snow" implies not only the unity of subject and predicate, but their objective reality in the sense of a constance of

¹ Cp NK, p 124. 13.

² Sigwart, Logik², I. 105 ff; cp. J. N. Keynes, op cit, p 451 ff; Bradley, op cit, p 142.

³ Ibid. I 104 — *ungeschiedene Einheit*, cp TPS, p 157. 6 — *sarvātmāṇa utpadyate*.

⁴ Ibid, I 105.

⁵ Ibid, I 107, note.

⁶ Ibid, I 105, cp Dignāga's words *anumāna-anymaya-bhāvo na sad-asad apēṣate*, Tātp, p 127.

phasis,¹ laws of Otherness,² of Identity³ and of Excluded Middle,⁴ are commonly understood. It is usually expressed in the conditional proposition «What is beset with contradictory qualities is manifold, as cold and heat»⁵ The real meaning of this proposition, which seems at first to be a truism, is not that two things are different things, but if one thing, or what is supposed to represent a unity, possesses two contradictory qualities, it is really not one thing, but two things. This brings us to the formulation that one thing cannot possess two contradictory qualities at once. If we substitute for «two contradictory qualities» the presence and the absence of the same quality, we shall have the Aristotelian formula «it is impossible that the same at once appertains and does not appertain⁶ to the same and in the same respect». However this meaning is quite different from the meaning which the Buddhists put into their formula. According to Aristotle, the same can appertain and not appertain to the same at different times and in different respects, or the same thing can possess two contradictory qualities at different times; the thing may be cold at one moment and become hot in another.⁷ According to the Buddhists a thing can never possess two contradictory qualities. If it seems to possess them, it is not really the same thing, but there are two altogether different things, the cold thing and the hot thing. The position of the Buddhists could not be anything else. When a thing is composed of a permanent stuff and its changing qualities, the qualities can change and the thing will remain identical. But if the stuff is altogether absent and the thing consists of mere passing qualities, every change of the quality will be a change of the thing. We have seen from the analysis of the law of Contradiction that mere «otherness» is included in contradiction. If the yellow is merely different from the blue and not contradictory to it, it nevertheless is contradictory, because the yellow is included in the non-blue and every non-blue is contradictory to the blue. Therefore to possess contradictory qualities means simply to be different.

¹ *paraṃpara-parihāra*.

² *anyatva* (= *nirīdha-śāstra*)-*virodha*

³ *ekātmakāra-virodha*.

⁴ *trīṭya-prakāra-abhāva*.

⁵ Cp. SDS., p. 24.

⁶ *vyāpka*.

⁷ We find the same example in the fragments of Heraclitus, but there it means (or is supposed to have meant) that the hot and the cold coexist or are compounded in the same thing. It is adduced as an instance against the law of contradiction.

We have seen that the Buddhists call this fact by the name of a law of Conformity¹ and that the whole Buddhist theory of judgment reposes upon that law.

What the Buddhists call the law of Identity is something essentially different. The law of Conformity refers to all perceptual judgments, i. e. to judgments with one predicate. The law of Identity refers only to a definite variety of judgments with two concepts, viz, the analytical judgments. The great importance of the distinction between a judgment with one concept and a judgment with two concepts, or judgment of consistency, must be here taken in account. In such a judgment both subject and predicate are general and vague. The concrete vividness of the subject is absent. They can be called judgments with two predicates. However Sigwart brings under the same head of his law of Agreement both the connections of subject and predicate in a perceptual judgment, e. g. "this is snow", and their connection in a judgment uniting two concepts, e. g. "the snow is white". From the Indian point of view these are quite different forms of judgment and quite different principles are lying at the bottom. The judgment uniting two concepts is one of consistency between them, not of their objective reality. The objective reality lies in another judgment, in the following one, in the judgment "this is snow, it is white", or "this is the white snow". The real subject is contained in the element "this". The consistency, the possibility of connecting "the snow" with "the white", reposes indeed on the Identity of the objective reference of both these concepts. This is a real law of Identity, but it is concerned about only one part of our judgments, namely the Analytical Judgments, which, according to their Indian interpretation, should be more properly called Judgments of Identical Reference.

Sigwart stretches out his law of Agreement-Identity so as to include the other half of all our judgments. He says² — "This real Identity does not exclude the difference of the objects at different times" "The same tree which was covered with leaves before is now, barren" "the same man whom I have known as a youth is now old". This in Buddhist philosophy is quite different. These judgments are not judgments of Identity, they are not analytical.³ They are synthetical, or causal. Their logical meaning is "wheresoever there is a barren tree

¹ *sārvīpya*, cp. above, p. 220

² Op. cit., p. I. 109-

³ *tādātmya-tat*

Thus the Buddhist law of Contradiction safeguards, to a certain extent, the identity of the ruby, it safeguards its ideal identity as a phenomenon, but only at the cost of destroying its real identity, as a Thing-in-Itself.

There are however qualifications and concepts which, although being mutually «other», are not contradictory, as, e. g., the blue and the lotus, or, more exactly, the «blueness» and the «lotusness» of a given point. They are not incompatible, their compresence in the same thing is not contradictory. They are, according to Buddhist terminology, identical. This part of the Buddhist doctrine will be examined in the sequel.

§ 6. OTHER INDIAN SCHOOLS ON CONTRADICTION.

The law of Contradiction in India is, under the name of a Law of Contradictory Predication,¹ a specifically Buddhist law. Not that the other schools denied or neglected this «best known and most forcible» among all the fundamental laws of thought, but they seem to have regarded it as something self-evident and not calling for explanations until the problem was tackled by the Buddhists.

The Aphorisms of the Vaiśeṣika system contain a doctrine of contradiction as a real relation between real facts, which are connected with one another by the tie of opposition.² It is real or dynamical opposition, considered apparently as a variety of Causation. There is no mention of logical contradiction even in the genuine logical part of that system. The contradictory logical reason, we have seen, is introduced in that system as a special logical fallacy under Buddhist influence.³ The Aphorisms of the Nyāya system, on the contrary, neglect contradiction as a relation between real facts, but contain a doctrine of a logical fallacy called the contradicting reason.⁴ Such a reason is a reason which destroys the thesis of the respondent. It is a contradiction of two judgments, the one denying what the other affirms.

The Sāṅkhya system also contained the relation of contradiction, or opposition among the varieties of relation between real facts,⁵ if

¹ *viruddha-dharma-samsarga*

² V. S., III 1 10—12

³ Cp. above, p. 318.

⁴ NS., I 2 6.

⁵ Cp. Tatp., p. 131. 27.

that it can be admitted as a correct account of the nature of affirmation only in the case of Analytical Judgments. He then proceeds to say that we then would be obliged to have "as many fundamental principles as there are kinds of relation."¹

This last remark is made ironically. Mr. Mill evidently thinks that the varieties of relations are infinite and cannot be digested into a system. But the Buddhist will repeat Mill's suggestion with perfect good faith. He understands relation as necessary dependence and admits only two fundamental varieties of such relation. He cannot be deterred by the necessity of having "as many fundamental principles as there are kinds of relation", because the relations are not infinite, but only two. These two varieties of relation are founded either on the principle of Identity or of non-Identity. The second is nothing else than the principle of Causality.²

d) Two European Logics

Turning to the Law of Contradiction proper, we must remark that there is in Europe two logics, the one founded on the law of Contradiction, the other founded on the neglect of the law of Contradiction. The first is a logic of non-contradiction, a logic of escaping and guarding against contradiction. It has been founded by Aristotle and has been inherited from him by modern Europe. It has received a mighty extension into Epistemology from Kant and continues to reign at the present moment.

The other logic is a logic of contradiction, a logic according to which Reality consists of mere contraries, because all things proceed from contraries and the corresponding thought is nothing but mere contradiction. Viewed from the standpoint of the first, or real, logic, this second logic must be termed non-logic. It existed in ancient Greece previously to Aristotle, from whom it received a deadly blow. It however recovered in the European Middle Ages at the hands of N. Cusano and arrived at full eclosion in the system of Hegel, in the first half of the last century. After having been condemned and forsaken in

¹ Ibid, p. 482.

² It must be noted that the domain of Mill's analytical judgment is much narrower than of the Buddhist one. He says (ibid, p. 484), "in a synthetical judgment the attribute predicated is thought not as a part, but as existing in a common subject along with the group of attributes composing the concept." But to exist "in a subject" is just to be a part of it, to have a common objective reference!

A separate position in regard of the law of Contradiction has been taken by the Jainas apparently at a very early date. They flatly deny the law of Contradiction. At the time when the battle raged between the founders of Buddhism and the Sāṅkhyas, when the latter maintained that «everything is eternal», because Matter is eternal, and the former rejoined that «everything is non-eternal», because Matter is a fiction, the Jainas opposed both parties by maintaining that «everything is eternal and non-eternal simultaneously». According to this theory you could neither wholly affirm, nor wholly deny any attribute of its subject. Both affirmation and denial were untrue. The real relation was something half way between affirmation and denial. Like the doctrine of Anaxagoras in Greece, this denial seems directed much more against the law of Excluded Middle, than against the law of Contradiction. However in the problem of Universals and Particulars the Jainas adopted an attitude of a direct challenge to the law of Contradiction.¹ They maintained that the concrete object was a particularized universal, a universal and a particular at the same time. Such is also the attitude of one of the earliest Buddhist sects, the sect of the Vātsīputīyas. They were averse to the Hinayāna principle, which, denying the Soul, maintained the existence of only detached separate Elements of a Personality, the Elements holding together exclusively by the causal laws of their concerted appearance. They maintained that the Personality, which consist of those Elements, was something half way real, it was, they maintained, something existing and non-existing at the same time.²

On the neglect of the law of Contradiction by the monistic Mādhyamikas and Vedāntins some remarks will be made in the sequel. From what has been expounded in this chapter it is already plain that the law of Contradiction does not extend its sway beyond the field of Experience, over the realm of the Things-in-Themselves. Although Dharmottara says that all objects, whether real or unreal, are subjected to the law of Contradiction,³ but he in this context alludes to the conditioned reality of dynamical opposition. The cold and the hot are both real, because they refer to two point-instants, they are not two point-instants themselves. This kind of opposition, since it affects only objects having «duration», cannot be extended to the Things-in-

¹ TS. and TSP, p 555 f f, cp *Śloka*, *Śūnyav.* 219

² Cp AK, IX and my *Soul Theory of the Buddhists*

³ NBT, p 70 22

much more akin to its Sāṅkhya variety than to the Buddhist one. There is in his fragments neither any trace of denying substance, nor any clear trace of the theory of an absolute point-instant of reality.¹ His «metrical» flashings are probably small bits of reality having some duration. This is clear from his theory of Causality. He maintained that the «running» reality is constantly «running into the opposite» (ἐναντιοδρομίζ), that the result is always the opposite of the cause. It is clear that in order to be opposite cause and effect must possess some amount of definiteness and duration. They cannot be bare point-instants as with the Buddhists. They are momentary flashes having definite character. The wet becomes dry, the hot becomes cold, light changes into darkness, the new becomes old, life becomes death, etc. etc. Heraclitus maintained that these «opposites» (ἐναντία) were nevertheless identical. Although the majority of examples of change adduced by him can be explained, and have been sometimes explained, as simple causation, it seems certain that he insisted upon the oppositeness, if not contradiction, of cause and effect and upon their real identity at the same time. This again is a trait of striking similarity between the Greek philosopher and Sāṅkhya ideas, since one of the fundamental Sāṅkhya principles is the «Identity» of cause and effect, the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, their simultaneous existence.² Thus the idea of constant change upon a hylozoistic substratum led Heraclitus to maintain the identity of opposites, in neglect of the law of contradiction. The ever-renewed junction of contraries and the perpetual transition of one contrary into the other he interpreted as their coexistence and identity. Aristotle disclosed the logical mistake inherent in the Heraclitean equations. The cause and the result, though being manifestations of the same matter, or of the same material cause, are not simultaneous. The identity of cause and effect can be established only by neglecting the element of time. The blunt denial of the law of contradiction by Heraclitus is, first of all, founded upon the neglect of what for the Buddhist is the

¹ Although this theory is involved in the Heraclitean denial of duration, according to which «is» and «is not» are both alike and conjointly true, while neither is true separately to the exclusion of the other. Each successive moment of existence involves thus generation and destruction implicated with each other and this is exactly the theory that «everything represents its own destruction» as expressed by Kamalaśīla. However there is no evidence that Heraclitus denied Matter (ὕλη), he only denied duration, cp G. Grote, Aristotle, p 429.

² sat-kārya-āda = tādātmya-āda

seen, is the cognition of a point of reality lying among things similar and distinguished from things dissimilar. The similars are united by the principle of Identity, they are distinguished from the dissimilars by the principle of Contradiction and they are "completely" distinguished by the law of Excluded Middle.¹ But these are not three different principles. It is one fundamental principle in its three applications. When we cognize a patch of blue in the judgment "this is blue", we then, owing to a Primordial Function of Productive Imagination,² construct out of the Universe of Discourse two parts, the blue and the non-blue. Everything that is not referred to the blue will be necessarily in the non-blue. There can be no third possibility, nothing in the middle. Such is the essence of contradictory opposition.³

b) The Law of Double Negation.

Another very important consequence flows out of Dharmakīrti's definition. Contradiction is not only "complete" exclusion, it also is "mutual" exclusion. That is to say, A and non-A exclude each the other mutually. There is among them nothing positive by itself, just as there is nothing negative by itself, their negation is mutual. A excludes non-A just in the same degree as non-A excludes A. A excludes non-A means, in other words, that A excludes the exclusion of A, since non-A is nothing but the exclusion of A. A excludes non-A means that A itself represents the exclusion of the exclusion of A, i. e., $A = -(-A)$. And *vice versa*, non-A represents the exclusion of A just in the same degree in which A represents the exclusion of non-A, that is $(-A) = -A$ just as $A = -(-A)$. This is the celebrated principle of Double Negation which more properly must be called the principle of Mutual Negation and mutual negation is nothing else than the principle of Contradiction expressed according to the Leibniz-Kantian formula.

Just as the law of Excluded Middle is not a separate principle, but it is the law of Contradiction itself, just so is the principle of

¹ *trīṇya-pralāra-abhāva* = *sepaleśa-vipaksābhāva* *trīṇya-abhāva*.

² *prāgbhaviya-vikalpa-vāsanā*

³ The name given to it by Aristotle, Antiphrasis, points to its logical rather than ontological, character. It is "counter-speaking" and not "counter-existence". But Grote (op cit, p. 579) thinks that both the Maxim of Contradiction and the Maxim of Excluded Middle have a logical as well as an ontological bearing with Aristotle

non-existent, indeed, since it is not real, can in no way be converted into something else. Thus in both cases (whether the counterpart be an Ens or non-Ens), the (supposed) contradiction cannot be real. This is the reason why the Master (Dharmakīrti) when discussing the opposition between contrary realities, has expressed himself in the following way—"When one fact has duration as long as the sum-total of its causes remains unimpaired, and it then vanishes as soon as another fact appears; it follows that both are incompatible, (or efficiently opposed), just as the sensations of heat and cold. The Master says that incompatibility (or efficient opposition) "follows", follows means that it is constructed by our understanding, it does not mean that there is a real opposition (between the Things-in-Themselves as point-instants)

When heat and cold are imagined as changing attributes of one and the same enduring substance, they can be constructed as causally inter-connected and even, to a certain extent, by neglecting the condition of time, declared to be identical, but if reality is envisaged as instantaneous there can be no real opposition in it. The opposition is then logical and refers to the concepts constructed by the understanding in accordance with the law of Contradiction¹

f) Causation and Identity in the fragments of Heraclitus.

The great majority of the instances envisaged by Heraclitus as opposition (ἐναντία) of things which he deems really identical, are instances of causation. The new and the old, life and death, heat and cold, are instances of a change in the same stuff. The cause is correlative to its effect, a cause cannot exist without its effect. They are interdependent. Owing to the vagueness of the notion of identity, interdependence can easily be interpreted as a kind of unity and identity. The effect stands "by" its cause; since it cannot exist without some cause it is said to exist, or preexist, "in" its cause. The historian of philosophy sees absolutely the same jump from "by" to "in" executed by the Sāṅkhya philosopher many-centuries before our era and by Hegel in the XIXth century in Europe.² This jump has been

¹ Cp NBT, p 70 18; transl p 196

² Cp the celebrated passage in the introduction of his *Phenomenology* (Jasson's ed., p 10), where he maintains that the bud is removed and contradicted by the flower and the fruit declares the flower to be a falsified Ens of the plant

c) The law of Identity.

This law is usually stated as «A is A» or «what is is», and is given as the principle of all logical affirmation, just as its corollary, the law of contradiction, in the form of «A is not non-A», is supposed to be the principle of all negation. The adequateness of such formulas has been questioned.

The law is sometimes interpreted so as to mean identity of sense in spite of difference in statement. The Buddhists would then reject it, because for them linguistic differences are not the domain of logic. Dharmottara says¹ that if the two propositions «the fat Devadatta eats nothing at day time» and «he eats at night» are used to express the same fact, they contain no inference, they contain the same fact in different language. They ought not to be considered in logic, since logic is concerned about the necessary connection of two different facts through Causality or of two different concepts through Identical Reference, but not about the meaning of different words.

The law of Identity is then represented as the law of the constancy of our cognitions to which a certain duration of things must correspond. Vācaspati calls it the Consecrated Recognition,² it means that I can maintain «this is the same crystal-gem which I have seen before», or «this is that same Devadatta whom I have seen in another place». Without such constancy neither cognition nor intelligible speech nor purposive action are at all possible. The Buddhists themselves define cognition as uncontradicted experience³ which means consistent or constant experience and is impossible without recognition. However of Constancy and Identity there is no trace in the ever moving, ever changing reality. Constancy and Identity are logical, they are in our head, not in the objective world. So it is that instead of a law of Identity we have in Buddhism a law of Identical Construction⁴ or Identical Objectivization. The identical things are projected images.⁵

But if the Buddhists insist that there is in Ultimate Reality no real Identity at all, they with equal emphasis insist that in logic

¹ NBT, p. 48 12, cp above, p 357 note.

² *pratyabhijñā bhagavati*, cp NK, p 125 8

³ *avisaṃvādanam samyag-jñānam*, cp NBT., p 8

⁴ *śataśādhyaśāya* = *śaṭpānā*, cp vol. II, p 406, 409

⁵ *aiśā-bāhyatā*, cp vol. II, p 411.

"There are in these fragments, says G. T. W. Patrick¹ two distinct classes of oppositions which, though confused in Heracleitus mind, led historically into different paths of development. The first is that unity of opposites which results from the fact that they are endlessly passing into one another... they are the same because they are reciprocal transmutations of each other. But now we have another class of opposites to which this reasoning will not apply "Good and evil, he says, are the same". This is simply that identity of opposites which developed into the Protogorean doctrine of relativity". It is to guard against this second class of identity of opposites that Aristotle introduced in his law the proviso "in the same respect" (αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ). The most eloquent example of this class of identical opposition is the identity of the One and the Many, this identity which puzzled the mind of Plato and to which he has devoted some of his most eloquent pages. Both classes are united as being always reducible to an identity of existence and non-existence. "In entering the same rivers", says Heracleitus, "we at the same time enter them and do not enter them, we exist and do not exist (in them)".² The identity of opposites is the identity of existence and non-existence, the cardinal tenet of Hegel. Aristotle, as well as the modern logicians, protest against it by maintaining that the same thing cannot exist and not exist (1) at the same time and 2) in the same respect".

What is here interesting from the Indian point of view is the fact that we can clearly discern in the double character of the facts upon which the Heracleitan denial of the law of Contradiction is founded, as well as in its formulation by Aristotle, the difference between the two fundamental relations on which all ratiocination, nay all thinking, is based. They are Causation and Identical Reference these two necessary and general relations of Interdependence, which are also the foundation of the Indian table of Categories, as well as of the Indian theory of Inference.

g) The Eleatic Law of Contradiction.

In the passage from Kamalaśīla quoted above³ we come across an argument not unfrequently recurring in Indian philosophy, an argu-

¹ G. T. W. Patrick, *The fragments of the work of Heracleitus on Nature*, Baltimore, 1952, p. 63

² Fragment 49^a by Diels.

³ Cp pp. 493 and 427.

the object «snow» at different times, for different people and from different points of view. The constructive function of the judgment remains absolutely the same whether we assume with the Realists that an independent reality lies behind our presentations or whether we, with the Idealists, maintain that this reality reduces to the mere fact of the constancy of these our presentations. This is, we have seen, exactly the view of the Buddhist logicians. They admit that the judgment remains a mental construction in both cases, whether we admit an external world or not.¹ The law of constancy could then be called a law of Identity. This law would be the necessary condition of all cognition, all speech and all purposive action. But Sigwart objects to the name of Identity for such a law, since the identity of subject and predicate (except in meaningless tautology) is never complete. The term «partial identity», suggested by some logicians, is contradictory, since partial identity means non identity. He therefore prefers to call it the law of Agreement² or the law of «Unpositing».³

In connection with this view of the judgment as an objectivizing function which, we have seen, is also the Buddhist view, two remarks of Sigwart must be noticed, since they are important parallels to Indian views. He says that the predicate, being general, is always vague, as compared with the vividness of the particular in intuition.⁴ It refers only to a part of the concrete unity of the subject. He also remarks that identity is never produced by a mere repetition of observation, «it is produced by a negation of the difference of content between two or more temporarily separated representations».⁵ This idea, the idea namely that identity reduces to a negation of difference and does not reach any further, that it is no real affirmation,⁶ we shall later see, is the foundation of the Buddhist theory of general names. The law of Identity or Agreement is thus supposed, if not to explain, at least to fix the fact of a union between the concrete vivid reality of the subject and the vague and general ideality of the predicate.

¹ Cp. above, p. 63

² *Übereinstimmung*.

³ *In-ans-actu*.

⁴ Sigwart, op. cit. I 111; cp. NK., p. 263. 12 — na *cūḥalpānubandhasya sparśārtha-pratibhāsāt*; cp. TSP, p. 553 9.

⁵ Ibid. I. 43. this is the Indian principle of *bheda-agraha* contrasted with the realistic principles of *abheda-agraha*, cp. Tātp., p. 56.

⁶ Real affirmation is only *sensaous*, reality *vastu = vidhi = pratyakṣa = vidhi-starīpa* cp. above, p. 192.

Ens does not exist¹», but this would mean with him that «what in a certain respect, at a certain time, under certain conditions, etc, is a non-Ens, cannot in the same respect, at the same time and under the same conditions be also an Ens», or, as he puts it, «it is impossible that one and the same thing should exist and non exist in the same time, at once and in the same respect». Mr. Svend Ranulf gives vent² to a supposition that «the Logic of Absolute Concepts»³ is not limited to Europe. He thinks that «in all probability we will find this logic reigning in Indian philosophy on a larger scale and with less limitation than in Europe» Now, as far as the Buddhists are concerned, it is in the highest degree remarkable that the same argument which is used by Parmenides to establish his Monism and by Plato to support his eternal Forms, is used by the Buddhists for exactly the contrary purpose. The passage from Kamalaśīla quoted above intends by its argument to support the theory of Instantaneous Being. We have seen the manner in which the Buddhist argument proceeds. If reality is changing, it is always and necessarily changing, it is change itself, to exist means to change. If it is not changing even during a moment, it will never change. Therefore the same thing cannot be hot and then become cold. What is hot has the essence of hot, it is hot «wholly», i. e. for ever. The result is for the Buddhist that the hot and the cold are two different things. The different cannot be the same. The «combination with a different quality makes the thing itself different»⁴ — such is the Buddhist law of Contradiction.

b) Plato.

In comparing the Buddhist system with the system of Plato the following points must call our attention.

1) Both systems are concerned about the connection between the running reality of the sensible world and the immutable stability of its Forms or concepts

2) Every cognition reduces therefore to the type-instance of the judgment $x = A$,⁵ where A is something eternally immutable, — it is

¹ Svend Ranulf, *Der elementare Satz vom Widerspruch* (Kopenhagen, 1924), p. 160

² *Ibid*, p. 207

³ *Die Logik der absoluten Vieldeutigkeit*, as he calls it.

⁴ *viruddha-dharma-samsargā anyad vāstu*, cp. NBT, p. 4, 2

⁵ Cp. Natorp, *Platon's Ideenlehre*, p. 151, 152, 390, 405, 406

there was a green tree before», «if this tree is barren, it was a green tree before», «wheresoever there is an old man, there was before a young man from which the old one is produced». If an object can be the same at different times, where is the limit? If the dried up old tree is the same as the former young one, the young one is the same as the sprout, and the sprout the same as the seed, the seed the same as its elements and so on. We will be directly landed in the Sāṅkhya theory of the Identity between (material) cause and effect.¹ This is a law against which the Buddhists from the start declared the most uncompromising war. The Sāṅkhya law of Identity the Buddhists opposed by their law of Contradiction, the law namely that «mutually exclusive attributes belong to different things».² Every object at every moment of its existence is a different object. The unity here is logical, it is a neglect of difference, it is a construction of our productive imagination, not a real unity. The term «agreement», if it is used so as to include both the identical reference of two concepts in an analytical major premise and the non identical objective reference of cause and effect, is misleading. The agreement in an analytical major premise is founded on Identity, in a synthetical premise it is founded on Causation.

Thus we must distinguish between 1) the Sāṅkhya law of Identity, which is an identity between cause and effect, 2) the Buddhist law of Identity, which is an identity between concepts referred to one and the same point of reality, 3) the Buddhist law of Conformity, which connects the unique subject with the general predicate, and 4) Sigwart's law of Agreement, which apparently confounds all these relations owing to an insufficient discrimination between the perceptual judgment and the judgment of concomitance.

A somewhat similar interpretation of the law of Identity is found in Sir W. Hamilton's Logic. Although deferring to the traditional version of the law as «A is A», he represents it to mean an assertion of identity between a whole concept and its parts in comprehension. This reminds us of the identity of the *śmīṣapā* with the tree, since the concept tree is an attribute, or a part, of the concept *śmīṣapā*. Sir W. Hamilton represents this principle of Identity to be «the principle of all logical affirmation». But J. S. Mill rightly remarks³

¹ *sat-kārya-vāda*

² *yad viruddha-dharma-bhāṣaṁ tan nānā*.

³ An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy (6th ed.), p. 484.

An idea "in itself" always remains what it is, "itself", "by itself", "uniform with itself", "eternally existent".¹ It is in itself beyond every relativity. But in relation to the sensible world Plato occasionally quotes a form of the law which in fact is the same as the Aristotelian one. An Ens, according to this formulation, cannot be a non-Ens only under the two conditions of "at the same time" and "in the same respect".²

7) The Buddhist law of Contradiction is the opposite corollary from the Eleatic law. Just as for the Eleatics uncontradicted is only the eternal Ens, just so for the Buddhists uncontradicted is only the sensational point-instant. Every duration, every extension, every definiteness, every concept necessarily involves contradiction since it involves "otherness", i. e., difference, or Ens and non-Ens together.

Thus it is that both Plato and the Buddhists agree that contradiction is produced whenever logic is applied to reality.³ This application, says the Buddhist, is only possible by constructing an artificial "similarity between things absolutely dissimilar".⁴ In sensible reality there is a constant mixing up of contradictory qualifications, contradiction is rampant. The same thing appears as a unity and as a plurality, as greater and smaller, as good and as evil, etc etc. But in the pure concepts, in the concepts "themselves", according to Plato, there is no contradiction.⁵ According to the Buddhists, there is no contradiction in the things "themselves", i. e., in pure sensation and in the point-instant which ontologically corresponds to it.⁶

¹ Ibid, p 160

² Natorp, op. cit., p 151; cp S Ranulf, op cit, p 156

³ S Ranulf, op cit, p 153

⁴ *atyanta-vilaksanām sālaksanyam = śārūpyam*. Thus the Platonic term *παρεσβια* corresponds to a certain extent to the sanscrit *śārūpya*, cp S Ranulf, op cit, p 180

⁵ Natorp, op cit, p. 197, S Ranulf, op cit, p 158

⁶ Bradley, op cit, p 148, in this point apparently shares in the Kantian view, which contains some analogy with the Buddhist one, as against the Hegelian. He represents an imaginary Hegelian reproaching him thus: — "And then, for the sake of saving from contradiction this wretched ghost of a Thing-in-Itself, you are ready to plunge the whole world of phenomena, everything you know or can know, into utter confusion." I wonder what would have been Bradley's opinion had he known the Buddhist conception of the Thing-in-Itself. The whole world is not at all plunged in confusion, but a distinction is made between the ultimate reality of a point-instant which is not dialectical and all superimposed, dialectical, mutually contradictory superstructures. It is just this everywhere present ultimate reality which saves the world from confusion.

the second half of that century, it now shows a tendency at revival, at least in some philosophic circles. Hegel in his "Science of Logic" expressly refers to the Indians¹ and quotes Indian theories in support of his logic of contradiction. He quotes the Buddhist doctrine of the so-called "Void". Although his knowledge was, of course, very indirect and scanty, he rightly guessed that this Void is not a mere negation, it is a positive principle of Pure Ultimate Reality, that reality where existence becomes identical with non-existence. Hegel was apparently guided by the natural inclination of many philosophers to antedate their own cherished ideas. But his guess is justified by our present knowledge of the Mādhyamika system. We have devoted to that system a special work² and need not repeat here its results.

e) Heraclitus.

The striking similarity between the Buddhist theory of Constant Change and the ontology of Heraclitus, the Ephesian, has already been pointed out. Still more striking is the fact that this similar ontology has led to opposite results, in regard of the law of Contradiction. Heraclitus bluntly denied that law, whereas the Buddhists, as we have seen,³ appealed to it, as a strong argument establishing their theory of Instantaneous Reality.

Indeed, like the Buddhists, Heraclitus maintained that ultimate reality is a running reality. There is in it no stability at all. It is comparable to a streaming river which is never the same at a given spot, or to a flashing fire "metrically" appearing and "metrically" disappearing.⁴ Its flashings are appearing "metrically", because there is a "harmony", a reason, a Logos, a general law controlling the running flashes of reality. So far this theory is not different from the Buddhist one. The conception of Reality as constant change under a general law of Harmony corresponds very closely to the Hīmayāna conception of instantaneous elements (*dharma*s), appearing according to a strict Norm (*dharma*tā) of Dependent Origination. There is however the great difference that Heraclitus, being a physical philosopher, believed in a pervasive primordial Matter (ὕλη) in which the changing flashes of reality are merged. His theory of constant change is thus

¹ Wissenschaft der Logik, I, p. 68 (ed. G. Lasson).

² The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, (Leningrad 1928), cp p. 58.

³ Cp above, p. 108 ff.

⁴ ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα (Diels, 30).

the Aristotelian law of contradiction, since it at once contains creation and annihilation, existence and non-existence. Grote rightly remarks that «thus appears to be an illustration of the doctrine which Lassalle ascribes to Heraclitus; perpetual implication of negativity and positivity,—des Nichtseins mit dem Sein, perpetual absorption of each particular into the universal, and perpetual reappearance as an opposite particular».¹ In this interpretation of Heraclitus Lassalle, as is well known, only followed in the steps of Hegel, his master who identified his own denial of the law of contradiction with the *ἐναντιοδρομία* of Heraclitus.

We thus have in Indian philosophy both the principles of Identity and non-Identity, of the absolute identity of the changeless essences and the absolute non-identity of changing sensuous reality. Both are exploited in the service of the theory of Instantaneous Being. The first is similar to the Eleatic law of contradiction. The second is supported by the Buddhist law of contradiction.

i) Kant and Sigwart

The clear distinction between real opposition «without contradiction» and logical opposition «through contradiction», this distinction so emphatically insisted upon by Dharmakīrti, is stated, partly with the same arguments and the same examples, by Kant in his youthful tract on the «Apphication of Negative Magnitudes in life».² He says that, e. g., dark and not dark is impossible in the same sense, at the same time and in the same subject. The first predicate is positive, the second is negative logically, although both may be «metaphysically» negative. They are related as existence and non-existence through contradiction. In real repugnancy both predicates, dark and light, are positive. The one cannot be contradictorily opposed to the other, «because then the opposition would be logical», not real. Contradictory opposition is existence and non-existence at the same time and in the same respect.

It is clear that it was quite indispensable for Aristotle to take into his formulation of the law of Contradiction the conditions of simultaneous time and identical relation. The law could not be saved without them. The same person, e. g., can be unlearned and learned

¹ G. Grote, *Plato*, II, p. 309 note

² Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (1785), esp. p. 25—26 (Kirchmann).

He therefore converts one of the predicates into a subject and thus constructs a judgment with two concepts, "A is not non-A". The judgment is then analytical, purely logical, it is not affected by time and refers to concepts in their absolute condition. What Aristotle has in view is something quite different. He has in his mind two judgments, of which the one is annulled by the other. Now from the Indian standpoint a judgment with two concepts is a judgment of concomitance, it is therefore an inferential judgment or an inference, a major premise. It is indeed an analytical conjunction of two absolute concepts. Such conjunction does not depend on time-conditions. But the time condition will reappear as soon as the concepts are referred to reality, which is always done in the minor premise and in the conclusion. Indeed we will then have the following formulation

Major premise. Who is learned is not unlearned (A is not non-A).

Minor premise. This one here is learned (in a special subject).

Conclusion. He is not unlearned (at the same time, respecting the same subject)

The judgment proper according to the Indian view, is always a judgment with one concept which is the predicate. Every concept is in this sense a predicate. The subject is always represented by the element "this", which contains the time condition. The law of contradiction refers to two such judgments which are contradictory, "this (here, now) is learned", "this (here, now) is not learned".¹

The standpoint of Sigwart² coincides exactly with the Indian one. He asks: "Why does Kant's example 'an unlearned man is learned' contain a contradiction?" Because the predicate "learned" is applied to a subject which implicitly contains in itself another judgment, "he is not learned". Kant's example reduces to two judgments: "x is learned" and "x is not learned". It contains in itself an affirmation of both these judgments and, only therefore does it contain a contradiction".

Up to the designation of the subject by the sign x^3 the coincidence of Sigwart's argument with the Indian is complete. This agrees also with his general view that "all real and genuine judgments" have an

¹ Kant here incidentally calls the judgment with two concepts, i. e. a judgment uniting two concepts, a judgment of two predicates. He says: "the misunderstanding arises . . . only on condition that the first and second predicate have both been applied at the same time" (cp. OPR, p. 126)

² Logik, I 196.

³ *limited idam*

disclosed in Greece by Aristotle and has obliged him to introduce the condition of time into his formulation of the law of Identity.

But by no means are all Heraclitean coincidences of opposites cases of causation. He quotes a number of identical opposition which cannot be interpreted as causation. Identical are good and evil, the clean and the dirty, the whole and the parts, the one and the many, etc. All these are instances not of causation, i. e. of two things necessarily following one another in time, but instances of identical objective reference, of the same thing differently regarded from a different point of view. A thing which is a unity as an aggregate is a plurality when considered as composed of parts. The same thing will be good from one stand-point and bad from another. clean or dirty, agreeable or disagreeable, moving or at rest, etc. These are cases which must be characterized as identical also from the Buddhist point of view. The identity, we have seen, means here identity of objective reference. The 'objective reality, the thing, is one and the same, it is identical. Its superimposed characteristics are different, or may be even contrary, in accordance with the point of view. Among the very numerous historians, philosophers and philologists who have attempted different interpretations of the fragments of Heraclitus¹ I find one who has called attention to this radical difference between the two groups of his examples.

"These forms", says he, "are not only different, but they dislodge one another and are incompatible with one another". However they are indispensable members of an organic whole, and in this sense identical, as contained in the one identical concept of a plant. From the Indian point of view Hegel confounds here four things, viz 1) the relation of simple causation, as of fire and smoke, 2) the relation of efficient repugnancy, as of fire and cold, 3) contradiction, as of cold and not cold at the same moment and in the same respect, and 4) that identity of transition in which the thing, as Kamalasila puts it, represents "its own annihilation", i. e. existence and non-existence coalesce. This leads to a non-discrimination between opposites as they stand «by» one another and as they stand «in» one another.

¹ That the interpretation is very widely fluctuating is no wonder, considering that Heraclitus was even in his own time reputed an «obscure» philosopher and that only a few fragments of his work have reached us. Nevertheless it seems, — to quote J. S. Mill, — «that no extent and accuracy of knowledge concerning the opinion of predecessors can preserve a thinker from giving an erroneous interpretation of their meaning by antedating a confusion of ideas which exists in his own mind». The celebrated F. Lassalle has read into these fragments a full blown Hegel and in our days, in a work otherwise exceedingly painstaking and thorough, M. A. Dynnik (Давидовича Гераклита Ефесского, Moscow, 1929) reads into them a full blown Karl Marx! What Marx himself held about such exaggerations he expressed in his letter to F. Engels datet 1st Febr. 1858 (Briefwechsel, v II, p. 242).

different. It is a major premise, a judgment of concomitance. That the minor premise represents in its essence a perceptual judgment — has been clear to the Indian logicians beginning with Vātsyāyana.¹ It would be perhaps better, in order to avoid confusion, to save the name of judgment² for the perceptual judgment, which is also an existential judgment, or a judgment of reality, and to give to the other judgment the name of concomitance or inference,³ as the Hindus have done. For it is a judgment, not of reality, but of consistency. The great difference between the major and the minor premises in this respect is clearly elicited in the fact, that fallacies against the major premise are fallacies of inconsistency or of uncertainty, whereas fallacies against the minor premise are fallacies of the unreality of the logical reason, as has been explained in the chapter on Logical Fallacies. The judgment «snow is white» asserts the concomitance of two concepts. The judgment «this is snow» asserts the objective reality of the concept snow. It is a judgment of Conformity between one concept and the corresponding reality. It is also an existential judgment. Not in the grammatical sense of «the snow exists». Existence, i. e., real concrete existence is never a logical predicate,⁴ it is the common subject of all predications. But such a judgment is an existential one because it asserts the objective reality of the object snow, not a mere concomitance of two concepts.

The double formulation of the law of Contradiction exactly corresponds to the double character of judgments. In perceptual or existential judgments it is a contradiction between two judgments which mutually annihilate one the other. In judgments of concomitance it is the principle of all analytical inferences and an analytical judgment.

¹ NBh, p 54 — *udāharanam pratyaśam, upanaya upamānam*. And NV explains — *yathā pratyaśo na uppratipadyate, evam udāharanēpi (upanayaḥ)*,
² e the minor premise (*upanaya*) contains a reference to sense-perception

³ *adhyasāyā = vilāpa*

⁴ *vyūpti* —

⁴ In order to avoid confusion we must not forget that Existence or Reality which is the common subject of all predication (*to ēv = Hoc Aliquid*) is the Thing-in-Itself, the point instant corresponding to a moment of concrete and vivid, although unutterable, sensation. There is another Existence which is a perfectly utterable, general concept. It can very well appear in the rôle of a predicate, e. g., «a tree exists» (or more precisely — this tree-ness includes existence), «this is a tree, it exists». Such an abstract concept of existence is quoted in *Pram Samuccaya*, V. This must be kept in mind in order to protect Dignāga from accusations to which Kant fell a victim, the accusation namely that he invented a non-existing Thing-in-Itself, a thing which on his own principles did not and could not exist (!)

ment which, at the face of it, seems to be quite the same as the one that was reigning in Greek philosophy previously to Aristotle. The argument states that «the essence of a thing can never be changed». If something is an Ens in its essence, it can never be changed into a non-Ens. A non-Ens is Nothing,¹ it is neither causally efficient, nor cogitable, nor teachable. The essence of a thing is just its essence because it is not subject to the conditions of time and relativity. If something is a unity, if it is one, it must be so «wholly»,² i. e. essentially, for ever and unconditionally, it cannot be «many», a plurality. No hundred of artizans in the world can change the essence of blue into yellow³ or a unity into a non-unity. This tacitly admitted principle is the reason why Heracleitus felt it as a contradiction that the same thing can be hot and non-hot, a whole and its parts, a unity and a plurality etc. And it is why Aristotle, fighting against this principle, felt the necessity of limiting the identity of a thing by the conditions of time and relation; a thing cannot be Ens and non-Ens at the same time and in the same respect. Previously to Aristotle the problem seemed insoluble. Parmenides maintained that the «non-Ens does not exist» and since all things relative and changing implied non-existence in some respect, he maintained that only the motionless Whole really existed. Plato was puzzled to find a solution for the contradictory tetralemma *Est unum, Non est unum, Est Multa, Non est Multa*,⁴ because *Unum* and *Multa* were for him absolute Forms which could not be relative and changing. For the same reason he was also puzzled to explain the transition from Motion to Rest. Since Motion and Rest were for him absolute Forms and «no artizans in the world» can change the Essence, or Form, of motion into non-motion; the transition becomes as inconceivable as the transition from Ens to non-Ens.

We thus have in Greek philosophy previously to Aristotle a law of contradiction quite different from the Aristotelian. Mr. Svend Ranulf who recently has submitted this problem to a detailed and deep investigation thus states the two conflicting laws. The pre-Aristotelian law says that «non-Ens is never an Ens, in no respect, in no way, at no time, under no condition and from no point of view is it an Ens». Aristotle also could have said that «the non-

¹ Cp TSP, p 157 7—*asato avastuteān na kimet lryate.*

² *sarvātmanā*, ibid.

³ TSP, p. 389. 11.

⁴ Cp. G. Grote, Plato, II, p 302 ff

But the Buddhist law of Contradiction comes to interfere with this result and says that «everything is apart», there is no real identity at all. An *Ens quatenus Ens* is certainly a cause, it «has» an effect, but it «is» not its own effect. On the other hand two different concepts may be superimposed on the same point of objective reality describing it from two different points of view. The concepts are then united by a common reference to the same reality. They are so far identical. Here the Buddhist law of Identity does not interfere, but supports this kind of identity. However identical is only the common substratum, the constructed concepts are different.

The quarrel between the two logics in European, as well as in Indian, philosophy is founded really on a different interpretation of these two necessary relations. The one logic — from Heraclitus to Hegel in Europe, from Upanishad up to Mādhyamika and Vedāntas in India — maintains that things necessarily interdependent cannot exist the one without the other, they are therefore not only opposed to one another, but they are also identical as included the one in the other. The other logic — from Aristotle to Sigwart in Europe and the Buddhists and Naiyāyikas in India — answers, «what is opposed is not the same»¹.

All empirical right cognition is uncontradicted cognition and there are only two great principles upon which this uncontradicted knowledge is founded. They are Causality and Identity of Reference. Uncontradicted cognition must be uncontradicted in regard of Causality, that is of different time, and uncontradicted in regard of its objective reference, that is of the different aspects of the same reality. Hence the proper formulation of the law of Contradiction must necessarily take into account those two general relations whose neglect vitiates empirical cognition and makes it contradictory. Thus it is that Aristotle, although unconsciously, in his formulation of the law of Contradiction affords an indirect, but very eloquent support to the rightness of Dharmakīrti's theory of relations. His law indeed contains an induct, concealed reference to what, according to Dharmakīrti, are the three principles constituting together our Intellect² or our logical thought: Contradiction, Causation and Identity. Through this our Threefold Intellect we cognize Reality indirectly, i. e. inferentially. Without this

¹ Cp. the formulation of Herbart «*Entgegengesetztes ist nicht einselne*» and of the Buddhists «*nyāyā viruddham* (= *viruddha-dharma-sameti 'am*) *tan nānā*, c. 8 in SDS, p. 24.

² *trirūpasya lingasya trīni rūpāni*.

always A and can never be changed into non-A¹—whereas x is something eternally changing, it never is the same x, it is always passing from x into non-x.

3) The relation between the two worlds is however in Buddhism exactly the reverse of what it is with Plato. The world of Forms is for Plato the fundamental one and the ever changing sensible reality is its pale reflex. For the Buddhist Logicians, on the contrary, the bright vividness of concrete change² is the fundamental world, whereas the stable concepts are its vague and general reflex.

4) Therefore the ultimately real world is for Plato the intelligible world of Forms, the sensible world of change is for him ultimately unreal. For the Buddhist, on the contrary, the ultimate reality is the unit underlying its constant change, it is the sensible point-instant. The world of durable concepts, on the other hand, exists for him only in imagination.

5) Both systems start from different conceptions of reality. For Plato reality is truth, what is cognized as true.³ Ideality if it is true is also reality.⁴ For the Buddhist reality is efficiency.⁵ Ultimately real is only the extreme concrete and particular object which exists in the external world.⁶ The ideas exist only in our head. Reality is the same as non-Ideality,⁷ and Ideality the same as non-Reality. Truth, i. e. cognizability as truth,⁸ far from being the mark of reality, is the mark of ultimate unreality, because ultimate reality is unutterable and incognizable.⁹

5) For Plato likewise the sensible particular is incognizable, and this for him is only a reason to condemn its ultimate reality.¹⁰

6) The law of Contradiction tacitly admitted in the majority of Platonic dialogues is the Eleatic one.¹¹ An Ens is never a non-Ens.

¹ Ibid., p. 155

² *spastārthatā*

³ Natorp, op. cit., p. 391

⁴ This standpoint is shared in India by the Naiyāyikas (*yat prameyam tat sat*) Under the veil of it a wealth of metaphysical entities and, first of all, a real Time and a real Space are surreptitiously introduced into the world of realities

⁵ *yad artha-kṛyā-kāri tat sat, yā bhūtiḥ sana kṛyā.*

⁶ *bāhya = artha-kṛyā-kāri = svalaksana = paramārtha-sat.*

⁷ *paramārtha-sat = kalpanāpodha = pratyaṣa.*

⁸ *mācaya-ārūḍha = buddhy-ārūḍha = viśalpa.*

⁹ *anabhilāpya = jñānena aprāpya*

¹⁰ Cp S Rannulf, op cit., p. 160, 151, 162.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 147 ff.

Stcherbatsky, I

CHAPTER III

UNIVERSALS.

§ 1. THE STATIO UNIVERSALITY OF THINGS REPLACED
BY SIMILARITY OF ACTION.

The Indian theories of Universals can be divided into two main groups, the realistic one and the idealistic one¹. The Realists assume that every Universal exists in the external world as a separate unit invariably connected with all the individuals in which it is present. The Idealists, who also can be characterized as Conceptualists and as Nominalists, maintain that only Individuals are real Ens-es, the Universals are mere images, mere concepts or mere names².

The Realists again are divided in those who assume the additional reality of Inherence³ as a separate Ens, and those who deny the reality, or necessity, of such an Ens. The maintainers of Inherence are further divided in those who assume that its reality is perceived by the senses directly, and those who assume that its reality is not perceived, but inferred. The Vaiśeṣikas assume an inferred Inherence, the Naiyāyikas — a perceived one; the Jainas, Mīmāṃsakas and Sāṅkhyas do not assume any Inherence at all⁴, and the Buddhists deny the reality of Universals altogether. The theory of the Buddhist logicians is characterized as an Idealism,⁵ as a Nominalism,⁶ as a Conceptualism,⁷ as a theory of Conformity,⁸ as a dynamical theory⁹ and as a dialectical

¹ There is scarcely an Indian work on philosophy in which the problem of Universals would not be touched. The best expositions of the Buddhist theory is found in the *āśrta-vāda* chapter of Kumārilā's *Śloka-vārttika*, in the chapters on *sāmānya-vāda* and the *syād-vāda* of TS and TSP, and in all the works on *apoha-vāda*, cp vol II, p 404.

² *samyak-mātra* = *astu-śūnya-vikalpa*

³ *samavāya*

⁴ Cp TSP, p 262 22.

⁵ *vyākhyāna-vāda*

⁶ *astu-śūnya-prajñapti-vāda*.

⁷ *vikalpa-vāsanā-vāda*

⁸ *sārupya-vāda*.

⁹ *śāli-vāda*

In this connection a suggestion of Plato must be considered, which by itself is difficult of comprehension, but becomes more or less explainable when confronted with its Indian solution. Just as the Buddhists Plato thinks that an object, while in motion, cannot change to rest, nor, while at rest, change to motion.¹ But at each time, whether present or past, it must be either in motion or at rest: at no time, neither present nor past nor future, can it be neither in motion nor at rest. "It follows that no time can be assigned for the change: neither the present, nor the past nor the future. Hence change is timeless (ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὐσα)". That which changes, changes at once and suddenly. at an instant when it is neither in motion nor at rest. "This suddenly (ἐξαπναι) — is a halt, or break, in the flow of time, an extra-temporal condition, in which the subject has no existence, no attributes, though it revives again forthwith clothed with its new attributes a point of total negation or annihilation, during which the subject with all its attributes disappears. At this interval all predicates may be truly denied of it, but none can be truly affirmed. The one thing is neither at rest, nor in motion; neither like nor unlike; neither the same with itself nor different from itself; neither *Unum*, nor *Multa*. Both predicate and subject vanish." "The thing, as Kamalaśīla states, is its own annihilation". Is it not clear that Plato comes here very near to the Buddhist idea of Instantaneous Being as a support for the universal and eternal Forms? His moment of a sudden change lies out of, or apart from, time. This means that it has no duration, it is the absolute moment. As such it has no qualities, it is pure qualityless existence. And it is at the same time non-existence, since it disappears at that very instant in which it appears, to be followed by another moment. Plato's moment of sudden change is what the Buddhist call "production of a dissimilar moment",² but it is "dissimilar" only in connection with the united series of previous moments, not by itself. Plato admits the objective reality of Time as a special Form. This time does not exist for the Buddhist. Each moment is a moment of change, change thus becomes the perpetual Form of Existence. What Plato was led to admit as a moment explaining conspicuous or gross change, is going on perpetually, it is pure existence, the subtle change underlying the world of stabilized images. This absolute moment of change is a challenge to

¹ In his *Parmenides*, cp. G. Grote, *Plato*, II, 309 ff

² *vyākṛāṇa-lakṣaṇa-utpāda*

substances' But nothing prevents us to assume that things, or forces, absolutely dissimilar produce similar results¹ E. g., the plant *gūdhū* is known in medicine to produce a febrifuge effect. It has not the slightest similarity, in shape and stuff, with other plants which are known in medicine to have the same — or stronger, or feebler — febrifuge effect Their similarity is not a similarity of substance, but a similarity of producing a similar, or nearly similar, effect. If the Universal would be an external real thing, a thing in itself, just as the real particular is, we would have necessarily a direct reflex of that Universal in our head. The function of the intellect would then be passive receptivity But that is not so!

The Buddhist logicians attach great importance to what we have christened as the Experiment of Dharmakīrti;² the fact, namely, that when the mind of the observer is absent,³ when his attention is otherwise engaged, the incoming stimulus may be fully exercised by the object, the photographic function of the senses may be fully discharged, but no recognition will follow, because «the mind is absent» The observer will «understand» nothing. His attention must be directed to the object and to the photographic process; past experience must be remembered, the name and its connotation must be recalled only then will the observer begin to «understand» and recognition will follow⁴ What does that mean? It means that the understanding is a separate faculty, different from the senses The understanding is the mind's spontaneous activity subsequent to the function of the sensuous passive apparatus. If the connotation of the name were an external reality; if it were an eternal form, residing in the object, a form in which the object would «partake», recognition would have been produced straight off, as soon as the stimulus would have reached the senses The processes of attention, recollection of passed experience and of the name, may go on with great rapidity, if the action is habitual⁵ But if it is not habitual, it will be gradual and revealed by introspection. If the febrifuge capacity belonging to some medicinal plants would represent an eternal Form residing in them, it would be always the same, never changing. But we know that it is changing

¹ TSP, p. 497. 16, cp. *ibid.*, p. 239. 27 ff.

² Cp. above, p. 150

³ *anyatra-gata-citta*, cp. TS, p. 241. 12

⁴ *saṁketa-manaskāraṁ sad-ādi-pratyayaṁ me jayamānaṁ tu laṅganie, na cāsa-vyūpraty-anantaram*, TS, p. 240. 17.

⁵ TSP, p. 240. 25

at different times of his life and in respect of different¹ subjects. But he cannot be learned and unlearned at the same time and in respect of the same subject. For the Buddhists these conditions are something self-evident, because the subject of a judgment is always a point instant, the element «this». «This is learned», «this is not learned» are incompatible when referred to the same point instant. But «this is a *śunīapā*» and «this is a tree» can be referred to one and the same point-instant of reality; there is between these predicates no incompatibility, because there is identity of substratum or Coherence.

The necessity of such a conditional formulation has however been challenged by no smaller an authority than Kant. He went even all the length of maintaining that the time-condition has been introduced by Aristotle «out of mere carelessness and without any real necessity»; «because», says he, «the principle of contradiction as a purely logical must not be limited in its application by time». A principle which is «purely logical» means apparently the same as what Mr. Svend Ranulf intends by the logic of absolute concepts.²

It is a return to the Eleatic formulation of the law. «A is not non-A» conduces logically to the Parmenidean «ὅτι ἔστι μὴ ἔναι». «If I want to say», Kant explains, «that a man who is unlearned is not learned, I must add the condition «at the same time», for a man who is unlearned at one time may very well be learned at another. But if I say «no unlearned man is learned»; then the proposition is analytical, because the characteristic «unlearnedness» forms part now of the concept of the subject, so that the negative proposition becomes evident directly from the principle of contradiction and without the necessity of adding the condition «at the same time».

What is important in this problem from the standpoint of Indian logic is not alone the law of contradiction itself, but also the light it throws on the theory of judgment and of inference as understood by the Buddhists. Sigwart impugns the formulation of Kant and rejects the strictures addressed by him to the Aristotelian formula. He contends that the Kantian formula is something quite different from the Aristotelian. Kant's critique is therefore «a stroke in the air». Kant remarks quite rightly that the Aristotelian formula refers to two predicates which are contradictory. They cannot be applied to one and the same subject simultaneously, but may be applied in succession.

¹ CPR., p. 126

² Logik der absoluten Vieldeutigkeit (= Eindeutigkeit) der Begriffe.

We see that the argument of Berkeley against Conceptualism and in favour of Nominalism is here repeated by Śāntiraksita and Kamalaśīla in favour of the same Nominalism, but against Realism.¹ However the enormous difference between Berkeley and the Buddhists consists in the evident fact which has apparently escaped the attention of the great Englishman, namely the fact that what he calls «particular colour and shape» is also general, general in respect of the particulars under it. The non-general is only the thing as it is strictly in itself. If it is, e.g., blue in colour, this means already that it is not non-blue, and then it is general, it is no more «in itself», it is «in the other», relative, constructed, dialectical. The absolute particular blue is unutterable. It represents «the very first moment» of sensation, the sensation of the «pure» object, the object bereft of all its characteristic features,² the object not yet touched by the dialectic of the understanding.³ This «pure» object is the foundation and cause of all our knowledge. It is efficient and consequently real. It is subsequently «understood», or «telescoped», by the understanding in an image which is universal and therefore unreal. It represents the object in a general picture. The knowledge of the first moment is affirmative knowledge, it cognizes pure reality. Is the knowledge of the image also affirmative? No, it is only distinctive, as we shall see in the sequel.

§ 2. HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS.

The problem of Universals apparently attracted the attention of Indian thinkers at a very early date. Names of philosophers are quoted who belong to the semi-mythical ages of philosophic pre-history and who were concerned about Universals, Particulars and their relation to names.⁴

¹ Berkeley's words «whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape or colour» cannot be translated into Sanskrit otherwise than thus: *yad eva cakṣuḥ-pāṇy-ādī-vijñānam mayā vikalpyate, viśiṣṭa-rūpa-ākṛti-anugatam anubhūyante*. Cp. this with Kamalaśīla's words, p. 243 20, — *vijñānam ca varṇa-ādī-pratibhāsa-anugatam anubhūyate*.

² *prathamataram sarva-vpādān-vivikta-rastumātra-darśanam pravartate*, cp. TSP, p. 241 17.

³ *na tad vikalpam aprīyate*.

⁴ TSP, p. 282 24 — *jātiḥ padārtha ity Vajrapyāyanah*; probably to read *Vajrapyāyana-Kātyāyanau*, *dravyam ity Vyādih, udhayanam Pāṇinih*. Cp. Ruben. Die Nyaṣa-Sūtras, p. 195 ff. and Otto Strauss, ZDMG, 1927, p. 185 ff.

indefinite subject. The judgment «this rose is yellow», for instance, reduces to the perceptual, or real, judgment «this is yellow».¹ The real logical subject is always expressed by the demonstrative «this» and it follows that every concept referred to objective reality is a predicate. From the Indian point of view Kant is quite right in maintaining that the Aristotelian formula refers to two predicates, but he is not right in converting one of these predicates into a subject.²

j) The Aristotelian formula of Contradiction and Dharmakīrti's theory of Relations

There is an intrinsic natural connection between all these Indian theories of Judgment, of Inference (Concomitance), of Relations, and of Contradiction; and if we attentively look into the Aristotelian formulation of Contradiction we will see the ghost of the Indian theory appearing behind the veil of it. Indeed Sigwart was right, more right perhaps than he himself suspected, when he maintained that the proposition «a learned man is not unlearned» contains two judgments, «x is learned» and «x is unlearned». For a judgment, as Kant clearly saw, consists in bringing the manifold of intuition under one general concept. It therefore always reduces to the form «x is A». It is a judgment with one concept. A judgment uniting two concepts, either according to the analytical or according to the synthetical principle, is something, Sigwart rightly maintains, essentially

¹ *Logik*,³ I 142

² It is curious that the polemic between such leaders of European science as Kant and Sigwart on so capital a problem as the formulation of the law of Contradiction by Aristotle has had no echo. None of the subsequent writers on logic, for aught I know, cared to interfere into the quarrel and to side either with Sigwart and Aristotle or with Kant. B. Erdmann (*Logik*, pp 511 and 513), without losing a word of argument and without even mentioning the initiators of the two formulas, inserts them both and represents the matter so as if Kant's formula were the fundamental one and Aristotle's its consequence. The reverse of this seems to be the opinion of J. N. Keynes, *op cit*, p. 455. Bradley's remarks, *op cit*, p. 116 (I V. § 13), are perhaps intended as a reply to Sigwart. J. St Mill comes very near to the Indian solution when he states (*Exam of Hamilton's phil.*, ch XXI) that «valid reasoning... is a negative conception». But in his *Logic*, II, 7, § 5, he thinks that the law of Contradiction is a generalisation from experience. A Pfänder, *Logic* p 343, seems to accept Sigwart's formula, we would have expected him to prefer the Kantian one as purely logical (analytical). He repudiates Sigwart's theory of Negation (p. 228) as being psychological and gives of Negation no explanation at all.

Since all things are, on the one hand, similar to other things and, on the other hand, different from other things, therefore consequent Realism admits the presence in every single thing of these two inmates, Similarity and Dissimilarity. Every atom, e. g., shelters a special reality called the Difference. All ultimate ubiquitous realities, such as Time, Space, Ether, Soul, etc., include such ultimate Differences which prevent them from being mixed up together. These real Differentiae are separate units perceived by the senses. In atoms and in ubiquitous substances they cannot be perceived by the eyes of ordinary people, but the Yogi who has a special gift of vision perceives them directly by his eyes. Realism could not proceed any further!

There was hardly any subsequent change or development of the realistic idea inside the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, except their divergence on the problem of the perceptibility of Inherence, mentioned above. The Vaiśeṣikas quarrelled on the question of the omnipresence of the eternal Universals. A part of them maintained that they were present only in the places where the respective particulars resided. Another part maintained that they were present not only in these places, but also in the intervals between them,¹ although unmanifested. Pṛāśastapāda rallied to the first of these views² and it became incorporated in the official doctrine of the school.

The Buddhist denial of Universals is divided in two periods. In the first period, in Hinayāna, abstraction, synthesis, universality and naming were regarded as special Forces (*saṃskāra*), either mental³ or general.⁴ In the second period, in the school of the logicians, Universals were regarded as concepts (*vikalpa*) and contrasted with the objective reality of the particulars.

There is no other doctrine which would equal Hinayāna Buddhism in its anti-universalist tendencies. What here corresponds to a Universal parades under the name of abstraction.⁵ The term indicating it is

additional residence in every atom of a special reality, called Differentiae. The question is answered in the negative. According to VS, I 2 5-6, Generality and Differentiae are resident in all substances, qualities and motions, but in the ultimate substances Differentiae alone are resident. These ultimate Differentiae have alone survived in Pṛāśastapāda's Bhūṭeya.

¹ Op. NB and NBT, p. 82 18 ff, trāṇal, p. 225

² Pṛāśastap, p. 311. 14, cp Śrīdhara, p. 312 21

³ *citta-samprayukta*.

⁴ *rūpa-citta-vyprayukta*.

⁵ *samjñā* = *udgrahana*, cp my CC, p. 17-18

itself, as Kant wanted it to be. The Aristotehan and Kantian formulas are different, because they refer to different things.

The double character of judgments falls also in line with the double meaning of the verb substantial. We have already mentioned the fact of this double meaning, viz., to serve as a copula in predication and to express existence. Now it is evident that the meaning of existence belongs to this verb in existential or perceptual judgments only. It serves as a copula, on the other hand, in propositions expressing the concomitance of two concepts.

We therefore must take exception to the rule that a judgment, or proposition, consists of subject, predicate and copula. This is a correct account of the nature of analytical concomitances only. In those founded on causation there is no copula at all, otherwise than linguistic. We of course can say "smoke is a product of fire", but the meaning is not that the smoke is something, but that it is produced by something. Thus there must be a word expressing existence or reality in a perceptual judgment, in a judgment proper. It has the form of "this is" or "there is" or "is" simply in the meaning of existence. It is also present in a negative judgment in the form of "there is not". There must be a word expressing identity in an analytical concomitance and that is the verb substantive in the meaning of a copula. Finally there must be a word expressing production in a concomitance founded on Causation.

The judgment therefore consists of subject, predicate and a word meaning either 1) existence or 2) identity (copula) or 3) causation. It is exceedingly curious that the Aristotehan formulation of the law of Contradiction — thus the law of all laws — virtually presupposes the Threefold Logical Reason — this fundamental tenet of Buddhist logicians. Aristotle indeed was right, more right than he suspected, in introducing into his formulation of the law of Contradiction the two, and only two, relations of Necessary Dependence (*niyata-pratibandha*) which Dharmakīrti has established as underlying all logical thought. Indeed what are the sources of the denial of the law of Contradiction at different times by philosophers of different countries? It is always want of discrimination between the necessary interdependence of two different facts, or concepts, and their identity. The effect cannot exist without a cause, they are necessarily interdependent. In careless language, in a semi-poetical flight of imagination, we may call them united and identical. We shall then have existence and non-existence at the same time, the cardinal tenet of Hegel.

vidual it somehow resides in its completeness and eternity. The Buddhists retorted that the Universal is 1) a mere name,¹ 2) it is also a mere concept without an adequate external reality² and 3) that the concept is dialectical,³ i. e. negative. Only in assuming that the concept is negative can we understand the otherwise absolute absurdity of the unity, eternity and complete inherence of the general in each particular.

There is an unmistakable parallelism between the European struggle and the Indian controversy. Its general lines are similar, but not its details.

The first distinction is this, that in India the problem was closely linked together with two different theories of sense-perception. The Realists assumed an imageless⁴ consciousness and a direct perception by the senses of both the external particular and of the universal residing in it. The Nominalists transferred these universals out of the external into the internal world and assumed an external world of mere particulars faced by an internal world of mere images; that is to say, of mere universals. Sensations became related to images as particulars to universals. Thus Nominalism became founded on the doctrine that the senses and the understanding are two utterly heterogeneous mental faculties, although united by a special causal relation, inasmuch as images always arise in functional dependence on sensations.

Another capital distinction is but a consequence of the first. The Buddhist conception of the particular is quite different from the European one. The particular apprehended in sensation is the bare particular, containing nothing of otherness or universality. All European Nominalism and Conceptualism is founded on the idea of a particular which is but a concrete universal.⁵ The line of demarcation lies in India, as indicated above, between the absolute particular and the absolute universal, not between the concrete universal and the abstract

¹ *saṃyudhā-mūlāram*

² *vastu-jñāya vikalpaḥ*

³ *anya-vyāvṛtta = apoha*

⁴ *nirākāra*

⁵ Duns Scotus has insisted upon the primal character of individuality (*haecceitas*), but had still regarded it as the generic substantiated Guillaume d'Oc cam asserted that the particular is the real and that the universals are gathered from our intuitive knowledge of the individualities. This is very near to the Indian view, but the conception of a pure and absolute particular is nevertheless absent.

threefold apparatus we can cognize Reality directly, through the senses; but pure sense-cognition is mere indefinite sensation.

We have in the different logics of Europe and India several laws of Contradiction: 1) the Eleatic law in its two varieties, the one of Parmenides and the one of Heraclitus, 2) the Platonic law which converts change into illusion, 3) the Buddhist law which converts stability into illusion, 4) Aristotle's law, which is also the law of the Indian Realists, according to which everything is alternately stabilized and changing, and finally, 5) Hegel's law introducing moving reality into the heart of his concepts and thus effacing all difference between reality and logic.

suggests to the mind"—would have probably been answered by Dignāga in the following way. Names are just as general as ideas. The capacity to receive a name is the distinguishing sign of an image, when distinguished from a sensation. All namable things are ideas just as general as the names by which they are designated. There is no difference in respect of reality between an abstract idea and a name.

Supposing Dharmakīrti would have been present at the same symposium, he would have probably delivered himself in his peculiar style; addressing himself to Locke, in the following way. "You maintain that some ideas are adequate, others are not; some are simple and individual, others are creatures of the understanding, added to the things from without. But why? Who is the Universal Monarch by whose decree one set of ideas is declared to be adequate and another not? Ideas are ideas, they are not reality. Either all are inadequate or none!" But when Locke maintains that the objects are nothing but "powers" to produce various sensations and that the corresponding ideas being in the mind are no more the likeness of external object than their names "are the likeness of our ideas",—thus Dharmakīrti would have readily admitted in extending this feature to all "ideas" in general.

The battle between Realism and Nominalism in European logic has remained undecisive. The contending armies have forsaken the battlefield. The majority of modern logicians have dropped this subject as irrelevant and insoluble. There are, however, the schools of Marburg and of Husserl which contain attempts at a new interpretation of Platonic ideas. Nay, even the school of Experience is not disinclined under the pressure of necessity to have recourse to the same solution. It is easy to imagine how Dharmakīrti would have answered these quite modern doctrines. To Husserl he would have spoken thus. "You maintain that the ideal objects really exist,¹ that they are not mere *façon de parler*,² that there is no such interpreter's skill in the world which could repudiate ideal objects altogether."³ On the other hand you maintain that there is a difference between the ideal existence of the Universal and the real existence of the particular.⁴ We do not object! The real fire is the fire which burns

¹ Log. Unt., § II, 124

² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 126

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 125. "Wir leugnen es nicht, dass ein fundamentaler, kategorischer Unterschied bestehe, zwischen dem idealen Sein und realem Sein, zwischen Sein als Species und Sein als Individuelles"

theory.¹ It is Idealism since it maintains that Universals are mere subjective ideas. It is Nominalism and Conceptualism since these ideas are the same as images and concepts and are capable of being associated with names. It is a theory of Conformity, since it maintains the correspondence of an image with some efficient point-instant of external reality. It is a dynamical theory since it maintains that reality consists of Forces capable of evoking images. It is a dialectical theory because it maintains that all concepts are relative and dialectical.

The theory of Conformity has been examined as a theory of judgment. The dynamical and dialectical theories will be now examined.

All these theories can be illustrated by the different interpretations of the existence and cognition of a piece of cloth. For the Naiyāyika it consists of three units: the threads, the "cloth-ness" and the Inherence of the clothness in the threads, all three being real external separate units, and all three perceptible to the sense of vision. For the Vaiśeṣikas Inherence is inferred, not perceived. But the threads and in them the presence of "cloth-ness" are perceived. For the Jaiṇas, Sāṅkhyas and Mīmāṃsakas there is no Inherence at all, there are only two units — the threads and the clothness. They are directly united without the go-between of an Inherence. For the Buddhist logicians there is here only a point of pure reality which stimulates our Productive Imagination to produce the image of a cloth. This last theory is a theory of Conformity or Correspondence between two quite heterogeneous things. It is a dynamic theory. The real individual things are not substances, but Forces, capable of evoking images in our consciousness.

"The things, i. e. the causally originating things, says Śāntirakṣita, (are Things-in-Themselves), there is 'not the slightest bit of another thing mixed up in (each of them).'² Reality consists of absolute particulars. Every vestige of generality is absent in it. Generality, similarity, relation or a Universal is always something imagined or constructed. What is then the connection between the real particular and its utterly heterogeneous cognition, since cognition is always a Universal? The answer is the following one.

There is in the things themselves not a bit of common substance. How could there be in them any similarity of substance, since, as we have seen, there is in them no substance at all? Forces they are, not

¹ *apoha-rūpa*.

² TSP., p. 19; cp. p. 486-20.

to the reality of a point-instant. These last are necessarily universals.¹

According to Bertrand Russell² the relation between the external particular and the mental Universal is causal. This would correspond to that part of the Buddhist theory which replaces the reality of an universal by the similarity between different stimuli exercised by discrete particulars. Moreover causality is not sufficient, there is besides between the particular and the corresponding universal a "Conformity." What this conformity means will be explained in the next chapter.

¹ This is also proved by the Buddhist theory of the Syllogism, for the major premise means consistency which is but the indirect reality of concepts and their laws, and the minor premise (incl. conclusion) means reference of these concepts to the ultimate reality of a sensuous element; the latter is the only ultimate reality.

² *Analysis of Mind*, p. 237 — "The facts open to external observation are primarily habits having the peculiarity that very similar reactions are produced by stimuli which are in many respects very different from each other", op. *Outline of Philosophy*, p. 172 f.

in every individual case. It depends on the quality of the plant, and this quality again depends on the quality of the field on which it is raised, its cultivation, manure, etc.¹ It belongs consequently to every individual case separately. There is in one case "not the slightest bit" of what is found in the other. The Universal is an illusion, it is a mere name without any pervasive reality corresponding to it. "It has been proved by us, says Kamalaśīla, that the particular real thing-in-itself,² which represents the substratum of what is designated by a name, is not touched by the dialectic of the understanding. But the empirical (non-ultimate) reality, whose form is constructed by the artist called Productive Imagination,³ is internal,⁴ not external. People not knowing the difference between perception and conception,⁵ noticing that the form of the object seems to be external, run after it as if it were just external. But this does not prove that it really is external. Our behaviour towards external objects, such as e.g. a goad, is founded upon their projection into the empirical world in our perceptual judgments,⁶ but they really represent a subjective construction of our mind". "Besides", says the same Kamalaśīla⁷ to the Realist, "what you intend to prove is that the general ideas⁸ refer to something different from those bodies (which are actually perceived).⁹ But this is wrong, because (these general entities do not exist), they are not (separately) reflected."¹⁰ Indeed what you describe as "cowness" is bereft of those colour, particular shape and (proper) name (which the actual cow possesses). The image which I experience (in my head) possesses these colour and other (particulars) reflected. How is it then possible that its pattern should be deprived of colour and (all these particular features). It is impossible to admit that the image should have one form and its external pattern a (general) form quite different, since in that case the super-absurdity¹¹ would arise (that every image would correspond to any object).

¹ TSP, p. 240 f.

² *svālakṣaṇa*

³ *kalpanā-śīlpin*

⁴ *antarmātrā-ārūḍha*

⁵ *dr̥ṣṭya-vikalpayor uccā-ānabhivyūṭṭayā*

⁶ *bahī-rūpatayā adhyarūṣita*

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 243, 17 ff.

⁸ *anugāmi-pratyayānām*.

⁹ namely because you consider the Universal to be a separate unity.

¹⁰ *tasya apratibhāsanāt*

¹¹ *ati-prasaṅga* = *sarvatra prar̥thi*

What is indeed the part of language in our cognition? Is it a real source of knowledge? Is it a separate source, different from the senses and the intellect, or is it a secondary source included in one of the two main sources? At the first glance the dignity of a source of real knowledge cannot be refused to verbal testimony. For what is a source of real knowledge, according to the system here analysed? It is, we have seen, uncontradicted experience. Real knowledge is successful knowledge. It precedes every successful purposive action. External reality produces a stimulus upon our cognitive apparatus, which constructs, when stimulated by reality, an image of the thing from which the incoming stimulus proceeds. Guided by this image we take action and, if the image is right, the action becomes successful, the object is reached. Supposing I am informed that there is a tree on the river and five apples on that tree. I then proceed to the river, find the tree and reach the apples. The action is successful, because the verbal testimony was right. But does that mean, as some philosophers have supposed, that the word is the adequate expression of external reality, that the connection between the object and its name is primordial and eternal, that reality is "interwoven" with names, that there is no reality without a name, that consequently the names precede reality, that language is a kind of Biotic Force, which shapes our concepts and even shapes reality itself in accordance with those concepts? We will see in the sequel that all these shades of opinion were represented in philosophic India. To all them the Buddhists opposed an emphatic denial. Language is not a separate source of knowledge and names are not the adequate or direct expressions of reality. Names correspond to images or concepts, they express only Universals. As such they are in no way the direct reflex of Reality, since reality consists of particulars, not of universals. The universals cannot be reached in purposive actions. Just as concepts and names they are the indirect, or conditional¹ reflex of reality, they are the "echo"² of reality, they are logical, not real. Being an indirect cognition of reality, language does not differ from inference, which has also been

¹ That the Indians clearly distinguished the direct from the indirect reflects is seen from the following passage of Pārthasārathi (ad Ślokar, p. 567) — *gnānākāram . svalakṣaṇam eva bhāsamānam anubhāsate, śabdān eva prati-bhāṣah*. Indeed the mental image (*gnānākāra*) indirectly reflects (*anu-bhāṣate*) the directly reflected reality (*bhāsamānam svalakṣaṇam*). *bhāsanam* = *prati-bhāṣa* is a reflex as in a mirror (*ādarśavat*), and *anubhāsa* is an indirect or conditioned reflex.

² Cp the passage quoted in the preceding note.

To the first historical period, the period of the rise of the Sāṅkhya, must probably be assigned the origin of the two principle doctrines between which the schools were divided in later times. With the doctrine of unity between cause and effect, hand in hand, must probably have developed the doctrine of a certain unity of Universal and Particular. With the doctrine of a divorce between Cause and Effect, and the splitting of all existence in separate minute elements, evidently, ran hand in hand the Buddhist doctrine denying the reality of Universals.

To a later period belongs the rise of the doctrine of Inherence in the two allied schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in which realism, assailed by its adversaries, hardened to an extent which is unique in the history of philosophy.

In the third period of Indian speculation when the mutual position of the chief actors on the stage of philosophy was laid down in systematic works we find the following distribution of roles in the play of Universals.

On the extreme right we find the extreme Realists of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. They make their appearance later than the others.

In the middle stand the moderate Realists of the Jaina, Mīmāṃsā and Sāṅkhya schools which probably represent the earliest doctrine.

On the extreme left stand the Buddhists which at a later date found adherence from the Vedāntins.

The Buddhists were probably the indirect cause of the exaggerated realism of some orthodox schools.

One of the aphorisms of the Vaiśeṣika system contains the statement that "the General and the Special are relative to cognition"¹ This aphorism cannot be interpreted in the sense of Relativism as meaning unreality, because the general tendency of the system is very realistic. According to that system things can be relative and real at the same time.² The aphorism simply means that the generality of Universals has different degrees, and these degrees are relative to each other. The system not only admits the Inherence, i. e., so to speak, personal residence of a Universal in the Particular,³ it moreover admits the presence in every particular thing of a second resident, called Difference.⁴

¹ VS, I. 2. 1.

² *nyekṣiko vāstavaś ca kārtr-laranādi-vyavahārah*, cp. Śrīdhara, 197. 26
sāmānyānti... śa-vāstava-sarva-gatāni, Praśast, p. 814. 19.

³ Praśast, p. 821. 2 ff., the question is asked that the Yogi could perhaps see the difference between atoms by his exceptional vision alone, without the

Steinbartschky, I

affirmation, «pure» affirmation¹ The intellect is dialectical, i. e. it is always negative. Its affirmation is never direct, never pure, it is affirmation of its own meaning necessarily through a repudiation of some other meaning. The word «white» does not communicate the cognition of all white objects. They are infinite and no one knows them all. Neither does it communicate cognition of a Universal Form of «whiteness» as an external Ens cognized by the senses. But it refers to a line of demarcation between the white and the non-white, which is cognized in every individual case of the white. The white is cognized through the non-white, and the non-white through the white. Just so is the cow, or cowness. It is cognized through a contrast with the non-cow. The concept of «having an origin» does contain absolutely nothing over and above its contrast with eternity. The negation is mutual. To have an origin means negation of eternity and eternity means negation of origin. Since the same refers to every concept and every name, we can in this sense say with Hegel that «Negativity is the soul of the Universe». But Hegel has left in the world nothing but logic; therefore there is in his world nothing but Negation. In the Buddhist view there is beside logic a genuine reality which is neither negative nor is it dialectical. Concepts, or logic, are all of them negative and dialectical. Reality, or the Things-in-Themselves, are affirmation, pure affirmation, they are non-dialectical. Negation at last discloses its real face. We at last can answer the puzzling question «why on earth is Negation needed? Affirmation alone will do!» Cognition is an assertory cognition of reality. If Negation is also cognition of reality, why are the two needed? We now have the answer. The direct knowledge is Affirmation, the indirect is Negation. But pure affirmation is only sensation whereas Pure Reason is always dialectical i. e. negative. The doctrine that there are only two sources of knowledge, the senses and the intellect, receives a new and deep foundation. The senses and the intellect are not only related as the direct and the indirect source of knowledge, they are related as affirmation and negation, as a non-dialectical and a dialectical source.

In the chapter of his great work dealing with the knowledge conveyed by words Dignāga begins by making the statement that verbal knowledge is not direct, it is inferential, relative and dialectical. He then examines the divergent theories of other schools. The theory that names express Universals he rejects, because of «infinity and

¹ Cp. above, p. 192

the same which in grammar is used to designate a name substantive, but it is here characterized as a mental energy¹ *sui generis*. The school of the Sarvāstivādins converts it into a non-mental, i. e. general, energy.²

It is clear that what is called generality or a Universal is here converted into a faculty of distinction, just as the genus³ is here also converted into a separate force uniting some units which themselves are supposed to possess nothing in common.

This fundamental idea finds its clear expression in Dignāga's classification of the genus as a name-giving construction of our thought.⁴ It is a Nominalism, but of the sort which cannot be distinguished from Conceptualism, since a concept and a name cover the same ground

§ 3. SOME EUROPEAN PARALLELS.

The Indian mediaeval logic is filled up with a struggle between Realism and Nominalism, just as the Middle Ages in Europe. The respective positions of both parties were fixed during the creative period of Buddhist logic, in the V—VIII centuries AD. From that time both doctrines became petrified and retained their mutual positions without any substantial change. Schools seldom change their fundamental principles in India. If they survive they remain in a changeless condition. Let us imagine for a moment that the school of Plato would have survived in the land of its origin to all political cataclysms and would continue to profess the same doctrine with but insignificant changes of style and literary form up to our days, — this would represent exactly the position of Indian Realism. Nominalism became extinct in India with the extinction of the school of Buddhist logicians. But in Tibet it continues exactly the same teaching during more than a millennium up to our own days.

The Indian Realists maintained that a Universal is an actual *Ens* residing in the objects of the external world. It possesses 1) unity, 2) eternity and 3) inherence;⁵ that is to say, in every particular indi-

¹ *citta* = *citta-samprayukta-samskāra*.

² *nāma-samskāra* contained among the *citta-samprayukta-samskāra*.

³ *niśāya-sādhāgati* = *jāti*, it is classified by the Sarvāstivādins as *citta-samprayukta-samskāra*, cp. my CC, p. 105.

⁴ *jāti-nāma-lāpānā*, cp. above p. 217

⁵ *ekatva-nityatva-anekasamutpatatva*

(Jinendrabaddha, f 285 a. 1) These words mean that in summarizing the rejection (of all realistic opinions which maintain that words express (real) Universals etc (Dignāga) merely establishes his own theory (mentioned by him in the beginning) One could have objected that by a repudiation of foreign opinions one's own theory cannot be established, according to what has been explained when examining and rejecting the *modus tollens* of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism (which the Sāṅkhya school admits as an independent proof) But this stricture cannot be made, since the own theory (of Dignāga) has been mentioned at the very beginning, where he says that, just as in the word "having origination", the own meaning of the word is always expressed through the repudiation of the contrary. Thus it is proved that verbal testimony does not differ (in principle) from Inference (285 a. 3) By rejecting the theory of those who maintain that language is a separate source of knowledge and that it expresses Universals and (Differences) through direct affirmation, (by rejecting them), the same theory (of the author, the theory, namely, that language expresses Universals not through affirmation, but through negation) becomes established¹ (285 a. 4) These words are (an introductory remark). (Dignāga) intends to expound and prove his own theory

(285 a. 4) Now, (does the word "repudiation" here refer to simple negation or does it refer to a special kind of it? And what is the consequence involved? If it be a simple negation of the discrepant, we will be in contradiction with the text, where it is stated that words express "their own meaning" by rejecting the contrary, because (usually), the simple rejection of something else is made independently from (the statement) of one's own (direct) meaning (285 a. 6) A part of the meaning will be then suggested by negation. The word will express a special (entailed) meaning in the way of an (implied) negation. The maintainers of this theory of a double meaning are contradicted by the text (of Dignāga)²

(285 a. 7) But if the (term "repudiation" here) refers to a special kind of negation,³ then the view of equally⁴ repudiating the contrary (i. e. of equally doing two different things, rejecting the contrary and

¹ J here comments on the word "established" (*gnas-pa* = *tyasthita*) used by D in connection with his own theory after rejecting divergent views. A rather superfluous comment.

² The first part of line 285 a. 7 is a repetition through misprinting

³ This special negation is also called *paryudāsa*

⁴ Correct *mnan-par* into *mīam-par*

one; for these are both universals and both abstract. The difference is only in the degree of abstraction.

With these very important distinctions we may assume that the contest in India corresponded to the contest in the European Middle Ages.¹

Turning to modern European philosophy, it becomes easy to imagine how Dignāga would have answered Berkeley and Locke, supposing they were all seated together at a round table discussing the problem of Universals. That the "general and universal" are mental "ideas", that they are "inventions and creatures of the understanding",² Dignāga would have conceded at once. But that "simple ideas" can be concrete and particular he would have emphatically denied. If the universals are necessarily intelligible, it follows that everything intelligible is necessarily a universal. The straight line which the geometer draws on the table is particular, but the straight line which is in my head is universal. It is infinite, it represents all straight lines of all times and places. It is of no use to say that while being particular it "represents" other particulars too. It is impossible to be one thing and to represent the opposite thing: to be particular and to represent the universal.

That the "simple idea" is nothing but the effect of certain "powers",³ is again quite an Indian idea. But this power is only the power of stimulating the understanding to produce "its own creature". This equally refers to the power of constructing the simple idea of blue and to the power of constructing the "ideas" of cow, horse, tree, justice, infinity, eternity, and the "primary" qualities of extension, bulk, etc. etc. It is true that all ideas must be in touch with some particular, they must be "*cum fundamento in re*". But they never are particular, or adequate to particulars. They are, as Locke says, in respect of the general ideas, "only signs".⁴

Berkeley's contention that there are no general ideas, but only general names for particulars, "anyone of which the name indifferently

¹ It can be mentioned that Abelard in his attempt at mediation between extreme Nominalism and extreme Realism expressed views which are partially found in India. He held that the Universal is more than a name, it is a predicate (*sermo*), even a natural predicate. We have seen that the universal as a general concept is always the predicate of a perceptual judgment, hence all universals are nothing but predicates.

² Locke's Essay, book III, ch. III, § 11.

³ Ibid., book II, ch. XXI, § 2.

⁴ Ibid., book II, ch. VIII, § 7, VIII, § 10 & § 17.

stood as the direct meaning, but it is impossible without at the same being a negation (or contraposition). Contraposition consists in a repudiation of a foreign meaning from one's own meaning. It is unthinkable that a contraposition should exist without an implied position.

(285. b. 7). Just for this reason the word does not accomplish two different jobs; viz the repudiation of the discrepant meaning and the positive statement of one's own meaning. Since the essence of one's own meaning of a word consists in its being different from other meanings. As soon as it is expressed, we straight off feel that the contrary is rejected.

(285. b. 8). Just as when we say "a twin-brother"! Since a couple is needed to constitute twinning, we necessarily understand that there is another twin when one is mentioned, — just so in any class which consists of two separate items, since they are only two, when the one is indicated, it is distinguished from the other.

(286. a. 2) (The objection has been made)¹ that if the word will have exhausted its function by repelling the contrary, we will be obliged to find another word in order to express its positive import. But this is a mistake, since the word *eo ipso* repels the contrary. Indeed a word by merely suggesting its own meaning, suggests also the repudiation of everything discrepant, because this suggested (negative) meaning is inseparable (from the positive one).

(286. a. 4) Thus there is not the slightest contradiction in maintaining that the "own" meaning of a word consists in Negation.

b) The origin of Universal.

(286 a. 1) Now further, (let it be negative!) What does this (negative meaning) represent? It represents a Universal Term which the speaker intends to designate. It is indeed invariably connected with a word. Therefore the word is the evidence of what the speaker wants to express.

(286 a. 5) However, if a (real) Universal is meant by a word how is it that a (concrete) mental image is supposed to be the object corresponding to a word? (Yes, indeed!). It is just this mental image that constitutes the (whole) Universal. (286 a. 6) How is that? (The mental image is a Universal, because it represents a combined result of many causes.) Indeed (take for instance) a visual sensation. It is the joint product of the organ of vision of a reflector and of attention

¹ By Bhikkhū mahā cūṭa and Tāp. p. 271.

and cooks. The ideal fire is the one I have in my head. I never have denied the existence of the universal fire in my head.¹ But the particular fire is in the external world, it represents the «ultimate reality»,² the efficient point-instant!»

In answer to Natorp's defense of Platonic ideas Dharmakīrti would have in all probability answered thus: «You maintain that Plato's theory reduces to the judgment $x=A$, where x represents the concrete and particular and A the universal.³ Both «exist», because existence means for Plato «complete determination of the element x ». We do not object! We only will add the proviso that «ultimately real» is the concrete particular, not the universal as assumed by Plato». In changing the application of Husserl's words, Dharmakīrti would have said that «no interpreter's skill in the world can do away the obvious fact that the real fire is the fire that burns and cooks, and the ideal fire which I have in my head can of course «completely determine» the particular fire, but it cannot burn and cook». We necessarily must distinguish between ultimate reality and imagination. The latter is a mental reality which is real only as a *façon de parler*.

That there are two quite different concepts of reality, is the most commonly known fact in Buddhism. The old definition is that existence means cognizability.⁴ Existence is divided in 12 categories⁵ of which the last category (№ 12) contains all mental items.⁶ But Mahāyāna has changed the definition into «real is the efficient»⁷ and such is only the external ultimate concrete and particular, the point-instant. The internal objects are sensations and images. Images are always universals. They are divided into pure imagination (or flowers in the sky)⁸ and imaginations which have an indirect or «general» bearing

¹ This kind of reality is called *svarūpa-sattā* cp. SDS, p. 26

² *paramārtha-sat*

³ Natorp. Plato's Ideenlehre, p. 390.

⁴ Ibid. p. 391, «Existenz sagt vollständige Determination des «Dessen»

⁵ In this point the Buddhists fall in line with the empirical school, cp. W. James. Essays in radical empiricism, pp. 32—33, and B. Russell, Analysis of the Mind, p. 187 ff., — with the very important difference that ultimately real is only the point-instant.

⁶ *yat praveśyam tat sat* It is is also sometimes the definition of the Naiyāyikas, who distinguish between *sattā-sāmānyam* and *svarūpa-sattā* cp. the *prāmānya-cāda* section in the NK. p. 162 ff

⁷ *dvādaśa-āyatanāni = sarvaṃ jñeyam.*

⁸ *dharmā-āyatana = dharmāḥ.*

⁹ *yā artha-kriyā-īdā tat sat = paramārtha-sat.*

¹⁰ in *upādhya*

tion) of repudiating the contrary? Indeed "difference", "repudiation of the contrary", "clearing out of what is different" are so many manners of expressing the same thing, since we do not admit that difference is something over and above the thing endowed with it.

(286. b. 5). Therefore (the following question arises). (If our cognition and our speech contain truth and refer us to reality, and if reality consists of mere particulars, whereas speech expresses mere universals and mere negations), how is it then that this self-same essence of an external particular, the Thing-in-Itself, is being converted in something whose essence is mental and negative? (286. b. 5) This question is out of place. The (Transcendental Philosophers) who are engaged in an investigation of Ultimate Reality will always know the distinction (between Reality and Ideality), but not so the others (Ordinary mankind will always confound them), because they think that this very image which they have in their heads can be efficient and real. They believe that at the time when we first see a thing and give it a name, as well as at the moment of our practical behaviour towards this thing, it remains just the same thing as which it is constructed by our imagination, (they believe that reality is congruent with thought). (286. b. 7) Therefore it will be just in accord with their habits of thought, if they will impute to us their opinion that Repudiation-of-the-Contrary is an external reality. But the learned men, trained as they are in the investigation of ultimate truth, will never believe in the unity (and reality of the Universal), because each reflex and (each thing) are separate (in themselves).

(286. b. 8) Moreover, the only foundation for the production of general ideas by our intellect is that very Repudiation-of-the-Contrary. We have said that the meaning of words consists in a repudiation of the discrepant in order to prove that (the Universals are negative in their essence). (286. b. 8) (Indeed this kind of negative universality is the only one) that is contained in Reality itself and can be admitted without contradiction.

(287 a. 1). Therefore it is by no means contradictory to assume that the reality which represents the foundation of similar presentations consists in nothing but a repudiation of the contrary. (Different individual things produce really similar stimuli, a unity of result is thereby produced, which allows to set aside those individuals, which do not produce the same result. (The things producing the same stimulus become then the causes of a transcendental illusion and are a pervasive presentation which has the form of a Universal Truth.)

CHAPTER IV.

DIALECTIC

§ 1. DIGNĀGA'S THEORY OF NAMES.

We have arrived at the closing act of Dignāga's Drama of Cognition. This drama is characterized by classical unity of action and unity of place. There are only two *dramatis personae* evolving all the while on the stage of cognition. They are Reality and Ideality. The first is running, the second is stable. The first is called Point-instant, the second is called Concept or, some-times, simply Logic. Reality we have witnessed as appearing in the first act in its genuine purity, unintelligible and unutterable, but vivid, and directly reflected «A prodigy!» exclaims Dharmottara,¹ the more it is vivid, the less it is comprehensible. In the second act we have watched the indirect, or conditioned, reflex of Reality in a Concept. The Judgment disclosed itself as a function bringing together the seemingly irreconcilable Reality and Ideality. Inference appeared as an extension of the Judgment, its function is to link together Reality with extended or inferred concepts. The Sufficient Reason of this linking is represented by two exceedingly important, though subordinate characters, Identity and Causality; which disclose themselves as inference to an identical point-instant and reference to two different, but interdependent, point-instants. This second act of the drama, establishing the Categories of relation between concepts and their relation to ultimate Reality, can be called the act of Transcendental Analytics, following the first act of Transcendental Aesthetics. In the last act the relation between Reality and Speech is represented. The unutterable reality can nevertheless be designated, of course indirectly, by names, and it becomes incumbent upon the author of the drama to represent the behaviour of Names towards Reality, to establish the part of reality they indirectly can touch. Since, as will be seen, the names can touch reality only dialectically, the concluding act of the drama may be called the act of Buddhist Nominalism, which is also the act of the Buddhist Dialectical Method. We thus will have, following a celebrated example, - a transcendental Aesthetic, a transcendental Analytic and a transcendental Dialectic; transcendental because Logic becomes here related to ultimate Reality.

¹ In *Āpoḥa-prakāśa*.

from its varieties such as *śimṣapā* and others, we will never know how to behave supposing we intend to avoid *śimṣapās* (and get some other kind of wood). (287. b. 1). Besides it would mean running into a contradiction, if we were to apply the term «tree» to trees in general without having previously distinguished them from non-trees. (287. b. 1) But let this be (as the case may be)! The Realist who maintains that Universals are real things (has another argument). You may repudiate whatever you like (says he), you will achieve (by mere negation) nothing at all! But in pointing distinctly to an-object situated before us, we establish its name by convention and say «this is a tree». Thus either the Universal which is itself perceived at the time of convention or the Universal which is connected (with the thing perceived) will be recognized by us in our behaviour, at the time (when we will want either to reach it or to avoid it).

(287. b. 3). Thus it is that (on this theory) the consequences for the behaviour will not be the same (for the Realist as for the Transcendentalist. He will recognize the tree and know how to behave)!

(287. b. 3). (The Transcendentalist). No! the consequences will not be «not the same!» (They will be just the same!) (Indeed consider the following dilemma). When you point to a single object and state «this is a tree», do you use this term with restriction or do you use it without restriction? In the first case the meaning will be «this alone is a tree, there are no others». If you never have seen any tree before and if you do not know at all what a non-tree is, how can this name convey any definite meaning? (287. b. 5) But if you speak without restriction, meaning «this is a tree, but there are other objects which also are trees», how will then the person so informed behave, supposing he wants at that time to avoid (coming in contact with trees)? The difficulty (for the Realist) is absolutely the same! (He must know what the non-trees are).

(287. b. 5) (The Realist). I maintain that when you have perceived a thing by the senses, it becomes easy to know what it is opposed to (and to distinguish it from what it is not). In this sense (the realistic theory) avoids the difficulty (287. b. 6) Being endowed with a direct sense-perception of such a (definite) object, whatsoever it may be, when I internally feel that in the case of another object another image, having another form (is present in my head), (when I feel) that this form is different from the one that has been seen at the time when the name of the thing (was first suggested), — then I can distinguish (the trees) from the heterogeneous (non-trees) Just then will I not

defined as an indirect mode of cognition. The name is a middle term through which its object is cognized. The connection between the middle and the major terms is here founded on Identity of objective reference, the deduction is analytical and the three aspects of the reason are realized; e. g.: 1) this object is called a jar, 2) wherever such objects are found they are called jars, 3) this name is never applied to a non-jar. However, this theory—the theory, namely, that names are, like logical reasons, the indirect mark of reality—is not the main feature of Dignāga's theory. He goes on to state that all names are negative or, as we may put it, dialectical.

The natural Dialectic of the human Intellect is thus considered in India, by the Buddhist Logicians, under the head of a Theory of Names. It is a kind of Nominalism. It is well understood that concepts and names cover the same ground, since conceptual thought is defined as namable thought, a thought capable of coalescing with a name. "Names originate in concepts", says Dignāga, and *vice versa* "concepts can originate in names". Hence to determine the import of names is the same as to determine the fundamental character of concepts. That the Theory of Concepts is brought under a Theory of Names is explainable by the special historical conditions out of which the Buddhist theory emerged. Language was for some schools a special source of our knowledge, fundamental and ultimate, coordinated to the senses and the intellect. In answer to these theories Dignāga makes the following statement.¹

Knowledge derived from words does not differ (in principle) from Inference. Indeed the name can express its own meaning only by repudiating the opposite meaning, as for instance the words "to have an origin" (designate their own meaning only through a contrast with things having no origin or eternal).

That knowledge derived from words does not differ (in principle) from inference means that it is indirect knowledge. Knowledge indeed can be either direct or indirect, either originating in the senses or in the intellect, either perception (sensation) or inference (conception). Knowledge derived from words is not direct, it is not sensation, it is indirect, it is like knowledge through inference. It is moreover negative or dialectical. Thus a new feature in the contrast of direct and indirect knowledge of the senses and the intellect, is given. The senses are

¹ Pram-Samucc., V 1.

- d) The experience of Individuals becomes the agreed experience of the Human Mind.

(288. a. 6) A perceptual judgment establishes (one's own mental image) as having the character of an external object. It is thus constructed (in imagination). Every observer experiences in his own innermost his own images. Nevertheless the imaginative operations of (different) Individuals agree with one another. It is just as the visual experience of two persons suffering from the same eye disease. They both see the moon double; although every one of them in his innermost experiences only his own image, they are persuaded that they see the same (double moon).

(288. a. 7). Therefore, owing to an illusion, we seemingly perceive a single universal form pervading different objects. Comparing with those remote trees, these (here) are also trees. Thus (in fixing the general meaning) those objects are excluded, which are not the cause of producing (such an illusively externalized) image. We then naturally realize that all objects having a discrepant form are non-trees.

e) Conclusion.

(288. a. 8). A thing perceived as a separate thing which nevertheless at the same time would be perceived and not perceived, which would thus produce a difference between a tree and a non-tree, which would be a unity capable of being perceived by the senses, such a thing (i. e. a Universal thing) does not exist, because these (tree and non-tree) are not perceived separately, as a stick and the bearer of a stick (288. b. 1) They cannot be so apprehended because the one is not the indirect mark of the other. (They are united dialectically, the one being simultaneously the affirmation of trees and the negation of non-trees).

(288. b. 2). The same form which is perceived in one (individual thing) is also perceived in another. If there were something in existence which at the same time would possess this definite form and not possess it, if it would at the same time be a tree and a non-tree, only then could we have a real individual which would be a tree in itself.

(288. b. 2) Our opponents are ignorant of the real essence of the theory of the Negative Meaning of words. They impute us a theory

discrepancy».¹ His critique is directed against the opinion that the Universal is a real Ens residing in a particular and cognized directly, by the senses. The Universal embraces an infinity of particulars, which cannot be cognized directly. He then rejects the Vaiśeṣika theory, according to which names express the «differences». This theory seems to be closely allied to his own theory of negative names, but he rejects it, because of its realism. The Vaiśeṣika's we have seen, indeed assumed that in every particular Ens there was residing a real Differentia, a real «otherness», by virtue of which every individual thing, and even every atom, could be distinguished from other things. He further rejects the Naiyāyika theory,² that names express three categories of things, abstract Universals, concrete Universals and Particulars. Absolute particulars are absolutely unutterable, and concrete Universals are not to be distinguished from the abstract ones. Both are Universals and both are abstract. Names of course express Universals, but what kind of Universals? These Universals exist in our head, they are constructed by the force of Productive Imagination and are essentially negative relative and dialectical. After having rejected divergent opinions, Dignāga repeats that knowledge produced by words cognizes reality by the method of «Repudiating the Contrary», i. e. negatively or dialectically.

Jinendrabuddhi interrupts his commentary at this place³ of Dignāga's text and gives the following summary of his theory, which I here translate in full

§ 2 JINENDRABUDDHI ON THE THEORY OF THE NEGATIVE MEANING OF NAMES.⁴

a) All names are negative

(*Pram-samucc-utti* ad V 11) «Therefore the meaning of a word consists in a repudiation of the discrepant meaning». «This means» (as is clearly seen in such names) as «possessing origination», etc. that they contain in their own meaning a repudiation of the discrepant. (This theory has been mentioned at the beginning and now it is) established «by a rejection of all conflicting opinions».

¹ *ānantyād vyabhicārāc ca*, ibid V 2 Cp TSP, p 277 27 — *na jātsabdo bhedānām tūcaka ānantyāt*

² NS II, 1. 65

³ Cp. Viśāla-hamavati Tanjur, Mdo, vol. 115 (Peking), pp. 285 ff

(316. 25). "Negation is double, says he, it is either special¹ or simple². The special contains an affirmation of the contrary. In its turn it also is double, it either is logical³ or ontological⁴.

(317. 2). The logical variety of qualified Negation is the mental image⁵ which we cognize in our perceptual judgments⁶ (as an Universal) which has one and the same form pervasive (through many objects)⁷.

The ontological variety of qualified Negation represents pure reality, when every thing unreal (i. e. every ideality) has been brushed away from it (It is the Thing-in-Itself).⁸

(317. 5). The essence of the logically Negative Meaning will now be defined.

It has been stated before⁹ that just as the *Haritalī* and other medicinal plants have one and the same febrifuge influence, without the presence in all of them of one pervasive universal form, just so such things as the bundled and the black cow etc., although they by their nature are separate things, nevertheless become the causes of the same repeated uniform image, without any reality of a universal in them. This is simply a similarity of action¹⁰. On the basis of these similar efficiencies, by an immediate experience of them, a conceptive knowledge is produced. In this conceptual cognition appears the form of the object, its image, its reflex.¹¹ (Reflex and object) become identified,¹² (but this reflex proves to be a dialectical concept) and the name of Negation (or Contrary-Repudiation) is applied to it. It is a concept,¹³ it is mental,¹⁴ it contains nothing external, (it resides in the head of

¹ *pariyudāsa*

² *prasajya-pratishedha*

³ *buddhy-ātmala*

⁴ *artha-ātmala*

⁵ *buddhy-pratibhāsa*

⁶ *adhyavasāya*

⁷ That is to say that what is Universal in a thing is merely a negation of the contrary

⁸ Lat. a (Negation) whose essence is the Thing (*ai thātmā*) is the own essence (*svatātmā*) of the Thing purified (*vyāvṛtta*) from the heterogeneous (ideality), the real essence (*svabhāva*) of the Thing (*ai thā*)

⁹ TS, p. 289 19, cp. TSP, p. 329 7 and 497 15

¹⁰ *ekārtha-kāritayā sāmānyam*

¹¹ *artha-ālāṅkāra*, *artha-pratibimbaka*, *ai thā-ābhāsa* (convertible terms)

¹² *īdāntmyena*

¹³ *saṁkalpaka*

¹⁴ *gñāne samānāntika anyam*

asserting one's own meaning) this view is rejected. Indeed the meaning is then that just as the particle of negation has no other function than denial, (just so every word) can have no other function than the repudiation of the discrepant.

(285. b. 1) But is the view of a double meaning really a different view? The mistake found in this view, (i. e. the mistake that it contradicts the text of Dignāga), will it not also extend to this (other view, because Dignāga speaks of the word's "own" meaning)? No, it will not! because the repudiation of the contrary is the exclusive meaning (of every word) And there is no contradiction (with the statement of Dignāga), because the "own" meaning of the word is just repudiation of the contrary (and nothing else) It is here expressed by the term "Contrary Repudiation". Indeed the aim of the text of Dignāga is that the word "expresses *per differentiam*" its own meaning

(285. b. 2) Another consideration! (We use Position and Contraposition as two different figures in Syllogism, the one is affirmation, the other negation). If we enjoin something special, we understand that it is different from something else. The practice of enjoining something is understood as a position and contraposition. The words are thus expressive of affirmation and repudiation. There is thus only one part of this relation which must be understood as a repudiation of the contrary (285. b. 4) But here it is maintained that words signify exclusively special meanings (such meanings namely which consist in a negation of the discrepant) (There is only one meaning, there is between affirmation and negation of the contrary) no such relation that the one would characterize the other

(285. b. 4) However, do we not in common life understand the words of speech either as having a sense of affirmation alone, or of negation alone?

No, that is not so! (The words express only negations, only differences!), because a pure affirmation without any (implied) negation is senseless (it conveys no definite) result. (285. b. 6). We likewise never can take our stand on any pure negation. There is no contraposition without a (corresponding) position, neither is there any position without contraposition.¹ A position (or positive concomitance)² is under-

¹ Cp NBT, p. 78 22—*ś aśya, antayasya vyatirekasya vā, yo(a) bhāva-niscayaḥ sa eva aparasya dvitīyaśa bhāva-niscaya-anantariyakaḥ*

² *antaya-vyatireka* are the same as *bhāva-abhāva*. Cp NBT, p. 79 7—*antaya-vyatirekau bhāva-bhāva*

— — — — —

(according to one system),¹ or else (according to the Realists) it is produced by the Soul and its interaction with an inner sense, an outer sense and an external object. All these factors are separate units, there is in them no pervading Universal unity, (but they produce together one combined result). Just so a *śimśapā* and other single objects, without having in themselves any mutually pervasive real unity at all, being experienced (by every observer) in his own mind separately, nevertheless produce a single united presentation. They stimulate our faculty of Productive Imagination and the (several acts of this imagination) create a united reflex² which becomes a single concept³

(286 a. 8) And this (single representation continues) in some way to represent us (a series of things) having different forms, as though they were non-different. It represents a unity between the characterized (particular) and the characterizing (general). By imputation it superimposes its own undifferentiated reflex upon this (plurality of individual things). The nature of this faculty of Concepts consists in this that it effaces the difference of individual forms (and replaces them by one general form)

(286 b. 1) Now this (purely internal) general reflex is believed by mistaken humanity to be an external thing. It is extended so as to cover many different individuals, to represent them as projected in the external world and to endow them with causal efficacy.

(286 b. 2). Thus a purely mental thing is converted into an external object. It is projected and dispersed⁴ in the external world as though (it were so many real objects). And such are the habits of thought of common humanity that they believe this projection to represent a real Universal.⁵ (286. b. 3). How is it then that we maintain that the meaning of a word is such a Universal and that it consists merely in a repudiation of the contrary? (Yes, indeed!) Just this very Universal is nothing but a repudiation of the contrary. (286. b. 3). How is it then that what makes the difference of every external object from other objects is (nothing but the mental opera-

¹ Cp my CG, p. 54 ff

² *tha-m-dad-par snañ-ba* = *abheda-pratibhāsa*

³ *enam-par-rtog-pai śca-pa* = *vikalpa-vijñāna*.

⁴ *lan-tu-hphro-ba-ñid* = *prapañcita*

⁵ Lat. 286 b 2—3 «This projection-dispersion of things entirely residing in the intellect, as if they were external, is settled by the cognizer, according to his manner of thinking, as a Universal»

alone). They have Unity, since they are the same in each (particular). they are eternal (logically) since their (negative) substratum is never destroyed, (it remains the same in every changing individual) they inhere in every individual in their full completeness. They possess Unity, Eternity and Inherence¹ (although they are purely negative or relative). Thus the meaning of words is Negation (i. e. distinction from) other meanings. This theory is preferable since (as compared with the realistic one) it has many advantages².

Such is the essence of the Buddhist Dialectical Method. It maintains that all concepts and the names expressing them are negative, because they express their own meaning through a negation of the contrary. Since, according to some interpreters, this is also the fundamental meaning of Hegel's dialectical method, we may, for want of another term, call it the Buddhist Dialectical Method. But we must carefully note that there is according to the Buddhists no contradiction between cause and effect (there is simple otherness) nor is there any self-development of the concept. Development and movement belongs to reality, not to logic.³

But on the other hand, the Buddhist Dialectical Method contains the solution of the quarrel between Nominalism and Realism. Since Concepts are purely negative, their universality, their stability and their inherence are explained as being mental, logical and dialectical. There is no contradiction for a Universal to be at once completely and continually present in a multitude of things if it is only a negative mark of distinction from other things. Since all concepts

¹ *Ekatra-nityatra-and-asamavetaina*

² To these comments on Dignāga's Dialectic by Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla we originally intended to add a translation of Dharmottara's tract on the same subject (*Apoha-nūpa-prakaraṇa*, Tenzar, *Mdo* vol II, ff 252-264). It is perhaps the best exposition of the subject. But it proved too bulky to be inserted in the present volume, and besides Vācaspatiśāstra's summary translated in vol II, pp 408 ff is mainly founded on this work. Although the core of the theory is the same every exposition follows its own method. It will be seen from Vācaspati's exposition that Dharmottara lays particular stress upon the *apoha*-theory as a theory of Neglected Difference (*bheda-agraha*) which contains an explanation of the identification of external reality with our subjective images of it and of the illusion of a belief in the objective reality of these images.

³ Those who make a sharp distinction between Contradictory Dialectic and Contrary Dialectic (like e. g. Benedetto Croce) will notice that the Buddhists admit only the first, and cancel the second.

is proved (that the Universal is the internal product which illusively appears as an external reality).¹

c) Controversy with the Realist.

(287. a. 2). To this (the Realist) who maintains (the external reality) of Universals makes the following objection. If a "tree" were nothing over and above the negation of a "non-tree", we never could explain the first cognition of a tree. Indeed at the time of the first cognition of a tree, we do not yet know what a non-tree is. If to the question "what is a non-tree", we then answer "it is not a tree", and to the question "what is a tree?" we answer "it is not a non-tree", this would mean arguing in a circle. Therefore it is impossible by a mere repudiation of the contrary to fix a name upon a merely relative object, which has no (independent) stand in our intellect.

(287. a. 5). (The Transcendentalist). However, if you by convention fix the name upon the (real) Universal "tree", do you then rescind the non-trees or not? Supposing you are (willing) to rescind them, but without previously knowing what a tree is, you will not know how to do it. At that time indeed the cognizing (human mind) does not yet know what a tree is. He approaches the problem just with the desire to know what a tree and what a non-tree are. And not knowing it, how will he know how to rescind the non-trees from (the connotation) of the word?

Without knowing it, with a word formed without repudiating the contrary, it will be impossible for him, in his practical behaviour in life, to distinguish (the non-trees from the trees), just as it will be impossible for him to distinguish the variety called *śimśapā* (if he does not previously know what a non-*śimśapā* is) (287. a. 7) If we give a name to a thing without having previously distinguished it (from other things), we in our practical behaviour will not be able to make a distinction (so as to reach what we want) and to avoid (what we do not want) (287. a. 8). Indeed if we attach the name "tree" to trees in general without having distinguished (the general meaning of the term)

¹ Lit 287. a. 1—287. a. 2. "Thus indeed owing to a unity of the result these individuals are set aside from the non-possession of that result, through the medium of an inner experience in one's own mind, they become the causes of a force (producing) an illusive result and create a connected idea of the form of a Universal; this has been shown"

ment of some of the problems, as well as in their solution is unmistakable and has attracted the attention of scholars.¹

These are problems to which neither yes, nor no, nor both, nor neither, can be given as an answer. They are absolutely unanswerable, but the human mind necessarily encounters them. Our Reason in dealing with them becomes «dialectical», i. e. self-contradictory.

The school of the Mādhyamikas has extended this verdict to the human understanding in general and to all concepts without exception. They all on analysis appear to contain contradictions. The human mind contains a logic of illusion, since no objects, congruent with its concepts, are given at all. They consist of parts which sublate each the other.

Candakīrti summarizes the central conception of the Mādhyamika method in the following words.²

«Simple humanity³ imagines (i. e. constructs dialectically) and dichotomizes⁴ Matter and (Mind⁵, etc.), without going to the bottom⁶ (of the dichotomy) ... But all such (imagined dialectical) concepts⁷ form an inveterated Habit of Thought,⁸ coeval with the beginningless world-process⁹ They arise in a process of Dispersion-into-Manifold,¹⁰ (of the original Unity of the Universe). Thus are created (in couples the dialectical) concepts¹¹ of cognition and cognized; the object (expressed) and the subject (expressing it); agent and action, cause and effect; a jar and a cloth; a diadem and a vehicle, woman and man, profit and loss, pleasure and pain; fame and infamy; blame and praise, etc. etc.¹² All this worldly

¹ Cp O Franke, Kant u die altindische Philosophie in «Zur Erinnerung an Emanuel Kant» (Halle, 1904), p. 187—188, cp my Nirvāṇa, p. 21 and 205 On the antinomy of infinite-divisibility cp below in the section on the Reality of the External World, under Idealism, and S. Schayer, Prasannapadā, p. XXIX

² Mādhy, vṛtti, p. 850

³ bāla-prithag-jana

⁴ vilalpayantah

⁵ rūpādi.

⁶ ayonśah

⁷ vilatpāh

⁸ abhyāsa

⁹ anādi-samsāra

¹⁰ vicitrat prapañcāt

¹¹ vilatpa meaning concept and logical dichotomy, = diadhi-karana

¹² Cp with these examples of dichotomy those quoted by Lassen in his explanation of Hegel's Dialectical Method, Introd to Wissenschaft der Logik vol. I, p. LVII.

know that "these alone are trees" and it will follow by itself that "all objects in which (this form) is not reflected are non-trees" (287. b. 8) This (theory which takes its stand on the fact of a direct perception of the same thing) becomes impossible on the Mutual Negation theory,¹ because on that theory the form perceived is one thing and the thing which was standing before us at the time of first name-giving is subsequently never apprehended any more. And even if it were cognized, that concrete particular tree which was seen at the time of the first name-giving is never recognized in another tree. We never can say "this is that very tree (which we have seen before)". Therefore a *palāśa* or any other variety of trees will be different from that particular perceived tree just in the same degree in which it is different from a jar or any other object, because no pervasive form (equally existing in all varieties of trees and uniting them into one real species) is being admitted.

(288 a 2) (The Transcendentalist) But look, see! This *yōr* theory is similar to the Negation theory! (You assume pervasive realities, really existing in the things belonging to the same class; we admit similar stimuli produced by separate objects which do not contain any pervasive unity in themselves). (288 a 2). Indeed, these objects (the trees) are every one of them a separate thing (a monad) But nevertheless they, every one of them, by their own nature produce one and the same effect of recognition, which the other objects (the non-trees) do not produce. Having produced a discriminating judgment of the form "these things are the cause of my recognition, others are not", the human intellect thus divides (the Universe of Discourse) into these two groups. Thus it is that this my recognition apprehends, (although) indirectly, an identical object only because it is produced by a thing which has an identical result, (not because there is an identical external thing in existence) (288 a 4). Thus the dichotomizing (operations of our mind), which are the outcome of (different objects) producing one and the same result consists in a recognition which receives the form of a Universal projected into the external world in an objectivizing perceptual judgment. These dichotomies appear as separate individual images, seemingly endowed with externality, seemingly endowed with causal efficiency and seemingly endowed with some kind of invariable connection

¹ *nam-pai-gcāḍ-pai-smra-ba=priccheda-iḍḍa=paḥspaḥ-paḥiḥra-iḍḍa.*

exist some common ground between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhist logicians, with all that radical difference which ensues from the realistic principles of the first and idealistic views of the latter.

The fate of Dignāga's theory of Negative Names was the same as the fate of Buddhist logic in general. It did not survive the extinction of Buddhism in the land of its birth. Together with Buddhism the theory migrated to Tibet where it exists up to our own time. Its appearance in India was met by a unanimous protest of all other schools. Even Prabhākara, the "friend of the Buddhists", who followed them in their theory of Negation, could not follow them all the length of accepting their theory of Negative Names. He evidently could not remain a Mīmāṃsaka, if he followed them so far. The Mīmāṃsakas became the leaders in the fight against the theory of Dignāga. A school whose valuation of Speech and of Names had all the character of religious veneration,—for whom the Word was an eternal positive Ens existing in an eternal union with the things denoted by it,—for whom the Word was first of all the word of the holy Scripture; this school could evidently only be shocked in the highest degree by a theory which reduces the names to mere conventional negative signs of differentiation. Nor could the Naiyāyikas who believed that the positive meaning of words was established by God, look favourably upon it. The argument of the Realists of all shades is always the same. There are positive things and there are negative things. Reality consists in existence and non-existence. The positive things are denoted by positive names, the negative ones by the addition of the negative particle "non."

Bhāmaha,¹ the rhetorician, rejected Dignāga's theory on the score that if the words were really all negative, there should be other words, or means of expression, for positive things. If the meaning of the word "cow" were really the negation of the non-cow, then some other word would be needed to express the different fact of a positive perception of the domestic animal possessing horns, a dewlap, and other characteristic signs. A word cannot have two different and even opposite meanings. Since according to the theory of Negation the negative meaning is the principal one and the positive follows in its trail, we accordingly in contemplating a cow must in the first place have the idea of "non-cow" and after that the secondary idea of the cow.

¹ TSP, p. 291. 7. ff

which we never professed) They maintain that this theory means a blunt denial of every reality and thereupon they are always ready to insult us. By this sober expounding alone of what the essence of Negation is, we have repudiated all their objections and thus (we deem) that our enemy is crushed.

In order to repudiate him a great deed must have been achieved (by Dignāga) and now it is enough dwelling upon this vast subject¹.

§ 3 ŚĀNTIRAKŚITA AND KAMALAŚILA ON THE NEGATIVE MEANING OF WORDS.

The following is a statement of just the same theory of Dignāga concerning the Negative Meaning of words (*apoha*), but in a somewhat different phrasing. It belongs to Śāntiraksita and his commentator Kamalaśila¹. It lays more stress on the fact that the words of our speech, although directly meaning a concept or a universal, inductively refer to the particular real thing. They call the Thing also Negation; since it is something unique in itself, it is a "negation of all the three worlds."² It is "ontological" (*arthātma*) negation, that is, the positive substratum of a negative concept. The main idea is just the same as the one emphasized by Jinendrabuddhi, namely, that the words express their own meaning through negation. They are therefore negative. Without negation they express nothing, they can express something only dialectically, i. e. in couples of mutual negation. Lotze³ comes very near to this theory when he says—"the affirmative positing of a contents and the negative exclusion of everything other are so intimately connected, that we, in order to express the simple meaning of affirmation, can avail ourselves of expressions which mean... only negation (?)" . This is exactly the thesis of Dignāga, although expressed with some astonishment. Lotze nevertheless thinks that there is an affirmation in names, and that negation is here (in names and concepts) something quite different from affirmation. Where the real affirmation lies, according to the Buddhists, will appear in the sequel. We now proceed to quote Śāntiraksita.

¹ Cp T. S pp 274—366 (śabdārtha-parīkṣā)

² *traśloka-nyāyārtha*

³ Logik², § 11

ness. E. g., instead of defining Concomitance as a necessary connection of the effect with its cause, it is defined as the connection of the cause «with the counterpart of the absolute non-existence of the result». Instead of telling that smoke is the logical reason, it is mentioned in the guise of «the counterpart of the absolute non-existence of the smoke».¹ Such twisted negative definitions are exceedingly in vogue in later Nyāya and form its characteristic feature.

§ 5. EUROPEAN PARALLELS.

a) Kant and Hegel

In the preceding pages we have made a statement of Dignāga's theory concerning the negative essence of all names and all concepts. We have made it as much as possible in the own words of Dignāga and of his Indian interpreters. We have called it a theory of Dialectics. We also could have called it a theory of Negativity or Relativity. There are good reasons in favour of each of these names, which, if not directly convertible, stand very near to one another. According to the method followed in this work we now will proceed to quote some parallels from the history of European philosophy, which, by way of similarity and contrast, are likely to throw some reflection on the Indian standpoint, and at the same time will justify our choice of the term Dialectics as the most appropriate for the designation of Dignāga's theory. Leaving alone the parallels found in ancient Greece and in mediaeval Europe, some of which have been mentioned when examining the law of Contradiction, we can turn our attention to modern philosophy.

According to Kant the Dialectic is a logic of illusion,² but not of every illusion. There are two³ kinds of illusion, the one is empirical or simple, the other is the natural illusion of the human reason when dealing with the four problems of 1) Infinity, 2) Infinite Divisibility, 3) Free Will and 4) a Necessary Ultimate Being. These are the four antinomies, i. e. problems that cannot be logically answered neither

¹ *hetu-samānādhikarana-atyanta-abhāva-pratyogi-sādhya-samānādhikaranyam*, where *hetu* is *dharma* and *sādhya* is *agm*: Cp Tarkasāgraha (Athalye), p. 247, cp. p. 289 and *passim*

² Kant ascribes this use of the term dialectic to the ancients, CPR, p. 49

Cp. however Grote, *Arist*, p. 379

³ *Ibid*, p. 242.

the observer). It is merely (imagined as something external) in a perceptual judgment.¹

(317. 25) But why then the name of Negation is given (to this image which does not seem to be negation at all)? There are four reasons, (a principal one and three derivative ones). The principal is the following one. The image itself appears only owing to its being distinguished from other images. (If it is not distinguished from others, it reflects nothing). It is called Negation, because it is distinguished from others, it is a negation of them.²

But although having in itself nothing of the external particular object, the general image is nevertheless connected with it in three different respects;

1) The image is the cause guiding our purposeful actions, and making us reach the particular external object. The image is thus regarded as the cause, although really it is the effect, of the particular thing;

2) Or, on the contrary, the object reached in a purposeful action, is regarded as its cause, (although it also is its effect); since the general image is the result of a direct sense-perception of the particular object. It is the expedient by which the human mind is produced.³

3) It is a natural illusion of the human mind to identify with the particular thing its (general) image which is nothing but a construction of productive imagination.

(318. 9). We go over to the ontological Negation⁴

The name of Negation can also be applied (indirectly) to the Thing-in-Itself, because it contains a difference from, or a negation of, all other things. The (feature of a) repudiation of the discrepant is also present. This is meant. It is thus intimated that the meaning of negation is indirectly⁵ applied also to the Thing-in-Itself.⁶

(318. 15) What is the essence of the simple Negation?

¹ *adhyavastu*

² *asthita-tastu = anya-asambaddha-tastu.*

³ Lat. (318. 1) "Either by imputing to the cause the quality of the effect, or, by being the cause of reaching a (real particular) thing, it is distinguished from others, or by imputing to the effect the quality of the cause. He shows it. Because it goes through the door of the unconnected thing. Unconnected means unbound to the other. This is just the door of the thing, the expedient. Owing to its direct perception such an image (concept) arises."

⁴ *arhātma-śloka*

⁵ Read *na mukhyatah*

⁶ It follows that the direct meaning of a Thing-in-Itself (*svataḥ-sana*) is pure affirmation (*vidhi-sarvāpa*).

and the Indians. Empirical objects will then be entirely constructed on a foundation of transcendental reality. But they will not be constructed dialectically, whereas according to Dignāga they also will be constructed dialectically, just as the notions of Infinity etc.¹ This falls in line with Hegelian views. "The Universality of a concept, says Hegel, is posited through its Negativity. the concept is identical with itself only inasmuch as it is a negation of its own negation."² This sounds exactly as the Indian theory that all universals are negative³, e. g., a cow is nothing over and above the negation of its own negation, it is "not a non-cow". "The Dialectic, says Hegel,⁴ is an eternal contemplation of one's own self in the other", i. e. in the non-self. "The Negative", says he, "is also positive. The Contradictory does not result in an absolute Nought, in a Null, but essentially in a negation of its own special contents".⁵ The stop which was taken by Kant when he established his antinomies was "infinitely important", according to Hegel,⁶ since the Dialectic became then "again asserted as a necessity for the Reason". "The definiteness of a concept is its Negativity posited as affirmation". This is the proposition of Spinoza *omnis determinatio est negatio*, it has "infinite importance".⁷

So far there is apparently complete coincidence between this aspect of Hegel's Dialectic and Dignāga's theory. What a concept means is nothing but the Negation of the contrary. Negativity is mutual Affirmation is relative, it is not an affirmation in itself, it is also a negation. Hegel therefore maintains⁸ "that light is negative and darkness positive, virtue is negative and vice positive".

das oben die beständige Behauptung der Kritik, nur dass sie enthalten den Grund, das Vorstellungsvermögen, seiner Sinnlichkeit gemäß, zu bestimmen, aber sie sind nicht der Stoff derselben» If this is interpreted as the capacity (Grund = Kraft) to evoke the corresponding image by stimulating productive imagination, the coincidence will be nearly complete

¹ Cp. above p. 459. Even such a general notion as «cognizability» must be interpreted as the counterpart of an imagined «incognizability», cp. the quotation from Dignāga's *Heta-mukha* in TSP., p. 319 21.

² *Wiss. der Logik*, II. 240.

³ *anya-vyāvrtti-rūpa*

⁴ *Encyclop.*, p. 192

⁵ *W. d. Logik*, I 86.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II 491.

⁷ *Ibid.*, I. 100

⁸ *Ibid.*, II 55.

(319. 23). At first we experience internally the thing as it exists (present to our senses). Then the desire to express it in language arises. Then the organs of speech are set in motion and a word is pronounced. When the word is connected in this indirect way with the external thing, such as fire etc., we implicitly cognize the particular object as distinguished from all dissimilar things.

(319. 25). Therefore the second and third meaning of Negation, i.e. its meaning as simple negation and its meaning referring to the thing itself as distinguished from all others, these two meanings are the metaphorical (secondary) meanings of Negation. (The principal is the meaning of the image, or concept, which is distinguished from all other concepts and represents thus a negation of them)

(320. 7) (The objection¹ that according to this theory the words represent mere negation and that therefore something else must be found to represent affirmation, is not founded). because we maintain that the particular (real) thing is also suggested by a name. And this meaning is affirmation, not negation. It is the indirect meaning of the word. When we say that a word «denotes», this means that it produces a Negation which is included in the definiteness of its concept (or image); it produces an image which is distinguished from among all other images and which (also) distinguishes its own object, the particular thing, from all other things.

Thus it is that the theory of our Master (Dignāga) contains no contradiction, (it does not assume in the meaning of words mere negations without leaving any room for affirmation).. »

(315. 15). «The counter-theory of the Realist Uddyotakara assumes real Universals representing each of them a real Unity, an Eternal Ens and an Ens wholly inherent in every attaining particular. It is the presence of this real Universal that imparts definiteness and constancy to knowledge according to his theory. But our Master Dignāga answers, that his Negative (or Distinctive) Meanings (possess all the advantages which are supposed to belong to real Universals

be perceived, while the universal «cat» is con-ceived. But this whole manner of viewing our dealings with Universals has to be abandoned when the relation of a mental occurrence to its «object» is regarded as merely indirect and causal (= *pārampariyena lārya-kāraṇa-lakṣaṇaḥ pratibandhaḥ*, TSP, p. 319. 22) The mental content is, of course, always particular (?), and the question as to what it «means» cannot be settled but only by knowing its causal connections. »

¹ B₁ Bhāmaha, cp TSP, p. 291. 7

sensation just as he denies the difference between the senses and the understanding as two heterogeneous sources of our knowledge. The senses are for him a modification of the spirit.¹

In summarizing roughly the mutual position of Kant, Hegel and Dignāga regarding the three cognitive faculties of the Senses, the Understanding and the Reason we can establish the following points.

1) Kant assumes three cognitive faculties: the Senses, the Understanding and Reason. Of them the Reason alone is dialectical.

2) Hegel abolishes the difference between the Senses and the Understanding and changes the relation between the Understanding and the Reason. All objects, or concepts, are viewed by the Understanding non-dialectically and by the Reason dialectically.

3) Dignāga abolishes the difference between Understanding and Reason, but retains the radical difference between the Senses and the Understanding. The senses are then the non-dialectical source of knowledge and the Understanding is all the while dialectical.

4) Kant and Dignāga, just as they agree in maintaining a radical difference between the Senses and the Understanding, likewise share in a common recognition of the Thing-in-Itself as the ultimate, non-dialectical, source of all real knowledge. Hegel, on the other hand, follows Fichte and Schelling in their dialectical destruction of the Thing-in-Itself.

5) In Kant's system Reality (the Thing-in-Itself) is divorced from Logic. In Hegel's system they become confounded.² In Dignāga's system they are kept asunder on the plane of Logic, but merged in a monistic whole on the plane of metaphysics.

b) J. S. Mill and A. Bain.

We now at last know that there is absolutely no definite thought which would not be negation. A thought which would deny nothing, would also affirm nothing. Every word, says Dignāga, expresses its own meaning through negation. It is false to suppose that negation is an implied consequence. The word itself is negative. Nega-

¹ Encyclopädie, § 418. However the consideration that pure sensibility is «das reichste an Inhalt, aber das ärmste an Gedanken» could also be applied to Dignāga's idea of the moment of pure sensation (*nirvikalpa*).

² However Hegel's conception of pure existence which is the same as non-existence remembers to a certain extent the Indian instantaneous Being which represents «its own annihilation».

and names are negative, the Buddhists would probably have said that Hegel was right in proclaiming that Negativity is the Soul of the world. However the world also consists not only of a Soul, but also of a Body. What the body of the world, according to the Buddhists, is, we shall see later on.

§ 4. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUDDHIST DIALECTICAL METHOD.

The Dialectical Method of the Buddhists developed gradually from insignificant, but characteristic germs affecting some problems only, into a general theory of the Understanding whose essence, as a special source of cognition, has been found to be dialectical. Three periods are to be distinguished, 1) the early period (Hīnayāna), 2) early Mahāyāna 3) the critical school of Logicians.

The earliest records contain the statement that the founder of Buddhism has refused to give an answer on some metaphysical questions. These questions are, 1) four questions regarding the beginning of the world, viz., there is a beginning, there is not, or both, or neither, 2) four similar questions regarding its end, 3) four questions on the identity between the body and the Ego, and 4) two questions regarding the survival or not of the Saint after death. It will be noticed that the characteristic quadrilemmic formulation is similar to the one used by Plato in his Parmenides for similar problems.¹

Leaving alone their scholastic formulation, the 14 questions reduce to two fundamental problems, the problem of Infinity and the problem of the Absolute. The similarity with Kant's antinomies in the state-

¹ In his celebrated book on Buddha, which at present impresses one as being a rather naïve account of Buddhist ideas, the late Prof. H. Oldenberg has nevertheless not overlooked the dialectical character of Buddhism from its beginning "The sophists", says he, "cannot be absent in a place where a Socrates is to come" (Buddha¹⁰, p. 80) But not only in the sense of sophistry does the dialectical character belong to early Buddhism, it contains also the natural dialectic of the human mind when it begins to deal with the ultimate problems of Infinity and the Absolute (ibid., pp. 81, 232, 315 ff.) Prof. H. Oldenberg calls this dialectic "moderately clever" (*wenig gewandt*), but this appreciation cannot carry much weight, since it belongs to a time when the right understanding and translation of the fundamental technical terms of *duḥkha*, *dharma*, *samskāra* and *pratitya-samutpāda*, without which Buddhism is unthinkable, was yet in its infancy.

led «privative»; they are equivalent in their signification to a positive and negative name taken together, being a name of something which might have been expected to have a certain attribute, but which has it not; e. g., the word «blind» which is not equivalent to «not seeing», since it is applicable only to things that can see, or did see, which are expected to see». This remark contains the germ of Dharmakīrti's and Sigwart's theory of negation and should not be restricted to names called privative, but extended to all negation in general. The conclusion would apparently be that all names are «positive and negative taken together», since all are privative in some respect.

This conclusion has been resolutely asserted by A. Bain with the rather unexpected by him result that he has been accused of having fallen into the Hegelian heresy and of having betrayed the faith of Empiricism.¹

He indeed has maintained that all names are positive and negative together, that there is no affirmation which would not be negation at the same time, neither is there a negation which would not be an affirmation at the same time. It follows that there is no affirmation in itself, nor is there a real negation in itself, but every name just at the same time when it affirms also denies. This is nearly the substance of Dignāga's view and Prof. A. Bain maintains the same without feeling the abyss in which he is falling. He evidently did not think that Negativity is the Soul of the Universe. He thought that there are positive things and negative things and that the same word expresses both (!). But if the same name is a designation of the positive as well as of the negative thing, it becomes quite impossible to determine which things are positive and which are negative. «In fact, says Bain,² positive and negative must always be ready to change

¹ Bradley, *Logic* 2, p. 168. «It would be entertaining and an irony of fate, if the school of Experience fell into the cardinal mistake of Hegel. Prof. Bain's «Law of Relativity», approved by J. S. Mill, has at least shown a tendency to drift in that direction. Our cognition as it stands, is explained as a mutual negation of the two properties. Each has a positive existence, because of the presence of the other as its negative» (*Emotions*, p. 571) I do not suggest that Prof. A. Bain in this ominous utterance really means what he says, but he says quite enough to be on the edge of a precipice. If the school of «Experience» had any knowledge of the facts, they would know that the sin of Hegel consists not at all in the defect, but in the excess of «Relativity». Once say with Prof. Bain that «we know only relations», once mean (what he says) that those relations hold between positives and negatives, and you have accepted the main principle of orthodox Hegelianism».

² *Logic*, I 68.

Manifold disappears without leaving any trace in the Void (of Relativity), as soon as the essence of all separate existence is perceived to be relative (and ultimately unreal).

Candrakīrti in his examples here throws into the same bag contradictory and contrary opposition. A jar and a cloth are opposed indirectly, inasmuch as a cloth enters into the category of non-jars. The opposition of man and woman is an exhaustive dichotomy. The opposition of blame and praise, or, more precisely, of blame and not-blame, is "complete and mutual" exclusion, or contradiction. Everything created by the understanding is created in couples or, as Jinendrabuddhi puts it, there are only "twin-brothers" born in the realm of the Understanding. The parts of such couples sublate each the other by their relativity, or the mutual negativity of their definitions. The result is, as Kant expresses it, *nihil negativum irrepraesentabile* or, in the language of the Mādhyamikas, "the Void of all separate objects"¹ and the unique reality of the Undispersed, non-manifold Whole.²

The school of the Buddhist Logicians, although fully admitting the dialectical character of all the concepts of the Understanding, objects to the wholesale unreality of knowledge and admits the pure reality of a non-dialectical Thing-in-Itself behind every couple of dialectical concepts.

The theory of Dignāga may perhaps have been partly influenced, in its logical aspect, by some views entertained in the school of the Vaiśeṣikas. This school has probably received its name from the Category of Difference which it assumed as an objective reality residing in every individual thing, in atoms as well as in ubiquitous substances. Every object, according to this view, contains both Similarity and Dissimilarity as residing in it.³ If we reduce both these residents to the single one of Difference and brush aside its realistic character, we shall have just the essence of Dignāga's theory, i. e. purely negative and purely mental Universals. In this point, as in some others, there seems to

¹ *sarva-bhāva-svabhāva-sūnyatā = sarva-dharma-sūnyatā*

² *nisprapañca*.

³ Cp above, p 449—450. The wording of VS. I 2 6 suggests the theory that on the one end of the scale, in *sattā*, there is *sāmānya* only and no *viśeṣa*, while on the other end, in atoms and ubiquitous substances, there is *viśeṣa* and no *sāmānya*. But already Praśastpāda assumes *antya-viśeṣas* only. The later definition *aty-anta-vyāvṛtti-hetuḥ* and *svato-vyāvarakāṭyam* suggest some similarity with the Buddhist *vyāvṛtti = apoha*.

thoroughly investigated by Dignāga in the V-th chapter of his great work. "All names are always negative", says Dignāga. "Some names, the so-called „privative" ones, are negative and positive at the same time", says Mill. "All names are always negative and positive at the same time", says Barn. "Take care!" says Bradley.¹ "Do you really mean what you say? You are falling into the precipice of Hegelian dialectics!" And Sigwart, it seems, listened to Bradley's warning. He took every precaution in order not to fall in the precipice of Hegelianism; with what success we shall presently see.

"The theory, says he,² that all things consist of yes and no, of existence and non-existence, has been first definitely expressed by Thomas Campanella, as pointed out by Trendelenburg. According to this view, "a definite thing exists only, inasmuch as it is not something other. "The man is" — that is positive, but he is a man, only because he is neither a stone, nor a lion, nor an ass, etc.". Sigwart rejects this view as a dangerous heresy preparing the way to full Hegelianism, with its confusion of logic and reality. But he confesses that then he is quite at a loss to explain negation! "The question, says he,³ is to know why are we in need of those subjective circuits in order to cognize the world of Reality in which no counterpart of our negative thought can be detected?" To this question no answer is given. Sigwart apparently escapes to Hegelianism at the price of sacrificing negation! All names should be positive, because no counterpart of the negative ones can be detected!

He then proceeds to ask, can incompatibility be explained by negation? "Man" is incompatible with every "non-man". The same thing cannot be a man and a non-man together. But the "non-man", the οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον of Aristotle, is not something real!⁴ It means

¹ Logic, p. 158.

² Logik, I. 171.

³ Ibid

⁴ Sigwart bestows taunts upon Kant's Infinite Judgment and tries to make it ridiculous (ibid., p. 182—185) Lotze angrily attacks it (Logik, p. 62) But H. Cohen defends it (Logik, d. r. Erk., p. 74) From the Buddhist point of view all diatribes against the infinite judgment are discarded by pointing to the fact that non-A is real just in the same measure as A, for there is absolutely no A without its implied difference from non-A. Both are dialectical constructions. Besides the A is just as infinite as the non-A. The judgment "this is white", e. g., refers to a point of demarcation between two infinities. Thus Sigwart seems indirectly to admit when he says that "white" must be restricted, otherwise it also will be infinite, op. ibid., p. 182 — "aber wo bedeutet das Wort «weiss» ohne weiteres alle weissen Dinge!"

This objection is disposed of by the consideration that the Buddhists do not at all maintain that the negative meaning suggests itself at first and is followed by the positive one. They, on the contrary, admit that the positive is direct, but it is nothing without the negative one, both are the same.

Kumārila's¹ chief objection consists in the following argument. When the Buddhist maintains that the meaning of "cow" is negative, that it is "not non-cow", he only in other words expresses the same opinion as is maintained by the realists, namely, that there is a real objective reality in the positive genus "cow". If "not non-cow" is a negation implying an affirmation of the contrary, then the negation of non-cow is the same as the affirmation of cow. Indeed what kind of object is suggested by the term "not non-cow" according to the Buddhists? Is it the individual thing, as it is strictly in itself, shorn of all extension? This is impossible, since such a thing is unutterable. It must therefore be admitted that there is an utterable essence of a cow present in every individual of that class. This general essence is the Universal of the Realists.

But if the Buddhist means by "non-cow" simple negation, without the affirmation of the contrary, this is pure idealism, a denial of the reality of the external world. The Mīmāṃsakas have opposed it as an ontological theory, now it reappears again in the garb of a theory concerning the import of Names.

The arguments of the Realists are numerous and of great variety and subtlety. It is superfluous to quote them here. They all reduce to this fundamental one. there are positive names, they correspond to Universals; the Universals are real external things, perceived by the senses, there are also negative things which also are realities perceived by the senses.

But although the theory of Dignāga is emphatically rejected by the Realists of all shades, an indirect influence of it seems to have survived in the method of negative definitions adopted by the later Naiyāyiks. They make almost all their definitions from the negative side, by stating the fact through a repudiation of the contrary. It is a well known and natural feature of speech that, in order to give more clearness to an expression, we must mention what it is opposed to. But the Naiyāyiks use the method of opposite definition even in such cases where it is absolutely useless for the sake of logical distinct-

¹ Ślokaḥ Apoha-vāda, kār. 1 ff; cp TS. and TSP., pp 292 ff.
Śik' vāda-śāstra, 1

at the same time and in the same sense, but he can very well be blind and not blind at different times and in different senses. Then indeed not-seeing and blind will not sublate one another. Otherwise they do sublate one another and are both "sublating", i. e. both negative, not both positive.

Having thus established that the privative names are really positive, Sigwart is obliged to make a further step and to assert that there are no negative names at all, all are positive! Indeed, he says¹, "all négation has a meaning only in the domain of judgment" .. The formula non-A has no meaning at all. The members of a logical division, the items that are brought under the head of a general notion, are exclusive of each the other, hence it would be natural to surmise that each includes in itself the negation of the other. But this, according to Sigwart,² is an illusion. "It is an illusion to think that black and white, oblique and straight, etc., have a special hostility against one another, as if they were the sons of the same father."³ Sigwart admits that there is a contrary and a contradictory opposition—the last when we have an exhaustive division in two, the former when the division is in three and more items⁴—but only in judgments. The names are not opposed. There is the straight and the oblique. But there is no straight and non-straight, because "the formula non-A has no meaning at all!" Persevering in the same direction Sigwart would have been obliged to maintain that there is presence, but there is no absence, no non-existence; everything is existence! Thus, without

¹ Ibid., p. 181

² Ibid., p. 180

³ It is curious that Dignāga (Fr. *saṃucca*, V. 27) appeals to the same example for an illustration of his opinion which is exactly the opposite of the opinion of Sigwart. He means that the varieties of a general notion are opposed to one another «just as the sons of a *vīśa*». After the death of the *vīśa* a quarrel begins between his sons regarding the regal power, which is their common property. The one says «it is mine», and the other says the same, the result is a civil war. Just so the *śimśapā* and the *palāśa* and other trees quarrel regarding the common property of the universal treeness. This quarrel is, of course, only logical or imagined, it is not real. It may seem real in such cases as heat and cold, or light and darkness, but these are, as proved by Dharmakīrti, cases of causality, not of logical contradiction.

⁴ Ibid., p. 188, «der Unterschied des sog. contradictorischen und conträren Gegensatzes fällt richtig verstanden mit dem Unterschied einer zweigliederigen oder mehrgliederigen Einteilung zusammen». Not quite so however man and woman, right and left are real couples besides being contradictories, but man and non-man is only contradiction, purely logical.

by yes nor by no, and therefore represent a natural illusion of the Human Reason. This corresponds more or less to the Hinayāna standpoint, according to which the questions regarding the origin of the world, the questions regarding its end, the problem of infinite divisibility, and the problem of the existence of the absolute eternal Being are insoluble, neither in the positive nor in the negative sense. Mahāyāna Buddhism likewise assumes two kinds of illusion, an original or natural one;¹ and a simple mistake. The first is also called "an internal calamity,"² of the human mind. The list of natural illusions is however very much increased, since every Universal and every concept is declared to be the result of a natural illusion of the human mind.

This would correspond to Hegel's standpoint, when he declares,³ in answer to the Kantian theory of the limited number of four antinomies, that "there are as many antinomies as there are concepts". Every concept, inasmuch as it is a concept, is dialectical. According to Kant all empirical objects, as well as the corresponding images and concepts, will not be dialectical. These objects are "given" us. Although as containing a manifold of intuition, they are also constructed by Productive Imagination, they nevertheless are "given". They are given to the senses, but once more reconstructed by the understanding.⁴ Some interpreters of Kant⁵ are puzzled by this double origin of things which are "given" and then once more constructed. They are inclined to find a fluctuation and want of decision in Kant, regarding this point. According to the Indians only the extreme concrete and particular, the point-instant, is "given". All the rest is interpretation constructed by Productive Imagination and by the natural Dialectic of the human Understanding. If we interpret Kant so that "given" is only the Thing-in-Itself—and some support for such an interpretation is not altogether missing in his text⁶—then there will in this point be an agreement between him

¹ *mūlhyā bhrāntiḥ*

² *antar-upaplatah*, cp. TSP., p. 322 7.

³ *Wiss der Logik*, I. 184 (Lasson)—"es können so viele Antinomien aufgestellt werden, als sich Begriffe ergeben".

⁴ CPR. p. 40 According to the Buddhists only the very first moment (*prata-matara-ksana*) is "given" (*nirvikalpa*).

⁵ as e g., Fr. Paulsen *Kant*³, p. 171.

⁶ Cp especially in his tract against Eberhard the passage p. 35 (Kirchmann). Eberhard asks "wer giebt der Sinnlichkeit ihren Stoff? . wir mögen wählen, welches wir wollen, so kommen wir auf Dinge an sich". Kant answers: "nun ist ja

10) This direct and indirect contradiction (or otherness) is logical. It prevents identity, but does not prevent peaceful coexistence.³

11) There is also a dynamical opposition, as between heat and cold.⁴ It is really causation⁴ and it does not interfere with logical contradiction of hot and non-hot. The logical opposition excludes their identity, the dynamical — their duration in close vicinity.⁵

12) Two properties of the same substratum are different only through the more or the less of exclusion. They are partly identical.⁶

13) Contradiction can exist only between definite concepts. The wholly indefinite Thing-in-Itself as well as the moment of pure sensation are beyond the reach of the law of contradiction, they are non-dialectical.⁷ They exclude all difference, i. e., all contradiction.

There is indeed a logical contradiction between two opposites without anything intermediate and representing mutually the one the complete negation of the other, and there is, on the other hand, either simple otherness or dynamical opposition, which admits intermediate members and where the opposite parts do not represent directly the one the negation of the other. J. S. Mill and Sigwart both maintain that «unpleasant» is positive, it is not simply the negation of pleasant, and so is «blind». But they forget that the same fact cannot be pleasant and not pleasant at the same time and in the same sense. If unpleasant is something more than not-pleasant, it is only because not-pleasant is further divided into not-pleasant simply and unpleasant or painful, which is more than not-pleasant simply. Contradiction is always an absolute dichotomy, and it becomes quite the same whether we affirm the one part of the couple or deny the other. The position changes when the division is not an absolute dichotomy, but a division in three or more parts. Blue and non-blue are contradictories, the blue is not the non-blue and the non-blue is not the blue. But blue and yellow are contradictories indirectly. To deny blue does not mean to assert yellow and *vice versa*. Yellow is included under the non-

¹ NBT, p. 70 78 — *lāksaniko'yaṃ virodhah*

² Ibid., p. 70. 20 — *saty apī ca asmin virodhe sahāvasthānam syād' apī*.

³ Ibid., p. 70 22 — *vastuṃ eva lāpṇeye*

⁴ Ibid., p. 68 9 — *yo yasya viruddhah sa tasya karmakāra eva... viruddho janaka eva.*

⁵ Ibid., p. 70 20 — *etena virodhena kīlenayor elatvam vāryate, anyena sahāvasthānam*

⁶ Pram samucc, V 28 — *rtien-gye hyal-ba med-pa-thā.*

⁷ NBT, p. 70. 7. — *na tu anyata-āhāro'vīhaḥ karmakāraśca, (kama = avaleśana = vidhā-svarūpa = pratyakṣa = paramārtha sat).*

However he takes a further step. According to Kant both opposed parts of a contradiction sublimate one another and the result is Null (*nihil negativum irrepraesentabile*).¹ According to Hegel they do not sublimate one another, the result is not Null, but only the «negation of one's own special contents».² This probably means that having declared all concepts to be negative Hegel feels it incumbent upon him to find out some kind of real affirmation. He then declares that «the Positive and the Negative are just the same».³ The non-existence of an object is a moment contained in its existence.⁴ «Existence, says he, is one with its other, with its non-existence». From the thesis that «everything is such as it is only insofar there is another; it exists through the other, through its own non-existence it is what it is», — from this thesis he goes over to the thesis that «existence is the same as non-existence» or «Position and Negation are just the same».⁵ Dignāga, as a logician, on the contrary thinks that «whatever is other is not the same».⁶ It is true that from another point of view, from a translogical point of view, Dignāga, as a monist, will admit the ultimate identity and confluence of all opposition within the unique substance of the world. He will admit this «voidness»⁷ of the whole. But this metaphysical and religious point of view is carefully distinguished from the logical.

The duality of the standpoint (which we also find in Dignāga) survives in Hegel through his distinction of Understanding and Reason, a distinction inherited from Kant. «The Understanding, says he,⁸ is definite and firmly holds to the differences of the objects, but Reason is negative and dialectical». For the Reason there is no difference between affirmation and negation, but for the Understanding this difference is all-important. The Reason annihilates all the definitions of the Understanding and merges all differences in an undifferentiated Whole.

There is still another and very important difference between Hegel and Dignāga. Hegel denies the Thing-in-Itself⁹ perceived in pure

¹ «Versuch (über) den Begriff der negativen Grössen», p. 26 (Krechmann).

² W. d. Logik, I 36.

³ Ibid, II 54.

⁴ Ibid., II. 42 — beide sind negativ gegeneinander.

⁵ Ibid., II 55.

⁶ *yad vṛuddha-dharma-samśṛṇam tan nānā.*

⁷ *prajñā-pāramitā = śūnyatā = jhānam advayam.*

⁸ W. d. Logik, I 6.

⁹ Cp. *Phaenomenologie*, p. 427; W. d. Logik, II p. 440 ff.

all? Was Sigwart on the wrong path when he was puzzled to find some justification for the existence of negation? The Indian answer to these questions is the following one. All the difference between an isolated concept and the corresponding perceptual judgment consists in the fact that the latter contains two heterogeneous elements, a non-dialectical subject and a dialectical predicate. The affirmation is contained in the subject, in the element «this». E. g., the concept of «having an origin» contains nothing over and above the negation of eternity and the concept of eternity nothing above the negation of an origin. By themselves these concepts contain no reality, no affirmation. By themselves they sublate one another, the result would be *nihil negativum*. But the judgment «the jar has an origin» or, more properly, «this is something having an origin» contains in its element «this» a real affirmation. Thus it is that a concept having «meaning and validity» is positive only in the measure in which it is referred to some element «this». It can be positive indirectly, but in itself it is necessarily negative, or dialectical. The same refers to a concrete concept, like a jar or «jar-ness». If the concept would have been positive in itself, then the judgment «the jar is» would contain a superfluous repetition, and the judgment «the jar is not» a contradiction.¹ A concept and a name become affirmative or positive only in a judgment. Sigwart thought that negation has a meaning only in a judgment² and that all names by themselves are positive. The contrary is true! Affirmation manifests itself only in a perceptual judgment (or in a minor premise of the syllogism). By themselves all predicates, i. e. all concepts and names, are negative. That the concept is nothing positive by itself, that it does not contain in itself any element of existence, has also been established by Kant on the occasion of his critique of the ontological argument.

It follows that Aristotle was right indirectly. His definition must be changed in that sense, that there is in every perceptual judgment an element of affirmation and an element of negation.³ A judgment is

¹ Op. vol II, p. 306 and 415

² Logik, I. 181—2 «Die Verneinung hat nur einen Sinn im Gebiete des Urtheils.. «Nem» und «nicht» haben ihre Stelle nur gegenüber einem Satze oder im Satze»

³ The judgment «this is a jar» and «this is no jar» are both, from this point of view affirmative in the element «this» and both negative in the element «jar» and «non-jar», for jar is as negative of non-jar, as the non-jar is negative of the jar, they are mutually negative and can become positive only through the annexed element «this». This becomes evident in such cases as «this is impermanent», resp. «this is non-impermanent».

trivity is the Soul of the World. The Dialectic, or Mutual Negation, is the negativity of all the determinations made by the Understanding. As soon as our mental eyes begin to glimmer and we begin to seek an expression for our feeling in a verbal sign, our object is already beset with contradiction and our thought has become dialectical.¹

As soon as the Intellect begins to «understand», that is to operate dialectically on the material presented it by the senses, it already denies something. Therefore the real name for the understanding is dichotomy,² or dilemma, partition in two parts, of which the one is the «complete and mutual negation» of the other.

We are now going to quote the opinions of some modern European philosophers on Negation in order to show that they are all the while groping after a solution which is more or less given in the Indian theory.

J. S. Mill³ thinks that there are positive names and there are negative names. But it is not easy to determine which are positive and which are negative, because the negative ones are often expressed positively and the positive ones are expressed negatively. E. g., the word «unpleasant» is positive, really meaning «painful», the word «idle» is negative, really meaning «not working». If we then ask which names are really positive and which are really negative, no answer will apparently be given. They are negative and this is all. Mill then passes the remark that the word «civil» in the language of jurisprudence stands for the opposite (i. e. for a negation) of criminal, of ecclesiastical, of military and of political. This would mean that the word «civil» is negative. If it contains no negation, it has no meaning at all. But if civil is negative why not declare that all are negative, since he says, «that to every positive name a corresponding negative one might be framed» and we never can know whether a given word has been framed in the negative or in the positive intention. This remark contains in it the germ of Dignāga's theory of Negative Names.

Another remark of J. S. Mill⁴ becomes also very interesting when confronted with Indian ideas. He says, «there is a class of names cal-

¹ Palaggy, Neue Theorie d. Raum u. Zeit, p. VII f.

² *vilalpa* = *dvandvī-lakṣaṇa*, it is also the name for a concept, i. e. = *dhī-lakṣaṇa*.

³ Logic, I, 48 f.

⁴ Suggested perhaps by Locke's (Essay, book II, ch. VIII, § 1-2) «positive ideas from privative causes», which are «real positive ideas», though perhaps their cause is but a privation in the subject.

with affirmation¹ "In sensation, says he,² is contained Absolute Position, without our noticing it. In the Understanding we must begin by creating it a new, through a negation of its contrary."

This is also an answer to those critics who have deemed it possible to destroy the concept of the Thing-in-Itself dialectically. Of course the concepts of pure existence, pure causality, the pure object and the Thing-in-Itself are dialectically "constructed a new", through the repudiation of the contrary by the understanding. But the particular fact, of this or that sensation, the particular efficiency of this or that point-instant, that Thing-in-Itself "which does not contain the slightest bit of „otherness.“, such is the ultimate reality, and the sensation corresponding to it is Pure Affirmation.³

It is highly instructive to follow the leading logician of post-Kantian Germany in his efforts to avoid the Hegelian Negativism. His efforts will hardly be found successful, and this is the more remarkable because the solution lies very near, and is half expressed by his own words. Being perplexed by the fact that Negation seems quite superfluous for the cognition of Reality and nevertheless is quite unavoidable, he says,³ "In these opinions (of Spinoza, Hegel and others) is always contained a confusion between Negation itself and its assumed objective foundation, the enclosed in itself Individuality and Uniqueness of every one among the manifold of things. What they are not, never appertains to their existence and essence. It is imported into them from outwards by comparative thought. Negation is comparative, or distinguishing, thought. Negation and distinguishing thought are convertible terms. Hegel was quite right when he said that Negativity is the Soul of the world. But the Body of the world is not Negation. It is Affirmation and even "the essence of affirmation."⁴ In the words of Sigwart, it is the "enclosed in itself Individuality and Uniqueness of every single thing." It is a thing into which nothing at all has yet been "brought in from without." As Śāntirākṣita puts it, it is the thing "which has not (yet) become identical with

the things by themselves (reality, *Sachheit*)". Consequently pure sensation (*kāyapaṇḍita-pratyakṣa*) corresponds to the Thing-in-Itself and contains pure affirmation or absolute position.

¹ *ślokaśānanam=paramārtha-sat=vidhī-śāstrāpam=utrat alpā a-pratyakṣa*.

² *Metaphysik II*, § 202, cp. above p. 192.

³ *Logik I*, 171.

⁴ *vidhī-śāstrāpam*.

places». Then the only conclusion possible is that all are negative since they are negative of each other.

Kant, we have seen, makes an important distinction between a logical and a real opposition.¹ «In a logical repugnancy», says he, (i. e. in contradiction) only that relation is taken in account, through which the predicates of a thing mutually sublate each the other, and their consequences, through contradiction». Which among the two is really positive (*realitas*) and which really negative (*negatio*). is not attended to. But the opposition between light and dark, cold and hot, etc. is dynamical. Both parts of the opposition are real: This opposition is not logical contradiction, but real otherness and dynamical repugnancy.

The same theory is expressed, we have seen, by Dharmakīrti² Logical Contradiction,³ says he, embraces all objects whether real or non-real. Dynamical repugnancy, on the other hand, is present only in some real couples. The opposition between blue and non-blue is logical, the first is as much a negation of the second as the second is the negation of the first. The opposition between blue and yellow, between a jar and a cloth is simple otherness. «All atoms, says Dharmotara, do not occupy the same place, but their duration does not interfere with one another», they exist peacefully in close vicinity.

Now these two kinds of opposition so clearly distinguished by Kant and by Dharmakīrti, have been confounded by Bain on one side and by Hegel on the other. Bain says⁴ «one might suppose that a chair is an absolute and unconnected fact, not involving any opposite, contrary or correlative fact. The case is quite otherwise». It involves the non-chair whose meaning is very wide. A chair is thus, according to Bain, merely the negation of a non-chair and a non-chair merely the negation of a chair. Both parts are negative of one another.

c) Sigwart.

Sigwart takes up the problem which puzzled J. S. Mill, A. Bain and F. H. Bradley,⁵ and which appears to be the same as has been

¹ Op. Essay on Negative Magnitudes, p. 26 (Kirchmann's ed.). Op. CPR.

² NBT., p. 70 22.

³ *paraspara-parihāra*

⁴ Logic, I 61

⁵ Sigwart does not mention in this connection the names of Mill, Bain and Bradley, but it is clear that in part 12—18 of § 22 of his Logic he expresses his view on the problem discussed by them and answers them. It comes clearly to the surface in the attempt to explain the word «blind» on p. 187.

amazing in the highest degree¹ says Dharmottara «Is it not, says he,¹ a very great miracle, that our concepts, although very well cognizing the (conceptually) definite essence of reality, are not capable to make definite Reality in itself?» (They cognize the Universal only, and are absolutely incapable of cognizing definitely the particular). «No, he continues, there is here not the slightest shade of a miracle! Concepts are by their nature imagination. They endow our knowledge with Consistency, but not with Reality² Therefore whatsoever is definite is necessarily the object of conceptual thought The immediately apprehended form of the object possesses no definiteness!»

It has been objected³ that the notion of a Thing is also a Universal, it is repeated in every individual thing and embraces in its comprehension the totality of all things. Indeed Existence, Reality, Thingness, Substantiality are general notions, this is not denied by the Buddhists, If these general notions did not exist, we could not name them. Every name refers to a Universal. But the concrete Thing-in-Itself, the *Hoc Aliquid*, is not a general notion, it is the contradictorily opposed part of a general notion. The general notion, being something ideal, requires genuine reality as its counterpart. The Thing as it is locked up in itself is the *Reality*, it is the Particular, a Unity, the Real. Pure Affirmation is something pre-logical, logic is always negative or dialectical.⁴

It must clearly appear from what has been stated precedently that the position of Dignāga is such as though he had taken the Dialectic from Hegel and the Thing-in-Itself from Kant. But at the same time it looks as if he had divested both the Kantian Thing-in-Itself as well as the Hegelian Dialectic of a great deal of their mystery and thus disarmed the enemies of both these theories. Indeed cognition is judgment and the epistemological pattern of a judg-

¹ In his *Apohā-nāma-prakarana*, Tanjur, Mdo, vol 112, fol 265 b. 8—264 a. 2

² *nam-par-rtog-pa-rnams-m . . . dñōs-po ñes-pa-ñid-dñ slyes-pa-rtogs-pa yin-gu, de-gag dñōs-po yod-pa-ñid ñes-pa-ma-ma-yin-no, ñid*

³ By the Jains, cp. TSP, p 487 22 (kār 1719)

⁴ This pre-logical element in our cognition is perhaps just the same as the one noticed and described as present in the cognitions of primitive humanity. The understanding is here at its lowest capacity, it is not altogether absent, but very near to the absolutely undifferentiated «Complex-quality», which by itself is incognizable, because not intelligible, however it is the source of all future operations of the Intellect. Cp. Lery-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (Paris, 1910) and S. Ranaul, op cit, p 206 ff

everything in the Universe of discourse except man. It means that the image of man is absent. "The absence of the image of man," says Sigwart, "is itself not another image". Thus non-A being not real, Sigwart concludes that there is no opposition at all between all those objects which are included under A and non-A. They can peacefully coexist close by one another without quarrelling. That they cannot be predicated together of the same subject, is a matter of fact, known from experience, it cannot be "explained by negation". In this manner Sigwart disposes of negation and escapes to the dangers of Hegelianism. The name "man" is purely positive and contains no negation at all and the name non-man is altogether nothing¹

There is, however, one case, according to Sigwart,² where "it seems impossible to deny the origin of opposition through negation". Such are the "privative" names.³ "Is it indeed possible to express the relation between seeing and blind otherwise than that blind means not-seeing?" Blind would then be the simple privation of vision and we would have "an opposition produced by negation". "It would then be absolutely the same whether I deny one part or assert the counterpart, whether I say 'he sees not' or 'he is blind'. Thus seeing would mean not blind and blind would mean not seeing. Some names at least would be negative in themselves and the danger of Hegelianism would become imminent again! "No proof is needed", says Sigwart,⁴ "to establish that it is not so! If the man does not see, the reason is not stated why he does not see. But if it is said that he is blind, it is thereby intimated that the apparatus is destroyed which enabled him to see". The man can evidently fail to see through want of attention or through distance, without having lost his faculty of vision. He will be "not-seeing", but he will not be blind!

One is really astonished to see a logician of so extraordinary perspicacity as Professor Sigwart producing so poor an argument! He seems to have forgotten that a man cannot be blind and not blind.

¹ Ibid, p 178 — "Die Vorstellungen von Mensch und Löwe sind an sich so wenig im Streit, wie die von schwarz und roth oder schwarz und weiss". Sigwart apparently thinks that there will be mutual opposition in the concepts of man and lion only when the lion will attack the man and devour him!

² Ibid., p 185.

³ Here evidently Sigwart takes up the discussion initiated by J. S. Mill and Locke

⁴ Ibid., p. 186

Professor Ulrich's exposition of Logic is remarkable in that respect. He defines the Understanding as the "differentiating activity of the Soul".¹ It becomes incumbent upon him to distinguish the "differentiating activity" from Negation, or else the Soul itself will be Negation, and that is Hegelianism. "Every difference", says he,² "involves not only a mutual negation between the objects, but also their mutual unity". This again is awfully Hegelian, it is an existence which at the same time is non-existence. But Ulrich seems firmly convinced that he has escaped from Hegel's "pure existence", this existence which at the same time is non-existence, a thesis, says he,³ which "Hegel tries in vain to establish by his sophistic dialectics". But when he explains his position he only repeats in other words Hegel's own argument. Indeed Hegel says,⁴ "Everything exists first of all only because there exists another. It is what it is through the other, through its own non-existence. Secondly it exists because the other does not exist. It is what it is through the non-existence of the other. It is a reflexion in one's own self". He concludes that each of the two sides can exchange its place with the other. "it can be taken as positive and also as negation".⁵ Ulrich is aware that this theory means a denial of genuine affirmation and a fall into the precipice of Negativism. He therefore emphatically insists,⁶ that "when we differentiate something, we conceive it as positive as an Ens". However this Ens discloses itself as being also a non-Ens. Indeed, he explains⁷— "when we differentiate the red from the blue, we conceive it as a negation of blue. But at the same time we also establish the contrary connexion, of the blue with the red, and conceive the blue as the not-red .. The red is thus implicitly connected in a roundabout way, by a circuit through the blue, with its own self". Is it not a very curious Ens which is connected with its own self "by a circuit through its non-Ens"? And does not Ulrich simply repeat Hegel's argument, while imagining that he repudiates it? And is it not exactly the argument of Dignāga, *mutatis mutandis*, when he says that "every word expresses its own (viz positive) meaning through the repudiation of the contrary (e. i., through negation)"

¹ Ulrich, *Compendium der Logik*,² p. 83 — *unterscheidende Thätigkeit der Seele*. Cp. p. 45 and 52.

² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁴ *W. d. Logik*, II, 42.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁷ *Ibid.*

noticing it, he would have fallen into Hegelianism from the other end, *duḥ kṛti mahāśaya*. The result of the theory that there is no negation in objective reality is just the same as the result of the theory that there is in it nothing but negation.¹

What the Indian attitude is in this question, is quite clear, viz. —

- 1) All definite things are negative. Definite means negative.
- 2) They are negative a) of the contradictory directly, and b) of the contrary indirectly.
- 3) They can be affirmative only as negations of their own negations.
- 4) Pure affirmation is only the Thing-in-Itself.
- 5) All other things are «things-in-the-other», i. e., negative of some other. without which negation they are nothing.
- 6) Direct contradiction (Negation) is only between existence and non-existence of the same thing.²
- 7) Indirect contradiction is lurking between any pair of definite objects inasmuch as the one is necessarily included under the non-existence of the other.³
- 8) Every object first of all excludes the varieties contained under the same universal.⁴
- 9) All other objects are excluded through the mutual exclusion of the universals under which they are contained.⁵

¹ Wishing to establish that there is no real negation in nature and that the incompatibility of objects is an ultimate fact «not to be explained by Negation», but simply to be gathered from experience, Sigwart rushes into quite impossible assertions «We could imagine», says he (*Logik*, I, 179), «an organization of our faculty of vision, which would make it possible for us to see the same surface coloured in different colours». If Sigwart means what he says, if he means that the same thing can be at the same time blue and yellow, i. e. blue and non-blue — and what else can he mean? — the price paid by him for his escape from Hegelianism is not only the sacrifice of negation, it is the sacrifice of logic itself. There is no opposition between the blue and the non-blue, he thinks, because the non-blue is infinite and unreal. There is neither any opposition between the blue and the yellow, because they can peacefully coexist by one another!

² NBV. p. 70 5 — *bhāva-abhāvayoh sāksād virodhah*

³ Ibid. — *astunoh tu anyanya-abhāva-avyabhicāritayā virodhah*.

⁴ Pram. samucco, ad V. 27 — they are «like the sons of a rāja in a civil war».

⁵ Ibid., ad V. 28 — «the word *śmśapā* does not exclude the jar directly why? Because there is no homogeneity». But the jar is under the universal earthen-ware and the *śmśapā* under plants, these both again under the universal hard stuff (*pārthivata*). Thus the *śmśapā* excludes the jar as «the enemy of a friend», not directly.

From the summary of Jñendrabuddhi¹ we can gather that the Indians were also puzzled over the problem whether affirmation and negation were in this respect «one inseparable thought», as Lotze thinks, or rather two interdependent thoughts, the one the consequence of the other. The verdict of Dignāga is to the effect that it is just one and the same thought. Such is also the theory of Hegel and Lotze falls in line notwithstanding all his desire to keep clear of the Hegelian precipice. The position of the Buddhist in regard of both Lotze and Hegel is distinguished by his theory of two different sources of knowledge. Supposing there were no other colours in existence than the red, we would then certainly perceive the red, but we never would know that it is red.²

Locke comes very near to Dignāga's standpoint when he points to the difference between a «clear idea» and a «distinct idea».³ A clear idea is that «whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well disposed organ» A distinct idea is that «wherein the mind perceives a difference from all others». In these words Locke has touched the vital point of Dignāga's theory. He certainly does not intend to say that the clear is not distinct, and that the distinct is not clear. However he says that the clearness is produced by the senses and definiteness by the understanding. If he would have made a step further and said that clearness is found only in pure sensation, where no definiteness (or negation) is at all to be found, and that definiteness (negation) is the exclusive function of the understanding, then the coincidence with Dignāga would have been complete. However such a step means a plunge into transcendental philosophy with its Thing-in-Itself and other features, as well as a partial fall into the precipice of Hegelian dialectics.

W. E. Johnson in his Logic⁴ evidently alludes to the same difference, when he says that «neither images nor perceptions reflect the concreteness and particularity of the individual thing, which should be described as determinate in contrast to the indeterminateness of the mental processes». The contrast is indeed not between the thing and the processes, but between the freshness of a particular sensation and the generality of a conception. What Locke calls «clear idea»

¹ Cp. above, p. 462

² *nīlam vijñānāti, na tu nīlam ity vijñānāti*, cp. Pram. samucc. vṛtti; ad I 4

³ Essay, book III, ch. XXIX, § 4

⁴ Logic, I, p. XXIX.

blue and only for this reason is it incompatible with blue. Thus blue is not non-blue, and blind is not non-blind and a cow is not a non-cow, and a tree is not non-tree, etc., etc. All names are negative in this sense.

Incompatible are therefore blue and yellow because, as just mentioned, the yellow is contained under non-blue, and blue is contained under non-yellow. But a tree and a *śimśapā* are not incompatible, because *śimśapā* is not contained under non-tree. They are therefore «identical» in the sense of the Buddhist law of Identity. Incompatibility or «unpredicability» is fully explained by Negation and the law of Contradiction.¹ All definite things consist of yes and no. But does that mean that the Buddhists have fallen in the Hegelian heresy? The Mādhyamikas certainly have, but not the Logicians. Their salvation will be described presently.

d) Affirmation what.

Now if all names and concepts are negative, if without the negation contained in them they mean absolutely nothing; and if, on the other hand, every concept is a predicate in an implied perceptual judgment, does that mean that all judgments are likewise negative? Was Aristotle quite mistaken when he introduced the division of affirmation and negation into the definition of a judgment? Is it possible that Hegel is right and there is in the world only negation and no affirmation at

¹ According to Sigwart (ibid., p. 179) no rules can be given why some qualities are incompatible. They cannot be predicated at once of the same subject, but this cannot be explained by negation. It is an ultimate fact. According to the Buddhists it necessarily always comes under the law of Contradiction. Since the time of Aristotle two grounds of negation are distinguished in logic, privation and incompatibility (ἀντιφύσις, ἐναντιότης). The first is evidently the real negative judgment, the judgment of «non-perception» corresponding to the perceptual judgment, the judgment of the pattern «there is here no jar (because I do not perceive any)». The second is the negative concomitance, or contraposition, which contains two concepts (or two predicates) and a negated copula between them. The latter is founded on the law of contradiction and should, therefore, be regarded as an incompatibility between two judgments, according to Sigwart's own statement. Just as in the case of the affirmative judgment we have established a difference between the judgment proper (with one concept) and the judgment of concomitance (between two concepts), and just as the verb «is» means existence in the first case and a copula in the second, just so can we establish the same difference on the negative side. Privation means non-existence. Incompatibility means disconnection. The first is called in Tibetan *med-āgag* (= *abhiśa-pratishedha*), the second — *man-āgag* (= *saṃ-bandha-pratishedha*).

PART V

REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

§ 1. WHAT IS REAL.

What reality is according to Buddhist logicians has been stated at the beginning.¹ It has also been stated that reality is double,² direct and indirect. Direct reality is the reality of sensation,³ indirect is the reality of a concept referred to a sensation.⁴

There is a pure reality, that is the reality of pure sensation, and there is a pure ideality, or pure reason. Pure ideality is the non-reality of a concept which is not referred to a sensation. The real is moreover called particular, and the ideal is called universal. The real is also the thing, and the ideal is the idea, the non-thing. Absolutely real is the thing as it is "in itself", it is pure affirmation. Unreal is the thing as it is "in the other", or differentiated from the other, it is therefore negation (or dialectical). We thus have a general dichotomy of which the one side is called 1) reality, 2) sensation, 3) particular, 4) thing "in itself" or 5) affirmation; and the other side is respectively called by the five names of 1) ideality, 2) conception, 3) universal, 4) the thing "in the other", 5) negation.

Now the second side of this dichotomy is monolithic, it is entirely internal, there are no universals nor any negations in the external world. But the first side does not seem to be so monolithic; it is split in two parts, an internal and external one. The internal is sensation, the external is the thing, that thing which is the thing "in itself".

The definition of reality is a capital issue between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The early schools are champions of the principle "everything exists".⁵ This slogan is explained as meaning that the *dharmas*.

¹ Cp. above, p. 63

² Ibid., p. 69

³ *svikṛti* *alpa* *am*

⁴ *svikṛti* *alpa* *am*

⁵ *sarva* *asti*

⁶ *dharmas*

a union between two quite heterogeneous things, it consists in the reference of an ideal content to a point of reality. Hegel was mistaken when cancelling the difference between the two sources of our knowledge, and Sigwart was mistaken in not sufficiently appreciating the power of negation. But Sigwart was right in maintaining that reality contains negation only when it is brought in from without. He should have added that a concept, or a name, contains affirmation, also only when it is brought in from without. Such is the answer which Dignāga probably would have given to the three representatives of European logic.

Pure or real affirmation is contained only in the very first moment of every sense-cognition. Supposing I have received an immediate impression. I am struck. The impression is vivid and bright I am baffled. In the very first moment I «understand» nothing. But this condition of absolute indefiniteness lasts only a single moment. In the very next moment it begins to clear up, gradually it becomes definite. *Definitio est negatio*. The process of understanding is capable of progressive development. We understand in the measure in which we deny. Sigwart asks, why on earth are we in need of the subjective circuit of negation in order to cognize reality, when we apparently could just as well cognize it directly? The only possible answer to this question is that we have two combined sources of knowledge and only one of them is direct. To the senses the objects are «given»,¹ but they are not understood. They are understood gradually in a process of continually progressing negation. The judgment containing non-A as its predicate is infinite in that sense, but it begins at once after the very first moment of pure sensation. We would never cognize the blue, if we did not contrast it with the non-blue. Those who maintain that they perceive, e. g., a tree exclusively by their senses directly, should, as Jinendrabuddhi says,² at once see in one and the same object the tree and the non-tree, see them simultaneously. But negation is the function of the understanding, not of sensation. Of the two sources of knowledge one is affirmation, the other negation.

From among all European philosophers Herbart appears to be the only one who,³ just as the Buddhists, has identified pure sensation

¹ In sense-perception the objects are *sva-sattayā pramāṇam*, for the understanding (*anumāna*) they are *jñātātena* (= *apohena*) *pramāṇam*, cp. Tāt., p. 98.

² Cp. above, p. 470.

³ Cp. however Kant's remarks CPR, p. 141 — «total absence of reality in a sensuous intuition can itself never be perceived», and *ibid.* p. 117 — «that which is phenomena (in perceptual judgments?) corresponds to sensation constitutes

to reality. The first is the logic embodied in the major premise of the syllogism, the second is the logic embodied in the minor premise or in the perceptual judgment. Our analysis of sense-perception, judgment, inference, syllogism and the logical fallacies must have sufficiently elicited this double character of logic. Just as the logical fallacies, or error, is distinguished into error against consistency (or error in the major premise) and error against reality (or error in the minor premise); just so is truth also divided in a truth of consistency (or truth of the major premise) and truth of reality, (or truth of the minor premise and of the perceptual judgment).¹

§ 2. WHAT IS EXTERNAL.

To be external means to be beyond. To be external to cognition means to be beyond cognition, to transcend cognition, to be the object residing outwards from cognition. If reality is external, the real and the external would then be convertible terms. But the object does not lie absolutely beyond cognition. Hegel accused the Kantian Thing-in-Itself of lying absolutely beyond cognition and being absolutely incognizable. But there is no dire necessity of splitting reality into two parts, sensation and the particular thing. The thing can be reduced to sensation.

The relative terms subject-object internal-external are apt to give rise to misunderstandings, if their different meanings are not taken into consideration. Our ideas, feelings and volitions are apprehended by introspection.² They are the "objects" of introspection, but they are not external. Ideas are themselves introspective, that is, self-conscious. There is in this case that identity between subject and object which Hegel extended to the subject-object relation in general. Quite different is the subject-object relation between the external material world and the internal mental domain. The external is real and efficient,³ the internal is ideal and imagined.⁴ The fire which burns and cooks is real, the fire which I imagine in my head is ideal. But ideal does not mean altogether unreal. The real and the ideal are two hetero-

¹ Since a perceptual judgment refers us to sensation this conception of Reality reminds us of the Kantian postulate, "what is connected with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is real", CPR, p. 178

² *sva-samvedana*

³ *artha-lasyā-lāri*

⁴ *buddhy-āridha*

the other by the admixture of whatsoever the slightest bit of otherness".¹

We now see that if every concept contains in itself a "yes" and a "no", two parts subsuming each the other; if it, in this sense, contains existence and non-existence; if a "cow" is nothing but a negation of a "non-cow", and a "non-cow" nothing but the negation of "cow"; that does not yet mean that there is nothing positive at the bottom of such dialectical concepts. It does not mean, as Kant puts it, that the result of such mutual negativity is the Nought, *nihil negativum irrepraesentabile*. Both Dignāga, as well as Hegel, will emphatically protest against the accusation that their philosophy leads to an absolute Null. Jinendra-buddhi² says — "our opponents are ignorant of the real essence of the theory of the Negative Meaning of words. They impute to us a theory, (which we never professed). They maintain that this theory means a blunt denial of every reality and thereupon they always are ready to insult us". Hegel says³ — "The contradictory does not result in an absolute Nought, in a Null, but essentially in a negation of its own special content." Kant perhaps would have answered that the negation of one's own special content is just the Nought. However, for the Buddhist Logicians there is a Pure Reality, just as there is a Pure Thing, and that is the thing as it is "locked up in itself", the thing cognized in pure sensation. It is the first moment of that bright vividness which is characteristic for a fresh impression. The Thing is then cognized in its full concreteness, but quite indefinitely, it is, as Sigwart says, "locked up". But as soon as it is "set free" and enters into the domain controlled by the Intellect, its vividness fades away and it *pari passu* becomes definite. It gains in definiteness what it loses in vivacity. Vividness and definiteness stand in an inverse ratio to one another. The highly abstract notions, such as Existence, Cognizability, Causation, seem to be totally dead, divorced from concrete reality. Such notions as a jar or a cow (that is, jar-ness, cow-ness) etc. seem very near to the concreteness of a sensuous impression. Nevertheless they are also constructions of conceptual thought on the dichotomizing principle, just as the highly abstract ones. As soon as the Intellect is aroused, as soon as it begins to "understand", it compares and becomes dialectical. By its essence it is not a capacity of direct cognition. Is it not

¹ TS, p. 1. 6—*anyasāpi nāmsena vibhūṭāpuraṇmukam, (s. a. pratītya-samutpannam artham svalakṣaṇam jagāda).*

² Cp. above, p. 470

³ Wiss. d. Logik, I 86 Cp. Encyclop., § 82

§ 4. CRITICAL REALISM.

It is hardly necessary to repeat what the theory of the Buddhist logicians regarding the problem of the reality of the external world was. The whole of our work is, directly or indirectly, concerned about this unique central problem. In the first part we have examined the direct reflex of the external world in our sensitivity. In the second and third part we have examined its indirect reflex in our understanding. In inference and syllogism the minor premise is there for keeping the constructions of the intellect always in touch with reality. The dialectical character of our concepts would have reduced all our knowledge to nought, if it were not also attached to the concrete reality of the external thing. The external is real, it is *the Reality*. Real and external are convertible terms. Ideality is imagination. But external reality is directly cognized, or, more precisely, not cognized but reflected, only in pure sensation. Sensation apprehends the particular individual thing. The understanding cognizes the thing only "in general", it cannot cognize the particular. There is no definite cognition without generality and generality is ideality. Thus Reality and Ideality are contradictorily opposed to one another, the real is not the ideal and the ideal is not the real.

External reality is moreover efficient, it is a cause. Ideality is an image, it is not causally efficient. An image can be efficient only metaphorically, as an intermediate link preparing a purposeful action.

Further, Reality is dynamic. The external object is not Matter, but it is Energy. Reality consists of focuses¹ from which activity proceeds and points to which purposeful activity converges. "Reality is work", Reality is instantaneous, it consists of point-instants which are centres of energy, they are *Kāṣṭhānta*².

What is the relation between this pluralistic reality and this ideality? It is causal and indirect.³ Reality is apprehended by the human intellect indirectly, as the echo of a sound,⁴ as the "shining of a gem through the chink of a door". Reality is "telescoped" to the mind by a superstructure of dialectical concepts. Not only are the sensible qualities subjective moods of reaction to the external stimulus, but the so called primary qualities, extension, duration, time, space, the notions of

¹ *yā bhūtiḥ saṁśṛīṣṭā*

² Cp. above, p. 474 n

³ Cp. *Pārthasarathimūlā* ad Ślokaḥ, p. 569

ment reduces to the form «this is a jar» or, more precisely, «the image of jar-ness is referred to this instantaneous event». It is a perceptual or real judgment. It is perception in the element «this», it is a judgment in the element jar-ness. The first refers to the thing as it is strictly «in its own self», the second to the thing as it is «in its other», in the non-jar. The first is reality, the second is ideality. The first is sensible, the second is intelligible. The first is the pure object, the second is pure dialectic. The first is affirmation, the second is negation. The first is direct cognition, the second is indirect cognition. Since both elements refer to the same ultimate reality, the one directly, the other indirectly, Śāntirakṣita¹ says that the Thing-in-Itself is the ontological foundation² of the logical dialectic³ of the understanding. Kant says⁴, «that which in phenomena (we must say in judgments) corresponds to sensation (the element «this») constitutes the Thing-in-Itself». Hegel says⁵, «all Things are in themselves contradictory, this contradiction is the developed Nought». This might be interpreted as meaning that the logical predicate of pure existence is dialectical.

Thus in supplementing Kant by Hegel and Hegel by Kant we will have Dignāga⁶

It hardly is needed to insist that these similitudes are approximations, they are what all similitudes are, curtailment of difference⁷.

e) Ulrich and Lotze.

Just as the problem of the Universals, the problems of Negation, of Dialectic, the Infinite Judgment and the Thing-in-Itself have been abandoned by modern logic without any final solution. These problems are allied, the solution of one means the solution of all of them. Post-Hegelian Germany having been overfed with mystified dialectics, not only abandoned it, but feels disgusted at it. Sigwart is not the only author who becomes full of apprehension whenever negation and dialectics are approached.⁸

¹ IS, p. 316 28 and TSP, p. 317. 2

² *artha-ātma-āpoḥa*

³ *jñāna-ātma-āpoḥa*

⁴ CPR, p. 117

⁵ W d Logik, II. 58.

⁶ It is not necessary to repeat that we here allude to the «dialectic of contradictions», not to the «dialectic of contraries»

⁷ *bheda-agraha*

⁸ Cf. Lotze Logik, § 40, Trendelenburg Log. Unt, v. I, ch. III. E v. Hartmann. Ueber die dialectische Methode, and a great many other works

from other things, it negatively receives the general characteristic of a jar. Thus the fire is a strictly individual sensation of heat, nothing more. But by opposing it to other things, through a repudiation of the contrary, we construct the universal idea of fire which embraces all fires in the world, past, present and future, but only negatively. The non-A which Lotze thought must be banished from logic as an *offenbare Grille*, is its real essence, "the Soul of the World". Such is the relation between the external, which is the particular and the internal, which is the universal. It is the same as the relation between the sensible and the intelligible.

§ 5. ULTIMATE MONISM.

Such is the result of the logical analysis of cognition. Reduced to its ultimate elements it consists of an external Thing-in-Itself, a corresponding pure sensation and a following image. Knowledge contains two sides, subject and object. Even reduced to its simplest elements they are nevertheless two. Logic cannot proceed any further. It cannot imagine a higher synthesis uniting both subject and object into a monistic undifferentiated Whole. This step is translogical, it means a plunge into metaphysics, a denial of the law of contradiction and a challenge to logic. For the Buddhist logicians, however, truth exists on two different planes, the logical and the translogical one. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti call themselves idealists, but they are realists in logic and idealists and even monists in metaphysics. In logic reality and ideality are divorced, but the "Climax of Wisdom", says Dignāga, "is Monism". In the very final Absolute subject and object coalesce "We identify", says Dignāga, "this spiritual Non-duality, i. e., the monistic substance of the Universe, with the Buddha i. e., with his so called Cosmical Body".¹ Philosophy here passes into religion.

Jinendrabuddhi² says: "How is it possible that from the standpoint of a philosopher who denies the existence of an external world there nevertheless is a differentiation of the "grasping" and the "grasped" aspect in that knowledge which in itself does not contain any differentiation between a source and a result of cognizing?" (The answer is the following one) "From the standpoint of Truthness (i. e., Absolute Reality) there is no difference at all!" But hampered as we

¹ Cp my introduction to the edition of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, in the *Bibl Buddh*

² Cp vol. II, p 396

In accord with this Ulrici then gives the example of the "definite colour red" and says,¹ "only because the red, just as red, is at the same time not-blue, not-yellow etc., only (through these negations) is it that definite colour which we call red". The positivity of red has dwindled away. It is definite, but definite means intelligible and necessarily negative or dialectical. Wishing to escape from the Hegelian "pure existence" he nevertheless falls into the precipice!

Sigwart² has perceived the dangerous position of Ulrici and hurries up to his rescue. "The theory", says he, "which maintains that a presentation becomes definite only through differentiation,"³ this theory forgets that differentiation is itself possible only between already existing differentiated presentations" "The sensation of red, or more precisely of a definite red, he continues to say, is something quite positive, having a characteristic content". It follows that this something quite definite, quite positive, this very definite shade of red, is differentiated in the highest degree without any help from the side of the Understanding, or as Ulrici puts it, from "the differentiating activity of the Soul". The Understanding is then either unemployed, or it has to redo what is already done by others

It is evidently in order to emphasize this double work, that Lotze⁴ calls it a "positive positing".⁵ But as already mentioned, he says, that this position is so clearly united with the "exclusion of everything other", that when we intend to characterize "the simple meaning of affirmation" we can do it only through expressions meaning the "exclusion of the other", i. e. negation. A very curious affirmation is it indeed which can be expressed only as... negation! Is it not again exactly Dignāga's thesis that our words express their own meaning through the repudiation of the contrary? "This affirmation and this negation", says Lotze, "is one inseparable thought".⁷ Is it not similar to Hegel telling us that affirmation and negation are one and the same,⁸ since their thought is "one" and "inseparable".

¹ Ibid, p 60

² Ibid, p 59 — das Hegel'sche reine Sein

³ Logik, I 393 n

⁴ This of course can mean that it becomes "definite through definition", or "different through differentiation", different and definite are here almost the same.

⁵ Logik², § 11, p 26

⁶ eine bejahende Setzung

⁷ Ibid, p 26 — "Jene Bejahung und diese Verneinung sind nur ein untrennbarer Gedanke"

⁸ W d Logik II 54 — "Das Positive und Negative ist dasselbe"

ledge should abandon its residence, travel towards the external material thing, seize its form and return home with this booty,—as the Realists assume.

That the hypothesis of a material external thing is involved in contradiction becomes clear when we consider the following *antimony*. The external thing must necessarily be either simple or composite,¹ there is no third possibility.² If it is proved that it neither is simple nor composite, it will be *eo ipso* proved that it is nothing, it is "a flower growing in the sky."³ For a flower growing in the sky is indeed neither simple nor is it composite. That the composite must necessarily consist of simple parts, is proved by the following consideration. Supposing we remove all composition in taking from a compound all parts one by one until the uncompound remains. This uncompound residue will be partless, indivisible. However it also will be unextended; like an instantaneous mental object it will be a point-instant, like a momentary feeling; and therefore, it will be a mere idea.⁴

Another argument is founded on the following consideration. Supposing a simple part, an unextended atom, is surrounded by other such atoms, the question then arises, does it face the neighboring atoms, the one in front and the one in the back, by the same face or not.⁵ If it faces them by the same face, the atoms will coalesce and there will be no composition.⁶ If it faces them by two different faces, it will have at least two faces and then also two parts. It will be a compound.⁷

Some atomists (or monadists) attempt the following defence. Let us assume that the atoms are not the minutest parts of a stuff occupy-

¹ *ekāṅśka-svabhāvam*, *ibid* p 550 26, it means *paramāṇu* and *atyantika*, *op* *ibid*, p 551. 6

² *trīṭya-rūpya-abhāvena*, *ibid*, p 550 18

³ *vyomotpalam*, *ibid*, p 550 17

⁴ Cp CPR, p 352 and TSP, p 552 22 — *apocīyamāṇa mīyama-siddhānta yadā mīramāṇa (synū), tadā na mīrītā vedanādvīat sīdhyanti*, and Kant, "wenn alle Zusammensetzung in Gedanken aufgehoben würde, so (würde) kein zusammenge-setzter Teil und folglich keine (ausgedehnte) Substanz gegeben sein." The Sanscrit appears as if it were a translation from the German!

⁵ *yena cakarūpēna ekāṅśa-abhinūllho tenasā apara-paramāṇu-abhinūllho yndī syātī*, *ibid* p 556 11. 31 The same argument is repeated by Vasubandhu and Dignāga

⁶ *pracayo na syātī*, *ibid*, p 556. 12

⁷ *āp-bhāga-bhedo yasya asti, tasya cātvaṁ na yitjyate*, *ibid*, p 557. 19

is here called a definite thing. What Locke calls «distinct» comes to be called here «indeterminate». The same confusion in regard of the expression «determinate» is found in the sanscrit terms *niyata*, resp. *anyata-pratibhāsa*¹ Sensation is determinate in its uniqueness and the image is determinate in its generality. The contrast is more conveniently rendered by the terms vivid (sensation) and vague (image); or by the «real» particular and the «pure» universal, the term «real» and «pure» in this context meaning ultimate, or, as Kant says, transcendental. At the bottom it is nothing but the rather trivial distinction between the senses and the understanding, this simple distinction the full importance of which first occurred to Reid, but has been neglected by his successors; it has been followed up to its transcendental source by Kant and again neglected by his successors.

Sigwart says that such affirmation, which is the foundation of negation is the «enclosed in itself particularity and uniqueness of the Thing». Lotze says that there is in every name an «affirmative position». Johnson says that there is in every perception «the concreteness and particularity of the individual thing». The «concreteness and particularity of the individual thing» evidently means nothing but the «particular particularity of the particular»! These double and treble expressions point to the feeling their authors must have had of getting hold of something extraordinarily particular, containing «not the slightest bit of otherness».

¹ Cp. index vol II, and the notes to the term *niyata*

its real Elements¹ Simplicity, as a matter of fact, cannot be inferred from any perception whatsoever.²

The idea of deducing the atom from the intuition of a mote is «the ripe fruit of a tradition which is founded on studying and inculcating absurd views (of naive realism)».³ Such is the first and chief argument of the Idealist.

His second chief argument consists in emphasizing the fact that the subject-object dichotomy is a construction of the understanding.⁴ As all such constructions it is dialectical. The subject is the non-object and the object is the non-subject. The contradictory parts become identical in a single higher reality which is the common substrate of both. What is this reality in which these opposites flow together? It is the point instant of a single pure sensation. The ultimately undubitable fact in cognition is pure sensation in a man whose sense-apparatus is in a normal condition.⁵ All the rest is in some degree, more or less, imagination. This pure sensation is instantaneous, absolutely unique in itself and in itself quite unintelligible. It can be extended, coordinated and interpreted by the understanding, that is, again by imagination. The understanding discloses that a certain sensation, which is reality itself and cannot be doubted, must be interpreted as included in a threefold envelope (*tri-puṭi*).⁶ The first is the Ego; the second is the object, say a jar and the third is the process of uniting the Ego with the jar. Thus the Understanding replaces a pure and real sensation by a threefold construction of a subject, an object and a process. There is not the slightest bit of pure reality in the Ego apart from the object and the process. It is entirely imagination. Neither is there any pure reality in the object jar. It is an interpretation of a simple sensation by the intellect. Still less is there any reality in the process. Cognition as something separate from subject and object, if it is not the instantaneous sensation, does not exist. There is only one real unit corresponding to the triad of cognizer, cognized and cognition, it is sensation. *Eṃs et unum convertantur*. One unity,

¹ *Ātma-prajñāpter atmanā lāraṇam syūt, na śi andhāh, ibid., p. 558. 23.*

² Cp Kant's words in the proof of the Antithesis «die Simplicität aus keiner Wahrnehmung, welche sie auch sei, könne geschlossen werden», cp *na tāvat paramāṇvāṇām ātmanā pratyedyate, ibid., p. 551. 7*

³ *Ibid., 558. 21*

⁴ *Ibid., p. 559. 3 ff*

⁵ *śravanā-mitrāṇā-jñānam, ibid., p. 550. 14.*

⁶ *vedya-vedāka-triti-bheda, ibid., p. 550. 1*

exist. They are arranged in 75 kinds or in 12 categories.¹ They include the subject and the object, internal as well as external items. A unit of a feeling, of an idea, of a volition, is as much an Element of reality as a unit of colour, of sound or of a tactile sense-datum, i. e., of matter. There is no difference in respect of existence between materiality and ideality. Everything is equally real. There is therefore no difference in the degree of reality between a thing and its qualities. "Whatever is found to exist is a thing".² The reality of a jar is the reality of a patch of colour (one thing), of a shape (another thing), of something hard (a third thing), of an image (a thing again) etc.; but there is absolutely no such real thing as their unity in a jar. The jar is imagination. Just as the Ego is imagination, although all its Elements, the five *skandhas* are "things", i. e., Elements. The eternal items, Nirvāna and Empty Space, are also Elements, *ergo* things. Element, reality, existence, thing are convertible terms.³

In Mahāyāna this is radically changed. In the first period of Mahāyāna nothing but the motionless whole is declared to be absolutely real. For the logicians Reality is opposed to Ideality. Not only every idea, feeling and volition, but everything constructed by the intellect, every Universal, every quality, every duration and every extension is ideal, not real. Real is only the thing in its strictest sense, that which contains not "the slightest bit" of intelligible construction. Such a thing is reality itself, it is the Thing-in-Itself. It is just the Kantian *Realität*, *Sachheit*, the thing which corresponds to pure sensation.⁴

Thus radical difference in the view of Reality culminated in the different conception of Nirvāna or Eternity. In Hinayāna it is an Element, a thing, just as Empty Space is also a thing. In Mahāyāna it is not a separate Element, not a separate thing.⁵

Thus it is that in the logical school Reality is not put on the same level as Ideality. Real is only the *mundus sensibilis*. The concepts have a merely functional reality. In accord with this double character of its subject-matter, logic is also double. There is a logic of consistency and a logic of reality. The first is the logic of interdependence between two concepts, the second is the logic of referring these concepts

¹ *sarve dharmāḥ = dvādaśa-āyatanāni.*

² *īdṛyamāṇam dīḍḍham*, cp. CC, p. 26 a

³ *dharmā = astu = bhāva = dravya*

⁴ CPR., p. 117.

⁵ Cp. my Nirvāna, p. 45 ff

rial object is needed. Successful action is a mere idea,¹ a representation of something that appears as a successful action.² There is absolutely no need of a double successful action, the one supposed to exist beyond my head, the other in my head. A single successful action is sufficient. It is true that all simple humanity «down to the shepherd» indulge without much thinking in the idea that there are real extended bodies in the external world.³ But the philosopher knows that there is no logical necessity of assuming this duplicate of perceived object. Just as you assume external reality as the cause to which our representations correspond, just so do we assume an object and a cause which are immanent. Knowledge is a running reality, every moment of which is strictly conditioned by the moment preceding it. The hypothesis of an external cause is quite superfluous. For us the preceding moment of consciousness⁴ discharges exactly that function for which you hypothetically assume the existence of an external cause.

§ 7. DIGNĀGA'S TRACT ON THE UNREALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

This work is a short tract in 8 mnemonic verses with a commentary by the author, entitled «Examination of the object of cognition».⁵ The argument of this tract is in short the following one. It starts with the declaration that the external object must be either an atom or an aggregate of atoms. If it can be proved that it is neither an atom nor an aggregate of atoms, it is nothing but an idea without a corresponding external reality.

Thus the antinomy of infinite divisibility, the contradictory character of the empirical view of a divisible object, is the chief argument of Dignāga for maintaining the ideality of the object of cognition and denying the reality of the external world. In his logic Dignāga assumes that the external object is an instantaneous force which

¹ *jñānam eva arthalakṣya-samvādas*, ibid 558 28

² *artha-lakṣya-abhāsa-jñānam*, ibid

³ *yad etad deśa-sāmanena pratibhāsamānam anūra-ramaṇīyam āgopāla-praddham rūpam*, ibid

⁴ *samanantara-pratyaya = ālaya-vijñāna = āśanā*, cp TSP, p 582 19

⁵ *Ālambana-parīkṣā*, its Tibetan and Chinese translations have been published with a translation in French by Susumu Yamaguchi and Henriette Meyer (Paris, 1929). On the difference between *ālambana* «external object» and *viśaya* «object in general» cp my CC, pp 59 and 97

ogeneous realities causally connected, the external object is the cause of the internal image. They are connected by causality, not by identity of reference. There is identity between them only from the standpoint of the Idealist who confounds reality with ideality. The external thing is a particular, it is moving, instantaneous and positive. The internal image is universal, immutable and negative.

The necessity of assuming an external object corresponding to sensation is psychological, it is not logical, not absolute.

§ 3. THE THREE WORLDS.

Independently from the path of logic which leads into either a world of things or a world of ideas, there is the path of Mysticism, which leads into the metalogical intuition of the Universe as a Whole. There are thus three different worlds, or three different planes of existence, each existing in its own right. There is the ultimate metaphysical plane where the Universe represents a motionless Unity of the One-without-a-Second. There is the logical plane where it represents a pluralistic reality of Matter and Ideas cognized in sensations and conceptions. And there is a third, intermediate plane where there is no Matter at all, there are only Ideas. Matter itself is an idea. Besides the world of Parmenides there is the world of Aristotle, and in the middle between them there is the Platonic world of ideas. Far from excluding one another these three worlds exist every one in its own right and in its own respective plane, they mutually supplement the one the other and it depends upon where we start to arrive in the one or the other of them. If we start with logic, and its "law of all laws", the law of Contradiction, we will arrive into a pluralistic world, whether it be the world of the naive realist or of the critical one. If we start with metalogic and neglect the law of Contradiction, we will plunge straight off into Monism. If we start with Introspection, which apprehends a double world of things and ideas, and if we cancel the logically superfluous duplicate of the things and admit the objectivity of ideas only, we will be in full Idealism. Dignāga has written his *Prajñāpāramitā-pindārtha* from the standpoint of the Monist, his *Ālambana-parīkṣā* in defence of Idealism, and he has established the mighty edifice of his logic, his chief concern, on a foundation of critical realism. He has eschewed naive realism, that realism which cancels both introspection and images and remains by the direct perception of the external things alone (as the *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Vaiśeṣikas* have done).

and appearing to us as though it were external.¹ The ultimate reality is thus the «Idea».² What in logic was the external point-instant, the Thing-in-Itself, is here the internal «idea» Subject and object are both internal, the internal world is double There is no difference between the patch of blue and the sensation of blue. The same idea can be regarded as a cognized object and a process of cognition³

It remains to explain the regular course of perceived events which according to the Realists is due to their regular course in the external world, as controlled by the Biotic Force of Karma This is done by assuming a subconscious Store of Consciousness⁴ which replaces the material universe and an intelligible Biotic Force which replaces the realistic Karma⁵

The Realist (Śarvāstivādin) then points⁶ to the scriptural passage which declares that «a visual sensation arises in functional dependence on an object and an organ of sense»⁷ How is this passage to be understood? Dignāga answers that the object is internal and the sense-organ is the Biotic Force.⁸ Indeed it is not the eyeball that

¹ Ibid., kār. 6, quoted in full TSP., p. 582 II. It means — «The essence of the object is something cognized internally, although it seems to be external; (and this is because) it is cognition (not matter) and since it is (its own) cause, (it is not produced by matter)

² *vyākhyāna*, or *vyākhyāna-mūlratā*, cp TSP., p. 582. 7 and Trīmśikā, kār. 17.

³ The unity of subject (*viśayin*) and object (*viśaya*) is here deduced from their inseparability, ibid., kār. 7 (Yamaguchi, p. 40). This is somewhat similar to Hegel's method, W. d. Logik, II, p. 440

⁴ *ālaya-vijñāna*, cp. ibid p. 40, identified TSP., p. 582 19, with *samanantarapratyaya*

⁵ The Biotic Force (*vāsanā*) is double It links together the preceding moment with a homogeneous following one (*sajātīya-vāsanā*) and it brings discrete sensations under a common concept or name (*abhīkāṣa*-, resp. *vikalpa-vāsanā*), cp Khai-dub, in the 2-d vol of his works In TSP., p. 582 13—15 parts of kār. 7 (*śakti-vyapanāt*...) and 8 (*atirodhaḥ*) are linked together D. says, that since every conscious moment has the Force (*śakti-vāsanā*) of being followed by the next homogeneous moment, there is no contradiction in regarding every moment as a process and as a content, *noëma* and *noësis* is just the same thing Nevertheless, says D., there is no contradiction in also representing them as following one another (*pramēṇāpi*) We would probably say that psychologically there is a difference of time and degree but logically it is just the same It is also the same problem as the one of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala*, mentioned by Dharmakīrti in NB 14. 16 ff. and 18 8, as is evidenced by the explanations of Jñendrabuddhi (transl. in v. II, p. 386 ff

⁶ Cp *avātaraṇa* to kār. 7c-d, transl., p. 42

⁷ *rūpaṃ prapīṭya cakāś ca cakāsur-vijñānaṃ utpadyate*

⁸ Ibid., kār. 7c-d — *śaktiḥ* = *indriyam*

existence, non-existence, reality, generality, causality etc. are all nothing but subjective constructions of the understanding.

One naturally will ask what kind of reality it is, what is it worth, if Time, Space and all external phenomena are constructions of the Understanding? Nay, even the fundamental notions of Reality, Causality, Substantiality etc. are nothing but subjective interpretations of an unknown ultimate Reality?

The answer is very simple! Real is sensation, nothing but sensation, pure sensation. The rest is all interpretation by the Understanding. Nobody will deny that what is "given" as sensation is real, it is not imagination!

The problem of the relation between external and internal has thus shifted ground and has become a problem of the relation between sensation and image, between sensibility and understanding, between perception and conception, between the particular and the universal. Ontologically a problem of the relation between the particular and the universal, logically or epistemologically it is a problem of a relation between the senses and the understanding. Now, those two utterly heterogeneous realms must be "somehow" connected, the gap must be "somehow" bridged over, and it can be bridged only in the following way. The connection is, first of all, causal. The image is "produced" by sensation; that is to say, it arises in functional dependence on a sensation. But that is not enough. There are other causes cooperating in the production of an image. Pure sensation is distinguished by "conformity" with the latter.¹

To christen an incomprehensible relation by the word "conformity", which moreover is explained as a "similarity between things absolutely dissimilar", is of course no solution of the problem. We have had several times the occasion to refer to this mysterious "conformity" and in the second volume we have translated a collection of texts characterizing it from different sides. But it is only now, after having analysed the Buddhist dialectical method, that a better comprehension of the theory becomes possible. The similarity, as in all concepts, is here negative, it is a similarity from the negative side. There is not the slightest bit of similarity between the absolute particular and the pure universal, but they are united by a common negation. By repelling the same contrary they become similar. That is what is called "conformity". It is a negative similarity.

Thus a point-instant of efficiency manifested in the fact of pouring water is an absolutely particular sensation, but by differentiating it

¹ *taḍutpathi-tatsārūpyābhyām vīsayatā*

must exist, and this points to a foreign mind. However the Idealist is not barred from making the same conclusion, only in slightly changing the phrasing. When he has images of foreign speech and foreign movements he will conclude that these images must have a cause and this cause are foreign minds. The Idealist says¹ "Those representations in which our own movements and our own speech appear to us as originating in our own will are different from those which do not originate in our own will. The first appear in the form 'I go', 'I speak'. The second appear in the form 'he goes', 'he speaks'. Thereby it is established that the second class has a cause different from the first. This cause is a foreign will".

The Realist asks:² "Why do you not assume that the second class of images appears without such a cause as a foreign will?" "Because", answers the Idealist, "if these images of purposeful actions could appear without a will producing them, then all our presentations of action and speech in general would not be produced by a will. The difference consisting in the fact that one set of images are connected with my body and another set is not so connected, does not mean that one set is produced by a will and the other is not so produced. Both are produced by a conscious will. You cannot maintain that only one half of our images of purposeful acts and of speech are connected with a will producing them. All are so connected."

The Idealist maintains "that whatsoever we represent to ourselves as purposeful act and speech, whether connected with our own body or not, has necessarily its origin in a conscious will. The general essence of what we call purposeful activity is invariably connected with the general essence of what we call a conscious will."³

The Realist thinks that he directly perceives foreign purposeful actions. The Idealist thinks that he apprehends not real external motions, but only their images. These images he would not have, if their cause, the conscious will, did not exist. There is absolutely no substantial difference between the Realist and the Idealist when inferring will on the basis of a certain class of images.

The Realist then points to the fact that external reality for the Idealist is a dream, it consists of images without a corresponding reality. Thus his own movements and speech will be immediately evidenced by introspection, but foreign acts will be dreams. To this

¹ Sūtra 11

² Sūtra 12

³ Sūtra 22

are by a Transcendental Illusion (we perceive only a refraction of reality). All that we know is exclusively its indirect appearance as differentiated by the construction of a difference between subject and object. Therefore the differentiation into cognition and its object is made from the empirical point of view, not from the point of view of Absolute Reality. But how is it that a thing which is in itself undifferentiated appears as differentiated? Through Illusion! This illusion is of course a transcendental illusion, the natural illusion of the human mind, its intrinsic calamity.¹

The arguments of the Monists we have exposed in detail in our work on the Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa. The most popular point of accusation from the side of non-Buddhists against the Mahāyānists is that they represent the external world as a dream (*svapnavat*).² But the meaning of this watchword of a waking dream is very different in the different schools. According to Dharmakīrti, the formula of a waking dream means only that images are images, they are essentially the same both in waking condition and in sleep. They are not altogether disconnected from reality even in dreams, just as in the waking condition images, as indirect reflexes, are to a certain extent dreams

§ 6. IDEALISM.

Let us review the chief arguments advanced in defence of Idealism. The Monist who maintains the unique reality of the One and Immutable Whole³ is challenged by the assertion that real is not that Whole, but the Idea⁴. It is infinitely manifold,⁵ constantly changing⁶ and brightly manifests itself⁷ in all living beings. It alone exists, because the non-mental, material thing, if it be assumed as a thing by itself, is impossible. It is impossible for two chief reasons, viz, 1) it is involved in contradiction⁸ and 2) the grasping of an external thing is incomprehensible.⁹ It is incomprehensible namely that know-

¹ *antar-upapāda* = *mulāhyā bhrāntih*

² Cp NS, IV. 2 31.

³ TSP., p. 550 10 — *yathopamaśad-āśātmam*.

⁴ *cijñānam*, *ibid*, p. 540. 8.

⁵ *anantam*, *ibid*

⁶ *pratīksana-viśarāru* *ibid*

⁷ *ojāyate sarva-prānabhīṭam*, *ibid*

⁸ *artha-ayogāt*. cp *ibid* and p 559 8

⁹ *grāhya-grāhaka-lāksana-saīdhuryāt*, *ibid*

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both see two real moons.¹ The sources of our knowledge are two, perception and inference. They are real sources, because they guide us in our purposeful activity.² In application to our cognition of other minds direct sense perception is out of question. Inference is the only source both for the Realist and the Idealist. But this inference is capable of guiding us in our purposeful actions towards other animated beings. Therefore it is an indirect source establishing the existence of other minds. But it is then equally a source of right cognition for the Realist as well as for the Idealist. There is in this respect no difference. Solipsism is no real danger in the logical plane.

§ 9. HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

In the system of early Buddhism there is strictly speaking no united external world facing a united internal Ego. The reality of the Ego is denied. This is the starting point of Buddhism. It is replaced by the Element of pure consciousness with regard to which all other elements are external. Feelings, ideas and volitions are not supposed to be self-conscious by themselves. They are external elements, "objects" (*viśaya*) with regard to this separate element of pure consciousness. A feeling or an idea is just as external with regard to consciousness as a tactile element or a patch of colour. The unit which is analysed into its elements is the Personality (*puṇḍāla*), but it is only an assemblage of discrete elements holding together through mutual Causation. This personality includes both the elements which are usually supposed to lie in the external world and the corresponding elements of what is usually called the internal world. With regard to such personality all elements are internal. With regard to one another every element is external in regard of all the others. When an object of our external world is contemplated by two *puṇḍāla*'s it enters into the composition of both complexes as a separate item. The late Professor O. Rosenberg thought that in such cases we must assume the existence not of one common object, but of two different ones, one in each *puṇḍāla*.

Vasubandhu³ delivers himself on the problem of external and internal element in the following way

¹ Sūtra 65

² Sūtra 72 ff.

³ AKBb., ad I 82, cp my CC., p 58 ff

ing space, but let us assume that they are space itself. Space does not consist of parts, but of spaces, the minutest part will be also space and therefore divisible. It will be the mathematical space, it will be infinitely divisible, but it will nevertheless not be an idea, it will be space.² To this the answer is as follows: Although you are convinced that your words deny the extended atom,³ they really imply its existence. Indeed if you assume the simple in order to explain composition, you imply⁴ that these atoms are a stuff occupying space. We should have to admit beside the mathematical point which is simple, but not a particle, other physical points which are simple; likewise, but possessing the privilege that, as parts of space, they are able, by mere aggregation, to fill space. This is impossible. Thus it is that the atom which must be simple, but at the same time cannot be simple, is nothing. It is a "flower in the sky."⁵ The aggregate does not fare any better, since it is supposed to consist of atoms.

The objector then asks that if the atom is an idea and if this idea is not utterly inane, it must have a foundation. That foundation, whatsoever it may be, will be the real atom.⁶ The Buddhist answers. Yes, indeed, the Vaiśeṣika assumes that the mote,⁷ the particle of dust seen moving in a sunbeam, is such a foundation. but then the Ego will also be a reality! If the image of an atom is the atom, the imagined Ego will be the real Ego. The real Ego will not consist of

¹ *pradeśa*. Prof. H. Jacobi (art in ERE., v. II, p 199) assumes that *pradeśa* with the Jains means a point. But TSP, p 557 21, expressly states that *pradeśas* are divisible (*tatrūpya avayava-kalpanāyām*). The indivisible (*anirama*), unextended (*amūrtia*) atoms are discussed in connection with particles occupying space, p. 552. 1 ff. It is moreover stated "although (in assuming *pradeśa*) you do not assume different sides (*dig-bhāga-bheda*), your words deny it, but it is implied in your assuming composition, etc. (*samyuktatāda-kalpanā-balād āpatati*)". It is something like the mathematical, infinitely divisible space supporting the physical atom. From mathematical space we will then have infinite divisibility, and from the physical atom the possibility of composition. Kant accuses the Monadists of a similar absurdity, cp. his Observations on the Antithesis of his Second Antinomy, CPR, p 357.

² *yaduparam anavasthanta (syāt), na tu prajñapti-mātratvam*. *ibid.*, p 557. 22.

³ *dig-bhāga-bheda* (the different faces) *īcā nābhīyupagatas*. *ibid.*, 558 18.

⁴ *samyuktatāda-dharma-abhyupagama-balād eva āpatati*, *ibid.*

⁵ *ekānēka-svabhāva-sūnyatāś cīyad-objarat*, *ibid.*, p. 558. 10.

⁶ *yat tad upādānam sa eva paramānura tī*, *ibid.*, p. 558. 21.

⁷ (*trasa*)-*renuh*, *ibid.*, p 558. 22.

is very subtle and Asanga himself, as well as other authors, do not scruple to write in accord with both systems.¹

The new theory appears at first in a series of canonical sūtras of which the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra is regarded by the Tibetans as the fundamental.²

But religious works (sūtras) in India are always followed by scientific digests (śāstras) in which the same subject is represented in a system.³ The same Vasubandhu who summarized the doctrine of the 18 early schools in his "great śāstra", undertook to lay down the principles of the new interpretation in three minor śāstra works.⁴ He was preceded in this task by a work of his brother Asanga on the same subject.⁵ In these works Vasubandhu deals with 1) logical arguments in favour of Idealism, 2) the theory of a stored up consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*) 3) a changed system of Elements, 4) the theory of the threefold essence of all Elements.

The logical arguments in favour of Idealism and against the reality of Matter are the following ones 1) The picture of the world remains quite the same whether we assume external objects or mere

¹ Cf. the article of E. Obermiller quoted below

² To the same class belong the *Avatamsaka*, *Lankāvatāra*, *Ghanavyūha* and in fact the majority of the sūtras of the section *Mūla* of the Kanjur. On this school cf. Sylvain Lévi, *Sūtrāṅkīra* (Paris, 1907) and *Matériaux pour .. Vyākhyānāmātra* (Paris, 1932), L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Vyākhyānāmātrāśāstra* de Hsün Tsang, (1922), D. T. Suzuki, *Studies in the Lankāvatārasūtra* (London, 1930); S. N. Das Gupta, *Philosophy of Vasubandhu* (I. H. Q., 1928) and *Philosophy of the Lankāvatāra*, in *Buddhist Studies*, Calcutta, 1931, S. Yamaguchi and Henriette Meyer, *Dignāga's Ālambana-pariśeṣa* (J. Asiatique, 1929). Notwithstanding all this work the problem of Buddhist Idealism is not yet solved. The translations are desperately unintelligible. A new light will probably come from the study of Tibetan tradition. Characteristic are the fluctuations of Asanga between the *Mūddhyanika-Prāsaṅga* and the *Vijñānavāda* systems, cf. ch. IV of E. Obermiller's article "The doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā as exposed in the *Abhisamayāṅkīra* and its Commentaries", *Acta Orientalia*, 1932.

³ On this class of śāstras cf. my article "La littérature Yogācāra d'après Bu-ston" in the *Muséon*, and now in the full translation of Bu-ston's *History* by E. Obermiller, vol. I, p. 53—57 (Heidelberg, 1931).

⁴ They are the *Mahāvijñāna-pañca-skandhaka*, the *Vimśatikā* and the *Triśatikā*, the last two discovered, edited and translated by Sylvain Lévi.

⁵ The *Abhidharma-saṅgraha*. Among the Tibetan lamas this is called the Higher *Abhidharma* (*stod*), while the great work of Vasubandhu goes under the name of the Lower one (*smad*).

one reality! But the Understanding makes of it a nucleus hidden in a threefold sheath. There is a coordination of the imagined jar-ness with pure sensation. This coordination is called "Conformity". Conformity is, so to speak, the "formity" of sensation,¹ the fact that sensation receives a form. They become logically identical. Sensation and conception are psychologically² not identical, they are two different moments, the one the cause of the other. But logically they are identical in the sense of the Buddhist law of Identity. They both refer us to one and the same point of reality, they are identical by the identity of objective reference. Conception, although produced at a different moment, is referred just to the same thing that has produced sensation. "How is it, asks Dharmakīrti,³ that the source and the result, the process and the content, (the *noesis* and *noema*) are one and the same? And he answers: "through conformity".⁴ i. e., through the "formity" of sensation, by endowing sensation with an imagined, general form.⁵ And how is it that they are identical? Because sensation represents the thing as it is "in itself", and conformity is the same thing as it is "in the other". We now know that "in the other" means dialectically,⁶ by negation of the other. The identity of sensation and conception is negative. That same sensation which is pure in itself becomes the image of a jar, by its opposition to the non-jars. By further differentiations any amount of dialectical concepts can be superimposed on the simple sensation of a jar. This pure sensation is indeed "the richest thing" in its hidden contents and the "poorest thing" in definite thought!

The Realist then asks, has not the efficacy of knowledge been assumed as the test of truth? Has not the object attained in purposeful action been declared to represent ultimate reality? But the object attained in successful action is the external one? Yes, answers the Idealist, successful action⁷ is the test of reality. But no external mate-

¹ *tādāruṇyād iti sārūpyād* ibid, p. 560 18.

² Cp. the considerations of Dharmottara on the problem that a concept and a thing are identical logically (*kalpitam*), but the concept is the result of the thing (*bāhyārtha-kāryam*) psychologically, NBT, p. 59 and 60 4 ff.

³ NBT, p. 14. 15.

⁴ *artha-sārūpyam asya pramānam*, ibid.

⁵ *ālāra = ābhāsa = sārūpya = anya-īyārṭi = apoha*.

⁶ Cp. NBT, p. 16. 3 — *asārūpya-vyavṛtīyā (apohena) sārūpyam gñānasya vījārasādhāna-ketuḥ*

⁷ *artha-lāgya-sameśādas*, ibid 553. 21



stimulates sensation and is followed by the construction of an image. In his tract he takes up and rejects the Vaiśeṣika view according to which the external object is double, as consisting of atoms and of their aggregates. The aggregates are assumed as things by themselves, existing over and above the parts of which they are composed. He then establishes that the atoms do not produce congruent images. Even supposing that they be the hidden causes of images this would not prove that they are the objects, for the sense faculties are also causes, but they are not the objects.¹ A cause is not always an object. An aggregate as a thing by itself it is a phantom, created by the Vaiśeṣikas, it is a double moon.² We want an object which would explain sensation and image. But the atoms produce no images and the aggregates produce no sensations; each part produces half the work.³ From Dignāga's point of view the atom is a "flower in the sky",⁴ because things are never indivisible, and the aggregate, as a second Ens, is but a second moon.

Nor can an agglomeration of atoms explain the difference of form. The jar and the saucer are composed of the same atoms.⁵ Their different collocation and number cannot explain the different image, since collocation and number are not things by themselves. These forms are phenomena, subjective forms, or ideas.⁶

Thus the supposed indivisible atoms, the supposed aggregates and the forms of the objects — are all nothing but ideas.⁷

After this refutation of the realism of the Vaiśeṣikas Dignāga concludes that "the object perceived by the organs of sense, is not external".⁸

He then goes on to establish the main principles of Idealism.⁹ The object of cognition is the object internally cognized by introspection

¹ Ālambanap, kārīkā 1, it is quoted TSP, p. 552 17, read — *yadīndriya-vijñaptih paramānuh kāranam bhavet*; evidently quoted by Kamalaśīla from memory.

² Ibid. kār. 2, according to the *Vijñānavādin* the unextended atoms will never produce an extended thing, cp TS, p. 552 20, cp. Ālambanap, kār. 5. (Yamaguchi), p. 85 of the reprint.

³ Ibid., ad kār. 2 *yan-lag-gcig ma-thsān-bav-phyir*, cp. Yamaguchi, p. 30.

⁴ Cp TS, p. 558. 10.

⁵ Ibid. kār. 4; transl., p. 33.

⁶ *buddhi-cakṣuṣa*, cp. ibid., p. 33.

⁷ *sāmṛta*. Ibid., kār. 5, transl., p. 35.

⁸ Ibid., p. 37.

⁹ Ibid., kār. 6—8.

than anything can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance». And Hume falls in line, saying,¹ «No priestly dogma invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinite divisibility with its consequences». To this antinomy Hegel turns his exclusive attention.² He impugns the Kantian solution and proposes a «dialectical» one. «Continuity, says he, and discreteness cannot exist the one without the other, therefore their unity is truth». However Kant maintained only that infinite divisibility cannot be applied to external reality, to the things by themselves. Nothing prevents applying it in pure mathematics. Since Hegel has cancelled the external thing, he ought not to object against the transcendental ideality of infinite divisibility. But if the dialectical solution be applied to the external object, it will be paralleled by a Jaina view according to which one and the same atom is double, extended and non-extended at the same time.³ «Such is the absurd opinion of some fools!» exclaims Śāntarakṣita.⁴

According to the Buddhist Dialectical Method, continuity is nothing but the negation of discreteness, and an atom is nothing over and above the negation of extension. Since the external thing can be neither simple nor composite, it does not mean that the unity of these opposites is «their truth»; it does not mean that the external thing is simple and composite at the same time; it means that the external thing, on being considered critically, proves to be «a flower in the sky».⁵ Hegel's own chief argument in favour of Idealism⁶ coincides with the chief argument of Dharmakīrti, it assumes an immanent object.⁷

In the next following Symposium we will attempt to confront some of the most salient European views on the reality of the external world with their Indian parallels. But the respective positions of Kant and Dignāga in this problem deserve special mention. It is well

¹ Essay on Hum Und, Sect XII, part II.

² Op cit, I 191.

³ TSP, p 564 f f., op. ibid, p 557. 21 ff the probably Jaina doctrine on the infinite divisibility of *pradeśas*. Op the argument of the *Monadists*, CPR, p 267 (1st ed., p. 440).

⁴ TS, p 554. 10.

⁵ TSP, p. 560 17.

⁶ Op cit, p. II 441.

⁷ Ibid, p 559 8 ff. From the two chief arguments Dignāga seems to lay more stress upon the first (*artha-ayogāt*), while Dharmakīrti seems to prefer the second (*grāhya-grāhaka-saṁbhūtyāt*).

represents the organ, but a respective sensuous faculty. In assuming a subconscious store of consciousness instead of an external world and a Biotic Force instead of the physical sense-organs, we will be able to account for the process of cognition. There will be no contradiction¹

The leading idea of this Idealism is that the hypothesis of an external world is perfectly useless, realism can easily be transposed in a respective idealism. Everything remains, under another name in another interpretation.

The second part of the work is a recapitulation of Asanga's Idealism. The originality of Dignāga is the prominence given to the fact of Infinity. The external world being something infinite and infinitely divisible is unreal, it is an «idea». As in Greece Idealism is established on a foundation of Aporetic.

§ 8. DHARMAKĪRTI'S TRACT ON THE REPUDIATION OF SOLIPSISM.

Dharmakīrti was aware of the danger which is menacing Idealism in the shape of its direct consequence — Solipsism. He therefore singled out this problem from his great general work and devoted to it a special tract under the title «Establishment of the existence of Other Minds»². The tract presents great interest, since it contains a verification of the whole of Dharmakīrti's epistemology in its application to a special complicated case. We are not capable here, for want of space, to reproduce the whole of its argument. But a short summary will be given.

Dharmakīrti³ starts by enunciating that the usual argument of the Realists, who reduce idealism *ad absurdum*, viz., to Solipsism, is of no avail. The Realist thinks that he can infer the existence of other minds by analogy. He immediately feels that his own speech and his own movements are engendered by his will, just so observing foreign speech and foreign movements, he by analogy concludes that their cause

¹ Ibid. kār. §; transl, p. 48.

² Santānāntara-siddhi; a Tibetan translation has been preserved in the Tanjur. Its text with two commentaries, the one by Vinītadeva and the other by the Mongolian servant Dandār (Bstan-dar) Lha-rampa has been edited by me in the Bibl. Buddhica. A double translation into Russian, the one literal, the other free, has also been published by me St Petersburg, 1922.

³ Sūtra 1

tual judgment¹ A Thing-in-Itself means just the same as a cause-in-itself.² The conception of reality, we have seen, is dynamical

Kant's position is much more fluctuating in the Transcendental Dialectic where the whole of his argument inclines towards absolute Idealism,³ notwithstanding all his desire not to be confounded with Berkeley and to retain the Thing-in-Itself as established in the Analytic. The dialectic of infinity (infinite divisibility) undermines and explodes the natural human belief in the reality of an external world. Since this fact seems to be a repetition of what previously once occurred in India, it becomes necessary to define the mutual position of Kant and Dignāga in this problem. It can be summarized in the following five points. Kant says that:

1) The key to the solution of cosmological dialectic consists in the fact that all (external) "objects are mere representations, as extended beings and series of changes they have no independent existence outside our thoughts"⁴

2) However they are not dreams; they are mere images without any reality corresponding to them, but to be distinguished from dreams. The "empirical idealism" of Berkeley maintains that they are dreams, but the "transcendental" idealism maintains that they are "real". Whatsoever the term "transcendental" may mean in other contexts, here⁵ it means "non-dreams" and at the same time non-external. According to this statement we must have a double set of images, images in dreams without reality and images in reality, but also without any congruent external reality (sic!)

3) "Even the internal sensuous intuition of our mind as an object of consciousness", i. e. the Ego, is not a real self, "because it is under condition of time"⁶

4) If both the cognized object and the cognizing Ego are not real by themselves, it seems to follow that neither the process of

¹ Such is the opinion of Fr Paulsen, *etc.*, that Kant had two different causalities in view, *op. cit.* Kant, p. 157

² *यथा धर्मिकं सत्ता कथं*

³ *Op. cit.* Caird, *op. cit.*, II 186 — "in the beginning (of the Critique) the thing-in-itself appears as an object which produces affections in our sensibility, whereas in the end it appears as the noumenon which the mind requires, because it does not find in experience an object adequate to itself." That is, in the beginning it is a thing, in the end it is an idea

⁴ CPR., p. 400

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 401 (1 ed., p. 491)

⁶ *Ibid.*

5) The ultimate reality (i.e. pure sensation) is alone free from all dialectical thought-construction. It is the foundation of that subject-object dichotomy, upon which all logic is founded. This logic is equally acceptable to the Realist, who assumes an external Thing-in-Itself and to the Idealist, who denies it. For the latter the subject-object relation is a dichotomy imagined by the Understanding. The first starts at a plane where subject and object are "given".

The chief charge of Dignāga against Kant probably would have been that Kant has failed to perceive the double possibility,¹ of idealism and realism. We can admit the external Thing-in-Itself and exist in this mental plane without taking into account the final dichotomy into subject and object, but we also can take it into account and exist in another plane.² There will be no contradiction. There scarcely will be any change of language, if we in speaking of external objects keep in mind that it means only phenomena.³

¹ According to Windelband (op. cit.) Kant's denial of the External Thing-in-Itself (what he calls the third phase of his doctrine) is his greatest feat. «Dieser Gedanke, dass ausserhalb der Vorstellung Nichts sei, worum sich die Wissenschaft zu kümmern habe, ist das Göttergeschick Kant's an die Menschheit». The assumption of the Thing-in-Itself, on the other hand, (what he calls the second phase) is quite senseless and needless, «eine völlig sinn- und nutzlose, daher störende und nervirnde Fiction». Thus Kant somehow managed to give to humanity a divine gift and a senseless annoyance, in just the same work and in regard of just the same problem! In accusing Kant of a glaring contradiction Windelband does not seem to have kept quite clear of contradiction himself!

² The position of Dignāga in this respect resembles to a certain extent the views of some modern philosophers who come to espouse metaphysics and realism at the same time. Indeed it is the weight of the subject-object «Aporetic», of which the Aporetic of infinity is for him only a part, that induced Nicolaï Hartmann to supplement Kantianism by metaphysics. These two arguments (*grāhya-grāhaka-vandhurya* and *artha-ayoga*, cp TSP, p. 559. 5) are also the chief reasons of Dignāga for supplementing his realistic logic by a metaphysical idealism.

³ In his Refutation of Idealism, CPR, p. 778 ff., Kant establishes that our consciousness is a consciousness of things and thus proves the existence of external things in space outside myself, in other words, that there is no subject without an object. Exactly the same consideration is used by Hegel in order to prove the identity of subject and object, and the Indians fall in line in maintaining that the subject-object dichotomy (*grāhya-grāhaka-kalpanā*) is dialectical. «The cause of the representations, says Kant (ibid p. 780), which are ascribed by us, it may be wrongly, to external things, may lie within ourselves». This is also the Indian view. The Indian Idealists, we have seen, replace the realistic Force of Experience (*anubhava-bhāvanā*) by an internal Force of Productive Imagination (*vikalpa-bhāvanā*).

«How is it possible for the elements of existence to be external or internal, if the Self or the personality with regard to which they should be external or internal, does not exist at all?». The answer is that consciousness is metaphorically called a Self, because it yields some support to the (erroneous) idea of a Self. «Buddha himself uses such expressions... The organ of vision and the other sense faculties are the basic element for the corresponding sensations; consciousness, on the other hand, is the basic element for the (erroneous) perception of a Self. Therefore as a consequence of this close analogy with consciousness, the sense organs are brought under the head of internal elements».

This confusion between external and internal objects has misled the Vaibhāsikas to maintain that even in dreams what we see is a real external object. Dharmakīrti ridicules that opinion. «Out of mere obstinacy, says he to the Vaibhāsika, you have been misled to maintain such an absurdity, that evidently contradicts both scripture and logic. You must have known that never will I be induced to believe the reality of such beings which are only seen in dreams». «This would mean that when I see in a dream an elephant entering my room through a chink in a window, that the elephant has really entered the room, and when I in a dream see my own self quitting the room in which I sleep, it will mean that my person has been doubled, etc etc »

In any case the standpoint of the Hīnayāna is thoroughly realistic. The objective elements of a personal life are as real as the subjective ones.

Roughly speaking a real external world is assumed in Hīnayāna, denied in Mahāyāna and partly reassumed in the logical school.

As a matter of fact it is denied in all the schools of the Mahāyāna. But the school founded by Maitrēya-Asanga in opposition to the extreme relativism of the Mādhyamikas is distinguished by assuming a Pure Idea¹ (*citta-māhātmyam* = *ijñāpti-mātram*)² not differentiated into subject and object as a final Absolute, and reducing all other ideas to illusions (*parikalpita*). Such Idealism is exactly the reverse of Plato's variety of Idealism. The difference between both these Buddhist schools

¹ Trisūktī, kār. 25

² D. T. Suzuki, *Lankavatāra*, p. 241 ff sees a difference between these terms, but I do not discern any.

and cognition is indirect and causal.¹ But logically it is a relation of Identity.² "How is it", asks Dharmottara, "that the same cognition includes a part which is being determined and a part which is its determination?"³ "Is it not a contradiction to assume in the same unit a cause and its own effect?"⁴ And he answers this is possible — by Negation! Indeed a pure sensation produced by a patch of blue receives definiteness by a negation of the non-blue,⁵ i. e., the Understanding interprets an indefinite sensation as being a definite image of the blue by contrasting it with non-blue. The same thing differently regarded becomes as though it were different itself. The objectivity is founded on causality *plus* identity.⁶ Thus it is that direct and indubitable cognition is only pure sensation. It contains every-thing. It is the richest in contents and the poorest in thought. But thought makes it definite by negation. Negation is the essence of thought. Definiteness, understanding, conformity, "formity", negation, repudiation of the contrary, image, concept, dichotomy, are but different manners of developing the one fundamental act of pure sensation. The Thing as it is in itself is disclosed by representing it as it is in its non-self, "in the other".

This part of the Buddhist doctrine we also find in Europe, but not in Kant, we had it in Hegel.

§ 11. INDO-EUROPEAN SIMPOSIUM ON THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

a) First conversation Subject Monism

1-st *Tedāntin*. Real at the beginning was the Nought.⁷

2-nd *Tedāntin*. Real at the beginning was neither Existence nor the Nought.⁸

¹ *tad-utpatti*. Cp. NBT., p. 10. 7 — *prameya-kāryam hi pramāṇam*

² *ākṛīya = tādṛīpya = tādātmya*

³ NBT., p. 15. 22 — *vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpana-bhāvo'pi tatham dīśya jñānasya?*

⁴ Ibid. p. 15. 19 — *yena cāsmiṃ tastuṃ tirodhaḥ syāt*

⁵ Ibid. p. 10. 8

⁶ *tadutpatti-tatsārūpyābhyām viśayaṭā*

⁷ Chāndogya, III. 19. 1, cp. Deussen, *Allg. Gesch. d. Phil.* I, pp. 145, 190, 202, and his *Sechzig Upamshads*, p. 155

⁸ Rgv. 10, 129. 1.

internal causes for our sensations and images;¹ 2) The subject-to-object relation is incomprehensible. It is a very poor hypothesis to imagine that consciousness can travel towards an object external to it, seize its form and return with this spoil.² 3) The infinite divisibility of matter clearly shows that the atom is a mere idea³

The theory of a store of the germs of all ideas (*ālaya-vijñāna*) is intended as a substitute for the external world.⁴ The consistent run of the events of our life has its origin in this store of ideas which one by one emerge under the influence of a Biotic Force (*vāsanā*). Every idea is preceded by a «homogeneous and immediate»⁵ cause not in the external world, but in that store from which it emerges and to which it returns.

The change in the system of Elements becomes clear from the following table⁶—

6. Receptive faculties	6. Objective aspects of ideas	8. Kind ^s of ideas
1 vision	7 colour	13 visual
2 audition	8 sound	14 auditive
3 smell	9 odour	15 olfactory
4 taste	10 flavour	16 gustatory
5 touch	11. tactiles (Matter)	17. tactile
6 mind (<i>kṛtsā-manas</i>).	12 mental phenomena (<i>dharma</i>)	18. intelligible (non-sensuous) ideas
		19 subconscious store of ideas
		20 The Absolute Idea

The items 19 and 20 are added to the original table of the *Himayāna*

The ten Elements of Matter (N^os 1—5 and 7—11) are converted into corresponding ideas. The item N^o 6 becomes the empirical Ego⁷ (*kṛtsā-manas*), because its former meaning (*citta-mātram*) is now transferred to N^o 20. The moment preceding the appearance of every idea

¹ Cp TSP. p 558. 27 — *yathā bhavatām bāhyo'rtha itī tathā tata eva (samanantara-pratyayād eva) viyamah siddhaḥ*. *Vimśatikā*, kār. 1—9.

² Cp. TSP. p 559. 8 ff where the *grāhya-grāhaka-vidhuryam* is exposed the same is repeatedly mentioned by Vasubandhu, cp. S. Lévi's Index.

³ *Vimśatikā*, kār 11—14 This is the main argument of Dignāga in his *Alambana-parīkṣā*; often quoted, cp. S. Lévi. *Matériaux*, p. 52 note.

⁴ *Trimś.* k. 15 and passim, cp S. Lévi's Index.

⁵ TSP. p. 582. 19 *samanantara-pratyaye* = *ālayāḥhye*

⁶ Cp the table in my CC, p 97.

⁷ *Trimś.*, k. 6.

or illumined, in the immovable light of the other. Inside Matter itself, six receptive faculties and six respective kinds of objective Matter are evolved. There is thus a double externality, the one is of the Matter regarding the Spirit. The other is of one kind of matter regarding the other. There is no God!

Descartes. All right! There are only two substances, the one extended, the other conscious. But both are eternally changing. There is a God, which is the originator and the controller of their concerted motion!

The Buddhist (Hinayāna). There is neither a God, nor an Ego, nor any spiritual, nor materialistic enduring substance. There are only Elements (*dharma*s), instantaneously flashing and disappearing. And there is a law of Dependent Origination in accord with which the Elements combine in aggregates. Just as in the Sāṅkhya there are six receptive faculties and six corresponding objective domains. There is thus here also a double externality. The one is of all Elements regarding one another, the other is of the six objective domains regarding the six receptive faculties.

Sāṅkhya. These Elements are infra-atomic units (*gunas*), they are unconscious and eternally changing.

Heraclitus. These Elements are flashes appearing and disappearing, in accord with a Law of continual change.

Democritus. These Elements are Atoms (material).

Herbart. These Elements are Reals (immaterial).

Mach. These Elements are nothing but sensations. Both the Ego and Matter are pure mythology. When philosophy is no more interested in the reality of an Ego, nothing remains but the causal laws of Functional Interdependence of sensations, in order to explain the connection of the whole.

J. St Mill. The so-called Substance is nothing but a permanent possibility of sensations. "The notions of Matter and Mind, considered as substances, have been generated in us by the mere order of our sensations". Phenomena are held together not by a substance, but by an eternal law (of Dependent Origination).

Nāgārjuna. Dependent Origination is alone without beginning, without an end and without change. It is the Absolute. It is Nirvāṇa, the world *sub specie aeternitatis*.¹

¹ Cp my Nirvāṇa, pp 48

the history of European philosophy when metaphysics was superseded by the critical school and epistemology became the leading philosophic science. How the Buddhist logical school emerged out of the idealistic one has been indicated before.

The speculations of the Buddhists on the reality of the external world have conducted them into a dead-lock. The question has been found to be unimportant. The important thing is logic and it remains quite the same in both cases, whether we assume or whether we deny external reality. This curious result has been attained in the way of a compromise between the early extreme Pluralism and the later extreme Monism. The Monists developed into a school of Idealism. From the Mādhyamikas were born the Yogācāras. The Pluralists, Sarvāstivādins, developed into the critical school of Sautrāntikas. The latter were apparently the first to assume the reality of a Thing-in-Itself behind the outward phenomenon.

The logicians compromised and established the hybrid school of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāras.

§ 10. SOME EUROPEAN PARALLELS.

The future historian of comparative philosophy will not fail to note the great importance of the argument from infinite divisibility. In Indian as well as in European philosophy it appears as a most powerful weapon of Idealism. Together with the other antinomies it has influenced the balance of Kant's indecision, by making him more inclined towards Idealism in the second half of his Critique of Pure Reason. It is the principle argument of both Vasubandhu¹ and Dignāga² for establishing their special variety of Idealism. It plays a considerable part in the equipment of the Eleatics for establishing their Monism. The arguments of Zeno, approved by both Kant³ and Hegel,⁴ are mainly founded on the antinomy of divisibility. Nay it seems even to have allured Locke and Hume, to a plane dangerously inclining towards Idealism. Indeed Locke⁵ says: "The divisibility *ad infinitum* of any finite extension involves us in consequences... that carry greater difficulty and more apparent absurdity,

¹ Vimāśatikā, kār. II

² Ālambanap, kār. I

³ CPR, p. 409 (1 ed p. 502).

⁴ W. d. Logic, I 191.

⁵ Essay, II, XXIII, § 81.

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Buddhist. You needs must assume some sort of Biotic Force in order to explain the change. It will be either the Force of Experience,¹ or the Force of Productive Imagination,² or the Force of Illusion.³ If you assume the latter there will be no reality at all in the phantom of an external world. If you assume the first there will be a superfluous double reality. If you assume the second you will have a transcendental ideality along with phenomenal reality.⁴

The Realist. Your theory resembles "a purchase without paying!"⁵ Indeed the external world, although consisting of mere point-instants, receives coloured perceptibility through imagination, but it can offer nothing in exchange, since it consists of colourless points! If sensation and understanding are entirely heterogeneous, how can a pure sensation be comprehended under a pure concept of the understanding, "as no one is likely to say that causality, for instance, could be seen through the senses?"⁶

Kant. There must be some third thing homogeneous on the one side with the category and on the other with the object as it is given in concreto

Dharmakīrti. The intermediate thing is a kind of intelligible sensation. We assume that after the first moment of pure sensation there is a moment of intelligible sensation by the inner sense which is the thing intermediate between pure sensation and the abstract concept.⁷ There is moreover between them a Conformity or Coordination.⁸

The Realist. What is this Conformity or Coordination?

Vasubandhu. It is the fact owing to which cognition, although also caused by the senses, is said to cognize the object and not the senses.⁹ The object is the predominant among the causes of cognition.

Dharmakīrti. Coordination or Conformity is "similarity between things absolutely dissimilar."¹⁰ Indeed all things as unities are things

¹ *anubhava-vāsanā*

² *vikalpa-vāsanā* = *vikalpasya sāmānyam*.

³ *avidyā-vāsanā* = *māyā*

⁴ Cp the detailed controversy between the Sāntarīntika Realist and the Yogicāra (Idealist) Buddhists in the II vol., p. 360 ff.

⁵ *amūlyā-dāna-kṛaya*, cp *Tāp*, p. 269 9

⁶ CPR, p. 113; an almost verbatim coincidence with NBT., p. 69 11 = no

disparities *kārye kārṇe janya-janaka-bhāve nūna dṛṣṭe*

⁷ Cp the theory of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, vol II, Appendix III

⁸ NK, p. 265 18 — *tatsāritrya-tadutpattibhāṣā vyayateam*

⁹ Cp. vol II, p. 347.

¹⁰ *atyanta-vilaksanānām sālaksanyam*, cp. *Tāp*, p. 369

known that Kant's position is not always clear.¹ The usual charge against his Thing-in-Itself, *viz.*, that it can be neither a cause nor a reality, since Causality and Reality are constructions of the understanding, does not, in my opinion, carry much weight. Reality and Causality refer us to things having extension and duration, but not to a point-instant of ultimate reality.² A glance at Dharmakīrti's table of Categories will show at once where the Category of Causality lies.³ It belongs to the logic of relations, to the logic of consistency, to the logic of the major premise. The Thing-in-Itself belongs to the logic of reality, of the perceptual judgment, of the minor premise. It is the common subject of all the five Categories (Substance, Quality, Motion, Class-name and Proper name).⁴ The fault of Kant consists perhaps in not sufficiently having emphasized the difference⁵ between the logic of consistency and the logic of reality, the judgment with two concepts and the judgment with one concept. His category of causality is deduced from the hypothetical judgment. Just the same is done, we have seen, by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. But the Thing-in-Itself is not a relation, it is not deduced from the hypothetical judgment. It is the subject of every percep-

¹ Cp. Windelband, *Ueber die Phasen der Kantischen Lehre vom Dinge an sich* (Vierteljahrsschrift f. Philosophie, 1877, pp. 244 ff.)

² According to Aristotle the sensible particular *Hoc Aliquid* is declared to be the ultimate subject to which all Universals attach as determinants or accompaniments, and if this condition be wanting, the unattached Universal cannot rank among complete Entia (Grote, *Arist.*, App. 1). Although this *Hoc Aliquid* as *Essentia Prima* is entered by Aristotle in his system of Categories, but it is, properly speaking, a non-category, a non-predicate. It is always a subject, the pure subject, the pure thing, the common subject of all predications. The predicate is always a Universal. Reality, Causality, Thingness are predicates, just as *jar-ness*, but not the ultimate point of reality, not the ultimate cause that is lying at the bottom of all universals.

³ Op. above, p. 254

⁴ We can have the judgments «this is reality», «this is causality», «this is (or has) substantiality». The concepts of Reality, Causality and Substantiality will be predicates and therefore Categories, but the element «this» is not a predicate. It is the subject, the genuine subject of all predication. A subject means a non-Category, a subject that never will be a predicate. Even if we construct the concept of «Thisness» the difference between the individual «this» and the Universal «Thisness» will remain the same.

⁵ That this difference occasionally occurred to him is seen from his considerations in the Critical Decision (section VII of the Antinomy) where he distinguishes between the logic of the major premise, where the connection between two concepts is «in no way limited by time» (CPR, p. 407) and the logic of the minor premise where phenomena are referred to things by themselves.

d) Fourth Conversation. Subject—the Thing-in-Itself.

F. H. Jacobi (and others). Supposing the Things-in-Themselves really exist, they cannot affect our sensibility; since Causality, being a subjective Category, is possible only between phenomena,¹ not between things.

The Jaina. Yes indeed! A thing which is strictly in itself, which has absolutely nothing in common with all other things in the whole world, is a non-entity, a flower in the sky! If you wish to distinguish it from a non-entity you must admit "Thingness" as a real Category, just as Causality and Substantiality.²

Dharmottara. Thingness, Causality, Substantiality are of course general Categories of the Understanding. They are general and dialectical. But the single pure sensation is neither general, nor is it imagined, nor is it dialectical. There is a limit to generality, that out of which generality consists. Causality is not itself a sensible fact,³ it is an interpretation of it. But the Thing-in-Itself is a cause, a reality, an efficient point-instant, a dynamical reality, a unity, a thing as it is strictly in itself, not as it is in the "other", or in the "opposite". The terms ultimate, particular, ultimate cause, ultimate reality, the real thing, the real unit, the thing in itself, the thing having neither extension nor duration are synonyms. But it does not follow that Causality, Reality, Thingness, Unity, etc., are not general terms, different categories under which the same thing can be brought according to the point of view. There is no other genuine direct reality than the instantaneous Thing-in-Itself. Its cognition alone is pure Affirmation, it is not dialectical, not negative, it is direct and positive. Thus the fact that Causality and Reality are concepts and Categories for the Understanding, does not in the least interfere with the fact that the Thing-in-Itself is the reality cognized in pure sensation.

Hegel. Your Thing-in-Itself is a phantom!⁴ It is Void.⁵ It is an "absolute beyond" to all cognition.⁶ Cognition becomes then contra-

¹ F. H. Jacobi, Werke, II, p. 301 f.

² TS, kār 1713 — *tasmāt kha-puspa-tulyatvam acchatas tasya vastunah, vastu-tvam nāma sāmānyam estavyam, tat-samānatā*

³ na laścid janya-janaka-bhāvo nāma drśto'stī. NBT, p. 69 12

⁴ "Gespenst", op. W der Logik, II, p. 441

⁵ Ibid, p. 440, — "der formale Begriff ist ein Subjectives gegen jene leere Dingheit-an-sich"

⁶ Ibid — "ein absolutes Jenseits für das Erkennen"

cognition which connects these two non-realities can be real. However this is not stated by Kant. The word «idealism» evidently should imply that the idea includes subject, object and process of cognition, the Indian «three envelopes».

5) But we must «have something which corresponds to sensibility as a kind of receptivity».¹ It is the «transcendental object», that is, the thing by itself. «We may ascribe to that transcendental object the whole extent and connection of our possible perceptions and we may say that it is given by itself antecedently to all experience»... «but they are nothing to me and therefore no objects, unless they can be comprehended in the series of the empirical regresses».²

To these five points the answer of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti would probably have been the following one.

1) The external material object is an idea. Once say that it is infinitely divisible, once mean what you say, and you will see that it can be nothing but the mathematical object, i. e. an idea.

2) Why should one set of images be images and real and the other set also images, but non-real? Images are images. In the waking state they are connected with reality directly, in dreams and other morbid conditions³ they are connected with reality indirectly.

3—4) This reality is the point-instant of pure sensation⁴. By the Understanding it is enclosed in a «threefold envelope» (*tri-ṣaṭī*) of a cognizer, cognized and cognition. These three items do not represent opposed forms of reality, but only contrasting attitudes towards one and the same reality.⁵

¹ Ibid

² Ibid

³ Kant says (GPR., p. 781), «in dreams as well as in madness a representation may well be the mere effect of the faculty of imagination», but it can be such an effect only through the reproduction of former external perceptions, cp. Dharmakīrti's view above, p. 522.

⁴ Without this pure sensation which imparts indirect reality to all conventional existence (*samvṛti*) the realist would be right who ironically remarks «your supreme logic says that all things without exception (*bhūtiṅy-eva*) do not exist», cp. TSP, p. 560 21.

⁵ Such is Dignāga's solution of the problem of «a sound starting point of all philosophy». It is a mere «something». It may be contrasted with Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* which implies a real subject and a real object. Hans Driesch's formula «I consciously have something» (i. e., I have it without seizing it), which moreover implies the reality of an «order», corresponds to the view of the Sarvāstivādins. It really means «I have consciously everything».

neous. We call it «unutterable». But again it is not unutterable absolutely. We call it «the thing», the «in-itself», the cause, the point-instant, efficiency, pure object, pure existence, reality, ultimate reality, pure affirmation, etc. etc. Understanding, on the other hand, means indirect cognition, judgment, inference, imagination, analysis, generality, vagueness, negativity, dialectic. Productive Imagination can imagine only the general and dialectical. But the senses cognize the real and the real is the particular.

Dharmottara. The relation of the object to the subject of cognition in logic is not Identity. The object is not included in the subject. It is wrong to reduce all relations to «otherness» and then to declare that the opposites are identical. The relation of cognition to its object is causal.¹ Object and cognition are two facts causally interrelated.

e) Fifth Conversation Subject—Dialectic.

Hegel. The relation between subject and object, between internal and external, seems at first to be causal, as between two realities.² But regarding them as an organic whole, there is no causal relation inside them at all.³ There is nothing in the effect which did not pre-exist in the cause⁴ and there is nothing real in the cause except its change into the effect.⁵ But notwithstanding their identity cause and effect are contradictory. A change or a movement is possible only inasmuch as the thing includes a contradiction in itself.⁶ Motion is the reality of contradiction.⁷

Kamalaśīla. We must distinguish between Causality and Contradiction. Causality is real, Contradiction is logical. Simple humanity, whose faculty of vision is obscured by the gloom of ignorance, indeed identifies causality with contradiction.⁸

¹ NBT. p. 40 5-7 — «*pramāṇa-sattayā prameya-sattā siddhynti . prameya-kāryam hi pramāṇam*», *trsl*, p. 108

² *Phenomenology*, p. 238 (on Causality between Mind and Body)

³ *Ibid*, p. 291. — «*indem das Fürsichsein als organische Lebendigkeit in sich auf gleiche Weise fällt, fällt in der That der Kausalzusammenhang zwischen ihm hinweg*»

⁴ *Encycl. of philos. Sciences*, p. 151 — «*Es ist kein Inhalt in der Wirkung . der nicht in der Ursache ist; — jene Identität ist der absolute Inhalt selbst*»

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 153, — «*dieser ganze Wechsel ist das eigene Setzen der Ursache, und nur dies ihr Setzen ist ihr Sein*»

⁶ *W d. Logik*, II. 58 — «*nur insofern etwas den Widerspruch in sich hat bewegt es sich*»

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 59 — «*die Bewegung ist der dauernde Widerspruch selbst*»

⁸ *Cp. above*, p. 408 and 427

Such is also the opinion of Sigwart.¹ According to him directly "given" is only the presence of a presentation.² According to the Indians it is only pure sensation. Its connection with an external object is a second step. The subjective Idealist maintains the necessity of this step, but for him it means only that every perception must be referred to some object imagined as existing beyond us. Through this act of imagination we only arrive into "a second plane"³ of imagination, but not into an independent external world.⁴

The necessity of objectivization is indeed psychological,⁵ but there is no logical necessity to assume a real objective world behind the world of images. There will be no contradiction, says Dignāga.⁶

The fluctuation of Kant appears from the Indian point of view as a fluctuation between two theories which are both possible. Kant was lead by his speculation into two different worlds, but it did not occur to him that both were logically possible. This double possibility is disclosed by Sigwart.

There is, as Sigwart rightly remarks,⁷ only a psychological necessity of inferring from the direct evidence of a sensation a cause for it in the external thing. There is no logical necessity. Psychologically sensation is one moment, the thing which has produced the stimulus is the foregoing moment. The next following moment, after the sensation by the outer sense, is a moment of attention or sensation by the inner sense,⁸ it is a kind of intelligible sensation. And finally comes the moment of the intelligible image.⁹ The relation between object

¹ Op cit, I, 408

² Vorstellung.

³ Ibid., "ein zweites Stadium des Vorstellens".

⁴ Ibid., "die Wirklichkeit welche wir behaupten ist nur eine Wirklichkeit von Erscheinungen, nicht von Dingen, welche von uns unabhängig wären".

⁵ Ibid, I. 409 Op. the interesting views of Dharmottara on the different kinds of connection, exemplified on the connection of words with their cause, in NBT, p. 60. The connection between a word and the intention (*abhiprāya*) with which it is pronounced is causal and real, or psychological (*vāstava*). The connection between a word and the external object which it expresses is causal and constructed, i.e. logical (*kālpita*). The connection between a word and the conception (*prajñā*) which it expresses is logical (*kālpita*) and one of identity (*svabhāva-hetutvam*).

⁶ Ālambanap., kār. 8, (transl. p. 45).

⁷ Logik, I. 409 — "der psychologischen Notigung eine solche (außere Welt) anzunehmen, keine logische Notwendigkeit entspricht".

⁸ *mano-vijñāna* = *mānasa-pratyakṣa*.

⁹ Op. vol. II, App. III, pp. 309 ff.

is expressed in the major premise. Their connection with sensible reality is expressed in the minor premise. In this part the doctrine is again nothing but the development of the fundamental idea that there are only two sources of knowledge. The doctrine of the dialectical character of the understanding is a further feature of the same fundamental idea, because there are only two sources, the non-dialectical and the dialectical, which are the same as the senses and the understanding.

The external world, the world of the Particulars, and the internal world, the world of the Universals, are again nothing but the two domains of the senses and of the understanding. The Particular is the Thing as it is in «itself», the Universal is the Thing as it is in «the other».

And at last, ascending to the ultimate plane of every philosophy, we discover that the difference between Sensibility and Understanding is again dialectical. They are essentially the negation of each the other, they mutually sublate one another and become merged in a Final Monism.

Thus it is that one and the same Understanding must be characterized as a special faculty which manifests itself in 1) the Judgment, 2) the Sufficient Reason, 3) the double principle of Inference, Identity, and Causality, 4) the construction of the internal world of the Universals and 5) the dichotomy and mutual Negation contained in all concepts. In all these five functions the Understanding is always the same. It is the contradictorily opposed part to pure sensation. Dignāga was right in putting at the head of his great work the aphorism: «There are only two sources of knowledge, the direct and the indirect».

Dignāga's system is indeed monolithic!

3-rd Vedāntin. Real at the beginning was only Existence, the One-without-a-Second.¹ It was Brahman

4-th Vedāntin. The Brahman is identical with our own Self. The «This» art «Thou!»²

Parmenides. There is no Nought³ The Universe is the One. It is immovable

Demokritus. Immovable is the Nought. It is Empty Space. It is filled by moving atoms.⁴

The Buddhist There is an Empty Space It contains an infinity of perishable Elements There is a Nought (Nirvāṇa), when all the perishable Elements have perished

Nāgārjuna. All perishable objects are relative and void. Their Nought, or the Great Void,⁵ is the only reality. It is the Buddha (in his Cosmical Body).

Spinoza. There is only One Substance! It is God (in his Cosmical Body).

Dignāga The Culmination of Wisdom is Monism⁶. This Unity is the Buddha (in his Spiritual Body)

Dharmakīrti The essence of Consciousness is undivided!⁷ Subject and object is an illusive division. Their unity is Buddha's Omniscience, his Spiritual Body!

Yogācāra Buddhist With the only exception of Buddha's knowledge which is free from the division in subject and object, all other knowledge is illusive, since it is constructed as subject and object⁸

b) Second conversation. Subject Dualism and Pluralism.

Sāṅkhya There is not one eternal principle, but there are two Spirit and Matter. Both are eternal, but the first is eternal stability, the other is eternal change. There is no interaction at all possible between them However the change of the one is somehow reflected,

¹ Chāndogya, VI 2, 1—2

² tat tvam asi

³ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι

⁴ μὴ μᾶλλον το δὲν ἢ τὸ μὴδὲν. Cp H Cohen, Logik d r. Erk, p. 70, μὴ ὅν apparently = tadanya + tadaviruddha = paryadāsa = parihāra, ὅν ὅν = abhāva.

⁵ mahā-sūnyatā = sarva-dharmānām paraśpara-apekṣatā.

⁶ prajñā-pāramitā jñānam adāyam, sa Tathāgataḥ (cp my Introd. to the ed. of Abhisamayālamkāra)

⁷ avibhāgo hi buddhyātmā, an often quoted verse of Dharmakīrti, cp. SDS, p. 32

⁸ sarvaṃ ālambane dhṛāntam mulikā Tathāgata-jñānam, in Yogācāra-matena, cp NBThpp, p 19

- Nāgārjuna, 14, 22, 28, 29, 186, 141, 588.
 Nyāya, 24, 418, passim.
 Nyāya-kandali, 84, 86, 213, 254, -260, passim.
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 Nyāya-praveśa, 33, 54.
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 Nyāya-bindu-tikā (N. b. t. or NBT), passim.
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 Nyāya-vādin (Buddhist), 14.
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 Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tikā (NVTT or Tātp.), passim.
 Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tikā-pariśuddhi, passim.
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 Vedānta-paribhāṣā, 183.
 Vaidalya-sūtra, 28.

c) Third Conversation. Subject—the Logic of naïve Realism and critical Logic

Dignāga. However the Universe *sub specie aeternitatis* can be cognized only by mystic intuition¹ It cannot be established by logic!

Candrakīrti. It can be established by the condemnation of logic!² Since all logical concepts are relative and unreal, there must be another, non-relative, absolute reality, which is the Great Void. It is the Cosmical Body of the Buddha.

Dignāga. In logic «we are only giving a scientific description of what happens in common life in regard to the sources of our knowledge and their respective objects.³ We do not consider their transcendental reality!» In logic we can admit the reality of the external world.

Candrakīrti. What is the use of that logic,⁴ if it does not lead to the cognition of the Absolute?

Dignāga. The Realists are bunglers in logic. They have given wrong definitions. We only correct them!⁵

The Realist. The external world is cognized by us in its genuine reality. Just as the objects situated in the vicinity of a lamp are illuminated by it, just so are the objects of the external world illuminated by the pure light of consciousness. There are no images and no Introspection. Self-consciousness is inferential.⁶

The Yogācāra Buddhist. There are images and there is Introspection. «If we were not conscious of perceiving the patch of blue colour, never would we perceive it. The world would remain blind, it would perceive nothing». There are therefore no external objects at all. Why should we make the objective side of knowledge double?

Realist. But the running change⁷ of our perceptions can be produced only by the Force of Experience. They change in accord with the change in the external world!⁸

¹ *yogi-pratyanakṣa*, cp. *ibid.*, p. 16 ff

² *Ibid.*, p. 135 ff

³ *Ibid.*, p. 140 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Cp. vol. II, pp. 352 ff

⁷ *śāntidevīkāra*

⁸ Cp. vol. II, p. 369 and NK., p. 259 11

- Jacobi, F. H 342
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in themselves, absolutely dissimilar from other things. But in the measure in which we overlook their absolute dissimilarity (their "in themselves"), they become similar. They become similar through a common negation. That is why all images are Universals and all Universals are mutual negations. Negativity is the essence of our Understanding. The senses alone are affirmation.¹

Hegel. According to my Dialectical Method Negativity is equally the essence of the objective world, which is identical with the subjective one.

Dharmakīrti. We must have an Affirmation contrasting with the Negativity of concepts

Herbart. Pure sensation alone is Affirmation, it is absolute position!

Dignāga. Our logic aims at being equally acceptable to those who deny the existence of the external world and to those who maintain it. No one can deny that there are two kinds of cognized essences—the Particular and the Universal. The particular seemingly always resides in the external world, the universal is always in our head.

Berkley. There are no real universal or abstract ideas.

Dignāga. There are no particular ideas at all, an idea is always abstract and general. A particular image is a *contradictio in adjecto*. Particulars exist only in the external world. In our Mind apart from pure sensation, we have only universals.

Berkley. However to exist means to be perceived, *esse est percipi*. The external world does not exist beside what is perceived.

Dignāga. To exist means to be efficient.

Kant. It is "scandalous" that modern philosophy has not yet succeeded to prove beyond doubt the reality of the external world! If there were no things in themselves the phenomena as they appear to us would become such things. The things are "given" to our senses, they are "cognized", i. e., constructed, by the Understanding in accord with its categories.

Sāntaraksita. Yes! Pure sensation is of course non-constructive, but it is a point-instant (*Kṣaṇpunct*) which stimulates the understanding to produce its own (general) image of the thing.

Dharmottara. Is it not a great miracle! The senses represent the Thing brightly, vividly, but they understand nothing definite. The intellect understands definitely, but without vividness, vaguely, dimly, generally, it can construct only a Universal. However the miracle is easily explained. The Understanding is Imagination!

¹ *pratyaśam* = *vidā-svarūpam*

INDEX OF MAIN LOGICAL TOPICS

Analytical Judgment (*svabhāvānumāna*), a judgment of concomitance establishing the connection of two concepts through Identity (not of the concepts themselves, which are different, but of their objective reference which is one and the same), 250, 424, the predicate is included in the subject, not as actually thought (psychologically), but as logically implied 272 n 2; all mathematical judgments are analytical in this sense. 262 n, 278, Cp Identity (the law of), Relations, Categories.

Avitapañcaka, the five negative syllogisms of the Sāṅkhyas, 293—4, Appendix.

Categories (1), five ultimate predicables (*pañcaridha-kalpāṇā*), originating in the name-giving, or perceptual judgment, 216 ff.

Categories (2), three ultimate relations (*arṇābhāṇā*), originating in the judgment of concomitance, 246 cp. Relations.

Causation (1), ultimate (*prafitya-samutpāda*) is Functional Dependence of every point-instant on its preceding points, 119, this theory the «most precious among the jewels» of Buddhist philosophy, *ibid*; C is efficiency (*artha-lāgya-lārtia*), 124, efficiency is synonymous with existence (*sat*), *ibid*; to exist means to be a cause, *ibid*; real or ultimate existence (*paramārtha-sat*) is the moment of efficiency (*lāgana*), it is the Thing-in-Itself (*svakāśana*), 70, 124 183; it is that element in the phenomenon which corresponds to pure sensation (*pratiśpalā-pratyakṣā*), q. c., plurality of C, 127; infinity of C, 129; the four different meanings of Dependent Origination (*prafitya-samutpāda*) 184, parallels.

Causation (2), metaphorical, is dependence of a phenomenon upon the necessarily preceding ones (*lālpāṇika-lāgya-lāraṇa-bhāṇā*), is a category of Relation, 309 ff.

Conformity (*sārupya*), the relation 1) between a sensation (*nirvāṇa-palā*) and a conception (*saṅkalpaka*), or 2) between a point-instant of external reality (*lāgana* = *śākalāgana*) and a constructed mental image (*jñāna* = *ālāra* = *prati-bhāsa* = *ābhāsa* = *kalpanā* = *vikalpa* = *ādhyatmasāya* = *niścaya*) or 3) between the thing as it is in itself (*svakāśana*) and the phenomenon, or the thing as it is «in the other» (*sāmānya-lāgana* = *ānya-ryāriti* = *apoha*), 218, 511 it is «a similarity of things absolutely dissimilar» (*atyanta-vaiśaṇṇya-sāmlāsanaya*), 218, this similarity produced by a neglect of dissimilarity (*bheda-agraha*) or by a common negation (*apoha*) 511: this relation of reality to image is double, it is Causation and Identity at the same time (*śatdūtprati-tat-sārupya-bhāṇā*), it is causation psychologically, for the Realist, it is identity logically, for the Idealist since sensation and conception refer us to one and the same thing, the «conformity» at the moment is the «formity» of the moment (*sārupya* = *tādātmya* = *tādātmya*), 517. Cp vol II, 343—400.

dictory, it becomes a cognition of a reality which is never cognized.¹

Demokritus. The Thing-in-Itself far from being a phantom is nothing but the material Atom, underlying the whole of phenomenal reality

Ephorus. The Thing-in-Itself (*αρχή*) is the material Atom together with the Vacuum and Motion.

Lucretius. We must admit a *principium* or *semen*, it is the material solid Atom.

Hegel. Thus *principium* is neither the Atom, nor an "absolute beyond", but it is included in the idea of cognition. It is true that the very idea of cognition requires the object as existing by itself, but since the concept of cognition cannot be realized without its object, therefore the object is not beyond cognition "Inasmuch as cognition becomes sure of itself, it is also sure of the insignificance of its opposition to the object."² Thus it is that, the Thing-in-Itself as something beyond cognition, and opposed to it, disappears and the subject and object of cognition coalesce, according to the general rule that everything definite is not a thing "in itself", but a thing "in its other" or "in its opposite!"

Dharmottara. It is true that the thing becomes definite only when it is a thing related to, or included in, the other. But when it becomes definite it *pari passu* becomes general and vague. Vivid and bright is only the concrete particular, the Thing as it is in itself.

Dharmakīrti. First of all it is not true that the Thing-in-Itself means cognition of something that never is cognized. And then it is also wrong that the relation of the object to its cognition is one of inclusion or identity. Indeed, if the Thing-in-Itself would mean something absolutely uncognizable, we never would have had any inkling of its existence. It is not cognized by our Understanding, it is not "understood", but it is cognized by the senses in a pure sensation. It is cognized brightly, vividly, immediately, directly. Its cognition is instant-

¹ Ibid. — «sein Erkennen dessen was ist, welches zugleich das Ding-an-sich nicht erkennt»

² We take Demokritus as the pioneer of Materialism and the mechanical explanation of the universe. The opinion of W. Kinkel (*History*, v. I, p. 215) who converts him into a "consequent rationalistic Idealist", is very strange.

³ Ibid., — «das Object ist daher zwar von der Idee des Erkennens als an sich seiend vorausgesetzt, aber wesentlich in dem Verhältniss, dass sie ihrer selbst und der Nichtigkeit dieses Gegensatzes gewiss, zu Realisierung ihres Begriffes in ihm komme»

[illegible]

But philosophers must know the difference between contradiction and simple otherness, between otherness and necessary interdependence, between Causation and Coinherence, or Identity. They must know the theory of Relations of our Master Dharmakīrti.

E. v. Hartmann (to Hegel). Your Dialectical Method is simple madness!¹

Dharmakīrti (to Hegel). Your Dialectical Method is quite all right; but merely in the domain of the Understanding, i. e. of constructed concepts! Concepts are interrelated dialectically. Reality is interrelated by the causal laws of Dependent Origination. There is moreover an Ultimate Reality where subject and object coalesce. There is thus an imagined reality (*parikalpita*), an interdependent reality (*paratantra*) and an ultimate one (*pariṃspanna*).

CONCLUSION

In the course of our analysis we have quoted parallelisms and similarities, partial and complete, from a variety of systems and many thinkers of different times. But it would not be right to conclude that the Indian system is a patchwork of detached pieces which can be now and then found singly, to remember some very well known ideas. The contrary is perhaps the truth.

There is perhaps no other system whose parts so perfectly fit into one compact general scheme, reducible to one single and very simple idea. This idea is that our knowledge has two heterogeneous sources, Sensibility and Understanding. Sensibility is a direct reflex of reality. The Understanding creates concepts which are but indirect reflexes of reality. Pure sensibility is only the very first moment of a fresh sensation, the moment x . In the measure in which this freshness fades away, the intellect begins to «understand». Understanding is judgment. Judgment is $x = A$ where x is sensibility and, A is understanding. Inference, or syllogism, is an extended judgment, $x = A \rightarrow A^1$. The x is now the subject of the minor premise. It continues to represent sensibility. The $A \rightarrow A^1$ connection is the connection of the Reason with the Consequence. This reason is the Sufficient Reason or the Threefold Reason. It is divided in only two varieties, the reason of Identity and the reason of Causation. It establishes the consistency of the concepts created by the understanding and

¹ «Eine krankhafte Geistesverirrung», cp *E. v. Hartmann. Ueber die dialectische Methode*, p. 124.

necessary reason (leaving alone Negation q. c.) is differentiated either as Identity (identical reference) or Causation (non-identical, but interdependent reference), there is no third possibility, 248, 309; the corresponding judgments (inferential) are either Analytical or Synthetical, 250

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APPENDIX

Professor Ui in a recent publication of the Tendai University, on the evidence of Chinese sources,¹ proves that the three-aspected logical reason has been introduced by the Sāṅkhyas and Nayasānmas² (=Pāśupatas?) before Vasubandhu. What is really due to the Sāṅkhyas, as has been stated above,³ is the special proving force supposed to belong to the *modus tollens* of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism, the canon of the five *avāta-hetus*. It is true that in this syllogism the minor premise is nothing, but the first aspect of the reason and the major premise corresponds to the third aspect which is a contraposition of the second one. Virtually the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism presupposes the existence of the three aspects. What makes the originality of Dignāga's position is the equipollency of the second and the third aspects. On this ground Dignāga dissented with the Sāṅkhyas who thought that the *modus tollens* (*avāta-hetu*) is an independent way of proof, cp N. mukha, transl p. 21. What enormous importance this change means is seen from Dignāga's dialectic⁴. The introduction of the Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism, position and contraposition, and the three-aspects of the reason, may be due to the Sāṅkhyas. But the epistemological importance of the whole theory, its position in Dignāga's logic is nevertheless established by no one else as by Dignāga himself as the Naiyāyikas always maintained and as, I hope, the readers of this my book will not fail to perceive.

¹ *Madhyāntānusāra-śāstra*, unknown in Tibet and said to be composed by Bodhisattvas Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga (?), translated by Gautama Prajñāraci of the Eastern Wei dynasty in AD 545 (B. Nanjo, № 1246). It mentions the three aspects in an inverted order — the first, the third and the second — a consequence perhaps of the importance attached to the *avāta-hetu*.

² Cp. Tucci, *Pre-Dignāga Texts*, p. XXIX n.

³ Cp. above, p. 298—4.

⁴ It stands nearer to the syllogism as cultivated by the Stoics, than to the Aristotelian one, but the Stoics have not drawn from it the same consequences as Dignāga.

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sūpi na anyena aparātmitakam*), 181; ultimate reality (in the logical plain) 188; it is transcendental, *ibid.*; the absolute particular, *ibid.*; irrepresentable in an image and unutterable, 185; an efficient point instant 189; its relation to the monad and the atom, 190; it is dynamical, 188; produces a vivid image, 186; it corresponds in logic to pure affirmation (*buddhi-svarūpa*), 192; its relation to Aristotle's First Substance, the *Hoc Aliquid*, 198;—to Herbart's «absolute position», 202;—to Kant's Thing-in-Itself, 200; coincidence with Kant's definition «that which in phenomena corresponds to (pure) sensation constitutes the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (Reality, *Sachheit*)», 201.

Time, as duration (*sthūla-kāla*, *sthira-kāla*) a construction of productive imagination, real only as a point-instant, (*lāṣa* = *sva-lakṣaṇa*), 84.

Understanding (*kalpanā*, *vikalpa*, *buddhi*, *mācāya*), that source of knowledge which is not sensation, 147; indirect cognition, thought-construction, productive imagination, judgment, inference, synthesis (whether the synthesis of the manifold in one concept or the synthesis of two concepts in a judgment of coincidence), a comprehensive name for the three laws of thought, i. e. Contradiction, Identity and Causal Deduction; the dialectical source of knowledge, cognition of the object not as it is in itself, but as it is «in the other», 548, *passim*.

Universals (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), according to the Realists, possess unity, eternity and inherence in every particular of the class (*ekatva-nityatva-clāṣa-mavetātva*), according to Dignāga they are mere concepts (*vikalpa*); mere names (*samjñā-mātra*) and mere negations (*apoha*), names are always negative, 450; they are «similarities between things absolutely dissimilar», v. II, p. 416; real things are particulars, there is in them not the slightest bit of a common or general stuff, 445; the reality of a common stuff is replaced by similarity of action, 446; an efficient point-instant of external reality calls forth an image which is vivid and particular in the first moment and becomes vague and general in the measure in which its vividness fades away, 186, 457; thus interpreted as concepts and negations it is explicable that universals possess logical unity, logical stability (eternity) and logical inherence in the particular, 475—6; the particular is the thing «in itself», the universal is (just as with Hegel) the thing «in the other», 484.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

Lane	Read
12	is in India, just as it is in Europe, a natural corollary from the theory of syllogism.
18	The Buddhism of this period, i. e. after Aśoka, was divided in 18 schools
38	<i>śāstara</i> —
34	On the prehistory of the Nyāya system cp. now also Tucci, <i>Pre-Dignāga Texts</i> , Introd., p. XXVII
35	The <i>Vigraha-vyāvartani</i> is now available in a sanscrit translation by Tucci in his <i>Pre-Dignāga Texts</i>
40	On the six genuine works of Nāgārjuna cp. now, besides my <i>Nirvāṇa</i> , p. 66, also E. Obermiller, <i>Boston transl.</i> , p. 51, and by the same <i>The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā</i> (Reprint from <i>Acta Orient.</i> , vol. X, p. 51). The <i>Vaidalya-prākāśa</i> is evidently spurious
38	(add) <i>Hetumukha</i> (TSP., p. 339. 15)
35	<i>Boston, History</i> , p. 44, 45
23	My friend S. Oldenburg calls my attention to the fact that the correction in sir A. Stein's translation of the <i>Rajataranginī</i> has already been proposed by the late Professor Hultzsch in the <i>ZDMG</i> , vol. 69, p. 279 (1915)
38	<i>Mādhyamika-Saṃvārtikā</i> .
36	<i>Hu-shih</i>
2	VI-th century
38	IRAS
23	K'wei
32	<i>nirvikalpa-pratibhāsa</i> .
30	<i>mūṇa-sum</i> , <i>hog-pa</i> and
24	transcendent
38	deny the visibility of <i>samavāya</i>
22	corollary from
14	of the causes
39	Tātp., p. 39
30	<i>Sāṅkhyas</i>
13	has been led
38	<i>śaṅka-pādena</i>
9	totally, on all sides
27	phantom.
37	cp. above, p. 161
37	<i>āśrīta</i> —

subject matter of this treatise — is the cause¹ of all successful human action, the importance (of a theory of cognition is alone) stated (directly) (2 3) But by making such a statement the subject-matter (of the work), its aim and its fitness² (for that aim) are (indirectly) indicated. Indeed when it is being stated that right knowledge, the source of all (successful) human action,³ will be analysed in the present work, it is also implied that right knowledge is the subject-matter of this literary composition, its aim is an analysis of (the phenomenon) of knowledge, and the work itself represents the means through which the analysis (is achieved). (2 5) Directly stated is thus only (one) point, the importance of the subject matter, (the other points), its fitness etc., are then implicitly understood⁴ The (prefatory) sentence alone is not adequate to give a direct statement of the subject matter, the purpose and the connection between them (separately) By naming directly only one point, it indirectly alludes to all three. (2 7). The word «thus» (knowledge) points here to the subject matter. The words «will be investigated» — to the purpose The purpose here meant (is double). For the author it is the task of composing the work, whilst for the student it is the task of studying it. (2 9) Indeed, all reasonable men set themselves to work when they have some useful aim in view To the questions⁵ as to why has the Master written this treatise and why should it be studied by the pupils, it is answered that its purpose is an analysis (of knowledge). It is written by the author in order that he may himself become the teacher for those

cognition, and then the three usual preliminaries as implicitly contained in it He thinks that a distinction between *pralānasya śāṭra-prayojanam* and *abhidheya-prayojanam* is useless, since *śāṭra* is first of all *śabda* which is not investigated

¹ *uktā* must be inserted before *prayojana*, p. 2. 2, cp *Tib rgyu-ñid-ñi* *bstan-pas*.

² *sambandha*

³ *purusa-artha-upayogi = purusa-artha-niddhi-hetu*

⁴ *Iat*, p. 2 5 «Therefore by the force of direct statement (*abhidhāna*) of the importance (*prayojana*) of the part (which is) the subject, connection etc. are expressed». Dh thus insists that the first sūtra, as a whole (*samudhāyārtha*), refers directly to *abhidheya-prayojana*, i e to the importance of a theory of cognition, the three usual preliminaries are then to be understood implicitly Vinītadēva thinks that *abhidheya* and *prayojana* are expressed directly (read *ñāṇ-ñi* instead of *ñāṇ-ñi*, p. 32 2 of M. de la Vallée-Poussin's edition in B I.) and *sambandha* indirectly The importance of a theory of cognition is then conceived by him as a *prayojanasya apt prayojanam* (p. 38 6)

⁵ *its samānye*

BIBLIOTHECA BUDDHICA . XXVI

BUDDHIST LOGIC

BY

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IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II

CONTAINING A TRANSLATION OF THE SHORT TREATISE OF LOGIC
BY DHARMAKĪRTI, AND OF ITS COMMENTARY BY DHARMOTTARA,
WITH NOTES APPENDICES AND INDICES

ЛЕНИНГРАД — 1930 — Leningrad
ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО АКАДЕМИИ НАУК СССР

tion about the ritual to be followed at the (re-)marriage ceremony of one's own mother¹; or that the aim could possibly be attained in an easier way than through this book; or again that it was altogether useless. If any such presentiment of uselessness arises, reasonable men will not apply themselves to the study of the book. By stating the subject matter etc. some useful purpose is (always) suggested, and this checks the suspicion of uselessness. Reasonable men are thus incited to take action. Thus it is clear that the connection (between the subject matter and the purpose) is stated in order that the book may be credited with efficiency, since such consideration incites human activity.

§ 2 RIGHT KNOWLEDGE DEFINED

(3.5). Right knowledge is knowledge not contradicted (by experience)² In common life we likewise say that (a man) has spoken truth when he makes us reach the object he has first pointed out. Similarly (we can also say) that knowledge is right when it makes us reach an object it did point to. But by «making us reach an object» nothing else is meant than the fact of turning (our attention) straight to the object. Indeed knowledge does not create an object and does not offer it to us, but in turning (our attention) straight to the object it (*eo ipso*) makes us reach it. Again «to turn a man straight to the object» is nothing else than to point it out as an aim of a (possible) purposive action. Indeed, (one should not imagine) that knowledge has the power forcibly to incite a man (against his will).³

¹ This is an indication that Buddhists had in India the same aversion to the remarriage of widows as the brahminical Hindus.

² This is the Buddhist definition of empirical knowledge (*samyag-jñāna* = *pramāṇa*). It is opposed to the definitions of the Mīmāṃsākas (*artha-atibodha*), of the Cārvākas (*artha-darśana*), the Naiyāyikas (*pramā-lāna*), Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras held that this knowledge is a transcendental illusion (*ālambane bhṛāntam*). With this reservation the first accepted the realistic Logic of the Naiyāyika, the second adhered to the reform of Dignāga, cp. my *Kiryāna*, p. 156 n. For Vinitadeva, p. 84 l. 40 l. 13, and Kamalaśīla, *Tattvasaṃgraha*, p. 392 l. 6, the definition refers to the field of experience only (*prāpaka-vṛttaye*) and thus agrees both with the Yogācāra and Sautrāntika views (*ubhaya-naya-samāśrayena*). But the Tipp., p. 18—19, thinks that the Yogācāra idealism is here forsaken and the Sautrāntika realism adhered to. As to Jinendra buddhi's view cp. Appendix.

³ This *jñānam* is a *jñāpaka-hetu*, not a *lāpaka-hetu*. These remarks are probably directed against Vinitadeva who explains *puruṣārtha* = *prayajana*, *siddhi* = *sādhaka* (*grub-par-byed-pa*) and *pūrvaka* as *hetu*. He thus converts *jñāna* into a *lāpaka-hetu*. Kamalaśīla, just as Dh., defines *arisaṃvāditva* as

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sive action. Thus it is that sense-perception points out a definite¹ object, (i.e., an object localized in time and space) which appears before us directly,² and inference likewise points out a definite object by way of the mark it is connected with. These two (methods of cognizing) point out definite objects, therefore they are right knowledge. (3.17). What differs from them is not (right) knowledge. Knowledge is right when it makes us reach the object, and it makes us reach it when it has pointed to an attainable object.³ But an object pointed out in some different way, not according to the above mentioned two (methods of right knowledge), is either absolutely unreal as, e.g., water seen as a vision in a desert—it does not exist, it cannot be reached—or it is uncertain as to whether it exists or not as, e.g., every problematic object. Since there is no such object in the world, which at the same time would be existent and non-existent, therefore such (a problematic object) can never be attained (3.21). And all imagination⁴ which is not produced by the (real) mark of the

¹ *niyata* is here contrasted with *samsāya* and *viparyaya*, it is the same as *nīṣenta*. Cp *niyata-pratibhāsa* on p. 8, 10, and *niyata-ālāra* on p. 70, 11, where the meaning of *niyata* varies.

² *pratibhāsa* = *nirbhāsa* = *ābhāsa* = *pratibimbana*, cp Tipp, p. 12, 13.

³ Lit, p. 3, 17. «There is no other *vyñāna*. What points to an object, which it is possible to attain, fetches, and by fetching it is right knowledge.» We would have a better meaning if this first sentence were united with the following two: «No other sensation (*vyñāna*) indicating (*ādarśayat* = *upadarśayat*) an object capable of being reached is such as «makes reach» (*prāpaka*) and through making us reach (the object) is right knowledge.» But the Tibetan translation does not support this interpretation. *Vyñāna* in logic loses its meaning of an indefinite pure sensation (= *nirvikalpa-lā-ñāna*) which it had in Abhidharma where it was contrasted with *samyñā* as a definite idea. With the Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas it is often contrasted with *ñāna* which has then the sense of transcendental knowledge (= Tib *ye-śes*). Here it has the general sense of knowledge, idea, or representation, just as in the term *vyñāna-lāḍin*, *ñāna* and *vyñāna* are here used indiscriminately, as the next following *ñānena* proves, *anyay* *ñānam* is then = *mithyā* *ñānam* as p. 3, 28, cp my Nirvāṇa, Index. However there are some contexts where, as will be seen below, we must take into account the original meaning of *vyñāna* or *vyñāna-śāndha* as pure sensation. Cp Vācaspati's remark that when *ñāna* stands instead of *vyñāna* = *viśiṣṭa-ñāna* it excludes every element of *smṛti* or *samskāra*, cp N. vārt., p. 48, 5–6 and Tipp, p. 114, 1. But the relation may be reversed, cp Jñānendrabuddhi, f. 40, a, 7.

⁴ *kālpānā* meaning primarily «arrangement» (*yojanā*) and *vikalpa* meaning choice, dichotomy (*dvaidhī-karṇa*), are both used in the sense of imagination but pure imagination (*utprekṣana-vyākṛā*) is distinguished from constructive imagination (*lingaya-vikalpa*). A doubt appertains always to the imaginative part of knowledge, not to sensation, *yas tu samsāyah*, (sa) *vikalpakasya jñānasya*, Tipp, p. 10, 11.

PREFACE

More than twenty years have elapsed since we have first treated the subject of Buddhist logic and epistemology as they were taught in the schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Our nearly unique source at that time was the Nyāya-bindu and ʾtikā, this solitary sanscrit remnant of what has been a vast field of literary production. Since that time our knowledge of the subject has been considerably enlarged. Important sanscrit texts have been discovered and published in India. The inter-connection and mutual influences of Indian systems are better known. The Tibetan literature reveals itself as an almost illimited source of information. Prof. H. Jacobi has contributed a series of articles on the early history of Indian systems. Prof. J. Tucci has recently elucidated the problem of Buddhist logic before Dignāga. Prof. de la Vallée Poussin has brought to a successful end his monumental translation of the Abhidharma-Kośa. Prof. Sylvani Lévi has enriched our knowledge by important discoveries in Nepal. Prof. M. Walleser has founded in Heidelberg an active society for the study of Mahāyāna. A great deal of work has been done by Indian and Japanese scholars. The Nyāya-bindu is no more a solitary rock in an unknown sea. Buddhist logic reveals itself as the culminating point of a long course of Indian philosophic history. Its birth, its growth and its decline run parallel with the birth, the growth and the decline of Indian civilisation. The time has come to reconsider the subject of Buddhist logic in its historical connections. This is done in these two volumes of which the second appears before the first. It contains translations which aim at being intelligible, a reservation not unnecessary in Indian matters, since we have witnessed translations by authoritative pens which read like an absolutely unintelligible rigmarole. In the copious notes the literary renderings are given where needed. This will enable the reader fully to appreciate the sometimes enormous distance which lies between the words of the sanscrit phrasing and their philosophic meaning

quality or a different place or a different time.¹ Indeed every variation in its characteristics (makes the characterized object) «another» object. (When we say that) the real object is «other», (we mean) that it either has another quality or another place or another time (than what is contained in our cognition).² Thus cognition representing one form of the object, is not to be considered as a right cognition when the real object has a different form, e. g., the yellow conch-shell seen (by the daltonist) is not a right cognition of this conch-shell, since it is really white. Neither is cognition right when it wrongly represents the place of the object, e. g., the radiance of a jewel seen through the chink in a door, when mistaken for the jewel itself which is in the room (behind the door), is not a right cognition of this jewel.⁴ (4. 6.). Nor is our cognition right when it represents the object as

¹ The proper place for these remarks would have been, as stated by the Tipp, p. 11. 2, later on, p. 18, when discussing the non-illusiveness of sense-perception. They are directed against Vinītadeva's theory that the image may be wrong while sensation is right, since the real object is nevertheless reached by subsequent purposive action (*artha-mātrasya prāptih*, Tipp, p. 11. 4).

² The law of «otherness», as understood by the Buddhists, is here alluded to. Concepts, ideas, objects are artificial cuts in an uninterrupted flow of moments. Every variation in time, space and quality (*avabhāva*) is an indication of something «other» (*yaḥ viruddha-dharma-samvetaḥ tan nānā*). The identity of an idea or an object thus reduces to a single moment which has neither duration in time (*lāla-ananugata*), nor extension in space (*deśa-ananugata*), nor any quality, *ksanabhedena vastuno bhedah*, *deśa-lāla-vyavirhita-avayavy-abhāvat* (read thus Tipp, p. 11. 7). From this point of view every definite cognition, since it corresponds to a subsequent moment, when the sensation is over, will be a cognition of an «other» object, strictly speaking it will be wrong. But empirical cognition refers to series of moments (*santāna*), infinitesimal time (*śūlśma-lāla-bheda*) is not taken into account. The definition of knowledge is framed so as to agree with realities having some stability, *santāna-apēksayā prāmānya-lakṣaṇam* ucyaḥ, Tipp, p. 11. 18. About «otherness» cp. W. E. Johnson, *Logic* I, p. XXXI.

³ Cp. Tātparyat, p. 56. Some logicians have maintained that since the object reached in a subsequent action is the real white conch-shell, the cognition will be a right one. But Dharmottara thinks that the image of the yellow conch-shell is nevertheless a wrong cognition, the white conch-shell is «reached» on the basis of another cognition. He has enlarged upon this point in his *līkḥ* upon *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* of Dharmakīrti.

⁴ The shining of a jewel, as well as of light in general, is moving matter (*gaṇi-dharmā*) and spreads in light-waves (*taranga-vyūhena*). But this is only the empirical view. The transcendental reality of what appears as a motion is but a series of point-instants in contiguous places following one-another, each representing an «other» thing, cp. Tātparyat, p. 324. 10. But this theory is here overlooked and empirical illusion alone referred to cp. also N. b. 4, p. 69. 2.—na lāsayor utrodhah

A SHORT TREATISE OF LOGIC,

NYĀYA-BINDU

BY

DHARMAKĪRTI

WITH

A COMMENTARY (TĪKĀ) BY DHARMOTTARA

recting our attention towards a possible object of successful action¹ Of these two only (the last variety), that knowledge which stimulates purposive action, will be here examined It merely precedes, but does not directly produce successful action. (4.15). When we acquire right knowledge we must remember what we have seen before. Remembrance stimulates will,² will produces action and action reaches the object. Therefore such knowledge is not a direct cause. (4.17). In cases when purposive action presents itself directly (the aim) is reached straight off and (the process) cannot be analysed. But in cases when reasonable men strive and doubt, it may be analysed. By intuitive knowledge³ the aims of man are attained (directly), in such cases men have no doubt about their aims. This makes an analysis impossible (4.19). Thus it is that the word "cause"⁴ has been omitted, and the word "precedes" used in order to suggest that right knowledge, when it is not immediately followed by action, is worthy of being analysed.

(4.21). Human action has an aim. That which is aimed at is an object, i.e., that which is desired.⁵ There are objects to be avoided and objects to be attained. An object to be avoided is an object which we wish to avoid. An object to be attained is an object which we wish to attain.⁶ There is no other class of objects different from these two. The indifferent object, since it is not desired, belongs to the class of undesirable ones.⁷

(4.23) Success is the (actual) attaining or avoiding of the object. When success is achieved by causes, it is called production. But when it is achieved by knowledge it is called behaviour.⁸ It consists in

¹ *artha-lrīgū-samarthe* must be interpreted as *artha-lrīgū-sādhana-samarthe* (Tipp., p. 12 13, read *evam uttaratraya*). But an alternative explanation is likewise suggested by the Tipp., p. 12 13-15, according to which *artha-lrīgū-jñānam* would be *anantara-kāraṇam* in the first case, and with respect to behaviour it would then be *tyavāhitaṃ sādhanā-nirbhāsa-jñānam*.

² *abhihāsa*, desire

³ *artha-lrīgū-nirbhāsa-jñāna*, lit., "when there is knowledge (as consciousness) reflected in purposive action"

⁴ Vinitadeva has interpreted *pūrvaka* as meaning *hetu*

⁵ *artha* is here derived from the root *arh*, the usual etymology is from the

root *r* with the *unāḍi* suffix *than*

⁶ Vinitadeva has explained *artha-siddhi* as meaning *prayojana-nirpatti*, but this is wrong, since *samyag-jñāna* is a *jñāpaka-hetu*, not a *kāraṇa-hetu*,

cp Tipp., p. 13 3

⁷ Indifferent objects are assumed by the Naiyāyika, cp Tātp., p. 66 1 ff

⁸ *anusthāna*

CHAPTER I. PERCEPTION.

§ 1. SUBJECT MATTER AND PURPOSE OF THIS WORK.

1 All successful human action is preceded by right knowledge Therefore this (knowledge will be here) investigated

(1.6) In this sentence the importance of the subject of the present work is pointed to The body of a literary work, indeed, has a double aspect, it consists of words and subject matter. The words, in the present case, have no other purpose than to convey their meaning; they will not be analysed. But if the subject matter were of no use, no work could be devoted to an enquiry¹ into it, just as no reasonable man would ever undertake an enquiry about the teeth of the crow, because this would serve no purpose.² Wishing to show that this treatise deserves to be written, the author points to the importance of its subject matter (1.10). Because (says he) all successful human action is preceded by right knowledge, therefore this (phenomenon) must be investigated, and with this aim the present treatise is undertaken Such is the meaning of the (prefatory) sentence³ (2.2). (By making this statement, viz) by stating that right knowledge—the

¹ *pratipatti* = *betan-pa*

² We would expect *kāka-danta-parīṣā-prayajana-abhūtāt*, since the meaning is not that the teeth are useless, but that an investigation about unexisting teeth is useless, cp *Tātp.*, p 1. 17, and *infra*, p 2 22 (text). This would agree with Vinītadeva's interpretation according to whom the *vyutpatti* (= *parīṣā*) must have a *prayajana* Since *vyutpatti* is already the *prayajana* of the treatise itself (*prakaraṇa-śarīra*), its importance will then be *prayajanasya prayajanam* To this double *prayajana* Dharmottara takes exception, he is thus obliged to give a somewhat awkward turn to his example But cp. *Tātp.*, p 28 12, *nisprayajane (-ām?) parīṣām*

³ Vinītadeva, p 31. 10, has interpreted the first sentence as containing an indication 1) of the subject-matter (*abhidheya* = *samyag-jñāna*), 2) of its aim (*prayajana* = *vyutpatti*), 3) their connection (*sambandha*) and 4) the aim of the aim (*prayajanasya api prayajanam*), the latter referring to the real importance of the study of the theory of cognition, since cognition is involved in every purposive action Dharmottara objects to the unusual *prayajanasya prayajanam* He takes the first sentence as a whole, indicating the importance of a study of the theory of

§ 3. VARIETIES OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

(5.15). In order to reject misconception regarding the number of its varieties, it is said,—

2. Right knowledge is twofold

(5.17). It is twofold, it has two varieties. By stating the number, the division into two varieties is indicated. There are two varieties of right knowledge. When the division into two varieties has been stated, it becomes possible to make a definition of right knowledge which (will consist of definitions) confined to each variety separately. (5.19) Otherwise it is impossible to indicate a unique essence which would embrace all varieties. Therefore the indication that there is a number of different (varieties) is nothing but an (indirect) way of stating that the essence (of knowledge) is double. Without mentioning the number, i.e., the different varieties, it is impossible to express this double essence. The number has thus been stated at the beginning, because this is the only way to specify the essence of knowledge.¹

(5.22) Now, what are these two varieties?

3. Direct and indirect (perceptive and inferential)

(6.2). The word for direct knowledge (or perception) means knowledge dependent upon the senses² (This meaning) of a knowledge dependent upon the senses is suggested by the etymo-

¹ This remark is a repetition of what later on, p. 17, text, is said in regard of the twofold division of inference. But there it is quite natural, since two absolutely different things are designated by the term «inference», a method of cognition and its expression in propositions. In this place the remark is strange, since the author has just been dealing at some length with a general definition of right knowledge. It may be Dharmottara had the feeling that his definition of right knowledge as uncontradicted by experience was, to a certain extent, merely verbal, meaningless without reference to its both varieties of direct and indirect cognition. Vinatadeva's comment contains the remark about the impossibility of a general definition only in the right place, i.e., with regard to the definition of inference.

² Lat., p. 62 «*Pratyakṣa* means that the sense-organ is approached, reposed upon. The compound word is composed according to (the rule) that prepositions like *at* etc. in the sense of (*at*)-*krānta* etc. can enter into composition with (their complement) in the accusative case. In words compounded with *prāpṭa*, *āpanna*, *āla* and prepositions (the rule) according to which the gender of the compound must be the same as the gender of its last member is not observed, (and therefore) it agrees in gender with the object to which it is referred, (and thus) the word *pratyakṣa* is established as (an adjective which can be used in any gender)».
cp. Vārt. ad Pāṇini, II, 4. 26.

who are being instructed in (the theory of) cognition, and it is studied by the pupils desirous of acquiring for themselves the instruction delivered by the Master. An analysis of knowledge is thus the purpose of both the composition and the study of the work. (2.13). No word (in the prefatory sentence) indicates the connection between the subject matter and the purpose. It must be supplied from the context.¹ Indeed when a reasonable man is working at this treatise for the sake of an analysis of right knowledge, this treatise is just the means of attaining his purpose and there is no other. Thus it is clear that the relation between this treatise and its aim is that of an expedient and the thing to be expedited.

(2.16). However, (the advisability of stating these topics at the beginning can be questioned), since, even if they are stated, no reasonable man will accept them without further evidence, before having looked into the book. This is true! Without a foregoing study of the book these topics, although stated, cannot be appreciated. But when stated, even without being authenticated, they provoke the spirit of inquisitiveness² by which people are incited to work (2.18). Indeed, when reasonable men presume that a thing may be of some use to them,³ they (immediately) set to work, whereas when they suspect that it is of no use,⁴ they give it up. (2.19). Therefore the author of a scientific work is especially expected to make at the beginning a statement about the connection (between his aim and the subject matter). For it is all very well for writers of romance to make false statements in order to amuse,⁵ but we cannot imagine what would be the aim of a scientific author if he went (the length of) misstating his subject-matter. Neither (do we see that this actually) occurs. Therefore it is natural to expect inquisitiveness concerning such (works). (2.22). If it were not stated, the student might possibly think that the subject matter served no purpose at all as, e. g., an enquiry about the teeth of a crow: or that (the aim) was irrealizable as, e. g., the instruction to adorn oneself with the demon Takṣaka's crest jewel which releases from fever⁶; or that its aim was undesirable, like the instruc-

¹ *sūmarthyāt*

² *saṁśaya*

³ *artha-saṁśaya*

⁴ *anartha-saṁśaya*

⁵ Lat. 2.20 «Indeed the words of story-tellers may be imagined in a different way for the sake of sport etc. (Tib = *l. rāḍāḍi*)».

⁶ Cp the same simile Tātp, p 36

(6.12). The word «and» (connecting direct and indirect knowledge) coordinates perception and inference as having equal force¹. Just as perception is a source of right knowledge, because being always connected with some (real) object it leads to successful purposive action, just the same is the case of inference. It likewise is a source of right knowledge always connected with some (real) object, in as much as it leads to the attainment of an object circumscribed by its mark.

§ 4. PERCEPTION DEFINED.

4 Direct knowledge means here neither construction (judgment) nor illusion

(6.16). The word «here» indicates localization,² but it is (moreover) used to indicate a selection. Thus the meaning of the sentence is the following one «Here»,¹ i. e., among direct and indirect knowledge — this is a reference to the inclusive whole, «direct knowledge» — this refers to one part of it. A part is thus separated or selected from the whole, because the latter is the general term³ (with reference to the former). (6.18) Direct knowledge is here taken as subject and the

¹ The tenet that there are only two sources of cognition, the senses and the intellect, has a capital importance for the whole Buddhist system. Of the discussions about *pramāṇa-samplava* and *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*, in *Nyāyavārt*, p. 51, and *Tūtparyat*, p. 123 ff, cf. Oandrakīrti's polemic against it in my *Nirvāṇa* p. 141 ff. The realistic systems admit a greater number of *pramāṇas* and maintain at the same time that perception is the chief *pramāṇa*. In the Buddhist view both are mental constructions on the basis of pure sensation, in this they have equal force. Perceptive knowledge is directly produced by an object (*taṣṭu*), inferential is indirectly produced through the medium of something identical with it or through its effect (*śābāṭmya-tadutpatti*), cf. *Vinitadeva*, p. 89. The Buddhist division pretends to be exhaustive since it corresponds to the double essence in every object, the particular (conceived as the extreme concrete and particular, the unique, the *ksana*, the *śaṭ-śaṭsana*) and the general, or the coordinated, the similar. The concrete individual object as far as it represents a complex of general features is not considered as a particular (*sva-śaṭsana*). All general characteristics are universal even when included in a concrete object. Every cognition of a universal is not sense-cognition. The term inference thus has a much wider connotation than our inference. When so understood perception and inference represent the passive and the active part in cognition, the senses and the intellect. They have thus an equal force, because they produce knowledge together, they can produce no real knowledge separately. Without any possible sensation it will be pure imagination, without any inferring or comparing (*śābāṭmya*) it will be pure indefinite sensation.

² *saptamī-arthā*.

³ *pratyakṣatva-jātyā* = Tib. *māon-sun-ñid-kyi rgye-kye*, cf. *Tipp.*, p. 172 — *pratyakṣeṇām bahutvāt*.

be a construction means to be foreign to construction, not to have the nature of an arrangement (or judgment). «Not an illusion» means not contradicted by that (underlying) essence of reality which possesses efficiency. This essence consists of patches of colour which are the substratum underlying the arrangement (of parts in an object)¹ Non-illusory means knowledge which is not at variance with this (direct reality).

(7.8). (However, as they stand) these two characteristics are intended to clear away wrong conceptions, not (alone) to distinguish (direct from) indirect cognition. The characteristic of «not being a construction» would have been alone quite sufficient for that (7.4) But if (the second characteristic) of «not being an illusion» were not added, (the following misconception would not have been guarded against (There are some who maintain that) the vision of a moving tree (by an observer travelling by ship) and similar perceptions are right perceptions, because (there is in this case an underlying reality which) is not a construction. (7.5). Indeed a man acting upon such a perception reaches something which is a tree,² hence (it is supposed) that experience supports³ his perception. It would thus be consistent knowledge and so far would be direct, as not being a (mere) construction. (7.7) In order to guard against this view the characteristic of «not being an illusion» has been inserted. It is an illusion. It is not a (right) perception. Neither is it an inference, since it is not derived from some mark in its threefold aspect.⁴ No other way of cognition is possible. We maintain therefore that the vision of a moving tree is error. (7.8).

Vācaspati, but this is perhaps true, to a certain extent, only in respect of the formulation of the theory. I did not realize then that its essence is already perfectly well known to the earliest Buddhists, where it is contained under the names of *vyñāna-sāndha* (= *nirvikalpa-sāndha*) and *saṃyogā-sāndha* (= *savikalpa-sāndha*) respectively. Cf. my Central Conception, p. 18, and Udayana's *Pariśuddhi*, p. 214 f.

1 By pure sensation we may cognize the presence of an object which is a patch of blue colour, (we shall have *nīla-vyñānam* = *nīlasya vyñānam*), but we will not know that it is blue (we will not have the *nīlam itī vyñānam*), since this knowledge is arrived at by contrasting it with other objects and contrast (*vyāvṛtti*) is the work of intellect, not of pure sensation, cf. my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 102 n. 3. The reading *va nātmoka* is supported by the Tib. transl. The alternative reading *dharmāmāla* conveys just the same idea since *varṇa* (or *rūpa*) is here a *dharmā*, an ultimate element in the system of Hīnayāna, cf. Central Conception, p. 11.

2 *vrkṣa-mūtram* = *vrkṣa-svarūpa*, cf. *artha-śruti-śaṣṭam vastu-rūpaṁ*.

3 *saṃvāda-kāraṇāt*. Dignāga assumed that such perceptions are right, cf. *Tattvasaṃgraha*, p. 894. 20.

4 About the three aspects of a logical mark cf. p. 18 17 (text).

object, which operates (freely) without taking notice of limitation (by reality) can but refer to a problematic fact (about which we neither know) that it exists nor that it does not exist. Such an object can never be reached. Therefore every cognition other (than perception or inference) is not a source of right knowledge, since it presents an object which cannot be reached, an object which is (either) absolutely unreal (or) uncertain as to whether it exists or not.¹

(3.28). (Sentient beings) strive for desired ends. They want that knowledge which leads them to the attainment of objects fitted for successful action. The knowledge that is investigated by the theory (of cognition) is just the knowledge they want. Therefore right knowledge is knowledge which points to reality, (a reality which) is capable of experiencing purposive action.² (4.1). And that object alone which has been pointed out by such right knowledge can be "reached", (i.e., clearly and distinctly cognized), because, as we have stated above (p. 4), we understand by "reaching" an object its definite cognition. (4.2). Now, if there is a divergence between what is pointed out (by our cognition) and the real object, the latter has either a different

¹ The realistic systems as well as, in a limited sense, the Mādhyamikas and Vedāntins admit additional sources of knowledge, besides perception and inference, e. g., testimony, analogy, negation, similarity. Buddhist logic includes them all in inference, or indirect knowledge. Therefore whatsoever is neither perception nor inference is wrong knowledge. In realistic systems there is also a difference between *pramāṇa* (= *pramāṇa-kāraṇa*) and *pramā* (= *pramāṇa-phala*). In Buddhist logic this difference is denied and *pramāṇa* = *samyag-jñāna*, the "reaching of the object (*grāhya*)" which was interpreted above, p. 4, as "reaching by definite cognition" is here taken in the sense of an actual successive action.

² Although the school of Dignāga (they are called the later Yogācāras, or the Vijñānavādi logicians, or the Sautrāntika-Yogācāras) deny the reality of an external world corresponding to our ideas, they in their logic and epistemology investigate cognition from the empirical point of view, cf. Candrakīrti, *Mādhy. vṛtti*, p. 58. 14, transl. in my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 140 ff. Therefore their definition of reality as efficiency (*artha-kriyā-kāritva*) and of knowledge as *artha-kriyā-samartha-
~tva-pradāraka* are purely empirical. But they contend that their analysis of empirical cognition leads to the establishment of an uncognizable transcendental substratum, the *sva-lakṣaṇa-paramārtha-sat*, the "thing in itself." The validity (*pramāṇya*) of empirical knowledge is thus established by a subsequent step (*paratoḥ*). The question whether the act of cognizing carries in itself (*svatoḥ*) the feeling of its validity, or whether this is due to a further cognition (*paratoḥ*) is very much debated in Indian philosophy. The school of Dignāga has thus established the validity of cognition in opposition to the condemnation of all logic by the Mādhyamikas. This *pramāṇa-rūpīśvara-vāda* is represented by Vācaspati, *Tātparyatā*, p. 7. 28.

(7.13). (In any case) one should not take «non-illusory» to be here an equivalent of «consistent». Direct perception is nothing but (a variety) of consistent knowledge. This circumstance alone is sufficient for making it consistent. To repeat it would be useless. The meaning of the sentence would then be, — «that kind of consistent knowledge which is called direct perception is free from construction and is consistent». Perfectly useless repetition! Thus it is clear that non-illusory here means not contradicted by that (underlying) essence of reality which possesses efficiency¹

(7.19) What kind of «construction» is here alluded to?

Inference is an illusion since it operates through ascertaining an object in the non-object which represents (this inference's) own reflex. Perception, on the contrary, is not mistaken in regard of the essence (*rūpe* = *sva-rūpe*) grasped (immediately). Perception, e.g., of fire proceeds from a momentary sensation to a constructed representation of the object fire. The first possesses more reality than the second. The first is a sense-datum, the second, the physical object «fire», a construction, a «non-object (*anartha*)». The first, as Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy, ch. V) puts it, is cognized «by acquaintance», the second «by description». When we infer the presence of fire from the presence of smoke the process of thought can be regarded as reversed. The cognized, or inferred, fire is a generality. The Buddhists do not distinguish here between concrete and abstract generality. Both for them are constructions (*lalpanā*). But the construction in order to be a real cognition must be referred to a possibility of sensation. Thus inference proceeds from the general to the particular, whereas perception takes the opposite course, from the particular sense-datum to some general construction. The term *pratibhāsa* is used to denote the *prima facie* mental content. Both perception and inference possess a *sva-pratibhāsa* (= *grāhya-svarūpa*) as contrasted with their *adhyavaseya-svarūpa*. Thus *lalpanāpādha* refers to sensation, but *abhrānta*, according to sūtra I 8, to Viñitadara and Kamalaśīla, is the same as *avasmavūda*, it refers to false construction (*prāpya-viśaye*), according to Dh. it differs from *avasmavūda*, and refers to sensation (*grāhya-viśaye*) Op. Anekānta, p. 208.

¹ In this alternative interpretation the term «non-illusory» (*abhrānta*) becomes almost a synonym of «non-constructive» (*lalpanāpādha*), since all construction, every judgment or inference, represents illusion when compared with pure sensation, the genuine source of real cognition. Inference is indirect knowledge, it is an illusion, because it is indirect. It is constructed, syncretical, subjective knowledge. It is nevertheless right knowledge, since it, although indirectly (*paramparayā*), also leads to successful purposive action (*bhṛāntam apy anumānam artha-sambādāna pramāṇam*, Tātp. p. 262). Thus it is that inference (or judgment) is right knowledge empirically, but at the same time it is an illusion transcendentially. There are for Dignāga, just as in Kant's Transcendental Dialectic (N. Müller's transl., p. 288), two kinds of illusion, an empirical and a transcendental one. The moving tree is an empirical illusion, but the standing tree, although an empirical reality, is an illusory construction when compared with the underlying «thing in itself». All the fabric of the empirical world, this interconnected whole of substances and their qualities (*dharm-dharma-bhāva*) and the inferential knowledge founded

indeed, a distinct cognition in which the mental reflex¹ has coalesced with its designation by speech² as, e. g., the constructed³ (cognition) «jar» with a man to whom this word is familiar.⁴ It contains such a mental reflex which is accompanied by the word «jar».

(8.3). But we may also have (mental constructions) which, although not accompanied by corresponding words, are capable of being so accompanied as, e. g., the mental constructions of a baby not knowing the import of words. (8.4). If constructions referring to mental reflexes accompanied by words were (alone) here mentioned, the constructions of those who do not speak would not have been included. But since it is said «capable of coalescing», they also are included. Although the mental constructions of a new born⁵ babe are not accompanied by words, they certainly are suitable for such a connection. Those that are connected are (*eo ipso*) also suitable. Thus by inserting the word «capable» both (the primitive and developed constructions) are included.⁶

¹ *ābhāsa* = *pratibhāsa*

² Lat., p. 8 1-2 «Among them (*tatra*) some distinct cognition (*pratiṣṭi*) exists possessing a reflex (*ābhāsa* = *pratibhāsa* = *pratibimba*) united with a word».

³ *kalpanā* = *yojanā*, more lit. «the constructive judgment («this is a jar»)».

⁴ *vyutpanna-sanketa*

⁵ *tadāharjāta*, cp. *Tattvas* p. 367 12 ff.

⁶ This *kalpanā* (= *vikalpa*) must be distinguished from the *vikalpa* (= *vitarka*) of the *Vaiśbhāṣikas*. About the meaning of *vitarka* and *vicāra* in the *Abhidharma*, cp. my *Central Conception*, p. 104. They also assume a special kind of *vitarka* which they name *svabhāva-vitarka*, a rudimentary instinctive synthesis inherent in all sensation, cp. *Abhidh. Kośa* ad I 30. The *Yogācāras* understand by *vikalpa* (= *devadāhī-larana*) the bifurcation of consciousness into subject and object, *grāhya-grāhaṇatā-vikalpa*. *Dignāga*, *Pramāṇa-samucc.* I 3 understands by this term *nāma-jāti-guṇa-kriyā-dṛavya-kalpanā*, i. e. a construction or an arrangement (*yojanā*) of a presentation which includes name, genus or species, quality, function and appurtenances, the whole complex being referred to a particular moment of efficient reality (*śākalāṇa*). The name, i. e., the proper name (*vyākṛtā śābdā* = *śābdā-ryyā-gyā* sgra, e. g., *ḍiṭṭha*) is here by no means the *deśekhā śābdā* of an extreme particular, as in European philosophy. *Devadāhī* (or *Śaśa*) would be for *Dignāga* only the designation of a series of occurrences (*samskāra-samūha*). Thus we must consider here *abhilāpa-samsāra* as including all other syntheses cp. *Tattvas*, 1226—8. The *Tipp*, p. 21 6, remarks that if we understand the mental synthesis in the same way as it is done in other systems we will not get the meaning of pure sensation for perception — *tesām grahaṇe sva-indriya-vyākṛtā-pratyakṣatva-anupapattih*. *Kalpanā* thus corresponds to our judgment and more specially to a judgment in which the subject represents *Hos Ah-* und, i. e. something indefinite to be made definite by the predicate, a judgment of the

avoiding the avoidable and attaining the attainable. Behaviour consisting in such activity is called successful action.

(5.2). When the (prefatory sentence) mentions «all successful human action» the word «all» is used to indicate the totality of the objects, but not the different ways of action. Therefore it is not meant that the (above stated) two varieties of purposive action depend upon right knowledge, but it is suggested that every successful action, whatsoever it may be, the totality of actions, depends upon right knowledge. Accidental success through false knowledge is impossible.¹

(5.5) Indeed, successful action is possible when (knowledge) has rightly constructed² the object whose (existence) has been pointed out by sensation.³ And thus is done by right knowledge alone, not by wrong knowledge.⁴ How could cognition which has not rightly constructed (its object) lead to successful action? Wrong knowledge indeed does not lead to it. That knowledge which alone leads to it is right knowledge. (5.8) For this very reason it must be carefully investigated. And since it is the only cause of every successful human action, therefore the author, when stating this, (has emphasized) that «all» (success) is preceded by right knowledge.⁵ (5.10). Thus the meaning of the (prefatory) sentence runs as follows,—because every efficient action is preceded by right knowledge, therefore this knowledge is investigated in the present treatise.

(5.14). The word «investigated» refers (to the method adopted) which consists in expounding the subject (indirectly) by refuting all contrary opinions. They are fourfold, in so far as they concern the number of varieties, their definition, their object and their result.

¹ Vinītadeva and Śāntirakṣita(?) think that a successful action may happen accidentally when acting upon a supposition, as e.g., when you approach a well and reach water without knowing beforehand whether there really is water in the well. They thus interpret the word «all» as referring to both ways of behaviour, obtaining and abstaining. They maintain that success is mostly (*bāhulyeṇa*) achieved when acting upon right knowledge, but may be accidentally produced by uncertain or wrong cognition. Dh. denies that, but he has a special theory about accidental successful action explained in his *Prāmāṇya-viniścaya-tīkā*, cp Tipp, p. 10 13, 13. 12 ff. and *infra* p. 17, 8 Cp also Kamalaśīla, p. 404. 2 and Dh.'s own words above, p. 8—4

² *prōpyati*, cp above, p. 12 3

³ *pradarśana* = *ādarśana* = *upadarśana* = *ālōcana* = *miratāpaśya-pratyakṣa*

⁴ I. t. p. 5. 6 «What produces the reaching of the shown is right knowledge only, what does not produce the reaching of the shown is wrong knowledge».

⁵ I. t. p. 5. 10. «The word *it* is used in the sense of «therefore», *ya*d and *tr*d are necessarily correlative».

ced by the object, (i.e. the particular moment which is being apprehended)? Because it does not (exclusively) depend upon what is present. A (new born) babe indeed does not stop crying and does not press his lips upon his mother's breast, so long as it has not produced a synthesis¹ of the breast it sees before him with the breast it has experienced in the foregoing (existence), by thinking (instinctively), "there it is". (S. 14) A cognition² which unites former experiences with later ones has not its object present to it, because the former experience is not present. Not having its object present it does not depend upon it. An independent cognition is not a reflex³ (narrowly) restricted (to one momentary sensation), because the (assembled) factors which would (exactly) correspond (to the synthetic image) are absent.⁴ Such (a synthetic image) is capable of coalescing with a word. (S. 16) Sense-knowledge is (strictly) dependent upon its object, since it is receptive only in regard to what is (really) present before it. And since the (real) object is a cause confining the reflex (to itself), (the corresponding cognition) refers to a (strictly) limited reflex, (to something unique) which therefore is not capable of coalescing with a word.

(S. 18) (This equally applies to every particular sound of the speech). Although we admit that a (particular sound) can have a meaning,⁵ we nevertheless, just for the reasons (stated above), maintain such non-constructiveness⁶ of the particular,⁷ (the absolutely unique sound). Indeed although the strictly particular (sound) can be significative, nevertheless the cognition of an object associated with such verbal expression is a (synthetic) construction.

(S. 20) (Objection) Now, a sensation,⁸ since it is a reflex strictly limited (to a unique particular) object, cannot produce a reflex capable

¹ *pratyaṅamṛṣaṭi* = *pratyaḥhyānāti* = *akīlatoṭi*

² Here again *vyñāna* is used contrary to its meaning in Abhidharma; it refers to a judgment, *«sa evāyam» ityādena vikalpasya avasthā ucyate* cp. Tīpp, 28 4—5. The abhidharmic sense is then expressed by the compound *indriya-vyñāna*, cp. p. 8 16 and 8 20.

³ *pratibhāsa* = *pratilamba* «reflex» «as in a mirror» (*ādarśarat*), as appears from this passage, can be either simple and direct (*niyata*) or indirect and conditioned (*aniyata*). Its counter part is *niscaya* = *adhyavasāya*. Dharmakīrti says — *pratyaḥsam — grhṇāti na niscayena, kun tarhi tat-pratibhāsenā*, cp. *Anekānta*, p. 177. Inference has also a *sa-pratibhāsa*, cp. text p. 7. 18 and *vāṅmā* can be *atatu-nirbhāsa*, cp. *N. kanikā*, p. 124.

⁴ *Lak*, p. 8 15-16 «And the independent, since there is no cause limiting the reflex, possesses no limited reflex»

⁵ *vācya-vācaka-bhāva*

⁷ *etadāśana*

⁶ *atvāśpalatva*

⁸ *indriya-vyñāna*

logical analysis¹ of the word, not by its actual use² (in philosophy) The idea of being dependent upon the senses contains, as its implication,³ the idea of direct knowledge⁴ which is thus being suggested.⁵ This alone is the real meaning⁶ of the term perception. Therefore any knowledge that makes the object (appear) before us directly is called perceptive (6 6). If the proper use of the word involved nothing but dependence upon the senses, then sense-knowledge (or sensation) alone could be called direct knowledge, but not (the three remaining varieties of it), mental sensation etc. Thus it is, e. g., that the (sanskrit) word *go* «cow», although it is etymologically derived from the root *gam* «to move», is actually used to express the idea of a cow. This idea is incidentally suggested by the fact of motion when it is inherent in the same object. But then it comes to be generally accepted to denote a cow, whether she moves or not.⁷

(6 10) (The word for inference means etymologically «subsequent measure») The word «measure» suggests an instrument (by which an object is measured, i. e., cognized). A source of knowledge is thereby indicated, whose characteristic essence is coordination⁸ It is called «subsequent measure», because it appears after the logical mark (or middle term) has been apprehended, and its concomitance (or major premise) has been brought to memory. (6 11). When the presence of the mark upon the subject (i. e., the minor premise) has been apprehended, and the concomitance between the minor and the major term, (i. e., the major premise) brought to memory, the inference (or conclusion) follows. Therefore it is called «subsequent».

¹ *vyutpatti*

² *pravṛtti*

³ *samūheta*

⁴ *artha-sūksāt-kāṛitra*.

⁵ *lakṣyate*.

⁶ *pravṛtti-nimitta*. The Tib translation contains, p. 18 5, a characteristic addition «*pratyakṣa* has not the meaning of being dependent upon the senses» This definition (*aisam pratītya jñānam*) belongs to *Prāśastapāda*, p. 186 12.

⁷ The word *go* «cow» is explained as deriving from the verbal root *gam* «to go» in order to conform with the general conception of the Pāṇinian school of grammarians according to which every word must be necessarily explained as deriving from some verbal root. According to this interpretation of the term «perception» it will embrace also the supernatural mystic intuition of Saints, Bodhisattvas and Yogins

⁸ Coordination (*sāṃyoga*) is a characteristic not only of inferential, but also of perceptive knowledge in its final stage (*pramāṇa-phala*), cp. *infra*, p. 15 (text) Pure sensation (*nirvikalpa*) alone contains no coordination

directly grasp the sound and the meaning, because it cannot apprehend (now) what has been experienced a long time ago.

(9.2) The same kind of argument must be applied to the (exceptional) sagacity of the Yogis. The meaning of all words is present to them, (they know it directly). It is not synthetic knowledge however, it does not grasp former experiences which happened at the time of the formation of language. (9.4).

6 Knowledge exempt from such (construction), when it is not affected by an illusion produced by colour-blindness, rapid motion, travelling on board a ship, sickness or other causes, is perceptive (right) knowledge.

(9.6). Knowledge which is free from constructiveness, i. e., contains (an element that is not) an arrangement (or judgment), if it is (at the same time not illusive, is perceptive knowledge—this is how the sentence should be connected with what follows, because absence of construction and absence of illusion constitute the definition of perception taken together and not separately. In order to point out this, it is said that knowledge which is free from construction, if at the same time it does not produce an illusion, is perceptive knowledge. Thus it is shown that both these characteristics combined with one another determine the essence of perception

(9.9) Colour-blindness is an eye-disease. This is a cause of illusion located in the organ of sense. Rapid movement (calls forth an illusion) as, e. g., when we rapidly swing a firebrand, (we have the illusion of a fiery circle) If we swing the firebrand slowly, we do not have it. Therefore the swinging is qualified by the word "rapid." This is a cause of delusion which is located in the object of perception.

(9.11) Travelling by ship (produces illusion as, e. g.), when the ship is moving, a person standing (on the deck) has the illusion of moving trees on the shore. The word "travelling" points to this circumstance. Here illusion depends on the place where one is situated (9.13) Disease is the disturbance (of one of the three humours of the body, i. e.) the gaseous, the bilious and the phlegmy.¹ When the gaseous principle in the body is disturbed, deceitful images like that of a flaming post arise.² This is

¹ These three humours do not represent exactly air, bile and phlegm, but three very subtle principles conventionally so called whose equipoise is equivalent to health, whose disturbed equipoise is equivalent to sickness

² All psychical diseases are attributed to an abnormal condition of the gaseous principle

characteristics of non-constructive and non-illusive (cognition) are predicated. (It is not a definition of its essence.¹ What its essence is) you and I very well know (in general). It is a kind of cognition which makes us (feel) that the objects are present to us directly. It is (now intimated) that it should be viewed as (something) non-constructive and (something) containing no illusion. (It may be objected, that since we do not very well know what these characteristics mean, we neither can know what direct knowledge is. But this is not so!) We must not imagine that if (the notions of) non-constructive and non-illusive are not familiar to us, we must refer them to some different special kind of direct knowledge which has been given this name and is here spoken of. The term «direct knowledge» (or perception) is familiar to everybody from its application (to that variety of direct cognition) which makes the object present to our sense-faculties and which is invariably connected with them.

(6 22). This (perception) is referred to, and the characteristics of being neither a construction nor an illusion are predicated. Not² to

¹ As e.g., in the sentence «sound is impermanent» impermanence is a characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the sound, but not its essence (*svarūpa*). These remarks are directed against Vinītadeva who has interpreted the sūtra as containing a definition and has even reversed the order of subject and predicate by stating that «whatsoever is non-constructive and non-illusive is direct knowledge» (p 39 12). The same is done by Kamalaśīla, *op cit* p 866 25, who maintains that, although *pratyakṣa* is here the *lakṣya*, it is also the predicate (*vidhīyate*). Cp Tipp., p 17—18. The term *pratyakṣa* is greater in extension than sense-perception (*indriya-jñāna*), *op above*, text p. 6 6—7. But a thing must be known in general when its special characteristics are given and what «direct knowledge» is in general that everyone knows from the example of sense perception.

² Thus this celebrated definition (*kalpanāpodha*) of Dignāga which is discussed almost in every sanscrit work on philosophy or logic is not at all supposed to represent any exhaustive definition of perception, but only an indication of one of its characteristics. The feeling of the presence of the object in the range of our senses is its essential function (*sāksī-lāritva-vyūpāra*) and it is followed by a construction or judgment (*viśalpeṇa anugamyate*). The Buddhists admit both pure sensation (*nirvikalpa* = *kalpanāpodha*) and definite perception (*saṃkalpa*), the latter under the names of *pramāṇa-phala*, *artha-prāpti*, *sārvjñāna*. The same distinction is already contained in Nyāya-sūtra I 4, where, according to the interpretations of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakāra and Vācaspati, the word *anupadeśya* refers to the *nirvikalpa*, and the word *vyavasāyātma* — to the *saṃkalpa* *pratyakṣa*. The difference between both conceptions consists in the prominence given by Dignāga to pure sensation (*nirvikalpa*) as the only source of knowledge through which we come in touch with «absolute reality» (*paramārthasat*), with the «thing in itself» (*sva-lakṣaṇa*). In my «Logic and Epistemology» (German translation, p 192) I ascribed the distinction of pure sensation and definite perception to Dignāga, and its introduction into brahmanic Nyāya to

8. Sense knowledge (sensation)

(10.4) Cognition, as far as it depends (on the activity) of the senses (alone), is sensation

(10.5). In order to answer the criticism raised against the theory of mental sensation the author proceeds to give its definition.

9 Mental sensation follows (the first moment of every) sense-cognition (which is thus) its immediately preceding homogeneous cause (The latter) is cooperating with (the corresponding moment of) the object, (i. e., with that momentary object) which immediately follows the proper (momentary) object (of sensation)

(10.8). The proper object of sense-knowledge (is the object in the moment corresponding to sensation). The following object is the object which is not different, (is quite similar to it). Difference here means interval in time as well as difference in quality. (10.9) Thus, (every) difference (between the two momentary objects) is denied. The quite similar second moment following upon the moment when the object has produced sensation and supported (by the preceding one) is here alluded to.¹ (10.10). This being the case, (it is clear) that the next following moment of the object, after the moment corresponding to sensation, a member of the same compact series of moments, is here meant. This (second moment) is here said to cooperate with sensation. (10.11) Cooperation (or causation) can have two different meanings. It can mean either a real mutual influence of (one fact upon the other), or (the compresence of two facts followed by another fact called their) one result. (10.12) Since we are here (on Buddhist ground) all reality is reduced to momentary (sense-data). A momentary reality can not possibly have an increment (as a result), therefore cooperation (is to be taken in the second sense), as one resulting fact (following upon preceding two facts). (10.13) Because the object and the sensation (first produced by it) are together producing (i. e., are only followed by) one mental sensation, therefore there is no mutual (real) influence between them.²

¹ Lat., p. 10. 9-10 "Therefore when difference is excluded, the supported (*upādēya*) moment of the object of sensation (*indriya-vyākāṇa*) which exists in the second moment (and) is homogeneous, is taken".

² Buddhist philosophy has gone deeper into the analysis of the idea of Causality than perhaps any other philosophy has done. The literature devoted to that subject is very extensive. Some details will be found in my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 59 ff. and

If it is error, how are we to explain that a tree is nevertheless reached (when acting upon such erroneous perception)? The tree is not (really) reached upon it, since a tree changing its position in space is the definite image¹ (corresponding to the visual sensation), and a tree fixed on one place is actually reached. (7.10). Therefore the object which has produced the sensation of a moving tree is not actually reached,² and (*vice versa*) the tree actually reached is not (the object which) has produced the visual sensation. Nothing at all is reached on the basis of this (wrong cognition). If a tree is actually reached, it depends upon an altogether different cognitive act. Thus it is that the characteristic of «non-illusion» has been introduced in order to clear away the theory (that illusion may lead to success).³

(7.12). However, the characteristic of «non-illusion» might also be taken as suggesting a difference between (direct cognition and) inference.⁴ In that case the characteristic of «neither construction» would be directed against those contrary theories (which include some synthetic activity of the intellect into direct perception).⁵ For, indeed, inference, (as indirect knowledge, is to a certain extent) an illusion. The course it takes consists in having to deal *prima facie* with mental contents of a (general), unreal character, and in ascertaining through them some real fact. On the other hand, what direct cognition *prima facie* apprehends is (pure reality), not unreality.⁶

¹ *paricchinna*.

² Lit., p. 7 10 «Therefore where-placed the moving tree has been seen there-placed it is not reached»

³ Dharmottara has discussed this question at length in his *Pramāṇa-viniścaya-tīkā*. Tattvasaṃ, p. 894. 16 ff., ascribes the view that illusion may some times be right (*vibhramāpī pramāṇatā*) to Dignāga, who therefore has omitted the word *abhrānta* in his definition. He also objects to the inclusion of the characteristic «non-illusory» (*avyabhicārin*) by the Naiyāyikas into their definition of sense-perception, N S., I 1. 4, because, says he, illusion is always mental (*grāhye gūḥya ni kīlhrul-paṭi gūḥya gūḥya*, cp. Pr. samucc., I. 19). Under *kārikā* I. 8 he states that *pratyakṣa-ābhāsa*, or illusions, are due to imagination (*ortaga-nas kyug-pa=viśālpapratīti*). Cp. Tipp., p. 10 11—*samśayo vikalpasya*.

⁴ In the printed text of my edition (B. B. VIII) on p. 7. 12 the following passage, confirmed by the Tibetan translation, must be inserted after *mrāṣārtham—tathābhānta-grahanaṇāpy anumāne mātṛiṣṭe kālpanāpōḥa-grahanaṇam vyatīti-pāth-nvāḥārtham*, (*bhrāntam hy...*)

⁵ According to the *Abh. Kośa*, I. 80, there is always included in every sensation a rudimentary synthesis called *śarīpa-vitarā* (*vitarā=viśālpā*).

⁶ Lit., p. 7. 12—13 (with the sentence restored according to the Tib.) «Thus likewise by mentioning «non-illusory» inference being rejected, the mentioning of «non-constructive» is (then) in order to reject divergent views. Indeed in-

sense (both are inseparable). The deduction *ad absurdum*, that namely the blind and the deaf would not exist, if the inner sense could apprehend a special object, (a moment of it) not apprehended by the outer sense—this deduction is thereby refuted.¹

(10.21) Now we contend that such internal sensation is (a kind of) direct cognitive process (in the presumption that) the efficiency of the outer sense is extinct (in one moment) The (indefinite) sensation of colour which we have at (the moment) when the sense of vision is efficient is entirely and exclusively sense-cognition. (10.22). Otherwise (if both these sensations, by the outer sense and by the inner sense, were simultaneous), we would have no (pure sensation at all), no sensation at all depending (e.g.) upon the organ of sight exclusively.²

(11.1). This internal sensation is a postulate of our system There are no facts to prove it (directly) But there is no contradiction in admitting it, if it were of the described kind In this sense its definition has been given³

(11.3). Self-consciousness is next being defined

¹ Lat, p 10 18—21 « And since the object of mental sensation (*mano-vijñānasya*) is different from the object of sensation proper (*indriya-vijñāna* corresponding to the abhūdharmic *vijñāna*), therefore the fault of non-validity, imputed (*āśaṅgīta*) because of cognizing the cognized, is discarded. And since the moment is taken which has a substratum in the object of sensation, therefore the deduction of the fault (*doṣa-prasaṅga*) of the absence of the blind and the deaf is discarded, because it cognizes another object which has not been cognized by sensation »

² Since the second moment would be likewise *indriya-vijñāna* it will not be possible to distinguish between *indriya-vijñāna* and *mano-vijñāna*, cp Tipp, p 80 8-5 « If the organ of sight will operate, why indeed should the (same) sensation not arise in the second moment, it is the same, provided it will make the object present (*yogyā-lāraṇa* = *sūksātkārṇa*) Therefore how is it that both will not be called sensations (of the outer sense)? » Cp also Tātṭp, p 111 2

³ The *siddhānta* mentioned p. 11 1 can include the *āgama* quoted in the Tipp, p 26 10, where Buddha declares that colour is apprehended in two ways, by the sense of vision and by the internal sense evoked by the external one Dh deems it a sufficient proof and no other proofs are needed The remark is directed against Jñānagarbha and his followers who devised a formal argument in favour of the existence of such a thing as mental sensation Since sensation and mental construction are, in this system, two quite heterogeneous sources of knowledge, something intermediate must be found which would be sensuous on one side and mental on the other, in order to account for a knowledge which combines sense-data with mental constructions. Thus the existence of an internal sense is proved by the existence of a subsequent mental construction (*nīla-vāyo-rājāṇī* *saṃāna-jāṭīya-nīla-vikāpa-udayā*) Dharmottara rejects the argument, as the Tipp, p. 80, assumes, because he admits the possibility of a result being pro-

thing (internally) in the shape of well-being or (some other emotion) which is a thing different (from the patch of colour). It is not possible to maintain that a patch of, e. g., blue colour is felt as being itself the pleasure (it affords us), because the verdict of our intellect does not support (the judgment) «this patch of blue colour has itself the form of pleasure» (11.11). If it were the case, if we were satisfied that blue and pleasure are felt as equivalents, then we could maintain such identity.¹ (11.12). (We call) cognized directly that aspect of (the object) regarding which the function of direct perception, i. e., the mere pointing out of its presence, is followed by the construction (of the corresponding image). But (we cannot maintain that the sensation produced by a patch) of blue is followed by an image (not of blue, but of pleasure (11.13). Therefore we really are experiencing pleasure as something quite different from the object blue, as something which is not equivalent to blue, and this is, no doubt, knowledge. Therefore we do experience our own knowledge. Selfconsciousness is essentially a case of knowledge, it makes present to us our own Self. It is not a construction, it is not an illusion, and therefore it is direct knowledge.

(11.16). The intuition of (the Buddhist Saint), the Yogi, is next explained.

11. The (mystic) intuition of the Saint (the Yogi) is produced from the subculminational state of deep meditation on transcendental reality.²

¹ These remarks are directed against the Sāṅkhya theory which assumes that pleasure and pain are something external, inherent in the objects which produce pleasure and pain. Cp. Tipp, p. 32. 10

² This is a kind of perception which is entirely mental, not at all sensuous. It can be, to a certain degree, assimilated to sense-perception because of the vividness with which the contemplated picture presents itself to the imagination. In a system which assimilates all representations, even the perceptive presentations, to dreams, the difference between a dream and a perception consists mainly in the vividness (*apṛatībhāva*) of the latter. A new characteristic of perception is therefore introduced, the vividness of the mental image. The two former characteristics of «non-constructive» and «non-illusory», and the general characteristic of «not contradicted by experience» (*avisamādi*) may be interpreted so as to cover this kind of perception, but not without some difficulty. Mystic intuition (*yoga-pratyakṣa*) is that faculty of the Buddhist Saint (*ārya*) by which he is capable completely to change all ordinary habits of thought and contemplate directly, in a vivid image, that condition of the Universe which has been established by the abstract constructions of the philosopher. The Buddhist Saint is a man who, in addition to his moral perfections, is capable of contemplating the Universe *sub specie*

(8.8) It may be questioned that if (mental constructions) are not accompanied by words, how can we have the certainty that they are capable of being accompanied? We answer — because they are mental reflexes not limited¹ (strictly to the actually perceived). They are not limited, inasmuch as the cause which would be a limit, (the fact which would exactly correspond to them) is absent. An object apprehended² (by acquaintance) can produce in the mind only something limited (to the actually present) as, e. g., a patch of colour producing a visual impression³ can only produce a mental reflex limited to that very patch. But constructed knowledge⁴ is not produced by the object (actually apprehended) and therefore it is not a (narrowly) restricted mental reflex, since the factor corresponding to it does not exist, (it is created by the synthesis of productive imagination). (8.12) Why is it that such a construction (of productive imagination) is not produ-

form «this is that» *sa evāyam*, cp Tīpp, p 23.4; e. g., «this is Dittha» is *nāma-lāṭṭha*, «this is a patch of blue colour» is *guṇa-lāṭṭha*, «this is a cow» is *jāṇ-lāṭṭha* etc This can be called the «epistemological» form of judgment and every judgment reduces to this form, since it is a known fact, admitted now in European Logic, that in every real judgment a reference to some reality is always understood, cp Sigwart, *Logic*,² p 67. It can be also viewed as a construction, a division, a bifurcation an imagination (*vilāpa*) etc, since every such judgment suggests in its predicate a division of the whole into the predicate and its counterpart, e g., blue and not-blue, cow and not-cow etc Cp about *vilāpa* Mādhy. vṛtti, p 850 12 A detailed discussion of Dignāga's *lāṭṭha* is found in Tattvas, 1914—1911.

¹ The term *nyāta* was used above, p 3 16, in the sense of *nīcāta*, it was then the contrary of doubt and error. Both *gratyālpa* and *anumāna* have each their *nyāta-pratibhāsa* = *eta-pratibhāsa*, cp. p 7. 16 and 12. 19, this *prati-bhāsa* is referred to *anartha* in the case of *anumāna*, hence it is *vilāpa-nāya* infra, p 70 11 (*nyāta-ākāraḥ kalpito drasṭavyaḥ*) it likewise refers to the constructed, synthetic object, not to the momentary sensation (*lāṭṭha*), not to the absolutely particular (*evālakṣaṇa*) But here, in the sense of «limited», it is referred just to that momentary indefinite sensation. Even the representations of a new-born child are supposed to be synthetic images when compared with such sensation. The author assumes as quite evident that a mental construction is not something «limited», i e., limited to a single indefinite momentary sensation, *vilāpa-jñānasya anyāta-pratibhāsātām eva*, cp Tīpp, p 22 18 Thus it is that what is called *anyāta-pratibhāsa* (= *anyāta-ākāra*) in the context of p 8. 8, is called *nyāta-ākāra* in the context of p 70 11.

² *grāhya* is contrasted with *adhyataseya* = *prāpanīya*, cp. p 12. 16—17.

³ *calur-vijñāna*. Here *vijñāna* is used as in Abhidharma, it is «pure sensation» produced by colour and the organ of sight, cp my Central Conception, p 16.

⁴ *vilāpa-vijñānam*. In the Abhidharma this would not be termed *vijñāna*, but *saṃjñā* (= *mūṣṭi-udgrahana*) cp. Central Conception, p. 18.

vividness (of direct perception), and just for this reason it (ceases to be) a construction. (12.3). Constructed (synthetic) knowledge would apprehend the (same) reality in mental images capable of coalescing with words, (indirectly including) experiences (which go back to the time) of the formation of language. An experience (which reaches back to the time) of the formation of language means that its object has been apprehended by some knowledge produced at that time. (12.5). But just as a cognition that has happened a long time ago is gone and does not exist any more at present, just so is it impossible for an entity to be apprehended by past knowledge at the present moment. (12.6). Thus (synthetic knowledge) apprehends something that does not really exist, and since it does not apprehend its object as something present before the observer, it lacks the vividness (of direct perception) without which it remains a construction. But when this vividness is reached it becomes non-constructed (direct, non-synthetic knowledge). (12.8). Moreover it is not contradicted by experience, since (the object of meditation) which is being apprehended represents the «pure» object (the point-instants of efficiency that are elicited) by acquired the habit of realizing the Relativity (*śūnyatā*) and unreality of the phenomenal veil (*samvrti*) concealing absolute Reality (*paramārtha* = *bhūtārtha*). He enters the Mahāyānistic *drsti-mārga* and the first of the ten Mahāyānistic stages (*bhūmi*), the stage called *pramuditā*. At the same time he becomes filled with overwhelming devotion to the Salvation of all living beings (*mahā-kārmā*). Cp. Mādhyavatāra, I 4 ff. He then understands the «Four Truths of the Saints» in their Mahāyānistic interpretation as a formula intended to suggest the equipollency of Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa in a monistic Universe. This intuition is a transcendental (*śloṭhara*) capacity, it is not, like Spinoza's *intuitus*, supposed to be rational. *Yogipratyākṣa* is not a *pramāṇa* in the sense indicated above, p 8 n 2. It is an intuition of a condition unrecognizable by logical methods (*apramāṇa-lakṣaṇam aviparīṭa-dṛṣṭi*). However, according to the school of Yogācāra Logicians, it is a *pramāṇa* indirectly, because the relativity of all our conceptions (*vikalpa*) or judgments (*kalpanā*), as well as the non-relative, absolute (*paramārtha*) character of the unrecognizable «thing in itself» (*svataḥsana*) is established by logical analysis. Logic destroys the naïve realism of a pluralistic universe. The underlying Unity *samvrti śūnyatā* is uncharacterizable (*anirvacanīya*) according to the Relativists (*śūnya-vādin*), it is pure, undifferentiated consciousness (*śūnyatā* = *vyāṇa-mūtram grāhya-gāhaka-nirmukta*) according to the Idealists (*vyāṇa-vādin*). Cp. the controversy between the Logicians and the Relativists in my Nirvāṇa, p 140 ff. Cp. also the masterly exposition of the *Nāgārjuna-abhinata-yoga-pratīkṣa* in Tātp, p. 49 17 ff and N. Kanikā, p 147 4 ff. According to Sañjānāntaras. (concl.) the supreme Yogi, i e., the Buddha alone possibly intuits the undifferentiated Absolute, the ordinary Yogins can intuit only its subject-object aspect, cp. *niṣṭa* p 84 n 4. Cp. analogous ideas of Kant on impossibility of «intellectuelle Anschauung», Kritik,³ pp 72, 149, 808

of being associated with a word, it is non-constructive. But an auditive sensation¹ apprehends a strictly particular sound. This strictly particular sound (has a double character), on the one side it is a sound, on the other it can have a meaning. It follows that the strictly particular (sensation of a) sound corresponds to a mental reflex which is capable of coalescing with a word, and (there you are!), it is a construction!²

(S. 23) (Answer) The objection is not founded! It is true that the strictly particular sound may have this (double character) of a sound and a meaning, (and that meaning involves synthesis), nevertheless it is really apprehended in this double aspect (not as a present fact, but) as something which was experienced at the time of the formation of language³. (when sounds at first received their conventional meaning).

(S. 24) The fact that an entity has been experienced at that time (is bygone and) does not exist at present. And just as that experience⁴ has now vanished, just so is it impossible for a present object to be apprehended by past experience⁵. Hence an auditive sensation cannot

¹ We would expect, p. 8. 21 *śrotra-vyñāna*, cp. Tib., p. 20. 5, *rna-bas nam-par-bes-pa*.

² These remarks are directed against Vinītadeva. He has explained, p. 41. 8, that the words «a mental reflex capable of coalescing with a word» refer to the fact that the general aspect of an object can coalesce with a general term, because there is between these two generalities an invariable connection (*anivāryatireka*). There can be none between particulars. The particular must here be taken in the Buddhist sense as the absolute particular, the unique (*śāraṇa-sādhana*). The point-instant cannot coalesce with a word, cannot be named, (p. 41. 8) *arīhasya viśeṣaḥ, śāraṇasya (śva)-lāṣanasya rūpam, abhīlāpayitum na śakyate* (read *mi-nus-te* instead of *be-hus te*). Neither can any particular sound or word have a meaning (ibid., p. 41. 15, = *śabda-viśeṣena abhīlāpayitum na śakyate*), cp. Tativasg., p. 378. 7 *na hi śāraṇasane saṃketaḥ, nāpi śabda-śā-lāṣane*.

śāṅkya-samayo nīlādīnām ātmā. But the contention that «the particular word can have no meaning» has given Dharmottara an opportunity for criticism. He insists that a particular word can have a meaning, not the momentary sound by itself but its traditional associations which may reach back to the time of the formation of language. No doubt Vinītadeva means the same and Dharmottara's criticism is unfair. The T'ipp. remarks, p. 28. 15-16, *paramārthataḥ sāmānyayor eva rūpya-lācakatam, nārtha-śabda-viśeṣasya*. If such particulars would be named we would have a so called *atiprasaṅga*, an «over-absurdity», we could name the cow a horse and vice versa, because the underlying point-instant, the *śāraṇasane* are undistinguishable. Cp. also above p. 19 n. 4. In his introduction to *Santānāntara-siddhi-tīkā* Vinītadeva gives expression to similar ideas.

³ *samketa-lāṣa*.

⁴ *darsana*.

⁵ Lat. p. 9. 1 «Indeed just as perception existing at the time of name-giving is now extinct just so there is to-day also no «its objectivity» of the thing».

(12.15). (Every) reality, indeed, has its real essence which is the particular (the unique) and a general (imagined aspect) That which is apprehended in direct perception is the unique. The object of cognition is really double, the *prima facie* apprehended and the definitely realized. (The first is) that aspect which appears directly (in the first moment)¹ (The second is the form which is constructed perceptively) in a judgment.² (12.17). The directly perceived and the distinctly conceived are indeed two different things. What is immediately apprehended in sensation³ is only one moment. What is distinctly conceived is always a compact chain of moments cognized in a construction⁴ on the basis of sensation, (e g., "this is blue") And just this constructed synthesis of a chain of moments is (finally) realized by direct perception, because a unique moment can never be realized in a definite cognition. (12.19). (The opposite course is taken by) indirect knowledge (inference) An unreality appears in it to the mind, and its course consists in distinctly cognizing an unreality as (a kind of) reality⁵ It apprehends (*prima facie*) an unreality. But this imagined object, which is apprehended (by inference), is definitely referred to an (imagined) particular. (12.21) Thus it is that constructed particulars are the proper province of inference, but its immediate object is an unreality (12.22) Consequently when the author makes the statement that the object of direct knowledge is the particular, he means the immediate (*prima facie*) object (i e., one moment, the unique)⁶

(12.23) Further, how can we recognize (the presence of such a momentary) object of knowledge which is the particular?

this point of absolute reality against the Mādhyamikas who maintained a Universal Relativity (*śūnyatā*) of knowledge, and tried to prove that even this "thing in itself" was relative, cp. the interesting controversy about the relativity of the "thing in itself" between Candrakīrti and Dignāga in the Mādhy. vrtti, translated in my Nirvāṇa, p 149 ff Cp Tipp., p 35 and Bradley, Princ. 2 p 647 ff.

¹ *yadālakāram* is an *avyayabhāva* = *yasya ākāram anantīkrmya*

² *yam adhyavasyati* ³ *pratyaśeṣya*

⁴ *māṣayena* = *kalpanayā* = *vikalpena* = *adhyavasāyena*, cp Tipp., p 37 25

⁵ For the lit. rendering cp p 17 n 6 (text, p 7 13)

⁶ Dharmakīrti evidently uses the term "thing in itself" (*ataisana*) in more than one sense. The same, as is well known, has happened in European philosophy. It means, 1) existence absolutely indefinite, not even differentiated into subject and object, it is then *grāhya-grāhaka-lalpanā-apekha*—it is the Absolute of the Yogācāras, the *śūnyatā* in its idealistic conception (*buddhy-ātmā*), cp. my Nirvāṇa, p 146 ff, the verses quoted in Sarvad., p 167 ff (B I) and the concluding passage of Śāntīnāntarā-siddhi; 2) the extreme concrete and parti-

an internal cause of illusion. (9.14). But each of these causes, whether they be located in the organ or in the object, whether external or internal, invariably affect the organ of sense, because when the organ of sense is normal¹ there can be no illusive sensation.² All these causes of disease, down to the internal one, are but an exemplification of the possible causes. (9.16) The words «and other causes» are added in order to include such organic diseases as the disturbance of vision by jaundice, such objective causes as a rapid movement to and fro. When, e g., the firebrand is seen rapidly moving to and fro, we have the illusion of a fiery-coloured stick. Such external causes as riding on an elephant and such internal ones as the effect of strong blows on vulnerable parts of the body are also included. Cognition when it is free from illusion called forth by these causes is perceptive knowledge.³

§ 5. THE VARIETIES OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE.

(9.20). After having thus given the definition (of direct knowledge the author now) proceeds to point out its different varieties, in order to refute the divergent opinions of those who maintain that there is no other direct knowledge but sense-perception, of those who find fault with our definition of mental sensation, and of those who admit neither self-consciousness nor the transcendental intuition of the Buddhist Saint. He says,

7. It is fourfold

(10.2). There are four varieties of direct knowledge.

¹ *avīṛta*.

² *indriya-bhṛānti*. It follows from this expression, if it is not a metaphorical one, that illusions are partly to be put on the account of the senses, and partly on the account of the interpretation of sense-data by the reason, cf. above, p. 19 n.

³ Vinītadeva, p. 43. 9, calls attention to the fact that the word «knowledge» (*jñāna*) is absent in sūtra I. 4, where the definition of perception is given, but it appears here, in sūtra I. 6. It seems as though some opponents had objected to an absolutely pure sense-perception without the slightest admixture of the combining intellect and maintained that it would not even represent knowledge, since the senses are by themselves unconscious, *agñāna-svabhāvaḥ* . . . *pratyakṣam*, cp. Tattvaśā, p. 366. 21 Vinītadeva, p. 43. 10 ff, and Kamalaśīla, p. 367. 1 ff, therefore maintain (in supporting their view by the same example) that *jñāna* must be understood in the definition implicitly. This apparently is approved by Dh., cp. Tipp., p. 26. 6 (read *bhṛānter*). Dharmakīrti's addition of the word *abhrānta* has given rise to a great deal of disagreement among all commentators. He himself here explains it as including not only hallucinations, but every kind of illusive perception. Dignāga includes all empirical knowledge (*samvṛti*), as well as all inference into his *pratyakṣābhāsa*, cp. Pr. samucc., I. 8. The term *pramāṇa* is thus used either in a direct or in an indirect sense. Real *pramāṇa* is only the pure *pratyakṣa*.

(13.8). Further, why is the particular the exclusive object of sense-perception?¹ Indeed, do we not realize in distinct thought a fire (when its presence is indirectly inferred from smoke), as something capable of being experienced, (as a permanent possibility of sensation)?

14 That alone (which is unique) represents ultimate reality.

(13.11). Ultimately real means something not constructed, not imagined. What so exists is the ultimately real. That object alone (which contains no construction), which produces an impression sharp or dim, according as it is near or remote, is the only real. Since it is just that thing which is the object (producing) direct perception, therefore the particular, (i. e., the unique moment, the thing in itself) is the exclusive object of sense-perception.

(13.14). Why again is this (absolute particular, the non-constructed point-instant) alone the ultimate reality?

15. Because the essence of reality is just² efficiency.

(13.16). What is aimed at is the object. It is either something to be avoided or something to be attained. The first repels, the second attracts. The object, i. e., the aim, has an action, i. e., produces something. The efficiency, i. e., the capacity to produce something, is a force. Just that is the character, or the essence³ of reality, (viz. to be a centre of forces). The test (of reality) is to be a force producing action (attracting or repelling something). For this reason (the unique,

universal (*sāmānyasya*), on the contrary, does not (change) in its image as clear or dim. (Read, p. 87 5, *śāśanam na bhavati*). According to Vinitadeva *asphuta* would mean dim in the sense of abstract, imagined, absent.

1 The following words are an answer to an objector who thinks that whatsoever produces a reflex (*pratibhāsa* = *pratibumbana*) in us is real, the universal (*sāmānya*) produces a corresponding reflex, therefore it is also real. It is answered that the efficient point-instant is alone ultimately real, the universal does not possess any separate efficiency of its own. The existence of a reflex is not a proof of reality, because by the influence of the force of transcendental illusion (*avidyā-balāt*) unreal things can evoke a reflex. A mental image does not exactly correspond to any efficient reality, because the image of a universal can be produced without the real existence of the universal (*vināpi sāmānyena*), simply by the force of inherited mental habit (*vāsanā-balāt*), cp Tipp., p. 88 2-3.

2 Read, p. 18 16, — *lakṣanātād eva vastutah* Cp Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, I 1 92-93.

3 *rūpam* = *śarīrakam*

(10.14) A similar (correlation exists between the sensations of ordinary men and those of the Yogi who is supposed to be capable of apprehending them directly. But in that case a foreign sensation is the objective fact followed by the Yogi's perception of it.¹ In order to distinguish this (analogous case of correlation between a sensation and the following moment of consciousness) the words "immediate" and "homogeneous" have been inserted. It is homogeneous as a mental content, and it is immediate, since there is no interval between them, and it is a cause, since it is followed by it. Thus it is an immediately preceding (moment in the same chain of momentary entities). Upon it (a mental sensation follows, i. e.), springs up (10.16). Thus it is being expressed that the outer sense and the inner sense represent (two succeeding moments), two parts of the same compact series (of one stream of thought, and in this sense) mental (or internal) sensation is a species of direct knowledge. Thus the intuition of the Yogi is discriminated, since it is part of another stream (of thought, different from the stream to which the sensation he is able to divine belongs).

(10.18) (Two objections have been raised against this theory of a mental sensation, 1) it is a repeated cognition of the same object and is no new cognition at all, and 2) if it is a real cognition of an external object, then the blind and the deaf would be able to apprehend colour and sound through mental sensation). But since the object of the inner sense differs from the object of the outer sense, (the reproach of repetition, i. e.), of not being a cognition because of apprehending what has been already apprehended by the outer senses, is ill-founded (10.19). On the other hand, since the moment of grasping by the outer sense is underlying the moment of grasping by the inner

164 ff and Index 6, s. v. Causality The main point is here very well expressed. There is no question, in the Buddhist outlook, of one entity really *producing* or *influencing* another out of itself or with the help of other forces, but there is a *coordination* between moments following one another in an uninterrupted flow of a stream of becoming events. There is no duration, no stabilized entities which could have the time to produce one another. This is the real general import of *pratītya-samutpāda* as contrasted with *adhītya-samutpāda* and other theories.

¹ Lit. p. 10.14 "By such sensation, when it becomes an objective condition, a direct perception of the Yogi (can) be produced", i. e., the Yogi owing to his extraordinary gift of divination may guess what the sensations of another man are, but the relation of the guessed sensations to his intuition will not be that of *samanantara-pratyaya* towards its *phala*, but that of an *ālambana-pratyaya*. In an irreproachable (*āśoda-lsama*) scientific definition even such subtle faults against precision must be foreseen in order to make it secure against all cavil.

(14.10). (The author) now states that this universal essence can be apprehended by indirect knowledge. He says,

17. It is the province of indirect knowledge (inference).

(14.12) It is the province of indirect knowledge, i. e., it is *prima facie* apprehended¹ (by inference).²

For convenience's sake this remark about the object of inference is inserted in the chapter on direct perception, because if it were intended to discuss the general essence as the object of inference in the (second chapter), it would have been necessary to repeat the whole passage in which the essence of the particular is treated.³

§ 7. THE RESULT OF THE ACT OF COGNIZING.

(14.15) After having repudiated misconceptions regarding the object of perception, (the author) proceeds to clear away that wrong theory which assumes a (difference between cognition and its) result.

18 This direct cognition itself is the result of cognizing.

¹ *grāhya-rūpa*.

² *Int.*, p. 14.12. «The pronoun has assumed the gender of the (word denoting) the subject-matter».

³ As the object cognized through inference we must here understand its immediate, *prima facie* object (*grāhya-rūpa*) which is always an imagined (*tālpa*), unreal (*anartha*) object. When we, e. g., infer the presence of fire from the presence of smoke, we imagine the fire, it is *prima facie* a fire in general. But the second step in this act of cognition will be to imagine it as a real fire, a possible object of purposive action, a possible sense-datum. Thus the particular sense datum will also be an object cognized ultimately through inference, but indirectly. The result (*pramāna-phala*) of both modes of cognition from this point of view is just the same, cp. ch. II.4. Inference is *sārūpya-lakṣaṇam pramānam*, *text.*, p. 6.10, but perception is also *sārūpya-pramānam*, I. 20. The divergence between the schools about the object of cognition (*viśaya-vipratipatti*) concerns only this *prima facie* object of each, cp. *Tipp.*, p. 36.5—6, *grāhya eva viśaye sarvessām vipratipattiḥ*. Since all the exposition is here made with a view to combat divergent opinions (*vipratipattiḥ nirākaraṇārtham*), therefore, when it is stated that the object cognized through inference is the universal, we must understand only that the first stage in indirect cognition of reality is not that pure sensation (*nirvāṇa*) which is characteristic in sense-perception. In this there is divergence with the Realists who assume a direct contact (*sannikarṣa*) between the senses and the Universal.

10. Every consciousness and every mental phenomenon are self-conscious.

(11.5). Consciousness simply apprehends (the presence) of an object. Mental phenomena apprehend special states of consciousness, such as pleasure etc.¹ It is (emphasized) that every (flash of) consciousness and every special state of it are self-conscious. Indeed pleasure etc. are being clearly experienced and therefore are present to the mind. (Self-consciousness) is not itself a (special) mental phenomenon differing from all others. In order to remove this supposition the word «every» has been inserted into the definition.² (11.7) There is no mental phenomenon whatsoever it may be which could be unconscious of its own existence. (This feeling of its own existence, is) immediate (direct) cognition.³ (11.8). For, indeed, (we feel our own existence in some way or other, and) this aspect of our knowledge, which represents a feeling of its own existence, is direct knowledge.⁴ (11.9). According to our (system when an external) reality, such as (a patch) of colour, is apprehended, we at the same time feel some-

duced from a heterogeneous cause But then the hypothesis becomes useless Dharmottara seems to say «let it be useless, but it involves no contradiction». It is evidently not what was meant by Dignāga Dh is again misled by his polemical fervour The position regarding *mano-vijñāna* or *mano-vijñāna-dhātu*, the *dhātu* № 18, is quite different, cp my Central Conception, p 17. After having established a radical distinction between the parts of the senses and of the intellect in cognition, Dignāga was evidently in want of something which would be partly sensuous and partly mental. He thus established his «mental sensation». A similar course, as is well known, has been taken in European philosophy. Some particulars about this exceedingly interesting theory of a mental sensation as well as translations from Vācaspati and the Tipp will be given in an Appendix.

¹ Not alone feelings are here meant, but all other mental phenomena, all *cāstasika-dharmas*, ideas, volitions, passions, etc.

² According to the Abhidharma consciousness (*cittam* = *manah* = *vijñāna* = *mana-āyatana* = *mano-dhātu*) is imagined as a separate element of pure consciousness which accompanies every cognition, cp. my Central Conception p. 16.

³ Lat., p. 11 7—8 «There is whatsoever no condition of consciousness in which the cognition of its own self is not immediate».

⁴ Lat., p. 11 8. «Indeed in what form the Self is felt in that form the feeling of the Self is immediate (*pratyakṣa*)». This remark is directed against the Indian realists, the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas who imagined in self-perception a real relation of cognizing mind towards a cognized Self. According to the Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras this relation does not exist in reality. Our knowledge is self-luminous (*svayam-prakāśa*) like the light of a lamp that does not want another light in order to be illuminated The Vaibhāṣikas and Mādhyamikas did not agree in this doctrine

right knowledge. When this (result) is reached, knowledge becomes efficient. (But this does not mean that the efficiency-function is something different from knowledge itself) (15.3). We have indeed stated above¹ that the efficiency function of efficient knowledge is nothing but the fact that it makes manifest the object of possible purposive action. Just the same perceptive knowledge² possesses (both) the character of being a distinct cognition of the object and of pointing to (the presence of the object in one's ken). Therefore the result of cognizing is but cognition itself (15.6) But then, if knowledge as a cognizing act³ is the result of cognition, what indeed is the instrument, (the source) of that act?

20. The source of cognizing consists in coordination (between the constructed image and its real) object.

(15.8). The fact of coordination,⁴ or conformity between cognition and its object, this is (a fact that might be interpreted as a kind of)

¹ Text, p 3 ff, transl, p 4

² *pratyaśa* is here used not in the meaning of sensation, but it is comprehensive of definite perception (*savikalpaka*) also

³ *pramiti-rūpa*

⁴ There is a coordination of the «thing in itself» with all the elements constituting the superimposed image or Universal. The term *sārūpya* is suggestive of a special theory of Universals. The Buddhists are neither Realists, nor Conceptualists but extreme Nominalists (*apoha-cārinah*). The school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika represents in India an extreme Realism, they use the term *sāmānya* and admit the objective reality of classes (*jāti*), individual forms (*ākṛti*) as well as particular things (*vyākṛti*). The Sāṃkhya deny *sāmānya* and admit *sārūpya*, on my Central Conception, p 56, 57, 64. The Mīmāṃsakas, very characteristically, admit both *sāmānya* and *sārūpya* (= *sādrśya*), as two separate *padārthas*, the latter is said to be relative, while the former represents the positive content of general features residing in an individual thing, its «form» (*ākāra*). The Buddhists of the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra schools likewise admit, but with very important qualifications, the «forms» of our ideas, they are *sākāra-cārinah*. Pure consciousness alone (*cittī-sattā*) could never produce a distinct cognition, because it is not differentiated (*avasthā-avibhaktā*). But «similarity» (*sārūpya*), or generality, «entering» into it (*tām āvśati*) is capable of giving it a form (*sārūpyavasthā ghatayet*), i e, of producing a clear and distinct idea. However we cannot, on this score, characterize the Buddhists as Conceptualists. Their Universals are purely negative, or relational (*viśad-vyākṛti-rūpa*). Their scope, their content, is always determined by the greater or lesser amount of negations, contrasts or «coordinations» which they may include. An elephant and a dog, although quite dissimilar, may be united as belonging to the «class» of «non-anthropes». The class «cow» is formed by contrasting it with horse etc. The Universals are relative and therefore unreal, the human mind's imagination. They obtain

(11 18). Reality is something really existing, (i. e., transcendental reality) Such reality is elicited (by the philosopher) after logical criticism, e. g., the Four Truths of the Buddhist Saint.¹ The contemplation of transcendental reality means its repeated forcing into consciousness. The culminating point of such contemplation means the point when our mind, containing the image of the contemplated object, begins to reach a condition of clarity (as though the fact were present before the meditator) (11 20). The adjoining (stage is that stage) when the clarity is as yet not quite complete. Indeed, as long as the clarity of the image is not quite complete, progress is going on, when it is complete progress ceases. Thus, what is called a condition nearly culminational is that degree of clarity which precedes complete vividness (11 23). (A state of mind) which is brought about by this underculminational point, a knowledge apprehending with absolute vividness the contemplated (image), as though it were actually present before the meditator, this is the Saint's direct perception.

(12 1) There are indeed here (three degrees of transic absorbtion, the first) is that when the image begins to be clear, contemplation is in progress, the (second) is the subculminational degree, when (the Saint) contemplates the (ideal) reality as though it were veiled by a thin cloud; in (the third) the object is perceived just as clearly as though it were a small grain on the palm of one's hand — this latter is the Saint's direct knowledge² (12 3). It has indeed the *aeternitatis*. Cp my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 16 ff. The *Mīmāṃsakas* deny the existence of *yogas* and of mystic intuition altogether, cp *Tipp*, 25 5, where correct *na santi* instead of *na sampatti*.

¹ About the Four Truths cp my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 16 and 55. Their Mahāyānistic interpretation is here alluded to. They then are the equivalent of the «two truths», the empirical and the absolute, the latter is the *bhūtartha=yañ-dag-par don*,¹ i. e., the real condition of things, or transcendental reality, so as it has been established by the philosopher (*pramāṇena tīkṣita*), it is *ksanikabuddi-grāhī mano vyāñānam* (*Tipp*, p. 88 9), *ksanikabuddi* is contemplated also by the Hinayānistic Saint, the Arhat. The Bodhisattva contemplates *śūnyatā* either in its idealistic (*Yogācāra*) or in its relativistic (*Mādhyamika*) interpretation. But the abstract form of these philosophic constructions (*atīkāhāram vācya-vācaka-rūpam*) then vanishes and remains a kind of direct vivid consciousness (*nyam vitti-rūpam*), cp *Tipp*, p. 34 7.

² According to *Vinitadeva*, p. 47, the *bhāvanā-prākāśa* comprises 4 degrees, *smṛty-upasthāna*, *asmogata*, *mūrdhāna* and *ksānti*, the *prākāśa-paryanta* is the same as *laukikāgradharma*. About these so called *śraddhā-bhāgiya*-stages and the *smṛty-upasthāna* cp *Abhidh. Kośa*, VI 14 ff. and VI 20 ff. After that comes the decisive moment, the meditating man suddenly acquires the faculty of transcendental intuition (*yogi-pratyakṣa*), he changes completely, it is another *puṇḍga*, a Saint, an *ārya*, a *bodhisattva*. All his habits of thought have changed, he has

tion of the object means a self-conscious idea¹ of it. Coordination is the cause producing (distinctness). (15.15). Direct cognition² of an object in the form of a perceptive judgment³ is possible, i. e., (the object is really) being cognized, owing to the coordination (of an image with a point of external reality and its contrast⁴ with correlative images). (15.16). Indeed, as soon as our awareness⁵ (begins to present itself as an image⁶ of something blue, only then can we judge⁷ that we have a distinct cognition of it (in the form «this is blue», «it is not non-blue»). It then is (really) cognized

(15.17). The senses, indeed, and⁸ (the object which together) produce (in us an indefinite) sensation⁹ are not equal (to the task) of determining it as an awareness of the presence in us of a self-conscious image¹⁰ of something blue. But as soon as we become aware of its similarity with (other) blue (objects and its contrast with everything non-blue), it then can be determined as a self-conscious image of (what is) blue.

(15.18) However, the relation (which is here admitted to exist between coordination) as producing and (cognition) as obtaining (distinctness) is not founded upon a causal relation (as between two things). It would be a contradiction (to assume such a relation in what, in our opinion), is but the same entity. On the other hand, the relation of being determined (as a content) and of determining it (as a process can be assumed to exist in what is essentially but one thing)¹¹

¹ *avabodha* is the term preferred by Mīmāṃsakas, = *adhigama* = *prāpti* = *prāpti* = *adhyavasāya*, cp N Kamāk, p 161.26, 187.21

² *vyākāṇa* means here *jñāna*, cp sūtra I 18, = Tib, p 85 4, *śes-pa*

³ *prāpti* = *adhyavasāya* = *lāpānā*, cp above, p 20 n 6

⁴ *sāriṣya* = *anya-vyāvṛti* = *apoha*

⁵ *vyākāṇa* = Tib, p 85.6, *rnam-par-śes-pa*, includes the abhidharmic sense of pure sensation

⁶ (*jñāna*)-*mr̥bhāsa* = *prātibhāsa* = *ālāna*

⁷ *avasiyate*, hence *prāpti* = *adhyavasāya*, *avasiyate* = *prāptam bhavati*

⁸ *āda* refers to *ālambana*, since according to the abhidharma two *pratyaya*s produce sensation, *ālambana* and *ādhyatma* (= *indriya*)

⁹ *vyākāṇa* includes here also the abhidharmic sense of pure sensation, the Tib p 85.7 has *śes-pa* instead of *rnam-par-śes-pa*, cp above, p 6 n 3

¹⁰ *samvādana* = *sva-samvādana*

¹¹ In this and the following passage we must distinguish, 1) the relation between perceptive knowledge as a mental act (*pramāṇa-rūpa*) and perception as an instrument (*pramāṇa*) of cognizing through the senses, and 2) the relation between the initial, indefinite moment of sensation (*mr̥tālāpaka*) produced by the object and the final construction of its image by synthetic thought (*saṁvādana*). The

logical (analysis)¹ Hence it is direct knowledge, just as (sensation) and other varieties of direct cognition are. Yoga is ecstatic (direct) contemplation The man who possesses this faculty is a Saint²

(12.9). So much is to be said about the different varieties of direct knowledge

§ 6 THE OBJECT OF DIRECT KNOWLEDGE.

(12 11). Having done with the exposition of the varieties of direct knowledge which (includes) no construction and no illusion, (the author) proceeds to clear away the misconceptions concerning its object and says,

12 Its object is the (extreme) particular.

(12 14) Its object, i e, the object of the fourfold direct knowledge, must be conceived as being the particular. The particular means an entity or an essence which is unique, which is shared by nothing else (which is the thing in itself)³

¹ *pramāṇa-sūddha-artha-grāhī* either means *pramāṇena sūddham artham grāhātī* or *sūddhārtham pramāṇena grāhātī*. The first would mean *pramāṇena sūddham = pramāṇena vinnīyatam, artham = bhūtartham, grāhātī*. The second — *sūddhārtham = svalakṣanam = artha-kṛiyā-kāri-lakṣanam pramāṇena grāhātī*. The Tipp, p 36 1, seems to favour the second interpretation, on p 24 5 and 24 9 it uses the word *sūddha* in a similar way. The expressions *sūddhā laipānā, sūddham pratyakṣam, sūddhārīhaḥ* remind us of Kant's terminology of «reine Vernunft», «reine Sinnlichkeit», «reines Object». The definition of right knowledge as knowledge «not contradicted by experience» (*avisamvādi*), which sounds so empirical, is here, in mystic intuition, interpreted as referring to the transcendental object.

² Vinītadeva, p. 48—49, reckons likewise as *yogi-pratyakṣa* the various gifts of supernatural divination and prophecy with which the Yogis are credited Dhī's comment contains here not a single word about them

³ The peculiarity of Dignāga's doctrine about the particular and the general consists in its conception of the particular as the unique. The existence in every direct cognition of «something unique by being present to me in perception» is also pointed out by Bosanquet, Logic, I 76. Here it assumes the rôle of the «thing in itself», it is the absolute particular, the limit of all synthetic construction. It represents a single moment (*ksana*), it has no extension in space (*deśa-ananugata*), no duration in time (*kāla-ananugata*), it is similar to nothing (*sarvato-vyāvṛtta*), it is unique (*irailōka-vyāvṛtta*), cp Tātparyaṣ p 12. 20 It is a transcendental reality, since it cannot be realized in a definite representation (*jñānena prāpyatūm aśakyatvāt*). Cognized are only generalities or similarities, relations, coordinations, by a synthesis of moments (*pīrāpara-lakṣaṇām abheda-adhyavasāyāt*). It is the absolute reality, the «thing in itself» which underlies every efficient empirical reality (*dāhādya-artha-kṛiyā*). Dignāga has established

certain extent, a process of cognition and, to a certain extent, a resulting content of it, this will not involve us into contradiction.

(15.21). Coordination is indeed the cause imparting distinctness to our cognition. Our self-conscious image of (e.g.) a blue patch is, on the other hand, the content obtaining distinctness. And if it is asked how is it possible for the same cognition to be (at once) obtaining and imparting distinctness, we shall answer as follows

(15.22) When we become aware of the similarity of our cognition (with other blue objects), it then appears (as though) grasping something blue in a definite judgment, ("this is blue").¹ But (at the same time our cognition is being determined as a self-conscious image of the blue, (it may then be regarded as a content which is being grasped and thus) obtains distinctness

(16.3). Therefore coordination, when (it is regarded as a process and) contrasted (with other processes which are) not coordination, becomes the cause conferring distinctness (and self-consciousness on our cognitions). But when (the process has been, as it were, stabilized and) our cognition appears as a self-conscious image of the blue, it is then contrasted (with other ideas which are) not images of the blue (and it then can be regarded as a content) obtaining distinctness.²

(16.4). What imparts distinctness (to our cognitions) is a constructed image. It must be regarded as something which is called forth (in us) by the influence of (pure) sensation.³ But it is not itself (strictly speaking) a sense-perception,⁴ because the latter is (passive), non-constructive⁵ and therefore it is not capable of delimiting its own self in the shape of a self-conscious image of the blue patch.⁶

(16.6). Although our sensation which has not yet been determined in the judgment⁷ ("this is blue") really exists, it is nevertheless

¹ *niscaya-pratyaya* = *lalpanā*, cp. above p. 20 n. 6

² Lat., p. 16.22—16.4 "Because this cognition (*vyākhyāna*), being experienced (*anubhūyamāna*) as similar, is settled in a thought of ascertainment as grasping the blue, therefore similarity, when it is grasped, is the cause of establishing. And this knowledge, when being established in a thought of ascertainment as a self-conscious cognition (*samvedana*) of blue, is (the result) which is being established. Therefore similarity is a cause establishing cognition by excluding the non-similar. And its having the form a conscious idea (*bodha*) of blue is being established by excluding the idea of non-blue"

³ *pratyakṣa-bala* = *nirvikalpa-bala*

⁴ *pratyakṣam eva.*

⁶ *nīla-bodha*

⁵ *nirvikalpatvāt*

⁷ *niscaya-pratyayena*

13. When the mental image varies according as the object is near or remote, the object then is the particular.

(13.2). The term "object" means object of cognition, i. e., an object which is being cognized. "Near" means localized in a near place, "remote"—localized in a remote place¹ (13.3). According as the object is near or remote, it produces a different mental image, a different form of the directly cognized (first moment), making it either vivid or dim.² (13.4) When an object of cognition produces a vivid (flash) of consciousness, if it is near, and a dim one, if it is, although remote, but still amenable to the senses, it is a particular. (13.6). Indeed, all (external) reality is vividly experienced when near, and dimly apprehended at a distance. This is (an indication of the presence of) a particular

cular, the *Hoc Aliquid*—*lambid idam*, the pure *āmbana*, existence localized in time-space (*āsana*), the limit of all mental constructions (*nāma-jātyūdhā-kalpanā-apodha*, but not *grāhya-grāhaka-kalpanā-apodha*), the point-instant of efficiency capable of affecting our sensibility (*artha-kriyā-samartha*), it then already contains what Kant would have called the *a priori* forms of our sensibility, the possibility of coordination (*āśrēpya*), if not already some rudimentary coordination; such is the meaning here and on this score it is sometimes supposed (Tipp, p 19 10) that Dignāga's school was partly *Santrāntika*; 3) (metaphorically) every concrete and particular (= *vyakti*) object, since its substratum is the thing in itself.

¹ Vinītadeva has explained *sannidhāna* as presence in the ken and *asannidhāna* as total absence, p 50 1, *thams-cad-ly: thams-cad-du med-pa*, cp Tipp, p 86 9—10 The sūtra would then refer to the presence or absence of an object in the ken This interpretation seems much preferable

² In order to understand this passage we must fully realize that, according to Dh.'s terminology, e. g., a fire, the physical object fire, is a construction, hence it is a generality or an assemblage of generalities The strictly particular is its underlying substratum (*upādhi*), the efficient point-instant (*artha-kriyā-samartha*) If the same reality could change and produce a clear image in one case, and a dim one in another, it would not be unique (*viśva-deśam syāt*) The author of the Tipp, p 86. 14 ff, asks, "But is it not a generality that, being perceived at a distance, appears in a dim image? it, is not the particular (point-instant)" And he answers that a generality by itself is something unreal, it does not exist in the sense of being efficient, efficiency always belongs to a point-instant of efficiency. And further, p 87. 9 ff, "The clear or dim image of the blue patch is not transcendently real (*astu = paramārthasat*), but that blue which represents the atom, (the underlying point-instant) which is capable of being efficient (is the real object), the clear and dim images are produced by the underlying substratum... , the real object (*arthasya = paramārthasatah*) appears as clear or dim not by itself (*paramārthatah*), but (indirectly) through the clearness or the dimness of the image (*gñānasya*), an

the procedure of constructive thought consists in imagination¹ (16 16). Therefore, when we have a perceptive judgment (concerning the presence) of an object (in our ken), (although it is a construction, nevertheless) our synthetic thought conceals (as it were) its proper function, and gives prominence to the function of direct presentation. We then (usually say) that it is just perception alone that has brought us this knowledge.²

End of the first chapter of the Short Treatise of Logic.

¹ Lat., p. 16. 16—17. «Thus from experience (*anubhava*) they resolve that the function of thought is (productive) imagination. Therefore in what object judgment (*adhyavasāya*) preceded by sensation (*pratyakṣa*), after having concealed its own function, presents the function of sensation, there just pure sensation alone is the source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*)»

² This concluding passage might have been easily misunderstood as suggesting that the discussion about the process and the result of cognition refers to the relation between the sensation and the following construction, or judgment, but it is not so. The trend of the discussion is to show that self-consciousness is not the attribute of a Soul, but it is immanent to every cognition without exception, it is neither a substance, nor the attribute of a substance, it is *śāntā*. Pure sense-perception, says Tattvas, p. 390 7, although containing no construction, possesses the force of evoking a construction, or a judgment, *avikalpakaṁ apī jñānam evikalpotpatti-śaktimat*. As stated above, p. 43 n., there is here a causal relation between two facts. The Buddhists do not in the least deny that in cognition the first indefinite sensation (*nirvikalpaka*) is followed by the construction of a definite image or idea (*avikalpaka* = *prāpti*), and the latter by a purposive action (*arthakriyā*). They do not deny that the preceding step is the cause and the following the result, (with the proviso of the Buddhist conception of Causation). But in considering the question of the result they neglect the separate moments (*prāptiparavoh śāntayor ekatādhyavasāyāt*, Tipp, p. 41. 1), they take cognition as a unity and maintain that the result of the act of cognizing is cognition, or the self-conscious idea. As against the Realists they maintain that we do not know the external object, our images are not constructed by the external world, but the external world is constructed according to our images, that there is no «act of grasping» of the object by the intellect, that our idea of the object is a unity to which two different aspects are imputed, the «grasping» aspect (*grāhaka-ākāra*) and the «grasped» aspect (*grāhya*). This same idea is also the idea of the potential purposive action (*prāpana-yogyā-lakṣaṇa-ākāra*). In this sense there is no difference between the act and the result of cognition, between *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* and we may by imputation speak of a coordination (*sārupya*) of the blue with a recognizable point of reality, and its distinction from the not-blue, as a kind of source of our knowledge, cp. below the note on p. 49—50

i. e., the point-instant is the only reality). The term «real object»¹ is synonymous with «ultimate reality»

(13.18) The following is meant. We apply the term «ultimately real» to anything (that can be tested) by its force to produce an effect.² Such an efficient object (is always localized, it) is either near or remote. Depending on (its localization) it produces different impressions.³ Therefore such (a localized point) is the ultimately real. (13.20). This indeed is the reason why purposive actions are realized in regard of objects directly perceived, not in regard of objects constructed (by imagination). (13.21). This explains the fact that an imagined object, although we can in thought realize it as something *quasi* visible, is by no means directly perceived, because no purposive action is possible upon (such fancied image). (14.1). A (really) perceived object, on the other hand, produces purposive action. Consequently real is only the particular (i. e., the unique point of efficiency, the thing in itself), not the constructed object (of imagination).⁴

16. Different from it is the universal character (of the object)

(14.4) The object of knowledge which is other than the unique (point), which does not represent the unique point, is its general character. An object, indeed, which is distinctly conceived by synthetic imagination does not produce different impressions when it is (imagined) in a near or in a remote place. (14.6) An imagined fire owes its existence to imagination, and it is imagination that makes it near or remote. When it is imagined, may it be as near or as remote, there is no different impression on the mind in regard of vividness. Therefore it is said to be different from the particular (from the unique). (14.8) The universal character of something is that essence which exists owing to generality, i. e. that essence which belongs equally (to an indefinite number of) points of reality. Indeed, (the fire) existing in imagination refers equally to every possible fire. Therefore it represents the universal essence.

¹ *vastu*

² *artha-īryā-samartha*

³ Lit. «reflexes», *jñāna-pratibhāsa*

⁴ Although Time, Space and Causality are regarded as constructions, but their underlying efficient point-instants are the ultimate reality, cp *infra*, p. 69,11 (text). They correspond to the second conception of a «thing in itself», cp. above. p. 34 n; it is partly different from the Kantian one.

(17.9). What are these two varieties?

2. For one self and for others

(17.11). (Internal inference is) inference «for one self». When we cognize something (internally) for ourselves, the inference is an internal (process of cognition). (Its formulation in speech) is inference «for others», it is (a method) of communicating knowledge to others.

(17.18). Between these two inferences, for oneself and for others, what is the characteristic of the first? The author says,

3. A cognition which is produced (indirectly) through a mark that has a threefold aspect, and which refers to an object, (not perceived, but) inferred—is internal inference¹

(18.2). The threefold aspect of the mark will be treated later on² A (logical) mark is that by which something is *marked off*, which conveys something, (from which something indirectly follows) (18.3) The words «produced from this threefold mark» characterize internal inference by its origin. (18.4) The words «referring to an inferred object» characterize it from the objective side. What is produced by this threefold mark is also an object upon which the threefold mark is directed (18.5) Thus the definition will be — internal inference is cognition³

dian conceptions Every synthetic operation of thought, *sārvāpā-lōkanam pramāṇam anumānam*, as opposed to the non-synthetic ideal sense-perception, is inference Kant's conception about two transcendental sources of knowledge, the senses and the intellect, comes much nearer to Dignāga's standpoint than our usual ideas about sense-perception and inference. In *Pr samucc.*, II. 1—2, the reason is given that inference alone receives a double treatment, as a process of thought and as a mode of communicating it, whereas perception is treated only as a process of cognition: perception namely is *inespressible* (*abhihitāpa-lāpānā-apoṇḥa*) About a similar division in the Vaiśeṣika school cf H Jacobi, *Indische Logik*, p. 479 ff, my article in *Museon* 1904, L Sual, *Introduzione*, p. 417, Faddeson, *The Vaiśeṣika-system*, p. 314 ff

¹ Read p. 18.1 *tat sāvṛthānumānam*

² On the three aspects of the logical reason see *infra*, § 2 They are here mentioned, as Vinītadeva remarks, p. 66, in order to distinguish a valid inference from logical error which is always produced by a deficiency in one or several aspects of the mark

³ The word *pramāṇam*, according to the same author, lays stress upon the fact that the logical mark (*linga*) or reason (*hetu*) produces cognition when it is definitely cognized. Sensation (*nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*), indeed, works automatically (*eva-sattayā, eva-rasakatayā*), whereas a logical mark leads to a conclusion when it has been definitely cognized (*prāṇatena*) Inferences or indirect knowledge represents thus the spontaneous, synthetic, definitely conscious element in cognition

(14.16). Just that direct knowledge which has been described above is the result of the act of cognizing (There is no difference between the act of perception and the percept)¹

(14.18). In what sense is it a result?

19. It has the form of a distinct cognition.

(14.20). Distinct cognition means determinate knowledge.² When direct knowledge assumes this form it possesses the essence of distinct cognition. This circumstance is the reason why (the result does not differ from the act of cognition). (4.21). The following is meant. Right knowledge is efficient knowledge.³ The faculty of being efficient (i. e., capable of guiding men's purposive action) is not produced exclusively by its dependence on the presence of some object (i. e., by passive reaction from some object). A sprout, e.g., is invariably connected with a seed, but it is not capable (of cognizing it).⁴ Therefore cognition, although produced by some object, (is not a mere reflex), but it necessarily has to accomplish some spontaneous function of absorbing the object, which alone when achieved makes the object distinctly cognized (i. e., assimilated) (15.3). And this is just (what we call) the result of

¹ It is clear from the whole exposition that the author assumes two different stages in perception, a first indefinite moment of sensation and a following mental construction. Since the second is called forth by the first, it can be called its result. But here the problem is envisaged from another point of view. The Realists consider the act of cognizing as an act of «grasping» the external object by the senses and of conveying its «grasped» form through the intellect to the Soul which alone is self-conscious. For the Buddhists there is no «act» of «grasping», no «grasped» form, no Soul and no adequate external object, but in every idea (*vyākāṇa*) there is immanent self-consciousness. A distinct idea (*prāṇī*) may by imputation be regarded, just as the case may be, either as a source, an act, an instrument (*pramāṇa*) or as an object, a content, a result of cognizing (*pramāṇa-phala*). The result of cognizing is cognition, cp. the notes on p. 43, 48, 46, and 49—50 Cp. Tīp, p. 89 ff. There is a difference between *chitti* and *chidā* in the act of cutting, there is no difference between *paricchitti* and *jñāna* in the act of cognizing.

² *prāṇī* = *āgama* = *bodha* = *prāpti* = *paricchitti* = *mācaya* = *ādhyava-sāya* = *lāpānā* = *vikalpa* are all nearly synonyms Cp. Tātp, p. 87 20, 88 2, 87, 25. They all contain an element of *smṛti* or *samākāra*.

³ Cp. above, text, p. 8 5 ff.

⁴ *apṛāpakatāt*, according to the context, means here *anivāṇakāṇāt* = *ajñāpakatāt*. The example then means that there is an ordinary case of causation between a seed and a sprout, the latter is the result of the former, but in cognition the product cognizes the object which is its cause, and this act of cognition is also the result. The author of the Tīp, p. 40 16 ff., suggests another explanation of this example.

(18 11). Just the same (can be maintained in regard of the object cognized through) inference. (Supposing we have cognized through an

of judgments, but as a single judgment or even a single idea, *clām vyñānaṃ*, cp *Ōyāva-Kaṇikā*, p 125 2 ff In perception we cognize the object in its own form directly, in inference we cognize it indirectly through its mark But the result is the same, it is a self-conscious idea coordinated with some external reality. This idea has a double aspect, the object-aspect (*grāhya*) and the self-aspect (*grāhaka*) There is no difference between cognizer, instrument, act, object and result, they are merely different aspects of the idea (*vyñāna*) Thus these Buddhists are called Idealists (*vyñāna-tāden*) When we, e g, cognize through an inference the presence somewhere of fire, the selfconscious idea of the fire is the result. In its inchoative state it is just a feeling of something either desirable or undesirable, this is its self-aspect which through coordination develops an object-aspect (Pr samucc I 10) The difference between perception and inference is not in their result which, from this standpoint, is the same, but in their essence and in their respective objects says Dignāga Pr. samucc II 1 The essence of perception is to give a vivid, immediate image. This vividness is inexpressible in speech If comments Jinendrabuddhi, f 95 a 4, it could be so expressed, then the blind could see colours through verbal testimony. Inference produces an abstract, dim, non-vivid image of the object As regards the *prima facie* object, in perception it is the particular, in inference the universal, the abstract, the imagined which is always dim The self-conscious idea being the only result can nevertheless be viewed in different aspects Coordination of the image with a recognizable point, the judgment «this is blue», produces its identity and distinctness, its contrast with everything else This aspect can be regarded as the act or the source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), because this feature appears as the most decisive factor of cognition, *pralāta-upāhāra* (Tip p, p 42 8) = *sādhakatama-lāraṇa* = *ādhipati-pratyaya* The self-conscious distinct idea (*pratiṣṭi* = *bodha* = *samvedana* = *vyñāna*) can be regarded as a kind of result (*pramāṇa-phala*)—The statement that the result of inference is the same as the result of perception reminds us of the view expressed, among others, by B Bosanquet that «the task of drawing a line between what is and what is not inference is an impossible one» (Logic, II 16) When this author further states that «at least a suggested distinction» is as «between direct and indirect reference to Reality» (ibid II 27), we see at once that this is quite the view of Dignāga When we also read that «the processes of Recognition, Abstraction, Comparison, Identification, Discrimination are characteristics which no judgment or inference is without» (ibid II 20), and that perception always contains some inference, we are reminded of the rôle attributed to *sārupya* and *vyūcriti* When it is stated that «every idea which is entertained must be taken to be ultimately affirmed of reality» (ibid. I 6, 76 ff, 146 ff) we are reminded of the rôle of *śa-laksana*, and when the sanscritist reads that «consciousness is a single persistent judgment» (ibid. I 4), he cannot but think of *adhyatmasāya* = *mācāya* = *kalpanā* = *buddhi* = *vyñāna* — Some details about the interesting fact of a certain similarity between Dignāga's Logic and that form of this science which it has received in Germany, under the influence of Kantian ideas, at the hands of Lotze, Schuppe and Sigwart and in the works of B. Bosanquet and others in England, will be found in the Introduction

a source¹ producing knowledge For us² (Buddhists, when we say that) a cognition has sprung up from an object, this (simply) means that this cognition is a fact which is coordinated to a (momentary) object, as, e. g., the cognition *produced* by a patch of blue colour is *coordinated* to (the substratum of) this blue.

This coordination is described (in other terms) as an idea,³ or representation⁴ (of the object)

(15.11) But then, is not coordination just the same thing as cognition? In that case, the same cognitive fact would be the source and the resulting (content) of cognition? However, it is impossible that the same entity should be its own cause and its own effect⁵ In what sense then is this fact of coordination an act?

21. Owing to this, a distinct cognition of the object is produced

(15.14). "This" means coordination. "Owing to this" means through the influence of the fact of coordination The distinct cogni-

some reality only through a substratum, the efficient focus (*artha-lasyā-lāra*), the point-instant (*leśana*), the «thing in itself» (*svataksana*). A distinct cognition is thus produced from two sources its coordinations, arranged by the human mind according to its own laws, and an indefinite «thing in itself». The «object-intentness» (*viśayatā*) of our knowledge does not consist in «grasping» (*grahana*), but it is the expression of these two facts (*taṭ-sārūpya-taḍ-utpattibhāṃ viśayatām*). Opponents have stigmatized this theory as a «purchase without paying the price» (*a-mūlyā-dāna-lāra*), since the supposed reality receives perceptibility (*pratyaśatām labhate*), i. e., becomes a clear and distinct perception, but «does not pay any equivalent», i. e., does not impart its «form» to this perception, since it is itself formless. Translating this phrasing into Kantian terminology we could say that the empirical object consists of an uncognizable substratum, the «thing in itself», and a superstructure which our reason imposes upon it according to its own categories of understanding. The best exposition of this theory is by Vācaspati, *Nyāyakanikā*, p. 256 ff, 289 ff, (reprint), he also several times alludes to it in the *Tātparyatikā*, e. g., p. 102 14 ff, 269.9 ff, 338 ff Cp also my *Soul Theory*, p. 338 ¹ *pramāṇa* ² *idā*

³ *ālāra*

⁴ *ābhāsa* This *ābhāsa* = *pratibhāsa* possesses the immanent feature of being *sārūpya-samvedana* through which *bodha* = *prāṇi* is attained, it can be regarded as a kind of *pramāṇa* = *sādhakalāna* = *prākṛsta-upalāna*, cp. Tīpp., p. 42.8

⁵ In Vīnītadeva's *ātatarana* there is no question of the same entity being its own cause and its own result, he simply asks what will be the process of (definite) perception, if perceptive knowledge is regarded as a result, and answers that the process consists in coordination or in contrasting.

(18.20). Although the word «necessary» is not expressed in the definition of this (first aspect), it nevertheless (will be) found at the end, (when defining the third aspect). It must be equally referred to both the preceding aspects (19.1). Because the mark produces a cognition of an absent object (by logical necessity), not by a possibility to do it, as e.g., a seed (which is capable of) producing a sprout. (The seed, even if we do not perceive it, is fit to produce a sprout) ¹ But smoke, (the mark of fire), if we do not perceive it, will never produce the cognition (of the presence of fire in a given place). (19.2). Neither is the mark comparable to the light of a lamp (when it reveals the presence) of, e.g., a jar. (Such) revelation of concealed objects is a cause (producing) knowledge of anything (that happens to be present) (There is no necessary bond between the lamp and the jar) ² Supposing, indeed, (smoke) is perceived, nevertheless we will not know (the presence of fire) if we know nothing about its necessary ³ concomitance (with

The object of the inference, or minor terms must necessarily possess, «just» the presence of the mark, or middle term, smoke, i.e. smoke must be «just» present, not absent. The particle «just» (*eta*) lays stress on that word of the sentence to which it is attached and thus changes the meaning of the sentence altogether. In the sentence «on this spot there is „just“ presence of smoke» the intention of the speaker is to express that smoke is really present, not absent. If it were said that «„just“ the smoke is present», this would mean that the speaker's intention is to deny the presence of something else. If it were said that «the smoke is present „just“ on this spot», the intention of the speaker would be to deny its presence elsewhere and to assert its presence exclusively on one spot. Every word of this definition is full of meaning, because each of them precludes some special logical error in the complete system of fallacies. Special fallacies will ensue 1) if the middle term will not be present at all, 2) if it will not be «just» present, i.e. present in one part of the minor and absent in the other, and 3) if its presence is not necessary, i.e. problematic. The translation of *eta* by «just» is resorted to for want of another.

¹ Cp. Tīpp, p. 40 16

² *Lit.*, p. 19. 1—2 «Because the mark is not the cause of the cognition of the concealed by possibility, as the seed of the sprout, since from an unseen smoke fire is not known. Neither is it an illumination of concealed objects depending upon (the production) of a cognition (having) its own object, as ...», cp. Tib., p. 42 4

³ The Buddhist conception of concomitance is that it represents an invariable and necessary connection. They then give what they suppose to be an exhaustive, although very simple, table of all possible logical connections. This is part of their general idea about the validity of knowledge, *pramāṇa-samśaya-pratīti*, cp. above p. 7. Vinītadeva says, p. 58 2, that concomitance is a necessary bond, because such is the nature of knowledge, *yathā-pratīti-sambhāvanā*. There is a divergence on this point between the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas. The first maintain the «necessity», *avinābhāva*, *nāntarīyavāda*, of invariable con-

(15.20). (This depends upon the point of view). If we therefore admit that the same entity has the (double) aspect of being, to a first question should not astonish us, it is something similar to a problem which European psychology has also discussed, the question whether perception should be envisaged as a content or as an act or as both, cp. B Russell against Meinong, *Analysis of Mind*, p. 16 ff. Just as this author, Dharmakīrti maintains that there is no difference between perception as a mental content and perception as a mental act. It is the same thing, it can be viewed either as a mental content or as a mental act, this depends upon the view-point. When contrasted with other processes, it is a process of coordination. When contrasted with other contents, it is a coordinated content. This evidently refers to the final stage of the synthetic image, and by no means to the initial sensation. The Indian realists, the Mīmāṃsakas and Nyāyikas, clung to the idea that cognition is an «act of grasping» which must have an instrument and a separate result, just as the «act of cutting wood» has an instrument — the axe, and a result — the fissure. Cognition and self-consciousness were for them a property produced in the Soul by the outer and the inner senses. This was opposed already by Dignāga who maintained (*Pr. samucc*, I, 9—10) that, 1) the «act» and its «resulting» content are two different aspects of the same cognition; 2) the «result» is also (*yañ-na*) a self-conscious image (*añ-rig* = *sia-samedana* = *anuvyavasāya*). Self-consciousness is not the property of a Soul which does not exist altogether, but it is inherent in every image, whatsoever it may be. That such is the meaning of the much discussed Buddhist theory about cognition as containing in itself its own result is very clearly stated above by Dh. himself, cp. p. 5 (transl.). Perception is here taken in its final form, as a unity, not as a consecution of moments, *anālāta-ksana-bheda* (cp. *Nyāya-kandali*, p. 191.8). That the momentary aspect of existence must be very often left out of account when considering Buddhist logical theories has been stated above, p. 8, n. 4 (transl.). But when the relation between the first moment of sensation and the subsequent clear image is considered, this momentary aspect can by no means be disregarded. The first is evidently the cause of the second. Dh. himself states it, since on p. 9 (transl.) he speaks about the two different moments of sensation and distinct perception, and when treating of mental sensation (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) he clearly says that the first is the cause (*upādāna-ksana*) of the second. He also characterizes perception as a process where sensation is followed by construction (*sākṣāḥ-lāra-vyūhāro vikalpena anugamyate*, cp. p. 8 13-14, 11. 12, text). The whole trend of Dharmakīrti's system requires us to admit here two entities, two moments, and the first is clearly the cause which produces the second, if we understand Causality in the Buddhist sense as a consecution of discrete moments in an uninterrupted flux, cp. Vācaspati's exposition of the problem in Appendix about *mānasa-pratyakṣa*. The fact that a distinct perception is at once «obtaining and bestowing» distinctness without being causally related has been misunderstood and has given to opponents an opportunity of easy triumph. Hemacandra remarks that «one undivided moment cannot contain in itself two things, the one obtaining and the other bestowing distinctness», cp. his Comment upon *Syādvāda-mañjarī* in the *Yaśovijaya Series*, N° 80, p. 120. Cp. also Haribhadra's *Anekānta-jayapātāka*. Vinītadeva's comment is quite simple, it avoids all the difficulties raised by Dh., its translation is given in an Appendix.

Reason. Because it is perceived by vision, etc.¹

(19.6) The word «just» aims at excluding a mark which is partly unreal, (which is present in one part of the subject only) (19.7), as e.g., in the inference,—

Thesis Trees are sentient beings.

Reason. Because they sleep.²

Trees, the subject of the inference, (the minor term), possess sleep which is manifested by the closing of their leaves (at night). But in one part of them this mark is non-existent. Indeed all trees do not close their leaves at night, but only some of them.

(19.8). The definition lays stress upon the circumstance that the mark, or middle term, must in any case be connected with the minor term, the subject of the conclusion, (i.e., the minor premise must be in any case realized). If, on the contrary, the emphasis were put on the word «object», (i.e., the object of the inference, or the subject of the conclusion, the minor term), then the definition might have been misunderstood as intimating that the middle term must represent something which is the exclusive property of the minor term, in which case an inference like the following one,—

Thesis. The spoken word is non-eternal,

Reason. Because it is apprehended by the sense of audition,

might have been regarded as a valid inference.³

(19.10) The word «necessary» aims at excluding every problematic mark⁴ of whose presence in the object of inference we can have no certainty.⁵

Indian logicians and all unorthodox schools assailed this theory vehemently, it became thus the principle point of dissention between the early logicians. This syllogism was thus introduced, with infinite subtle variations, as the usual example in manuals, and retained its place, although the theory to which it owed its origin had lost very much of its importance.

¹ Read, p. 19.6, *cāksusatiāś ty āśi*

² This syllogism is the argument by which the Jains establish the animation of plants, in accordance with their idea of universal animation.

³ Lat, p. 19.8—10. «By putting the word «just» after the word «presence» an exclusive quality (*asādhāraṇa dharmatā*) is set aside. If it were and «the presence» «just» in the object of inference, then «just» audibility would be a reason»

⁴ *samvāgāha-asādhāra*

⁵ As e.g., in «someone is omniscient, because he speaks», op. p. 56 n. 1

quasi altogether non-existent,¹ (if we want it to represent) the self-conscious idea of the blue patch. Therefore our cognition (begins) really to exist as possessing its essence of a self-conscious image of the blue² only when it is being definitely shaped in the judgment («this is blue»)³ (Coordination is then immanent to the image).

§ 8. PERCEPTION IS A JUDGMENT.

(16. 7). (Pure) sense-perception thus becomes a (real) source of our knowledge only when it has elicited a judgment. As long as the judgment has not been produced, our cognition has not been determined in its essence of a self-conscious idea of the blue.

(16. 9) Thus it is that without such judgment cognition is resultless, since its essence, the distinct image of the object, has not been elicited. Such a mental (process) cannot even be regarded as cognition, since the most characteristic feature of cognition is here in abeyance. (16. 10). But when the definite judgment («this is blue») has been elicited (internally) and the mental process contains the self-conscious image of the blue patch as determined through its coordination, it is then proved that just this coordination is the (real) source of our knowledge, since it is the cause which gives it distinctness.

(16. 12) If it is so, then sense-perception becomes a (real) source of our knowledge only in combination with a (constructed) judgment, and not (in its genuine form of) a pure (sensation). Not (quite) so! Because in a perceptive judgment which is produced on the basis of a sensation, we judge that we see the object, but not that we imagine it.⁴

(16. 13) «Seeing» is the function of direct cognition, we call it presenting the object directly (in our ken). «Imagining», on the other hand, is the function of constructive (synthetic) thought.⁵

(16. 14). Indeed, when we mentally construct an absent object, we imagine it, we do not see it. Thus it is that our own experience proves that

¹ *asat-lāpam eva*

² *nīla-bādha-ātmanā*

³ *niscayena = lāpānanyā*

⁴ *Īt*, p. 16. 18 «Because by a judgment (*adhyavasāya*) which has been produced by the influence of sensation (*pratyakṣa = nirvikālpaka*) the object is definitely realized (*avasthate*) as seen, not as imagined».

⁵ *vikālpā = lāpānā*.

Thesis. Someone is omniscient.

Reason. Because he speaks ¹

The similar cases are cases of omniscience. (The existence of omniscient beings is problematic, hence it never) can be made out with certainty whether they speak, (or not).

7. Its absolute absence in dissimilar cases is necessary

(19.20) What a dissimilar case is, will be stated later on. The third aspect of a logical mark consists in its absolute absence in dissimilar cases, (such absence being characterized by) necessity. Here the word «absence» aims at excluding a contrary mark, since the contrary is present in dissimilar cases. (19.21). By the word «absolute» an overwide² mark is excluded which embraces (all similar cases and) part of the dissimilar cases (as well), e. g.,

Thesis. Words are produced voluntarily

Reason. Because they are impermanent.

In this example the mark (impermanence) is present in one part of the dissimilar cases, such as lightning etc. (which are not voluntarily produced and are impermanent), and absent in another one, e. g., in Space (which is not voluntarily produced, but is eternal). Therefore, it must be necessarily rejected (as a valid mark). (20.1). If instead of saying «absolute absence in dissimilar cases» the author would have put emphasis on the word «dissimilar» cases, the meaning would have been the following one — «this is a valid mark which is absent in dissimilar cases only». Then (in the above example) the quality of «being produced voluntarily» would not make a valid mark, because it is really also absent

¹ The origin of this strange-looking inference is probably the following one. The Buddhist Saint, the Īrya, the Bodhisattva, is credited with the faculty of apprehending the Universe *sub specie aeternitatis*, cp. p. 82 n. When he has reached the *dr̥ṣṭi-mārga* all his habits of thought are changed and he directly intuits by mystic intuition (*yogī-pratyakṣa*) that condition of the world which reveals itself to the monistic philosopher. This is called omniscience (*sarva-śāstra-jñātā, sarva-jñātā*). But this outlook is something beyond verbal expression (*anurūpaniye*). Therefore whosoever puts his teaching into words cannot be omniscient in this sense of the term. Cp. *Nyāya-kanikā*, p. 110 15 ff and 181 25 ff. The problem reflected in this example is that Omniscience is beyond our knowledge. The terms have then been arranged in every possible, positive and negative, combination, as will be seen later on, ch. III, sūtra 76, ff. Cp. also *Kamalaśīla*, p. 882 7 and 890 ff.

² *sādhārāṇa*, «cover-embracing»

CHAPTER II

INFERENCE AS A PROCESS OF THOUGHT.

§ 1. DEFINITION AND RESULT.

(17. 1) After having done with perception, (the author) proceeds to analyse inference and says,

1. Inference is twofold

(17. 3). Inference is twofold,¹ i. e., there are two different inferences. Now, what is the reason for (our author) to start suddenly by pointing out this division, when we would expect a definition? We answer. Inference «for others» consists of propositions, (it is a communication). Inference «for oneself» is an (internal) process of cognition. Since they are absolutely different things, no inclusive definition is possible. (17. 5). Thus it is intended to give (two different) definitions, each appertaining to one class only, (and for this aim it becomes necessary) to start with a division. For a division is an indication (of the number) of instances. When this has been done, it becomes possible to frame definitions suited to each case separately. Not otherwise. Thus to state a division means (here) to divide the definitions.² Having realized that it is impossible to do it (here) without previously indicating the number of instances, the author begins by setting forth the division.³

¹ Lat, p. 17. 7 «Therefore the statement about the division of species is (here) nothing but (eva) a means (*anga*) of distinguishing between the definitions»

² Dignāga's reform in logic aimed at a distinction between logic as a theory of cognition and logic as a teaching about various dialectical methods. The logic of the early Naiyāyikas was exclusively dialectical. Dignāga therefore deals with dialectics under the heading of inference «for others». The three-membered syllogism belongs only indirectly to the province of epistemological logic along with other dialectical methods. But inference as a process of thought distinguished from sense-perception is quite a different thing. Our terminology is so much influenced by Aristotle that we cannot free ourselves enough to find terms corresponding to In-

in order that the necessary connection of the proving (mark) with the derived (predicate) should be established (20.10) And since they must necessarily allow of no exception, only one of them should actually be expressed, not both together. Thus it is that these two aspects of the logical mark are given (out of practical considerations), in order to teach precision in using either the positive concomitance of the mark with the predicate or its contraposition.

§ 3. MINOR TERM. INDUCTION FROM SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR INSTANCES

(20.18) When giving an account of the three aspects of the logical mark, (the terms) "object of inference", "similar case", "dissimilar case" have been mentioned Their definition shall now be given What is here understood under object of inference?

8. The object (cognized in) inference is here the substratum whose property it is desired to cognize.

(20.16). The word "here" means that the object of inference appears as a substance (a substratum) when the definition of its mark is considered, (the mark being an attribute of this substance) But from another standpoint, when the deduced (conclusion) is realized, the subject of the inference would be a complex (idea of the substratum together with its property).¹ (20.17) And when the invariable concomitance (between the middle and the major terms) is considered, then the inferred fact appears as an attribute² (of this substance, as the

¹ *anumeyā*, «the thing to be inferred» In a general sense it may mean an object which possesses the united properties of the major, the minor and the middle terms, e.g., «the mortal man Socrates», it is then *ekam vyāptānam* It may also mean the major term or the conclusion separately, as well as the thesis which is also the conclusion (= *praksa* = *sādhya*) In a special sense it means the minor term, the subject of the conclusion, and even, more precisely, the underlying substratum (*dharmin*), the efficient point-instant, that underlying point of reality upon which any amount of interconnected qualities may be assembled as a superstructure The Buddhists do not admit the transcendental reality of the relation between substance and quality (*dharma-dharma-bhāva*) The substratum alone is reality the qualities are construction Therefore in the formulation of inferences the subject of the conclusion, the minor term, since it contains a reference to this indefinite substratum, is usually expressed by «here», «now», «this» And even when not so expressed it is always so understood in every judgment or inference cp B Bosanquet, *Logic* I 146

² *dharma*, not *dharmin*, i.e., the major term, the inferred, the deduced quality

produced by a three-aspected mark and concerning an inferred object.

(18.7) This is (our author's) answer to the different definitions (of other schools) He now proceeds to repudiate the misconception about (the supposed difference between inference and its) result.

4. The distinction between a source of cognition and its result is here just the same as in the case of perception¹

* (18.9). (The problem of a special) result produced by the act of cognizing must be solved here, in the case of inference, just in the same manner as it has been done for perception. (18.10) Indeed, when we have some (indefinite) sensation (and) begin to feel that it is coordinated with the object «blue», (our sensation) then takes the shape of a definite self-conscious idea² of the blue. We thus (may regard) the fact of coordination of our cognition with its object «blue» as (a kind of) cognitive activity producing distinctness. (The same cognitive fact) viewed as a definite self-conscious idea of the blue (may be regarded as) the resulting (mental content) obtaining distinctness.³

¹ Vinītadeva's comment on this sūtra, p. 56. 16 ff., runs thus «Just as in the case of perception this very cognition (i. e., the definite presentation) has been said to be the result of that cognitive method, just so in this case (i. e., in inference) just the cognition of the inference (*anumānasya jñānam*) is the result of cognition (*pramāna-phalam*), since it has the character of definitely ascertaining the object (*artha-viniścaya-sambhāratāt*) Just as coordination (or similarity, *sārūpya*) with the perceived object is a mode of (definite) cognition, just so coordination of the inferred object is a mode of (definite) cognition, because through it (i. e., through coordination) the definite ascertainment of the object is established».

² *nīla-bodha* = *nīla-samīdāna* = *nīla-anubhava* = *nīlam itī vijñānam*, cp. above, p. 16 n 1

³ The realistic systems pondered over the problem of a special result for every special mode of cognition and considered it as a series of steps in the act of cognizing, the following step being a result of the preceding one The result of the inferential mode of cognition of an object consisted in the conclusion of the inference, it was considered as the result of the preceding step, the minor premise (= *trītiya-linga-parīkṣā*) A further result was the idea of a purposive action and that action itself. Without at all denying the existence of these steps and their character of cause and effect, the Buddhists applied to them their conception of Causality (*prāpti-samutpāda* = *niroyāpārāh sarve dharmāḥ*, cp. Pr. samucc. I. 10 and Kamalaśīla, p. 392. 12) But the problem of the result, as has been stated above, p. 39, they considered from an altogether different standpoint. The result of cognizing, they declared, is cognition. In this respect there is no difference between perception and inference. The latter is not then regarded as consisting of a sequel

-being contrary include the conception of the absence of a similar case, because through the analysis of these two conceptions (the third one) is revealed.¹ (21.10). Thus it is, that absence is conceived as something representing the non-existence of a similar case directly. Difference and contrariety are conceived as representing it indirectly. Therefore all three are dissimilar cases.

§ 4. THREE KINDS OF LOGICAL MARKS. CLASSIFICATION OF INFERENCES

11. And there are only three varieties of the three-aspected mark

(21.13). Owing to its three aspects the logical mark is threefold. Another division in three varieties is now added (in the words «and there are only three varieties of the three-aspected mark».)² The questioner³ has first asked about the three aspects of the mark, now he has (another) question concerning (the varieties of) the three-aspected mark. Of them the three aspects have already been defined. The three varieties are next going to be defined. The threefold marks are just three, i. e., there are *only* three varieties (of the mark). What are they?

12. Negation, Identity and Causation.

(21.18). The predicate (is either denied or affirmed), when it is denied, negation⁴ (is its mark and it has) the three aspects. When it is affirmed, (its mark is either) existentially identical⁵ with it, or (when it is different, it represents) its effect (Both) possess the three aspects.

(21.20). An example of Negation is (now) given.

¹ Lat, p 21 10 «Therefore by the force of the realization of the «other» and of the «contrary», the other and the contrary are realized as possessing the form (or essence = *svarūpa*) of the non-existence of the similar»

² Lat, p 21 18 «The word «and» aims at the addition of another (group of three) which will be indicated»

³ This interpretation of the word *pareṇa* is supported by the Tib. transl. Otherwise it seems more natural to translate, «one threefold division has been given above, another threefold division follows»

⁴ *anupalabdhi*, *upalabdhi* = *jñāna*, cp text p 22, 6, i e., definite cognition, *savilāpaka*

⁵ *svabhāva*, own existence, essence. One thing, e g., *śimśapā*, is said to be the «own existence» of the other, e g., «tree», when it contains the latter in its intension (comprehension, connotation) and is itself contained under the latter's extension,

inference the presence somewhere of a patch of blue colour.)¹ This image of the blue arises (at first indefinitely); it is then settled as a definite self-conscious idea of a blue patch (by the way of its contrast with other colours which are not blue). Thus the coordination of the blue, (its contrast² with other colours, may be regarded) as the source of such a (definitely circumscribed image), and the imagined³ distinct representation will then appear as its result, because it is through coordination (and contrast) that the definite image of the blue is realized.

(18.15) The misconceptions about the number (of varieties), the essence and the result (of indirect cognition) have thus been repudiated. The misconception concerning the object cognized through inference has been repudiated in the chapter on perception.⁴

§ 2 INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE OR THE THREE ASPECTS OF A VALID LOGICAL MARK.

(18.16). When specifying the definition (of an internal inference), the three aspects of the logical mark have occasionally been mentioned. They are now defined

5. The three aspects of the mark are (first)—“just” its presence in the object cognized by inference.

(18.18). The three-aspected mark means that the mark has three aspects. We must understand⁵ that they will now be explained. The (author) accordingly goes on to explain what these three aspects are.

(18.19). What an object of inference (a minor term) is, will be stated later on. The first aspect of the mark consists “just” in its presence in this object, (i.e., in its presence there in any case, but not in its presence exclusively there)⁶ This presence is) “necessary”.

¹ A patch of blue colour is the usual example of sense-perception. But here it is taken as an object whose presence is not perceived, but inferred. As a matter of fact, any real object can be cognized either directly by sense-perception or indirectly through inference or verbal testimony. Vinitadeva refrains from this example.

² *sārūpya* = *atad-vyāvṛtti* = *anya-vyāvṛtti* = *anya-yoga-vyavaccheda* = *āhāra* = *ābhāsa*

³ *vikalpana*

⁴ See above, p. 37

⁵ Lit., “we must add (*śeṣaḥ*)”

⁶ The usual example of an inference is the following one

Wherever there is smoke there is also fire,
On this spot there is smoke,
Hence there is fire

The object¹ of the inference is constituted by a particular spot, visible to the observer (22.5). «No jar», this is the predicate.² Perception³ means (here) knowledge. The totality of causes producing knowledge are essential⁴ to it, because they constitute its essence. An object included⁵ among these (causes is so called), because it is included among this totality, as (one of the causes) giving birth to (cognition). (22.7) An object which is in the condition of cognizability is (nothing else but) a visible object, (an object which could be visible). The words «because we do not perceive any» contain the reason (or middle term).

(22.8) Now, (it can be questioned), how is it possible for a (jar) to be perceptible in a place from which it is absent? It is said to be perceptible, although it is absent, because its perceptibility is imagined. We imagine this object in the following way. «If it were present on this spot, it certainly would have been perceived». In this case an object, although absent, is *ex hypothesi*⁶ visible. (22.10) And what is the object which can be so imagined? It is the object whose (empty) place (is perceived), all the causes of this perception being present. And when can we judge that the causes⁷ are all present? When we (actually) perceive another object included in the same act of cognition. We call «included in the same act of cognition» two objects, dependent upon one another, amenable to the same organ of sense, (two objects) upon

¹ *dharmin* = *anumeya*, cp sūtra II 8

² *ādhyā*, the thing to be proved, to be deduced, to be inferred, the major term, it is also called *anumeya*, cp comment on sūtra II 8, since the inference, or conclusion, represents the minor and major term combined. Subject and predicate, *anurādā* and *cidhī* or *vādheyā*, are the terms of a proposition. Since Indian logic distinguishes sharply between judgment and proposition the term predicate is used only for want of another one.

³ *upalabdhi* is cognition in general, but *anupalabdhi* is non-cognition or negation conceived as the absence of sense-perception (*drśya-anupalabdhi*), therefore it can be here rendered as perception, cp. text, p. 37.5 — *upalabdhih* = *cidhīh*

⁴ *laksana* = *lakṣaṇa* *anena*

⁵ *prāptā* = *antar-bhūta*

⁶ *samāropya*

⁷ *sāmagrī* or *hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrī* are the four *pratyayas* which also include the *hetus*, *hetu-pratyaya*, *ālambana*, *samanantara* and *adhīpātī*. The *ālambana* or *artha* being here reckoned separately remain the three conditions, the *adhīpātī* — the organ of sense, the *samanantara* — the preceding stream of consciousness, the *hetu* or *sahakāri-pratyaya*, light and other circumstances. Under *lābhya* — *hetu* the whole condition of the universe with respect to a given moment is included, cp my Nirvāṇa, Index

the latter)¹ (19. 3) Therefore the function of the logical mark, owing to which it is able to create cognition of absent things, is nothing else than the necessity of an invariable concomitance between (the perceived mark and) the absent object (19.4) It follows that the word «necessary» must be referred to all the three aspects in which the mark manifests itself, since all these three forms, viz. 1. the positive concomitance of the mark with the deduced predicate, 2. its contraposition (or the inverted concomitance of their negations) and 3 the presence of the thus characterized mark upon the subject of the conclusion — all these three connections, since they represent the essence of the function performed by a logical mark, must be ascertained as being necessary.

(19.6) The word «presence» (in the above definition) aims at excluding a (quite) unreal (non-existing) mark, as e g., the mark of being amenable to the sense of vision (in an inference like the following one),

Thesis The (spoken) word is non-eternal²

nection founded on an exhaustive table of necessary *a priori* existing principles (*tādātmya-tadutpatti*, cp below p 52, text) The second admit invariable connection *sahacarya*, *avyabhicāritva*, but not necessity, since «the devil of a doubt» (*śaṅkā-piṭācī*) can never be completely removed, they deny the exhaustive table of connections (*sambandho yo vā sa iṣṭo bhavatu*) and maintain that the connections are various and can be cognized by induction, by the method of agreement and difference (*anvaya-vyatiśeka*), by summarizing (*upasaṃhāreṇa*) some observed facts, cp. Tātparyat, p 105 ff The characteristic *na yogyatayā hetuh* (*lingam*) is repeated below, p. 47 9 and 49. 15 The comparison with a lamp is admitted by the Navyānyikas

¹ One of the words for a logical reason, or mark, is in sanscrit *hetu* which also means cause It is here distinguished as not being a producing cause (*utpādaka-hetu*) like the seed of a plant, since it does not operate automatically (*sva-sattayā*) like the senses, but only when cognized (*jñātatayā* = *drśtatayā*) Neither will it be quite right to call it an informative cause (*jñāpaka-hetu*, *jñāna-utpādaka*, the Tib. translates, p 42. 4, *jñānāpaka* as if it were *jñānotpādaka-apaka*) comparable to the light thrown upon an object in the dark, because it is an ascertaining reason (*niscāyaka*), a fact whose connection is «necessary».

² The syllogism deducing the impermanent, evanescent character of the spoken word, and of the sound in general, from the fact that it is produced by special causes, for whatsoever has a beginning has also an end, — this syllogism performs, in the manuals of Indian logic and in all countries which have borrowed their teaching of logic from India, the same function as the syllogism about the mortality of Socrates in European logic The orthodox brahmanic school of Mīmāṃsakas have exhibited their religious zeal by establishing a theory according to which the sounds of the words of their Holy Scriptures were eternal substances, something comparable to Platonic ideas, the actually spoken words were then explained as the accidental manifestations of these unchanging substances The

cognition of that same bare place. (Negation means the presence of a bare spot as well as the fact of its cognition)

(22.20). Further, what is meant by the presence of (the totality) of conditions producing cognition?

14. The presence of (all) the conditions of cognition consists in the presence of an individual entity and the totality of all other conditions of cognition.

(22.23) The conditions of cognition are present,—this means that the totality of the causes producing the perception, e.g., of a jar, is present. The words «the totality of all other conditions» have the following meaning. The cognition of a jar is produced (partly) by the jar itself, (partly) by other factors, the sense-organs etc. The words «other conditions» refer to the conditions other than the perceptible jar itself. The «totality» of them means their presence. (23.1). The existence proper, that what distinguishes (one thing) from another, that peculiar (fact), i.e., separate (discontinuous, individually distinct existence).¹ Thus it is that an individually distinct existence and the presence of all other conditions must be both considered as constituting the perceptibility of jars and other (individual objects).

What is an individual? The (author) says,

15. It is a thing which, being present, is necessarily perceived when all other conditions of perceptibility are fulfilled²

¹ *svabhāva-viśeṣa* means an individual in Locke's sense (Essay, XXVII 4), existence individually distinct, «existence itself» (*svabhāva eva*), existence which is «the same as long as it is continued», existence determined by the *principium individuationis*, or Grundsatz der Individualisierung (Erdmann, *op cit*, p. 148). It must be distinguished from the extreme concrete and particular momentary thing, (*avalakṣaṇa* = *ksana*) which has no duration and which is characterized by Locke, in a truly Indian manner, as «each perishing the moment it begins» (*vyasam eva ksane utpadyate tasmān eva vinaśyati*) Rgyal-thsab says, f. 25, *ghato bhūtalāḥ svabhāva-viśiṣṭāḥ*, i.e., when a jar stands out in relief so as to be distinguished from its place, it is an individual, otherwise — according to Leibnitz' principle of Identity of Indiscernables it would not be an individual. Vinītadeva explains it as sensible existence, a possible sense-datum, not metaphysical, *na vyavahārikā* = *śakyā-darśanāḥ* = *dṛśyāḥ*. The notions of sensible existence and individual existence are here characteristics of the same fact. Cp. also Kamalaśīla, p. 476 i and 481.15

² According to Dh, p. 28 7, the Tib, p. 51.7, Vinītadeva, p. 62 5 and Rgyal-thsab, f. 25 a 2, the sūtra reads — *śaiṣe cpy anyesu upalambho-praty-ayeṣu yāḥ svabhāvaḥ saṃ pratyakṣa eva bhavati*

6 Its presence only in similar cases

(19.12). The definition of a similar case will be given later on. The second aspect of the logical mark consists in its *necessary* presence *only* in similar cases. Here likewise (every word of the definition aims at precluding some logical fallacy). The word «presence» aims at excluding a contrary mark. Such a mark is absent in similar cases.¹ (19.13). The word «only» sets aside non-exclusive marks, for such marks are not present in similar cases «only», but in both the (similar and dissimilar ones).² (19.14). The emphasis is put on the word «similar», (the mark is present in similar cases «only», never in contrary cases. This does not mean that it must be present in every similar case without exception, but it means that it must be found in similar cases only, never in contrary cases) Thus the mark of «voluntary production» will be valid (in the following inference,—

Thesis Words are non-eternal.

Reason. Because voluntarily produced).

This mark (of production at will) does not extend to every case of non-eternality, (but it never occurs in eternal substances).³

(19.15) If emphasis were put on the word «presence», the meaning would have been, «just» the presence, (i. e., presence always, never absence), and the mark of «voluntary production» would not have been valid, (since it is by no means present in all non-eternal entities)

(19.16) By the word «necessary» an uncertain logical mark is set aside, a mark of whose direct concomitance (with the predicate) we have no certainty, e g,—

¹ As e g, «there is here fire, because there is water», or «words are eternal, because they are voluntarily produced»

² Lit., p 19.18 «By the word «just» the general-uncertain (is set aside)», i. e., an uncertain reason (*anaiāntika*) which is overcomprehensive (*ādāharaṇa*), it is found in similar and in dissimilar cases, as e g,—

Thesis Our words depend upon volition,
Reason Because they are impermanent.

Impermanent things are found in similar cases, in objects whose production depends upon volition, and in dissimilar cases, e g, in lightning whose production does not depend upon human volition

³ Lit., p 19.14—15 «By putting the emphatic word before mentioning «presence» the validity (*hetutā*) of «dependence on an effort» is indicated, which possesses existence not embracing (all) similar cases».

(23.17). The essence of a thing (can be a valid) logical reason. This is the idea.¹ What kind of logical reason consists in its merely being contained in its own predicate? The predicate possesses the characteristic of existing wheresoever the mere existence of the reason (is ascertained). (23.18). A predicate whose presence is dependent on the mere existence of the reason, and is dependent upon no other condition besides the mere existence of the fact constituting the reason—such is the predicate which is inseparable from the reason (and can be analytically deduced)

(23.20). When such (a predicate) is deduced, the reason represents the same fact of existence as the predicate, it is not different, (it is identical).

(23.21). An example is given.

sattā-mūlra-bhāvanā). Cp Sigwart, *op cit* I, 264, «wo ein Subject für sich ausreicht (= *sattā-mūlra*) seine Bestimmungen (= *sādhya dharma*) notwendig zu machen ... fassen wir die Nothwendigkeit (*niscaya*) als eine innere». The subject in an analytical judgment is thus the «sufficient reason» for deducing the predicate. It is therefore rightly characterized here as a reason (*hnga, hetu*) It will also appear as «subject» of the major premise in the fully expressed formula of a deductive reasoning. When two characteristics are essential and coexist in the same object, at the same moment, the mere fact of the existence of the object (*sattā-mūlra*) is then sufficient for deducing the presence of its essential property. The analytical judgment «*Āśoka* is a tree» is thus conceived as an inference in the form of «this is a tree, because it is an *Āśoka*, whatever is an *Āśoka* is also a tree». The major premise in this inference is an analytical judgment. Its subject represents the reason (*hetu*), its predicate the major term (*sādhya*). Their connection is a connection of Identity (*īdātmya*). Between the tree and the *Āśoka*-tree there is no difference in the underlying point of reality, the *Āśoka* is essentially identical with the tree. *Dharmakīrti*, therefore, characterizes their relation, in this sense, as founded on Identity (*īdātmya*), cp *Sūtra* II 28—29. Kant, *Kritik d. r. V.* 2, p. IV, calls analytical those judgments where the connection of the predicate with the subject is conceived «through their identity» Wundt, *Logik*, I, 264, calls it «partielle Identität», Bouanquet, *Logik*, I 14 — «identity in difference», Sigwart, *op cit*, I, 111, objecting to Kant's view, prefers to call it «agreement» (Uebereinstimmung). The last named author, *ibid* I 264 ff, gives also expression to the view that the necessity of everything existing is deduced either out of its essence or out of its origin (aus dem Wesen und der Ursache), thus would correspond to *Dharmakīrti*'s division of affirmation as founded either on Identity or Causation (*īdātmya-kaūtpattī*), cp also Schuppe, *Logik*, p 128. All judgments which are not founded on a causal relation between the terms, and which are not negative, can be reduced to such a formula where the minor term is a point-instant, the major is the predicate, and the middle, which is the subject in the analytical judgment, represents the justification for predication.

¹ *sambandha*.

in (some) of the similar (i. e. impermanent) cases (such as lightning)¹ Therefore the words «in dissimilar cases» have not been emphasized. (20.3) The word «necessary» (absence) sets aside a problematic mark, a mark whose absence in dissimilar cases is uncertain.

(20.5). The following question arises When the presence of the mark «only» in similar cases has been stated, its «absolute» absence in dissimilar cases must evidently follow by implication.² Why is it then, that two different aspects of the mark have been mentioned? (20.6). The answer is as follows. Either the positive concomitance³ (of the mark with the predicate) or (its contraposition, i. e.), the inverted concomitance (of their negations),⁴ should be actually used.⁵ But both must be without exception.⁶ Not otherwise. In order to emphasise (this necessity) both aspects have been mentioned. (20.7). If however both were actually used without being applied strictly, we would have the following result—«a mark which is present in similar and absent in dissimilar cases is valid», and then we would have a valid inference in the following example,

Thesis. The (child in the womb of this woman) has a dark complexion.

Reason. Because it is her child

Example. Just as her other children whom we see.

In this example the fact of being the son of this woman would be a valid mark, (although this is not the case, since the complexion of the future child depends upon the diet of the mother)⁷ (20.9) Therefore, either the positive concomitance or its contraposition must be actually used in inference. But both must needs be without exception

¹ Lit. p. 20 1—2. «(Supposing) the emphatic word precedes the word absence, the meaning would be the following one, «that is a reason which is absent in dissimilar cases only» But the «being produced by a voluntary effort» is also absent in some of the similar cases, (i. e. in some impermanent objects), therefore it would not be a reason».

² Lit. p. 20 5 «But when it is said the presence «just» in similar cases, does it not necessarily follow that in the dissimilar cases there is «just» absence?»

³ *anvaya*, corresponding to the major premise of the first figure of Aristotle's syllogism

⁴ *vyatireka*, contraposition.

⁵ *prayoktavya*, lit «formulated».

⁶ *niyamavān*, limited, necessary.

⁷ When a pregnant woman feeds on vegetables the complexion of the child is supposed to turn out darker than when she keeps a milk diet This is the usual example of an unsufficiently warranted generalization

tion of causality is not given, in contradistinction from the analytical reason (whose definition has been given)

§ 5. HOW ARE SYNTHETIC AND ANALYTIC JUDGMENTS POSSIBLE.

(24. 13) (The consistency of a division into Negation, Identity and Causality) might be questioned (If they are quite different) three principles, we cannot at all speak of one logical reason (in general). And if they are the different varieties (of one genus), then (the varieties may be endless), because the various cases of an analytical deduction alone are innumerable, and it becomes impossible to reckon only three varieties of logical deduction To this we answer that (the principle of the division) is the following one

19. (Cognition) is either affirmation or negation, (and affirmation) is double, (as founded either on Identity or on Causation)¹

(24. 16) The word "here" means "among these three different logical reasons". Two reasons establish realities They are the foundation, or justification,² for an affirmative judgment³ The (remaining) one is the reason, or justification, for a negative judgment It must be kept in mind that by negation we mean (all deductions of) absence and the practical value of negation in life⁴ (24. 18) The meaning is the following one. (The reasons are different not by themselves, but indirectly,

¹ Lat, p 24 15 «Here two are establishing real things (*vastu*), one is the reason of negation».

² *gamaka*

³ Very noteworthy is here the identification of reality (*vastu*) with affirmation (*vidhi*) The following terms must be regarded as synonymous *vastu* = *paramārthasat*, cp p 13 18, = *śalākṣana*, cp p 13 10, = *ksana*, cp p 12 18, = *arthakryā-lāre*, cp p 13 15, = *vidhi*, cp Tāt, 480 19 p — *bhāṣya* = *śalākṣanasya* = *vidhi-rūpasya* = *paramārthasat*, and Tarkabhāṣā, p 31 (Bombay ed) where *sāmānya* is characterized as *pramāna-nirasta-vidhi-bhāva*

⁴ *abhāva-ucyate* This point is insisted upon because negation is also interpreted as the cognition of a post-instant of efficient reality (*vastu*), cp text p 28. 22—*artha-jñāna eva ghatasya abhāva ucyate* It is the result of the first formula of negation, while *abhāva* is deduced in the remaining ten formulae, cp. *infra*, text p. 29 22—24 and 38 4—5 Ācārya Śākyabuddhi objects to this sūtra In the inference «the word is not eternal, because it has an origin» the reason is positive the conclusion negative, and in the inference «there is fire removing cold on the mountain, because we see smoke», the conclusion is positive, if the presence of fire be the main thing, it is negative, if the absence of cold is intended as the main thing, cp. Bgyal-thsab, Rigs-thugs-hgrel, f 26 (Lhasa ed)

major term) In order to point out (these differences) the word «here» has been used. We call «object of inference» an object whose property, or specification, it is desired to cognize.

What is a similar case?

9. A similar case is an object which is similar through the common possession of the inferred property

(20.21) A similar case is a similar object. An object which is similar, which is analogous to the object of the inference, which metaphorically is called its copartner. It is characterized by the word «similar»¹ (20.22) All right! But what is this similarity which unites one part with its counterpart? The answer is, (they are similar) by the common possession of a quality which is the logical predicate. It is (the predicate), the thing to be proved, since it is not yet proved (as long as the inference is not concluded), and it is a property, because its existence depends upon a substratum from which it differs. Thus it is a predicated (or derived) quality, (a property whose existence is being deduced). (21.2). No particular can ever make a logical predicate.² It is (always) a universal. Therefore, it is here stated that the thing to be cognized, (the logical predicate) is a common property. It is a predicated property and it is general. The similar case is similar to the object of the inference, because both are comprehended in the universality of the predicated quality.

(21.5) What is a dissimilar case? It is said,

10. A case which is not similar is dissimilar—(it can be) different from it, contrary to it or its absence.

(21.7) That which is not similar is dissimilar. What is it that cannot be similar? That what is different from the similar, what is contrary to it, and what is equivalent to the absence of a similar case. (21.8) Both the being different and the being contrary cannot be conceived so long as the concrete absence³ of the similar case is not realized. (21.9) Therefore the conceptions of being different and of

¹ *Int.*, p. 20.22. «The word *sa* is a substitute for *samāna*»

² Particular (*vīśeṣa*) is here called what we would call substance (= *dharma*), since it is contrasted with every predicate. In sūtra II 8, on the contrary, *vīśeṣa* = *dharma*, it refers to a general quality which characterizes a particular

³ *śābhhāta-abhāva*, this refers to the second *irodha*, cp. III 77, *viruddha* of II.10 would then refer to *sahānatasthānam*, cp. p. 70.22

these (connections) are contained in the one expression «existentially dependent.»¹ (25.9) (This means that) because the fact (expressing) the reason can prove the existence of the fact (corresponding to) the predicate, only if it is existentially dependent (on the latter), therefore, the above mentioned three relations alone can prove something, and there are no other relations which would allow to deduce (one fact from another).²

(25.11) Now, why is it, that we can deduce one fact from another, only if there is existential dependence?

21. Because a fact which is not so dependent upon another one, cannot be invariably and necessarily concomitant with the latter.

(25.14). «So dependent» means existentially dependent A fact whose existence is not dependent upon another one, is not so dependent. (25.15). If one fact is not existentially dependent on another one, it is independent, and there can be no regularity³ in its concomitance with the latter. Such a fact, representing that part from which the other part depends, cannot itself be subject to a rule of concomitance.⁴ (25.17). The meaning is the following. If a fact is not tied up

in *svabhāva-anumāna* this term means identity in the sense indicated above, p 66, it then is *exclusive* of the relation of causality. We must distinguish between *svabhāva-linga*, identity and *svabhāva-pratibandha*, dependence. Smoke is *svabhāva-tena pratibaddha* with fire, but they are two different *svabhāvas*, it is synthesis. On the other hand Aśoka, although likewise *svabhāva-tena pratibaddha* with tree, includes the latter in its *svabhāva*, the *svabhāva* is one, it is analysis. In the latter sense *svabhāva* refers to the intention, the essential properties, of a term. Thus, e.g., *śmśapā* is *vrkṣa-svabhāva* = *vrkṣa-vyūpyā*, but not vice versa, *vrkṣa* is not *śmśapā-svabhāva*.

¹ Lat., p 25 7—8 «When cause and essence must be established, the essential tie (*svabhāva-tena pratibandha*) of the result and of essence (*svabhāva* in the sense of identity) is not different, thus both are comprehended in one composite word. The word *hi* has the sense of «because»

² Since internal inference (*svārthanumāna*), as stated above p. 66 n., corresponds rather to our judgment, the classification of affirmative judgments (*vidhi* cp text, p 24.16) in *svabhāva-anumāna* and *kāryānumāna* corresponds to our classification of judgments in synthetical and analytical. That the judgment «this Aśoka is a tree» is analytical will not be denied. All non-analytical, i.e., synthetical judgments are conceived as judgments of causality, because, as just mentioned, every regular connexion between two point-instants of reality is regarded as causation.

³ *niyama*.

⁴ Lat., p 25 15—16 «What is not tied up to what, by its essence, for this not tied up to that, there is no rule (*niyama*) of non-divergence in that. Non-diver-

(26.2). This existential dependence is (a dependence) of the logical reason upon the fact (corresponding to the predicate) The logical reason, being the subordinate part, is dependent On the contrary, the fact corresponding to the predicate is not subordinate, and therefore it is (the principal part), the part on which the mark depends,¹ and which is itself independent. (26.3) The meaning is the following. Even in those cases, where there is (an analytical deduction founded on) Identity² (of the predicate with the reason, there always is a dependent and an independent part) It is the dependent part that possesses the power to convey the existence of the other The (independent part, that) to which the other is subordinated,³ is the deduced part. (26.4) If the essence of an attribute⁴ is such that it is invariably concomitant⁵ with something else, it is dependent upon the latter, e g., the fact of «being produced by a voluntary effort» is invariably concomitant with, (and dependent upon, or subordinate to), the fact of «not being an eternal entity»⁶ On the other hand, a quality whose essence admits of being sometimes concomitant, and sometimes not, does not depend; it represents the fact upon which the other depends, e g., the quality called «non-eternity» *versus* the quality of «being a voluntary product», (for there are other non-eternal objects besides those produced by a voluntary human effort) (26.7) The possibility of deducing one fact from another reposes on a necessary connection⁷ The essence of a thing produced by a voluntary effort is never to represent an eternal (substance), this is a necessary characteristic (of such things). (26.8) Therefore it (represents) just the fact which invariably is concomitant with the fact of impermanence. Thus it is that concomitance cannot be anything but the (necessary relation) of a determined object⁷

¹ *pratibandha-viśaya*

² *tādātmya-avibheda*, lit «in non-difference of identity», about identity between the terms of an analytical judgment cp above, p 66 n

³ *dharma* ⁴ *nyātaḥ svabhāvaḥ*

⁵ Whatsoever is voluntarily produced is non-eternal, as e. g., a jar, but not vice versa, a thing can be non-eternal without being voluntarily produced, e g., lightning, although not created by human effort, is evanescent

⁶ Lit, p 21 7 «The relation of deducer and deduced (*gamya-gamaka-bhāva*) refers indeed to necessity», *niscaya* = *nyāya*

⁷ Lit, p 26 8 «Therefore the relation of deduced and deducer possesses just a determined object, not otherwise» The author insists repeatedly (text pp 19, 26 47, 49 etc) that logical concomitance is a necessary relation Invariable concomitance is always of the middle with the major term, it is *nyāta-nyāya*, i e., it refers only to the middle term The reason is always a dependent fact, and because it is dependent, it proves the reality of the other fact upon which it is dependent

which the eye or another organ (can be simultaneously) fixed with attention (22.12). Indeed, when two such objects are (before us) we cannot confine our perception to one of them, since there is no difference between them as regards possibility of perception.¹ (22.13). Therefore if we actually perceive only one of them, we (naturally) imagine that if the other were present, we should likewise perceive it, because the totality of the necessary conditions is fulfilled.² Thus something fancied as perceptible is imputed. The non-cognition of such an object is called negation of a hypothetical visibility.³ (22.15). Therefore that very spot from which the jar is absent and that cognition which is intent upon it are both styled negation of a possible visibility, since they are the real source of negative judgments.⁴

(22.16). Indeed we must at first be able to assert the presence of the (second) object which is a part of the same perception, and (then be able to assert that we have) this cognition. As long as (these two judgments are not made) we will never be able to assert the absence of something that could be present.⁵ (22.17). Consequently what we call negation is (not absence of knowledge, but) a positive reality,⁶ and an (assertory) cognition of it. (22.18). The simple unqualified absence of cognition, since it itself contains no assertion at all, can convey no knowledge. But when we speak of negation whose essence⁷ is a negation of hypothetical perceptibility, these words may be regarded as necessarily implying⁸ a bare place where there is no jar and the

¹ *vyogyanā*

² Lat. p. 22.13—14 «Therefore when one (thing) combined in one cognition is visible, if the second would possess the whole totality of vision, it would be just (even) visible».

³ *drśya-anupalabdhi*, it is contrasted with *adrśya-anupalabdhi*, negation of such objects which can never be visible, which we therefore cannot imagine as visible. i.e., transcendental objects, as e.g., an omniscient being whose existence can neither be affirmed, nor denied, since it is something unknown to experience. It cannot be imagined as being experienced. Negation is a source of real knowledge (*niscaya*) only in regard to objects experimentally known.

⁴ Lat. «the cause of a judgment (*niscaya*) about non-cognition of the (hypothetically) visible (*drśya*)». About *niscaya* as judgment cp. above, p. 20 n. 6.

⁵ Lat. p. 22.16—17 «Indeed as long as the object combined in one cognition is not asserted (*niscaya*) and its knowledge (is not asserted), so long there is no assertion of a non-cognition of the (hypothetically) visible».

⁶ *vacat*

⁷ *rūpa*

⁸ *vacatā-sāmarthyānā etā*

facts constituting) the reason and the consequence¹ (26.16). (We have already mentioned that)² the possibility of deducing one fact from the other always reposes upon a necessary (connection between them) Therefore their difference (in an analytical deduction) concerns exclusively those (constructed) conceptions which have been superimposed (upon the same reality) and which are necessarily (connected)³ The (underlying) reality is the same.

(26.17) But Identity is not the only (possible) relation between, a logical mark and what can be deduced from it) There is moreover (the relation of Causality) The mark can represent an effect of the fact (whose existence is then) inferred from it The logical reason (middle term) can be existentially dependent on, (and therefore invariably concomitant with), another fact, the existence of which is deduced from it, because (the reason) owes its existence to it.⁴

(26.19). Why is it that a logical connection can be the outcome of no other relation⁵ than these two, (Identity and Causality)?

24 Because when a fact is neither existentially identical with another one, nor is it a product of the latter, it cannot be necessarily dependent upon it

(26.21) If one fact is a characteristic of the same (underlying) existence as another one, they are (here said to be) existentially identical

¹ Lat, p 15—16 «But the object of mental construction (*vikalpa*), that essence (*rūpa* = *śarīra*) which has been superimposed by imagination (*samūropita*), with respect to it, there is a split between the reason and consequence»

² Above, p 26. 7

³ Lat, p 26 16 «Therefore their difference is all right (*vyūha*) only when referred to (that their) essence which is situated upon (*ārūḍha*) necessity (or assertion, *niscaya*)» -It has been noted above, p 7 n, that the conception of *niscaya* or *nyama* is assimilated to *pramāna* and *samyag-jñāna* All definite knowledge (*prāṇa* = *bodha* = *ādhyāgama* etc) is constructed knowledge, *kalpita* = *vikalpita* = *samūropita* = *vikalpa-ārūḍha* = *niscaya-ārūḍha* = *buddhy-avasita* Every definite assertion is thus contrasted with the indefinite, transcendental character of ultimate reality And because all assertions are founded upon some invariable concomitance between constructed concepts, the term *niscaya* implies both necessity (= *nyama*) and judgment (*adhyavasāya* = *kalpanā*).

⁴ Lat, p 26 17—18 «Not alone from identity, but also there is origination of the mark from that deduced object, and because of origination from it, there is an essential tie of the mark to the deduced object»

⁵ *nimitta*,

(23.6). An individual means an entity which, being present, necessarily is perceived when all other conditions of perceptibility, i. e., the causes other than the perceptible jar itself, are fulfilled. The following is here meant¹. It is a definition of perception made from the standpoint of an individual observer. (23.8). Indeed, if a man is actually observing something, the perceived thing possesses the two (above mentioned requisites of perception). But things imperceptible, whose place, time and essence are inaccessible,² have no distinct reality for him, although all other conditions of perceptibility be fulfilled. (23.10). The (subjective) factors which allow the observer to see are, indeed, present. (Even if he sees nothing of the sort) they are present when he looks³ But if he does not look at all, objects, although they be in a place amenable to his senses, cannot be perceived. The distinct object is then present, the remaining conditions are not fulfilled. Things remote in time and place will then lack both conditions of perceptibility. (23.12). Thus it is that if somebody is looking on, the distinct thing might be absent, but all other conditions are not absent. If he does not look on, then an object, situated in his ken, (an object) which he could perceive, (but does not perceive), is deficient with regard to the other (the subjective) conditions of perceptibility (23.14). All other objects (the remote and the inaccessible) are then deficient in both respects.

(23.15) After having done with the example of negation, (the author) proceeds to give an example of an analytical reason (founded on Identity).

16. Identity is a reason for deducing a property when (the subject) alone is by itself sufficient for that deduction.⁴

¹ Mallavādi, fol. 49, says—*nanu deśa-lāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭāḥ piśūcādayo 'smad-ādi-pratyayāntara-sālakṣyaṅtas, tathā taddeśa-tallāla-vartī-purusasya piśūca-rūpa-apelsayā apratyakṣāś ca, teṣāṃ apy upalabdhī-lakṣaṇa-prāptatāḥ upalabdhī-lakṣaṇa-prāptasyeti yad viśeṣaṇam* (23.1) *deśādi-viprakṛṣṭa-vyāvartikam tad anarthakam ceti āśankya āha tad ayaṃ it* (23.7). Cp. text, p. 88. 20 ff

² *deśa-lāla-svabhāva viprakṛṣṭa* refers to things metaphysical, uncognizable, neither by the senses nor by the reason (= *adrśya*, not *adrśyamāna*), cp. *infra* sūtras II. 28, 48, 49, III. 97 and Kamalaśīla, p. 476. 8. Mallavādi, f. 49, has *adrśyeti*, not *adrśyamāna* Vinītadeva seems not to involve *viprakṛṣṭa* here.

³ *nanu yadā cakṣur-ādibhiḥ meri-ādīn na paśyati, tadā katham cakṣur-ādīṇaḥ sannitāḥ, padārtha-jñānena sāmānyā-anumites teṣāṃ ity āha, ataś ceti* (23.10), cp. Mallavādi, fol. 49—50. Read *ataś ca sannihitā yau...*

⁴ Lit, p. 28.16 «Own existence (*svabhāva*) is a reason for a deduced property (*sādhya-dharma*) which exists in its own (the reason's) existence only (read *sta-*

on Identity or on Causation. But how are we nevertheless, to explain the circumstance that nothing but a comprehended fact or a produced effect have the force necessarily to establish the existence of something by inference¹

25 It is (simply) because Identity and Causation (causal origin) belong just either to a comprehended property or to an effect. Inferential reference to Reality is possible exclusively on this basis.

(27.10). Since the possibility of deducing one fact from another is based exclusively upon these two relations of (underlying) Identity and Causation, and since they (in their turn) are founded exclusively upon either the presence of a (comprehended) attribute (allowing analytical deduction of the comprehensive fact), or upon the fact that a result (must have a cause), therefore the establishing of reality, or affirmation, is possible only upon the basis of these two relations, Identity and Causation.²

¹ Lit., p. 27. 6—7 «Let it be, for sure, that the Own-existence-bond comes only from Being-originated-by-this, but how is it that Own-existence, (i.e., the subordinated *sambhāta*, the comprehended property) alone (and) the effect (alone) are conveyors?»

² Lit., p. 27 8—11 «And these Identity-with-that and Origination-from-that belong to the «own existence» and to the effect alone, thus from them alone is reality (*vastu*) established — And these etc. The word *it* in the sense of «therefore» Since Identity and Causation have their stand on «own existence» and result only and conditioned by them is the relation of deducer and deduced, therefore from them alone from «own existence» and result, comes establishing of reality or affirmation. — The fact of being a tree (*vrkṣatva*) is included in the fact of being an *Aśoka* *śimṣapāitva*, the first fact «depends» (*pratibaddha*) upon the latter, it is invariably concomitant with the latter because the latter is «its own existence» (*sambhāta*). i.e., both are characteristics of the same underlying reality (*vastu* = *paramārtha-sat* = *stavalāna* = *lāna*) We have here two terms so related that by the analysis of the one we get the other, by analysing the term of greater comprehension (*vyāpta*) we get the term of greater extension (*vyāpaka*) This relation is here explained as «identity» (*tādātmya*) of existence, since both terms ultimately refer to the same underlying sense-datum. A result, on the contrary, points to another reality which is the cause from which it is derived. These two relations alone point to realities. Upon such a basis alone can we establish inferential reference to reality or truth. The term *vastu* «reality» is used as a synonym of *cidh* «affirmative judgment», cp text, p. 24 16 and 27. 11 All affirmative judgments so far they represent cognition of reality can be reduced to these two patterns, «this is a tree, because it is an *Aśoka*», and «there is fire there because there is

17. Ase g.—Thesis This is a tree.
Reason. Because it is an Aśoka.

(24.2). The word "thus" points to the subject (of the conclusion), the words "a tree" contain the predicate, the words "because it is an Aśoka" contain the reason. This means,—this object is fit to be called a tree, because it is fit to be called an Aśoka (24.3). Now, if some unintelligent man who does not know the proper use of the word Aśoka (would reside) in a country where such trees are abundant, and if somebody would point out to him a high Aśoka and say "this is a tree", then the man, being unintelligent, will think that the height of the Aśoka is the reason why it is called a tree. Looking at a small Aśoka, he would think that is not a tree. (24.6). This unintelligent man must be induced (to use the word tree properly, as being) the general mark of every Aśoka. It means that not the height or some other special mark are the reasons for using the word tree, but (its essence alone), the mere fact of its being an Aśoka, its (general) characteristics, its boughs and other attributes, are the reason.¹

(24.9). In order to exemplify (a deduction by causality, where the reason is) an effect, the author says

18 The effect is as follows

Thesis Here is fire.

Reason Because there is smoke.

(24.11). "Fire" is the predicate (major term) "Here" is the subject (minor term) "Because there is smoke" is the reason (middle term).

Causality is a conception familiar in common life.² It is known to be derived from experience (of the presence of the cause wherever there is an effect present), and from the negative experience (of the absence of the effect when its cause is deficient). Therefore the defini-

¹ Judgments referring to the extension and comprehension of concepts are thus brought under this head. Vinitadeva gives here no example at all. The formula of Dharmakīrti refers to all analytical judgments or inferences, and not to such cases of name-explaining alone

² This of course does not mean that the every-day conception of causality is admitted. Dharmakīrti develops his views on that subject in *Pramānaviniścaya*. The exposition in *Sarvadarśi S.* (p. 5 ff) is borrowed from that source. Causality exists only between point-instants (*kṣāṇa*) which are not producing, but merely following one another. Dharmottara alludes to this theory above, text p. 10-12 and in the sequel, p. 70 ff. But predication, inferring, purposive action, cognition, and consequently causation are examined in logic mainly from the empirical point of view

(27.20). Why this alone is the basis, (and why is negation of unimaginable things impossible)?

28^a. Because otherwise, (sc. if the absent thing has not been imagined as present, its absence, and the entailed successful actions, cannot follow with logical necessity).¹

(28.3). Because otherwise etc. The word «otherwise» implies — «because unimaginable (sc. metaphysical or problematic) negation is possible even if the (corresponding) entity be present.» That is the reason why successful negation (in life) is founded on no other (but imaginable) denial. But why is that so? Why is it that even admitting the reality (of metaphysical entities), their (non-perception by the senses) can be (only problematic)?²

28^b. Because when entities do not conform to the conditions of cognizability, when they are inaccessible in space and time and (invisible) by nature, since all human experience is then excluded, apodictic negative judgments are not possible.³

(28.5) We have stated above⁴ that an object is said to be satisfying to all conditions of perceptibility, 1) when all the accompanying

applied their idea of *pratīksana-parināma* and viewed *ghata-abhāva* as a *parināma-lāna* of *bhūtala* which, as all *parināma-bheda*, is cognized, they maintain, by sense perception.

¹ *anyathā ca*, according to Vinitadeva, p. 66 18, and Rgyal-tshab, f. 27, = *drīyānupalabdhiṃ anāśrītya*, according to Dh, = *adrīya-anupalabdhi-sambhavāt*

² Vinitadeva, p. 67 and Rgyal-tshab, f. 27, interpret sūtra II, 28 as meaning «because otherwise there can be no definite assertion (*niscaya*) of non-existence (*abhāva*) concerning.»

³ The *anupalabdhi* of the Sāṅkhya, e.g., is an *adrīya-anupalabdhi* it refers to entities which are not sensible, not individually distinct. They maintain that their Matter (*pradhāna*) and Souls (*purusa*) are metaphysical (*sūksma* = *añindriya*). Their non-perception alone (*anupalabdhi* = *pratyakṣa-mūrthi-mātram*) does not entail apodictic negative judgment (*abhāva-niscaya*). They are cognized by *sūmānya-to-drśta-anumāna* which is explained as *adrśta-svalakṣaṇasya sūmānya-viśeṣasya-darśanam*, cp. S-t-kaumudī ad K 5—6. The Buddhists admit valid denial only if there is some *śālākṣaṇa* = *vidhi-rūpa* = *vastu* = *artha-kriyā-lāri*, i.e., in regard of such objects which can alternately be perceived and not perceived, present and absent, cp. *infra*, text, p. 88. 18. Cp. also, sūtra III 97 where the judgment «he is not omniscient», being metaphysical, is proved to be problematic.

⁴ Sūtra II 14, on Dh's interpretation of *vyāpār-śeṣa* cp. notes on p. 64 and 66

through the difference in the things they help to establish). The reason is subordinate to the deduced predicate. Its aim is to assert the existence of the predicate. The predicate constitutes the main (independent) part. Therefore the reason which is subordinate to the predicate is split into varieties not by itself, but in accordance with a division of the main part, the predicate (24.19). The predicate is sometimes positive, sometimes negative. Since affirmation and negation represent attitudes mutually exclusive,¹ the reasons for them both must be different. (24.20) Affirmation² again. (i. e., the reality which is asserted, can only be) either different from the fact from which it is deduced or identical³ with it. Difference and non-difference being mutually opposed by the law of contradiction, their justifications must also differ. (25.1). Therefore, there is altogether no inherent difference in the reasons *qua* reasons,⁴ but when the deductions⁵ (that follow) are exclusive of one another, their reasons become different (indirectly).

(25.3). Why again is it that these three (relations) represent logical reasons? Why are there no other (relations) representing valid reasons?⁶ In his answer (the author) shows both why the three mentioned varieties are alone valid reasons, and why the others are not.

20. Because one thing can convey the (existence of) another one when it is existentially dependent (on the latter)

(25.6). Existentially dependent means dependent in its own existence. Existential (and necessary) dependence means dependent existence.⁷ When the cause of something is to be deduced (synthetically), or an essential quality⁸ is to be deduced (analytically), the effect is in its existence dependent upon its cause, (and the analytically deduced) fact is by its essence dependent upon the fact from which it is deduced. (25.8) Both

¹ *paraspara-parashūra* is the second mode of the law of contradiction, cp. below, sūtra III. 77

² Here again affirmation (*viddhā*) means object of which the existence is affirmed, *viddhīyate itī viddhā* (*karma-sādhana*)

³ *abhinna*, cp p 48 9 — *sa eva vrisah, saiva śimśapā*

⁴ *svata eva*.

⁵ *sādhya*

⁶ The Naiyāyikas assume an indefinite variety of relations (*sambandho .. yo eva itā bhavatu*) established by experience, Tāt.p., p 107 10.

⁷ *Lit*, p 25 6—7 "Being tied up by one's own existence means having one's own existence tied up. The composite noun is according to the rule, Pāṇini II 1 32"

⁸ The term *svabhāva* is here used in two different senses, *svabhāva-pratibandha* is existential tie which includes the relation of the effect to its cause. But

(28. 18). For this reason negation is not really deduced (by an inference), because simple negation, (being its fundamental aspect), is established (by direct perception). (But how can non-existence be perceived by the senses? It is perceived in imagination!)¹ An object, e.g., a jar, although absent, is nevertheless said to be perceived, because it is imagined as perceived, as being cognized in all normal conditions² of perception, upon a place which appears as part of the same act of cognition.

(28. 20). Therefore what we call negative experience³ is this object (the substratum) itself appearing as part of the same cognition, and the cognition of such a substratum. Because on the basis of this perceived substratum and of its cognition we arrive at the judgment⁴ on the absence of an object which is being imagined as perceived in all normal conditions of a (possible) experience.

(28. 22). Consequently when we assert the absence of the perceptible jar, we necessarily assert something positive, (we assert the presence of the bare place and the fact of its cognition).⁵

¹ Lat, p 28 17—18 «The object jar etc perceptible to the observer, its absence is non-cognition, its essence means so much as the absence of this (object) Just this non-existence is not deducible, because «non-perception of own existence» (the fundamental first formula of negation) is established (itself)». *abhāva-vyavahāra* is deduced in the first formula, *abhāva* is deduced in the remaining ones cp. text p. 88. 4

² *samagra-sāmagrīka*

³ *pratyakṣa-nivṛtti*.

⁴ *avasthyate = nidāhyate = vikalpyate = pratīyate = prāpyate* etc

⁵ Lat, p 28 22 «Therefore just (positive) cognition of a thing is called non-existence of a perceptible jar» Cp Bradley, Principles², p 117,—«every negation must have a ground and this ground is positive», it is affirmation of a quality *x* which «is not made explicit», and, p 668, he even maintains that the negative is *more* real than what is taken as barely positive, B. Erdmann, Logik⁴, p 500,—«die Urtheile mit verneinendem Prädicat sind trotzdem bejahend» According to the Indian view every judgment reduces to the form «this is that», *sa eva ayam*, it is an arrangement (*kalpanā*) or a conjunction (*yogjanā*), at the same time it is a resolve, or a judgment in the real sense of the word (*nāhyavasthyā*) and a choice, a distinction, a contrast, the result of a disjunction (*vikalpa*) These terms describe the same fact (*anavahantaram*, Tāt p, p 87) Now, in the conjunction of the two parts «this» and «that», of Thisness and Thatness (*idamitā* and *tatitā*, cp N Kanikā, p. 124) the part «this» refers to Reality, to the point-instant, to the «thing in general» (*Ding überhaupt*), or «thing in itself» (*svataḥsana = vastu = vidhū-vatīpa*) This is an intrinsic affirmation (*vastu = vidhū*, cp above, p 68 n. 8, *nāstitya anena na sam-badhyate*, Tāt p, p 840 11) The judgment is made up by the second part, by

by its existence to another one, it cannot be necessarily concomitant with the fact to which it is not tied up. Therefore, there is no rule of their invariable concomitance, i. e., of the impossibility of the one being existent without the other.

(25.18). The possibility of deducing one fact from the other¹ reposes upon an invariable rule precluding the existence of the one without the existence of the other. (25.19). For we do not admit, that the logical mark is comparable to the light of a lamp which occasionally² brings to our knowledge some unperceived objects.³ On the contrary (the logical mark is always a fact whose invariable connection) is ascertained beyond the possibility of exception.⁴ (25.20). Therefore if (two facts) are existentially connected, we can assert that one of them cannot exist independently from the other, and therefore from the presence of the one follows the presence of the other. Hence it is established that the existence of one fact can convey the existence of another only when it is existentially dependent on the latter, not otherwise.

(25.22). Now, if among two facts one depends upon the other, there must be a dependent part and an independent part.⁵ And here, between the logical reason and the logical predicate, who is dependent upon whom?

22. This is a dependence of the logical reason upon the fact which is deduced from it, (upon the predicate)

gence in that, is non-divergence in this object of being tied up. its rule ... Read *pratibandha-śāstra* = *hrel-pa'i yul gañ yin-pa de-la* . . . According to the Tib p, 57.8, we would expect *yah pratibandha-śāstras tasmān avyabhicāras tad-avyabhicārah*; *pratibaddha* is the term of lesser extension, e. g., the Aśoka tree. *pratibandha-śāstra* is the term of greater extension, e. g., the tree in general, *apratibandha-śāstra* = *ma-hrel-pa'i yul*, Tib 57 11, is an object from which there is no dependence, with which another object is not invariably concomitant, cp text p 26 8 The logical mark, or middle term, is always a term of lesser extension as compared with the deduced fact, or major term. Therefore it is «tied up» or dependent

¹ *gamyā-gamaḥ-bhāṇa* ² *yogyatayā*

³ About invariable concomitance cp above, p 52 n 3, it is here characterized as necessary, cp also below, p 72 notes 6 and 7.

⁴ *māyā* is here used as a synonym of *nyāya*. cp p 25 16, just as above, p 18. 20, and below 26 16 Otherwise it is also used as a synonym of *kalpanā*, *cīlāpa*, *ādhyatmā* and then means assertion, judgment cp above, p. 47 and Tātp. p 87 25

⁵ Lit, p., 25.22 «And is it not a tie of the dependent on the other upon the independent on the other?»

(29. 1). Therefore,¹ when we have realized the non-perception of the object after having imagined its presence, (this process contains) by implication² the idea of its non-existence. However, this idea has not yet been translated into life.³ It can therefore receive practical application on the basis of (an inference whose middle term is) non-perception⁴ (29. 6). Consequently we must keep in mind that what is called negation (has a positive ground in) the associated bare place and in the fact of its being perceived, because this can be regarded as the middle term in an inference which repels the suggested presence of a visible object⁵

visible is imagined, from its non-perception of the visible is ascertained, and just from the capacity of the ascertainment of non-perception of the visible, the non-existence of the visible is ascertained»

¹ *ata evambhūtād drśya-anupalambha-niscayād iti samānādhikaranyam (ibid)*

² *sāmānyāyād*

³ *vyavahāra* — On the practical importance of negation in life (*vyavahāra*) B Erdmann delivers himself, *Logik*, p. 500, as follows, «das formulierte Denken findet . . . Anlässe für die Bildung kontradictorischer Artunterschiede, eben weil es das Wirkliche vom Standpunkt der praktischen Weltanschauung aus deutet, der das anschaulich und praktisch-teleologisch Hervortretende vor allem ins Auge fallen lässt» Cp. H. Bergson, *op cit*, pp. 297, 312, 315, 321

⁴ *atha yadā drśya-anupalambhena keśala-bhūtinā grāhi-pratyaksena drśyagata-adbhūto niscayato eva, na vyavaharīyat, turh kēna vyavaharīyato ity āha drśyatyādhī (p. 29. 5), drśya-anupalambhena lingo-bhūtena vyavaharīyato ity arthak (ibid) Cp. Kamalaśīla, p. 481. 18, — tasmāt sarvatra sambhūti-anupalabdhir anad-vyavahāra-hetuḥ paramāṁśhataḥ kāmānupalabdhir eva drśyatyādhī*

⁵ *Lit.*, 29. 6—7 «Therefore another thing which is being perceived and associated in one cognition and its cognition, since they are the logical reason (*hetu*) for the ascertainment of the absence of the perceived (thing), should be regarded as called absence of the perceived» — The fully expressed-formula of a negative inference is given in III. 9 — All these subtleties are probably the outcome of controversies with the Mīmāṃsakas who also admitted «repelled suggestion» or «challenged imagination» (*drśya-anupalambhī*) as a method of cognizing real non-existence (*vastu*), though they viewed it not as an inference, but as a third, independent source of our knowledge, cp. note 8 on p. 77. For the Buddhists the reality (*vastu*) is the bare place which is cognized by the senses. The Mīmāṃsakas retorted that the place is also perceived when the jar is present. We would then have the absurdity that the absence of the jar must also be perceived if the jar be present. Therefore they concluded, absence must be a reality *ans generis* (*vastu-tarām*) — Among European logicians Sigwart inclines to the view that negation is really an inference («secundärer und abgeleiteter Ausdruck», *op cit* I. 167), J. N. Keynes, in despair, thinks that «the nature of logical negation is of so fundamental and ultimate a character that any attempt to explain it is apt to obscure rather than to illumine», cp. *Formal Logic*, p. 120

(26.10) Further, why is it that the mark, (i e., the reality underlying the reason) is existentially so related to the predicate?

23. Because, as regards (ultimate) reality, (the entity underlying the logical reason) is either just the same as the entity (underlying) the predicate, or it is causally derived from it.¹

(26.12) In reality (there are only two necessary relations, Identity and Causation). «Identity» with the predicated fact means that (the mark) represents (the predicate) itself, its essence. Since (in those cases) the essence of a logical reason is contained in the predicate, therefore it is dependent upon the latter (and invariably concomitant with it).²

(26.13) The question arises, that if they are essentially identical, there will be no difference between reason and predicate, and then the argument will be (a repetition or) a part of the thesis?³ Therefore it is said, «as regards reality», i. e., the two are identical with reference to what is the ultimately real essence, (i. e., the sense datum underlying both facts). (26.15) But the constructed objects, those (conceptions) which have been superimposed (upon reality), are not the same (in the

¹ Lat. p. 26. 11. «Because in reality there is identity with, and production from. the thing predicated». The author insists that there can be only two kinds of logical relations. The principle of his division is this: Existence is split in point instants. Every efficient point-instant can be the substratum of a variety of characteristics. It can be a tree, an *Aśoka*-tree, a solid body, a substance, etc., etc. All such characteristics refer to the same entity, they are simultaneous, they will be, according to the terminology of the author, identical. But if a tree is characterized as produced from a seed, this will be a relation between two realities, two underlying point-instants, since there is a causal relation only between the last moment of the seed and the first moment of the sprout. Therefore there can be only two relations between the terms in cognition, either the one is contained in the other, or it is produced from it, either analysis or synthesis, either identity or causation.

² Lat. p. 26. 12-14. «From reality etc., of what this *probandum* is the Self, the own existence, that is (the possessor) of its Self. Its condition is its-selfness, (the Self of one thing belonging to another thing), for this reason. Since the *probans* possesses the own Self of the *probandum*, therefore it is existentially tied up. This is the meaning. If the *probans* possesses the own existence of the *probandum*, »

³ The thesis will be, e. g., «this is a tree», and the reason «because it is an *Aśoka*-tree». The reason «*Aśoka*-tree» contains the predicate «tree», or *Aśoka*-tree is a part of trees in general, *pratyñā* is here the same as *sādhya* or *pañā*, op. III. 40. The analytical judgment being reduced to the formula «the *Aśoka*-tree is a tree» seems utterly useless. This problem continues to puzzle European philosophers. The Indian solution is here hinted, it will be reconsidered *w/ra*, in *sūtra* III. 20.

remembered, nor the fact of the failure to perceive any. But a present spot, when there is no jar on it, cannot escape memory. Neither the imagined jar, nor the failure to perceive it can then be forgotten. Therefore the qualification of non-obiterated memory is not meant as a characteristic of a present negation¹. A present object is never severed from the trace which it leaves in memory.²

(29.18) What is meant is this. Negation is valid in regard of a past object, if this is clearly remembered, and in regard of a present one. We can cognize "there was here no jar, because we did not perceive any", "there is here no jar, because we do not perceive any". But the judgment "there will be here no jar, because we will not perceive any" is impossible, since a future non-perception is problematic. The time of valid negation has thus been defined.

(29.22) Its function will be next indicated. It consists in making use of the idea of non-existence (by applying it to life). (It includes) 1) the judgment "there is not", 2) the words expressing it, and 3) successful purposive action, consisting in moving about with the certainty (not to fall upon the absent object). The last case is the physical³ use of the idea of non-existence. When a man knows that there is no jar (in the place), he moves about without expecting (to find it). This threefold practical application⁴ of the idea of non-existence is based upon non-perception of the hypothetically visible.

(30.1) But has it not been stated above that the judgment "there is no jar" is *produced* by (sense-perception, by the perception of the bare place)?⁵ (And now we include this judgment into the practical consequences *deduced by inference* from this perception). (30.2) (Yes, we do not deny that!) Since the bare place is cognized by sense-perception, and since the negative judgment "there is here no jar" is a judgment produced by the direct function of perception, (that function which makes the object present to our senses), therefore (it is quite

¹ Vinītadeva has interpreted this passage as if the qualification of "non-obiterated memory" could refer to both the present and the past experience, cf p 68 1—5, (but not in 69 14). Dharmottara takes great pains apparently to redress this slight inconsistency.

² *Īt*, p 29 17—18. "For this very reason the word «and» has been used, «and of the present», in order that it should be known that the «present» without any qualification is combined together with the past as possessing qualification."

³ *lāyika*

⁴ *vyavahāra*

⁵ *anupalabdher*, p 30 1, is explained by Mallavādi as = *bhūtād*

(30 10). Why is it then that negation is valid (only) in regard of past or present events? The (author) says,

30 It is exclusively on the basis of such (negation) that absence can be ascertained (with logical necessity)

(30 12) The absence (of a thing) is ascertained only from it, i e, exclusively through a negation of a determined time, as has been indicated above. A future negative experience has always the nature of being itself problematic. Since it is itself uncertain,¹ a negative judgement² cannot be (sufficiently) founded on it, but a past or present (non-perception is a sufficient reason for deducing a negative judgment)

§ 7. THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF NEGATIVE JUDGMENTS

(30 14) The different varieties of negation are next shown

31 This (negation) has eleven varieties, according to difference of formulation

nition of the visible turns out the ready made cognition of non existence, but does not make the unmade. Therefore the ascertainment of non-existence, although turned out by non-cognition, is made by perception, it is said to be turned out by non-cognition. Thus non-cognition is directing the run of non-existence. — Mallavādi calls attention to the circumstance that this passage should not be regarded as a mere repetition of the argument contained in the passage *nanu ca* etc on p 29 1, and explains that the objector in 29 1 ff contended that the practical use of the idea of a non-*Īms* is produced directly from the perception of the bare place, just as the idea itself (*abhāva-miscaya*) is produced. The solution, in the passage *kecalam* etc, p 29 2 ff, is that sense-perception produces a negative perceptive judgment, the negative inference deduces its practical applications. In the second instance, in the passage *yady api ca* etc, p 30 1, the objection is that the judgment "there is not" is also comprized under the practical applications of the idea of a non-*Īms* (*abhāva-vyavahāra*) and must be, accordingly characterized as inferential, not as perceptual. We are thus seemingly landed into a contradiction, since the negative judgment which was at first said to be produced by sense-perception and just its practical consequences deduced through the help of an inference, is now also included among these practical consequences. The distinction established in the first passage is thus jeopardized. The solution is given in the passage beginning with *tathāpi*, p 30 2, and establishes that the negative judgment is produced by sense-perception. But this does not prevent its being actually in life deduced from a negative logical reason, i e, from a repelled suggestion, — *tathāpi tyādnā pratyakṣa-kṛtātām samarthya sanvṛtābher abhāva-ādholatām uktam it* (fol 61)

¹ *asiddha*

² *abhāva-miscaya*

§ 6. THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGATIVE JUDGMENTS.

(27.12). Now, why is it that we do not consider non-cognition of a thing¹ unimagined as the cause of success, (when purposive action is evoked) by a negative judgment?²

26. The success of negative behaviour is only owing to a negative cognition of the form described above.

(27.14). The success of negative behaviour reposes exclusively upon such a (process of) repudiating in thought the imagined presence of an object. No other basis for it is therefore given.

(Two questions are now raised, 1) why does it repose upon such a basis, and 2) why no other basis, e. g., no real non-cognition of a real non-existence is possible)?

(27.16) First, why does it repose upon such (a process)?

27. Because when a real object is present (it is perceived and it) becomes superfluous (to imagine its presence)

(27.18) Because if the object to be denied³ were present, (this would be perceived and) it would be impossible to deny its imagined presence⁴ This proves that negation is founded upon such (a process of repelling some suggestion)

smoke» It will be noticed that judgments, or inferences, about future results are not considered as valid, e. g., «there will come a rain, because there are clouds» is a valid inference for the Naiyāyikas, but not for the Buddhists, because they assume that causes are not always followed by their results, cp text, p. 40.8 Results necessarily must have always some cause or causes, therefore there is «necessity» (*niscaya*) in such affirmations, but no necessity in deducing a future result from its possible cause

¹ *adrśya-anupalabdhi* is always problematic, cp *infra*, p. 78 ff.

² *pratishedha-siddhi* = *pratishedha-vyavahāra-siddhi* = *prahsedha-vaśāt puruṣārtha-siddhi*

³ E. g., the visible jar (*Bgyal-tshab*), for Dh this seems to refer to *cīpra-lāta-tastu*, cp. p. 28 9.

⁴ The Indian realists maintained that negation is a cognition of real absence. Just as affirmation is cognition of real presence, they thought that negation is a non-cognition of real absence. The Mīmāṃsakas viewed non-existence as a reality *sūgenarī* (*astīantaram*) and admitted *yogyā-pratyogy-anupalabdhi*, though not as *anumāna*, but as a special *pramāṇa* which they called *abhāva*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school viewed it as a special category (*padārtha*), a reality cognized by the senses, owing to a special contact (*viśeṣya-viśeṣana-bhāva-sannikarṣa*) The Sāṅkhyas

33 Negation of an effect is as follows

(Thesis) There are here no efficient causes producing smoke

(Reason). Because there is no smoke.

(31.9) «Here» is the subject. Unchecked, i. e., efficient «Causes whose efficiency in producing smoke is not checked, are not present», this is the predicate «Because there is no smoke» is the logical reason

Causes, indeed, do not necessarily produce their effects. Hence when we observe the absence of the effect, we can infer only the absence of such causes whose efficiency has not been interfered with but not of other ones. Causes whose efficiency remains unopposed are the causes which exist at the ultimate moment (of the preceding compact chain of moments), because the possibility of all other (preceding moments) being checked (in their efficiency) never can be excluded.

(31.12) (This method) of negation of an effect is resorted to in cases where the cause is invisible, because if it were visible, the method of direct negation (first formula) would have been adopted.¹

(31.13) The following (is a case where this method must be applied) (Supposing a man) stands on the roof of a palace wherefrom he fails to perceive the court grounds. He looks at the upper extremities of the walls enclosing the court on its four sides and at the same time he sees the space which is called the range² of his sight, free from smoke. (31.15) Since he is sure that there is no smoke in this space, he must conclude that there is (also) no fire, the efficiency of which to produce smoke is unchecked in a place wherefrom the smoke would reach the court.³ (31.17) The smoke which would be produced by a fire situated in the court would be present in the space (visible to him). Therefore he must conclude that there is no fire in that place. (31.18) Then the man standing on the roof (produces a judgment) the subject of which is the court, surrounded by the walls, as well as the space surrounded by the upper parts of the walls, the space which constitutes his range of sight and which is free from smoke. (31.19) Therefore the subject consists here of a particular space actually perceived and of an

¹ Lat., «Just non-perception of the perceptible is *śahd* (*gamitā*)»

² *ālāka*

³ Lat. p. 31. 15—16 «Because of the certainty of the absence of smoke in that (place), we must learn the absence of fire whose efficiency is unchecked, by which fire, in which place situated the produced smoke would be in the place»

necessary conditions are fulfilled, and 2) when the individually distinct object itself is present. When one or the other of these clauses is deficient, the object is said to be in a condition of non-perception. The words «do not conform to the conditions of cognizability» point here to the absence of the first clause. The words «inaccessible in space, time and invisible by nature» point to the total absence of individual distinctness.

(28.9) There can be no certainty about the absence of such objects. We contend that we never could know it with certainty, even if such entities did really exist¹

(28.10) Why is it that there could be no such certainty? It is impossible, because human experience of such objects is excluded.

(28.11) Since human experience² in respect of (metaphysical objects) which do not satisfy to the conditions of possible experience is excluded, and there can be no apodictic knowledge of their non-existence,³ therefore, even supposing that such objects really exist, only a metaphysical⁴ negation regarding them is possible, a negation whose essence is to be beyond human experience.

(28.12) Thus the basis of negative judgments is that (process of thought which we have) described above

(28.14). The time to which such cognition, if it is valid,⁵ refers its essence, and its function will next be stated

29. Negative behaviour⁴ is successful when a present or a past negative experience of an observer has happened, provided the memory of this fact has not been obliterated.

(28.17) The preception by somebody of an object, e.g., of a jar, has not happened. This is called negative experience. This means that the essence of negation is the fact of some experience having not happened⁶

¹ Lat, p 289—10 «Even if reality exists, its non-existence is admitted» *tasya abhāvaḥ = niścayaśya abhāvaḥ, satī vastuni = pratishedhye satī vastuni*

² *āśīta-pratyaśa-mvrtti = iādi-pratīvādi-pratyaśa-mvrtti* (Rgyal-tshab)

³ *abhāva-niścaya-abhāva*, no assertion as of a reality (*vastu*), *ibid.*

⁴ *adrśya = svabhāva-viśeṣa-viprakṛta*, cp sūtra II 15

⁵ *pramāṇa*

⁶ *abhāva-vyavahāra*, a negative judgment, a negative proposition and a corresponding successful purposive action are suggested by this term, cp text, p 29, 22—23, for abbreviation we may express it as negative behaviour

like the Aśoka tree is not being perceived. If it were in a condition affording possibility of perception, simple negation of the hypothetically visible, (i.e., the first formula), would be sufficient.

(32.7). Now (let us imagine before us) two contiguous¹ elevated places, the one covered with a forest, the other consisting of mere rock, without tree or bush. (Let us imagine) an observer capable of seeing the trees, but not capable of discerning their species, Aśoka or other. For him the presence of trees is perceptible, but the presence of Aśoka trees is not (32.10). Then (turning) to the treeless place which consists of bare rock, he produces a judgment² ("I cannot discern Aśoka trees in this wood, but on that place beyond there are surely none, because there are altogether no trees.") The absence of trees he ascertains through simple non-perception,³ because they would be visible, the absence of Aśoka trees — (indirectly) through the absence of the pervading term, the trees.

(32.11) This method of negation is resorted to when non-existence is predicated in cases analogous to (the example here given).

(32.12) (The fourth formula) consists in the affirmation⁴ of something which by its nature is incompatible with the presence of the negated fact. It is exemplified

35. Affirmation of something incompatible (with the fact which is being denied) is as follows

(Thesis) There is here no sensation of cold

(Reason) Because there is fire

(32.14) "Here" is the subject "There is no sensation of cold", i.e., a negation of such a sensation, is the predicate "Because there is fire" is the logical reason. This variety of negation must be applied where cold cannot be directly experienced. Otherwise simple negation would be sufficient⁵. Hence it is applied in such cases where fire is directly perceived by seeing a characteristic (patch of) colour, but cold, because of its remoteness, although present, cannot be felt.

¹ *pūriṭa-aparā-śpaśista*

² *acāyati* = *niścinoti* = *kalpayati*

³ *dr̥ṣya-anupalambhāt*

⁴ *apalābādhih* = *vidhih*, op. infra, p. 37. 5

⁵ Lat., p. 32. 15 "Because, when it is perceptible, non-perception of the perceptible is applied"

And¹ since we are dealing here² (with inferential knowledge as far as it controls our purposive actions), absence is not the bare (phantom) of a non-Ens, because this alone could not produce an ascertainment of the absence of a (definite) perceptible thing.

(29.1) Now,³ (if) the absence of a visible thing⁴ is ascertained through sense perception,⁵ (and not through an inference, the practical importance of negation as a guide of our actions, could be derived from the same source)? Quite true! (It could be so derived). However,⁶ (inference likewise plays a part, from the following point of view. At first) an object is imagined as visible (in the following manner), "if a jar did (really) exist on a place which would be a part of the same cognition, this jar would certainly be visible", and then, on the basis of such (a hypothetical judgment), we ascertain our negative experience.⁷ (29.3). When it has been ascertained that an object perceptible (by its nature) is not being perceived, we just *eo ipso*⁸ realize its absence. If the visible object would have been present, its non-perception would never have occurred.⁹

«thatness», which contains no intrinsic affirmation (*nirasta-māhi-bhāva*), it can be both, affirmation and negation (*gaur asti, gaur nāsti, ibid*, p. 840 10). It is always a universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) a construction, not «a thing in itself», it involves a choice, a contrast, a distinction. A judgment without any reference to reality (i. e., to sensation) in the element «this», will be, as the Indian says, a lotus growing in the sky. All real cognitions are, in this sense, positive, whether they be expressed in the affirmative or in the negative. Cp also H Bergson, *Evolution Créatrice*, pp. 297 ff, S Alexander, *Space, Time and Demy*, p. 198 ff

¹ *tu-śaddah punar-arthe* (Mallavādi)

² *śhetṛṅga-prastāve* (*ibid*)

³ *nanu yathā bhūtala-grāhi-pratyakṣam ghata-abhāve pramāṇam, tathā abhāva-avyavahāre'py asti, kim dr̥ṣya-anupalambhena lṅga-bhūtena kāryam, iti parā-līlam pralambayann āha nanv ityādī* (p. 29. 1) (*ibid*)

⁴ *dr̥ṣya-mertir ghata-abhāvaḥ* (*ibid*).

⁵ *dr̥ṣya-anupalambhād iti leśala-bhūtala-grāhi-pratyakṣād iti tato 'abhāva-avyavahāro 'pi tatha syād iti parāśanyah* (*ibid*)

⁶ *nanu yady asmad-uklasya satyam ity ādinā* (p. 29 2) *anumatis, tadā dr̥ṣya-anupalambh-lṅgaṭā na yuktā, ity āśankya āha, leśalam ity ādi, kimtu samānādhi-karanyam* *iti* (*ibid*) *samānādhi-karanyam* here evidently means that the same fact can be viewed either as a sense-perception or as an inference, cp Kamalaśīla, p. 481.12—*yathāpi leśala-pradeśopālambhād (pratyakṣād) ghata-abhāvah Siddhah, sāpi ghatānupalambha-kārya-anupalambhā eva (anumānam)* The absence of noise is perceived by *kāryānupalambhā, ibid*

⁷ *dr̥ṣyānupalambh*

⁸ *sāmāthyād eva*

⁹ *lit.*, p. 29 1—4 «And is not absence of the visible ascertained from non-perception of the visible? This is quite true! However, if on a visible (place) united in the same cognition there were a jar, it necessarily would be visible, thus the

(29.7) And just as a jar, although absent, (can be now) imagined as present on a perceived spot which is part of the same perception. (we can likewise remember the absence of a jar in the past) The character¹ of the jar is the same, it is a non-existing jar, it is imagined on a present, or remembered on a former, place, it is appertaining to the same cognition, provided the memory of the latter has not been obliterated.²

(29.9) Thus the essence of logical negation³ has been explained, it is the perception of a jar that has not happened. And this is a real fact established (by introspection).⁴ Thus the non-existence of a jar cannot be deduced, but the negative judgment, as mentioned above,⁵ is deduced (from that fact)

(29.11) "Not obliterated" refers to an impression⁶ produced by an experience and having the capacity of evoking a recollection. This refers to a past experience of some human individual, and a present experience of such an individual is likewise referred to. (29.13). But the qualification of "non-obliterated" memory does not refer to the present cognition. It occurs that an impression produced by a spot without any jar upon it leaves no traces, neither is the imagined jar

¹ *śāda-rūpam*

² Lit p 29 7-9 "And just as the perceptibility of a jar on a perceived (place) united in one cognition, although it does not exist, just so on this (place) united in one cognition past, if the memory-impression has not been obliterated, and present, this form of the jar is imagined although non-existent, thus should it be considered"

³ *drśya-anupalabdhi*

⁴ *sā ca śiddhā*, p 29 10 = *sā ca śiddhā*, Tattvas, p 481 2, op. 470 22, lit "it really exists", "it is established as an objective reality", the reality is the bare place. The realists who maintained that negation is a negative cognition of real absence (*adrśya-anupalabdhi*) contended that the Buddhist idea of a non-Ens had no corresponding objective reality, that it was *asiddha*, *tuccha*. The Buddhists answered that their view was proved and the objective reality of their idea of a non-Ens established as an active principle of cognition and conscious behaviour (*abhāva-vyavahāra*), by both perception and introspection (*śva-samēdana*), perception of the bare place and introspective awareness of that perception Cp Mallavādi, fol. 58, — *atha bhāvadīyāpi anupalabdhiḥ parolka-mūrta-mūtra-tuccha-rūpa-anupalabdhiḥ śiddhā syād ity āśanīya āha, 'ā cetyādi* (p 29.10) *leśala-bhūṭala-grāhi-jñāna-rūpāyā anupalabdheḥ śva-samēdana-maityaksa-śiddhatvāt, leśala-bhūṭala-rūpāyā ca leśala-bhūṭala-grāhi-pratyakṣa-jñāna-śiddhatvāt ceti*

⁵ p 29 5

⁶ Here the term *samskāra* = *smṛti-bhā* is used in the Naiyāyika sense, as the special faculty included in the *smṛti-janaka-sāmagrī*

(33.14) For us¹ (Buddhists) constancy is permanence (eternity), non-constancy impermanence.² Since permanence and impermanence are (qualities) exclusive of one another,³ it would be a contradiction to assume their (simultaneous) presence in the same place. (33.15) In such cases, if one of the two contradictory qualities is present, the presence of the second must be *eo ipso* denied⁴ (33.16). But such negation is possible only in regard of an (object) whose perceptibility is hypothetically assumed. When denying the reality (of the predicate) we, indeed, must argue in the following manner.⁵ "If the fact before us were permanent, we would have some experience of its permanent essence, but no permanent essence is being experienced, therefore it is not permanent."⁶ (33.18) It follows that when we deny permanence this denial refers to objects of a possible experience

¹ *ika*, cp above text, p 10 12

² The argument is that the real thing being one (*unus numero*), cannot possess two such contradictory characteristics as origination and destruction *utramque an bhūvaḥ katham tasya uttarakālam lāraṇāntarāḥ svadhāvāntaram ākhyate*, Kamalaśīla, p 134 8. The real thing can be either *nitya*, eternal and unchanging or *anitya* = *ksanika*, momentary — *aprayuta-anutpanna-sthira-kasībhāṭam nityam ākhyāyate, prakṛty-eka-ksana-sīhiti-dharmakam cūnityam* (Anelūta) p 18. The Realists and the Jains assume a limited duration of some things which in that case possess both characteristics of origination and destruction. The Sāṅkhyas assume *parināma-nityatā* no ever changing substance, the Buddhist — a constant change without any substantiality, simple momentary flashes. Since *anāḍa* is the name for such a flash, and *adhruvabhāṣa* is the same as *anityatva*, the problem here alluded to amounts at asking whether *anityatva* is itself *anitya*, a problem the solution of which attracted the attention of the Buddhists already in the Kathāvatthū, XI 8, just as in later times they were interested in the problem whether *śūnyatva* is itself *śūnya*, cp my Nirvāṇa, p 49 ff.

³ *paraspāra-parihāra*, cp below, text p 69 20

⁴ *tādātmya-nusēdha*, lit, «its identity (i e, its presence in that thing) must be denied». This expression means evidently the same as *ekavācchātva* or *ekātma-katva-virodha* on p 70 11—12 (text), cp below the notes on the translation of that passage. Between *vīśa* and *śūnyatva*, as noted above, p 73 ff, there is no *tādātmya-nusēdha* with regard to the *vastu*, but between two consecutive moments of the same thing there is one.

⁵ Lit., p 33 17. «Because the denial of the identity (of the fact constituting the predicate, i e, of permanence) is done thus»

⁶ Lit., p 33 17. «If this thing we look upon were eternal, it would appear in its eternal essence (*rūpa* = *svatūpa*), but it does not appear in an eternal essence». The term *darśana* is used where we would say «experience», *darśanā* means «because we know from experience». Cp the use of that term in the Kārikā of Dharmakīrti quoted in Sarvad, p 22 (Bombay 8 S ed, incor-

true) that the negative judgment immediately following on the perception¹ of the bare place is a perceptual judgment. (30.4). Indeed, the negative judgment, according to what has been said above, is directly produced by sense-perception, because (qualified) perception has just the capacity of producing a judgment as to the existence (before us) of a bare place² (30.5). However,³ (the proper function of negation consists in the next following step) Objects might be not perceived, but this only gives rise to doubt, (the feeling arises as to which of them) might be present? So long as this doubt has not been removed, negation has no practical importance, (it cannot guide our purposive actions)⁴ (30.6) (Imagination then steps in, and) it is thus that negation, (as a negative deduction), gives practical significance to the idea of a non-Ens. Since an object which I imagine as present on a given place is not really perceived, just therefore do I judge that «it is not there» (30.7). Consequently this negation of an imagined presence (is an inference which) gives life to the ready concept of a non-Ens, it does not newly create this concept itself. Thus it is that (the author) maintains that the negative judgment receives its practical significance (through an inference) from challenged imagination,⁵ although it is really produced by sense-perception and only applied in life (through a deductive process of an inference whose logical reason consists in the fact of) a negative experience⁶. A negative inference, therefore, guides our steps when we apply in life the idea of a non-Ens⁷.

¹ *pratyakṣa-vyūpāra* = *nirvikalpa-*i*-pratyakṣa*, *īdān-anusūcī mścayāḥ* = *sarikalpaka pratyakṣa*, in the sense explained above, text p 16, transl p 45

² *diśya-anupalambha-śabdena* (p 30.4) *bhūta-gñānam bhūtaṃ colāṃ Mallavādī*

³ *keśalam*, the *cheda* after *sambhaviṭ* must be dropped

⁴ *vyaśahartum* = *pravartayitum*

⁵ *anupalambhāt lingāt, ibid*

⁶ *anupalambhena kṛga-rūpeṇa, ibid*

⁷ *Īt*, p 30.1—30.9 «And although the cognition «there is no jar» appears just from non-cognition and just this is an ascertainment of non-existence, nevertheless, since by perception the bare place is cognized, and therefore the ascertainment of non-existence follows on the function of perception thus «there is here no jar», therefore the ascertaining of non-existence which follows on the function of grasping the bare place is done by perception. And moreover, non-existence is ascertained just by perception in the above mentioned manner, just by its capacity of making an ascertainment of the non-cognition of the visible (30.5). However, since (things) non-perceived can also exist, through the doubt of existence he is not able to use non-existence. Therefore non-cognition makes us use non-existence. Since the visible is not perceived, therefore it does not exist (30.7). Therefore non-cog-

(Thesis) There are here no efficient causes of cold

(Reason). Because there is a fire

(34. 7). "Here" is the subject. "Causes of cold", i. e., causes whose efficiency to produce cold has not been arrested, this is the predicate "Because there is a fire" is the reason. (34. 8) We can avail ourselves of this formula in those cases where neither the causes producing cold, nor the cold itself are directly felt. Where cold is felt we will use the (second formula), the formula of denying the result ("there are here no causes of cold, since there is no cold"), and when its causes are amenable to sensation, we will use the formula of a simple negative judgment, (the first formula, "there are no causes of cold, because we do not perceive them")

(34. 10). Consequently this is also a method of deducing non-existence. We avail ourselves of it in cases where the observer is situated at a distance. He can neither feel the cold, nor perceive the causes which would produce cold sensation, but fire, notwithstanding the distance, is perceived through its refulgence.

(34. 12). (The eighth formula of a negative judgment) consists in affirmation of something incompatible with a fact of greater extension than the fact denied. An example will be given

39 Affirmation of something incompatible with a fact of greater extension is as follows —

(Thesis) There is here no sensation produced by snow

(Reason). Because there is a fire.

(34. 14) "Here" is the subject. "No sensation of snow" is the predicate. "Because there is a fire" is the reason. This method (of proving the absence of snow) is used in cases where neither the fact of lesser extension, the snow, nor the fact of greater extension, the cold, can be directly experienced, because when they can be experienced directly, either (the first formula), the simple negation (of snow), or (the third formula), the negation of the fact of greater extension (i. e. of cold) will be resorted to (34. 16). Consequently this is likewise a method of deducing non-existence. For a remote observer any variety of cold lies beyond the range of sensation, and the sensation produced by snow is but a variety of the sensation of cold. Fire, on the other hand, owing to its specific refulgence, is seen even at a

(30 16) This negation, such (as has been here described), has eleven different varieties. What produces this difference? It is a difference of formulation. We call formulation the method¹ of expressing something in speech. Speech indeed may sometimes express (negation indirectly, through) what *prima facie*² would be an affirmation of something else, or it may sometimes express a negation, (but also an indirect one, a negation) of something else. Nevertheless (a repelled suggestion), the negation of an assumed perception,³ will always be understood, even if not expressed (directly). Consequently there are different varieties of negation according to the different methods of expressing it. This means that in its essence⁴ it is not (different, it always reduces to the same formula)

(30 20). The different varieties are (now) explained

32 (The first formula) is existential (or direct) negation, it is the following one

(Thesis) There is here no smoke

(Reason) Since, the conditions for its perception being fulfilled, none is perceived

(31 3) (Simple negation), or non-cognition of the existence of the denied object, is exemplified⁵ «Here» is the subject of the inference.⁶ «No smoke» is the predicate. «Because of non-perception of (an imagined smoke) which nothing would prevent to perceive, if it existed»,⁷ this is the logical reason. It must be understood as explained above

(31 6) (The second formula) expresses the absence of an effect, from which the absence (of the cause) is deduced. An example (follows)

¹ Lit., p. 80 17. «Application or appliance is called the denoting power (*abhidhāna-vyūpārā*) of the words»

² *sākṣāt*

³ *dr̥ṣya-anupalabdhi*

⁴ *svatūpa*

⁵ Lit., p. 81. 3 «What is the own existence (*sva-bhāva*) of the thing to be denied, its non-cognition is as follows»

⁶ *dharma*, «the possessor of the quality», i. e., the real substratum (*śāla-lāṇa*) of the constructed cognition (*kalpanā*)

⁷ Lit., «Because of non-cognition of the contained in the essence of cognition, thus the reason»

(35. 12) "He" is the subject. "Shivering", chattering teeth etc. are special symptoms produced by cold. They are different from the expressions of fear, devotion and other (emotions), therefore they are called special symptoms. Their absence is predicated. An efficient fire is a fire which is distinguished from other fires by its capacity of removing cold. For there are fires which are not capable of that, as e. g., the fire of a lamp. In order to set aside such fire, a qualification has been introduced. "a proximate good¹ fire". Its presence is the logical reason.

(35. 16). This formula is applied in those cases where cold, although existent, cannot be directly felt, and its symptoms, like a shivering produced by it, can neither be seen. When these symptoms can be perceptible, direct negation of the hypothetically visible (the first formula) is used. When cold can be directly felt, the negation of the cause is applied. Consequently this is also a method of deducing non-existence. (35. 19) Indeed, fire is perceived at a distance owing to its specific refulgence when neither the cold can be felt nor the shivering observed directly. Therefore their absence is deduced (indirectly), from seeing (a fire) which is incompatible with their cause. In such cases this formula is used.

(35. 21). (The eleventh formula of negation consists) in affirmation of an effect of something which is incompatible with the cause of the fact denied. An example is given

42. Affirmation of an effect of something incompatible with the cause is as follows.

(Thesis) In this place nobody exhibits symptoms of cold, such as shivering etc.
(Reason) Because there is smoke

(36. 3) "This place" is the subject. It is devoid of men exhibiting shivering and other symptoms of cold, this is predicated. "Because there is smoke" this is the reason. When the shivering can be observed, we use direct non-perception, (the first formula). When the cause, the sensation of cold, can be directly felt, we use (the ninth formula), the formula of non-perception of the cause. When the fire is perceptible, we use (the tenth formula), the formula of the perception of the thing incompatible with the cause. But when all the three cannot

¹ *dhāna-cīṣa*

un-perceived part, (not of the perceived part alone). It is a complex of something cognized directly and something invisible. It has the power of bringing about a judgment on the absence of fire. The word «here», which points to perception, refers to the visible part.

(31. 21). The subject of an inference (or the substratum of a judgment) is a combination of a part perceived directly and a part not actually perceived not only in the present case but in other cases also. E. g., when it is being deduced that the sound represents (a compact series) of discrete momentary existences,¹ only some particular sound can directly be pointed to, others are not actually perceived. Just the same occurs in the present example. The subject of an inference (or of a judgment) represents a substratum (an underlying reality), upon which a conception (corresponding to) the predicate (is grafted).² On the present example it has been shown to consist of a part directly perceived and a part unperceived. That the same is the case in the following formulae of negation (the reader) will be able to make out by himself.

(32. 3). The third formula represents negation of a fact of greater extension from which the absence of a subordinate fact is deduced. An example is given

34. Negation of a term of greater extension is as follows.

(Thesis) There is here no Aśoka tree,
(Reason) Because there are no trees.

(32. 5). «Here» is the subject. «No Aśoka tree», i. e. the absence of such trees is predicated. «Because there are (altogether) no trees», i. e. the term of greater extension is absent. This is the logical reason. This formula of negation is used when a subordinate term

¹ *lāṇanika*.

² Lit., p. 81. 21—82. 1 «And just as the subject (*dharma*), being the substratum for the cognition of the probandum (*sādhya-pratipatti-adhikarana*), is here shown to consist . . . The real subject of a judgment (*adhyavasāya* = *nīlāya* = *cīlāpa*), whether it be an inferential or a perceptual judgment, is always a point of reference to reality which in speech is expressed pronominally as «this», «there» etc.. It then corresponds to the Buddhist «thing in itself» (*svataḥsaṃ*), or it may also include some characteristics. It then consists of a visible and an invisible part and is expressed by a noun. Cf. the remarks of Sigwart, op. cit. I. 142, upon the judgment «this rose is yellow» which reduces to the form «this is yellow» the real subject being expressible only by the demonstrative «this». the actually perceived part

negation, and therefore included in it, i. e., their essence is direct negation¹

(37 1). However there is a difference between the formula of direct negation (the first formula) and the formulae of non-perception of the result, (i. e., the second) and other formulae. Therefore how can they be included in the former? He says,

44. Indirectly There is a difference of formulation, (a fact is denied indirectly) through affirmation or negation of something else.

(37 4). Although there is a difference of formula, i. e., of verbal expression, nevertheless they are included. How is this different formulation to be understood? (Our author) says, through affirmation and (negation of something else) In the (fourth formula), the formula of affirmation of something incompatible with the existence of the object denied, we have, e. g., a positive cognition, or affirmation,² of something different from the denied object. In (the second formula), the formula of non-perceived result and similar formulae, we have a negation (of something different from the object which it is intended to negate). (37 6) Thus by affirmation of another, (i. e., of an incompatible) fact, and by negation of another, (i. e., of a connected) fact, the formulae are different.

(37 7) If in different formulae some connected facts are either affirmed or denied, how is it that they are included? He says indirectly, i. e., mediately (37 8) The following is meant. These (ten) formulae do not directly express a negation of imagined visibility, but they express an affirmation or a negation of something else, and this invariably leads³ to simple negation of the hypothetically visible. Therefore, they are included in simple negation not directly, but mediately.

(37.11). Now, if the difference is one of verbal expression, this should be discussed under the head of inference "for others" (or syllogism)? Difference of formulation is, indeed, difference of verbal expression. But speech (is not internal inference or judgment, it) is external

¹ Lit., p. 86 21-22 "They go through identity into inclusion in the non-cognition of own-existence, this means that they possess own-existence of non-cognition of own-existence"

² *upalabdhi* = *vidhi*

³ *avyabhicārin*

(32 18) (The fifth formula) consists of the positive perception of the effect of something whose presence is incompatible with the presence of the fact denied. This gives valid¹ (negative judgments)

36 The affirmation of an incompatible effect is as follows

(Thesis) There is here no sensation of cold

(Reason) Because there is smoke.

(32 20) «Here» is the subject «There is no sensation of cold», i.e., the absence of such sensation, is the predicate «Because there is smoke» is the logical reason

(32 21). In those cases where cold could be felt directly, its simple negation will give a valid judgment Where fire which is incompatible with such sensation is directly perceptible, (the fourth formula), the affirmation of the incompatible, must be resorted to But when both are beyond the range of sense-perception, we can avail ourselves of (this fifth method, consisting) in an affirmation of an incompatible effect, (i.e., in deducing the absence of something from the absence of something else, this second thing representing the result of a cause whose presence is incompatible with the presence of the denied fact).

(33 1) (This happens, e.g.), in following cases Supposing somebody perceives a thick column of smoke coming out of a room. This allows him to infer the presence of a fire capable of removing cold from the whole interior of the room After having inferred the presence of such an efficient fire, he concludes that there is no cold In this case the subject consists of the visible place in the door together with the whole interior of the room, as has been noticed before,² because, when realizing the predicate³ (absence of cold), we must conform (to its peculiar character of filling up the whole interior).

(33 5) The (sixth formula of a negative reason) consists in the affirmation of a fact which is subordinate to (or less in extension than) another fact, when the latter is incompatible with the presence of the fact denied An example will be given

37 (A negative reason consisting in) the affirmation of something subordinate to an incompatible fact is as follows

¹ *gamāḥ*

² Cf. above, p. 80

³ *sādhya-pratīti*

§ 9 NEGATION FOUNDED ON SENSIBLE EXPERIENCE

(37 21) However, it may be questioned, how are these formulae all implied in the (first one), in the negation of a (hypothetically) visible object? Indeed, in such formulae as, e g., the (fifth) which represents the non perception of a result, the presence of causes is denied which are anything but perceptible, because in cases when something that might be perceptible is denied, we are obliged to use the formula of direct negation. If such be the case, their denial, (it would seem), is not made on the basis of an imputed perceptibility?¹

The answer is as follows

46 Negation is the process through which either the absence of something or some practical application of the idea of an absent thing is deduced. Whether the facts be denied by way of an affirmation of something incompatible with them or through the negation of their causes etc., everywhere negation, on analysis, refers to possibilities of sensation²

(38 4) Absence and its application (are here mentioned, because in the first formula), in direct negation, the deduction refers to the practical application (of the idea of an absent thing, of a non-Ens, as produced by sense perception), in the remaining formulae the absence (of the denied facts) is itself deduced. The negative cognition on which both are founded (always refers to sensations actual or possible)

(38 6) All the formulae of negative deduction reduce to the formula of direct negation, because whatsoever be the facts denied in

¹ Lat. p. 37 21—23 "And how is it that there is negation of just imperceptible causes etc. in non-cognition of effect etc., since there is the consequence of the formula of non-cognition of own-existence in the negation of the perceptible, and, if it is so, there is no negation of them from non-cognition of the perceptible, therefore how are these formulae included in non-cognition of the perceptible?"

² Lat., p. 38 1—3 "And everywhere in this non-cognition which establishes non-existence and the application of non-existence, (the things) whose negation is expressed through cognition of the incompatible with own-existence etc., and through the cognition of causes etc., their cognition and non-cognition must be understood exclusively as of (things) reached by the essence of (sense-) perception."

A special cause¹ is a cause different from origination,² e. g., a hammer (by whose stroke a jar is destroyed). Evanescence (according to Realists) is dependent upon such a (special cause) «Because it so depends» is the logical reason. (33.11). Now, (the fact of being) dependent on a special cause is not something constant,³ e g., the colour of a cloth depends upon a fortuitous process of dyeing which is not constant. Non-constancy is the opposite of constancy (33 13) Evanescence (interpreted) as the fact of having an end, is assumed (by Realists) to depend upon special causes⁴ They therefore deny its constancy, on the ground of experience, (which teaches) that it depends upon special causation, (and this fact of accidental causation disproves constancy), proves the opposite (of constancy)⁵

¹ *hetu-antara*

² The Buddhist theory of Universal Momentariness (*āsanakṛta*), converting the universe into a kind of cinema, maintains that there is no other cause of destruction than origination, entities disappear as soon as they appear, the moment when the jar is broken by a stroke of a hammer does not differ in this respect from all preceding moments, since every moment a new or «other» jar appears, constant destruction or renovation is inherent in every existence which is really a compact series of ever new moments. The realistic opponents of the Buddhists admit the duration (*sthāyitva*) of entities from the moment of their origination up to the moment of their destruction by a special cause (*hetu-antara*). The Sāṅkhyas established the theory of constant change (*paripāma-mityatā*) of Matter. The Buddhist theory of Universal Momentariness is once more alluded to below. *sūtra* III 11 ff, cp notes.

³ Lat p 33 11 «Dependence upon a special cause indeed is contained under (*vyūpta*) non-constancy»

⁴ Lat, p 33 13 «And destruction, being the very essence of the destructible, is admitted to be dependent on another cause» The Tib, p 75 11, emphasizes in repeating *kyig-pa yai* According to the realists destruction which they call *pradhvaṃsa* is a reality *sui generis* (*bhāva-sarīrpa* = *bhāvēntara*), according to the Buddhists it is a name for the thing itself, for the momentary thing, since every existence is a flow of discrete moments, *bhāva eva vinasīyati iti kṛtvā vinnāsa ity ākhyāyate* cp Kamalaśīla, p 137 22 This simply means that every duration is really a motion and that causal connection exists between moments only. a conception of causality which is not unfamiliar to students of European philosophy. From the Buddhist standpoint the *hetu-antara* can be only the preceding moment, (cp p. 88 and *Tattva*, kūr 375), but not *mudgarādi*. Hence, if *vināsa* is the *svabhāva* of existence, it cannot depend upon a special cause. The passage therefore means «the things which we, Buddhists hold to be evanescent every moment by their nature. you, realists, assume to possess duration and to be destroyed by special causes»

⁵ Lat p 37 13—14 «And destruction whose essence is to possess an impermanent nature is admitted to depend upon another cause. Therefore observing dependence upon another cause, (this dependence) being subordinate to what is incompatible (*avuddha*) with (constancy), constancy is being negated»

Causality and of Subalternation (39 9). If we do not have in our memory some negative experience,² we will not remember contradiction and other (relations), and then, in that case, the non-existence of a fact³ would not follow from the affirmation of an incompatible fact or from the negation (of its cause) etc. Since the negative experience which we have had at the time when we first became aware of the fact of incompatibility or (of a causal relation) must necessarily be remembered, (it is clear) that a negative cognition is founded exclusively on such (a repudiation of imagined visibility) (39 11). Thus, although the negative experience is not occurring at present, it did occur at the time when the incompatibility of the facts and their other relations have been first apprehended. Its presence in our memory is the real foundation of our negative judgments⁴ (39 13). The negation of the result, (i e, the second) and following formulae, differ from the (first) formula, the direct repudiation of an imagined presence, in that they deduce the absence of something from a past negative experience,⁵ but since, by the affirmation of the presence of an incompatible fact or by the negation of the presence of the cause, they implicitly refer⁶ to a negative experience, therefore (in these cases also) negation⁷ is based just on such a repudiation of an (imagined) presence which occurred at another time, but is nevertheless present in memory, and therefore these formulae are (virtually) included in the (first) formula of sensible negation. Thus it is clear that the whole (of the preceding discussion) proves that the ten formulae of negation are at the bottom⁸ nothing but negative experiences of sensibilia.

§ 10 THE VALUE OF NEGATION IN METAPHYSICS

(39. 18). Negation which has been here analysed (as reducing to a negative experience of sensibilia) is a valid cognition of the absence

² *dr̥ṣya-anupalabdhiḥ*

³ *etara-abhāva*

⁴ *abhāva-pratipatti*

⁵ *Lot*, p 39 13—14 «Therefore — there is no perception of the visible now — thus by proving non-existence the formulae of non-perception of a result etc. differ from the formula of non-perception of the visible»

⁶ *ālīkṣita*

⁷ *abhāva-pratipatti*

⁸ *pāramparyena*

distance. Hence from the presence of fire the absence of cold in general is deduced, and from it the absence of its variety, the sensation produced by snow, is ascertained, because the specific sensation is included in the general one. This method will accordingly be resorted to in specific cases.

(34.20). (The ninth formula of a negative reason consists in) a negation of the causes of the denied fact. An example is given.

40. Negation of causes is as follows

(Thesis). There is here no smoke

(Reason). Because there is no fire.

(35.2) «Here» is the subject. «No smoke» is the predicate. «Because there is no fire» is the reason. This method is used when the effect of something, although existent, is not directly perceived. When perceptible, we will avail ourselves (for denying it) of the method of simple negation of the hypothetically perceptible, (the first formula). Consequently this is likewise a method of deducing non-existence. (35.4). (It occurs, e.g., in following cases). Supposing we have a pond covered by an extensive sheet of motionless water which in the dim twilight in winter time emits vapour. Even if some smoke were present, it would not be possible to discern it (in the darkness). Nevertheless its presence can be denied through non-perception of its cause. For if there were fire, (in a piece of wood) swimming on the water, it would be visible through the characteristic refulgence of its flames. (35.6). Even supposing it is not flaming, but lingering in some piece of wood, then this fuel being the place where fire is concealed could be visible. Thus fire would be in any case visible, either directly or through the object in which it is concealed¹. In such cases this formula is applied.

(35.9). Next comes an example (of the tenth variety) which consists in affirmation of something incompatible with the cause of the denied fact.

41. The affirmation of a fact incompatible with the causes of something is as follows.

(Thesis) He betrays no symptoms of cold, such as shivering etc

(Reason). Because there is an efficient fire near him

¹ *ādharma-rūpena*

does not prove the non-existence of the object, and since (this absence of knowledge) proves nothing, the negation of the non-imagable² is the source of problematic reasoning, not of (assertory) judgments³

(40.7) But on the other hand it is only right to maintain that the existence of a (suitable) source of knowledge proves the existence of the correspondent object. A right cognition⁴ is the product of its object. A product cannot possibly exist without a cause. But causes do not necessarily carry their results. Therefore the existence of right knowledge proves the existence of real objects, but absence of knowledge cannot prove the non-existence of (the corresponding) object.

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physical, declared to be uncognizable entity, as is clear from sūtra III, 97, is an Omniscient absolute Being, a Buddha. This agrees with the views of Dharmakīrti as expressed in other contexts, e.g., the concluding passage of *Santānūntarasiद्धi*. Such entities are also characterized as *anupalabdhī-takṣana-prūṣa* (II 28), *svabhāva-viśeṣa-rahitā*, p. 28 9, 28 8, and *adrśya*, p. 39 18. In regard of such entities no judgments, no deductions which would possess logical necessity (*niscaya*) are possible. A negative judgment in regard of them is possible only by *tādātmya-niscāha*, i.e., by assuming for them a kind of visibility for a moment, as explained under sūtra II 37.

² *adrśya*, the non-sensible

³ *niscaya-hetu*, the reason of an inferential judgment. A problematic judgment from the Indian point of view, is a *contradictio in adjecto*, a judgment is a verdict, the solution of a problem, as long as there is no solution, there is no judgment (*niscaya* = *adhyavasāya*)

⁴ *pramāṇa*, in the sense of *pramā*

be directly perceived, we use the present formula. Hence, this is also a way of establishing non-existence.

(36.7) This formula is a suitable means of cognition in those cases, when neither the fire nor the cold nor the shivering can be directly perceived by a remote observer, but smoke is perceived directly. Such smoke is here meant which points to a fire capable of extinguishing the cold in that place. If fire in general is inferred from the presence of some smoke in general, then neither the absence of cold nor the absence of shivering can be ascertained. Thus it must be borne in mind that the reason does not consist in the mere presence of some smoke in general.

§ 8. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FORMULAE OF NEGATION.

(36.12). If there is only one reason, (i. e., one logical process) of negation, how is it that we have enumerated eleven (different) reasons from which non-existence can be deduced?

43 All these ten formulae of a negative judgment, beginning from the second, are (virtually) included (in the first), the (direct) non-perception of the existence of something.

These, i. e., the formulae of negation. The word «these» points to the formulae which have just been specified. How many of them are meant? The non-perception of the result (the second formula) and the following ones. Three or four or how many out of their number are meant? He says, ten. Are the ten examples alone meant? He says, all (36.16). The following is meant. Although not mentioned, but similar to those which are mentioned, are all (the cases of negation). Thus it is that since the word «ten» comprises all the adduced examples their totality is suggested (through this word alone, the word «all» becomes superfluous). However, since the totality of the quoted examples is already suggested by the word «ten», the additional word «all» refers (to another totality), the totality of the cases similar to the examples.¹ They are identical with simple

¹ This superfluous remark is probably directed against Vinitadeva who has, quite naturally, interpreted the word «all» as meaning that all the ten varieties of negation, without any exception, can be reduced to one fundamental formula, the first one, cp p. 78. 16. As usual, Dharmottara seizes every possible subtle occasion to find fault with Vinitadeva.

are called (respectively) direct concomitance¹ (or major premise expressed positively), its contraposition (or the same premise expressed negatively)² and (the minor premise or) the fact of the presence of the mark in the subject (of the inference, i.e., the fact that the subject of the inference is characterized by the logical mark)³ (41.4) The logical

¹ *antaya*, e.g. «wherever there is smoke, there is fire», or «whatsoever is a product is non-eternal», it corresponds to the major premise of the first figure of Aristotle

² *vyatireka*, means that subject and predicate, or the middle and major terms, exchange their places and change quality at the same time, it is a conversion of the negations of both the subject and predicate of the major premise, e.g., «where-soever there is no fire, neither is there smoke», or «whatsoever is eternal, (i.e., not non-eternal) is not a product». Although one of the premises, the judgments «there is no smoke» and «it is not a product» are negative, the inference itself will not, according to the Indian view, be a negative process of cognition, because the conclusion is positive, e.g. —

Major premise Wheresoever there is no fire, neither is there smoke
 Minor premise But there is here smoke
 Conclusion Hence there is here fire

The conclusion, and therefore the inference, i.e., the inferred cognition of some reality, is exactly the same as when the major premise was not contraposed. Under a negative syllogism, or negative inferred cognition, something quite different is understood, as has been explained above, ch II, p 77 ff and will be exemplified below, ch III p sūtra 9 ff

³ *palśa-dharmatā* does not correspond to Aristotle's minor premise exactly, for it not only ascertains the presence of the middle upon the minor, but it refers to such a middle term whose invariable concomitance with the major has already been ascertained in the foregoing major premise, e.g., «there is here that very smoke which is known to be invariably concomitant with fire». Therefore there is practically no need of expressing the thesis and the conclusion in separate sentences, they are both understood without being explicitly stated, op. below. sūtra III 36 ff. The syllogism of the Naiyāyikas counts five members, because both the thesis (*pratyakṣa* = *palśa*) and the conclusion (*nyāyama* = *sādhya*), although they are equivalents, appear as separate propositions, and the minor premise appears twice: once in the ascending process of Induction and once in the descending process of Deduction, e.g., 1) the mountain has fire, 2) because it has smoke, 3) just as in the kitchen etc. smoke is always concomitant with fire, 4) this very smoke is present on the mountain, 5) the mountain has fire. The Indian syllogism is thus the verbal expression of the normal type of ratiocination which is always inductive and deductive, cp J S Mill, *Logic*, I 228 ff. Dignāga in his reform has dropped the thesis conclusion and the double appearance of the minor premise. Thus the Buddhist syllogism reduces to two members since the major and its contraposition express exactly the same thing. It consists of a general statement and of its application to a given particular case. The general statement is always followed by examples, positive

inference (or syllogism). In answer to this question (the author) says,

45. The formulae have been specified under the head of internal inference, because by their repeated consideration the distinct conception of what a negative judgment¹ represents internally (as a process of thought) becomes thus also clear to the (scrutinizing individual) himself.

(37 15) Formulae are scientific constructions. The repeated occurrence of their cognition, again and again, also leads the cognizing individual himself to a right conception of what limitation or negation is, in the way which has been analysed just above.² (37.17). The meaning is the following one. By a study³ (of these different) formulae we ourselves also in the way thus (indicated) arrive at understanding (what negation really means)⁴. Therefore, since (the study) of the different formulae (does not exclusively serve the purpose of communicating knowledge to others, but) since it also serves the purpose of our own analysis⁵ of them, they have been considered (in the chapter) devoted to internal inference (or inferential judgment). On the contrary (the methods) which are exclusively used to communicate with others will be necessarily examined (in the last chapter), as a verbal expression of inferences,⁶ (not as a process of thought).

¹ *vyavaccheda* is properly limitation, contrast or distinction, but here it is explained, p. 37. 17, as = *pratishedha*.

² Lat., p. 37. 15-17 «Consideration of the formulae etc. Of the formulae which have been constructed in science (*śāstra*) the consideration, the knowledge. Its repetition, its reoccurrence again and again. Therefore, for (this) reason. Also for himself, i. e., also for the cognizer himself. Thus, in the above mentioned manner. Of the contrast (*vyavaccheda*), of negation, the distinct knowledge (*prāpti*) arises. The word *it* in the sense of «therefore».

³ *abhyāsa*.

⁴ i. e., that it means «contrasting» (*vyavaccheda*), and since a contrast is involved in every act of definite cognition, negation is inherent in every clear thought. About the importance of *pariccheda* and *vyavaccheda* in cognition cp. below, text p. 69. 22 ff. and Tātpariyat., p. 92. 15 ff.

⁵ *pratipatti*.

⁶ *parārthānumāna*, as stated below, text p. 40 is not an inference, but only 1st formulation.

inference will be here discussed (41.14). On the contrary, the aim being to explain what inference is, its essence should be elicited, and its cause found out.¹ This cause is the three-aspected logical mark, (the middle term and its concomitance) which produce inference either when cognized directly or when communicated by another (42.1). Therefore both the essence of the logical mark and the words by which it is communicated must be elucidated. The first has been done (in the preceding chapter), the second will be done now. (42.3) Hence, the full meaning² is the following one. Our Master (Dignāga) has given the name of inference to propositions,³ in order to suggest that (the methods of) expressing inference must necessarily be discussed

(42.5). The varieties of this kind of inference "for others"⁴ are now given.

3. It is twofold

(42.7). "It" means syllogism.⁵ It is "twofold", i.e., it has two varieties

(42.8). Why has it two varieties?

4. Because it is differently formulated

(42.10). Difference of formulation is difference in the expressive force of words. Formulation,⁶ or expression, means (the capacity of words) to express a meaning (The verbal formulation) of an inference is divided into two varieties according to a difference in the expressive force of the words, (they can express the same meaning differently)

(42.12) In order to show this difference, produced by the method of expression, the (author) says

¹ Lat. "Because the essence (*svatūpa*) of inference must be explained its cause should be explained"

² *paravārtha*

³ *śabda*, it is reckoned in the majority of schools as a separate source of knowledge including Scripture

⁴ It would have been more precise to call it an inference "in others", as in the hearers, cp text p 41.10

⁵ *parārtha-anumāna*

⁶ *prayoga* has the meaning of a formula, or mode of a certain syllogistic figure, cp p 87.15 (text), here and above, p 30.15, it is identified with *abhidhā* or *śakti*,

⁷ e, the direct expressive force of words is compared with their capacity of indirect suggestions (*lakṣanā, vyākṛti*) The two methods of inference are here ascribed to a difference in the direct meaning (*abhidhāna-vyāpāra*) of the propositions composing a syllogism

all of them, they are all *sensibīla*,¹ i. e., objects susceptible of sense-perception²

(38 7) How is it proved that they are all *sensibīla*? They are all *sensibīla* because in all these formulae there is either affirmation of the contradicting counterpart of the denied fact or the denial of its cause etc., (and the laws of Contradiction and Causation refer to *sensibīla* only)³

(38 10) To be sure, negation is expressed in them either by the affirmation of something essentially incompatible (with the fact denied) etc. or by the negation of its cause etc. But nevertheless, does it follow that negation refers to *sensibīla* only?

(38 11) They refer to *sensibīla* only for the following reason. In order to establish the subalternation of two facts or their causal relation, and in order to know what will contradict these relations, we necessarily must have had some experience of them, i. e., we must have had some perception of their presence and some experience of their absence, preceded by a perception of their presence.⁴ Objects which have been alternately perceived and not perceived are necessarily perceptible

(38 14) Consequently when incompatible and other facts are being denied either by the way of an affirmation of their correlative part or by an elimination of their causes etc., we must know that this refers to *sensibīla* only, to such objects whose presence and absence have been alternately observed⁴

¹ *dr̥ṣya* The term *sensibīla* as contrasted with sense-data we borrow from B. Russell, *Mysticism*, p. 152

² *upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta*

³ It is interesting to compare on this topic the view of Herbert Spencer (apud Stuart Mill, *Logic* 8 I, p. 322) — «the negative mode cannot occur without excluding a correlative mode. the antithesis of positive and negative being, indeed, is merely an expression of this experience». According to the Buddhists the concrete content of every single case of contradiction, as of causality, is provided by experience, the causal laws have an application to *sensibīla* only, but whether the laws themselves are mere generalizations from experience is another question, cp. p. 69 11 (text)

⁴ *Lit.*, 38 5—16. «And everywhere The word *ca* is used in the sense of «because» Because everywhere, in non-perception of what (facts) the negation is expressed of them the negation (refers to objects) reached by the conditions of cognition of the perceptible, therefore it is included in non-perception of the visible. Why is it that this (refers) only to perceptibles? He says, own-existence etc. Here also the word *ca* has the meaning of cause (38 8) Because negation is expressed by affirmation

(Major premise). Eternal entities are known not to be products

(Example). As e. g., Space¹

(Minor premise). But the sounds of speech are a product.

(Conclusion. They are *impermanent*).

(42 20). These (propositions) express (*prima facie*) a divergence between the sounds of speech, the subject of the conclusion, and Space, the example. The divergence is produced by the fact that the one is and the other is not a product.²

(42. 22). If the (*prima facie*) meaning expressed in both these syllogisms is different, how are we to understand that (the conclusion is not different, i. e., that) they express the same logical (connection) in its threefold aspect?

¹ Space (*ākāśa*) is a reality (*vastu or dharma*) only in Hinayāna where it is entered into the catalogue of Entia as *asamskrīta-dharma* № 1 along with *nirodha* or *Nirvāna* which in these Buddhist schools represents a lifeless reality. The Mahāyānist schools and the intermediate school of the Sautrāntikas did not admit the reality of eternal, unchanging (*asamskrīta*) elements, because they did not fit in their definition of reality. But although unreal, Space could be used as a *negative* example to confirm a universal major premise. For negative examples the rule is laid down that *vastu avastu iā iaidharmya-dratānta isyate*, cp text, p 87 § In the Brahmanical systems *ākāśa* means Cosmical Ether, it is either one and indivisible or atomic and entering in the composition of material bodies

² The Methods of Agreement and Difference have been established by J S Mill in European Logic as methods of experimental inquiry. They are treated under the same heading by Sigwart, *op cit* II 477 ff. But A Bain, *Logic*, II 51, calls the Method of Agreement — «the universal or fundamental mode of proof for all connections whatever. for all kinds of conjunctions» The same, no doubt, applies to its corollary, the Method of Difference. It is in this generalized function that we meet both methods in Indian Logic. They are used not only for singling out the cause of an event, but also for establishing the limits of every notion. Since those methods are methods of Induction, it is clear that Indian Logic, especially its Buddhist variety, considers every process by which anything is inferred as consisting of an Induction followed by a Deduction. This is, according to J S Mill, *op cit*, I. 282, the «universal type of the reasoning process» which «is always susceptible of the form, and must be thrown into it when assurance of scientific accuracy is needed and desired» The methods of Concomitant Variations (*pratyaya-bheda-bheda* or *taḍ-vikāra-vikāritva*) and of Residues (*śeṣānumāna*) are very often discussed in Indian Logic, in the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and in *Pr samuccaya*, but they are not given the fundamental importance of the first two methods and are not put on the same level. Both methods are already mentioned in the Nyāya-sūtras, I 1 34—35, cp below p 126 n 5

perceived. Their contradiction with something else, their causal relation (to something else), their subalternation¹ it is impossible (to imagine). Therefore it is impossible to ascertain what is it they contradict, and what are they causally related to.² For this reason contradicting facts (causes and effects) are fit to be denied only after their observation has been recurrent.³ Therefore, since the impossibility of contradiction or of causal relation is established, the incompatible facts can be denied only when they refer to objects which alternately are perceived and non-perceived. Those which are open to both (perception and non-perception are called *sensibilia*), they are necessarily capable of being experienced. Therefore, negation refers only to objects of possible experience.⁴ (39.1) The following is the meaning. Contradiction, Causality, Subalternation are necessarily based upon negative judgments, (upon non perception of *sensibilia*) (39.2) Contradiction is realized when on the presence⁵ of one term we distinctly cognize the absence of the other. Causal relation is established when the fact which we accept as the result is absent, if another fact which we accept as cause is also absent. Subalternation is established when it is precisely known that on the absence of the term which is admitted to possess greater extension the less extensive term is definitely absent. We must indeed be alive to the fact that the extension (and comprehension of our concepts) are founded on Negation. The (comparative) extension (of the terms tree and *Aśoka*) is fixed when we know that, if on a certain place there are no trees, there are also no *Aśokas* (39.6) The knowledge of the absence of something is always produced only by the repudiation of an imagined presence (39.7). Therefore, if we remember (some cases) of Contradiction, of Causality or of different extension, we needs must have in our memory some negative experience (Negation is) the foundation of our concept of non-existence which is underlying⁶ our knowledge of (the laws) of Contradiction, of

¹ Lat., p 88 21 «And absence of the contained (the term of lesser extension) when there is absence of the container (the term of greater extension)»

² Lat., p 88 22 «Therefore for the cause of non-establishment of the contradicting, of the relation of cause and effect and of non-existence (of the subaltern)» (according to Dh.) The real meaning is probably «because the absence of the contradicting and of causal relation is not established»

³ Lat. p 88 22 «Can be negated contradicting (facts) etc only when they possess perception and non-perception»

⁴ *drśyānām eva*

⁵ *samvādh* in the sense of presence (not nearness as in *sūtra* I 13)

⁶ *visaya*.

(of the denied objects) and (a source of the corresponding) purposive actions.¹ Now, what may be the essence and what the function of a negation of *non-sensibilia*?²

48 Negation of objects inaccessible (to experience) is the source of problematic reasoning, since its essence is exclusive of both direct and indirect knowledge

(39.21) An object can be inaccessible in three respects, in time, in space and in essence. Negation regarding such objects is a source of problematic reasoning.³ What is the essence of such reasoning? It is repudiation of both direct and indirect knowledge.⁴ This means that they are not (knowledge at all, because) the essence (of knowledge is to be an assertory) relation between cognition and its object.⁵

(40.1) However, cognition⁶ proves the existence of the cognized, therefore it would be only natural to expect that absence of cognition would be a proof of the absence of the cognized?⁷ (This question) is now answered.

49 When there are altogether no means of cognition, the non-existence of the object cannot be established

(40.4). When a cause is absent the result does not occur and when a fact of wider extension is absent, its subordinate fact is likewise absent. But knowledge is neither the cause nor the extensive fact, in regard of the object of cognition. Therefore, when both the ways of cognition (the direct and the indirect one) are excluded,⁸ this

¹ *abdhāra-īyavādhāra*

² *adrśya*, i. e. objects unimaginable as present to the senses

³ *samśaya-hetu*, i. e., doubtful reasons or non-judgments

⁴ *pratyakṣa-anumāna*

⁵ *jñāna-jñeya-sābhāva*

⁶ *pramāna*

⁷ This was the opinion of the Naiyāyikas and of European science up to the time of Sigwart

⁸ It is clear from this passage that *vipralakṣa* = *tribhū vipralakṣa* = *deśa-kāla-sābhāva-vipralakṣa* refers to metaphysical entities which are so *ipso* declared to be uncognizable by their nature = *na jñāna-jñeya-sābhāva*, they are uncognizable neither by sense-perception = *afindriya*, nor by inference = *pratyakṣa-anumāna-nirvrti-lakṣaṇa*. cp. Kamalaśīla, p. 476. 3 The example of such a meta-

consequence) consists in 1) the necessary presence (never absence) of the predicate upon the subject, and 2) in the presence of the subject exclusively in the sphere of the predicate, (never beyond it)¹

(44. 4). The example (points to induction), to the evidence by which the invariable concomitance has been established² In order to indicate it, it is said «just as (when we fail to perceive) another object» etc. This means that the example is some other object, different from the subject of the conclusion (or minor term). (44. 5) «Known from experience» (to be quite unexisting) means ascertained by evidence The horns (on the head) of a hare have indeed never been perceived by vision, nevertheless they are imaginable, and this is the evidence owing to which we conclude that we will never have an opportunity of experiencing (them as efficient). These (utterly unexisting) horns are indeed an evidence proving that the idea of a non-Ens has a practical value (for our purposive actions) and it is exclusively founded on our capacity to imagine their existence and then to repudiate that suggestion This

¹ Lat, p 44 8—4 «Concomitance is necessary presence (*bhāva eva*) of the embracer (*vyāpaka*) there and the presence of the embraced (*vyāpka*) necessarily there (*tatra eva*)», e g, in the judgment, or the deduction, «the Aśoka is a tree» concomitance requires the necessary presence of the term of greater extension, the «embracer», «the tree», with the subaltern, or embraced Aśoka, but it may be also found outside the Aśokas, in other trees, whereas Aśoka, the term of greater comprehension and lesser extension, is necessarily present among trees only, not among non-trees Reduced to Aristotle's phrasing this rule means that a universal affirmative judgment is not convertible otherwise than *per accidens* Now, the negative judgment, or negative deduction, in its basic form, is not a tautology of the form «there is no jar because there is none», but it is a deduction of the form «there is no jar because there is a bare place» It is a cognition of an underlying point-instant of reality and this makes it a true cognition or judgment (*niscaya*) The term «a bare place» (*drśya-anupalabdhī*) is greater in comprehension and less in extension than the affirmation of non-Ens which is deduced from it, since there are other non-Ens'es which are not associated with a bare place (*adrśya-anupalabdhī*) transcendental objects, unimaginable concretely, cp sūtra II 48—49 Cp H Bergson, *op cit*, p 319— «De l'abolition (= *drśya-anupalabdhī*) à la négation (= *nāsti* etc), qui est une opération plus générale, il n'y a qu'un pas»

² Lat, p. 44 4 «The example is the sphere (*visaya*) of proof (*pramāṇa*) establishing concomitance» It is clear that the example performs the part of Induction from particular instances, *pramāṇa* thus has the meaning of evidence, of an ascertained fact, *pramāṇa-siddham* *trairūpyam* means concomitance established upon ascertained facts or upon experience (*avisamāhita*), *drśta*, *darśana* corresponds to our experience, *pramāṇena niscita*, or sometimes *pramāṇa* simply, means an established fact, induction from particular facts, cp the meaning of this term in p 45 1, 61. 10, 80 21, 81. 1—2, 81 20, 86 11 etc, cp below p 147 n 7

CHAPTER III

SYLLOGISM.

§ 1. DEFINITION AND VARIETIES.

(41 1) Between the two classes of inference, (internal) «for oneself» and (verbal) «for others», the first has been explained. The (author) now proceeds to explain the second.

1 Inference «for others» (or syllogism) consists in communicating the three aspects of the logical mark (to others).

(41.3). Communicating the three aspects of the logical mark, i. e., (the logical mark appears here also in) three aspects¹ which

¹ The three aspects are those mentioned in ch. II, sūtra 5—7. Its first aspect (II. 5) corresponds to the minor premise (*pakṣa-dharmatva*), its second aspect (II. 6) — to the major (*antaya*), and its third aspect (II. 7) — to the contraposition of the major premise. It will be noticed that, although the three aspects of the logical mark are the same in internal inference and in syllogism, their order is different. Inference starts with the minor premise and ascends to a generalization corroborated by examples, it looks more like a process of Induction. Syllogism, on the other hand, starts with a general statement in the major premise, whether positive or negative, and then proceeds to its application in a particular case. It represents Deduction, although the examples are always mentioned as a reference to the inductive process by which the major premise has been established. In the third posthumous edition of his monumental work on *Logik*, the late Prof. B. Erdman has decided to reverse the traditional order of the premises in all syllogisms, because the traditional order of beginning with the major premise is in contradiction with «the real connexion of the premises in the living process of formulated thought» (p. 614). The Indian inference when treated as a process of thought also starts with the minor premise (*anumeye satyam lingavya*) and proceeds to a generalization of similar cases (*sapakṣe ca satyam = antaya = vyāpti*). But when syllogism is regarded as a method of proving a thesis in a controversy, the exposition begins with the universal proposition or major premise and the minor premise occupies the second place.

lying before the eyes of the observer. (44.12) Although it is "some" place, but that place alone is the object of a negative purposive action which is present to the observer, not any other place (A jar) satisfying to the conditions of perceptibility¹ means a jar which can be imagined as perceived.² (44.13) The manner in which a non-existing jar is placed by imagination in all the necessary conditions of perceptibility has been explained above.³

(44.15). In order to give the formula of an analytical reasoning⁴ according to the Method of Agreement⁵ the (author) says —

10. The analytical reasoning can be expressed according to the same (method)

(44.17). Just as the negative deduction has been formulated according to (the method of) Agreement, just so will an analytical deduction now be formulated according to this same (method)

11. (Major premise) Every thing that exists is momentary.

(Example) Just as a jar (representing a compact chain of momentary existences)

(Minor premise. The sound exists)

(Conclusion) It is a chain of momentary existences).

This is the formula of a simple (unqualified) analytical deduction

(44.19). "What exists", i. e., existence, is the subject. "Every thing is momentary", i. e., momentariness is predicated. The words "every thing" are inserted for emphasis. All is impermanent, there is nothing which is not impermanent. What exists is necessarily impermanent. Over and beyond impermanence, there is only eternity and that is no existence⁶ (44.21) Thus it is declared that existence is necessarily dependent on

¹ *upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prūṭa*

² *dr̥ṣya*

³ Cp text p. 29, transl p. 81 ff

⁴ *svabhāva-hetu*

⁵ *sādharmyavat*.

⁶ Different definitions of what is meant by existence, or reality, have been current at different periods of Buddhist philosophy. In the Hinayāna the Sarvāstivādins and other schools defined existence as whatsoever has a character (*dharma-svabhāva*) of its own (*sva-svabhāva-dhāranā dharmak*). This involved a pluralistic view of the Universe. The Mādhyamikas defined existence as non-relative (*anapekṣa*),

mark possesses these three aspects and they are being expressed, (i. e., communicated) Expression is (an expedient) through which some thing is being expressed or communicated. (41. 5). And what is this (expedient)? Propositions.¹ Indeed the three aspects of the logical mark are communicated to others by propositions. Therefore it is called "inference for others"

(41. 7) An objection is raised Has not inference been defined as (a variety) of knowledge, (viz. as indirect cognition)? How is it then that it is now said to consist of propositions? The (author) answers,— (propositions are given the name of an inference) —

2. Metaphorically, (by naming) the cause instead of the effect.

(41. 10). When the threefold logical mark has been expressed (in propositions, the person to whom it has been communicated) retains them in memory, and his memory produces an inference (in him) Of this inference the propositions expressing the logical mark are the indirect² cause (through his memory) Thus the propositions are the cause and the inference the result, there is a metaphor, an imputation of the latter upon the former. (41. 12). By dint of such a metaphor propositions are called inference, (whereas they really are its) cause. This means that they are an inference metaphorically, not in the literal³ application of the term (41. 13) Nor should it be supposed that whatsoever is capable of being indirectly indicated by the word

and negative, which correspond to the part performed in modern European logic by Induction Thus the full form of the Buddhist syllogism will be represented in the following example,

1) Major premise Wheresoever there is smoke there is also fire. e. g., in the kitchen where both are present, or in water where there is no smoke, because there can be no fire

2) Minor premise and conclusion combined There is here such a smoke indicating the presence of fire

The ultimate result is an inferred judgment (*niscaya* = *adhyavasāya*), i. e., a reference of a mental construction to a point-instant of external reality (*śāla-lasana* = *paramārtha-sat*)

¹ *vacana* We see that the question which has been so long debated in European, especially in English, logic, viz the question whether logic is concerned with judgments or with propositions, is here clearly solved by a distinction between what is the part of a thought-process and what the part of its verbal expression

² *paramparayā*

³ *mūlīya*

12. The formula of an analytical syllogism with a middle term which is differentiated by a qualification existentially identical with it, is the following one —

(Major premise). Whatsoever has an origination is impermanent

(Example). (Just as a jar etc.).

(Minor premise). (The sounds of our speech possess origination)

(Conclusion) (The sounds of our speech are impermanent)

(45.5). «Origination» means assuming one's own essence¹ The words «what has an origination» express the subject (of the major premise). The words «is impermanent» express the predicate Thus the invariable concomitance of everything having an origination with impermanence is expressed

(45.7). This is a formula whose *raison d'être*² (as compared with the preceding one) consists in a special qualification which (however) is existentially identical,³ essentially the same, (as the preceding one). An entity is called «having an origination» when contrasted with beginningless entities, (which is the same as permanent, eternal entities). When we wish to give expression to a contrast independent from

sound is deduced here out of a special conception of existence This is a specific argument of the Buddhists, the advocates of Universal Momentariness or Continual Flow of Existence. The realistic Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, in combating the Mīmāṃsaka theory of eternal sounds of speech, deduce the non-eternity of words from the fact that they are products and even wilful products of man. These arguments are also admitted by the Buddhists, but they begin by a deduction from their general idea of existence as a flux and continue by deductions from its subaltern or narrower characteristics, such as production, wilful production etc

¹ *svatūpa-lābha* = *svabhāva-lābha* = *ātma-lābha*, usually rendered in Tib. by *lus* = *śarīra* (the sentence is here omitted, in the Tib. transl., cp p 101 15)

² *hetukṛtiya*

³ We have noticed above, transl p 70 n, the two different meanings of the term *svabhāva*, in *svabhāva-pratibandha* where it includes causation and *svabhāva-hetu*, where it excludes causation and means «inherent property». In sūtra II 15 we had *svabhāva-viśeṣa* meaning «an individual» Here we have a further differentiation of the second meaning Inherent property is divided in *svabhāva* proper and *upādhi*. The first is an inherent property which «seems to mean something» (*vyatirekmitva*), but means nothing additional, it is synonymous Since existence according to the Buddhist theory of Universal Momentariness is nothing but permanent origination without any stability, origination and existence practi-

5. (Method) of Agreement and (method) of Difference.

(42.14). To agree means to possess the same attribute. The (corresponding) condition is agreement. To disagree means to possess a different attribute. Difference is the condition of one who possesses attributes which do not agree. (42.15). When there is an agreement, produced by (the common possession of) the logical reason (middle term), between the subject¹ of the conclusion and the similar cases² (from which the positive form of the general proposition is drawn by induction), we call it Agreement. But when there is a contrast, produced by the logical mark, (between the subject and the examples, i e., when the examples are negative), we call it the method of Difference.

(42.16). Out of these two (methods, the method of Agreement) consists in propositions proving³ this agreement (directly), as e. g. —

(Major premise) (All) products⁴ are impermanent.

(Example). Just as a jar (etc.)

(Minor premise). The sounds of speech are such products

(Conclusion) They are impermanent).

(42.18). The directly expressed meaning is here the agreement between the subject of the inference (or minor term) and the similar cases⁵ (the jars etc.), an agreement on behalf of the fact that both are products.

(42.19). But when the (*prima facie*) expressed meaning is disagreement, we call it (the method) of Difference, as e. g. —

¹ *sādhya-dharmin*.

² *dṛṣṭānta-dharmin*; the agreement is, more precisely, between two substratums (*dharmin*) upon which concomitant qualities (*dharmā*) have been superimposed by constructive thought.

³ *sādhana-ākhyā*, or simply *ākhyā*, is the term more closely corresponding to our syllogism, as a complex of propositions proving something; when the method of agreement is used, the analogy, between the given case and those cases from which generalization is drawn, is expressed directly (*abhidheya*), the *prima-facie* meaning is agreement. When the method of difference is resorted to, the *prima-facie* meaning is divergence, the examples are negative, but the result is the same.

⁴ *līlāla* corresponds to what in Hinayāna is called *samskṛta* or *samskāra*, e. g., in *antyaḥ sarve saṃskārāḥ*.

⁵ I.e., between the two possessors (*dharmīnoḥ*) of the similar and of the inferred qualities.

impermanence. Therefore it shows that there is an invariable concomitance between every product and impermanence. This is the formula of the analytical reason with an additional (accidental) qualification² (45 15) "Qualification" means characteristic. An analytical reason characterized by a difference of qualification, by an (accidental property) which is different from it, is here formulated (45 16). Now, sometimes (in life) we name a thing simply, sometimes accompanied by a characteristic which is not separate from the object itself, sometimes accompanied by a characteristic which is separate. E.g., "Devadatta" is a proper name, "long-eared" is a name by which he is characterized through both his ears which are not beyond him. "The owner of a brindled cow" is a name by which he is characterized by (the accidental characteristic of the ownership) of a brindled cow which is not beyond him (45 18). Similarly the word "existence" is a simple designation (of a fact) "Having origin" is (a designation of the same fact) through a characteristic which does not differ from it. "A product" is a characteristic (of the same fact) through something (additional), that he is beyond it, (viz. through its causes).

(45 20) The following objection (will be perhaps made) In the example of the "owner of a brindled cow" there are two words expressing the qualification (of Devadatta), the word brindled and the word cow. In the example (a product is impermanent) a single word "product" is used without any qualifications. (How can it represent a qualified reason?) The answer is as follows:

11. "A product" means an existence (viewed as something) which for its own concretisation is

former, it is (certain) in the latter it is greater in comprehension and less in extension (vyāpti) than the latter (the *vyāpti*). This would mean that the proposition "all products are impermanent" is convertible *per accidens*, that momentary entities are assumed which are not products, but from III 128 it seems that both conceptions are contemporaneous.

² I. 1, p. 45 11-13 "Through a difference of the condition (*upādhi*), the words formula of self-existence (*svabhāva*) are connected (from the preceding *sūtra*).

The introduction of two words in *śāstra-gu* this seems quite immaterial, it might have been expressed by one word as well. Important is only the fact that the accidental characteristic is expressed. Vinīśadeva's *avataṛana* states that in the word "product" there is no qualification perceptible (*mūlān-pa* = *sūlān*), and explains that it is not expressed but understood, p. 83 1-2.

6. There is no virtual difference between the two (meanings).

(43. 2). The meaning is the aim (of the syllogism), the real fact which must be expressed by it, the fact concerning which both the syllogisms are drawn. (43. 3). There is no difference whatsoever in the fact which they aim at establishing.¹ Indeed, (the aim) is to express a logical connection² which (always has) a threefold aspect. For that purpose both (methods) are used. (Although they represent) two (different methods), they express (just the same fact of one) logical connection having three aspects. The idea³ which they should express is just the same. From this side there is no difference whatsoever.

(43. 6) But then, indeed, we would neither expect any difference in expression? It is answered (that there is no difference) —

7. Except the difference of formulation

(43. 8) Formulation is verbal expression. Except a difference merely verbal, there is no other difference, no difference in the aim.⁴ (43. 9). The meaning is the following one. The *prima facie* meaning⁴ is one thing, the aim for which it is used another one. The expressions differ so far the *prima facie* meaning is concerned, but regarding the (aim) for which they are used there is no difference. (43. 10). Indeed, when the (direct or positive) concomitance has been expressed (in the major premise), its contraposition follows by implication. The method (of this contraposition) will be explained later on⁵ And likewise, when the converted (i. e., contraposed) concomitance has been expressed, its positive form follows by implication. (43. 11) Thus it is that the threefold logical reason which should be expressed remains unchanged. Indeed the implied meaning does not always change when the words expressing it are different. (43. 12). For if we have two propositions. «the *fat* Devadatta does not eat at day-time» and «the *fat* Devadatta eats at night»,⁶ although the direct

¹ Lit «Between both no difference whatsoever from the aim (*prayojanāṅ*)».

² *linga*.

³ *prayojana*

⁴ *abhidheya*. ⁵ Cp. sūtra III. 28 ff

⁶ This is the usual example of the method of Necessary Implication (*arthāpatti*), a method of proof very much in vogue in the school of Mīmāṃsakas. They applied it wherever the consequence seemed to them immediate and quite unavoidable (*anyathānupapatti*), the contrary being simply impossible (*sambhāva-abhāva*). The Naiyāyikas reduced all such cases to simple inferences in which one proposi-

with a change in the causes» Here the words expressing it are «concomitantly with a change in the causes». This expression and other similar ones, as e g., the expression «invariably dependent on volition»¹ are instances of the analytical reason² where this reason is accompanied by an indication of an additional (accidental) attribute just as in the word «a product» (46.13). The sounds of our speech vary according as the causes (producing them) change. Their conditions or causes⁴ being different, being variable, they have themselves the nature of changing concomitantly, according as the conditions vary. (46.15). Thus from the fact that the sound is variable, dependent on a change in its causes, it is deduced that it is a product. From the fact that it «invariably depends on volition» its impermanence is deduced. (46.16). In the first instance the words «concomitantly with a change in the causes» and in the second the word «volition» express such qualifications which are additional (to the fact adduced as a reason)

(46.17) We have thus shown that there can be a threefold difference in framing the analytical reason, it may be simple, essentially and accidentally determined. This we have insisted upon in order that no one

¹ *prayatna-anataryulakṛta*. This attribute is introduced here by Dh as an instance alluded to by the word *ādi* of the sūtra, but in the text commented upon by Vinītadeva it was included in the sūtra

² *svabhāva-hetoh prayogūh*

³ *bhīma-vāśesana-svabhāva-abhūdhāyin*.

⁴ *pratyaya* condition and *kāraṇa* cause are here used synonymously

⁵ We find the method of Concomitant Variations for the first time applied in Indian Philosophy in the *Abh. kośa*, I 45, (cp V S II 2.29), where it appears under the name of *taḍ-vikāra-vikāritā*, i e, «the fact of (this thing) undergoing a change when there is a change in that thing». It is there applied as a proof of the connection between the senses and feeling, i e, as we can put it, between the brain and the mind. European logicians will be perhaps astonished to see that a similar statement of Prof. A. Bain, *Logic*², II 68, was anticipated by Vasubandha. They will perhaps be still more astonished when they have fully realized the implications of the fact that the Buddhists were led to this conclusion by their conceptions of Causation (*pratītya-samutpāda* = *asmiṃ satī idam bhavati*) of which the psycho-physical parallelism is an illustration. Indian philosophy has thus abandoned the anthropomorphic view of Causality at a very early date, and replaced it by the idea of what in mathematics is called a function, cp my *Nirvāṇa*, p 89 ff., *pratyaya-bheda-bheditā* is of course just the same as *taḍ-vikāra-vikāritā* and Vācaspati-miśra thinks that we must interpret *upacāra* in N S II 2.13 as *śabda-bheda-pratyaya*. Of course the Method of Concomitant Variations is not treated here as a separate method, in coordination with the fundamental methods of Agreement and Difference, it appears here as a method of proof subordinate to the method of Agreement.

9. (Major premise). Wheresoever we do not perceive the presence of a representable thing, we exhibit corresponding behaviour towards it.

(Example) Just as when we fail to perceive another thing known from experience to be quite unexisting, though representable, e.g., the horns on the head of a hare etc.

(Minor premise) On a certain place we do not perceive the presence of a jar which is representable.

(Conclusion. We behave without expecting to find it there)¹

(43 21) «A thing (known) to be essentially perceptible»,² i. e., a thing which can be imagined as perceived, and «is not perceived» — these words represent the subject³ (of the major premise), it is the fact of the absence of a cognition of something representable.⁴ (43. 22). This is a case when we are justified to behave in accordance with its non-existence,⁵ i. e., we can take action knowing that it is absent. (44. 1). Thus it is stated that the fact of not perceiving (the presence) of a representable object is necessarily associated with the possibility of negative purposive action towards it. This means that a representable object not being perceived affords an opportunity for a corresponding negative action⁶ (44 2). Now, the statement that the logical reason is necessarily associated with its consequence is a statement of invariable concomitance, this is according to the definition — invariable concomitance (between a subject and its predicate or a reason and its

¹ Lit., p. 43 18—20 «What, being contained in the essence of perception, is not perceived, it is established as an object of non-Ens-dealing; just as some other established hare-horn etc.; and on some special place a jar contained in the essence of perception is not perceived».

² The word *lakṣaṇa* is here rendered in Tib. by *rig-bya* = *jñeya* = *cicaya*, and *prāpta* by *gyur-pa* = *bhūta*, thus *upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāpta* = *jñāna-cicaya-bhūta*, i. e., an object which does not transcend the limits of our knowledge, which is representable, is not something transcendental, cp. above. transl. p. 107 ff.

³ *anūdyate*.

⁴ *dṛṣya*.

⁵ Lit., p. 43 22. «This is the established object of (our) dealing (*vyaśāhāra*) with non-Ens, it means we can behave with the thought (*ati*) „it is not”».

⁶ Lit., p. 44 1 «Through this predication is made of the fitness (*yogyatā*) of the (object) for non-Ens-dealing».

§ 3. ANALYTICAL DEDUCTIONS ARE DEDUCTIONS OF COEXISTENCE.

(46.21) Follows the question, can these analytical reasonings be used when the connection of the reason (with the deduced property) is already known or when it is not known? In order to show, that they must be used in such cases where the connection (of the subject and the predicate) is already known, (the author) says —

17. All these attributes (which are given as) reasons¹ (for the deduction of corresponding predicates) should be conceived (as logical reasons) for deducing only such predicates² whose necessary dependence on nothing but (the presence of) the reason is established by proofs,³ (whatsoever they may be) suiting every special case

(47.3) They are called reasons, since they prove (the presence of something else), and they also are attributes, since they where in

dharmaḥ, and *Vācaspati*ṁśra, *loco cit*, p 315, identifies it with a reference to the Buddhist «law of otherness» (*ciruddha-dharma-samsarga*) according to which every variation in time, place and character makes the object «another» object, cp above note 2 on p 6 The Buddhists start with a deduction of the non-eternity of the sounds of speech from their conception of every existence in general as a run of momentary events having only apparent stability, and then proceed in order to refer to the 1) fact of having a beginning, 2) causality, 3) concomitant variability, 4) dependence on a wilful effort The first and 4th of these arguments correspond to the 3d argument of the *Naiyāyikas*, and the 2d and 3d are contained in their first one (*ādir = lāreṇam*) There is more logic in the Buddhist arrangement The first argument contains in itself all the others, the second directly (*stabhāvena*) the third and others — indirectly (*spādānnā*). All these conceptions, existence, origination, causality, concomitant variation, dependence on the will are analytically connected, in the Indian sense of the term *stabhāva*, the first includes all the others, it is of greater extension and less intension than the others which are its subalterns The extension and intension of all these attributes are determined, according to what has been stated above, p 38—39 (text), transl p. 103 ff, on the basis of actual observation, on the basis of «perception and non-perception». From this point of view all judgments of Coexistence, or co-inherent attributes, are also founded on experience, just as those which are founded on uniformity of Succession or Causation

¹ *sādhana-dharmāḥ*. ² *sādhya-dharma*

³ *pramāṇa* is here an equivalent of *drṣṭānta*, cp above p 44 8 (text) cp below p 147 n 7.

alone is the evidence. (44.8). By this proposition (containing a reference to the evidence proving the general law), we must be satisfied that the invariable concomitance is (fully) expressed.

(44.9) After having established the general concomitance (in the major premiss), the (author) now proceeds to state its application² to the subject (in the minor premiss). He says «and we do not perceive (the presence of a jar somewhere on a definite place)». A place is one (definite) place on earth. It is '«just this place»' because it is distinguished from other places.³ One definite place means the place upon which (there is no jar). «Somewhere» means a place

¹ Lit., p. 44. 6—8. «But by evidence (*pramāṇena*), by non-perception of the imagined, it is known to be fit for non-Eas-dealing. The hare-horn is the first (example) of an object of a non-Eas-dealing, it is so expressed. On the hare-horn etc., indeed, the non-Eas-dealing is proved by evidence to depend on nothing but non-perception of the imagined Just from this evidence». *tata eva pramāṇāt* — is a separate sentence — The horns of a hare or of a donkey, the son of a barren woman, a lotus flower in the sky are the usual examples of absolute unrealities. They differ from the absent jar which is a contingent unreality. The author lays stress on the fact that even absolute unrealities are representable and have some negative importance in guiding our purposive actions, this being the test of reality. It is real absence, it is not nothing (*tuccho*), because nothing could not guide our actions even negatively. But it is not a reality *sui generis* (*castrotritarum*), as the realists maintain, it is imagining (*dr̥ṣya*) Unimaginable are metaphysical entities, e. g., Buddha or Nirvāṇa in their Mahāyānistic conception (*śarvajñatvam hy adṛṣyam*, p. 71.8). Mallavādi, fol. 76—77, expatiates on this example as proving that negative behaviour (*anad-ryarahāra*) has no other logical reason, i. e., no other necessary reason than imagination of a thing absent or unreal. Others, says he, have maintained that the absence of a perception (*ghaṭa-jñāna-abhāva*), the fact that we do not name it (*ghaṭa-jñāna-abhāva*), the fact that we do not use the jar for fetching water (*jala-āharopādī-kriyā-abhāva*) are the reasons for availing oneself of the idea of a non-Eas in practical life. But these facts of non-existence are either simple nothings (*tuccho*), they are then unreal (*anidha*) and can have no influence on our actions; or they are meant for their positive counterparts (*pratiyoga* = *paryudāsa*) which is cogitated, as stated above, p. 30.8, by sense-perception, when the perceptual judgment «there is here no jar» is the outcome. But when the facts of speaking of other things, not of the absent jar, and the fact of doing something else than fetching water in a jar (*paryudāsa*) are the outcome, this is already a practical consequence of the idea of the absent jar, and it thus, being itself purposive action, cannot be the reason of that very purposive action (*na hi sūdr̥ṣyam eva sūdr̥ṣyam tvaṇeti*). Therefore the only reason of our negative behaviour is imagination.

² *pāṭya-dharmaṭā*.

³ Cf. H. Bergson, *op. cit.*, p. 201 — «quand je dis que l'objet, une fois abol, laisse sa place inoccupée, il s'agit... d'une place, c'est à dire d'un vide limité par des contours précis, c'est-à-dire d'une espèce de chose».

logical necessity) as an ascertained case of invariable concomitance (47.9). The function of the logical reason is, indeed, to produce the cognition of an unobserved fact, and this is just (what is meant by) ascertainment of the reason's invariable concomitance with the latter. (47.10). First of all, (as a preliminary step), we must be certain that the presence of our logical reason is necessarily dependent upon the presence of the predicated consequence, (we must verify it by trying to find) contradictory facts¹. We then can proceed to syllogize and avail ourselves of the general proposition recorded in our memory, (the proposition) intimating that its subject is invariably concomitant with its predicate, e. g. —

Any object produced (according to causal laws) is non-eternal (47.12). After that we can connect this general record with the given particular case —

That causal origin which is a characteristic of the sounds of our speech necessarily coexists with the attribute of non-eternity

(47.13). Between these (two premises, the major) contains the mnemonic record, it is a knowledge of the logical reason (and its concomitance, acquired by whatsoever evidence). The syllogism (proper is contained in the next step, when we in the minor premiss) assert² that

¹ *bādha-lena pramāṇena* We take *pramāṇa* here as meaning *drṣṭānta* as in 44.4, 61.10, 80.21, 81.1—2, 81.20—21, 86.11, 87.5. Rgyal-thsah, f. 86, explains it as meaning that the denial of an analytical judgment is impossible, since it would be a contradiction, «eternal (i. e. immutable) substances cannot produce anything, since they cannot be efficient, neither gradually, nor at once» cp Sarvad, p. 21—24. Another verification, according to the same author, would be a reference to the Buddhist doctrine of Universal Momentariness — *roñ-yod tsam-nas hye-pa rai-gi ño-bo ñid-du, rjes-su ñbrei-te*. The author of *Pramāṇa-vārtika-ālamkāra* (Rgyan-mkhan-po), Prajñākara-gupta, Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, vol. 99—100, thinks that this doctrine is an extraordinary intuition of great men (*anāraṇya-jñāna* of Mahāyānas) which cannot be arrived at in the ordinary way. According to Rgyal-thsah, sūtra III.17 suggests (evidently in the words *gathā-svam-pramāṇaiḥ*) that the usual methods of induction indicated in sūtra II.66 (*sapāṭhe sattham* etc. etc.) do not apply in these cases, that the reasoning starts here with the general proposition — *go-hyed-du-hgyur-ba ñbrei-ba thead was ñhāi-du-chud-pa la ñkos-pa* = *gunala-bhūta-sambandha-pramāṇa pratī-apēta*. Thus we would have here, according to the author of the *Alamkāra*, «ratioacination independent of any previous induction» (cp. J. S. Mill, *Logic*, book II, ch. 2, § 4). Thus however is not the general view Mallavādi has here a lacuna.

² Lit. «remember». Rgyal-thsah, f. 86, mentions that the interpretation of the syllogism here as two acts of memory belongs to Dharmottara, (the minor premiss is usually represented as a judgment by analogy, cp. Tātp., p. 40.7)

18—20. Because (what we call an analytical reason) is just the fact that the predicate is a natural outflow of the reason, (not a fact outside it), it is contained in the essence of the latter. The underlying reality is the same for both (the reason and the fact deduced from it). If the reason could exist without the predicate, the latter would not be contained in the essence of the former.²

(47.19). Such connection alone represents its, (the analytical reason's), essence.³ «Such (connection) alone» means the established fact of a necessary concomitance (of the logical predicate) with every case where the property representing the reason is present. «Represents its essence» means, belongs to the essence of the attribute representing the reason. Indeed, wherever a fact is deduced which is necessarily inherent in every instance of the reason, it is necessarily (comprehended) in the essence of the latter. No other (property can be so deduced)

means a satisfactory answer to the accusation of begging the question Vinita-deva's introduction. p 90.14 ff, is much more reasonable. According to him sūtra III 18 answers the question why is it that the deduced property here follows (on the mere fact of the presence of) the attribute representing the logical reason? And the answer is then quite natural, viz. because in reality (V. adds *dñes-vu-na = tasyatas*, as in sūtra III 20 which he omits) the deduced property is already contained in the reason

¹ Lat, p. 47.17—18. «If thus the tie of the deduced (*sādhya*) with the reason (*sādhana*) must be ascertained, why is it that the following, which is certain, of the deduced from the fact (*dharma*) (representing) the reason, is sought for? He says. »

² Lat, sūtras III 18—22 «Because just this (following upon the mere reason) is its (the reason's) essence (19) And because this essence (of the reason) is the reason. (20) Because in reality they are identical (21) Because the non-appearing when this appears is not its essence (22) And because of the possibility of divergence» —Sūtra III 20 is omitted by Vinita-deva, but the word *evastatas* is added in sūtra III 18

³ *svabhāva* here in the sense of essential property as indicated above. This means that the proposition «*Aśoka* is a tree» is susceptible only of a *concomitans* *accidens*, the *śimśapā* is *vr̥ka-svabhāva*, but *vr̥kaś* is not *śimśapā-svabhāva*, therefore the sūtra emphasises *tasya*, *tat-svabhāva* is here felt as a *tat-purusa*, *sādhya* (= *vr̥kasatvam*) *tasya* (= *sādhanaśya* = *śimśapātyasya*) *svabhāva*, we can change the expression and say *sādhana* *sādhya-svabhāva*, then the last word will be a *bahuvrīhi* as in 47.12 — *kr̥tāntam anvayata-svabhāva* cp. N. Kandali, p 207.20 Jayanta, p 114.10.

any other (real) contrast, (a contrast limited to expression), it is called apparent contrast,¹ as e. g. «the beginning of existence», (existence is nothing but permanent beginning). A (momentary) reality qualified by a beginning which is only apparently different from the (reality itself) is described as something having a beginning. (45.10). Thus the analytical reason here formulated must be regarded as characterized by an attribute which is included in the same thing itself and can be distinguished only in abstraction (i. e. in imagination).²

13. The formula of an analytical syllogism with a middle term containing an additional (accidental) qualification is the following one —

(Major premise). Whatsoever is a product is impermanent.

(Examples) (As a jar etc.).

(Minor premise). (The sounds of our speech are products).

(Conclusion). (The sounds of our speech are impermanent).

(45.13). The attribute of «being a product» is the subject, «impermanence» is the predicate (of the major premise). It expresses that the fact of being a product always includes³ in itself the notion of

cally become synonyms. The second is an inherent property which really means something additional, something different (*vyatirekin*). The difference however is only of the point of view, since both the attributes of «origination» and «production from causes» are continuous and coherent in every existing thing. From one point of view every thing appears as constantly changing and having no duration at all, but without any reference to causal laws. From the other point of view every thing represents a constant change in coordination with antecedent moments according to causal laws. For the Buddhists they are correct inferences supported by the totality of the similar cases and contrasted with the dissimilar, or eternal, cases, since the latter have no existence. For the Realists who admit the existence of both the eternal and non-eternal entities they will be logical fallacies (*anupasamhāra*).

¹ *vyatirekya*.

² The difference between Aśoka-tree and tree in general is also said to be produced by imagination (*kalpita-bheda*—*vilalpa-viśaya* cp. above, text 26 15, cp. 48 9), it is logical, not real, since both these concepts are different, although they appear as the characteristics of the same moment of reality (*vastutah*). Here, on the contrary, the difference is produced not by different concepts, but only by two expressions which, taking into account the theory of Universal Momentariness, are synonymous.

³ *niyata* = *pratibaddha*, lit, «the being a product is fastened to impermanences», i. e., the notion of being a product is subaltern to the notion of imperma-

is wrapt up in the other) (48.8) Indeed when we at a distance observe an object having twigs and (leaves), we assert «it is a tree», we cannot assert «it is an Aśoka tree». Next to that, (when we are near the object, we assert) «just the same thing is a tree and an Aśoka» The (underlying) reality is thus quite the same, but our judgment imposes upon it a construction which makes it appear as divided (between two notions) different only by the contrasts (implied in them)¹ (48.10). Therefore reason and consequence are here different (not as realities), but on account of those conceptions which have been superimposed upon reality by constructive judgments.²

(48.11). In this sense (analytical) reasoning (is not a tautology), the argument is not a portion of the thesis. But the (underlying) reality is identical

(48.12). Further, why is it that the deduced essential attribute is necessarily coexistent in every particular instance where the attribute representing the reason is found? It is said,

21. (If it were not co-existent, if the consequence) could have appeared without the reason having also appeared, it could not represent an inherent property of the latter.

(48.14). If one thing is not necessarily implied in the other, it can be absent when the other is present Such an attribute which can

¹ *vyāvṛti-bhēdena* «through a difference of contrasts», e.g., when we characterize an object as «Aśoka» we have in mind its contrast with birches, pines and other trees, but when we characterize the same object as a «tree», we have in our mind its contrast with houses, mountains, rivers etc. The reality is the same, only it is put in a different light by a difference of those objects with which it is being contrasted, cp *Tātp*, p. 340. 19 ff. A similar difference must be assumed between the notions of «being produced» and «being impermanent», the first means produced from causes and conditions (*hetu-pratyayaṅ kṛtam*), it is contrasted with space or a motionless cosmical Aether (*ālāśā*), the second means inherent evanescence, every moment a new thing (*hyig-paṅ rañ-theul-can-gye rañ-dehin=sa-ra-n-viṇāśa-stabhāva*), it implies a denial of the ordinary view of a limited duration of empirical objects, cp *Vinītadeva*, p. 90. 17 ff.

² *Lat*, p. 48. 7—10 «Indeed the relation of deduced and deducer are two forms (*rūpe*) which are lifted up upon certainty (i.e., superimposed upon reality by constructive thought, *mācaya = vikalpa = laipana*) And a form which is imputed certainty by an imputed division produced by mutual exclusion of one another becomes divided, thus the deducer (reason) is one thing, the deduced part another thing. . . Therefore certainty (i.e., constructive thought) points out to us as divided in a division of mutual exclusion a reality (*vastu*), although it is not divided»

dependent upon the efficiency (of entities) other (than itself).

(46.2). The efficiency¹ of causes other (than the entity itself) is needed for the appearance of a (concrete) entity.² This is the reason³ (why the word product contains this meaning). Since we call produced (an entity) which depends on the efficiency of something else, therefore we say that the analytical reason⁴ is qualified by something (additional, something) lying beyond it.⁵ (46.4) There is here no word corresponding to this additional characteristic, nevertheless it is implied in the word "product" itself. That is why this word has the shape of a technical term,⁶ since grammar enjoins to build technical terms in this way.⁷ In those cases where the attribute is implied there is no necessity of using a special word for it.

(46.8). Sometimes the (accidental) attribute is understood (but not expressed), as e.g., if we say "a product" we understand "produced by causes". In such cases, the word "causes" is sometimes expressed and sometimes not.

15. The (expression) "variable concomitantly with a change in the causes" and other (similar expressions) must be understood in the same way.⁸

(46.11) (The accidental characteristic) is expressed by a corresponding word, e.g., in the expression (a function) "variable concomitantly

¹ *vyāpāra*

² *svabhāva* in the sense of *svabhāva-vīśeṣa* "an individual" cp. sūtra I. 15.

³ Lat., p. 46.8 "The word indeed (hi) in the sense of because".

⁴ *svabhāva* here in the sense of *svabhāva-hetu*.

⁵ *vyatirīkṣita vīśeṣa*.

⁶ The term *kyāka*, as stated above, corresponds to the Hinayānist term *samāhṛta-lāraṇa* (= *samāhṛta*) *sambhūya kṛtam*. The connotation in Hinayāna is different, since reality is there divided in *samāhṛta* and *asaṃskṛta* elements, whereas in the Mahāyāna and in the Sautrāntika school the definition of reality having been changed, the *asaṃskṛtas* including Nirvāṇa have no separate reality, cp. my Nirvāṇa, p. 42.

⁷ Lit., p. 46.6 "Because the suffix *kan* is prescribed for names", cp. Pāṇini IV. 3. 147.

⁸ This sūtra, according to Vinitadeva, p. 88.9, included the word *prayatnānantarīyaka* also. This would make two further arguments for proving that the sounds of our speech are not unchanging metaphysical eternal elements, as maintained by the ancient Mīmāṃsakas, viz. 4) whatsoever exhibits concomitant-variations is impermanent, and 5) whatsoever is produced by a conscious effort is impermanent.

(49. 3). Therefore (analytically) deducible is only such an inherent property which is always coexistent with the (fact representing the) reason

(49. 4). And thus it is fundamental that analytical reasoning should be applied only to such cases where an inherent property is already known to be always coexistent with the fact from which it is deduced.¹

§ 4. SYLLOGISM OF CAUSALITY IN THE METHOD OF AGREEMENT.

(Next comes the reasoning from causality, where the logical reason corresponds to the result and the logical predicate to the cause).

(*anityatā*) would be produced, then divergence would be possible, since sticks and similar objects are likewise produced from their own causes. Thus it necessarily (must be admitted that) if something is not a product it cannot be annihilated. Thus existence and evanescence are comherant and the latter conception can be analytically deduced from the former. But in order to make this deduction we must previously know by appropriate arguments (*yathāśram-pramāṇāḥ*) the exact meaning of both conceptions. How the Buddhist theorem of existence is proved has been hinted above, p 121 n

¹ The argument in sūtras III. 17—23, expressed freely in terms of modern philosophy, seems to be the following one. There are analytical judgments, they are concerned with co-inherent or coexistent attributes. When the subject of a general proposition contains in itself a «sufficient reason» for an affirmation of the predicate, when the mere presence of the thing denoted by the reason necessarily implies the presence of the connoted consequence, then wheresoever the first is found, the second is necessarily present. The connotation of the subject can be established by whatsoever methods, by definitions founded on observation, by an extraordinary intuition (*anūsrāṣa gñāna*), testimony, Scripture or some complicated analysis (as the one by which Dharmakīrti has established the theory of Universal Momentariness). Whatsoever its origin the general proposition establishes that the reason A contains in itself the predicate B, because (18) B is the inherent property (*svabhāva*) of A. But (19) A, the reason, is also the essence (*svabhāva*) of the consequence B. Does that mean that the analytical judgment is a tautology? No, because (20) the identity is of the underlying fact of existence the logical superstructure is manifold but comherant in this underlying reality. (21) If it were not coexistent, the consequence would not be the inherent property and (21) it would then be a separate existence. — Some difficulty of interpretation arises from the double meaning of *svabhāva*, in sūtra III. 19 *svabhāvaḥ = hetuḥ*, in p 48 4 it is = *sādhya-dharmah*, in p 28 20 we have *hetuḥ = svabhāvaḥ sādhyaḥ* and in p 47 21—23 *sādhya-dharmah = svabhāvaḥ, svabhāvaḥ = sādhyaḥ*. The solution can be found in the fact that as *sādhya*, *svabhāva* means essential property and as *hetu* it means identity of that reality in which both the *hetu* and the *sādhya* comhere.

should be misled by a difference in the wording when using the analytical reason (i. e., a reason from which the predicate is analytically deduced).¹

16. The sounds of speech are existent, they have a (real) origin, they are produced — these are the minor premises²

¹ Dh warns us against committing mistakes in using the term analytical or essential reason (*svabhāva-hetu*). The latter has been defined above, sūtra II. 16, as a reason which alone by itself is a sufficient ground for deducing the consequence. the consequence is contained in the reason, no other additional or accidental condition is needed (*na hetu-sattvāyā vyatiriktiṃ karmad dīctum apēksate*, p. 22, 19). We were, accordingly, justified in assigning to the major premises of Dharmakīrti's analytical syllogisms a place among the class of propositions in which the predicate is of the essence of the subject. But now we are warned that if an accidental or additional attribute (*upādhi*) is contained in the reason (or subject), the judgment will nevertheless remain analytical. The analytical reason can, in its turn contain either an essential or an accidental attribute (*vyatiriktiṃ vīśanena vīśataḥ svabhāvaḥ*, p. 46 4). The judgments «whatsoever changes concomitantly with a change in its causes, is a product of these causes» and «whatsoever is consequent on an effort is impermanent» are, according to Dharmakīrti, analytical or essential judgments, the predicate is included in the subject. Now what is contained in the subject and what is not yet included in it is very often questionable, and accidental attributes may become essential when the observer has satisfied himself from experience that the subject always possesses that attribute. The extension and intension (*vyāpya-vyāpaka-bhāva*) of attributes, is determined by their definitions founded on observation (cp. text, p. 39 5 ff.). The subject is thus supposed to include all those attributes, whether essential, previously known, or accidental, newly added to it as a result of assent to a judgment, which are co-inherent in him. It has been acknowledged in European philosophy that the line of demarcation between attributes essential and accidental is constantly shifting. In India all attributes known (*siddha*) to be coexistent are considered as constituting the essence of the thing. The difference is between coexistence and succession.

² The ancient Mīmāṃsakas (*śarad-mīmāṃsaka*) in their speculations on the nature of sound established a theory according to which the sounds of speech (*śrāvaṇa*) were imagined as unchanging eternal appurtenances inherent in the cosmic aether (*ākāśa*), their existence occasionally manifested itself when a condensation of air was produced by the conjunction or disjunction of objects, cp. Tāt., p. 307. The Naiyāyikas, N. S. II 2. 18 ff., cp. V. S. II. 2 32, opposed this theory by three arguments, 1) the sounds of speech have a real beginning or causes, 2) they are perceived not in the place of their origin but when having reached the organ of audition, hence the existence of a series (*santāna*) of momentary sounds must be assumed in the interval, and 3) these sounds are variable in intensity and character, hence at every moment we have a different sound (this is the meaning of *kṛtavad upacāraḥ*, according to commentators). The last argument, Uddyotakara remarks, is Buddhist, since it implies Universal Momentariness — *sarva-antyaḥa-sādhana*.

on causation. The words "is already known" mean that the existence of a causal relation (must) be ascertained¹ (by induction from particular cases)

This certainty must necessarily be established, because, as we have said,² the logical reason conveys a deduction not accidentally, but on the basis of an invariable concomitance.

§ 5. DEDUCTION BY THE METHOD OF DIFFERENCE

(49. 17). The analytical, causal and negative syllogism according to the method of Agreement have been thus exhibited. The author proceeds to exhibit the (method) of Difference

25. The method of Difference³ (will be now exhibited). Negation represents then the following formula —

(Major premise) What exists, all conditions of perceptibility⁴ being fulfilled, is necessarily perceived

(Example) As, e. g., the particular case of a patch of blue colour⁵ etc.

(Minor premise) But on this (spot) we do not perceive any existing jar, although all conditions of perception are fulfilled

(Conclusion) (Therefore there is here no jar)

(50. 4) The method of Difference (will now be demonstrated) "What exists, all conditions of perceptibility being fulfilled", means what exists and is perceptible, (hence) existence is taken as the subject of (the general proposition) "Is perceived", i e., perception is predicated.

¹ *niscita*, characterized by necessity, : s, the major premise must be shown by an induction from particular instances, no counter-instance being producible, cp above, p 19 ff (text). The necessity consists in the fact there is no effect without a preceding cause. Therefore, strictly speaking, permissible are only the deductions of causes from effects, not *vice versa*, of future effects from causes, cp above text p 81. 10, transl p 88

² Cp text, p 19 1 ff. and p 47 9

³ Read *vaidharmya*-, instead of *vaidharma*

⁴ *upalabhi* misprint in stead of *upalabdhi*

⁵ *nīlādī-vīṣeṣa* = *nīlādī-svalakṣaṇa*, the latter in the third sense indicated transl p 84 n. 4

something else.¹ These attributes «alone»,² i. e., nothing but their mere (presence is sufficient for making the deduction of other co-inherent attributes). By the words «nothing but»³ every additional circumstance which should be taken into account is excluded. (47.4). Their «necessary dependence»⁴ means their following, their flowing⁵ (necessarily from the nature of the fact representing the reason).

(47.5). The necessary dependence upon nothing but the presence of (the fact representing) the reason which is here mentioned is «established».⁶ By what is it established? By corresponding proofs. Every predicate is established just by that proof which is the proper proof (for the given generalization). (47.6). Since the reasons by the analysis of which⁷ (the predicate of impermanence) may be established are many, the proofs establishing the (analytical) tie⁸ are likewise many, therefore they are mentioned in the plural.

(47.8). (The deduced or predicated attribute is characterized as) «deduced» because it is made to follow (from the presence of the reason), and it is also an attribute, because it is inherent in something else, (it is co-inherent with the attribute representing the reason).

(47.8). What the (author) means is really⁹ this. A logical reason does not produce cognition (of some unobserved fact) accidentally, as e. g., a lamp (producing knowledge of such unobserved objects which it accidentally happens to illumine).¹⁰ But it produces knowledge (by

¹ *dharma* is here used in the ordinary (and original) sense of a quality belonging to some substance. It does not follow that the objective reality of the categories of substance and quality (*dharma-dharmabhūta*) is admitted, but the Hinayanistic view that there are only *dharma*s and no *dharmas* at all, that, as Yaśomitra puts it, *vidyamānam dravyam* (cp. my Central Conception, p. 26), this view is forsaken, and replaced by the admittance of a logical connection between a substratum and all the variety of its possible attributes, this logical connection has also an ontological meaning so far the ultimate substratum of all logical constructions, the ultimate *dharma* is the point-instant as the thing in itself (*svataḥśaṅka*).

² *etā*.

³ *mātra*.

⁴ *anubandha*.

⁵ *anvaya*.

⁶ *siddha*.

⁷ *svabhāva-hetu*, as, e. g., the three conceptions of «existence», of «having an origin» and of «being produced from causes» through the analysis of which the predicate non-eternal is deduced.

⁸ *sambandha* = *pratibandha*, cp. Jayanta, p. 114. 9 — *nam cānyaḥ sambandhaḥ, anyasā pratibandhaḥ*.

⁹ *paramārtha*.

¹⁰ Cp. text p. 19. 2 and 49. 15.

that the (second) is also absent, hence (we arrive at the absence of the absence of the consequence, i e.), at its affirmation.¹

(50.10). The following rule is therefore established, — when a deduction is made according to the method of Difference it always must be shown that the negation of the deduced consequence necessarily involves the negation of the reason.²

(50.12) The formula of an analytical deduction according to the method of Difference is next given.

26. (Major premises). What is changeless is neither existent nor has it an origin nor can it be a product.

(Example) (As e. g., the Cosmic Ether etc.)

(Minor premises) But the sounds of speech exist, have origination, are a product (of causes).

(Conclusion) (Hence they are impermanent).

(50.15). The consequence to be deduced (i.e., the major term), is here the impermanence (or non-eternity of the sounds of speech)³ Its negation necessarily involves⁴ the absence of the logical reason. By this (proposition) it is expressed that the negation of the consequence necessarily involves⁵ the negation of the reason, in all the three cases

is absent, the embraced non-existence of the consequence is non-existent, thus there is ascertainment of the consequence (*sādhaya*).

¹ *sādhya-niścaya* = *sādhya-tidhi*

² Thus the major premise in a negative deduction, i.e., the fundamental formula of it, is always an affirmation. The fact that subject and predicate have been substituted by their negations and have changed places does not affect the quality of the judgment, it remains affirmative. But the minor premise, as well as the conclusion, are negative.

³ As against the view of the Mīmāṃsakas, cp. above, p. 127 n. 2

⁴ *nyāta* = *pratibaddha* = *vyāpka*, e.g., «whosoever there is no fire, as in water, there necessarily is no smoke», or «whosoever there are no trees, there necessarily are no Aśoka-trees».

⁵ *vyāpka*, lt. p. 50 16, «the absence of the consequence is embraced by the absence of the reason» In the major premise, as in every judgment, the predicate or major term is greater in extension (*vyāpaka*), it «embraces» or contains the subject or middle term. But it is also «bound up» (*pratibaddha*) to the latter, because the presence of the latter involves necessarily the presence of the major term, which becomes «necessarily following» (*nyāta*, *anubaddha*, *pratibaddha*, *anvita*) In a contraposed major premise the same relations obtain between the ne-

the causal origin which is inherent in the particular case of the sound is necessarily coexistent with the attribute of non-eternity. (47.15). If that is so, then cognition (or communication) of an unobserved fact is, for sure, nothing but a cognition of invariable concomitance. It is therefore stated that analytical deductions (or deductions of coexistence) can be resorted to when the deduced fact is known (by whatsoever evidence) necessarily to be present wheresoever the mere fact of the presence of the reason is ascertained, and not in any other cases¹

(47.17) If that is so, (what we have to do in ratiocination) is to ascertain the connection of the logical predicate with the logical reason. But here the predicate (necessarily) follows on the mere fact of the presence of the attribute representing the reason. Why is it then that something already quite certain is being (here) sought-after? (An analytical deduction is it not a *petitio principii*?)² (No,—)

¹ Lat., p. 47.9—16 «The reason is not like a lamp, producing cognition as a possibility, but it is ascertained as an invariable concomitance, for the function (*vyāpāra*) of the reason to convey a cognition of the probandum consists just in an ascertainment of (its) invariable concomitance with (this) probandum, it is nothing else. At first through a contradicting proof the dependence of the reason on the probandum must be ascertained, «the attribute (— *trā*) of being produced, namely, possesses the essential attribute (*śā-bhāva*) of non-eternity». Then, at the time of syllogizing, he joins the meaning (*artha*) remembered in general with the particular case «this attribute of being produced which is inherent in the sound possesses also the essential attribute of non-eternity». Among them (*tatra*) the memory of the general is cognition of the reason, and the memory of the particular, of production inherent in the sound as possessing the essential attribute of non-eternity, is cognition of the syllogism (*anumāna* = *parārthānumāna*). And if it is so, the fact of communicating an unobserved thing is just a cognition of invariable concomitance. Therefore it is said that «own-existence»-reasons (or co-existence reasons) must be applied for a probandum which follows the mere (presence) of the (probans), not anywhere else»

² Dh's introduction to sūtra III 18 suggests that in this sūtra we shall have an answer to the objection very much urged in Europe by the assailants of the syllogistic doctrine, namely that the syllogism contains in the conclusion nothing that has not been stated in the premises, that it is therefore a *petitio principii*, *nīśeto mrgate* = *siddha-sādhana*. This is repeated by Rgyal-tshab, fol. 36—*ñes-par hñrel-ba bñal-bar-byā-ba yin-te*. We would expect an answer somewhat similar to that which has been given in European logic, (cp J. S. Mill, *loc. cit.* § 5) namely, that the syllogism contains an extension of the general proposition to unobserved and new individual cases (*parol-sārtha*, p. 47.15). But we then find in the sūtra III 18 only a restatement of the doctrine that (in analytical judgments) the subject by itself is a sufficient reason for deducing the predicate. This is by no

27. The formula of a reason representing an effect is as follows —

(Major premise). Where there is no fire, there neither is smoke

(Example). (As e.g., on the water of a lake, etc)

(Minor premise) But there is here some smoke.

(Conclusion). (Hence there must be some fire).

(50.21). Here also it is stated that the absence of fire involves¹ the absence of smoke.² The words «but there is here some smoke» express that the involving³ part, the negation of smoke, is absent. Hence the involved⁴ part, the negation of fire, is likewise absent. And when (the negation of fire is denied, its affirmation, i.e., the presence) of the consequence becomes established.⁵

§ 6 EQUIPOLLENCY OF THE METHODS OF AGREEMENT AND DIFFERENCE.

(51.1). The following question is now answered. How is it that in the formulae expressed according to the method of Agreement, the contraposition of the general proposition is not expressed, and in those which are expressed according to the method of Difference the original form⁶ of it is not stated? How can it then (be maintained that syllogism) is an expression (in propositions of all) the three aspects of a logical relation, (concomitance, contraposition and minor premise)?

28. From a formula of agreement the corresponding formula of difference follows by implication.

¹ Lat., *complecti* «is embraced», is included, is involved, is subaltern, is less in extension, i.e., there can be no smoke without fire, but fire may be present where there is no smoke, as e.g., in a hot iron-hall

² Hence the absence of fire involves the absence of smoke, but not vice versa

³ *vyāpaka*, embracing, including, containing, pervading.

⁴ *vyāpya*, embraced, included, contained, pervaded

⁵ *sādhya-gati*

⁶ *antaya*.

(47.23). All right! Let this be just the essence (of an analytical deduction)! Why should we then deduce this essence? Why should we have recourse to logical reasoning for deducing from the reason what is already given in the reason?¹

(48.2). Because the essence is the reason, (i.e., we deduce out of the reason its inherent property).

(48.2). We are dealing here just with (the analytical reason which is a reason in whose) essence (the deduced property is included). Therefore we can deduce merely such facts which are included in the essence of the fact (serving as a reason). Now, this essential property can be nothing else but a fact present wheresoever (the other fact representing) the reason is also present.²

(48.4). But if the deduced fact is included in the reason (the deduction will be a tautology), the argument will be included in the thesis?³ (Yes), because in reality they are one. (48.6). «In reality» means from the standpoint of the ultimately real.⁴ (Viewed as properties of an underlying reality, both) the deduced property and the property from which it is being deduced are identical. They are different by imputation.⁵

(48.7). The logical reason and the logical predicate are (here), indeed, two aspects (of the same underlying reality). (These two aspects) have been constructed in our judgments.⁶ But a logically constructed aspect is (always relative). By such an imputed differentiation (reality) becomes split (in two parts seemingly) exclusive of one another. Thus the attribute representing the reason is one thing, and the attribute representing the consequence is another one, (but in reality the one

¹ Lit., 47.23. «Why the application of a reason for deducing (*sādhya*) of just one's own essence?»

² Lit., 48.3. «And essence (*svabhāva*) is following upon the mere fact (*dharma*) of the reason».

³ *pratyñā*. e.g. «this is a tree», *hetu* «because it is an Aśoka-tree» In the adopted phrasing the «thing to be deduced» (*sādhya*) means predicate, conclusion, major term and thesis as well, whereas *hetu* means reason, middle term, subject (*anurāda* in the major premise) and argument also.

⁴ *paramārthataḥ*.

⁵ *saṃāropita*.

⁶ Or, as J. S. Mill, in discussing a problem somewhat analogous, expresses it, according to his ideas on propositions and names, *op. cit.*, § 6, «have been added as a result of assent to a proposition» To the Indian realists both conceptions are realities, there is no existential identity between them, an identity would have been between synonyms *crkṣa* and *taru*, not *vrkṣa* and *śṃsapā*, cp. Tātṭ, p. 309 5.

30. Similarly (when the deduction is expressed) by the method of Difference, the original (positive) concomitance follows (by implication)

(51.13). If we apply the method of Difference, the direct concomitance (of the reason with its consequence), although not *prima facie*¹ expressed, follows simply by implication, just as in the case when direct concomitance is expressed, (its contraposition follows also by implication).

(51.14). Why?

31. Because otherwise the absence of the reason in cases where the² consequence is absent would not be established

(51.16). If the general proposition, in its original form, would not be present to the mind,³ the absence of the reason when the consequence is absent could not be established, i e, could not be ascertained. (51.17). If it is realized, through the contraposition of the general proposition, that the absence of the consequence is invariably concomitant⁴ with the absence of the reason, it cannot be expected that the consequence will be absent where the reason is present. Because otherwise it could not be known,⁵ that the absence of the consequence is invariably concomitant with the absence of the reason. (51.18). The concomitance is realized⁶ when it is realized that in the presence of the reason its consequence is invariably present (51.19). Therefore when in a contraposed general proposition it is directly expressed that the absence of the consequence is invariably concomitant with the absence of the reason, the positive (original) form of the concomitance is also conveyed⁷ by implication.

(51.21). (When constant change is being deduced from the notion of existence), space and other (immutable substances are adduced as negative examples proving) the absence of the reason wherever the

¹ *anabhidhīyamāna*

² *tasmāt* misprinted for *tasmin*.

³ *buddhi-grhīta* is here the same as above, p. 51. 8, *buddhy-avanta*, but in other cases *grahana* is the opposite of *adhyavasāya*, both are contrasted, cp the explanations of sūtra I. 12.

⁴ *nyāta*

⁵ *pratīta* = *nīcata* = *adhyavanta* = *buddhi-grhīta*.

⁶ *gata*.

⁷ *anvaya-gata*

be absent at the time when the reason is present cannot be its inherent property. (48.15). Indeed, presence and absence is the same as existence and its denial. Existence and non-existence (are correlative), they have their stand in mutual exclusion. (48.16). If there could be a unity between what has already appeared and what has not yet appeared, then the same thing could be at once existent and non-existent. (48.17). However existence and non-existence, being contradictory of one another, can impossibly be united. Because absence of unity (or «otherness») consists in assuming attributes exclusive (of one another) (48.18). Moreover, a thing appearing after another one (not only possesses a different time attribute, but) is produced by other causes, since every difference of the effect presupposes a difference in the causes. (48.19) Therefore a thing which has already appeared and a thing which has not yet appeared represent a difference consisting in having attributes exclusive of one another, and a difference of causes which produce the difference of these attributes. How is identity then possible? Consequently an (analytically) deduced inherent property¹ is (coexistent with the reason), it necessarily is present wheresoever the fact constituting the reason is present.

(48.21). All right! We admit that the subsequent fact cannot be an inherent property of a foregoing fact. However why should (the subsequent fact) not be deducible (from the foregoing fact)?

22 Because they can exist separately

(49.2). A thing appearing later can exist separately, quite distinctly,² from a thing appearing before. Because of such a possibility the later fact (the effect) is not (analytically) deducible from the former one.³

¹ *sādhyaḥ śabdhātah.*

² *parityāga = paraspara-parihāra = virodha* Between every two moments in the existence of a thing there is thus divergence (*vyabhicāra*), incompatibility (*parityāga*), mutual exclusion (*paraspara-parihāra*), contradiction (*virodha*) «otherness» (*viruddha-dharma-samsarga*) It will be noted that the terms «opposite», «contrary» and «contradictory» cannot be used strictly in the Aristotelian sense since these conceptions are here applied not to terms and propositions, but to cognitions of the type «this is blue», blue and not-blue are opposed directly, blue and yellow also opposed, because yellow is only part of the «not-blue». A tree and an *Āśoka*-tree, although identical for the underlying reality, are opposed (*vyāvṛtti*, cp. p. 48.8) logically, they are mutually «other» On the «law of Otherness» cp. above p. 8 n. 2, on the law of Contradiction cp. below, text p. 69 ff

³ *Vinītadeva*, p. 91 12 ff., gives the following example, «if a product did exist (= *īyataḥ siddhe*) and afterwards by a cause like a stick impermanence

on that occasion also stated¹ that the dependent (part is the fact represented by) the reason, (it is dependent upon the fact corresponding to) the deduced consequence.²

34. It follows therefore that if the (concerned) absence (of two terms) is expressed, their interdependence must reveal itself. Therefore the contraposed general proposition always contains an indication of their interdependence. This indication is nothing but the general proposition (in its positive form). Thus it is that one single general proposition, either directly or in its contraposed form, declares that the logical mark is present in similar and absent in dissimilar cases. Therefore it is not indispensable to express both these propositions.³

part of the notion of a *śiṃṣapā* (A) and it is the latter that is logically dependent on, i. e., subordinated to, the former. The foundation of this dependence is identity of the underlying reality. But, according to the Indian view, it is not the "only way." There is a dependence of Coexistence and a dependence of Succession. Every thing is the result of some causes, it is therefore *logically*, or *necessarily*, dependent on its causes. But a cause does not necessarily produce its effect. Therefore there is never logical necessity (*nīṣṇaya*) in the predicator of a future result, cp. transl. p. 108.

¹ sūtra II 22.

² It is here again pressed with emphasis that there is no other logical dependence than the dependence founded either upon what is here termed Identity (*tādātmya*) and explained as coexistence of coherent attributes, or on Causation which is explained as a logical necessity for every entity to have a cause (*tādutpatti*). Every fact is thus either coexistent and coherent with another fact, or it is its product. Thus the general proposition either expresses a Uniformity of Coexistence or a Uniformity of Succession. It follows that whatever be the method applied, whether it be the method of Agreement, or the method of Difference, a logical deduction or logical thought in general cannot possibly express something else than what either directly represents or finally reduces to these two kinds of logical relations. Contraposition is therefore equipollent with the original proposition.

³ Lit., p. 52 9—18 "Since (it is so), therefore who speaks abolition must show connection. Therefore the proposition of abolition (the negative proposition) is just an indirect showing of suggested connection. And what is suggestion of connection, that is just expression of concomitance. Thus by one proposition formulated with a concomitance-face or with a contraposition-face the presence-absence of the mark in the similar-dissimilar cases is declared. Thus the formulation of two propositions is not necessary as in the sense of "because".

23. (The deduction by causality, where) the reason represents the effect, has the following formula, also (expressed by the method of Agreement) —

(Major premise). Wherever there is smoke there is fire,

(Example). As e.g. in the kitchen, etc.,

(Minor premise). Here there is smoke,

(Conclusion). (Here there is fire).

(49.8). This is a formula where an effect (takes the place of) the reason. It follows from the context that this formula is expressed according to (the method of) Agreement. «Wherever there is smoke» means that smoke is the subject (of the general proposition). «There is fire» means that fire is its predicate. Their connection should be conceived as a necessary one,¹ (not an accidental one), just as in the preceding case (of the analytical tie). (49.9). Consequently this (proposition) represents an invariable concomitance based upon the law of causality.² (49.10). Pointing to the sphere of observation from which this concomitance is established³ (by Induction), it is said, «just as in the kitchen etc.». In the kitchen and similar cases it is established by positive and negative experience,⁴ that there is between smoke and fire an invariable connection representing a causal relation. The words «here there is (smoke)» wind up⁵ (the syllogism by applying) to the subject of the inference⁶ its deduced characteristic⁷ (i.e., they contain the minor premise).

24. Here also, we can assert that an effect is the logical reason for deducing from it the cause, only when the fact of their causal relation is already known (in general).

(49.14) The words «here also» mean that not only in the case of analytical deductions, but also here, when the syllogism is founded

¹ *nyamārtha*

² *lārya-lāraṇa-bhāva-nimitta*

³ *vyāpti-sādhana-pramāṇa-vṛṣaya*

⁴ *pratyakṣa - anupalambhābhyām*, cp. above p. 88 13, 39.7 (text), transl. p. 103—105.

⁵ *upasaṃhārah*

⁶ *sādhya-dharmin*.

⁷ *palṣa-dharma = sādhya-dharma*.

sence of the mark in similar cases and its absence in dissimilar cases.² (53.1). The positive concomitance may be *prima facie* expressed. It is one method of expressing it. Similarly the contraposition may be *prima facie* expressed.³ But since a single proposition conveys both (these meanings), there is no strict necessity for the formulation of both in every single syllogism.³ (53.4). Words are used to convey a meaning, when the meaning is conveyed, what is the use of (superfluous) words?

(53.4). Thus it is that either the original form of the general proposition must alone be used or its contraposition, (but not both together).

35. (This rule applies) also to (Negation, i.e., to a deduction of absence whose reason is) non-perception. When we state (the contraposed formula⁴ of negation, viz.) —

«Whatsoever exists, all conditions of perceptibility being fulfilled, is necessarily perceived»,

the original concomitance —

«If such an object is not perceived, it is absent»,

is established by implication.

(53.8). Even⁵ in a (proposition expressing Negation founded on) non-perception, the original positive concomitance follows when the contraposition is expressed. «Whatsoever exists all conditions of perceptibility being fulfilled» — these words express that the predicate (in the formula of simple negation) is cancelled, i.e., the possibility of such behaviour (which follows upon a perception) of absence (is

1 i.e. the induction from particular instances, no counter-instance being producible.

² *Iat*, p 53 1—2 «Positive concomitance is the face, the means, because it is directly expressed, this is a proposition whose face is positive concomitance. Thus (also the proposition) whose face is contraposition. The word *it* in the sense of „because“»

³ *sādhana-vākyā*

⁴ *anaya*, the positive or original concomitance. Negation in contraposition will be double negation, i.e., affirmation. The formula of negation expressed as direct concomitance in a general proposition will be «non-perception is concomitant with absence», its contraposition will be «non-absence is concomitant with non-non-perception» or «presence is followed by perception»

⁵ *na ketalam lāgya-stabhāna ity arthah* (Mallavādī, f 86)

(50.5). Thus this (proposition) expresses that the existence of something perceivable, (the totality of the conditions being fulfilled), is invariably followed¹ by perception. Existence is the negation of non-existence,² and cognition the negation of non-cognition. Hence (we have a contraposition), the negation of the predicate is made the subject, and the negation of the subject is made the predicate.³ (50.7). Thus the (general proposition) expresses that the negation of the consequence is invariably concomitant⁴ with the negation of the reason, because it is necessarily dependent⁵ upon the latter (i.e., wherever there is some sense-perception, there necessarily is some existence). (50.8). If the deduced fact (the consequence or major term) were not to be found with the subject of the inference (minor term), neither would the reason (middle term) be there present, because the absence of the latter necessarily involves the absence of the former. But the reason is present, (hence its consequence must also be present).⁶ (50.9). Consequently the negation of the reason is the term of greater extension to which the negation of the consequence, being the term of lesser extension, is subordinate.⁷ When (the first) is absent, it follows

¹ *vyūpta* Lat. «is embraced in the fact of being and object of perception».

² P 50 6 read — *lathitam, asattva-nvyttis ca sathitam, anupalambha*...

³ i.e. the contraposition of the same major premise as formulated according to the method of agreement in sūtra III 2, transl. p. 117. There it was said, «the possibly visible, if not perceived, is absent», here it is expressed by contraposition «the possibly visible, if it is present, is necessarily perceived». Both these formulations represent expressions of the principle underlying every negative deduction. However complicated, the negative deduction can be reduced to it. The method of this reduction has been explained in sūtra II. 48—49, p. 116 ff, and a classification of all negative deductions has been given there, II. 81—82. The Naiyāyikas have remained faithful to their theory of the perception of non-existence, or absence, by the senses. They accordingly reject the Buddhist theory of negation. But this does not prevent Vācaspati Miśra very often to formulate complicated negative deductions according to one of the formulas prescribed by Buddhist logic, cp., e.g. Tāt.p., p. 88. 12, 88 17 etc

⁴ *vyūpta*.

⁵ *nyāta* = *pratiśiddha*.

⁶ Thus conclusion that right cognition (*pramāṇa*) is a proof of existence has been already mentioned above, text p. 40. 7. Cognition is conceived as an effect of an objective reality and the principle is laid down that we always conclude from the existence of an effect to the necessary existence of its cause, but not *vice versa*. Since a possible cause does not necessarily produce its effect, the conclusion about a future effect is always more or less problematic for a non-omniscient being.

⁷ Lat., 50. 9—10 «Therefore, since the embracing non-existence of the reason

(53.15). (The core of a syllogism is) the logical reason (or middle term), its invariable concomitance with the deduced property must be expressed, and this again, (as we have shown), is based either upon necessary co-existence or necessary succession between the facts corresponding to the reason and the deduced property. Whether we apply the method (of Agreement or the method of Difference), in both cases the fact to be deduced is the same. Therefore there is no absolute necessity of expressing separately (the thesis or) the conclusion (Supposing) the reason has been cognized as invariably concomitant with the deduced property, (we then know the major premise). If we then perceive the presence of that very reason on some definite place (i.e., if we know the minor premise), we already know the conclusion. (What is then the use of mentioning this fact once more?) The repetition of the deduced conclusion is of no use!¹

(53.18). That just this² (principle) applies to the formula of a negative deduction (as founded on a repelled suggestion), will be next shown.

37. In our³ formula of Negation, expressed according to the method of Agreement, it is likewise (superfluous to mention the conclusion separately). When it is stated that —

(Major premise) Whatsoever is not perceived, although being in conditions of perceptibility, is practically non-existent.

suffices it to state the major and minor premises, the conclusion or thesis being then implicitly contained in the minor premise. Mallavādi, f 87, introduces this section with the words, *atha matāntaravad bhāvan-matēpi paśaś kimś na nirdeśyate*⁴ — an allusion to N. S, I 1 88

¹ Lat., p. 53 15—17. «And because in both formulations the *probans* (*sādhana*) must be understood as tied up to the *probandum* (*sādhya*) from identity with its and «production by it», therefore the stand point (*paśaś*) must not be just necessarily specified. What *probans* is cognized as confined to the *probandum*, just from it when it is perceived upon the substratum (*dharman*) of the *probandum*, the *probandum* is cognized. Therefore nothing is (achieved) by the specification of the *probandum*» —According to the Tib *pratīti* is perhaps to be read instead of *prati* in p. 53.17. *sādhya-nirdeśena* = *paśaś-nirdeśena*. If we have ascertained by induction the invariable concomitance of the smoke with its cause the fire, and then perceive smoke upon some remote hill, we then have present to our mind the judgment «there it is, this very smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire» It becomes quite superfluous to repeat the conclusion, cp p 162, n 6.

² Read *etiam* *eva*

³ Read *atra* in stead of *yasmāt*, cp Tib transl

of analytical deduction.¹ (50 16). «The sounds of speech exist, have origination, are a product» — these words refer to the presence of the reason in the subject of the conclusion, (i. e., to the minor premise), equally in all three cases. (50. 17). Here again it is (thus) stated that in the present case the absence of the reason is missing, (i. e., it is stated that the reason is present) And since the absence of the reason contains in itself the absence of the consequence, (this latter absence being subordinate to the former), it follows by implication that the absence of the consequence must also be missing. The absence of the absence of the consequence (i. e., its double negation) is equivalent to its affirmation. (Hence the presence of the consequence is proved).²

(50 19). The formula of a causal deduction according to the method of Difference is next given.

gation of the predicate and the negation of the subject. Expressed as a Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism *modo tollente* the present example must be thrown in the following form —

If a thing has an origin, it is non-eternal,
Non-eternity is absent, e. g., in the Cosmic Ether.
Hence origin is also absent

But this is equivalent merely to the contraposed major premise of the Indian syllogism, which gives rise to a new mixed hypothetical syllogism, —

If a thing is non-non-eternal (i. e., permanent), it has no origin,
The attribute of having no origin is absent in the sound,
Hence the attribute of non-non-eternity is also absent, (i. e., sound is impermanent)

When all double negations are stripped off, the conclusion is affirmative, «sound is impermanent». But in its negative form —

Sound is not non-non-eternal,
Because it has not the quality of non-origin,

it is a negative syllogism according to the third figure (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*, *op-sūtra* II 84, because *sādhanaḥ* is *vyāpakā* in regard of *sādhyaḥ*)

¹ A full *chēda* is needed after *hetu*s and the one after *ukta* must be dropped.

² *Lat*, p. 50. 15—18 «Non-eternity being absent etc. Here it is expressed that the non-existence of the consequence, of non-eternity, is necessarily dependent (*niyata*) on the absence of the reason. By this it is said that the absence of the consequence is embraced by (or contained in) the absence of the reason in the three «own-existence» reasons also. The sound is existent, has an origin, is a product—thus the presence (—*tra*) of (these) attributes in the subject (*palāsa*) is indicated. Here also the non existence of the non-existence of the reason, (which non-existence of the reason) is the container (*vyāpakā*), is stated. Hence also the contained (*vyāpya*) the non-existence of the consequence, is precluded. Thus the existence of the consequence (is proved)»

(54.8). In the formulation according to the method of Difference, the conclusion «there is here no jar as an object for our purposive action» follows by mere implication. It is the same conclusion as in the formula (expressed according to the method) of Agreement. The (author) then proceeds to indicate the process of implication (54.9). A thing which can be an object of purposive action means a thing which is present¹ An object being in the conditions of perceivability means an object imagined as present. This represents the negation of the deduced consequence² (54.10). The words «is necessarily perceived» express the negation of the logical reason.³ Thus it is shown that the absence of the consequence is invariably concomitant with the absence of the reason. (54.11) The words «no such (jar)» etc. mean that on this place the possible perception of a jar has not happened in the manner in which other perceivable objects (usually) are perceived. Thus it is proved that upon the subject of the conclusion, (i. e., on a definite place) there is absence of the reason (i. e., of perception) which invariably involves the absence of the deduced consequence (i. e., of the jar). (54.13) Supposing the consequence would not be present upon the subject of the conclusion, neither could the reason be there present. But the fact⁴ representing the reason is present, (hence the consequence must also be present). This is (how the conclusion) is implied. (54.14). Therefore, since it is implied, there is no need of explicitly stating it, because we understand (without such a statement) that «there is here no jar».

(54.15) Similarly in the formulae of an analytical or causal deduction (the conclusion) becomes simultaneously present to the mind⁵ by implication. There is, consequently, no necessity of stating it explicitly⁶

¹ *vidyamāna*

² The deduced consequence is the absence of the jar

³ The logical reason is non-cognition, its reverse (*avriti*) is cognition.

⁴ *dharma* ⁵ *sam-pratyaya* = *sama-lāṭhna-pratyaya*

⁶ Pārthasārathimūra remarks, *Śāstra-dīpikā*, p. 299 (Benares, 1908) that the Buddhists, thinking that the Naiyāyikas have introduced superfluous details in their 5-membered syllogism, have reduced it to two members, major and minor premises (which he calls *udāharana-upanaya*) After having remembered the major premise «what has a cause is non-eternal», and then having merely mentioned «the sounds have a cause», it is quite superfluous to repeat the conclusion that «the sound is non-eternal», because this is implied in the minor premise Cp. Sigwart, op. cit. I, p. 478 n. — «Ebenso setzt . der Untersatz die Conclusion voraus, denn wo bliebe die Wahrheit des Untersatzes, dass Sokrates ein Mensch ist, wenn es noch zweifelhaft wäre, ob er. die Sterblichkeit hat die der Obersatz als allgemeines Merkmal jedes Menschen aufführt»

(51.4) When a formula directly¹ expresses agreement (i.e., the positive concomitance of the reason with its consequence), their difference, i.e., the contraposition (of the general proposition) follows virtually,² i.e., by implication. Therefore (each formula) is a verbal expression of the three aspects of the logical mark.³ (51.6). Although the contraposition of the general proposition is not directly expressed when the concomitance is expressed in the original form, it nevertheless is understood⁴ as implied in the latter.

Why?

29 Because if that were not so, the reason could not be invariably concomitant with the consequence.

(51.8). If the contraposition of the general proposition were not ascertained in thought,⁵ neither could the positive concomitance of the reason with the consequence be so ascertained. (51.9) When the original general proposition⁶ testifies that the reason is invariably concomitant⁷ with its consequence, no doubt is possible as to the presence of the reason where the consequence could be absent, otherwise it could never be invariably concomitant with the latter.⁸ (51.10). The contraposition is realized when it is realized that in the absence of the consequence the reason is likewise absent. Thus when stating in the original general proposition that the reason is invariably concomitant with its consequence, it is also implied⁹ that their contraposition holds good.¹⁰

¹ *abhidheyena*

² *arthāt*

³ The three-aspected logical mark (*trvīpa-linga*), as explained above, sūtra II, 5 ff., is equivalent to an induction from particular instances, no counter-instance being producible

⁴ *avasīyate = mīśīyate = gamyate = jñāyate.*

⁵ *buddhy-avasāta* is here an equivalent of *mīśaya-avasāta*, *mīśaya-ārūḍha*, *mīśaya-apeksa*, cp. p. 26 16, the term *buddhi* thus refers to *saṁkalpaka-jñāna*, *buddhy-ārūḍha = mīśaya-ārūḍha* (p. 48. 7) = *vikalpita*. But in other cases *buddhi* = *samvid* especially in *lārūḍha*, may refer to *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, cp. Tīpp, p. 31. 6

⁶ *anvaya-lābha*

⁷ *myata*

⁸ Lst, p. 51. 10. « Otherwise (the reason) would not be conceived (*pratīta*) as necessarily tied up to its consequence »

⁹ *sāmarthyāt*.

¹⁰ *avasāta*

(55.6). Since the thesis represents (the proposition) which must be deduced, there is nothing else¹ (to which we could give that name). Therefore its essence² consists in its being deduced.

(55.8). In order to explain the meaning of the word «just»,³ it is said —

42. «Just as such» means accepted as the fact which must be deduced, in contradistinction) from the reason from which it is deduced.

(55.10). It might perhaps be asked why do we not take⁴ the word «just» separately? Why do we repeat it in the combination «just as such»? We answer. The word «just» is a particle of emphasis. It emphasizes the quality contained in another word. Therefore it is repeated together with the word which points to the emphasized part (55.12). (The thesis is the fact which it is intended to deduce), not also the fact which is admitted to represent the reason. What is expressed as being the reason, is also accepted as being the reason (55.13). When the reason is not accepted (by the opponent), he may also regard it as something that requires a proof, (as a fact which must be deduced). But this is excluded. The word «just» is an indication (that not every unproved thing is a thesis).⁵

(55.15). An example —

43. Supposing the non-eternal character of the sounds of speech must be established (as against the Mīmāṃsaka), and the reason would be, (say), its visibility. Since the visibility of sounds does not exist, it might be regarded as

¹ *aparam rūpam*.

² *sva-rūpam*

³ *eva*.

⁴ *praty-ava-mrs*, «to reconsider singly»

⁵ The definition of the Naiyāyika «a thesis is a statement of what wants to be proved», N. S. I 1 88, was assailed by Dignāga on the ground of his theory of the purely relative character of the meaning of all words (*apoha*). If the expression «wanting a proof» only excludes the things proved or real (*nādhā*), then every reason and every example, especially if they are quite absurd (*anupapa-dyanāna-sādhana*) can be characterized as being in want of a proof and would be included in the definition, as e. g., «sounds are eternal because visible», — *sādhyaḥ hetu-dvāntayor api prasaṅgo, yathā nityaḥ śabdāḥ cākṣaṣatāḥ*, ep. N bhāṣya, p 40, N vart, p 118 and Tātp, p 188 ff.

consequence is absent. Does it follow that (these examples) can likewise prove the presence of the consequence when the reason is present?¹

32. (No!) If their concomitance² is not (ascertained), then the absence of one term cannot necessarily follow from the absence of the other.

(52.2). (Concomitance is based upon) an essential dependence (of one thing upon another). If there is no such dependence (between two things), the negation of one of them, of the logical consequence, does not necessarily imply the negation of the other one, of the reason (or middle term).

33 It has been stated above³ that there are only⁴ two kinds of dependent existence, whatsoever the case may be. (The dependent part represents either existentially) the same thing or the effect of (another existent).

(52.5). Whatsoever (be the content) of the dependent part, (the form of the dependence is of (one of) two kinds. The essence or the cause (of one form of dependence) is Identity (of existence). The essence or the cause (of the other one) is the fact of being an Effect (produced by causes). If one (existence) is dependent upon some other (existence), the thing upon which it is dependent represents either (essentially) the same fact of existence or a cause. (52.7). To be dependent upon something else is impossible. Therefore has it been stated (above) that there are (only) two kinds of dependence.⁵ (52.8). And we have

¹ Vinītadeva's introduction to the next sūtra is much simpler. He says «if it be asked why is it that when there is no concomitance the contraposition is not valid, (the following sūtra gives the answer)». (*anvayābhāve vyatireko' siādha ity etat kutaḥ*) Dharmottara's *avataṛaṇa* means lit. p. 51.21—22: «If really in space etc. in the absence of the predicate (major term) there is absence of the reason (middle term), nevertheless for sure (does it follow) that in the presence of the reason the predicate is present? To this he answers».

² *svabhāva-pratibandha* = *vyāpti*.

³ sūtra II.25. Lat. «consisting in identity-with-that and consisting in origination-from-that».

⁴ *caḥ* (p. 52.4) *gaur-artha, cārtha vā, tena dvī-pralāra evaṁ yojanīyam* (Mallavādi, f. 85).

⁵ Cp. B. Russel, *Mysticism*, p. 152—«the only way... in which the existence of A can be logically dependent upon the existence of B is when B is part of A». This is the same as the Indian view. The notion of a tree (B) is an inherent

(56.9) If that is the case, the meaning is (simply) that the thesis is what the disputant wishes to prove. What is the use of such a statement? This means that only that fact is a (real) thesis which a definite disputant, at the occasion of a (definite) disputation, intends to prove, and not any other fact. It is equivalent to saying that we cannot force anybody to defend a cause which he himself does not care to defend¹.

(56.12) But at what juncture could it occur that (the disputant would be expected) to prove (not the thing he would himself care to prove, but) something else? To guard against what has it been necessary to make this specification?

46. The following is meant. Supposing someone takes his stand on a definite system and quotes arguments accordingly. Supposing the framer of the system has admitted several facts characterizing the same subject. Nevertheless the thesis will be represented by that fact alone which at a given occasion, a definite disputant himself chooses to argue, not by any other one.²

¹ Lat., p. 56. 11 «The result of these words (means) so much as a repudiation (*anvartana*) of the advocacy (*sādhya*) of an undesirable feature (*anustadharma*)»

² Since in the laconic style of the sūtras every superfluous syllable must be avoided, Uddyotakara declares that the word «himself» is quite useless. He exclaims «there you are! so keen upon finding the fault of superfluous syllables in others, you make this mistake in your own proposition: no reasonable man will say «I am myself going to wash», cp. N. part p. 120. According to Dignāga «myself» in this case means «not another one». His principle is that every word includes a negation (*apoha*), the disputant «himself» means «not the initiator of the system to which the disputant adheres». The point of Dignāga is apparently directed against dogmatism, he wishes to vindicate the freedom of the philosopher to choose his arguments, he is not bound to quote only the arguments accepted in the school to which he belongs (*abhiyupagama-siddhānta*). This is denied by the Naiyāyikas. If, says Vācaspati-mīra, someone known to be an adherent of the Vaiśeṣika system would appear in a learned society (*parisaḍ*) and advance the tenet that the sounds of speech are eternal entities, which is a tenet of the Mīmāṃsaka school against which the Vaiśeṣikas always protested, neither the society nor the official opponent would care to listen. He would not even be allowed to state his argument, he would be declared beaten as soon as he had pronounced the thesis, cp. Tātp., p. 187. 5 ff.

(52.13). When (two facts) are essentially interdependent,¹ the absence of the one conveys the absence of the other. Therefore, if it is shown that the reason is absent wherever the consequence is also absent, the interdependence of both these absences² will be shown. (52.14). If the reason is dependent upon its consequence, then it will necessarily be absent wheresoever the consequence is absent.³ (52.15). And since it is (impossible not to) indicate the dependent (character of the reason), therefore the proposition indicating the absence of the reason, if its consequence is absent, contains⁴ an implied indication⁵ of its dependence. (52.16). This indication is nothing but the general proposition (or major premise) itself.⁶ The interdependence (of reason and consequence) must necessarily be stated, but (this does not mean that it should always) be made in the positive form, because the example will always establish the interdependence by induction,⁷ and thus will represent nothing else but the general proposition in its positive form. (52.18). Therefore when the negation of something depends upon the negation of something else, the interdependence of both these terms must reveal itself, and this becomes simply a cognition of their positive concomitance.⁸ (52.20). Since the positive concomitance implies its contraposition and (*vice versa*) the contraposition implies the original proposition, therefore one⁹ of them is (sufficient) to declare the pre-

¹ i. e., when one fact represents either the identity of the underlying reality or its production from another reality.

² *nivartya-nivartakayoḥ pratibandhaḥ*, lit., «the dependence of the stopped and the stopper».

³ as e. g., smoke being dependent upon fire, is not to be found in places where there is no fire

⁴ *ākṣipta* = *samgrhīta*.

⁵ *upa-darśana*.

⁶ Lit., p. 52 15—17. «And because its dependence must be shown, therefore the proposition about the non-existence (*anyatā*) of the reason when the predicate is absent, by this (proposition) an indirect indication (*upa-darśana*) of the dependence is suggested (*ākṣipta*). And what (represents) the indirect indication of the dependence suggested by that, just this is the concomitance-proposition».

⁷ *pramāṇena*. Concomitance must be shown by an induction from particular instances, no counter-instance being producible, these particular instances are termed *āyātanta* or *pramāṇa*, cp. the use of this term in the ff. passages, 44. 5, 45. 1, 58. 1, 61. 10, 64. 1, 80. 21, 81. 1, 81. 2, 81. 20, 81. 21 (*apramāṇa*)

⁸ Lit., 82. 19—20. «Therefore the connection (interdependence) of an abolished and the abolisher must be known, and thus just (*eva*) concomitance is known. The word *iti* in the sense of „because“».

⁹ The word *vākyena* must be inserted after *ekenāpi*, cp. Tib. p. 119. 9, *thang geig-gis kyan*.

wishes to establish, the thesis, even if it is not expressly specified, is (understood from the context).

(56.8). "On a subject", e. g., on the existence of the Soul. (Supposing) a doctrine opposed to the existence of the Soul is being discussed, a doctrine denying the existence of the Soul, (a doctrine maintaining that) there is no Soul. Since affirmation and negation are contradictories, this doctrine contradicts the view that the Soul exists. (Supposing) that in answer to this contrary tenet an argument is adduced by someone who wishes to establish, i. e., to prove¹ the existence of this object, of the Soul. The word "accepts" intimates that this fact (the existence of the Soul) will be his thesis (even if it is not explicitly stated).² (57.6). This is the meaning suggested by the word "accepts".³ Although in a verbal inference, (in a syllogism), we would expect that the thesis to be deduced should be expressed (in a separate proposition), nevertheless, even if it is not expressed, (it is clear) what the thesis really is, because it is expressed by implication

(57.8) Why is that?

48. Because it represents the point against which the opposite view is directed.

(57.10). "It" means that topic which is the subject (of the discussion), the subject matter against which the opposed view is directed. Because of this circumstance (the real intention of the speaker becomes evident from the context).

(57.11). The following is meant. The disputant adduces a proof in order to confute the opposed view. Therefore the tenet which the opponent aims at disproving is *eo ipso* the topic he himself wishes to

¹ *niscaya* is here a synonym of *siddhi*, meaning something "logically proved to be real"

² Or even if the thesis explicitly proved is different from what is really the intention of the speaker. The real thesis is the intention of the speaker. A thesis can be clearly understood out of both premises without expressing the conclusion separately. But even if it is expressed separately, it may sometimes represent the real intention of the speaker only half-way, indirectly. This happens when the speaker intends to prove his tenet surreptitiously, through an indirect suggestion, as is illustrated by the following example

³ Lat., p. 57. 6 "What is mentioning at the end (sūtra 49, p. 57. 17) of *śītyaśīlam bhavati*, with regard to this place the sentence must be closed." Instead of repeating these words twice, at the end of sūtra 47 and 49, they have been taken only once at the end of sūtra 49.

denied). It means essentially the same as the existence of something perceivable. «Is necessarily perceived»—these words express the absence of non-perception. It means essentially the same as perception.¹ (53.10). Thus it is shown that the absence of the consequence (or predicate) is invariably concomitant with the absence of the reason.² Supposing the consequence could be absent even if the reason were present, then the absence of the consequence would not be invariably concomitant with the absence of the reason.³ (53.11) Indeed, when we realize the (contraposed) concomitance, we must (also) realize that the presence of the reason is invariably concomitant with the presence of its consequence. (53.12) Therefore (the negative conclusion) is drawn in the words «if such an object, i. e., a representable object, is not perceived, it is absent» Since this (conclusion) is cognized, since it is simultaneously present to the mind,⁴ the original concomitance (of the formula of negation) is thus ascertained.⁵

§ 7. IS THE CONCLUSION A NECESSARY MEMBER OF THE SYLLOGISM?

36. When either of these two (methods) is applied, it is not always necessary explicitly to mention the thesis (or the conclusion)⁶

¹ *upalambha-rūpa*

² i. e., we cannot deny the existence of something when it is present in the ken of our sense-faculties

³ The absence of the consequence means here the presence of the object in the range of our senses, the absence of the reason—its perception. If the object could be present without being perceived, then we could not maintain that its presence (accompanied by all other factors of perception) is invariably followed by its perception

⁴ *sam-pratyayāt.*

⁵ *anvaya-siddhi.*

⁶ The term *pakṣa* means here the standpoint of the disputant, it includes both the thesis and the conclusion. In sūtra III 41 it is identified with *sādhya* which is also as *sādhya-dharma* the name of the major term. In the five membered syllogism of the Naiyāyikas both the thesis (*pratyakṣa*) and the conclusion (*nyāyana*) are admitted as separate members, beside the reason, the major and the minor premises. The Mīmāṃsakas and the later Naiyāyikas were inclined to reduce the members of their syllogism to three, roughly corresponding to the three members of Aristotle. But Dignāga makes a distinction between inference as a process of thought (*svārtha*) and syllogism as a method of proof in a controversy, and points to the fact that very often when the point under discussion is evident out of some former argumentation,

refer to the facts on which that generalization is established¹ Beds, chairs etc. are requisites serviceable to man² and they are composite substances.

(58.1). Thus, although this example³ does not (by itself) mean that the organs of sense are employed by the Soul, nevertheless, although unexpressed, this is the thesis. (58.2). Indeed, the Sāṅkhya philosopher maintains that the Soul exists. The Buddhist maintains, on the contrary, that the Soul does not exist. Thereupon the Sāṅkhya philosopher, starting from⁴ the Buddhist view which is opposed to his own, brings forward an argument, with the aim of confuting the opposed view and of establishing his own (58.4). Therefore, the fact that (the senses) are in the service of the Soul represents the (real), although unexpressed, thesis (which the disputant has at heart), since the opposed view is directed against it.

(58.5). It is not proved that beds, chairs and other requisites used by men are in the service of the Soul. The major premise⁵ ("whatsoever is composite is controlled by the Soul" is not proved at all). Established is only the simple fact that these composite things are made for the use of somebody, in this sense they are called objects "for use" by somebody. (58.6). The (real) intention is to prove that the Intellect is also an organ of something else This is suggested by the words "and other senses". This "something else" in regard of the Intellect can be only the Soul (58.7) Thus it would be proved that consciousness⁶ is in the service of another (higher principle) The

¹ *vyāpti-viśaya-pradarśana*, "pointing to the scope of the concomitance"

² *puruṣa-upabhoga-anga* has here probably a double sense, with regard to beds, chairs etc. it means the requisites serviceable to man, with regard to the Soul (*puruṣa*) of the Sāṅkhyas it means the experiences imputed to the Soul during its state of bondage in some particular existence, as conditioned by the deeds (*karma*) in former existences.

³ *atra pramāṇe = tasyad-ma hāw*; *pramāṇa* is here used in the sense of *āstānta*, cp. 52. 18 and 7 note to transl p. 147

⁴ *hetu-kṛtya*

⁵ *antaya*

⁶ *vyākāṇa = vyākāṇa-sāndha*. For the Sāṅkhya undifferentiated "consciousness", pure changeless consciousness, is an eternal substance, the Soul (*puruṣa*). For the Buddhist this same undifferentiated consciousness is pure sensation, consisting of momentary, ever changing flashes. There is thus in the argument of the Sāṅkhya a *quaternio terminorum*, since he understands under *vyākāṇa, manas*, *antahkaraṇa* unconscious, physical principles, consisting predominantly of a special intellect-stuff (*satva*) or nervous matter capable only to be reflected in consciousness which, in the shape of a Soul, is a quite different principle. For the Bud-

(Minor premise). On this place no jar is perceived, although all other conditions for its perceptibility are fulfilled.

(The Conclusion) «There is here no jar» follows entirely by implication.

(53.22). In (negation) expressed according to the method of Agreement (the conclusion) «there is no jar on this place» follows entirely by implication.¹ The (author) shows the process of implication. (53.23). The words «whatsoever is not perceived, although being in conditions of perceptibility», refer to a negative experience as a subject. The words «it is an object practically non-existent» refer to the possibility of our behaviour towards it as non-existent. (54.1). Thus it is shown that the non-perception of something imagined (as present) is invariably concomitant with corresponding purposive actions.² (54.2). The words («a jar) is not perceived» prove that the logical mark is present upon the subject of the conclusion (on the minor term).³ If the deduced fact would not have been present upon that substratum, neither could the logical reason be there present, because the latter is invariably concomitant with the former.⁴ This is how the (conclusion) is implied.

38. The same refers also (to this formula expressed according to the method) of Difference—

(Major premise) Whatsoever is present (as an object of our purposive actions) and is in conditions of perceptibility, is necessarily perceived.

(Minor premise) But on this place no such jar is being perceived.

Through mere implication (the conclusion) follows that as an object of our purposive actions this thing is absent.⁵

¹ *sāmarthyā eva.*

² Lit., p 54 1—2. «If it is so, the non-cognition of the visible is shown to be contained in the fact of being fit for a non-Ens deal»

³ *sādhyā-dharmin*

⁴ *sādhyā-myatatoāt tasya.*

⁵ Lit., p 54 6—7 «Just by connotation (*sāmarthyā*) it becomes „there is here no object of dealing as existent with“».

accepts just as such etc." The words "not discredited (from the start)" are added in order to declare that a proposition may conform to (this part of) the definition and nevertheless not represent a thesis. (58.15). What is the fact that cannot be a (sound) thesis, although (the disputant) may be willing to defend it? The (author) answers: Supposing (the disputant) intends to prove a topic which is discredited i.e., its contrary is proved, either by perception or inference or (the identity) of a conception or his own words, this will not be a thesis.¹

51. Among them contradicted by perception
is, e.g. (the following proposition),

The sound is not perceived by hearing

(58.18) There are four kinds (of contradiction), viz by perception etc. Among them what is a proposition contradicted by perception? The following is an example. It is an example because there are other cases of contradiction with perception, which must be understood just as this one. Perceptible by hearing means perceptible with the ear. "Not so perceptible" is not to be heard, not to be apprehended by the sense of audition — this is the (intended) meaning of the thesis.² (58.20) The non-perceptibility of the sound by hearing is contradicted by its perceptibility which is established by direct perception.³

¹ These words (i.e. the four syllables *alāra-catuṣṭayam*, 'm-rā-ṭ-ṭ-ā for every syllable counts) are redundant, says Uddyotakara, p. 119, because if the word "accepts" is inserted in order to exclude unacceptable and unaccepted (*anvīṣita*, *anīṣita*) theses, the contradictory theses are already excluded by it. Moreover Yaśanbaddhu has also omitted them in his definition — *sādhyaśādhādānam pratyakṣa*, cp *N vārti*, p. 121, and *Tātp*, p. 186. 67 Dh. thinks that a thesis may satisfy to all conditions already mentioned and nevertheless be unacceptable not to the disputant himself, but to the audience. The judge (*madhyastha*) will then declare the discomfiture of the disputant without allowing him to continue, cp *Tātp*, p. 187. 5 ff.

² Such a thesis as "the active sense of vision does not perceive the visible" has been advanced with a special intention by the celebrated "sophist" Bhāṣa-viveka, cp *Madhy vrtti*, p. 32. 9 (B. B.), cp my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 116.

³ The full inference according to Dignāga is, *asāraṇaḥ śabdah kṛtātātṛt ghaṭṭānat*. His idea is that this inference cannot even be admitted to discussion because of its glaring contradiction to fact. Uddyotakara proposes another example, "the fire is not hot", cp *N vārti*, 116. 21. He thinks that "audibility" cannot be perceived directly, because the process of the operation of the sense-faculties is imperceptible, *indriyavṛttinām atīndriyatāt*. According to the Buddhist theory of Negation (*anupalabdhi*), if a sound is not heard it does not exist as an object influencing behaviour (*vyavahāra*). But for the Naiyāyikas the denial of audibility

§ 8. DEFINITION OF A THESIS.

39. Nevertheless what is it that we can call a (sound) «thesis»?

(54.18). It must be nevertheless explained what is the meaning attached to the word thesis.

40. A (sound) thesis is (a proposition to be maintained by the disputant, i.e., a proposition) which he himself accepts «just as such», (i.e., just as the point he *bona fide* intends to maintain, if from the start) it is not discredited (by self-contradiction).¹

(54.20). «Just as such» means just as (the proposition) to be maintained. «Himself» means the disputant «Accepted» means that (the proposition) is not only expressed in words, but also (*bona fide*) accepted (to be true). Such a topic, if it is not invalidated (from the start) by perception or other proofs, is called a thesis.

(54.21) But if the thesis is not to be explicitly mentioned (in the conclusion or at the beginning of a syllogism), why do we give the definition of such a (member) which can be dispensed with? We give the definition not because it should be a (necessary) member of the syllogism,² but because there are (logicians) who mistake a wrong thesis for a right one and *vice versa*.³ Therefore, in order to set aside misconceptions about what can and what cannot be a (sound) thesis,⁴ the definition of a proposition to be maintained is given

(55.4). The words «as such» are next explained.

41. «As such» means accepted as (the proposition) to be maintained.

¹ Lit., p 54 19 «What is accepted just as the proper form and not repudiated, is a thesis».

² *sādhana-vālya-avayava*

³ This remark is directed against N. S. I. 1. 33 and possibly also hints at both the schools of the Mādhyamikas. The Prāsaṅgika school was prepared to defend any amount of theses, but not *bona fide*, its aim being to undermine logical methods altogether and to demonstrate the hopeless contradictions of the principles upon which logic is built. The other Mādhyamika school, the Svāntarīkas, the followers of Bhāva-viveka, although admitting logic, have established a series of quite incredible theses in contradiction to common sense, cp my Nirvāṇa, p. 115.

⁴ *sādhya* = *paśca*

(corresponding to both these words) (59.6). A thing is said to be distinctly conceived¹ when it is an object (apprehended by a synthetic) mental construction.² To be a concept or to be conceived means to be an object of a mental construction. (59.7). Owing to the circumstance that the thing «bearing the image of a hare» corresponds (in our speech) to a mental construction which has the form of a concept, (of a distinct image), it is established beyond doubt³ that it can be given the name of the moon (59.8). Indeed, what corresponds to a constructed image⁴ is capable of coalescing with a word,⁵ and what is capable of coalescing with a word can be designated by a name chosen (arbitrarily) by convention. (59.9). Consequently the possibility of giving it the name of the moon, and the contradiction⁶ of denying it, are established by (the identity) of the object of mental construction, i e, by the (identical) form of the (corresponding) image.⁷

¹ Dignāga called this case *loka-prasiddhi-viruddha* «contrary to what is generally known». Vinītadeva and the Tibetan translators interpret *pratiṭi* as meaning the same as *prasiddhi* = *grāṣa-pa*. Uddyotakara thinks that this cannot be a separate class and must be included in the preceding ones, cp N vārt, p 117 9 ff. The change of *prasiddhi* into *pratiṭi* by Dharmakīrti nevertheless seems intentional, cp Tātp, p 185 4. Dh. thinks that this must be considered as a case of an analytical syllogism, it can then be thrown into the following form,

Major premise: Whatsoever appears as the distinct image of the moon
can be given the name of the moon

Minor premise: The «hare-marked» object appears as the distinct
image of the moon

Conclusion or Thesis: It can be given the name of the moon

Both names represent two coexisting possibilities, the presence of the one is by itself a sufficient reason for inferring the necessary presence of the other, the denial of this would be a contradiction (*bādhitā*). Vācaspati thinks that the Buddhists ought to have considered this wrong proposition as repudiated by introspection (*śāntamēdāna*), and the Naiyāyikas as a case repudiated by internal evidence (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*). The difference between these two views is that the first implies simultaneous self-cognition as inherent in every moment of consciousness, cp above sūtra, I 10, the second considers it as a subsequent moment, cp Tātp, p 185 4-5.

² *vilāpa-vijñāna* = Tib *nam-par-rtog-pa*; *nam-par-śes-pa*, p 59 8 our text has *vilāpa-jñāna*, probably a mistake for *vijñāna*, because the Tib has, p. 184 11, *nam-par-śes-pa*. Cp Tātp, 185 4 where we nevertheless have *vilāpa-jñāna-gocaratva*. All difference between *vijñāna* and *jñāna* is here obliterated.

³ *eva*

⁴ *vilāpa-jñāna-grāhya* = *vilāpa-vijñāna-vśaya*

⁵ *śabda-ākāra*. ⁶ *bādha*

⁷ The interpretation of Vinītadeva is much more simple and natural. He takes *pratiṭi* not in its technical sense of a mental construction, but in its general

a fact which is in need of proof. But it is expressed as the reason, therefore it is not here intended to be proved, (albeit it is unproved).

(55.18). Supposing the non-eternal character of the sounds of speech is to be proved, and (someone would point to their) visibility as a (possible) reason. Since the existence (of visible words) is not established, one (could be misled to suppose) that it is just the thing which (the disputant) wishes to establish. (55.19). Therefore it is said that "this", i. e., visibility, "here", i. e., in regard of the sounds of speech, is not admitted as just the point to be established. It is said that there is no necessity (to envisage it here) as something that is intended to be established, since it is expressed as the reason. Whatsoever is expressed in the form of a reason is also admitted to represent the reason, but not the consequence.¹

(55.22). The word "himself" is next pointed to and explained.

44. "Himself" means the Disputant

(56.3) "Himself" is a pronoun.² "Disputant" is the proximate (subject to which it refers).³

(56.6) Who is this Disputant?

45. That one who at this occasion sets forth an argument.

(56.8) "At this occasion" means at the time of some philosophical disputation. He sets forth an argument. As there can be many disputants, this is a specification of the disputant, denoted above by the word "himself".

¹ Therefore the Naiyāyika definition in N. D. I. 1. 83, *sūdhya-nrdeśaḥ prajñā*, has been corrected by Dignāga in adding *eva*

² *nyāta* = *theṅ-phrad-lyā sgra*, "a particle meaning some relation".

³ *Lat*, p. 56.2—5 "The word 'himself' is a particle which is used for the (reflexive pronoun) 'self' in the Genitive and in the Instrumental cases. Now, here the word *svayam* is used in the sense of the word self in the Instrumental case. Moreover the word self is a pronoun (*sambandhi-labdha*) And the disputant is near. Therefore of whose disputant the self is endowed with the sense of the Instrumental case, just that one is specified as endowed with the sense of the Instrumental case: 'by the disputant'. But 'by the disputant' is not here the synonym of 'himself'. — This perfectly useless explanation is characteristic for Dharmottara's scholasticism. Vinītadeva (p. 102) links this sūtra with the following and simply says, "a thesis is only that topic which (the author) proves himself, but not the one that is established by the originator of the system (*śāstra-kāra*)".

means that the character of being a source of right knowledge is denied of inference (or judgment)¹ But this is contradicted by the proper words in which it is expressed, i.e., by the words "inference is not knowledge". (59.16). The fact that the speaker resorts to such a proposition is an indication that he admits the idea produced by its expression² to be a true one (59.17). Indeed if the speaker intended to convey the following meaning "the idea which will be produced³ in you by my words is a false one", he never would have pronounced them. Supposing the idea to be communicated (to my hearer) is that my words have a wrong meaning, well, my words will then (really) have a wrong meaning⁴ (59.19). Supposing somebody says "whatsoever I speak is wrong", even then the speaker pronounces this proposition in order to convey⁵ that these his words (at least) have a true meaning. If this proposition is shown to be true, then his other propositions will (*eo ipso*) be shown to be false (60.1). If this proposition were not true, his other propositions would not be declared to be false. There would then be no use of pronouncing them. He would have never pronounced them. (60.2). Consequently when a speaker pronounces a proposition he (*eo ipso*) really declares that the idea⁶ produced by his words, the idea corresponding to the meaning of the proposition is a true one, (i.e., reflects reality) (60.3). If this be the case, (the speaker) can show that the meaning of his words is truth only in showing (*eo ipso*) that there is an invariable concomitance⁷ between speech and external reality. It is a relation of an effect to its cause (60.4). Thus our words (can be regarded) as an effect of those objects of the external world which they denote. By using them we wish to show that the ideas communicated by them represent truth, (i.e., they express external reality, their cause). We thus clearly show that the process of understanding the meaning of a word is nothing but an inference from an effect of external reality to its cause, reality itself (60.6). Therefore

¹ It has been indicated above, *passim*, that the *sārthānumāna* is in many cases equivalent to our judgment. Here the proposition "inference is not a source of knowledge" virtually means "a judgment is not a judgment".

² *sābda-pratyaya*

³ *yo 'rtha-sampratyayaḥ*

⁴ *apārthaka*

⁵ *ādarśayan* "clearly showing"

⁶ *vyñāna* is here, as well as in 60.4 and 60.5, in the sense of the old *saṃyajñā*, but Tib. has in all the three cases, p. 186 6, 186 9 and 186 12, *des-pa = jñāna*

⁷ *nāntarīyaka*

(56.16). The possibility of some other fact¹ being deduced in regard of the same subject arises when the author of a system, accepted by the disputant, has admitted several facts characterizing the same subject (about which a variety of discordant views are current).²

(56.17). It is indeed quite wrong to suppose that if somebody ranges himself at the side of a definite system, he is obliged to advocate every doctrine which is there admitted. This (wrong view is here) cleared away. Many doctrines may be accepted, nevertheless that topic alone which the disputant (at a given occasion) chooses himself to argue will represent the thesis, but not any other one.

(56.19). The following question might be asked. Should not a logical argument³ disregard all established doctrines and be guided (exclusively) by the weight of real facts?⁴ Therefore a philosopher should never take his stand on a body of established doctrines, since they must be left out of account? (56.20). Quite right! But, as a matter of fact, even in those cases when (a philosopher) selfreliently takes his stand on a body of established doctrines, i. e., if he is an adherent of a definite system (and) quotes arguments (in accordance with that system), nevertheless only that proposition will represent his thesis which he himself chooses to advocate (at a given occasion). In order to declare this, it is stated that (the thesis is a proposition which the philosopher «himself» chooses to advocate at a certain occasion).⁵

(56.23). The word «accepts» is next taken (separately) and explained.

47. The word «accepts» (in the above definition of a sound thesis) means (that there is sometimes no necessity of expressing the thesis in words). When an argument is adduced in answer to an objection on a subject which one

¹ *dharma*

² *tasmān dharmāḥ=vipratipatti-viśaya-dharmāḥ*, cp. Vinītadeva, p. 102. 13. Probably an allusion to the great variety of views on the same subjects advocated in the different Buddhist schools.

³ *linga*.

⁴ *vastu-bala-prāptiḥ*

⁵ Lat., p. 56. 21—22 «But although, as a consequence of infatuation, he takes his stand upon some teaching (*sūtra*), admits some teaching (and) says the reason, nevertheless just what for him is desirable, just that is his thesis (*sādhya*). In order to declare that, thus has it been told».

not knowledge" is contradicted by this (intention of the speaker to communicate something).

(60.12). This is wrong! That our words are really the result of the intention with which they are spoken¹ (we do not deny). But we do not allude here to the real (immediate) cause (which produces language)² We have just mentioned that the identity of a conception is a sufficient reason (for inferring the identity of the meaning of two different words), and (we now contend) that our language is a sufficient reason for inferring the existence of some real facts of which it is an expression.³ But we take these relations in their logical,⁴ not in their real (or psychological aspect).⁵

(60.14) And further, (we admit) that if someone denies inference, he will have no right to infer the presence of fire from the presence of smoke, he likewise will have no right to infer the intention of the speaker from his words. Nevertheless we avail ourselves of speech in order to make a communication about something really existing in the external world. Therefore language is not caused by a conviction that it is an expression of our intentions.

(60.17) And then, we do not pronounce words in order to intimate that we have the intention (of doing so) but we do it in order to make a communication about the existence of some external reality. Therefore language is caused by our conviction that it is an expression of real facts existing in the external world.⁶ Thus our interpretation as given above is the only right one.⁷

¹ Except when he is mistaken himself or wishes to deceive others, cp Tāp p 185 10

² The real cause is here evidently conceived as the last moment of the proceeding series of efficient moments, all other moments can be only logically or indirectly constructed as causes, cp above, text p 81 11—12

³ In the first case we imagine coexistence between two attributes of the same reality or an analytical relation founded on identity of the underlying reality. In the second an indirect succession of two facts.

⁴ *Lōpita*.

⁵ Intention is viewed as the psychological cause of pronouncing words. Truth may be regarded as its logical foundation, or reason. Vinitadeva is thus guilty of not having sufficiently distinguished these two relations.

⁶ The existence of real objects in the external world (*bāhya-vastu-caitva*) must be understood as explained above in the notes to ch. I, sūtras 20—21

⁷ *Lit.* p 60 11—19. "But others have said, knowledge produced from a word which is the result of intention has (this) intention for its object, the use of words belongs to a man who wishes a real meaning by this the thesis, the fact of not

prove. (57.12) His argument has just the aim to confute the opposed view. If this were not his thesis, where on earth could you find something as definitely representing a thesis, as this one!¹

(57.15). This case is exemplified. When an argument is advanced against an opponent, something may be understood to represent the deduced thesis without being expressly stated.

49. An example² —

(Thesis) The sense of vision and other senses (are organs) to be used by someone else

(Reason). Because they are composite (substances)

(Example). Just as beds, chairs and other implements (composed for the use of man)

(Major premise. Whatsoever is a composite substance is not an independent existence)

The aim is to prove that (the senses) are the organs of the Soul (which is a simple and independent substance), although this is not expressly stated. Thus the thesis is not always that alone which is expressed. That is the meaning (of the word «accepts»).

(57.18). «The sense of vision, the sense of audition etc.» are the subject, (the minor term). They exist for the sake of someone else, i. e., they have dependent existence, this is the predicate, (the major term). «Because they are composite (substances)», that is the reason, (the middle term). (57.20). The words «just as beds, chairs and other implements»

¹ Here again, according to Dignāga's method the word «accepts» includes a negation, «accepted» means «non-expressed», as illustrated by the next following example «the senses are the organs of some one else». The Naiyāyikas answer that this qualification is superfluous «No one will establish what he does not accept», says Uddyotakara, N vārt., p. 118 and Vācaspati comments, «if the aim of the word «accepted» is to include an unexpressed intention, this cannot be done in the syllogism which would then be wrong (*ananvayo hetuh*). But words have always beside their direct expressive power (*vācyaṃ*) a power of indirect suggestion (*lakṣyaṃ*). If the words are not suggestive, they cannot point to an unexpressed intention, cp Tāpt., p. 186.

² Cp Śākhya-kārikā, 17.

must be argued in a controversy is the opposite of a point already previously established. The thing proved is contrasted with the thing unproved. Therefore a thesis to be proved cannot be something already proved.¹ (61.7). But not every unproved point (makes a thesis). It is further contrasted 2) with the fact adduced as the proof, 3) with the fact which the disputant himself does not intend to prove on that occasion, 4) with the necessity to give it expression in words, (it can be understood without being expressed), 5) with a fact which although unproved it is impossible to prove.

(61.9). The point which is free from these five negative characteristics (with which it is contrasted), a point which is 1) not yet proved, 2) not a reason, 3) intended to be proved by the disputant, 4) which may be either expressed or understood, 5) which is not invalidated (from the start by counter) proofs — such is the point which has been defined by the words «is intended as such by the disputant himself and not discredited»²

¹ Lat., 61.5—7 «The predicate (*sādhya*) must be envisaged by opposition, by the reason of its being the opposite to the proved. This means that to what object the proved object is opposed, this is the predicate, the proved is the opposite of the non-proved. Therefore the unproved is (the predicate) to be proved»

² Thus the inadmissible theses are, 1) according to Dignāga *pratyakṣa*—, *anumāna*—, *āgama*—, *prasiddhi*— and *svavacanā-nirākṛta*, 2) according to Prāsaśta, *pūda* who borrows from Dignāga, *pratyakṣa*—, *anumāna*—, *abhyupagata* (= *āgama*), *śāśāstra*— and *svavacanā-virodhin*, 3) according to Dharmakīrti — *pratyakṣa*—, *anumāna*— (= *śāśāstra*), *prātil* (= *prasiddhi*) and *svavacanā-nirākṛta*. Śaṅkara-svāmin in his *Nyāya-praveśa* has added four further varieties of an impossible thesis, thus increasing their number to nine. The Naiyāyikas and the united Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school reject the wrong theses, on the score that a thesis is never right or wrong by itself, but only on account of the reason, cp. N. vārt., p. 116 ff and Tāt., p. 82. 2—3. They accordingly reckon two additional wrong reasons, or logical fallacies, the counterbalanced (*satpratyakṣa*) and the self-contradicting (*bādhitā*), and likewise two additional aspects of a valid reason (*asat-pratyakṣasatvam* and *abādhitā-ṛsayatham*), since they have borrowed from Dignāga the view that the classification of wrong reasons must correspond to the number of the aspects of a valid reason, cp. my *Théorie bouddhique de la Connaissance* in the *Museon*, V p. 42 (reprint). The *asat-pratyakṣa*— form of the reason corresponds to what in the definition of the thesis is hinted at by the words *sādhya-paraṇāyaka*, cp. N. Kāṇḍali, p. 208. 10 — *palso nāma sādhya-paraṇāyaka* ca *artha* na *sādhyanam* *arhati*, *lastmo* *arhati*, *sambhāvyamāna-pratyakṣa* ca *artha* na *sādhyanam* *arhati*, *lastmo* *arhati*, *śūnya-abhāva*. The *abādhitā-ṛsayatha*— form of a valid reason corresponds to the four inadmissible (*nirākṛta*) theses, cp. *ibid.* — *pratyakṣa-sādhya-virodhin* *palso* na *bhāvati*. Therefore these both additional aspects of a valid reason are to be included in the first one (*anumeye sattvam*), *ibid.* — In the final form of the Nyāya system

a syllogism, but does not represent a (valid) syllogism. It is a fallacy consisting in some one of the three aspects being deficient.

58. And also (there will be a fallacy) if they are, although expressed, but either unreal or uncertain, either for the opponent or for the speaker himself.

(62.4). Fallacy is produced not only by deficient expression, but also through unreality or uncertainty of the reason, either to the hearer, i. e., the opponent or the speaker, i. e., the respondent.¹

§ 10. UNREAL REASON

(62.6). Now, what is the name of the fallacy corresponding to each unreal or uncertain form of the reason?

59. If one aspect of the reason, namely, its (first aspect), its presence upon the subject of the conclusion, is either non-existent or uncertain, the reason is called unreal.

(62.8). If one of the aspects (of the middle term), its necessary connection with the subject of the conclusion, i. e., its presence upon that subject, is either non-existent or uncertain, the fallacy is called «unreal² reason». Just because it is «unreal», it conveys no knowledge about the subject. It neither conveys cognition of the predicate nor of the reverse of it nor of something uncertain, it is a reason of cognizing nothing. Such cognition would never convince anyone.³ This meaning is clearly implied just in the name «unreal».

(62.12). An example is given

¹ This is the celebrated rule of Dignāga which lays down the fundamental principle that a philosophic debate must have some common ground to start with. Neither the speaker nor his opponent has the right of quoting facts or reasons that are not admitted as real by the other party. This rule proved very embarrassing to such philosophers as the Mādhyamikas who denied altogether that the Absolute, the «thing in itself» (*śataśana*), could be cognized by logical methods. They nevertheless produced arguments, but only with the aim to show that all arguments were mutually destructive of one another. They pointed to the fact that Dignāga himself was obliged to admit that in religious matters (*śāgama*) it was impossible to find a common ground between two opposed religions, cp my *Nirvāṇa* p. 119.

² *asiddha*

³ This remark refers only to the first example in III 60

52. A thesis contradicted by inference is, e. g.,
(when an adherent of the Vaiśeṣika system affirms),

The sounds of speech are eternal entities.

(59 2). Contradicted by inference is, e. g., (in the mouth of an adherent of the Vaiśeṣika system the proposition) «the sounds of speech are eternal entities». The intended thesis, the proposition that the sounds of speech are eternal, is contradicted by their non-eternity which (the Vaiśeṣika) proves by inference.¹

53. A thesis contradicted by the (identity) of a conception is as follows,

The word «hare-marked» does not mean
the moon

(59 5) The following is an example of a proposition standing in contradiction to the (identity of the corresponding) conception. The word «hare-marked» does not mean the moon, i. e., cannot be denoted by the word moon This is disproved by (the identity of) the conception

lity does not mean denial of existence, *na śabdābhāve tan-
(śrāṇatva)-mudho* 'vakalpatē, cp. Tātp, p. 81.12; and even the non-existence of a sound is for them something real, *na cābhāvas tucchaḥ, ibid.*, hence even this non-existence is apprehended by the sense of audition. For the Buddhist, on the contrary, non-existence of the sound is not a reality (*abhāvas tucchaḥ*), but its substratum is a reality, therefore it only can be inferred on this substratum by *lāryānupalabdhi*, cp. Tattvas, kār 1689 and Kamalaśīla's Comment. According to the Vaiśeṣikas sound is directly perceived, cp. V. 8, II. 2 21

¹ The text commented upon by Dharmottara has *ntyaḥ śabdāḥ* and this is supported by the Tibetan translation But Vinītadeva reads *ghato ntyaḥ = bum-pa n: riag-pao*, and this probably has been one of the current readings. Dignāga originally has characterized this class of wrong theses as contrary to the accepted doctrine (*āgama-viruddha*) Owing to the ambiguity of the term *āgama* this could also mean «contrary to Scripture». Uddyotakara, p. 117. 5. then objected that the Vaiśeṣikas prove the non-eternality of the sounds of speech not from Scripture, but by argument, cp. V S II 2 28 ff This criticism has apparently been accepted by Dharmakīrti, he then has changed *āgama-viruddha* into *anumāna-viruddha* The reading *ghato ntyaḥ* seems also to have found its way into some Mss for similar reasons, cp. N vīrti, p. 117. 8 Since Dharmakīrti enumerates in this place such theses which are not worth the while of being disproved, the example of Vinītadeva seems much more natural than the Mīmāṃsaka thesis round which war has been waged during centuries Otherwise every thesis opposed by the Buddhists would fall into the category of impossible theses. The text is either to be corrected accordingly or it must be understood as referring only to a Vaiśeṣika-philosopher to whom the audience will refuse to listen. This is another instance of very old text corruptions cp. above sūtra III. 18—20.

other parts of the body.¹ Its existence is inferred from the fact of the production of visual and other sensations. Under «life», in common parlance, breath is understood. The meaning attached to this term in (Buddhist) science² is (that of a special transcendental force determining *a priori* the term of an existence), it is here out of place.³ Therefore life as manifested in breath is here meant. The extinction or cessation (of these phenomena) is the mark or the essence of death. This death is meant by the Buddhist when he contends (something about this subject).

(63.5). However, why is (this reason which is advanced by the Digambaras) unreal? Because there is no such death consisting in the extinction of sensation etc. in the trees. Extinction presupposes previous existence. If someone admits the extinction of consciousness in trees, he cannot but admit its (previous) existence. Therefore, since no consciousness in trees is admitted, neither can its extinction be maintained (63.7). It might be objected that exsiccation is death, and this really occurs in trees. This is true. But the reason adduced (by the Digambara) is a death which is conditioned⁴ by the (previous) existence of consciousness, not mere exsiccation. Hence that death which is taken as a reason is unreal, and that death which is real, consisting in exsiccation, is not the reason.

(63.10) The Digambara takes as reason death in general, without making a difference between a death concomitant with the predicate (sentient being) or not so concomitant. Hence the respondent is here mistaken (about the connotation of the word) death which he adduces as a reason. Consequently he thinks that exsiccation is a real (reason), because experience teaches⁵ that trees are subject to death from exsiccation. The opponent, on the other hand, has the right conception, therefore the reason is for him unreal.

¹ According to the *abhidharma* an organ of sense (*indriya*) consists of an imperceptible (*atīndriya*) subtle kind of matter different in every organ, it has been compared with the nerves, cp my Central Conception, p. 12 ff.

² *āgama-siddha*, *āgama* includes all Buddhist literature, religious or revealed (*sūtra*) as well as scientific (*śāstra*). But when dogmatical knowledge is contrasted with empirical (*vastu-darśana-bala-pravṛtta*), *āgama* refers to the former, cp. below, *sūtra* III. 116.

³ *āyuh-samskāra* or *jīva*, one of the non-mental forces, *citta-uprayukta-samskāra*, cp Central Conception, p. 105.

⁴ *vyūṣṭa* concomitant.

⁵ *darśanāt*.

(59.11) The existence of a distinct image is here an analytical reason, because the possibility of giving some name, arbitrarily chosen, flows naturally just out of the circumstance that it is a mental construction. (59.12). Thus the possibility of giving the name of the moon, and the contradiction of denying this possibility must be considered as established by analytical reasoning.¹

54 A proposition contradicted by the words in which it is itself expressed, is as follows,

Inference is not a source of knowledge.

(59.14). When the intended thesis² is contradicted by the proper words of the proposition which expresses it, it cannot be deduced, as e g, "inference is not a source of knowledge." This proposition

sense of something being known to everybody. A thesis is inadmissible when it runs against the generally accepted meaning of the words. Everybody knows that the moon is called (in sanscrit) the thing «marked by a spot in the form of a hare», therefore it is impossible to deny it. He adds the very characteristic remark that this wrong thesis is also overthrown by the fact that «every word can have any meaning» (*sarvasya śabdasya sarvārtha-vācyaṁ*), since the meaning of a word is a matter of conventional agreement (*saṁketa*). This reminds us of a saying current among pandits *sarve śabdāḥ sarvārtha-vācyaḥ*, an allusion to the exceedingly developed metaphorical use of sanscrit words. Vinītadeva adds (p 106 7) «you may (if you like) call the jar a moon!».

¹ The comment of Vinītadeva on this sūtra, p 109 1—7, runs thus «There are some who maintain the thesis that the thing having the mark of a hare is not called the moon. This (thesis) is repudiated on the ground of universal consent (*pratiṭi = prasiddhi*) that the «hare-marked» is a name of the moon. It is moreover repudiated by the fact that every object can receive any name, because the connection between a thing and its name is arbitrary (read *brāhmarāga-pa*), e g, we can give to a jar the name of a moon» — Thus, according to V, the meaning of words is founded on convention (*prasiddhi = saṁketa*). This, of course, is not denied by Dh. But he calls attention to the fact that the possibility of giving a name is founded upon the existence of a concept (or distinct image = *pratibhāsa-pratīti*) constructed by the synthesis of our thought (*vikalpa-vijñāna = kalpanā*). Such a concept contains in itself the possibility of being designated by a conventional name (*abhihāsa-samsarga-yogya*, cp sūtra I 5). Therefore the judgment expressed in the proposition «every distinct conception can be given a conventional name» is an analytical judgment, since the predicate, the possibility of giving a name fixed by convention, is contained in the subject, in every distinct conception. Thus Dignāga, the Tibetans and Vinītadeva are satisfied with a reference to the conventional meaning of words (*prasiddhi = saṁketa*), but Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara make the addition that this is founded on the existence of constructed concepts (*prasiddhi* is founded upon *pratīti*).

² *pratyū-ārtha = palśa*. This indeed has been a thesis of the Cārvākas.

the sake of convincing the opponent, (the Buddhist). Therefore such a reason must be given which is valid for him.¹ The opponent admits as true that (elements) which never have existed are produced (out of nothing), and that the existent is impermanent, i e, vanishes without leaving anything behind, (reverts to nothing).² Both these tenets are wrong in the eyes of the Sāṅkhya (63.22). In such a case the reason is fallacious for the respondent (who brings it forth), because he has no knowledge of the manner in which both the (absolute) beginning and the (absolute) extinction are argued.³ (64.1) If he did possess a knowledge of the arguments by which these (theories) are supported (and if he did believe in them), they would be real reasons for him, but since he has no proper knowledge of them, they are unreal from his own point of view.

(64.3). Next comes the unreal, because uncertain, reason.

63. If doubt prevails regarding the very (fact adduced as a reason) or regarding its localization, the reason is unreal

(64.5). If the reason itself is subject to doubt or its localization uncertain, it is unreal (as a reason). The localization of a reason is something different from the reason itself, it is a place where it is found, a place corresponding to the subject of the conclusion. The reason must be present upon it in order to convey (the predicate).⁴ When its localization is uncertain, (the fact itself) becomes uncertain.

¹ This point is especially controverted by Candrakīrti, *op my Nirvāṇa*, p 118 ff

² This is one of the methods of expressing the theory of Universal Momentariness or constant change. Every moment in the existence of a thing is regarded as a separate existence detached from the preceding and following moments (*pūrvā-
opara-kāla-kālā-vikalāḥ kṣaṇāḥ*), it then appears that at every moment the thing is produced out of nothing and reverts again to nothing

³ Cp above text, p 38 10 ff and 44 20 ff Transl p. 9 1 ff and 120 ff

⁴ Lit, p 64 5—6 «And its localization, i e, the localization of this reason, localization means that the reason is lodged in it, a substratum of the predicate (*sūdhya-dharmin*) is indicated which constitutes the locus, which is different from the reason». — Unreal is not the fact corresponding to the reason, but the fact corresponding to the minor term (*dharmin*). All fallacies of an «Unreal» (*asiddha*) reason are what we would call fallacies of the minor premise, they refer to the absence or doubtful presence of the middle term upon the minor, i e, to what is here called, cp II 5, the first aspect of a logical mark

proved "Because we hear its cries" is the reason Why is it unreal by localization?

66. There can be a mistake as regards the direction from which the cry comes

(65.2). That place wherefrom the peacock's cry comes is called the place of its origin, the place wherefrom it reaches us When there is a mistake, or confusion, regarding the place from which it reaches us, the basis of the reason is unreal. Supposing we have a number of caves contiguous with one another, we might be mistaken whether the cry comes from this cave or from that one This is called unreal by localization.

(65.6) When the subject (minor term) is a non-entity, the reason is likewise unreal. An example is given.

67. And when the subject is not a reality, the reason will likewise be unreal. E.g., when the omnipresence of the Soul (of an individual) is deduced from the fact that its attributes may be apprehended anywhere, this reason is unreal

(65.9) Soul, (i.e., an individual Soul), is omnipresent, to be found in any place, i.e., ubiquitous When this is to be proved, the reason adduced is the fact that its attributes can manifest themselves in any place Its attributes such as pleasure, pain, desire, hatred etc can manifest themselves in whatsoever a place (the corresponding living body be transferred to). For this reason (it must be ubiquitous, because a Soul cannot displace itself)¹ (65.11). Attributes cannot exist without the substance to which they belong, because they are inherent in the latter But Soul is motionless Therefore if it were not ubiquitous, how could it be possible that the feelings of pleasure etc which we experience while living in the Dekkhan should be also experienced when we move to the Midlands² Consequently, (our) Soul must be

¹ The Vaiṣeṣika system imagines the Soul of every individual as an omnipresent substance, coterminous with Space, motionless and unconscious by itself as a stone, but capable of producing consciousness in the corresponding individual through a special contact with its internal organ When the body of the individual moves from one place to another its Soul remains motionless, but the thoughts and feelings are then produced in that part of the omnipresent Soul which corresponds to the place which the body has newly occupied, cp my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 57 f

² *madhya-deśa*

55 The four kinds of an inadmissible thesis are thus rejected

(60.21). The words «not discredited (beforehand)» are intended to reject four impossible points

(60.22). Next it will be shown what meaning results if the negative counter-part of every word is taken and all the negations collected together.¹

56. Thus (a sound thesis should not be) 1) a fact already proved, 2) a fact, although not yet proved, but adduced as a reason, (not as a consequence), 3) a fact which the disputant himself does not intend to prove at that occasion, 4) it must not necessarily be a fact explicitly stated, 5) it must not be a fact impossible (by self-contradiction) (All this is excluded), and just this contrast will show that our definition (of a sound thesis) is unimpeachable, namely, 1) it is a point which the disputant himself has chosen to establish, 2) which he himself admits and 3) which is not (internally) impossible.

(61.5) «Thus» means in the manner just exposed. A thesis to be proved² is contrasted with a point already proved. A point which

being a source of knowledge, is contradicted. This is wrong, because here we admit the distinct idea (*prāṭi*) as an imagined own-existence-reason, and one's own words as an (unimagined) effect-reason, not as real. And the fact of being an effect of intention is quite real for the word. Therefore it is not taken here. Moreover, just as the one who does not admit inference does not understand the non-discrepancy (*avyabhicāritā*) of smoke with fire, just so will he not understand the non-discrepancy of the word with intention. And the word is used for communication of external reality. Therefore the use of words is not preceded by admitting an invariable connection between words and intention. And again, words are pronounced not in order to make known an intention, but to communicate the existence of external reality. Therefore the use of words is preceded by admitting (their) invariable connection with external reality. Therefore just the preceding interpretation is faultless.

¹ In order to wind up this lesson on the theory of the relative or negative meaning of words (*apoha*) the author now repeats the whole definition from the negative side by collecting together all negations implied in the positive formulation.

² *śādhya* = *śāsta* a thesis and a predicate

§ 11. UNCERTAIN REASON

68. When another aspect of the reason—its absence in counter-instances—taken singly—is unreal, the fallacy is called uncertainty.

(65.18). When another¹ single aspect of the reason, namely its absence in counter-instances, is (not supported) by reality, we have the fallacy of an uncertain reason. Certainty means one issue. It is the aim of (the syllogism), it becomes then conclusive. Inconclusive is uncertain. It is a case when neither the conclusion nor its negation can be ascertained, but, on the contrary, there remains only a doubt.

are fallacies of concomitance, or of the major premiss. All the cases where the minor premiss is wrong, i e, where the reason is either totally or partly absent on the subject of the conclusion, or where its presence there is uncertain, are called «unreal» (*asiddha*) reasons. These are material fallacies or fallacies of fact, *fallacies extra dictione*. *Fallacia in dictione*, in the strict sense of the term, so, fallacies of expression, where the thought is all right, but wrongly expressed, are treated as wrong examples, cp. below, text 89.8—*na dustam vastu tathāpi vaktvā dustam darśitam*. All other fallacies are also, strictly speaking, fallacies of fact, material fallacies, since they are fallacies of a wrongly established concomitance, and concomitance is always a generalization from facts. When the presence of the middle term upon the whole compass of the minor term is an ascertained fact, comes the next step of ascertaining its position between the similar and dissimilar cases. It must be present in similar cases only and absent from every dissimilar case, cp. sūtra II 6—7. The conclusion is right *udī non reperitur instantia contradictoria*. This again must be ascertained by facts. But these latter fallacies correspond more closely to our fallacies of undistributed middle and of illicit major and can be termed logical fallacies in the stricter sense. We thus have two main groups of fallacies which we can call fallacies of the minor premiss and fallacies of the major premiss. In the monastic schools of Tibet and Mongolia pupils are trained to distinguish among these two groups at once, without delay, when a series of quite fantastic combinations are proposed to them. If the minor premiss is not supported by the facts, the answer must be «the reason is unreal» (*ī tasya mā grūb = asiddho hetuḥ*). When the concomitance between the middle and the major terms is not warranted, the answer must be «concomitance is not produced» (*āhyat-pa mā bhyuñ = vyūptir na bhavati*). Dignāga distinguished 4 varieties of *asiddha hetu*. The number is here increased to six. Gaṅgeśa and the logics of the united Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system have retained the class of unreal (*asiddha*) fallacies, but the clear cut principle of Dignāga's division has been obliterated by useless details and the desire to compromise with the fivefold division of fallacies in Gotama's sūtras, cp. Sual, Introduction, pp. 393—394.

¹ Read *aparasya*

(61.12). What must thus be proved is called the thesis. The definition is thus¹ shown to be unimpeachable. There is nothing inconsistent in it.

§ 9. LOGICAL FALLACIES.²

(61.14) Having concluded the examination (of the syllogism which is) the verbal expression of the three aspects of the logical mark (or reason), and having incidentally dealt with the (correct) definition of the thesis, the author now proceeds to examine the logical fallacies. By way of introduction it is stated —

57 We have defined the syllogism as the verbal expression of the three aspects of the reason. Now, if even one of the three aspects is not (correctly) expressed, (the result) is a fallacy

(61.18) The following is meant. If someone wishes to give verbal expression to the three aspects of the logical reason, he should do it with precision,³ and precision is attained when the negative counterpart⁴ of (every aspect) is likewise stated. When we know what is to be excluded, we then have a better knowledge of the other part, of what is to be accepted (61.20) The definition of a syllogism has been given above, it is «the verbal expression of the three aspects of the logical mark». Now, i. e., in the light of this definition,⁵ if even one of the aspects is not (correctly) expressed — the word «even» implies that the same consequence will follow, if two of them are not (correctly) expressed⁶ — a fallacy will ensue. A fallacy is what resembles

as settled by Gangeśa in his *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* the impossible theses of Dignāga appear as impossible reasons (*bādhitā-ḥetiḥbhāsa*) and ten varieties of them are established.

¹ *Lat.*, p. 61 12 «The word *it* in the sense of „thus“».

² All the implications, the originality and the importance of the Buddhist theory of Logical Fallacies will be elicited only when Dignāga's Table of Reasons (*hetu-caṅkra*) will be analysed and translated. An edition of it with a commentary by Bstan-dar Lha-rampa and an english translation by Mr A. Vostrickoff will shortly appear in the Biblioteca Buddhica series

³ *sphuṭa*

⁴ *prati-rūpaka* = *prati-yogin*.

⁵ *Lat.*, «if this exists»

⁶ No fallacy of omission of one of the aspects of the logical reason is mentioned in the sequel. But some examples will be given of syllogisms which although valid by themselves are not correctly formulated, cp. below text, p. 88—89. The three aspects of the logical mark are those mentioned under III. 1, but not those mentioned in II. 5—7

The reason "cognizability" covers similar as well as contrary cases, (eternal objects, like Space and impermanent ones, like jars etc. It is inconclusive).

(66.8). (Second syllogism)

(Thesis). The sounds of speech are not produced by an effort.

(Reason). Because they are impermanent.

(Major premise). (Whatsoever is impermanent is not produced by an effort).

(Examples). Just as lightning and as Space, (both not produced by an effort, but the one impermanent, the other eternal).

(Counter-instances). And (not) as jars etc (which are so produced and hence ought to have been permanent, but are impermanent).

Impermanence is present in one part of the similar cases (i.e., in objects not produced by an effort) It is present in lightning etc, but it is absent (in the other part of them), in Space etc And it includes all the contrary cases, since it is present wheresoever there is production by an effort.¹

(66.10). (Third syllogism).

(Thesis). The sounds of speech are produced by an effort.

(Reason) Because they are unpermanant.

(Major premise) (Whatsoever is impermanent is produced by an effort).

(Example). Just as a jar (which is so produced).

(Counter-instances). And (not) as lightning and Space (which both are not so produced, but the one is impermanent and the other eternal, whereas if the reason were right they ought to have been both eternal entities).

¹ No such syllogism, of course, has ever been advanced *bona fide*, but the idea of the Mīmāṃsākas about eternal unmanifested sounds is twisted in every possible way for exemplification of logical rules. The Indian and Tibetan logicians think that in order to get the real force of the syllogistic formulae, it is much better to practise on propositions which are quite wrong, so strikingly wrong that they never have occurred to anybody.

² The dissimilar or contrary cases are objects produced by an effort, as jars etc The contraposition of the major premise gives the proposition — "whatsoever is produced by a conscious effort is eternal"

60. E. g., when 'it must be proved that the sounds of speech are not an eternal entity, the reason «because they are visible»—is unreal for both parties.

(62.14). This reason is wrong for both sides, the respondent, (the Mīmāṃsaka who maintains the eternity of the sounds of speech),¹ and the opponent, (the Buddhist who denies it).

61. «Trees are animate beings»—this should be deduced from the fact that «they die when the entire bark is taken off» It is not accepted by the opponent. He defines death as an extinction of sensations, sense-organs and life. Such a death does not occur in trees.

(62.18). The Digambaras maintain that trees are sentient beings.² They point to the fact that they die as soon as they are entirely stripped of their bark. (The reason) is unreal in the eyes of their opponent, the Buddhist. Why? Because (a Buddhist understands by death the cessation or extinction of sensations, of sense organs and of life)³

(63.1) Sensations — means here visual and other sensational consciousness⁴ Under sense organs we understand some special (subtle) matter⁵ in a (living) body, located on the ball of the eye and in

¹ Cp. above, p. 127 n. 2

² The Jainas assume that plants are animate beings possessing only one sense-faculty, viz. the tactile sense, cp. v. Glasenapp, *Jainismus*, p. 172

³ Lat., 63.1 «Sensation and organ and life is a *dvandva*-compound»

⁴ *vyākāṇa* or *vyākāṇa-saṅkha* means in Hinayāna exclusively undifferentiated pure sensation, the mere sensation of the presence of something indefinite in the ken of our sense-faculties (*grāh-vyāpti*). It is one element (*dharma*), has by itself no varieties, but distinguished into visual, auditional and other sensations according to the cause which evoked it. Cp. my *Central Conception*, pp. 16 and 68. In the Mahāyānist *abhidharma* another *vyākāṇa* has been imagined, the *ālaya-vyākāṇa* which is the store house for the germs of all future ideas and for the traces left by all the former ones, but the school to which *Dharmakīrti* belonged seems to have rejected this theory.

⁵ *rūpa* or *rūpa-saṅkha* means every element of matter as characterized by resistance or impenetrability, it must be distinguished from *rūpa-āyatana* which means only colour and lines, cp. *Central Conception*, p. 11.

70. When this aspect of the reason is dubious, the fallacy is likewise one of uncertainty.

(66.17). When this aspect of the reason, its absence in contrary cases, is unreal, the fallacy is one of uncertainty. And similarly, when this aspect is dubious, the (resulting) fallacy is likewise one of uncertainty.¹

An example —

71. Supposing we wish to prove that a certain person is non-omniscient, or that he is subject to passions. If the fact that he is endowed with the faculty of speech (and other attributes of a man) is quoted as a reason, its absence in contrary cases (i.e., with omniscient beings) becomes problematic.²

of the similar cases and moreover trespasses partly upon the domain of the dissimilar ones. This would give us an inference of the form «Socrates is a man because he is mortal». The reason mortality not only pervades the whole domain of men but trespasses moreover upon the forbidden ground of the dissimilar cases, i.e., of non-men. It is the *ὁμογενὴς ἁπορρογενὴς* of Aristoteles. In Dignāga's Table it occupies the place of the second uncertain reason, (the place at the right corner of the Table). Here and in the *Nyāya-praveśa* it is given the third place, but below, text p. 76 18—14 (*sandigdha-tīpakṣa-vyāvṛttilakṣa*) it is rightly placed as the second. The third variety (here placed as the second) will be when the reason pervades the totality of the dissimilar cases and only one part of the similar ones. This would give us an inference of the form «Socrates is not a man, (is a non-man), because he is mortal». Here the similar cases, the non-men, are partly mortal, and the dissimilar ones, so men, which should be all immortal, are, on the contrary, all mortal. Finally the last combination will be when the reason is partly present on both sides. This would give us an inference of the form «Socrates is immortal, because he is an idea». Excluding all ambiguity in the terms and assuming that Socrates is taken in the sense of a man, we will have an uncertain reason, because there are ideas on both sides, mortal and immortal ones. All this scheme is devised only in order to show the exact position of the right reason between the similar and dissimilar instances, as in the inference «Socrates is mortal, because he is a man».

1 Thus an uncertain or problematic judgment is always a case of incomplete induction from particular cases, counter-instances being producible

2 The syllogisms would have the following forms,

- 1 Whosoever is a man is non-omniscient
This one is a man.
He is non-omniscient
- 2 Whosoever is a man is non-passionless
This one is a man
He is non-passionless

(63.13) But if someone produces an argument which he himself also acknowledges (to be wrong), the rule is that the argument remains unreal for him, (e. g.),

62 Supposing a supporter of the Sāṅkhya system wishes to prove that the emotions, pleasure etc, are unconscious, and refers to the fact that they have a beginning or that they are impermanent. This argument is "unreal" for the disputant himself.

(63.16) "Pleasure etc." means (emotions) like pleasure, pain etc. Their unconscious character it is intended to prove by pointing to the fact that they have a beginning or that they are impermanent. What has a beginning or what is impermanent is unconscious, as for instance, the elements of Matter are (in Buddhist philosophy)¹ Pleasure etc. indeed have a (perpetual) beginning and are impermanent, therefore they (must be) unconscious. Consciousness, on the other hand, is the essential attribute of Soul (which according to the Sāṅkhya system has no emotions)² In this instance beginning and impermanence are to be taken separately (as reasons), not simultaneously³ Both these attributes are not real from the standpoint of the disputant, of the Sāṅkhya (63.20). Now, a logical reason is advanced for

¹ Here evidently the *rūpādi-āyatana* are meant, i. e., the sense data, *āyatana* §§ 7—11, cp. my Central Conception, p. 7. It cannot be *rūpādi-skandha*, because although they are also impermanent and momentary, but only the first of them is unconscious, all the others are intent (*sāmbhava*) upon an object.

² Consciousness (*puruṣa*) in the Sāṅkhya system is imagined as an eternal, changeless, motionless substance, as the pure light of consciousness which is being reflected in the mental phenomena. The latter are imagined as being by themselves mere collocations of material particles (*gunas*), unconscious (*jada*) in themselves. For the adept of this system whatsoever is impermanent (*pariṇāman*) is unconscious. But from another point of view the Sāṅkhya declares all phenomena to be eternal (*etiam nityam*), since they are only modifications of one Matter (*prakṛti*) with which they are identical according to the principle of identity between cause and effect (*satkārya-vāda*). The Buddhist, on the other hand, denies the existence of a substantial Matter, and replaces it by momentary flashes of special elements (*dharma*), or forces (*saṃskāra*). In the present case the Sāṅkhya apparently wishes to deduce his idea of unconscious mental phenomena out of the Buddhist idea of impermanent elements, assuming evidently that whatsoever is a momentary flash cannot be conscious, since consciousness includes memory.

³ This remark probably hints at the Sarvāstivādin theory that all elements (*dharma*) appear and disappear in the same moment, cp. my Central Conception, p. 40.

in regard of limited knowledge, (a case where the absence of the mark is ascertained).¹

(67.15). (The opponent may rejoins² that) it is not (experience, be it) negative experience, which induces (him) to maintain that omniscient beings do not speak, but (he maintains it) because (human) speech is incompatible with omniscience?³

(We answer. No, because —)

73. The contraposed proposition, viz., «an omniscient being does not resort to speech» cannot be proved by negative experience, neither (can it be deduced from incompatibility with speech), because there is no contradiction between omniscience and the faculty of speech, (omniscience) being problematic.⁴

(67.16) There is no incompatibility between omniscience and the faculty of speech, and for this reason the contraposed proposition cannot be established. (67.17) The contraposed concomitance⁵ is (now) quoted. «One who is omniscient (does not speak)» The subject is the negation of the predicate, i. e., omniscience. The predicate is the negation of the subject, i. e., «the absence of the faculty of speech». Thus it is intimated that the negation of the predicate is invariably concomitant with the negation of the subject, and the first is thus subaltern to the second.

(67.19). Such an inverted concomitance (of the form «whosoever is omniscient is not a man») could be accepted as established, if omni-

¹ *Īt.*, p. 67.11—12 «Since non-cognition whose object is irrepresentable (*adrśya*) is a cause of doubt, not a cause of certainty, therefore is the exclusion of speech etc. from omniscience, which is the contrary of non-omniscience, doubtful»

² *Īt.*, p. 67.15 «Not because of non-cognition do we declare that speech is absent in omniscience, but because of the contradiction of speech with omniscience» This proposition must precede the *sūtra* III.78

³ Cp. *N. Kanikā*, p. 111.11 — *sarva-jñātṛyā atyantā-śaralāśyāh* / *ena cid apī saha pratyakṣa-pratīkṣa virodhānāgatah*

⁴ *Īt.*, p. 67.18—14 «And because there is no opposition (*virodha*) between the faculty of speech and omniscience, even if there is no experience (*adarśane'ya*) of «whosoever is omniscient does not speak», the contraposition does not really exist (*na siddhyati*), because of doubt»

⁵ *vyūptimān vyatirekaḥ*

(64.8). (The author) proceeds to give an example (of an unreal reason represented by a fact which is) uncertain in itself.

64. If something is suspected to represent (not smoke, but) vapour etc., and if it is adduced as a proof for the presence of fire, it will be an unreal, because uncertain, reason.

(64.11). Vapour etc. means either vapour (or smoke or fog or dust) etc. When something is suspected to represent either vapour or (smoke), it is an assemblage of material elements, an assemblage of the solid (the liquid, the hot and the gaseous atoms).¹ When (sometimes) one is uncertain whether something represents vapour (or smoke), and when it is adduced as proving the presence of fire,² it becomes an unreal reason.

(64.13). The following is meant. (Supposing we think that we perceive) smoke, but we are not sure whether it may not perhaps be vapour. Then it is unreal (as a reason), since it lacks the proving force of certainty. What is ascertained as being smoke, since smoke is produced by fire, proves the presence of the latter. But if this is uncertain, then it proves nothing. Thus it falls under the head of logical fallacies, called (here) unreal reasons.

(64.16). An example of an unreal (fact, because of the uncertainty of its) localization, is the following one—

65 There is a peacock in this cave, because we hear its cries.

(64.18) «This cave» is the subject (or minor term of the deduction). A cave is a place covered by a rock which stretches out horizontally and conceals it. The presence of the peacock is the fact to be

¹ Matter (*rūpa* = *rūpa-sandha*) is imagined in the *abhidharma* as consisting out of four kinds of atoms, the solid (*prthivī*), the liquid (*ap*), the hot (*tejas*) and the levitant (*rāgni*). They are conceived as focuses of energies producing resistance, cohesion, heat and motion, the latter conceived as contiguous appearance of a series of discrete moments (*nirantara-utpāda*). The body is then either solid or liquid or gaseous (ever moving = *sataṭa-gatī*) or hot according to the intensity of the force (*utlarsa*), since the proportion of different atoms is constant, always the same, in every bit of matter, whether it be solid or liquid or gaseous, hot or cold. Thus *bhūta-saṃghāta* or *mahā-bhūta-saṃghāta* simply means some material phenomenon, or something physical. Cp. my Central Conception, p. 11.

² *agni-siddhau* is corrected by Dh. into *agni-siddhy-artham*.

not exist). This is (the idea) carried by the expression «unimpaired causes».

(68.7). But is it not evident that as long as the totality of the causes of something remains intact, nothing (in the world) will be able to interfere with it? How can it then be (efficiently) opposed (by anything else?)

(68.8). This is however (possible) in the following way Let the sum total of its causes be present, the fact is nevertheless (efficiently) opposed by that other fact which, producing a breach in this totality, thus removes it¹ If a fact is opposed to another one in this sense, it always affects it in some way or other. (68.10) Indeed if (an agency) producing cold curtails its efficiency to produce further moments of cold, it removes cold and (in this sense) is opposed to it (68.11). Therefore to be (efficiently) opposed means just to produce a disappearing (phenomenon) by producing a breach in its causes² This kind of opposition means (Incompatibility), or impossibility of contiguous coexistence. (68.12) Consequently contiguous coexistence of such mutually opposed facts in the same moment must be impossible. Such mutual exclusion obtains between two opposed (phenomena) when they

«Of a possessor of non-deficient causes» — thus that one is called whose causes are non-deficient, are intact Of whom there is non-existence, through deficiency of causes, to him there is no opposition even from whatsoever»

¹ Lat., 68.8—9. «However thus Even the possessor of undeficient causes is known (*gate*) to be in opposition to that one through the cause-deficiency-made-by-whom there is non-existence» Cp. Jayanta, Nyāyamañjarī, p. 55 — *akim-cit-karasya virodhātva 'typrasaktiḥ*

² Lat., p. 68.10—11 «Indeed, opposed (*aruddhak*) is the abolisher (*antar-talak*) of cold-sensation which counteracts the force producing cold-sensation, (although) being (himself) a producer of cold-sensation Therefore opposed is just the producer of the disappearing phenomenon (*antaryatra*) which makes a deficiency of causes» — The idea seems to be that when cold is superseded by heat there is a struggle between two forces Three phases, or moments, of this struggle must be distinguished Heat is latent in the first phase, although it latently counteracts already the forces producing cold, so that in the next phase cold will appear in a final moment, in order to be superseded in the third phase by heat Thus it is that in the first phase cold is in a state of latently efficient opposition with the forces which will produce heat in the ultimate phase Dh thus maintains that the causes which produce cold in the next moment, will produce heat in the next following moment That heat is the cause of cold means that heat is present among the causes which produce the last moment of cold This also is an answer to the much debated question, in India as well as in Europe, whether the night which precedes the day can be regarded as the cause of the day

ubiquitous. (65.13). Now, for the Buddhists, Soul itself (as a separate substance) does not exist, still less does the fact of its attributes being perceived anywhere exist. Thus the reason is unreal.¹

(65.15). The difference between the two last cases is that in the former one the existence of the subject was doubtful, because its place was unknown; in the latter case the subject of the conclusion itself is a non-entity.

(65.16) Thus it is, that when one form of the reason, the form concerning its presence upon the subject of the conclusion (i. e., the minor premise), is not real, we have the (material) fallacy of an unreal reason.²

¹ According to the Tib the *cheda* before *tasya*, p. 65 14, must be dropped, it then refers not to *dauddhasya*, but to *ātmā*; *asiddhau* must be then corrected into *asiddho*.

² Lat. *substratum*», *dharmen* = *āśraya* The ultimate substratum in every cognition (cp. comment on sūtra I 12) is the «thing in itself» (*svataksara*), the efficient (*artha-kṛyā-kāraṇ*), the point-instant (*ksana*), it is the pure substratum (*dharmin*) with all its attributes (*dharma*) stripped off, not the empirical thing (*samudāya* = *dharm-dharma-samudāya*, cp. comment on sūtra II 8) This underlying point-instant of reality is problematic in the first case, it is quite absent in the second, i. e., when the attributes of sensation, feelings, ideas etc. are taken away there remains no point of something real to which the designation of a Soul could be applied. The construction of an ubiquitous Soul-substance, the substratum of all mental phenomena, by the Vaiśeṣikas is therefore pure imagination.

³ The division of logical fallacies (*hetvābhāsas*) which we find in the original sūtras of the Nyāya and of the Vaiśeṣika systems, as well, as in the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, is substantially different from the Buddhist classification which was first established in strict conformity with his theory of the three aspects of a logical reason, by Dignāga in his celebrated little work «An Elucidation of a Table of possible Reasons» — *Hetu-sakṛa-samarthana*. The Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda has then adopted the main lines of Dignāga's classification and all the subsequent evolution of this part of the science of Indian logic is influenced by it, cp. my article «Rapports entre la Théorie Bouddhique de la Connaissance et l'enseignement des autres écoles», in the *Muséon*, V, cp. also Randle's article in the *Mind*, 1924, p. 406 ff. Since all objects in the whole universe are interconnected and logically dependent upon one another, either as uniformities of Coexistence or as uniformities of Succession, every object is *eo ipso* a logical reason and the possibilities of logical fallacies are infinite. Those that are not worth considering have been set aside, as we have seen, as impossible theses. After that come the fallacies of the reason properly speaking which are fallacies of one or of more than one of its three aspects. The cases where the first aspect alone is either wrong or uncertain are all fallacies of the minor premise. The cases when the second and third aspect of the logical reason are either wrong or uncertain

moment onwards begins a new series which is efficiently opposed¹ (to the preceding series).²

(69.1). (Now, if efficient opposition is nothing but a change when one phenomenon produces (or is followed by) another one, this efficient opposition will obtain between two phenomena having duration, not between two moments?³ (This however could not be an efficient

¹ *vrudhāho*

² The difference between this case of such an abrupt change and the preceding one is that in the latter we have two systems of momentary existences running parallel and a meeting point between them which can be reckoned as the beginning of efficient opposition, the incompatibility (*vrudhā*) is a process (*bhavana-dharman*). Every change is theoretically constructed as occupying three moments (*tri-kāṇa-parīṇāma*), because there is always an intermediate phase between the opposed phenomena, in contradistinction from the second kind of opposition, or logical contradiction, where the counterparts are diametrically opposed (*paraspara-parihāra*, *parityūga*) and there is nothing intermediate. When light is produced just in the place formerly occupied by darkness, e. g., by lighting up a lamp, there is no efficient opposition in the first phase of the process of change, because there is as yet no light, nor is there any in the third moment because there is already no darkness, (cp below, Mallavādī's comment). The opposition reduces to a simple change just as, e. g., the change of clay into a jar, or the destruction of the jar by a stroke of a hammer, its change into splinters. According to the Buddhist idea of the Universe as an impersonal process of perpetual change where the point-instants (*ksana*) following upon one another according to causal laws may be arbitrarily united in series (*saṁtāna*) which receive names, the series of light moments is only the continuation of the series of dark moments. Every existence has the possibility to be followed either by homogeneous or by heterogeneous moments (*ajñātya-ajñātya-ubhaya-santāni-janana-śakti-yukto ghatah*). There is thus no opposition between two consecutive moments, but only between the end of one duration and the beginning of the other. The so called incompatibility (*navartya navartaka-bhāva*) is nothing but the beginning of a new series (*janya-janaka-bhāva*), it would be simple difference, no opposition. The question is solved in the sequel by pointing to the fact that there is an antagonism or struggle between two continuous phenomena trying to oust one another Cp Mallavādī, fol 96, — *atha yadā tattraṇa pradēśe utpadyata ālokaḥ tadā kā vūrtity āha yadā to* (p 68 10) *ity ādiḥ tata* (p 68 21) *iti, yatah pradīpādūr andha-kūṇḍy aśamarīṭham janyan nnavartayati, tatah kīraṇāni atha bhavatu janya-janaka-bhāvena navartya-navartaka-bhāvaṇi, param kim atah siddham?* *ity āha, atāś cety ādiḥ* (p. 68 22) *ato janya-janaka-śakti-cna navartya-navartakatvaṇ---* *yad āti yasmād vū (?) yo janakaḥ kṛāno na sa vrudhā-deśam ākramati, yaś cākramati na sa janaka* 'śamarīṭha-vīkūṇḍyāś, tat kṛānāyayor vrudhā ity āha, janyety ādiḥ (p 68 1) Cp also Jayanta's *Nyūyamaśūjari*, p 60—61 (Vizian)

³ Lit., 68 19—89.1. "But when light is produced just there, in the place of darkness, then, from which moment the birth-moment of the light of the darkness-

We call uncertain a reason which makes us fluctuate between a conclusion and its denial. Examples are now given.¹

69. Supposing we must prove the eternal character of the sounds of speech or some other (property to be mentioned presently). If the fact of its being cognizable and other properties are quoted as their (respective) reasons, they—being present, either partly or completely, in dissimilar cases also² — (are uncertain reasons)

(66.3). «The eternal³ character or some other property». By «some other property» (the following three predicates) are alluded to, 1) the fact of not being produced by a voluntary effort, 2) the fact of being so produced, and 3) eternity (once more).

(66.4). «The fact of being cognizable and other properties». By «other properties» (the corresponding three following reasons) are meant, 1) impermanence, 2) (once more) impermanence, and 3) (penetrability or) the fact of not being an extended body⁴ When eternity or the other (three) attributes are predicated, cognizability and the other three properties (in the order stated) are uncertain reasons, since the absence of all the four facts in counter instances is subject to doubt. (We thus obtain the four following patterns of uncertain reasoning).

(66.7) Indeed, (first syllogism)

(Thesis) The sounds of speech are eternal.

(Reason). Because they are cognizable.

(Major premise). (Whatsoever is cognizable is eternal)

(Example). Just as Space, (cognizable and eternal).

(Counter instance). And (not) as a jar, (non-eternal, but not incognizable).

¹ The aspects of the logical reason referred to in this section where the logical fallacies are examined are always those which are established for internal inference, cp sūtras II 5—7, not those mentioned under sūtra III. 1. The latter are again taken into account when examining the wrongly expressed examples, cp. below, text p 88—89.

² Lat «in both the similar and dissimilar cases».

³ Read *anīya* instead of *anīya* in 66 1, 66 3 (bis), 66 6 and 66 7

⁴ *amūrta* = *lu-con-ma-yin-pa*, «not possessing a body», *mūrta* means possessing a definite limited dimension, = *paricchinnā-parimāṇat*.

flicting phenomena of that place. Although the light of a lamp standing in one corner of a room is contiguous with the dark (parts of the room), it does not remove darkness altogether, because it has not the force to produce further moments of light in those parts of the room which are still occupied by darkness.

(69.7). In order to indicate that this kind of opposition concerns only serial existences and is brought about by producing a breach in the causes (of a lasting phenomenon), it has been stated (above), that (the opposed facts) have «duration». Duration means lasting for some time without interruption. (Such) a series of moments of cold vanishes when a series of moments of heat appears

(69.11) There are some (philosophers) who maintain that the relation of (efficient) opposition is not a reality. To them we answer (as follows) When an effect is produced, we do not really experience causation itself (as a sensible fact). But the existence of a (real) effect presupposes the former existence of a (real) cause, therefore (indirectly) the relation is necessarily a real one.

(69.13) And similarly when something real has been removed, we can have no direct sense-experience of opposition itself. But when a cold sensation is not followed by any further such sensation, (we know) that this is caused by (real) heat. (Efficient) opposition is thus as much a reality as the relation of cause and effect)¹

(69.15) The example «just as the sensations of cold and heat» must be interpreted according (to the lines traced) above.

(69.19). Turning to the second variety of opposition the (author) says,

77. There is also (opposition between two facts) when their own essence consists in mutual exclusion, as between the affirmation and negation (of the same thing)²

¹ This passage is of extreme importance as an evidence of that Kantian spirit which prevailed in the school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The categories of Causation, Substance, Quality, Negation etc. are logical, mental constructions (*kālpānā*, *adhyavastā*, *mānā*) superimposed (*āropita*) upon the absolute reality (*paramārthikatā*) of point-instants (*kṣaṇa*) or the extreme particular «things in themselves» (*svakakṣaṇa*) inconceivable in discursive thinking (*prāpñāna prāpñāna* *asakya*, cp N b 4, p. 12 10)

² Lat, p 69.20 «Or by the fact (-*īyā*) of having (*bhūtv*) an essence which has its stand on mutual exclusion, as existence and non-existence (affirmation and

'Impermanence is present in one part of the contrary cases,' it is present in lightning etc., but absent in Space. It is moreover present in all similar cases, since everything produced by a conscious effort is impermanent.

(66.12). (Fourth syllogism).

(Thesis). The sounds of speech are eternal.

(Reason). Because they are not limitedly extended bodies.

(Major premise). (Whatsoever is not an extended body of limited dimensions is eternal).

(Example). Like Space and like atoms (which both are eternal).

(Counter-instances). Contrary¹ to motion and to a jar (both of which are impermanent, but the first is non-extended).

The attribute of «not being a limitedly extended body» is partly found both in similar and contrary cases. It is present partly in both, in (eternal) Space and in (impermanent) motion, (both are not bodies of limited dimensions). But in atoms which represent one part of the similar (eternal) cases, and in jars etc. which represent one part of the contrary (non-eternal) cases, it is absent. Jars as well as atoms have limited dimensions. That atoms are eternal is a tenet admitted by the Vaiśeṣika school, therefore they are included in the similar cases. (66.15). In these four examples, the (condition of) the absence of the reason in contrary cases is not realized, therefore they produce fallacies of uncertainty.²

¹ i. e., in some of the objects which, although impermanent, are not produced by any conscious effort, like lightning.

² Lit. «like».

³ These are in Dignāga's system the four varieties of an overwide, or not exclusive enough (avyavahāra) logical mark. They have all that feature in common that the mark is not excluded from every dissimilar case. While being present, either partly or totally, in similar cases—this is only as it should be in a correct reason—it is nevertheless present, either partly or totally, in the dissimilar cases also. The third aspect of a logical reason, mentioned in sūtra II. 7, is not realized. In order clearly to show the position of the reason between the similar and the dissimilar cases Dignāga begins by giving an example where the reason pervades all things cognizable, i. e., all similar and all dissimilar cases together. This is the absolutely overwide reason (śūdhārāpa-hetu). This would correspond to an inference of the form «Socrates is immortal because he is a cognizable object», an inference which by itself would not be worth considering, but it is introduced in order better to show the full score of the possible situation of a reason between similar and dissimilar instances. The second variety will be when the reason pervades the totality

(70.3). Further a thing¹ which is (merely) «other» than blue cannot avoid being (included in) the negation of blue.² When we perceive a yellow or some other colour (that is not blue), we (*so ipso*) do not perceive any blue. We then imagine its presence (and on the ground of a repelled suggestion) we ascertain its absence (in a negative judgment), because³ just as the blue excludes its own negation, so also does the yellow and any other colour exclude⁴ the negation (of its own self). (70.5). Thus it is that there is a direct contradiction between affirmation and negation, (between blue and non-blue), and (only an indirect) contradiction between (blue and yellow, i e, between the affirmations of) any pair of (different) objects,⁵ in as much as they unavoidably include the one the negation of the other

(70.6) But⁶ what is it that we can conceive as non-existent in something else? Something distinct. Not something unlimited, as e.g., the fact of being a point-instant.⁷ Since the very essence of all

¹ Lit, «a form», *rūpam*

² Mallavādi, f 97, introduces this sentence thus, *yady etam nīlam etābhāvam etā pariharati, na nīlābhāvatat-pitāśīlam ity āha nīlasyādi* (p 70.3)

³ Lit, p 70 3—4 «Because of an ascertainment of non-existence through non-perception of the blue imagined as viable (*Arśya*) when yellow etc is perceived» — Thus our author's theory of negation falls in line with his view of Contradiction

⁴ *co heterarhas* (Mallav, f 97)

⁴ *abhāvi-avyabhicāri* would mean lit «invariably connected with non-existence» or including non-existence, but of course *svābhāva-abhāva-avyabhicāri* is meant, i e, including the impossibility of its own non-existence or excluding its own non-existence

⁵ *astunoh* would mean lit. «between two realities», but this is not quite accurate, since below, p 70 22, it is said *ekale astuny avastum ca*

⁶ *lasya ceti caḥ punararthe, ibid*

⁷ An extreme concrete and particular (*śālaśāna*), or a point-instant (*śāna*), is «other» in regard of every thing in the whole Universe (*trailokyavyāvṛtta*), it includes no coordination (*sāṃsṛpya*). It is something unlimited (*amya-ākāra*) A patch of blue, as including already coordination with other colours and variation through a series of moments (*santāna*), may be characterized as a mental construction under the law of Contradiction, but if «non-blue» is interpreted as including every thing in the Universe except this blue, as has been sometimes done in Europe (cp Sigwart, *op cit*, I. 184—185), the representation and the judgment will be infinite and senseless. H. Bergson, *op cit*, p 817, characterizes the denied fact as replaced «par une certaine qualité», and Bosanquet falls in line by maintaining, *op cit*, I 305, that «A is not B may always be taken to = A is x», i.e. *amya-ākāra*. By Dh the «non-blue» is here characterized not as an x, not as including all the point-instants of the Universe, but as the fact of the ab-

(66.21). The predicate to be deduced is «non-omniscience» (i. e. limited knowledge). «A certain person», is a person whom the speaker has in view. This is the subject of the conclusion. A second predicate is the fact that he is subject to passions. When the fact of limited knowledge or the presence of passions are asserted, such attributes as the faculty of speech, (or such animal functions as) the opening and closing of the eyes etc. are inconclusive. Their absence in contrary cases (i. e. in omniscient beings) it is impossible to prove. (67.3). The contrary case is omniscience. Whether omniscient beings possess that faculty of speech (and other attributes of men), or whether they do not possess them, it is impossible for us to decide. Consequently it is never known whether a speaker is omniscient or not. Speech is an uncertain mark.¹

(67.6). But (it might be objected) that there are altogether no omniscient speakers in existence, why then should we entertain doubts regarding their faculty of speech?

72. A negative judgment of the form «there are no omniscient speakers in existence» concerns a fact which is essentially beyond any possible experience. Therefore the absence of speech and (human attributes in omniscient beings, i. e.) in cases contrary to non-omniscience, cannot be warranted.²

(67.9) For this very reason the negative judgment «there are no omniscient speakers in existence» produces uncertainty. For what reason? Because it refers to an object whose essence is to be beyond any possible experience, and thus (always) leads to uncertainty. (67.11). When a negative judgment refers to an object inaccessible to experience, negation then does not produce a necessary conclusion³ but a problematic argument.⁴ The absence of the faculty of speech in omniscient beings is therefore uncertain. Omniscience is the counter-instance.

¹ About the origin of this example see above, p. 56. The idea that an omniscient being should necessarily remain silent, since human speech is incompatible with omniscience, because it is adapted to express relative, but not unlimited knowledge, this idea is now being pressed in different combinations merely in order to exemplify logical rules; cp. N. Kanikā p. 111 ff. and the concluding part of Tattvas.

² *nidanya-hetuḥ*

³ Cp. above, ch. II, sūtra 46—49

cognize (the absence of a definite object) on some definite place, we cognize it not in the form of an illimited non-existence, but in a definite form, whether this form has been actually experienced or only imagined. Thus when we deny eternity (or simple duration¹ of existence, or when we deny the presence) of a ghost² we should know that (these denied facts) must have a definite (representable) character.

(70.11). This Contradiction is a contradiction (or cancellation) of Identity.³ If two facts have their stand upon mutual exclusion (if they are correlative) they cannot be identical. This Contradiction is therefore, called Essential Contradiction⁴ (or law of Contradiction), meaning by it that it serves to establish the essence, or the nature, of (all) entities.⁵ By dint of this (law of) Contradiction the essence of (every) reality is established as something «other», (as contrasted with other things)

(70.14). This (visible contrast between all objects of perception) is just the foundation⁶ (of our theory of Negation). If, in perceiving something, we (*eo ipso*) deny something else, we deny it after having (for a moment) imagined its visibility. (70.15) Whether, in pointing to a yellow patch, we deny even⁷ (its own) non-existence or whether we deny that it is a ghost, we can deny only a representable (concrete form of non-existence). Therefore negation is founded exclusively on a repelled suggestion (Negation is then decided) after having (for a moment) imagined the visibility (of the denied fact)

(70.17). And if it is so, (it follows that) when an object is being definitely circumscribed⁸ (by cognition), a representable form of its negation is being (*eo ipso*) repudiated. (not an illimited, infinite form).

(70.17). (Now, when yellow is denied simultaneously with a perception of a patch of blue colour, does this absent yellow include in its turn, also a denial of non-yellow? Yes!) The definite form of non-existence which, (because it is definite), itself includes (another) non-existence,

¹ Cp. above, p 33 17.

² Cp. above, p 33 20

³ I e. the law of Contradiction is the counterpart of the law of Identity

⁴ Cp. Jayanta, p. 59. 10

⁵ Here again *vastu* is used for *vastu* and *avastu*, cp p 70 22

⁶ *ata ccesti vibhaktatva - vyavasthāpanād eva drīyābhyupagama - pūrvaśca*

śāstra-samīpam bhāvayati. Mallav, f. 98

⁷ *abhāvo' pīti na khalo bhūva ity api śabdah*, ibid f 99

⁸ *paricchedyate = pratiyate = jñāyate*.

science and human speech¹ were opposed (by Incompatibility or Contradiction). But that is not the case. Therefore, the inverted concomitance does not hold good. Why? Because it is uncertain. Since there is no opposition, therefore the problem (cannot be solved) And when uncertainty obtains the contraposed concomitance is not established.²

§ 12. THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION.

(67.22) How is it that there is no opposition?³

74. Opposition between objects is of a double kind.

(68.2). There is no opposition between the faculty of omniscience and human speech, because opposition can be only of two kinds, (Efficient Opposition and Contradiction) and no more. What is this double aspect of opposition?

75—76. When (one fact) has duration (as long as) the sum-total of its causes remains unimpaired, and it (then) vanishes as soon as another, (the opposed), fact appears, it follows that both are incompatible, (or efficiently opposed), just as the sensations of heat and cold.

(68.5). Possessing unimpaired causes means having the totality of its causes present. If something owing to deficient causes ceases to exist, it cannot (efficiently) be opposed by something else,⁴ (since it does

¹ The faculty of speech, as is clear from text, p. 67.2, is only quoted as the main characteristic of a human being, all other characteristics are equally meant, we could therefore translate «if omniscience and man were opposed by contradiction»

² Lit., p. 67.19—21. «Such contraposition implying concomitance (*vyāptimān*) would exist between omniscience and the faculty of speech, if they would be opposed. But there is no opposition. Therefore it (the contraposition) does not really exist. Why? He says, because of doubt. Since there is no opposition, therefore there is doubt. Because of doubt contraposition is not real (*asādhya*)».

³ In the following exposition we will translate *virodha* when it refers to both its varieties by «opposition», its first variety by «efficient opposition» or Incompatibility, its second variety by «logical opposition» or Contradiction, resp. law of Contradiction.

⁴ Lit., 68.4—6 «Because of the non-existence, in case another exists, of a lasting possessor of non-deficient causes, there is a conception (*gati*) of opposition.

§ 13. THE UNCERTAIN REASON (CONTINUED).

78. Now, neither of these two kinds of opposition does exist between the faculty of human speech and omniscience

(71.2). Admitting now that there are two kinds of opposition, (it is clear that) neither of them obtains between the faculty of human speech and omniscience.¹ (It cannot be maintained), indeed, that omniscience (as a phenomenon enduring as long as) all the conditions (producing it) are fulfilled, vanishes as soon as human speech appears. Omniscience is really irrepresentable (transcendental). And (according to what has been explained above)² the absence of something irrepresentable³ can never be asserted⁴ (with logical necessity) For this reason (alone) efficient opposition with such a (transcendental entity) is altogether impossible.⁵

(71.4). Neither (does the second variety of opposition, i e, logical contradiction, obtain between these two facts, for it cannot be maintained that) the essence of omniscience consists in the absence of human speech. In this case logs of wood would be omniscient, because they cannot speak. Nor does the essence of the faculty of human speech consist in the absence of omniscience. For if it were so, logs of wood would possess this faculty, because they are not omniscient. Consequently since there is no opposition (of whatsoever a kind), we cannot deduce a denial of omniscience from an affirmation of the faculty of human speech

(71.8) Be it so! But if there were altogether no incompatibility between (omniscience and the faculty of speech), they could have been observed as coexistent, just as a jar and a cloth. This coexistence, however, has never been observed. Could we not think, on the ground of such negative experience,⁶ that (nevertheless some kind of) incom-

¹ Lat., p 71 1 «Further this, albeit double, opposition is impossible for speech and omniscience» *sa ceti caḥ punararthe* (Mallav., f 99).

² Ch II, sūtra 48, cp text p 89 18. transl p 198 n

³ Read *adrśyasya*, cp Mallavādi, f. 99 — *tata eti* (p 71 4), *yato adrśyasya sataḥ sarvajñatvasya nābhāvo* ²*astīyate iaktvīti sati, tataḥ lāṅghānāi*.

⁴ i e, no negative judgment (*adhyavāśāya*) in the real sense of this term is possible, cp above, notes on pp 104 ff

⁵ Lat., p 71 4 «Therefore there is no knowledge (*gati* = *logs pa*) of opposition with it» *aneneṣ sarvajñatvena*, ibid

⁶ *adāśānat*

are neighbours to one another, because if they are located at some distance there is no (efficient) opposition between them.

(68.13) Thus it is that when one (phenomenon) removes the opposite one, (there is a gradual change, and if the change is abrupt), it can do it in no less than in three moments. In the first moment it meets it and becomes ready to produce a condition of non-efficiency. In the second it (actually) reduces the opposite phenomenon to such a condition. In the third it removes and supersedes it¹

(68.16) If this is right,² then light, which represents a moving substance, occupies space spreading gradually by light waves (in the following manner). When it produces the moment of light which follows immediately upon darkness, it (begins) by producing in the neighbouring darkness a condition of non-efficiency. That darkness alone becomes non-efficient which is contiguous with the light, (first moment). When the non-efficient has been removed, (second moment), light springs up in the same place, (third moment) In this manner darkness can be gradually driven away by light. In the same way a hot sensation can be superseded by a cold one

(68.19). But when light springs up (abruptly) just in the place occupied by darkness, (the series of light-moments is the direct continuation of the series of dark moments, there is no antagonism)? (68.20) (However, in that case also there is a moment of darkness which is followed by the final moment of it), the moment which produces no further darkness, and it is just this moment which (must be reckoned as) being also the birth moment of the (future) light. The antagonism³ consists just in the fact that a condition of non efficient (feeble) darkness is produced (after which no further darkness appears). (68.22) Therefore if the change is produced (abruptly, with the utmost) speed, darkness has disappeared in the third moment from the beginning of the process. (From this third

¹ Lat, 68 13-15. "Therefore who of whom is the remover, he removes him, at the utmost, in the third moment. Coinciding in the first moment he is fit to produce a condition of non-efficiency. In the second he makes the opposed unefficient. In the third, when the unefficient has disappeared, he occupies its place", p 68 14 read — *avasthādāna-yogyo*, cp. *Mallavādī*, fol 95, — *asamarthā cāsav avasthā ca īsanāntara-janana-śakti-(ra)hitety arthah, tasyā ādhāna-īṣanam, tatra yogyo bhavati*

² *tatra ity evam sthiti sati* (*Mallavādī*)

³ *martakāram*

as coexisting with the gift of human speech), the presence¹ of the latter (cannot be interpreted as) the presence of something incompatible (with omniscience). Consequently the presence of the former² does not imply the absence of the latter.

(71.15) Similarly we cannot deduce the presence of passions (in an individual) from the fact that he (is a human being and) possesses (the faculty of speech. Because, if speech were the result of passion, we could then deduce the presence of passions from the presence of the faculty of speech, and (*vice versa*) from the extinction of passions the absence of the faculty of human speech. But human speech is not an effect of passions

Why?

80 — because a causal relation between passions and speech has never been established

(71.18) Since passions etc. have never been proved (by induction) to be related to human speech etc. as cause to effect, therefore (speech) is not the effect of passions. Hence we cannot infer the existence of passions from the existence of the faculty of human speech.

(71.20) Let us admit that human speech is not the outcome of passion, it nevertheless can be a coexisting (*phenomenon*), and then the passions being extinct, the faculty of speech can likewise disappear, (because) the accompanying *phenomenon* is absent? To this question we have the following reply,

81. We cannot conclude that the faculty of speech must be absent when something that is not its cause is absent.

(72.2). If something that is not the cause³ of speech is absent, if it is something that merely happens to be (sometimes) coexistent with it, then the other fact, viz., the absence of speech, does not follow (with necessity) Therefore it is (quite) possible that the faculty of speech and extinct passions will be found existing together.

82. Thus the faculty of speech is an uncertain mark. Its (necessary) absence is certainly

¹ *vidhi* = *sattva* = *yod-pa* = *sgrup-pa*, ap Tib, p 162 18, 162 15 and 168. 1.

² *asmād iti taktiyāt* Mullar, p 100.

³ Read *cāhāranasya* in 72 1 and 72.

opposition, since causal efficiency belongs to moments only¹ and not to artificial integrations of these moments into series? Yes,) but although the serial existences are not realities, their members, the moments, are *the* reality. (69.2). Therefore the core of the problem² is the following fact. There is no incompatibility between two moments, but between (two series consisting) of many (moments). Indeed (the incompatibility of heat and cold does not consist in simple difference, but in the fact that) as long as the moments of heat are present, the moments of cold, although being active (forces), are kept down (in a state of suppression)³

(69.4) Efficient opposition is thus marked off by an antagonism between two phenomena having duration. All atoms (on the other hand, possess mere difference), any pair of them cannot occupy the same place,⁴ but there is no efficient opposition between them, because the duration of one atom does not interfere with the duration of another one

(69.5). (But if light has the capacity of stopping the duration of darkness why does it not stop it completely⁵)? Light is a moving substance, when it occupies a place it stops the duration of the con-

place is being produced, just from that (moment) the darkness which is not capable of producing other darkness has been produced. Therefore just the production of an unefficient condition (means) doing it away. And therefore in which moment is the birth-producer, in the third moment from it the opposed is stopped, if it is stopped quickly (69.1). And since there is relation of producer to produced the opposition is of two series, not of two moments»

¹ Cp. above notes on pp. 91 and 121

² *paramārtha*

³ Lit., «The moments of cold, albeit efficient (*pravṛtta*) have the attribute of non-efficiency (*nūrtti-dharmā*)».—They are, so to say, kept in the state of *nūrtina*, the Hinayānist conception of *nūrtina* being just a condition when all the forces (*samskāra*) of life are suppressed to a condition of non-efficiency, cp. my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 28 and 197

⁴ Such was evidently one of the current definitions of contradiction—*ayam eva ca vrodhārthah, yad ekatra ubhāyor anavasthānam*, *Jayanta*, *op cit*, p. 60. In the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, III 1.10—12, *virodha* is defined as a variety of *sambandha* and even non-existence or absence was regarded in later *Nyāya* as residing in its substratum by *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-sambandha* or *svarūpa-sambandha*. Cp. Sigwart, *op cit* p. I 169, — «ein Band welches trennt ist ein Unann», nevertheless contradiction is a relation, and a relation is a connection (*sambandha*)

⁵ Cp. Mallavādi, f. 97 — *atha samīpavarty-andhalāram prati pradīpāder nirvartatave bhūyupagamyamāne sarvāparānā-mādhyasthāndhalārasya pradīpāder nūrttiḥ syān, na ca drśyata ity āśanīyāha*

rence from the existence of the effect (to the existence of its¹ cause). (72.18) The words "produced voluntarily" may indeed (have a double meaning), they may refer to the production (of an object) or to its cognition. Production is identical with the thing produced. But cognition is an effect of the object cognized. The latter is here meant. It is an argument from causation.² Both these arguments,³ (supposing they are adduced to prove the eternity of the sounds of speech), are fallacious and are proving just the contrary.

(72.22). Why is it so?

87. Being absent in similar and present in dissimilar cases, they prove just the contrary.

(73.2). It is certain, that neither the attribute of being produced nor the attribute of being voluntarily produced, are present in similar cases, (i. e., in unchanging eternal entities). On the other hand, their presence in contrary cases only (i. e., in impermanent objects) is certain. Therefore the reverse (of what is needed) is established.

(73.4). Why is it, again, that when the reverse is established the reasons are contrary?

88. They are contrary, because they establish just the inverted (conclusion).

(73.6) They prove the reverse part of the predicate "eternal", i. e., they prove impermanence. Therefore, they are called contrary.⁴

¹ Cp. above, text p. 46.12, transl. p. 126, where it was quoted as an example of an analytical deduction of coexisting attributes.

² Lit., "Therefore an effect-reason."

³ For his Table of Reasons (*Hetu-cahira*) Dignāga wants two varieties of reasons to the contrary, just as he has also two varieties of correct reasons. For the details of this interesting question we must refer to the impending edition and translation of Dignāga's work. Since he wanted an analytical and a causal deduction to the contrary, he modified the inference *śabdo' nityaḥ, prayatnānantariya-lakṣaṇāt* into the form of *śabdo' nityaḥ, prayatnānantariyaka-jñāna-utpādanāt*. *antīyatra* is here the same as *sattha*, and existence is posited as the cause of its willful cognition. The exact interpretation of this strange example has given rise to many divergent views among Indian and Tibetan logicians.

⁴ The author establishes three varieties of the fallacy of a contrary reason. Two of them contradict an explicitly stated major, viz., 1) sound is eternal, because it is a product, 2) sound is eternal, because it produces knowledge by a conscious effort. Both reasons, the one coexisting with, (analytical), the other succeeding to,

Mutual exclusion means complete separation (diametrical opposition, without anything intermediate). If two facts have the essence, or possess the nature, consisting in such mutual exclusion, they (are correlative, they) have their stand in mutual contradiction.

(69.22). When something on earth¹ is definitely cognized, (something else is always at the same time) excluded, the essence of the distinctly cognized has its stand on a contrast with the excluded. (70 1) When (a patch) of blue is being definitely cognized, its non-identity² (the non-blue) is (eo ipso) excluded. If it were not excluded we would have no cognition of blue.³ Therefore existence and non-existence of a reality (its affirmation and negation, are correlative, their) essence is mutual exclusion,⁴ (the one is nothing but the negation of the other)

negation)» — It is clear that in these words we have a definition of the Law of Contradiction, so much discussed in European Logic from Aristoteles through Leibnitz, Kant and Sigwart up to the modern logicians. It is therefore of the highest importance to realize the exact meaning of the Indian view. It will be noticed, first of all, that there is no difference between a contradiction of concepts and a contradiction between judgments, the terms *bhāva* = *vidhi* = *vastu*, Tib *god-pa* = *agrub-pa* = *dños-po* being synonymous, cp E. Obermiller's Index of N b t. The term «blue» in logic always means the judgment «this is blue», it is a synthesis of «thisness» and «thatness», it is contrasted with the mere reflex of the blue (*pratibhāva*), an unascertained reflex which has no place in logic. Thus in the quarrel between Aristoteles and Sigwart, *op. cit.* I 118 ff., on the one side, and Kant on the other, the Indian view will fall in line rather with the first party. The contradiction is virtually between the judgments «this is blue» and «this is not blue».

¹ *śhet jagati*, cp Mallavādi, f. 97

² *tādūpya-pracyuti* = *tādātmya-abhāva* «loss of identity» or «non-identity». The term *tādūpya-pracyuti-vyavaccheda* or, as below p 70 18, *sta-pracyuti* means that if A is A it is excluded that A is non A or, in other words, that the law of Identity is the counterpart of the law of Contradiction. From this point of view the law of Contradiction expresses the impossibility of contradiction between subject and predicate of the same analytical judgment, this would correspond to the Leibnitz-Kant formulation of the law. We have seen above, p. 182 ff., that Dharmakīrti, avails himself of the term *tādātmya* to designate also a quite different identity, the existential identity which Sigwart, *op. cit.*, I. 111, calls law of Agreement (*Uebereinstimmung*)

³ i. e., if the judgment «this is not blue» were not excluded we would not have the judgment «this is blue».

⁴ Lat., 70 2—8 «Therefore being and non-being of a real object possess an essence (*rūpa* = *svarūpa*) having its stand on mutual exclusion» — Since the terms *vastu*, *vidhi*, *bhāva* (Tib *dños-po*, *agrub-pa*, *god-pa*) are used as synonyms, cp the note above, the sentence means that reality and unreality, affirmation and negation, existence and non-existence are correlative.

«they are composite substances», this is the reason. (73.16). Indeed, the eye and other organs (are physical they) consist of an assemblage of atoms,¹ therefore they are called composite. On the other hand, beds and chairs etc. are requisites, because they are commodities to be enjoyed by man. This is the example which proves the general proposition (On the authority of) this example the fact of having a composite nature is supposed to be subordinate to the fact of being serviceable to somebody else. Since beds, chairs etc. have a composite nature and they are serviceable to the man who uses them, therefore they are called requisites.

(73.21). How does this reason contradict an admitted principle?

91. It is a contrary reason, because it proves just the reverse of (the principle) admitted by the (disputant), viz, the reverse of an existence for the sake of a simple substance.

(74.2). To exist for the sake of something simple, means to have an aim directed towards something simple. This principle, the existence of the composite for the sake of the simple, is admitted by the disputant who is a Sāṅkhya philosopher. The opposite of it is existence for the sake of something composite. Since it proves the opposite the reason is self-contradictory. (74.4) (Indeed), the Sāṅkhya maintains that the Soul exists. The Buddhist asks, why is that? The other then adduces a proof for establishing the existence of the Soul (74.5). Thus it is that the point to be proved is that the sense-organs are serviceable to the Soul which is a simple substance. But this principle implies just the contrary. Indeed, when one thing helps the other, it is efficient in regard of the latter. And the effect is always something composite either from the start or gradually. Thus it is, therefore, that (the proposition) «the senses are not independent substances» means, that they exist for the sake of some composite substance, (not for the sake of a simple one).

(74.9). This variety of a self-contradictory argument has been established by our Master Dignāga. How is it that you (Dharmakīrti), being the author of a Commentary on his work, have omitted it?

¹ E.g., the organ of vision consists in atoms of transparent matter (*rūpa-prasāda*) located on the surface of the eye-ball in concentric circles, cp my *Central Conception*, p. 12 ff.

existing objects, (sc. coloured points), patches of blue etc., consists in point-instants, therefore this fact has no limits. If we exclude (all) point-instants, nothing (real will remain) that could be apprehended.

(70.9) If that is so, (viz. if this bare form of existence is unlimited and indefinite, its counterpart) non-existence will be equally unlimited? Why? (Why) indeed should it be unlimited? In so far as this non-existence has the (definite) shape of the repudiation of a real object (whose presence) has been imagined,¹ (it is not unlimited).²

(70.10). (And since this is an imagined concrete case of non-existence), therefore³ when we (in a negative judgment) distinctly

sense of a representable blue on a substratum on which it could have been present and on which its presence can be imagined. The term *niyata-ākāra* means here exactly the reverse of what is designated above by the term *niyata-pratibhāsa*, text p. 8—9, although *ākāra* and *ābhāsa* (= *pratibhāsa*) are quoted as synonyms, p. 15 9—10 and N Kanikā, p. 184 16 *anyata-pratibhāsa* is meant. We find the term *anyata* applied to an object not restricted to a present moment in Aś Kōśabh. ad I. 23. Thus *niyata-ākāra* corresponds to *anyata-pratibhāsa*. The term *nirūpa-abhāva* which is also used as a characteristic of the excluded counterpart of an idea must be interpreted so that it should not conflict with *niyata-ākāra-abhāva*, cp below, text 79. 10,—*abhāvo hi nirūpo yūdrō vilāpina darśitah*, cp Jayanta, op cit, p. 52 8.

¹ *vastu-rūpa-enikā-ākārah kalpitā 'bhāvaḥ = kalpitā-anupalambhah = drśya-anupalabdhiḥ*

² Here evidently Dh. hits upon the problem of an infinite or unlimited (unendlich, unbegrenzt, *αοιωτος*) judgment. The judgment «this is non-blue» will be according to Aristotle, Kant, Cohen and others infinite. According to Sigwart, op cit, I 157, the predicate alone is infinite, but the judgment is affirmative. This is denied by Wundt. The infinite judgment endures the taunts of Lotze, Logik, p. 61—62 and is highly vindicated by Cohen, Logik der Erkenntnis, ch. I. According to Sigwart the law of Contradiction obtains only between the pair of judgments «this is blue» and «this is not blue», the first is affirmative, the second negative. Vis-à-vis this confusion in European logic the position of the Buddhist logician is quite clear: the judgments «this is not blue» and «this is non-blue» are both negative, they refer to the same fact. As every negation they express not something unlimited, an *av* (*abhāva-mātram* = *anyata-ākāram*), but only the repudiation of a thing whose presence has been imagined (*drśya-anupalabdhiḥ*). As to the problem of an infinite predicate or name, *ονομα αοιωτος* it is very much discussed by the Buddhists under the head of their theory of naming according to which all names, when viewed from a certain point of view, are infinite or, as Sigwart, loco cit, puts it, «limitless», not really positive but only «limiting» (*apoha*). This theory exhibits some remarkable points of analogy with Cohen's view of the infinite judgment as the foundation of a universal category of thought. Vācaspati-miśra's exposition of the Buddhist theory of naming (*apoha*) will be translated in an Appendix.

³ *tata itī yataḥ kalpitā 'bhāvas tataḥ kāranaṭ* (Mallaṭ, f. 98)

§ 15. ANOTHER FALLACY OF AN UNCERTAIN REASON.

(75.4). What fallacy ensues when one aspect of the reason is wrong and the other is uncertain?

95. When one of the two forms¹ is wrong and the other dubious, the reason becomes uncertain

(75.4). When the reverse of both these aspects of the reason is ascertained, the reason is contrary. When one of them is wrong and the other dubious, the reason is uncertain.

(75.6). What form has it? The author answers,

96. An example —

(Thesis) Someone is passionless or someone is omniscient.

(Reason). Because he possesses the faculty of speech.

(Major premise) (Whosoever is a human being possessing the faculty of speech is omniscient and passionless).

The contraposition is here wrong, the positive concomitance uncertain

(75.9) "Free from passions" is one predicate, "omniscient" is another one. "Because he possesses the faculty of speech" is the reason. The contraposition gives a wrong judgment. Our own personal experience teaches us that the reason is present in dissimilar cases, that a person who has passions and who is not omniscient is nevertheless not deprived of the faculty of speech². Therefore, the general

¹ The second and the third aspect of the logical reason are alone here alluded to, its presence in similar cases only and its absence in every dissimilar case *alias* the major premise in its direct and its contraposed form. The first aspect of the reason or its presence upon the subject of the conclusion, *alias* the minor premise, is here left out of account; its deficiency has been treated above in sūtras III 59—67.

² *Ist*, p. 75 10—11. "Just in the self which has passions and is non-omniscient, in the dissimilar case, the fact of speech is seen"

is also repudiated as an imaginable (concrete form of non-existence). Therefore those objects which are excluded (according to the law of Contradiction, when something is definitely cognized), are excluded together with all the negations which they themselves include. Thus it is that the identity is denied (of all correlative objects, i. e., of all) objects the essence of which consists in mutual exclusion.¹

(70.20). This kind of contradiction does not prevent coexistence (in close contiguity) Thus the two kinds of opposition have different functions. By one of them the identity of cold and heat is precluded, by the other their contiguous coexistence. They also have different spheres of application. The (law) of Contradiction (is logical), it regards all objects, whether real or not. But (Incompatibility or) impossibility of coexistence refers to a limited number of real (occurrences) only. Thus they have different functions and different spheres of application. Hence (if cannot be maintained that) they mutually include one another.²

¹ Lit., p 70 17—19. «And the definite form possessing the non-existence of that, it is also excluded as representable, therefore, just as one's own non-existence, the possessors of non-existence are likewise excluded. Thus the possessors of an essence which has its stand on mutual exclusion are all by this denied to be identical»

² Thus the Buddhists have established, 1) a general law of Contradiction which has two aspects, a) what can be termed its Identity-aspect according to which every thing and every idea excludes its own non-existence, and b) its Difference aspect according to which every thing and every idea has its own character different from others 2) Besides this the Buddhists have their law of Otherness (*viruddha-dharma-samsarga*), cp above p 8, note 2, according to which every variation of place, time and quality make the object «another» object, this law reduces everything to point-instants and cancels individual identity altogether. 3) Among the «different» real objects there are some that are antagonistic inasmuch as the duration of the one is repugnant to the duration of the other (*sahāna-vasthāna*) 4) Among the non-repugnant attributes there are some that are coherent, belong to the same object, they are declared to be existentially identical, (*tādātmya*), e. g., a tree and an oak. The contrary opposition which is assumed in some European logics between the extreme members of a series, as between white and black, and the contradiction between general and particular judgments is not taken notice of in Buddhist logic Sigwart, *op cit* I 178, remarks that an almost Babylonian confusion reigns in European logic in the application of the terms contrary, contradicting, opposed, repugnant etc. This makes the task of translating Indian conceptions extremely difficult Sigwart himself, *op cit*, I § 22, establishes a difference between a predicate which is absent from the subject and a predicate which is incompatible with it. this difference, to a certain extent, corresponds to the difference established by *Dharma-kīrti* between general opposition (or contradiction) and efficient incompatibility.

not, (will always remain) a problem. Therefore we will never be able to decide whether omniscience can be deduced from the faculty of speech or not. The reason is uncertain.

§ 16. WHAT FALLACY ENSUES WHEN BOTH ASPECTS OF THE REASON ARE UNCERTAIN

(75.17). It will now be stated, that when both the aspects of the reason are dubious, the reason is (also) uncertain.

98. When there is doubt regarding these same two forms of the reason, the fallacy is (also) called uncertain.

(75.19) When the same forms, i.e., the general proposition and its contraposition are dubious, the reason itself is dubious.

99. (Thesis). The living body is endowed with a Soul.

(Reason). Because it possesses breath and other (animal functions)¹

¹ We find the argument inferring the existence in a body of a substantial Soul from the presence in it of animal functions, already adumbrated in Vaiś 8, III 2 4. It was included by Dignāga in his Hetu-cakra as a logical fallacy of a counter-mimous (*asādhūraṇa*) reason. Uddyotakara, opposing Dignāga, took it up and vindicated it as a valid reason. He thus was led to establish the theory of logical reasons supported by negative examples alone (*kevala-vyāptirekṣā*). He also interpreted the Method of Residues (*śeṣavad-anumāna*) as an inference from negative instances only and applied to it the term of *avāṅta-hetu* which in the Sāhhyā school was the current designation of the Method of Difference (*vaśīkarmayāsa*). N. Karmadali, p. 208, Jayanta, p. 496 and 577, accepts the theory. After some fluctuations it was finally incorporated into the amalgamated system by Gaṅgeśa, cp. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, p. II 582 ff., and has become one of the characteristic features of modern Nyāya, cp. on it H. Jacob: in *90 A* 1919, p. 9 ff. and art. *Vita* und *Avita* in R. Garbe's *Festschrift*. As fallacy it occupies in Dignāga's system of possible logical reasons the central position, it is the most barren, so to say, reason, so barren that it almost is no reason at all. The function of a logical reason is to determine the position of a subject between similar and dissimilar cases and thus to connect it through similarity with its logical predicate. But in this case there are no similar and no dissimilar cases at all, the subject being counter-mimous with the fact adduced as a reason. Since the predicate and its negation contain in themselves all things cognizable, the supposed reason, so far it is a real fact, must be contained somewhere among them, but there is absolutely no possibility to determine whether it is contained therein one part or in the other. The argument, according to Dig-

patibility obtains between them, and then conclude, on the ground of this incompatibility, that (the presence of the one implies) the absence of the other?

This supposition is rejected in the following words.¹

79. Even when a fact has never been observed, its non-existence cannot be deduced from the presence of another fact, if the latter has not been established (by experience) as incompatible with it.²

(71.11). Even if (omniscience) has never been actually observed, (in a speaker), the existence of the³ (faculty of speech) cannot be (interpreted) as the existence⁴ of something incompatible (with omniscience). Although (it is true) that both facts have never been observed together, this does not mean that there is incompatibility between them, because incompatibility is not established through the mere fact that they never have been observed together. On the contrary (it is established) through our conviction⁵ that among two (equally) observable facts the presence of the one blots out the presence of the other.⁶ (71.13). Therefore although (the gift of omniscience has never been observed

¹ Lit. p 71 8—9 «Be it (so)» If opposition does not exist at all, (we) could also observe their coexistence, just as of a jar and a cloth. But from non-observation opposition (would) follow. And from opposition non-existence (would) follow? Having thus emitted a doubt he says.—The introduction of Vinītadeva. p. 117. 11—13, is, as usual, more simple. «Let there be no opposition, if it is nevertheless asked whether speech can exclude omniscience also without any opposition (between them), the answer is . . . » Dh. has complicated the problem by the useless example of jar and cloth. In his comment Mallavādi remarks that for the sake of argument we must imagine that a jar and a cloth are two attributes predicable of the same subject, — (*ghata*)-*patayoḥ samānādhikāraṇyaṁ syād ity api sam-bhāvāne* (f 100)

² Lit. p 71 10 «And from the affirmation of the non opposed (= non incompatible) even if there is non-perception, non-existence does not follow» —The term «affirmation» *vidhi* is here synonymous with «reality» (*astiti*) or «existence» or «presence» or a perceptual judgment, cp. above text, p 24. 16

³ *ayam* «*takṛtvādhī*», Mallav, f 100

⁴ *vidhi* = *bhāva*

⁵ (*adhy-*) *avasthāyāt*, lit «through a judgment», in the direct meaning of the term judgment, as implying an assertory attitude towards some reality by logical necessity. Vinītadeva says, «we cannot believe» (*vid-ches-par mī nūc-so*) in its absence» (p 117.16).

⁶ *anarīya-matīṅga-bhāva*

ved.¹ (76.9). A fact which points to an indefinite position of the subject between two mutually exclusive attributes is a source of doubt. A fact which is not capable of doing even that (is no reason at all), it is a source of ignorance. A fact which points to a definite position of the subject between two (opposed) possibilities is (either a right logical reason), or it may also be just a contrary one.²

(76.11). Therefore, if there are only two all-embracing possibilities and no certainty that the subject is present upon only one of them, this will give rise to doubt. (76.12) On the other hand, (if there are instances) proving the presence (of the reason either in the one or in the other class), if we are certain that it is definitely present (only on one side), the reason will be, (as stated above, either a right one) or just the contrary (of a right one, in any case it will not be indefinite). (76.13). But if we are certain that it is indefinite, it then can be either 1) an overwide mark (pervading not alone the subject of the inference, but all the similar and dissimilar instances as well³), or 2) a reason whose exclusion from the dissimilar instances is subject to doubt,⁴ or

¹ Lit., «could not point to a subject non-disjoint from one attribute among the two», i. e., could point to a subject disjoint from one of the attributes, and consequently conjoint with the other.

² E. g., both propositions «Socrates is mortal, because so many persons are known to have died», and «Socrates is immortal, because so many persons are known to have died» have that feature in common that the position of the middle term «man», although right in the first case and wrong in the second, is in both cases definite; in the first proposition it is represented as present in similar and, *eo ipso*, absent in dissimilar instances, in the second it is, on the contrary, represented as present in dissimilar cases, i. e., in cases of immortality, and absent, *eo ipso*, in similar cases, or in cases of mortality. It is indispensable to mention both these combinations because in Dignāga's system of logical reasons they fill up definite places assigned to them.

³ Example see above, text p. 68.7, transl. p. 181, «the sounds of speech are eternal entities, because they are cognizable». Cognizable are both the similar eternal entities, like the Cosmic Ether or Space, and the dissimilar impermanent entities, like pots etc. The presence of the reason is equally ascertainable on both sides, hence no conclusion is possible.

⁴ Example cp. above, text p. 68.10, transl. p. 182, «the sounds of speech are wilfully produced, because they are impermanent». There are two classes of objects, they are either wilfully produced or produced without the intervention of a personal will. Wilfully produced are pots etc., and impermanence is present on them. But existing without the intervention of a personal will are both permanent objects as the Cosmical Ether and impermanent things like lightning etc. The position of the reason is uncertain, since it is only partly excluded from the dissimilar cases.

cases (where there is the gift of omniscience and passions are extinct) is subject to doubt

(72.5). Therefore the faculty of human speech is an uncertain reason, since its absence in (all) contrary cases is subject to doubt. (The contrary cases are) omniscience which is the contrary of non-omniscience¹ and extinct passions which is the contrary of efficient passions.

§ 14. THE CONTRARY REASON.

(72.7) After having thus explained the fallacies which are incurred when a single aspect of the logical reason (viz, its first aspect or its third aspect) is either wrong or uncertain, the (author) now goes on to explain the fallacies which are incurred when two aspects together are either wrong or uncertain

88. When the reverse of two aspects of the (adduced) reason is true, (the fallacy is called) a contrary (or inverted) reason.

(72.10). When two forms of the reason are wrong, the reason is inverted. But the reason has three aspects. In order to specify (the two wrong aspects), it is asked,

84—86. What are the two? Its presence in similar and absence in dissimilar cases. E.g, the attributes of being a product, or of being voluntarily produced, become contrary reasons, if the eternality of the sounds of speech is to be deduced from them

(72.14). The two particular aspects are being specified.

(72.17) They are the presence of the reason (only) in similar cases and its absence from (every) dissimilar case. We must connect (these words with the preceding ones and understand), when the contrary part of both these aspects is true, (the reason becomes an inverted one) The fact of being a product is an analytical reason.² The fact of being voluntarily produced (must be understood here) as an infe-

¹ The syllogism is stated in sūtra III, 71, the major term is non-omniscience, the dissimilar or contrary cases are cases of omniscience.

² Cp above, sūtra III, 18, transl p 123.

(76.15). Therefore (the author now proceeds) to indicate the two causes why an attribute conterminous (with the subject of the inference) can produce no certainty.

100. Because except the class of entities possessing a Soul, and the class not possessing it, there is no (third) group where animal functions are found

(76.18) «Possessing a Soul» is an entity wherein the Soul exists. «Non-possessing it» is that wherein it is absent. There is no group, different from them, wherein breath etc. should be present as a real attribute. Therefore it gives rise to uncertainty

(76.21). Why is it that there is no other group?

101. Because presence and absence of the Soul embrace between them every existing object.

(77.2). Presence of the Soul is its existence. It is contrasted with non-existence.¹ Both embrace, i. e., include, every existing reality. Where Soul exists, we have an entity possessing a Soul. All other

dharma) is a cause (*hetu* = *rgyu*) of doubt from two causes (*kāraṇa* = *rgyu*). Because which two forms are the object of doubt in them every existing object is included, and because there is no certainty of (its) presence even in one of these two pervasive forms. There is no doubt regarding those two forms in which two forms all existing objects are not included. Because when another form occurs, the attribute of the subject will not be capable of showing the subject as non-dissolved from one attribute among the two, therefore it will not be a cause (*hetu* = *rgyu*) of doubt. (70.9) The thing showing an indefinite existence between two attributes is a cause (*hetu* = *rgyu*) of doubt. But a thing incapable of showing even an indefinite existence among two attributes is a cause (*hetu* = *rgyu*) of non-cognition. A reason (*hetu* = *gtan-thigs*) showing a definite position is eventually (or) contrary. (76.11) Therefore by which two (possibilities) every thing existing is included, for them there is a cause (*hetu* = *rgyu*) of doubt, if there is no certainty of the presence also in one among them. But if there is certainty of presence, if there is certainty of definite (-exclusive) presence in one place, the reason (*hetu* = *gtan-thigs*) can eventually be a contrary one. But if there is certainty of non-exclusive (*anyata*) existence, it will be generally uncertain or uncertain as to the exclusion from dissimilar cases or doubtfully concomitant or wrong as to exclusion. But if there will be uncertainty as to its presence even in one place, it will be a non-shared uncertain (reason). Note the double translation in Tibetan of *hetu* either by *rgyu* = *kāraṇa*, or by *gtan-thigs* = *linga*.

¹ Lat., p. 77.2 «The presence of the Soul is its real existence, its exclusion is its non-existence».

§ 15. A REASON CONTRADICTING AN ADMITTED PRINCIPLE.

(73.8). If these two arguments, (the one analytical, the other causal), are fallacious contrary arguments, because they prove just the reverse (of what they were supposed to prove), then¹ the major term (of which the reverse is thus being proved, must) be explicitly stated in the syllogism, it cannot remain unexpressed. We have however stated above² that the point to be deduced is (sometimes understood) without being explicitly mentioned. Therefore an argument which contradicts a (tacitly) admitted principle will constitute a separate, (third variety of this fallacy). Alluding to this (circumstance the author) says,

89. There is a third variety of a self-contradictory argument? That which contradicts a (tacitly) admitted principle.

(73.11). Has not a third variety of the contrary reason been given? Two of them prove the contrary of what is expressed. The third is destructive of an admitted principle which is not explicitly stated.

(73.13). An example is given.

90. This is an example —

(Thesis). The sense of vision and other senses are serviceable to another one's needs

(Reason) Because they are composite substances.

(Example). Just as beds, chairs and other requisites³

(73.15) "The eye and other sense-organs", this is the subject. They participate in the production of a foreign purpose, of another's aim, or they really create such an (object) The words "they are serviceable to another one's needs" — express the consequence. Because

(causal), the major term, are similar since they establish the same inverted conclusion explicitly stated, cp Mallavādi, f. 101, — *tata ut* (p. 78 6) *viparyaya-sādhanaḥ ity anayoḥ samānādhikaranyam*.

¹ Cp Mallavādi, f. 101, — *uktam ce te* (p. 73 8) *cas tathārthe*.

² Cp sūtra III 47, transl. p. 157.

³ Cp. above, sūtra III 49, transl. p. 159

tain when it is either overwide (trespassing into the sphere of dissimilar instances, whether embracing all of them or only a part), or when it is over-narrow (conterminous with the subject). The (author) now introduces the minor premise, giving it the form as though it were a conclusion.

104. Therefore, since it is not proved that animal functions inherent in a living body exclude it either from the class of all objects possessing a Soul or from all objects not possessing any, (it is impossible to point out that one among) these two groups in which they are necessarily absent

(77 19). The words "animal functions inherent in a living body" point to the minor premise. Since there is no certainty of the absence of the mark in neither of both groups, therefore it does not exclude (the living body, neither out of the one group, nor out of the other) If it were a real attribute necessarily present in one of the two all-embracing groups, it (*eo ipso*) would have been absent in the other. Therefore it is said, "since it is not established that (animal functions in a living body) exclude it either from all entities having a Soul or from all entities not having any Soul etc...". Animal functions are absent in some objects only, e.g., in jars etc. So much alone is certain. But we do not know precisely whether it is absent in all objects having or in all objects not having a Soul. We do not know that it is necessarily absent in the whole of the one or (in the whole) of the other group. It cannot, therefore, be necessarily excluded out of neither of them.

(78.5). But then perhaps the positive concomitance of animal functions with one of the two groups is certain?

105—106. Neither is there any positive concomitance, because (the necessary presence of the reason) in one of the groups is also not established

(78.7). Not animal functions are not necessarily concomitant with either of the (two groups), neither with the group of those having a Soul, nor with the group of those who have none. Why is that? (78.10). Because its presence in one of the two groups, either in that where there is a Soul, or in that where there is no Soul, is not established. That animal functions are a real attribute to be found some-

92 Why is it not mentioned here (as a separate variety)? Because it is implied in the two other ones.

(74.14). It might be objected that this contrary reason does not prove the reverse of what is expressed. How is it then, that it is included in the foregoing ones?

93. It does not differ from them, in that it proves the reverse of the consequence.

(74.16). (It is included in the former ones), because such a reason which contradicts an admitted tenet, does not differ from them, inasmuch as it proves the reverse of the predicate which it is intended to establish. Just as the previous two forms prove the reverse, so is also this one. Whether it proves or not the reverse of the words expressing it, does not matter. Therefore it is necessarily included in them.

(74.19) If someone would object that the predicate to be deduced must necessarily be expressed, and ask how it is then that the latter form (of fallacy) is identical with the preceding two in proving the reverse of the predicate, the author answers,

94. There is indeed no material difference between an expressed and an intended predicate.

(74.21). Since there is no distinction, no difference whatsoever, between what is expressed as a predicate and what it is intended (really to prove), therefore this last form of the contrary reason is implied in the former two. Such is our conclusion.¹

(74.22) Every section (in a scientific treatise) is devoted to some fact which has been challenged² by the opponent. To establish this fact is the aim (of the disputant). Whether this aim is explicitly stated or implicitly understood, makes no difference, because (according to our opinion) there is no necessity of explicitly stating the point which must be established, (when it is understood implicitly)⁴ There is thus no (material) difference (between the last and the former two varieties of a contrary argument).⁵

¹ *upasaṃhāra*

² *āpanna*

³ *jyāñāṣita*

⁴ Cp. above, sūtra III. 47-49

⁵ Lat., p. 75. 1—2 «And what has fallen into the section is objectivized by the wish to prove it. A probandum is admitted whether expressed or not expressed, but not exclusively just the expressed is the probandum. Therefore no difference».

ther of the presence or of the absence — is inseparable from the affirmation¹ of the other, of the second (alternative). (Denial) necessarily implies affirmation.

(79.1). Such is the condition. For this reason (the Buddhist's Soul-denial is here irrelevant). Since one negative certainty implies the (correlative) positive certainty, therefore both alternatives cannot be simultaneously true

(79.3). Why is it again that the denial of one (alternative) necessarily implies the affirmation of the other?

This question is answered —

109. The necessary presence and the necessary absence² (of animal functions wheresoever a Soul is absent), (these two facts) are exclusive of one another. Since neither of them can be established, (the adduced reason for proving the existence of a Soul) is uncertain, (it proves nothing).

(79.6) The mutual exclusion of two facts means that the absence (of the one is equivalent to the presence of the other) This alone is the essence³ of both (the facts in question). Thus their relation⁴ constitutes their essence.⁴ For this reason (the argument is uncertain).

(79.7) The positive and the inverted connection (of the middle term are here nothing but its) presence and absence Presence and absence (of the same thing) are by their essence mutually exclusive. (According to the Law of Contradiction) when something is delimited by its difference from something else, it takes its stand upon this contrast.⁵ (79.9). Now, presence can be defined as an absence of its own absence, (as a double negation). Thus the presence of something takes its stand upon an exclusion of its own negation. (79.10). Negation (or non-existence) is again, (according to our theory of Negation⁶) the absence of a (definite) form⁷ of it, (a form representable), con-

¹ *bhāva-nidāya*.

² *anāya-vyatiraka* = *bhāva-abhāva*

³ *rūpa* = *svarūpa*.

⁴ *bhāva*

⁵ Cp. above, text p. 69 22—70 3, transl. p. 193

⁶ Cp. above, cp. II, sūtra 26 ff.

⁷ *nirūpa-abhāva*, lit. formless or illimited negation but here the negation of a definite form must be understood, otherwise the passage would stand in glaring

proposition is wrong when contraposed. In its positive form it is uncertain.¹ Why?

97. Since omniscience and (absolute) absence of passions are inaccessible to experience, it is uncertain whether the gift of speech coexists (with these attributes) or not.

(75.14). Omniscient beings and beings (absolutely) without passions constitute the similar instances (from which the generalization is to be drawn by induction). They are inaccessible (to experience),² they are metaphysical.³ The faculty of speech, on the other hand, is a faculty known from experience. Whether this faculty is present with them,⁴ i. e., with transcendental omniscient and passionless beings, or

¹ The positive form of the major premise will be,

Whoever possesses the faculty of speech is omniscient.

Its contraposition will be,

Whoever is non-omniscient does not possess the faculty of speech.

Although it has been established above, sūtra III. 28 ff. that concomitance and its contraposition are equipollent and always express implicitly the same fact, nevertheless in a fallacious syllogism the one may be wrong and the other only uncertain. Here the contraposition is proved by personal experience to be wrong. This same experience, one would think, is sufficient to explode the positive form of the major premise *modo tollente*, but it is here treated as though it had the form of the proposition «all omniscient beings possess the faculty of speech» and is then rejected on the ground that omniscient beings are beyond our experience. It is a matter of course that no such syllogism has ever been maintained by any school. The Jains have maintained that the founder of their religion was omniscient because he has preached their religion. Other Jains are reported to have considered the knowledge of astronomy as a token of omniscience, cp. below sūtra III. 181. The Buddhists, on the contrary, have maintained that preaching (*upadeśa-pranayanam*) is a mark of non-omniscience, since conceptual thought (*vikalpa*) and speech can express only limited, imputed knowledge, cp. N. kanikā, p. 112—118. It is nevertheless a tenet in Mahāyāna that Buddha, the Absolute Being, is Omniscient, but this cannot be established by logical methods. Here the terms are arranged in every possible combination, from a formal stand point, for didactical purposes, without any reference to real tenets. It has become usual among Tibetan logicians to choose quite senseless examples in order better to impress the rules of formal logic. An inference of the form «all goats are sheep because they are cows» is considered to be well suited to exemplify an inference where all the three aspects of the reason are wrong.

² *apraśaṅgā*

³ *anāndriyatā*.

⁴ *tatra*.

bent upon them to admit that) logically¹ (the existence of a Soul remains a problem). (So far the adduced reason can prove nothing), both its presence (in living bodies) and its absence (in lifeless things) are not proved. (79 17). Just because there are no facts which could (by the methods of Agreement and Difference) establish beyond the possibility of doubt the presence of an (eternal) Soul (on the one side) and its absence (on the other), just therefore (the existence of animal functions can decide nothing), neither can it prove the presence nor the absence (of a Soul). (79.18). But if we had facts establishing beyond doubt the impossibility of one horn of the dilemma, these very facts would (*eo ipso*) establish the necessity of the other horn, and there could be no doubt at all (regarding the question where animal functions) are present and where they are absent (79.20). But since this is not the case, just therefore we fluctuate between an affirmation and a denial. Doubt produces an uncertain reason. That is what (the author) has expressed (in the aphorism).²

¹ *pramāṇa* here in the sense of evidence, of facts from which a valid conclusion is possible.

² *Āt.*, p. 79. 4—21. «Because concomitance and contraposition (or presence and absence) have the essence of mutual exclusion, just therefore, because of doubt regarding concomitance and contraposition, it is uncertain (79 6) Mutual exclusion is (mutual) non-existence. Just this is the essence of them both. Their relation (*dhātva*) is their essence. For this reason (the terms) concomitance and contraposition are (here used in the sense of) existence and non-existence. And existence and non-existence have both the essence of mutual exclusion. By whose exclusion what is defined, by its opposition to that is it established. Existence is defined by the exclusion of its own non-existence. Therefore existence is settled through an exclusion of its own non-existence. (79 10). Non-existence, indeed, is formless in so far it is shown by imagination (as it is the absence of an imagined form) By excluding formlessness a form possessing an image is defined. If this is so, the non-existence of concomitance (presence) is contraposition (absence), and the non-existence of contraposition (absence) is concomitance (presence). Therefore, when the non-existence of concomitance (presence) is ascertained, contraposition (absence) is being ascertained, and when the non-existence of contraposition (absence) is ascertained, concomitance (presence) is being ascertained (79.18) Therefore if, for sure, the possessor of a Soul is no reality and the non-possessor of a Soul is reality, nevertheless there is no certainty of the non-existence in them of both the presence and absence of breath etc., because, since the existence and non-existence at once of one thing is contradiction, the certainty of the non-existence of both is impossible (79 16) And the two things having and not having a Soul are not real and unreal in accordance with the opponent (the Buddhist), but in accordance with evidence, thus they are both uncertain. Therefore there is doubt of existence and non-existence concerning the possession of breath etc. in them both. Just because

(76.2) «Is endowed with a Soul» is the predicate. «The body» is the subject. The «living body» is a qualification. When the body is dead, the existence in it of the Soul is not admitted (by the advocates of a substantial Soul). «Breath» means taking in breath and other attributes of a sentient being, like opening and shutting the eyes etc. The fact that the living body possesses these attributes is the reason.

(76.5) This fact gives rise to uncertainty (as to whether a Soul really exists in it or not), since it is over-narrow,¹ (i. e., it is found in the living body exclusively, the reason is conterminous with the subject).

Indeed, the presence of the middle term upon the minor² produces³ doubt (as to the presence there of the major term) owing to two causes. (The first is) that a dilemma is produced of which the two horns embrace together every thing existing.⁴ (The second is) that we do not know which of these two comprehensive classes includes (the fact representing our logical reason, or middle term). (76.7). If these two classes did not embrace together every thing existing, (if some evidence from similar and dissimilar cases would have been available), there would be no doubt, because there being other (similar) instances the minor premise⁵ (would then be confirmed by evidence drawn from them), one of the horns of the dilemma would be cancelled and the doubt sol-

nāga, reduces to the formula «sound is eternal because it is heard», which is as valid as the contrary judgment «sound is non-eternal because it is heard» According to the Naiyāyikas there are contrary cases, viz., inanimate things, jars etc., from which animal functions are excluded, and this proves by mere dissimilarity the existence of a Soul. But according to the Buddhists there is no exclusion from dissimilar cases, if there is no inclusion in the similar ones. The Buddhists deny the existence of the Soul as a separate substance. Mahāyāna denies also the existence of all eternal substances and applies the term existence only to what is causally efficient (*artha-līyā-lāra*). But the question whether the Soul really exists, or whether eternally unchanging substances really exist, is here left out of account, and the question is taken from the logical side only, which must be binding even to the advocates of the existence of a Soul

¹ *asādhāraṇa*

² *pakṣa-dharma*.

³ *hetu* = *lāraṇa* = Tib *rgyu*.

⁴ Viz., the living body possessing animal functions, as according to the law of excluded middle, either is or is not the possessor of a Soul. The possessors and non-possessors of a Soul represent together all things existing

⁵ The minor premise (*pakṣa-dharma*) here must be imagined as having the form of «this living body possesses those animal functions which by induction from similar cases are proved to be invariably concomitant with the presence of a Soul». Since there are no facts from which this generalization can be drawn, there is no certainty concerning the reason and minor premise

(80.6). After having explained the fallacies which are incurred when the three aspects of the logical mark are either wrong or uncertain, the author draws the conclusion,

111. Thus there are three kinds of fallacies, the Unreal, the Contrary and the Uncertain. They are respectively produced when either one aspect of the mark singly, or any pair of them, are either unreal or uncertain.

(80.9). "Thus" means in the manner above explained. When one single aspect of them is unreal or uncertain, or when each pair of them is unreal or uncertain, we then have the fallacies of Unreal, Contrary or Uncertain reasons. "Respectively" means that the fallacy is determined by that case of unreality or of doubt which agrees with the corresponding unreality or uncertainty (of the aspects of the mark). "Respectively" means that to each object on one part there is a corresponding object (on the other).

§ 17. THE COUNTERBALANCED REASON

112—113. One more (variety) of an uncertain reason has been established, viz., the (Counterbalanced) reason which falls in line with its own contradiction, (which is self-contradictory) — Why is it not mentioned here? Because it cannot occur in the process of (natural) ratiocination.

(80.14). But did not our Master (Dignāga) establish one more (variety) of an uncertain logical reason, viz., (the counter-balanced reason), the reason which falls in line with its own contradiction? It falls in line with what contradicts a (principle) established on other grounds, it is contradictory. (80.15) Or else, it is a contrary reason, because it proves the reverse of a fact established on other

absent everywhere. The Buddhist negation of a Soul was mentioned above, ch III 67, in connection with the fallacy of unreal (*asādhya*) reason. There it was assumed that the minor term and minor premise in a syllogism must be something admitted as real by both parties, by the disputant and the opponent. But here the fallacies of concomitance are alone considered and the stand-point is one of formal logic, all metaphysical judgments are considered as problematic, the Buddhist denial of a Soul is not excluded.

dictory is not something established on real facts. Therefore, since it is impossible, it is omitted (in our system). (81.4). Why should it be impossible?

114. A (real) contradiction is indeed impossible (in the domain of the three varieties of logical dependence), as established by us, in the cases of necessary Succession, of necessary Coexistence and of Negation.¹

(81.7). Indeed, a (real) contradiction is an impossibility. We have already explained what we understand under a causal and under an analytical logical connection. Causality consists in the (necessary) dependence of everything upon its cause. An analytical reason consists in its being contained under the fact which is deduced from it. In order that there should be a real contradiction the effect must exist altogether without its own cause, and a property must exist somewhere beyond the concept under which it is contained.² (81.10). And negation should then also be something different from what has been established (by us). Negation has been established as a repelled suggestion of presence. Such negation is also unthinkable without the fact of the absence of some real object (on a definite spot). It also affords no opportunity for a (real) contradiction.

fallacies, and the Indian and Tibetan logicians largely use quite impossible combinations, because they throw a strong light upon the canons of syllogism. What the author here wishes to express is not that contradiction cannot partly repose on facts, as every fallacy does, but that, although in our natural process of every day thinking we can draw fallacious conclusions, we cannot at once draw two diametrically opposed conclusions. This is only possible when the construction of scientific theories depart a long way from the safe ground of realities and dwell in the sphere of metaphysics. This and the adjoining passages are very remarkable as a clear indication of the critical tendencies of Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

¹ Lat., p. 81.5-8. «Because there is no possibility of contradiction of Effect and Own-existence whose essence has been indicated, and of Non-perception» — The author wishes to emphasize that all our thinking, or else all syntheses of thinking, consists either in the affirmation of Succession or of Coherent Attributes, or in the affirmation of Absence of something on a bare place. There is no other general principle than these three, they control the entire domain of thought.

² Lat., p. 81.9-10, «What is effect and what is own-essence, how could it exist quite forsaking its own cause and (its own) pervader, through what could it become contradictory?»

entities do not possess it. There is no other (third) group. This circumstance is (one of the) causes producing uncertainty.

(77.5) After having stated that the two groups include everything existing, the second (cause of uncertainty) is next given.

102 Neither can the presence (of the reason) in one of these (classes) be apprehended with certainty.

(77.7). There is no certainty of the presence, or of the real existence, (of the reason) in one of these groups, either in the one which (is supposed) to possess a Soul or in the one which (is supposed) not to possess it. Neither is there some other place, besides these two groups, where the presence of animal functions could be found as a real attribute.

(77.8) Therefore only so much is known that (animal functions) are an appurtenance of some entities which are included (somewhere) among just these two groups. But there is no certainty about that particular group in which alone they are really present. That is the meaning. Therefore (the author) says, — (the reason is uncertain).

103. Since neither in the entities supposed to possess a Soul, nor in the entities known not to possess it, is the presence of animal functions certain¹

(77.12). There are no real objects in which either the presence or the absence of an (eternal) Soul would be (empirically) ascertainable and universally accepted, and in which (at the same time) the absence of animal functions would be an established fact. Therefore the reason is uncertain, since its concomitance is not ascertained. These two causes make an attribute conterminous (with the subject) an uncertain reason. They have been thus indicated.

(77.15). Every logical reason being present upon the subject of the conclusion² (constitutes the minor premise, but it) becomes uncer-

¹ In sūtra III 108 read *asiddheś* instead of *asiddheś*, the following words *tā-ḍhyām na vyatiricyate* must be transferred to the end of the next sūtra, where likewise *asiddheś* is to be read instead of *asiddheś*.

² The minor premise (*palśa-dharma*) would have been «the living body possesses animal functions». But the author introduces it in the form of a part of the conclusion, saying in sūtra III. 104 «therefore the breath etc. being present in the living body» etc. The term *palśa-dharma* is often used as a synonym of *hetu*, Dandār Lha-ramba calls the *Hetu-caḥra* *Phyogs-chos-khor-lo* = *palśa-dharma-caḥra*.

(81.20). The contemplation of non-realities is pure imagination. Its force is its influence. When the logical foundation¹ of an inference is influenced by (such phantoms) it is not established on real facts, but on pure imagination, and imagination is not reality²

(82.1). Now, what is the proper place of such dogmatic arguments?

There are subjects³ which are the proper place for such arguments, viz., metaphysical⁴ problems, problems unaccessible neither to direct observation nor to (correct) ratiocination, as, for instance, the problem of the reality of the Universals. When the investigation of these problems is tackled, dogmatical argumentation flourishes.⁵ Our Master Dignāga has mentioned the counterbalanced argument (as a special fallacy) in connection with such (metaphysical problems only).

(82.5) Why again does such a fallacy occur in dogmatic argumentation only?

117. It (often) happens that promoters of systems are mistaken and ascribe (to entities) such attributes as are incompatible with their nature.⁶

(82.7). Promoters of systems ascribe, or include into entities such attributes that are incompatible with them, such as are contrary to reality. When this happens the counterbalanced reason becomes possible. This happens by mistake, through confusion. Indeed, there are such confused scientists who never stop in imagining unwarranted facts.⁷

(82.10). But if scientific authorities can be mistaken, how can we believe ordinary men? He says —

118. When the argument is founded on the properly observed real condition of real things,

¹ *travṛtṭyam*

² Lat., p. 81.20—82.1. «The contemplation of a non-real object is mere construction, its force is its efficiency, from it starting, not from evidence, having its stand on mere construction, the three-aspectedness of inference founded on dogma, not on evidence — The Tib = *āgama-siddha-travṛtṭya-anumānasya apramāṇyāt*

³ *artha*

⁴ *aiśvarya*

⁵ *sam-āhṛaty,*

⁶ Read *śabdānasya* in p. 82.6.

⁷ Lat., p. 81.8—9. «Indeed confused makers of science (or scientific works) superimpose such and such unexisting natures».

where among the two groups, this is certain. But it is not certain that they necessarily coexist with a Soul, or that they necessarily are incompatible with Soul. How can then their concomitance (with the Soul) be ascertained?

(78.13) Now, the Buddhist denies the existence of Soul altogether. For him there can be no question whether animal functions really exist in those beings which (are supposed) to possess a Soul. On the contrary, for him there is only certainty that we can speak neither of the presence nor of the absence of such functions in them. (Does that mean that he can deny both their presence and their absence with the non-existing Soul?)¹ This suggestion is answered (in the following passage),

107—108. Whether the Soul exists or whether it does not exist, we cannot in any case deny at once both the presence and the absence of animal functions (in soulless beings), because the denial of the one implies the affirmation of the other²

(78.17). If there are real beings endowed with a Soul, we can impossibly be (simultaneously) certain of both the presence and absence in them of animal functions. (Nor is the contrary possible). If there are no (real beings) endowed with a Soul, we neither can deny (at once) the presence and the absence (in them of those functions).³ Why is that? (78.21). Because just the denial⁴ of the one — whe-

¹ *Lat*, p 78 13—15. «And is it not that for the opponent there is nothing possessing a Soul? Therefore there is neither concomitance nor exclusion of this reason in the possessor of a Soul. Thus there is certainty of the non-existence of both concomitance and exclusion in the (non-existing) possessor of a Soul, but not doubt of its real existence. Having put this question he says». — *vyatireka* is here used not in the sense of contraposition, but of exclusion or absence, = *abhāva*, cp. text p 78. 7. From the fact that there are no Souls altogether, the disputant draws a *deductio ad absurdum*, that animal functions whether present or absent will always be concomitant with the absence of a Soul. *sūtmala* means here the *supposed* possessor of a Soul.

² *Lat*, p 78, sūtras 107—108. «And there is no certainty of non-existence of both concomitance and exclusion of it from the possessor of a Soul and from the non-possessor of a Soul, because the certainty of the non-existence of the one is invariably concomitant with the existence of the other».

³ *Lat*, p. 78. 18. «And the ablative case «from the possessor of a Soul, from the non-possessor of a Soul» must be regarded as depending on the word exclusion».

⁴ *abhāva-niścaya*.

be situated" — this makes up for the subject (of the general proposition) "Is ubiquitous" — is its predicate. It expresses that the fact of such simultaneous presence is invariably concomitant with omnipresence, and therefore, subaltern to the latter.

(83.2). Now, it has been established by the great sage Kanāda that a Universal is motionless, is amenable to sense-perception and possesses unity. It simultaneously resides in every object with which it is connected by inherence. A pupil of Kanāda, named Paṇḍita,¹ has advanced the syllogism (in question) in order to prove that Universals are present in all particulars, and in the intervals between them, where the particulars are absent, as well. (83.5). "Just as the Cosmical Ether" — is an example supporting the general proposition. The Cosmical Ether, indeed, is simultaneously inherent in all the objects which are contained in it, wheresoever they be situated, e. g., in trees etc. The words "a Universal is simultaneously inherent in all objects everywhere situated", contain (the minor premise establishing the fact) that the reason is present upon the subject of the conclusion.

(83.8). The (author) understands² this argument as an analytical reasoning.

120. The deduction is an analytical one. The real presence of (a Universal) in a definite place is deduced merely (by analysis) of the fact that it is inherent in the objects occupying that place. Indeed, (the opposite of that is impossible), if something is absent from (a definite) place, it does not fill up that place by its own self³

¹ Paṇḍita and Paṇḍita are evidently two invented names in connection with the theories of *pīṭh-pāka-vāda* and *pīṭhara-pāka-vāda*, the first was later ascribed to the Vaiśeṣikas, cp. *Praśastapāda*, p. 107 5, the second to the Nyāyikas, cp. *Tarkadīpikā*, p. 17 (Bombay, 1918) But no connection between these names and the doctrine of the reality of Universals has as yet been on record Kanāda's sūtra I 2.3 is unclear The doctrine is full blown in *Praśastapāda*, p. 314.21—*antarālā ca .. avyapadeśyān*. It is one of the fundamental tenets of the united Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school From Dh's words it would appear that the Pīṭhara-pāka-vāda did not share it

² *yogayan*, lit. "construes"

³ *Īt.*, p. 83. 9—10. "The possession of a nature which is present in its place depends as a consequence (*anubandhinā*) upon merely the nature connected with it (i. e., inherent in it) Indeed what where is absent, it does not pervade its place by its own self Thus a formula of the own-existence reason". — The gist of the argument seems to be that Universals cannot move, hence they must be omnipresent

structed by imagination. By contrasting (a given content) with what represents its own negation, we cognize that content as a (definite) image

(79.11) If that is so, the denial of the presence (of animal functions in beings having no Soul) is equivalent to their absence, and the denial of their absence is equivalent to their presence. Therefore, if we are certain that they are not present, we (*eo ipso*) are certain that they are absent, and if we are certain that they are not absent, we (*eo ipso*) are certain that they are present. (The presence and absence of animal functions in things characterized by the absence of a Soul cannot simultaneously be true)

(79.13) Therefore, supposing (we adhere to the Buddhist view and maintain) that the existence of an (eternal) Soul is a phantom,¹ (because no creature) in reality possesses it, nevertheless this does not mean that we can, with apodictic certainty, deny both the presence and the absence of animal functions in these (soulless realities on the score that every thing is soulless). (According to the Law of Contradiction²) one real thing cannot simultaneously be present and absent in another one, and therefore we cannot with apodictic certainty deny them both at once, (we can only fluctuate between them).

(79.15) Nor do we here propose to prove to our opponents³ (the Naiyāyikas) that the (eternal) Soul does not exist at all and that real beings do not possess it, but (we propose to prove that it is incum-

contradiction to p 70.9, where a *nyata-ālāra lalita abhāva* is laid stress on. The meaning is *rūpam paricchedyate nīrūpatām (tasya eva rūpasya abhāvam) vyavacchedya*. Such also seems to be the intention of the Tib. translators. cp p 180 9—11 Jayanta speaks, p. 52.2, of *nīrūpa-abhāva* as non-existence possessing no perceptible colour Mallavādi, fol 105—106, explains — *atha bhavatu yasya vyavacchedena yat paricchedyate tat tat-parihāreṇa vyavasthitam. param nābhāva-vyavacchedena bhāvasya pariceśaḥ syād ity āśankyāṇa sūbbhāveti* (79 9)... *athābhāvasya nyata-svarūpa-abhāve katham tad-vyavacchedena bhāva-vyavasthititṛṣṇā syād ity āśankyāṇa (ajbhāvo nītyādi, (79 10) aha bhavatu nīrūpo (ajbhāvaḥ, param na nīrūpam vyavacchedya rūpam ākaravat paricchedyate iti). Kamalaśīla, p 984 18, uses the term nīrūpa in connection with sāmānya in the sense of nīr-sabbhāva = śūnya*

¹ *avastu*

² Cp. above, text p 70 12 ff.

³ The argument here discussed is advanced by the Naiyāyika, cp. N. vārt and Tātp ad Nyāya-sūtra, I 35, the opponent, *prativādin*, is the Buddhist, but Soullessness is a characteristic tenet of Buddhists against which the Naiyāyikas usually protest, both parties are mutually the opponents of one another.

comprehension, nor inherence which is equivalent to comprehension. But comprehension exists and consequently presence in the same place, (i. e., everywhere) exists as well¹ This is an analytical deduction.²

(84.3). The (contrary) syllogism advanced by Paithara is now given.

121. The second, (the contra-) deduction runs thus.

(Major premise). If something perceptible is not perceived upon a place, it is absent from it.

(Example). As e. g., an absent jar.

(Minor premise). A Universal, although (supposed) to be perceptible, is not perceived in the intervals between the (corresponding) particulars.

(Conclusion). (Hence it is absent).

This negative conclusion and the former analytical deduction, since they contradict one another, produce together an uncertain (conclusion).

(84.8). What fulfils the conditions of perception, i. e., what is a possible object of perception, what may be imagined as perceived — such is the subject of the general proposition. "It is here absent", i. e., we can take action³ without expecting to find it there — such is the predicate. It is thus stated that the first is subordinate to the second. The example is an absent jar.

¹ Lat., p. 88 22. «Pervasion of real things situated in this place is subordinate to existence in that place. Because if there is no existence in its place, there is no pervasion of it, there will be no inherence-connection whose essence is pervasion. But there is pervasion, therefore (there is) presence in its place. Therefore this is an own-existence reason»

² Since Dharmakīrti admits only two varieties of deduction, deduction of necessary Succession or Causality and deduction of necessary Coexistence or analytical deduction, he evidently could construct the conclusion about the real presence of Universals in the individual things in which they inhere as an analytical judgment or judgment of necessary coexistence. The subject of the judgment — the fact of inherence — is alone sufficient to deduce the reality or real presence of the Universal. The judgment is so constructed that its validity reposes on the law of Contradiction alone «what really inheres is really present, inherence is presence»

³ *vyavahāra*

(79 22) (The author once more states in what sense (the argument) is problematic.

110. Neither can we affirm (on such grounds) the necessary existence of a Soul, nor can we deny it.¹

(80.1). Neither can we affirm (the necessary existence of a Soul on such grounds) nor can we deny it. (80.2). Because both the direct concomitance (of animal functions with a Soul) and its contraposition are uncertain, we cannot affirm neither the major term (the existence of the Soul) nor the other, the opposite fact, (its non-existence). When both the presence of the reason in similar cases and its absence in (every) contrary case is unascertainable, neither the predicate nor the reverse of it can be established. Nor is there any other (intermediate) alternative between these two. Entities either have a Soul or they have none. (80.4). We (conclude) therefore that whether in the object of the inference, in the living body, a Soul exists or not, cannot be ascertained through (the mark of) animal functions. This mark is uncertain.²

there is neither somewhere certainty of existence nor certainty of non-existence of the direct and contraposed concomitance, just therefore there is doubt of direct and contraposed concomitance (of presence and absence) (79.18) But if, albeit somewhere, there would be certainty of the non-existence of one among the positive and contraposed concomitances (of presence and absence), just this would be the certainty of the existence of the second. Thus there would be no doubt at all of the positive and contraposed concomitances (79 20) But since there nowhere is certainty concerning existence or non-existence, just therefore there is doubt of positive and contraposed concomitance (of presence and absence) And from doubt (the reason) is uncertain, thus he says». — *anaya* and *vyatireka* at first mean concomitance and its contraposition, cp text p 41.3 Both are characterized as equipollent, cp text p 48 1, as mutually implying one another, cp text p. 52 20. Here they are used in the sense of presence and absence, *bhāṭṭabhāṭau*, p. 79 7, and characterized as exclusive of one another. Moreover *vyatireka* is also used in the sense of *vaidharmya* «method of Difference», cp. text 51 5, hence *anaya* also means the method of Agreement

¹ Lat., p. 80 1 «Because from this there is no certainty of the major term and of its counter part».

² The concluding part of the argument, beginning with p. 78 18, is apparently directed against an opponent who had set forth an argument like the following. If the Buddhists admit the existence in some cases of animal functions and deny the existence of Souls altogether, then for them both the presence and the absence of animal functions will be concomitant with the absence of a Soul, because Soul is

122. The exposition of the three-aspected logical reason is finished. Such a reason is quite capable alone to produce cognition of the (inferred) object. Hence the example is no separate member of the syllogism. Its definition is not given separately, because it is implied (in the definition of the reason).

(85.3) The three-aspected reason has been expounded. What is the use of dwelling upon the examples?

However (it may be objected) that the reason alone does not, by itself, produce a cognition of the object (of inference)? The (author) answers that the reason is quite sufficient alone to produce a cognition of the deduced predicate, (he means) just the reason as he has defined it. Such a reason is capable alone to yield a result. Hence the demonstration will be complete when the reason alone has been given (full) verbal expression. The example does not really constitute a separate premise, and for this reason a definition of the example has not been given separately from the definition of the reason.

(85.6). But it may be questioned, how is the invariable concomitance of the reason to be established, if there are no examples (to support it)? (The author answers). We do not at all maintain that there are altogether no examples (to support it), but we maintain that the example is inseparable from the reason, it is necessarily included in the reason. That is why it is said that its definition is not given separately, it is not (simply) said that its definition is not given at all.

(85.9). Be it so! It is nevertheless a member subordinate to the reason. This should (not prevent us) from giving its definition? (This however would be useless) Since the import of such a definition is implied (in the definition of the reason), its import, its purpose, the meaning expressed by the word, are implied. For this cause (it is not given).¹ (85.10). Indeed, when a definition of the example is given, this is done in order to produce a clear conception of what an example is. But since we already know it just from the definition of the reason, therefore the purpose of the definition is (attained), the clear concep-

¹ *Iat*, p. 85.9 "If so, the definition also of the subservient to the reason must be just given, thus he says — because the meaning is known. The meaning, the aim, or the expressed part is known, of what the example-definition (should be). Thus its condition, essence, therefore."

grounds, and (in the same time) it is a right reason, since it is concomitant with its own (special) consequence. Thus it is contrary and right (at the same time).

(80.17). Quite true! Our Master has established (this variety). But I have omitted it here. Why? Because, (a reason simultaneously right and wrong), cannot occur in the process of (natural) ratiocination.¹

(80.21) The proper domain of inference² is the threefold logical tie, (sc. the necessary presence of the reason upon the subject of the conclusion, its necessary presence in similar and its absolute absence in all dissimilar cases). (This threefold logical connection), as far as it is established by positive facts,³ (constitutes the domain of inference proper) It produces inference, therefore we call it the domain of inference. An inference (or a conclusion) is produced from such a threefold connection when proved by positive facts. Therefore this alone is the (real) domain of inference. Since (real) inference (alone) is our subject-matter, we cannot deal with a reason which is (at once) right and wrong.⁴

(81.1). Indeed, when we have proposed to deal with the threefold logical connection as far as it is established on real facts, we can introduce only such logical fallacies which are (albeit partly) established on real facts.⁵ But a (double) reason which is right and contra-

¹ The *viruddhāvabhāsa* fallacy of Dignāga has survived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika united system under the name of *sat-pratipakṣa*, and a corresponding aspect of the valid reason, the *asat-pratipakṣa* aspect, has been invented, in order to save the right proportion between the number of the aspects of a valid reason and the corresponding number of fallacies. Praśastapāda, p. 239. 2—3, includes it in the category called by him *anādhyastānta* reason. He admits that conflicting arguments, such as pointed out by Dignāga, occur in science (*sāstra*), but he objects to the name of a doubtful reason for it. A doubt is produced when we are not capable to decide between two aspects of the same thing, and not when an argument is counterbalanced by another one, cp N. Kandalī, p. 241. 18 ff. It is clear that Praśastapāda's words are a reply to Dignāga's theory. Bodas thinks, Tarkasamgraha p. 307 (Bombay, 1918), that the *sat-pratipakṣa* fallacy is foreshadowed by Gotama's *prakarana-sama*, N. S., I. 2. 7, but this is doubtful.

² It is clear that this is also the only domain of logic in general; logic, inference, three-aspected reason, invariable concomitance, necessary connection, all these expressions by their implications cover the same ground.

³ *pramāṇa-siddha*

⁴ I.e., α There is no possibility of contrary and non-discrepant.

⁵ A fallacy like the one mentioned in ch. III. 60 cannot be maintained to repose, albeit partly, on positive facts. The theory of syllogism is better illustrated by fal-

Therefore it must be stated that (the logical reason), in particular, represents either the effect (from which the cause is inferred) or an (essential attribute) from whose presence alone the consequence follows (by way of analysis). These two varieties must be represented as instances possessing (the general features of a logical reason) (86.3). Indeed, when we have clearly realized¹ (an entity as) an effect, we (*eo ipso*) have realized its presence in similar cases only, and its absence from every contrary case. (86.4). An analytical predicate must be represented as following out of «its mere presence», i. e., (out of the presence of) the reason. The consequence (in these cases) exists wherever the reason exists. It is a consequence, i. e., it follows. Nothing but the presence of the reason, «it alone», means the reason alone, (its presence is sufficient for the consequence to follow). The «identity» of the consequence (with the reason) consists just in its being present (whenever the reason is present). (86.6). When something is known to possess an inherent property,² it (*eo ipso*) becomes known that it is an analytical reason which is present in similar cases only and is absent from every contrary case. (86.7). It is just this general characteristic that must be realized as inherent in the varieties (of the reason). Not otherwise. The definition of the varieties has been given for that purpose. (86.8). What follows from this? It is (said what) follows. Namely it follows that when someone wishes to give a general definition, it must be done by pointing out (its application to) the particular cases. This is the general meaning³

(86.10). «Wherever there is smoke, there is fire» — this is (the general proposition) expressing the invariable concomitance of the effect (which effect represents) the logical reason. This concomitance is established by facts⁴ proving the causal relation (of fire and smoke). Therefore, the example «like in the kitchen» must be given. «Where there is no fire, there never is any smoke», this is the contraposition of the major premise. It likewise must be proved (by examples), «as e. g., in the contrary cases», (namely in the pond etc.). Indeed, it

¹ *vyākṛāte*

² *Int*, p. 86.6 «When the essence of the *probans* becomes known. „», 1. 2, when one fact representing the consequence becomes known as representing an essential property of another fact which is the reason, its presence is deduced from the presence of the latter

³ *sambandha*

⁴ *pramāṇa*

(81.12). All right! But perhaps there is some other possible connection (between realities)?

115. There is no other inseparable connection.

(81.14). There is no other inseparable connection than the three (above mentioned). Whatsoever logical connection exists is strictly included in these three.

(81.15). But then, where has our Master Dignāga exposed the fallacy (of a counterbalanced reason)?

(Since two contradicting, mutually repugnant arguments cannot appear at once in the natural run of thought) —

116 Therefore Dignāga has mentioned it as a mistaken argument establishing two contradicting facts, such arguments occurring in dogmatic systems where inference concerns metaphysical problems and is founded on dogmatic (premises) and not upon an (unbiased) observation of real facts.¹

(81.18). The self-contradictory reason has been established with reference to arguments founded on (blindly accepted) dogmatic theories, because it never occurs in an argument which is founded on the weight of real facts.

(81.19). When an inference (and) the logical construction² on which it is founded are dogmatically believed,³ the foundation of the argument is dogma.

(81.19). But are dogmatical constructions⁴ not also established upon some real facts?

The answer is that they are not naturally evolved out of an (unprejudiced consideration of real facts, but) they are produced under the influence of phantastical ideas⁵

¹ Lit, p 81 16—17. "Therefore the contradicting-nondiscrepant proof-fallacy has been established with reference to inference founded on dogma, not starting from observing the force of real facts in pondering over such objects"

² *linga-trairūpyam*

³ *āgama-siddham*.

⁴ *trairūpyam*

⁵ *arastu-darśanam*

(86.22). Neither can the other relation, (the relation which constitutes the second) variety of logical dependence (namely the analytical relation) be indicated (without having in view the examples). This relation consists in the necessary concomitance of two co-inherent attributes,¹ the presence of the one being the necessary mark of the presence of the other.²

(86.23). Since the relation of Causality or the relation of Coherence must be established (by experience) on examples like the kitchen fire (producing smoke), or the jar (being non-eternal), therefore in pointing to the facts³ on which the general proposition⁴ is based the examples by similarity must (inevitably) be quoted. (87.1). The contrary example has the aim of pointing to the absence of the effect where the reason is absent, after their causal relation has been established (at first by positive examples). (87.2). This is just the reason why (the contrary example) is not necessarily something real⁵ The absence of the effect when the cause is absent (since

ing an effect. Just this is necessity (*niyama*), because smoke is necessarily dependent on fire as its cause. This, the necessity (consisting in) being its effect, as having the essence (*rūpa* = *svatūpa*) of the definition of (one) variety, cannot be shown otherwise ».

¹ The *linga* is *svabhāva* and the *sādhya* is *svabhāva*, or else the *linga* is a *linga* for its own *svabhāva*, cp above the sūtras III 18—20 and the notes to the translation

² Lit., p. 86 22—23. «And the pervasion of the own-existence-mark by own-existence which is the *prabandam*, being the essence of the definition of (the other) variety cannot otherwise be shown ».

³ *pramāṇa* ⁴ *vyūpti*

⁵ According to the Naiyāyika a syllogism where the contrary example is not a reality is a syllogism without any contrary instance, a syllogism whose major premise is a generalization from positive instances alone, it is *leśala-anvaya*, *tipaka-kīnaś*, just as the Buddhist deduction of the non-eternity of the sounds of speech from the fact that they are products, *yathā sarvāṇṭyafala-cādmām, antyāś lab-dah, kṛtakatvād* etc, says Uddyotakara, p 48 12 The counter-example of the Buddhists is Space or the Cosmical Ether which is eternal and unproduced, but, according to Mahāyāna-Buddhists, not a reality, since all reality is non-eternal. The Buddhists retorted that if the reason is not absent in the contrary, albeit imagined, cases, it must be present, since non absent means present, and we will be landed in the absurdity of admitting the presence of a reality in an unreality. This point was then discussed with much scholastic subtlety and great animosity between the Buddhist logicians and the Naiyāyika, cp Tātp, p 114 22 ff, Pari-śuddhi, p. 708—735 and the gloss of Vardhamāna-upādhyāya *ibid* Uday-gupta's Vārtikālamkāra (p 730) and Prajñākara-

when either a case of (necessary) Succession or of (necessary) Coexistence or of Absence¹ is thus established, there is no room for contradiction.

(82.12). (Facts) are established as logical reasons not by any (arbitrary) arrangement,² but by their real condition. Therefore when the facts of (necessary) Coexistence, of (necessary) Succession and of Absence are established as the real condition of real things, there is no room for (contradiction). (82.13). An established fact is an ultimately real³ fact. Properly established is a fact established without trespassing (into the domain of fancy). Properly established real conditions of real facts are the facts which have been thus established. Such facts are not founded on imagination,² but they stand as stands reality (itself). Therefore they do not afford any room for illusion which could alone give an opportunity to two mutually exclusive reasons.

(82.17). Follows an example of two mutually exclusive reasonings.

119. An example of this fallacy are (the following two contradictory deductions The first is),

(Major premise) A (thing) which is simultaneously inherent⁴ in different objects, where-soever they be situated, (must be) ubiquitous.

(Example) Just as the Cosmical Ether.

(Minor premise). A Universal is simultaneously inherent in different objects which are to be found everywhere.

(Conclusion). (Hence a Universal must be ubiquitous).⁵

(82.21). «An (attribute) which is simultaneously (and obviously) present in a number of objects in which it inheres, wheresoever they

¹ *ātma-lārya-anupalambheṣu*. Līt, «in self, in effect, in non-perception».

² *laipañā*.

³ Ultimately real (*paramārtha-sat*) is here evidently not in the strict sense of a «thing in itself», but of something having an ultimately real substratum, cp above tral p. 34, note 6.

⁴ *abhi-sambandhyate* = *samaveti*

⁵ Līt., p. 82 18—20. «An example for this. What is simultaneously intimately (*abhi-*) connected with those its own intimate containers which are resident in all places, that is ubiquitous, just as Ether. Intimately simultaneously connected with its own intimate containers which are resident in all places is a Universal».

wrong example. This is virtually implied (in our account of the logical reason).

(87.16). Some instances of wrong examples are now given.

126. (Thesis). The sounds of speech are eternal entities.

(Reason). Because they are not impenetrable bodies of limited dimensions.

(Examples). As, e. g., motion, atoms or a jar.

These examples are deficient in regard of the consequence or of the reason or of both.

(87.19). The eternal character of the sounds of speech is the consequence which must be established. The fact of not being an (impenetrable) material body (of circumscribed dimensions) is adduced as the reason. The examples of motion, of atoms, and of a jar are quoted as similar cases. They are wrong, because they are deficient either in the first attribute (the predicate eternity) or in the second (the reason — (impenetrability), or in both.

(87.21). Motion lacks the first. The atoms lack the second, since the atoms have (infinitesimal) dimension. A body is a substance which is not ubiquitous and has (limited) dimensions. Atoms are not ubiquitous and are essentially substances. That they are eternal, (i. e., unchanging), is a tenet of the Vaiśeṣika school. Thus they are not deficient in the predicated attribute. A jar is deficient in both. It is not eternal and is an impenetrable body of limited dimensions.

126. The same applies to cases where the presence of the predicated attribute and (of the reason) is uncertain.

1. E. g., (Thesis). This man is subject to passions.

(Reason). Because he is endowed with the faculty of speech.

(Example). As e. g., a man in the street.

2. (Thesis). This man is mortal.

(Reason). Because he is subject to passions.

(83.11). The essence of a Universal is to be inherent in the (corresponding particular) things everywhere, (wheresoever) they be situated. This property alone is sufficient to deduce from it the fact of the (real) presence (of the Universal) in these places, (i. e., everywhere).¹

(83.14). If something possesses the essence of being inherent in a number of other things, it necessarily must be present in the places occupied by them. Therefore the fact that a Universal is present in a place is deduced from the fact of its being inherent (in the particular things) there situated.

(83.16) It may be objected that a cow is (intimately) connected with its owner, but he does not occupy the same place² as the cow. How is it then that the property of occupying the same place is deduced from the fact of being in a (certain) connection with the objects occupying it? It is said in answer.

(83.17). (This connection is one of inherence). If something is not present in a place, it cannot contain in itself the objects there situated.

(83.18) The connection which is here alluded to as existing between a Universal and (the corresponding particulars) possessing it, is Inherence. Such a connection is only possible between two entities occupying the same place. According to that (kind of connection, a Universal) inhering somewhere comprehends the object in which it inheres in its own essence. It thus locates its own self into the place occupied by the object in which it inheres.³ To contain something means (here) just to occupy that very place⁴ which is (also occupied by this thing) This is Inherence.

(83.21). Therefore, if something inheres in something else, it pervades that thing by its own existence and becomes itself present in the place (of that object)

(83.22). The idea (of the author) is the following one. Comprehension involves presence. If there is no presence, neither can there be

¹ Lat., p 83 11—14 «The nature of a Universal is to be conjoined with those things situated in all places This alone, the mere nature of being conjoined with it It follows on it, it is consequent on it What is it? He says. The fact of having the nature of being present in their place. The place of those connected is their place. Whose own-existence is present in their place, it has its own existence present in that place Its condition is (its) essence».

² *samvīta* here clearly in the sense of «being present», not of being near, cp. this term in I. 13, transl. and note.

³ Lat., p 83. 19—20 «It introduces itself into the place the object inheres in».

⁴ *deśa-rūpa* = *deśa-svarūpa*.

(88.16). Deficient in regard of necessary concomitance¹ is a case where the accidental coexistence² of reason and consequence is alone indicated, but it is not shown that the reason is logically subordinated³ to the consequence. An example in which the necessary concomitance of (the reason with the consequence) is not rightly expressed, is an example where the right logical concomitance (exists in the mind of the speaker), but is not put by him in the right form

(88.18). An example of the first kind is the following one, ("whosoever speaks is subject to passions") "Whosoever speaks", i. e., the faculty of speech, is the subject of the general proposition. "He possesses passions", i. e., the attribute of passions, is the logical consequence. Hence the existence of the faculty of speech is a fact logically subordinated⁴ to the fact of having passions. The necessary concomitance (of both these attributes) is thus expressed. "Like our Mr. So and So" is the example. By the word "our"⁵ the disputant and the opponent are equally included (i. e., a person is alluded to which is well known to them both) as possessing passions. (88.21). What is really proved (by this example) is merely the fact of a coexistence in M-r. So and So of the faculty of speech together with his passions. But the necessary logical subordination (of the first attribute to the second) is not proved. Therefore the example is deficient in regard of (the necessity and universality of) the concomitance⁶

(88.22). (In the second example) "impermanence" is the logical predicate; "because it is a product" is the reason

(89.1). (The example is) "like a jar" This (example) is not sufficient to express adequately the necessary concomitance (of these two attributes). Although the sounds of our speech are similar to a jar as regards production, (both are produced according to causal laws), but they cannot (on this ground) be necessarily conceived⁷ as similar in regard of the attribute of impermanence. (The example, as it is expes-

¹ *an-anvaya*

² *sambhava-māitram*

³ *vyūpta*

⁴ *nyayana*

⁵ *ista*

⁶ It is clear that Dharmakīrti treats here every case of incomplete, not sufficiently warranted, induction as a fallacy of example, but the term example becomes then partly a synonym of the major premise, not only of induction, as is clearly seen in the next sūtra

⁷ *pratyetum = nitcetum*

(84.10). The words «a Universal etc.» point to the minor premise.

(84.11). The intervals between the particulars include other particulars, as well as empty space. Although the Universal «cow» is perceived in some particulars, it is not perceived in others, e. g., in horses etc. Neither is it perceived in empty space, where there are altogether no particulars. It follows that it is absent in these places.

(84.13). This negative conclusion and the aforesaid (analytical deduction) prove (two conclusions) which are contradictory of one another — they produce uncertainty about the subject of the inference (making the existence of Universals doubtful).

(84.14). There is no such object in existence which should (really) possess contradictory properties. One of the reasons here proves the presence of Universals in other particulars and in empty space. The other, being negative, proves their non-existence there.

(84.16). Now, one thing cannot at the same time and in the same place be existent and non-existent, because this (runs against the law of) Contradiction. Thus it is, that the (kind of) Universal which is theoretically constructed has two predicates simultaneously — omnipresence and non-omnipresence. The two reasons establishing that are in conflict with one another.

(84.18). Because it is assumed that the same Universal is simultaneously inherent in all particulars, wherever they be situated, and because it is assumed that it is visible, therefore it is concluded — from the fact of its inherence, that it is omnipresent, and from its perceptibility, since it is not visible in the intervals between the particulars, that it is not omnipresent. Thus it is that the promotor of the doctrine himself has failed to take notice of this mutual contradiction. He has constructed two conflicting attributes and has thus given a loophole for contradiction to enter.

However, in (objective) reality such contradiction is impossible.

§ 18. THE IMPORT OF EXAMPLES.

(84.22). Different logical reasons, since they are members of syllogisms, have been examined and, incidentally, fallacious reasons as well. Now the question is asked, whether the examples which are also members of syllogisms must not likewise be examined, and on this occasion false examples as well?

120. This also refers (to an example whose meaning has been expressed through) an inverted concomitance, e.g.,

(Thesis). (The sounds of speech are impermanent).

(Reason). (Because they are produced from causes).

(Example). (Just as a jar etc.), whatsoever is impermanent is a product¹

(89.11). The following is an example (which is in itself quite a right one, but the interdependence of the two attributes which it should illustrate has been expressed) in an inverted order. This is exemplified by the proposition (attached to the example of a jar etc.), "whatsoever is impermanent is a product". The example should prove (in our syllogism) that whatsoever is produced is impermanent. Then the impermanent (or momentary) character of things could be deduced from the fact that they are produced (from causes) (The reverse has been done) in the present case, production has been represented as a consequence of impermanence and not (*vice versa*), impermanence as a consequence of production.

(89.13). Indeed (impermanence can be deduced from production, since) production is necessarily subordinate to impermanence. But production has not been quoted (in the present syllogism) as necessarily subordinate to impermanence, therefore impermanence cannot be deduced from such production which is not quoted as subordinate to impermanence.

(89.15). Indeed, the words "whatsoever is impermanent" express the subject of the general proposition, the words "is a product"

¹ Lat., p. 89. 10. "Thus (the example) with inverted concomitance, what is impermanent is a product" — The formulation of this passage is very characteristic. It represents really the major premise, but is here called an example. The major premise being always a generalization drawn from particular cases or examples these examples become virtually the equivalent of the major premise. This is why Pārthasarathi says that the Buddhist syllogism consists only of example and minor premise, cp. Śāstradīpikā, p. 239. Thus, of course, must not be understood as intimating that experience and induction from particular cases are the exclusive source of knowledge. On the contrary, Dharmakīrti puts great emphasis on his principle that deduction implies logical necessity (*niścaya, nyāya*) which can never be found in experience alone.

tion of what an example is, is known, is realized, or the meaning of the word example, the idea (corresponding to it) is implied (in the meaning of the reason).

(85.18). How is its meaning implied?

123. The essence of a logical reason, in general, has been defined by us as consisting in its presence only in similar cases, and its absence from every dissimilar case. Further, we have specified that the causal and the analytical reasons must be shown to represent, (the first) an effect (from which the existence of a cause is inferred), (the second, a necessarily coexisting attribute) which alone is sufficient for deducing (the consequence). When the reasons are so represented, it is then shown that 1) wherever smoke exists, fire exists, like in a kitchen; if there is no fire, neither is there smoke, like in contrary cases; 2) wherever there is production there is change, like in a jar; if something is changeless, it is not a product, like Space. It is, indeed, impossible otherwise to show the existence (of the reason) in similar and its absence from (all) contrary cases with the qualification that we have introduced, viz. 1) the causal deduction (of the existence of a reason) 'necessarily follows from the existence of the effect, 2) the (analytically deduced) property is necessarily inherent in the fact representing the analytical reason. When this is shown, it is likewise shown what an example is, since its essence includes nothing else.

(85.22). The essence of the logical reason is (first) given in general terms, without specification. It means that the general definition, equally applies to the causal, the analytical and the negative reasons. Now, why is (this general essence which comprises) the two aspects—its presence in similar cases only, and its absence from every dissimilar case—why is it (first) generally stated? The general essence, although indicated, cannot be realized (by itself). Just the same must be represented as inherent in (every) particular case. (86.2).

fore (the example «a jar etc.») is not wrong by itself, but the speaker has made a mistake (in attaching to it an interpretation carelessly expressed). It thus does not contain an inverted concomitance in reality, but owing to the carelessness of the speaker (it appears as though containing it). In a syllogism which is intended for an audience mistakes of expression must be also taken into account.

129. (Such are the fallacious examples when the syllogism is expressed) according to the method of Agreement

(89.23). There are thus nine different species of wrong examples in the syllogism of agreement.

§ 20. FALLACIOUS NEGATIVE EXAMPLES.

(90.2). In order to declare that there are likewise nine different species of wrong examples when the syllogism is expressed according to the method of Difference, (the author) says —

130. The same (applies to deductions by the method) of Difference. The examples in which either the cosequence (or the reason, or both) are not absent,¹ (as they should be in a syllogism of difference), are the following ones — atoms, motion and Space (respectively).

(90.2). When (the Mīmāṃsaka wishes to) prove that the sounds of our speech are eternal (entities inherent in the Cosmical Ether), (supposing he adduces as) a reason their quality of not being impenetrable bodies of limited dimensions, the negative example² of the atoms (in the contraposed major premise «whatsoever is impermanent has limited dimensions») is deficient in regard of the predicate (impermanence), since the atoms are assumed (by the Vaiśeṣikas) to be eternal.³

¹ *avyatireka*

² *pañāharmya-āptānta*.

³ The deduction (fallacious) is here the same as in sūtra III. 125, viz,

Thesis. The sounds of speech are eternal entities.

Reason Because they are not impenetrable bodies of limited dimensions (*amūrta*)

must be proved that the absence of fire is necessarily followed by the absence of smoke. This can be proved by pointing to instances dissimilar to the case of the kitchen fire.

(86. 13). «Wheresoever (we apprehend) the fact that a thing is produced (from causes), (we also observe that) it is impermanent», this is (the general proposition) establishing the invariable concomitance in an analytical judgment.¹ Its contraposition is exhibited by the words «wherever there is no impermanence (i. e, no change) there never is any production» (i. e, no causal relation). (86. 15). The facts² establishing the concomitance must be pointed to by an example of similarity. When the (positive) concomitance has been established, it must be further shown that the reason is absent wheresoever the consequence is absent. Thus the examples (both positive and negative) «just as a jar» and «just as Space» must necessarily be given. (86. 17). Why is it so? Because it would be otherwise impossible to show that the presence in similar and absence in contrary cases, which constitute the general essence (of a logical connection), possess the indicated qualification, viz, that they are necessary. Necessity is the indicated qualification, it consists in the circumstance that the reason is present in similar cases *only*, and absent in *every* dissimilar case. Indeed, when the special definitions have been given, the specified character of this (necessary) presence and of this (necessary) absence of the reason has (*eo ipso*) been pointed to.

(86. 20) And it is impossible to specify the essence of the varieties (of logical dependence) without (pointing to the examples from which they are drawn). Smoke is a result (of causes and it here plays the part of a sufficient) reason (Fire is the cause and its necessary presence) is the logical consequence. This relation, or the fact of the existence of an effect, implies logical necessity,³ because the presence of smoke as an effect, is necessarily dependent upon the presence of fire (as its cause). This necessary dependence of an effect (upon some previous cause),⁴ which is the essence (of one) of the varieties of logical dependence, cannot be shown otherwise (than by pointing to examples).⁵

¹ *svabhāva-hetor*

² *pramāṇa*.

³ *nyāya*

⁴ *tat-lāryatā-nyāya*

⁵ *Lat.*, p 86 20—22 «And the essence of the particular cannot be shown otherwise. Of this *probandum* the effect, its effect, smoke. Its relation (*bhāṭa*), its be-

(90.13). The absence of the predicate is uncertain in these examples.

(90.14). A negative example, in which the absence of the predicate is doubtful, is the following one. «Not omniscient» is one predicate. «Not trustworthy», i. e., not excluding the possibility of a mistake, is another one. «Kapila etc.» is the subject of the conclusion. The words «because of the absence (of the mark) of omniscience etc.» include the reason¹

(90.16). The mark of omniscience and trustworthiness, the exclusive proof (of absolute trustworthiness), is absent. Thus exclusive proof,² constituting the mark of omniscience and trustworthiness, is a science which some possess. This circumstance is the cause why (Kapila and consorts are not omniscient, because they do not possess it)

(90.19). The highest proof (which is an indication of omniscience and absolute precision is here supposed to) consist in the teaching of astronomy. If Kapila and consorts, (the brahmmical sages), were really omniscient and guarantees of absolute truth, why then did they not teach astronomy? But, as a matter of fact, they did not. Therefore they neither are omniscient nor guarantees of truth.

(91.1). In the rôle of a fact³ establishing (the rule), we have here a negative example, (an example by contrast). Every one who is omniscient or (absolutely) trustworthy has been teaching astronomy which is an indication of omniscience and a guarantee for truth, as e.g., Rishabha, Vardhamāna and other teachers of the Digambaras. They were omniscient and absolutely trustworthy.

(91.3). Now, it is here, on the face of these negative examples⁴ of Rishabha and Vardhamāna, uncertain, whether the predicates non-omniscience and possibility of mistakes are really contrasting, i. e., absent.⁵

Because well nigh might you teach astronomy, and nevertheless be neither omniscient nor free from mistakes! Why should these attributes be incompatible? This kind of knowledge is casual and not a necessary concomitant of omniscience. It cannot prove the existence of the latter.

¹ Read *atyāda hetuh*.

² *pramāṇa-atīśaya*

³ *pramāṇe*

⁴ *śaīdharṇya-uāharṇya*

⁵ *vyatirēka = vyāvṛtti*.

it is an absence) occurs in real as well as in unreal cases. Therefore we admit as negative examples real and unreal (i.e., imagined) facts. (87.3). Thus it is impossible to indicate either the positive concomitance or its contraposition without an example. (87.4). Consequently—when the essence of the logical reason has been elicited, it has been *eo ipso*¹ shown, 1) that a positive example being the fact² proving the concomitance of the reason (with its consequence, must be assumed) and 2) a negative example, as well, must be quoted, because it shows (subsequently), after the positive concomitance has been established—that if the consequence is absent, the reason is also absent.

(87.6) When this (relation) has been indicated the examples have been *eo ipso* indicated also. When it has been shown that such and such a fact³ is to be taken as a fact⁴ establishing concomitance from the positive side, and when (the other facts) have been shown where this concomitance is absent, the examples have been *eo ipso* given. (87.8). If it is asked, why?—we answer, because (its essence) is nothing but that. Indeed so much only is the essence of an example. For a positive example, it is to indicate the facts establishing the concomitance, and for a negative example, it is to show that the reason whose concomitance has been positively established, is absent where-soever the consequence is absent.

(87.11). Now, all this is already clear from our explanation of the character of a logical reason. What then may be the use of giving a (separate) definition of the example?

§ 19. FALLACIOUS POSITIVE EXAMPLES.

124. Fallacious examples are also virtually rejected by this (account of the reason)

(87.13). The analysis of the essence of a logical reason discloses the (function of) examples. It virtually includes an account of wrong, i.e. fallacious, examples. When, indeed, an example has been chosen for illustrating (the general proposition), as has been explained above, if it nevertheless is not fit to fulfill its own function, it will be a

¹ *ākhyānād eva*

² *pramāṇa*

³ *so 'yam arthah*

⁴ *pramāṇa*.

(Thesis). Kapila and consorts are not free from passions,

(Reason). Because they are subject to acquisitiveness and avarice.

A contrasting example should prove the rule that a person who is free from passions neither does acquire nor is subject to avarice, e.g., Rīśabha and consorts.

The absence in Rīśabha and consorts of both the predicates, i. e., freedom from passions and of acquisitiveness and avarice, is uncertain.

(91.28). An example where the absence of both the predicate and the reason is uncertain is given «Not free from passions», i. e., subject to passions, this is the predicate. Kapila and consorts are the subjects (of the conclusion). Acquisition is the initial appropriating of what is received. Avarice is greediness and envy which follow upon the act of initial acquisition. Kapila and consorts take possession of what is given to them and do not forsake their belongings. This proves that they have passions.

(92.4). Here we have in the rôle of a fact¹ (establishing the general rule) an example by contrast, where the absence of the reason in all cases where the predicate is absent must be illustrated

(92.4). The words «every man free from passions», i. e., the negation of the predicate is made the subject (of the contraposed major premise). «Free from acquisitiveness and avarice», i. e., the absence of the reason, is predicated. The example (intended to illustrate this contrast) is Rīśabha and consorts.

(92.6). Now, it is doubtful whether really in the case of this Rīśabha both the predicate and the reason, both the fact of being subject to passions and of having the instinct of property are absent. Indeed, it is not certain whether Rīśabha and consorts are really free from the instinct of property² and from passions.

(92.8). Although in their own school they are declared to be such, but this is, nevertheless, very doubtful.³

¹ *atra pramāṇe*

² *parigraha-āgraha-yoga*

³ *sandēha eva*

(Example). As e. g., a man in the street.

3. (Thesis). This man is non-omniscient.

(Reason). Because he is subject to passions

(Example). As e. g., a man in the street.

(88.7). The first of these (deductions) has an uncertain predicate. (All) are examples where (there is some uncertainty); either the predicated attribute is uncertain or the reason adduced is uncertain or both are uncertain.

(88.8). (The following are) examples. In the (first example) the existence of passions is the predicate, the faculty of speech—the reason, the man in the street—the example. It is uncertain whether he really is passionless.

(88.10). (Again in the second example) «mortal» is the predicate; «this man» is the subject; «because he has passions» is the reason. The presence of the latter in the example, a man in the street, is uncertain, but his mortality is certain.

(88.12). (In the third example), the predicate is non-omniscience; «because he is subject to passions» is the reason. Both are uncertain in the man in the street, his not being omniscient (since this is a transcendental quality which never can be neither affirmed nor denied), and his being subject to passions.¹

127. (Next come examples where) necessary concomitance is either absent (because of incomplete induction) or not rightly expressed (because of the carelessness of the speaker).

1. (Thesis). Whosoever speaks is subject to passions.

(Example). Like, e. g., our Mr. So and So.

2. (Thesis). The sounds of speech are impermanent.

(Reason) Because they are products,

(Example). As e. g., a jar.

¹ For the same reason, i. e., because an absolute freedom from passions and desires is not known from experience

tion, since both attributes are (admittedly) absent in a piece of stone? Let both passions and speech be absent in it, what does it matter? A necessary absence¹ of them (inasmuch as the absence of the one necessarily entails the absence of the other) is not proved. Therefore the example is not one (which could establish) the contraposed general premise.

(92.19). What is this necessary concomitance? The words «every one who is free from passions» indicate the negation of the consequence, this is the subject (of the contraposed general proposition) The words «does not speak» indicate the absence of the reason, this is its predicate. (92.20) This serves to declare that the absence of the consequence is invariably concomitant with the absence of the reason. This (would really represent) a necessary concomitance.² (In the present case) the contrast is not established as (necesssry) The function of an example is just to prove this circumstance, (the necessity of the connection) Therefore, since this example does not fulfil its function, it is fallacious

135. An example in which the contrast is not properly expressed is as follows

(Thesis). The sounds of speech are not eternal

(Reason). Because they are produced (from causes).

(Example) (In contrast with) Space (which is not produced and eternal)

(93.2). An example not (sufficiently) disclosing the contrast is the following one. «The sounds of speech are not eternal», i.e., non-eternity is the consequence. «Because they are produced» is the reason «Like Space» is the negative example. Here in a spoken syllogism, the meaning must be understood from the words of the speaker.

(93.4) If it is correct in itself, but wrongly expressed by the speaker, then it becomes wrong in the form in which it is expressed, while the form in which it would be correct, is left without expression. The reason is that reason which is expressed. Thus a reason or an example may eventually be wrong in a syllogism through a mistake of the speaker's expression.

¹ *vyūptiā vyatīka*

² *vyūptiā*.

sed, proves mere coexistence, not necessary coinherence, and if deductions were allowed on the ground of mere coexistence), every thing would be deducible out of anything.¹ (89.2). But if it were clearly realized that the *essence*² of production implies impermanence, then we could deduce the latter from the former. (The syllogism should have been expressed thus), «whatsoever is a product is impermanent». The necessary concomitance of production with impermanence would have been clearly expressed. And then, in order to prove this concomitance, an example should be given whose object it would be to illustrate the meaning of the general sentence³

(89.5) In that case the example would really serve to illustrate necessary coexistence. But in our case the example is given without at all expressing the necessary coexistence. Such an example serves only to point out some similarity. But the predicate cannot be validly deduced upon mere similarity (or incomplete induction).

(89.6) Thus the function of an example is (to prove the validity) of the invariable (and necessary) concomitance. In our case such an example is not given. The example as it is given is useless, since it proves mere similarity. It is fallacious by the fault of the speaker, (not by itself). (89.8). The speaker indeed must here convince his interlocutor. Therefore although the real stuff is not wrong, but it has been wrongly represented by the speaker. In this sense it becomes wrong nevertheless.

¹ *atiprasaṅgā*, «because of an over-deduction ad absurdum; the term is used when the deduction implies giving up of every uniformity and the possibility of everything, cp. N. Kanikā, p. 27 11 and 28.5 *nyamaka-nimittābhāṣāi sara-sambhavaḥ-atiprasaṅgaḥ* = *sarvatra-pravṛtti-prasaṅgaḥ*

² *svabhāva* here in the sense of an essential attribute, implying *svabhāva-pratibandha*

³ In the preceding syllogism the major premise which, being the result of Induction, is regarded as an inherent part of the examples, of the similar and dissimilar cases, has been given full expression, although the induction was incomplete and the generalization unsufficiently warranted. In the present syllogism, on the contrary, the example alone is mentioned, the major premise is not expressed. Although the example of the jar is sufficient for the Buddhist who conceives the jar, and every existent object, as a compact chain of momentary existences, it may have no sufficient proving force for his interlocutor. Therefore the speaker, for the sake of clearness, should have appended the major premise emphasizing that it is of the essence of every thing produced according to causal laws to be impermanent, i. e., discontinuant or new in every moment

(93.15). A general proposition and its contraposition must here prove that (the fact adduced as) a reason is invariably concomitant with (the fact deduced) as its consequence. But when this relation is expressed in the contraposed form, the absence of the predicate must be proved to be invariably concomitant with the absence of the reason. Then it will be likewise shown that the reason is invariably concomitant with its consequence.

(93.17). But if it is not stated that the negation of the consequence is invariably concomitant with, (and dependent on), the negation of the reason, then the possibility of the consequence being absent when the reason is present (would not be excluded), and then the invariable concomitance of the reason with the consequence will not be established (as necessary).¹

(93.19). Therefore it should be expressed that the absence of the consequence is invariably concomitant with the absence of the reason, but not (*vice versa*), that the absence of the reason is concomitant with the absence of the consequence

(93.21) Indeed the words «non-subject to causal laws»² express the absence of the reason, (since the non-eternity of the sounds of speech is deduced from the fact that they are produced according to causal laws). This is the subject. The words «it is eternal» express the absence of the consequence. This is the predicate of (the contraposed general proposition). The meaning is thus the following one, «what is not produced from causes is necessarily eternal», (instead of saying «what is eternal is never a product»). Thus the expression means that the fact of not being a product is invariably connected with the reverse of the consequence, i.e., with eternity, but not (the contrary, not) that an eternal substance (never is a product, i.e.) that it is invariably connected with the negation of the reason. (94.1). Thus the contraposition which should contain negation of the reason as invariably concomitant with, and dependent on) the negation of its consequence, has not been (rightly) expressed

When the terms of the contraposition are quoted in an inverted order it is wrongly expressed. Instead of saying «whatsoever is eternal is not subject to causal laws», the speaker has said «whatsoever is not subject to causal laws is eternal». Cp notes on sūtra III. 128. Here as elsewhere «eternal» means unchanging (*nityatvam acasthāna-mātram*), «non-eternal» means momentary.

¹ na pratīyeta = na nūcīyeta.

² abhīka = karanair na kīyam.

express the predicate This means that if something is produced (by its causes), it is so because it is impermanent, and not (as it should be), that if something is a product, it necessarily is impermanent.

(89.17). We cannot, indeed, conclude that something is voluntarily produced because it is impermanent, since voluntary production is not necessarily consequent on impermanence, (there are impermanent things which are not so produced). Just so would it be impossible to deduce production from impermanence, because the fact of production is not necessarily consequent on impermanence¹

(89.18). Although, as things stand in reality, the fact of being produced (from causes) is necessarily subordinate to the fact of being impermanent, (and this is just what the speaker means by his example; but he has failed to express himself correctly, since one must understand his words as meaning that the first attribute) is not necessarily subordinate to, (and contained under, the second). (89.19). There-

¹ The two concepts of «being produced by causes» and of «being an impermanent entity are really conterminous in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Existence is defined by the Saṅgāntikas and Yogācāras as causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā-lāṅkā*). Every existence is imagined as a continual run of discrete moments of existence, the next following moment being the product of the preceding one. Thus to be a product, to be impermanent, to be momentary and to exist become conterminous expressions predicable of every empirical fact. In Hinayāna existence, or element of existence (*dharma*), was split into permanent and impermanent (*nitya* and *anitya*), uncaused and caused (*asamskṛta* and *samskṛta* = *kyāka*), *Nirvāṇa* and *Saṃsāra*. In Mahāyāna all permanent elements and Nirvāṇa itself were excluded from of the sphere of existence and this term was restricted to empirical existence alone, cp. my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 41. It would seem that the notion of being a product or of being subject to causal laws is not contained under the concept of being impermanent. Since both concepts are conterminous and necessarily coherent, the first may be deduced from the second just as, *vice versa*, the second from the first. The concept of voluntary production is really contained under the concept of impermanence, it is less in extension and greater in comprehension, than the latter, but not the concept of causal production in general. Nevertheless it is here stated that production cannot be deduced from impermanence and it is a *lapsus* on the part of the speaker if he has expressed himself so as to suggest the possibility of an inverted deduction, the deduction of causal origin from impermanence. The explanation of the lapsus (and it is probably the right one) is that the conception of causal origin is much more familiar to us than the conception of impermanent or momentary existence which can only be established by very elaborate analysis. The *lapsus* is natural in a man profoundly versed in Buddhist philosophy, but for the sake of the listener it is more natural to start with the notion of causal origin and to deduce impermanence from it.

189. To refute means to indicate the insufficiency and other (fallacies in an argument)

(94.16). What is to be regarded as a refutation? An indication of the insufficiency of proofs and similar (methods). Through it (the insufficiency is indicated. Thus refutation is a verbal expression (of the fact that the proofs quoted are insufficient).

(94.17). In order to explain refutation, which consists in an indication of the insufficiency of the proofs, the author says,

139. Refutation means exposing the fallacies which have been explained above, the fallacies consisting in failure to prove something. Refutation prevents the triumph of the doctrines advanced by the opponent

(94.20). The insufficient proofs, the fallacies of Unreal, Contrary and Uncertain arguments which have been explained, their exposure, their disclosure, is refutation.

(94.21). It can be questioned whether an insufficient proof and the other (fallacies) are not (also proofs, because) they prove the contrary? Why are they then mere refutations? Because they, i.e., the disclosures of insufficiency in argument, prevent the triumph of the tenets advanced by the opponent.

(95.1). A refutation does not necessarily require the proof of the contrary. (A reason proving the contrary is the so called) contrary reason. But if we succeed in invalidating the certainty which is the aim of the opponent, we then shall have the reverse of (that) certainty. The contrary will be established in that sense that the opposite of certainty shall be proved.

(95.3). That is all about refutation.

140. Wrong refutations are sophistry, (evasive answers)

(95.5). The word sophistry expresses similarity (to reasoning). Evasive answers are would-be answers. They resemble answers because they are expressed second in place (where an answer is expected).

(95.8). Wishing to declare that the similarity with (real) refutation consists in that they occupy the place of answers, the author says,

(90.3). The example «motion» is deficient in regard of the reason, because motion is not a body of limited dimensions. Space (or Cosmical Ether) is deficient in regard of both, it is eternal and illimited.

(90.4). Thus either the predicate or the reason or both are not necessarily absent. Their «non absence» means that they are not instances of the absence (of the reason as conditioned by the absence of its consequence). In these cases, since they are not (instances of such absence), they are deficient in regard of the absence of the predicate, of (the reason, and of both together).

(90.7). The other fallacies are next exemplified.

131. Similar are also the cases where the (necessary) absence¹ of the predicate, (of the reason and of both) is uncertain, e. g.,

(Thesis). Kapila and others are not omniscient,² or are not (absolutely) trustworthy.

(Reason). Because their knowledge cannot stand the special test of omniscience and (absolute) trustworthiness.

An example by contrast is the following one.

(Contraposed major premise). Omniscient or (absolutely) trustworthy is a man who teaches astronomy.

(Example). As e. g., Rīṣabha, Vardhamāna and others.

The absence of the predicates «not-omniscience» and «not absolute trustworthiness» in these examples, is subject to doubt.

Major premise Whatsoever is not an impenetrable body of limited dimensions is eternal, as motion. (But motion is momentary although not a body)

Contraposition. Whatsoever is non-eternal is a body of limited dimensions

Example Just as atoms etc.

But atoms are eternal, although they are impenetrable bodies of limited dimensions Therefore the example is wrong, since in this case the example must establish the necessary concomitance of the attributes non-eternity and limited dimension This alone would allow us then to deduce the eternity of the sounds of speech from the fact that they are not bodies of limited dimensions

¹ *vyatireka*.

² Read *yathāśarvajñāḥ*.

182. A negative example in cases where the exclusion of the reason is uncertain is as follows.

(Thesis). A Brahmin possessing the knowledge of the three Vedas should not trust M-r So and So.¹

(Reason). Because (the man) might be subject to passions.

A contrasting example (must illustrate the rule that) whosoever is to be trusted is not subject to passions, e.g., Gautama and other promoters of legal codes. The reason, i.e., the absence of passions in Gautama and consorts, is uncertain.

(91.10). The predicate to be deduced is the fact that a Brahmin who knows the three Vedas, the Rig, Sāma and Yajur Vedas, should not trust the words of a certain man. The subject is some definite person, M-r So and So, e.g., Kapila. «Because he is subject to passions» is the reason. Here we have in the rôle of a fact² establishing the rule an example by contrast.

(91.15). An example by contrast (a negative example) is a case which proves that the absence of the predicate is necessarily concomitant with the absence of the reason. «Those whose words are to be trusted», i.e., the reverse of the predicate, is here the subject (of the contraposed general proposition). «They are free from passions», i.e., the absence of the reason is predicated.

(91.16). Gautama, Manu and consorts are the authors of legal codes. They can be trusted by a Brahmin knowing the Veda, and they are free from passions. Thus it is that Gautama etc. are taken as contrast to the subject, (men like Kapila who, being unorthodox, cannot be trusted). But the absence of passions, i.e., of the reason, in Gautama and consorts is uncertain. Let them be trusted by the Brahmin, but whether they be subject to passions or free from them, is not certain.

183. A case where the exclusion of both is uncertain is as follows.

¹ Insert *evakṣita* before *pin uṣa*, cp. Tib

² *pramāṇe*.

(92.10). The last three fallacies are now exemplified.

134. An example not proving the contraposed general proposition¹ is as follows,

(Thesis). He is not free from passions.

(Reason) Because he possesses the faculty of speech.

An example by contrast (should illustrate the rule that) if something has no passions, it cannot speak,² as e.g., a piece of stone.³

Although both the attributes are absent in a piece of stone, (it neither has passions nor does it speak), nevertheless the negative proposition, that «every one who is free from passions does not speak», in its generality⁴ is not proved. Therefore (the example is not a proof) for the contraposed (general proposition).⁵

(92.14) Not including the contrast is an example (not proving) the contraposed general proposition. «Not free from passions», i. e., subject to passions is the predicate. «Because he possesses the faculty of speech» is the reason.

(92.15). The contraposition will here be as follows. The words «if a person is not unfree from passions» refer to the absence of the predicate, it represents the subject (of the contraposed general proposition). «Neither is the faculty of speech present in him», i. e., the absence of the reason is the predicate. Thus it is stated that the absence of the predicate is invariably concomitant with, (and dependent on), the absence of the reason.

(92.17). The example (illustrating the rule) is a piece of stone. How is it that this example does not prove the contraposed proposi-

¹ *avyatirāḥa*

² Read p. 92. 11—12, *yatrāvītarāgattam nāsti na sa vaktā*.

³ *Lit.*, p. 92 11—12 An example by contrast is «in whom there is absence of passions, he is not speaking, like a piece of stone». — Here again the major premise is regarded as inhering in the examples

⁴ *vyāpti*.

⁵ *Lit.*, p. 92 18 «Thus, since exclusion is not established pervasively, it is non-exclusive».

tainment¹ and conception² do not mean different things. Sense perception whose essence and form consist (in a perceptual judgment) is qualified perception.

(87.26). This point, (*vis*, that sense perception includes the affirmation of a distinct image of the object) is quite clear, the pupils will understand it (by themselves). Therefore it has not been enlarged upon by the authors of the Commentary and Subcommentary (on the Nyāya Aphorisms). But we, wishing to follow the path opened by our teacher Trilocana,³ will give the following exposition (of the problem), according to the facts and to the arguments (adduced by both sides, the Buddhists and the Realists).

PART I.

The Buddhist makes a statement of his views. The Realist inserts suggestions.

§ 1. THE PARTS PLAYED IN PERCEPTION BY SENSATION AND BY IMAGINATION MUST BE DISTINGUISHED.

(88.1) (The Buddhist) It would be so, (*vis*, the perceptual judgment of the form «this is a cow» would be included in sense perception, if it were produced by a sensory stimulus, but) this is impossible, (the definition of the Naiyāyikas is wrong), sense perception

¹ *niscaya*, ascertainment or «necessity» in the sense in which every assertion wishing to be objectively real is a necessary assertion, as established by Sigwart *op. cit.*, I 243. The same term is used to express the necessity of logical deductions, cp N b t, text, p 19 (sūtra II 7).

² *vikalpa*, this term, which also means a choice, is applied to the judgment of the form «this is that», cp Tipp, p 23. 4 — *an evāyam ite vikalpaśyātva tñā ucyate*. It thus points to «the function by which we identify a numerically distinct and permanent subject of discourse» and which by W James, *Psychology*, I 461 (1890) is called «conception» or «conceiving state of mind». This same function is also called, in Europe and in India, synthesis (*ineinsatzung*, *abhedādhyaratna*, cp N. b t, text, p 4. 11). Thus the functions of judging, ascertaining, necessary, affirmation, conceiving and synthesis are here declared to be so many names for one and the same mental operation whose result is the perceptual judgment of the form «this is blue» or «this is a cow». It is partly Kant's «Verstand», «Vermögen der Urtheile».

³ Quoted in the *Apoha-siddhi*, p 18 (B. I)

(93.6). The cognition of the inferred fact is not based on similarity or dissimilarity, but on invariable concomitance of the reason with the consequence.¹ Therefore the general proposition, whether in its positive form, or in its contraposed form, must express that the reason is invariably concomitant with the consequence. (Otherwise it would be expressed in a form which proves nothing.²

(93.8). The rightly expressed concomitance must be shown to be established by examples. Thus an example really is the indication of the meaning of the general proposition, positive or contraposed.³

(93.9). But in the present case the general proposition in the contraposed form has not been mentioned. (93.10). Therefore (it looks as if) the contrasting example has been quoted in order to prove by dint of mere similarity. In this form it has no proving force. It could have such a force if it were expressed as corresponding to a general proposition in the contraposed form.⁴ But this has not been done. Therefore an example is wrong through a mistake of the speaker, when it is not expressed as illustrating a contraposed proposition (in its generality).

(93.13) A negative example containing an inverted contraposition is as follows.

136. (An example attached to an inverted) contraposition is the following one.

(Major premise). What is not subject to causal laws is eternal.

(Example). (As e. g. Space)⁵

¹ *sādhya-matyād dīśtok*, lit. «from the reason which is necessarily dependent (niyata) on the consequence (sādhya)».

² *na gamāla*

³ Thus it is here clearly said that the weight of the major premise depends on the examples in which it is contained.

⁴ *vyatireka-māyatiṇa*.

⁵ The fully expressed syllogism is here the same as in sūtra III. 128, but the positive major premise is replaced by its contraposition, viz.,

Thesis The sounds of speech are non-eternal.

Reason. Because they are produced (according to causal laws).

Positive major premise and example. Whatsoever is produced according to causal laws is non-eternal, as a jar etc.

Contraposition and example. Whatsoever is eternal (unchanging) is not subject to causal laws, like eternal Space.

produced by an external object can point¹ only to that object and not to its name.

(88.6). The colour of an object may be associated with a certain flavour, but the visual sensation perceives the colour and not the flavour. (Similarly our sense perception apprehends the object and not the name. If therefore the Realist admits no other origin of our knowledge than the external world, he ought to conclude that all our ideas are unutterable, since there are no names in the external things)²

(88.6). Therefore the cognizing individual³ (really apprehends by his senses just a simple reflex, but he) thinks that (his imagined mental construction with all its general features also) is present in his ken⁴. This mental construction⁵ converts⁶ an object which is quite independent from any association with a name into an object containing (the connotation of its) name. (The cognizing individual possesses indeed a faculty of sense-perception and a faculty of imagination) When he thinks that he perceives a constructed image by his senses, he simply

verbs and substantives, all constituting together the *pañcaviṃśa-lāpaṇā*, cp. Tātp. p. 82 6 ff and 102 2 ff. Since the Realist contends that all these categories are objective realities, but not mnemo-verbal constructions, the Buddhist deduces this view *ad absurdum* (*prasanga*). He says that from the standpoint of the Realist the qualified percept should only point to the qualified object, but not to its grammatically arranged structure—*yato asya pratyakṣasya nābhilāpa-samsarga-yogavātsambhavaḥ tasmād.. vikalpa-rūpaṃ artham eva ādarśayet itī prasangaḥ, nābhilāpa-samsargitayā*. If that structure were borrowed from external reality it ought to exist there. Just as in European philosophy there was a struggle between the advocates of an *intellectus archetypus* and an *intellectus ectypus*, so in India the Vaiśyikarāṇas and Mīmāṃsakas favoured, so to say, a *vox archetypa*, the Naiyāyikas — a *vox ectypa*. The Buddhists maintained, as against this, that if the categories were borrowed from the external world, they must have pre-existed in that world. If they did not, the objects would be unutterable, like sensations are. The Buddhists then replaced the *anūśīlita-bhāvanā* of the Mīmāṃsakas by an *anūśīlita-vikalpa-bhāvanā* conceived as a Biotic Force responsible for the logico-grammatical structure of the empirical world. Cp. B. Russell, *Outline*, p. 264 and 174—5, on the connection between syntax and physics.

¹ *ādarśayet, na cārtham upadarśayati, abhivāpa-samsargitāṇā, artha-ya ca tadabhivācāt* (V)

² Here ends the *prasanga*, follows the *viparyaya*.

³ *pratipattiṭṭhā*

⁴ Construct *vikalpa-vyākāṇam. cartamānam abhimananyante*

⁵ *vikalpa-vyākāṇam.*

⁶ *ādarśayat*



(88.12). The denied fact is the possibility of verbal designation. It is the contrary of the impossibility of such verbal designation Subordinate to the latter is the fact of being produced by the object (directly, as a simple reflex).¹ This fact is established² (by the preceding argument) It proves the impossibility of giving names (to our ideas) and disproves the possibility of doing it (But this is absurd). (88.14). Because, indeed, (no one) can deny the obvious fact that these (perceived) images³ are associated with their names. For sure, it is therefore clear that they are not (mere reflexes), they are not produced by the (genuine) efficiency of the objects (alone).⁴

(88.15). Indeed, (we can also draw the following conclusion which destroys the foregoing one).

II. (*Second syllogism*).

(Major premise). Whatsoever represents an idea associated with a name is not (a simple reflex) produced by a sensory stimulus (alone).

(Example). Just as the ideas of God, of Matter etc.

(Minor premise) And all our ideas, the subject of our discourse, are such (constructions)⁵

(Conclusion) (They are not simple reflexes produced by the object):

(88.17) This is a negative deduction according to the eighth figure of Negation.⁶ What is denied is the fact of being produced by a sensory stimulus coming from the object This fact is subordinate to the fact of

¹ viz, "whatsoever is a simple reflex cannot associate with a connotative name"

² *upalabdhih*

³ *praijnya*.

⁴ We would throw this counter-argument in the form of a Mixed Hypothetical syllogism thus,

Major premise. Whatsoever is produced by an object (directly as a simple reflex) cannot receive a connotative name.

Minor premise But our ideas have names

Conclusion Therefore they are not simple reflexes

⁵ It will be noticed that all our ideas as constructions of our faculty of productive imagination are here contrasted with pure sensation, the limit of all constructions The ideas of God, of Matter and other most abstract ideas are, in this respect, not different from the idea of «blue» which is constructed by a contrast with non-blue and other colours.

⁶ Cp above, N b. t, p 84 13 ff, transl p 98

141. Sophistic answers are discoveries of non-existing fallacies.

(95.10). Discovery of a non-existing, an untrue, fallacy (is sophistry). It is discovered by words, hence it is a disclosure. Such are sophistic answers. They are answers by generic resemblance with answers.

§ 22. CONCLUSION.

If I may claim to have explained
Some words and problems in this treatise,
As pure as moon-rays is my moral merit.
If a position, prominent and lasting,
If science and religion¹ I have reached,
I wish my work will serve alone
The weal of all the living creatures.

Finished is this Comment on the «Short Treatise of Logic». It is the work of Dharmottara who has used all his skill for throwing it into the compass of one thousand four hundred and seventy seven ślokaś (of 16 syllables each).

¹ The fact (*caśin*) described in this stanza is the conclusion of the work, the emotion (*rasa*) echoed (*anurāga-rūpa*) in it is either a feeling of resignation (*śānta-rasa*) or of sympathy (*karuṇā-rasa*). This expression of feeling is the principal aim (*angin*) of the author, the double meaning of the word *dharmottara* is a subordinate (*anga*) embellishment (*alanāra*). We have here a case of *dharma*, the *śleśa* is suggested (*ālasyā*), but not developed (*amroyūḍha*), cp Dhvanyāloka, p. II 22 ff. The Tib translates *jñāna* by *ye-śes*, this would mean «transcendental knowledge».

versal) has never been (really) perceived (by the senses). On the contrary, the thing (really) perceived is the particular,¹ the (extreme concrete and) particular which is alone the ultimate reality,² (it is the thing in itself shorn of all its extensions). Therefore it (alone) is the efficient cause of sensation,³ but not the Universal.⁴ The (Universal) is bare of any kind of efficiency, it is a spurious (reality).

(88.25) Thus it is that what is really perceived (by the senses) is not the meaning⁵ of a name, and what is meant by⁶ a name is not what is really perceived (by the senses).

(88.26). Moreover,⁷ (that names are given not to reality, but to logical constructions, not to sense-data, but to Universals, appears clearly from the fact that sensations are unutterable), if sensation⁸ were utterable⁹ we would know what heat¹⁰ is from its name, just as we know it by actual experience, and if we could feel it from its name, cold would disappear (as soon as the word heat would be pronounced).¹¹

§ 3. THE REALIST CONTENTS THAT THE UNIVERSALS ARE INHERENT IN PARTICULARS. THE ANSWER OF THE BUDDHIST.

(89.1). (The Realist). (We agree) that names, just as logical marks, refer to Universals, but the Particular possesses the Universal

¹ svalakṣaṇa

² Read *paramārtha-saḍ atah*

³ *vyākhyānasya* The *vyākhyāna* is produced by *svalakṣaṇa* which is *trailokya-viśālaṇa*, but nevertheless *darśana-gocarah sarūpa-lāvātī* (P), *śaśadṛṣṭi-ākāra-ādhyakṣatvāt* (V), it is not *ākāra-lādācchikāna-anumeya* (V)

⁴ *sāmānyam artha-līkṣyām aśaktatvāt tan na paramārtha-sat, asattvāt na tad vyākhyāna-janakaṁ, ajanakatvāt na sarūpaṇam, asarūpakatvāt na darśana-gocarah* (P)

⁵ *sambandha*

⁶ *anugata* = *deśa-lāla-anugata* (P)

⁷ This argument is answered below in the II^d part, text p 93 24—26

⁸ *dṛṣṭa* = *pratyakṣa*, cp p 93 24

⁹ *śabda-vācya* = *abhināṣya*

¹⁰ *na hy auspyād atirīkṣito cāhūr nāma asti daudḍhamale* (P).

¹¹ The usual example is the impossibility to convey by words the knowledge of colours to the blind Cp B Russell, Outline, p 12, «in each case what is really a datum is unutterable» P remarks that heat, although a datum, is not unutterable, people understand what the word means, *sanīeto' pi tatra* (V - *sādhane*) *lenacāḍ vṛṇeyena* (V - *atad-vyāvṛtīyā*) *dhavyayati* But what the word expresses is not «really a datum», *na ca vahnī-śabdāt sarvathā cāhūr agraśīlā, tasmā śabda-lāpānā-ullūkṣitam avastī eā vastvābhāsam* (P)

APPENDIX I.

Vācaspatimiśra on the Buddhist Theory of
Perception.

(89.8). (The Buddhist). No! (we do not admit the existence of a double reality apprehended by the senses), because the (Universals), class-character and other properties, do not exist as separate bodies¹ (united with the particulars) and are not apprehended (separately) by pure sensation²

(89.9). Indeed, Class and its possessor, Motion and the moving thing, Substance and Quality, or the Inherence (of the latter) in the former — are not present to our mind³ as separate things. And things which never have produced separately a reflex⁴ in our mind, (which possess no separate efficiency by themselves), cannot be mixed as milk with water, by the man who cognizes them.⁵

(89.11) Therefore we think that the right view is the following one. The particular⁶ is a unity and has no parts,⁷ but it is differentiated by class character and other properties superimposed upon it by our primeval faculty⁸ of productive imagination.⁹ (Thus undifferentiated transcendental unity) is thus differentiated and imagined as possessing such and such (qualities and actions)¹⁰

¹ *pinda*

² *avilāpakena*

³ *calāsati* = *pratibhāsante*

⁴ *apratibhāsamāna*.

⁵ Read *taḍ-vedinā*, it is a *śūdrharmya-āśānta*, milk and water have been perceived separately and can be mixed. Pure substance is supposed to be perceived in a momentary sensation, but the Categories have no reality besides application to sense data, therefore a mixture in a real sense is impossible. The example can also be understood as a *śūdrharmya-āśānta*, milk and water are not mixed for the swan who is credited with the capacity to drink the milk out of the mixture and leave the water behind, just as the Sāṅkhya Saint intuits the conscious Soul as separated from Matter. The irreducible character of pure sensation and pure thought are usually illustrated by pointing to the irreducible Indian solid and liquid atoms, which nevertheless *de facto* (*pratipattitah*) are mixed in the milk, cp N. Kasiā, p 268 1—2. (translated below)

⁶ *i* e, the extreme concrete and particular, the "thing in itself"

⁷ *avibhāga* = *niravayava* = *niramaśa* (vastu)

⁸ *anādi-cāsanā*.

⁹ *vikalpa*

¹⁰ *taḍhā taḍhāḥ guṇa-karma-gaṇa eḍāhāranatena vā dīpyate* (P), *vyāpṛtīyā bhāsanā, na dīpyate* (V)

Vācaspatimiśra on the Buddhist Theory of Perception.

(Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā, Vizian. ed., pp. 87.24—95.10.
Benares ed. 1925, pp. 133.9—144.2).¹

(87.24). (The definition² of sense-perception in the Aphorisms of the Nyāya system includes the characteristic that) «it contains a judgment³». These words point directly to a fully qualified⁴ (determined and complex) perception. Indeed, the terms judgment, ascer-

¹ Vācaspatimiśra, a native of Northern India (Durbhanga), lived in the IXth century A. D. at the court of the king of Nepal. He is posterior to Dharmottara whom he quotes several times (Tātp., pp. 100, 339 and N. Kanikā, p. 257). About him see R. Garbe, *Der Mondschein der Sāṅkhya Wahrheit*, Introduction, and my article in Prof. H. Jacobi's *Festschrift*. He possessed an unrivalled mastery in the exposition of the most difficult problems, a vast knowledge in brahmanical systems and first hand information in Buddhist philosophical literature. His exposition of the Buddhist doctrine of perception is therefore of high importance. His text was commented upon by Udayana-ācārya, living in the Xth century, in a work entitled *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā-pariśuddhi* (quoted here as P). The latter text was again commented upon by Vardhamāna-upādhyāya, living in the XIIIth century, in a work entitled *Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa* (quoted as V.). The exposition as usual is divided into two parts. In the first the Buddhist leads and makes a statement, the Realist passes remarks. In the second part they interchange their functions, the Realist answers all the arguments of the Buddhist and makes a final conclusion.

² This definition, as interpreted by the best commentators, runs thus — «Produced by a sensory stimulus (coming from an external) object, a cognition, which is not an illusion, which is (either) an unutterable (sensation) or a perceptual judgment, this is sense-perception».

³ *vyavasāya-śīmaḥ*, lit. «contains a decision», it will be seen in the sequel that a perceptual judgment of the form «this is a cow» is meant.

⁴ *savikalpaka*.

cerving one of them we ought to perceive them all¹ (89.19). The fact of "supporting"² something is, indeed, pregnant³ with efficiency. A plate situated just under an apple which would otherwise fall to the ground is a "support"⁴ (of that apple), it (affects it and) produces an apple which does not fall to the ground.⁵

(89.21). The same must happen here (to the Universals if they are situated upon the substance), the substance will support them (and will not allow them to fall away)

(89.22). Now the following question arises: When the substance supports its attribute, is there or not between the two terms of this relation a third unity, the relation itself, in the form of a force uniting the related terms? Indeed such a unity is impossible, because this would involve us into a hopeless process, we would be obliged to imagine a new link connecting the force with each of the terms and so on *ad infinitum*.⁶

(89.23) Therefore we must conclude that the relation of a substance to its qualities is a natural one.⁷ Every substance, as soon as it springs up into being from the causes producing it, is such. It supports a great number of Universals (by the fact of its existence alone, without special forces or processes)

(89.24). Accordingly, when nothing but the bare presence of something has been discerned (at a great distance, the object is supposed to

¹ Lat., 89.19 "When from a remote place there is perception conditioned by one attribute (*upādhi*), a perception must follow as characterized by all attributes.— But at a distance we can discern the mere presence of something indefinite, we neither can see a tree nor an Aśoka tree Op N b i., text, p. 48 B, transl p. 184

² *ādharma-ādheya-bhāva*

³ *upakāra-garbha*

⁴ *ādharma*

⁵ According to the Buddhists the apple is a "string of events" (*saṃhā*), the apple in the basket is an altogether different event (*saṃhā*) produced by different causes. The realist, although believing in the stability of the apple, admits causation of the basket which stops its downward movement and counteracts gravitation (*gati-mūrtim gurutva-pratibandham ca . vidadhāt P*)

⁶ Lat., p. 89.22—23 "And not does it help by other forces, because, if it would help by an other force, there would be also falling into infinity by imagining (ever) other forces" — This is exactly Bradley's (Logic, p. 86) argument against the reality of relations. The Realists assume here Inherence as an *Ess* (*padārtha*).

⁷ *stabdhāva-sambandha* is, e.g., the connection between fire and heat, for the Buddhists they are one, for the Naiyāyika two unities connected by *stabdhāva-sambandha*, cp. below note on the passage text p. 98 26 where the argument is refuted

cannot contain a decision¹ (of that form), because such a decision would include a (distinct) image,² an image which (always) is utterable³

(88.2). However, our knowledge,⁴ so far as it is due to a sensory stimulus coming from an external object, is a reflex of the object⁵ (alone), (the object) does not possess the power of amalgamating (a sensation) with a name

(88.3) Indeed the names are not contained in the objects, (they neither are appended to them, nor inherent in them, nor produced by them⁶). Nor are the objects identical with their names. If it were so, we have had already an occasion to remark,⁷ the behaviour of a man who never has learned a (given) language would be just the same as the behaviour of a man who understands it, (he could get the names by looking at the object).

(88.4). (If the name of the object) is not to be found in the external world,⁸ (neither can it be found inside us), it is not an idea.⁹ It is arbitrarily applied to an object,¹⁰ (but this does not mean that it can be got out of the object). Indeed knowledge¹¹

¹ *vyavacāya*, the decision or judgment, e. g., «this is a cow», cp p. 89. 5.

² *pratibhāsa*, «image» (= *anyata-pratibhāsa*).

³ Read *abhīkāpa-samsarga-yogyā*, this is right on the assumption that knowledge contains images — *sākāra-pakṣe* (V).

⁴ *vijñānam* refers here to sensation

⁵ *arthāśābhāsa*, viz. *nyata-śābhāsa*.

⁶ *na santi, samyogena, samavāyena, kāryatayā* etc (P)

⁷ *Tātp*, p. 82 5 ff. There was a school of Grammarians who maintained that names were identical with things (*nāmadheya-tādātmyam arthānām*), that even new-born children and deaf-dumb persons had their ideas from a congenital Name-forming Force (*śabda-bhāvanā* = *śabda-vāsanā*), since naming is primary in our knowledge, *ibid.* p. 88 11 ff. To a certain extent they held just as Dr John B. Watson, although on other grounds, that «we do not think, but only talk». To this Force as manifested in the eternal words of the Scripture, the school of Mīmāṃsikas ascribed the origin of our religious and moral duties.

⁸ *artha-asamaparśi*; *arthāsamaparśaś ca atadortitvād atadūpattēś ca* (P)

⁹ *samvedana-dharmo jñatrvādīh* (P), although there may be a *śabdākāra* as *grāhyākāra*, it is *arthāsamaparśi*, i. e., *arthākārāsamaparśi*

¹⁰ *nyayanāt* = *nyogato yoganāt* = *bāhya-sāmānyādaharanyena pratīteh* (P); *nyogā* = *śicchayā nyogā*, cp *Kamalaśīla*, p. 88.

¹¹ *jñānam* here refers to the qualified percept corresponding to the object as the real possessor of all its attributes, *arthāt sarūpālād upajāyamānam jñānam vikalpa-rūpam* (P). Dignāga has established that this object is a spontaneous construction of our mind according to the exigencies of our language, or just of its syntax, it is a *nāma-kalpanā*. The names are divided in class-names, adjectives,

which is not split in a number of partial forces,¹ each supporting a different attribute, how can there be any clear cut difference² among the «supported» (attributes), if they are supported all at once.³ If the apprehended object⁴ is the supporter of one attribute, it (*eo ipso* supports all the others), the others are not supported⁵ (separately). Whether (every single) attribute has been perceived or not, (does not matter) If the one is perceived, all the others also ought to be perceived».

(90.8). Now, according to our opinion, the distinct perceptions⁶ (or perceived images) are produced⁷ (by our Reason's spontaneity), by an innate⁸ natural constructive capacity.⁹ What they apprehend and what they affirm¹⁰ (in a perceptual judgment) are both mere relations,¹¹ not (independent) reality.¹² They do not in the least touch¹³ the ultimate reality. But indirectly they are however connected with real things, (the efficient point-instants). They therefore guide the purposive¹⁴ (efficient actions) of men, they help them to reach¹⁵ their aims, they lead to successful¹⁶ activity, and thus is the reason why, although they do not penetrate to reality itself,¹⁷ they nevertheless are not quite identical with one another, (each construction represents another relation).

(90.7). And further, (let us concede that our conceptions do not apprehend the ultimately real, they nevertheless may be caused by

¹ *anga-sāli*.

² *bhedo niscitaḥ*.

³ *sarvātmanā*, lit «by one essence», = *ekena svabhāvena*.

⁴ *grāhya*.

⁵ *nopalābhāḥ* = *nopalārahāḥ*.

⁶ *vikalpāḥ*.

⁷ *-vyūḍānāḥ*.

⁸ *anūḍā*.

⁹ *vikalpa-vāsanā*.

¹⁰ *grhṇanti sāmānya-mūlram, adhyavasyanti santānam* (P) Cp. Tālp, p 342 8

¹¹ *anya-vyūḍa-rūpa*.

¹² *avastu alīkṛtat* (P)

¹³ *gāhate*.

¹⁴ *pravartayanti*.

¹⁵ *prāpayanti*.

¹⁶ *anuvādayanti*.

¹⁷ *vastu-svabhāva*.

conceals,¹ as it were, his imaginative faculty and puts to the front his perceptive faculty. This imaginative faculty² is the mind's own characteristic³ (its spontaneity), it has its source in a natural constructive capacity⁴ by which the general features⁵ of the object are apprehended. Since the image is called forth by a reflex,⁶ (we naturally) think that we perceive the image as present in our ken,⁷ (but it is really constructed by productive imagination)⁸

(SS.10). Thus (there are two conflicting deductions that can) be established

I (*First syllogism*).

(Major premise) Knowledge originating in a sensory stimulus is unutterable

(Example). Just as a simple reflex.⁹

(Minor premise). But (our ideas), the constructed images,¹⁰ the subject of discourse, are called forth by stimuli coming from (external) objects.¹¹

(Conclusion). (Therefore they cannot be designated by a name).

(SS.11). This is a *deductio ad absurdum*.¹² It is a negative argument according to the sixth figure of Negation.¹³

¹ *tīraskurvat* = *adhyasyat* (F)

² *utprekṣā-ryūpāra*. Read *utprekṣā* p 88 8 instead of *upelṣā*

³ *mānasam ātmīyam*.

⁴ *r'ālpa-vāsanā*, on *vāsanā* cp notes in the sequel

⁵ *anyatārtha* in the sense of *anyata-pratibhāsa*, cp. N b t, p. 8. 8, 8. 15--16

⁶ *anubhava-prābhavataḥ*.

⁷ *vartamānam*.

⁸ *Lit*, p. 88. 6--10 "Therefore the cognizers falsely impute as a present experience a constructed idea (*vīkṣā-ryūpāra*... *vartamānam*) which points to a thing (by itself) not connected with a word as connected with a word, by concealing its own mental function consisting in imagination, arisen from a natural capacity (*vāsanā*) of differentiating arrangement (*vīkṣā*), apprehending a non-limited (*anyata*) object, and putting in front sensation (*darsana*), which is a (passive) faculty of direct experience (*anubhava-ryūpāra*), because it, (i. e., the differentiating arrangement) is called forth by a direct experience. — The emendation in the Benares ed. is wrong.

⁹ *nirvikālpam*.

¹⁰ *vīkṣā*.

¹¹ They are the constructions of productive imagination, but imagination is stirred up by a simple reflex, therefore they are *indirectly* also products of external reality

¹² *prasanga-sādhana*

¹³ Cp. above, N. b t. p 88. 6 ff., transl p. 91.

«If the senses have not produced a cognition¹ at first, because they do not possess the special faculty² of doing it, they neither will be able to do it afterwards».

(90.13). Indeed, what is gone by, (what has vanished, will never be apprehended by the senses), it is not their field of action,³ and you may employ thousands of devices, you will never induce them to do what is not their own special job.⁴ (90.14). Nor can memory whose domain is the past ever cognize⁵ the present which, has not been apprehended before.⁶ If that were possible, the blind would be able to perceive colours by memory. This has been said by (Dharmakīrti), —

(90.16). «Then a visual sense perception⁷ would be possible even when the faculty of vision would be lost».⁸

§ 5. THE BUDDHIST CONCLUDES.

(90.17). Thus it is that the judgments⁹ (which apply to existence the Categories of) Names, of Class, of Quality, of Motion (or Causation) are excluded (from having their origin) in sensuous¹⁰

¹ *buddher*.

² *upayoga-avisesatah* = *viśiṣṭa-upayoga-abhāvāt*.

³ Cp. N. Kanikā, p. 258 1—2 — *anubhava-samāropayor vikalpa-arikalpa-rūpatayā drata-lāhanavā tādātmya-anupapattēh*, i e., perception and imagination (or experience and imputation), being by their essence non-constructive and constructive (or passivity and activity) are as opposed as the hard and the liquid stuffs are, they cannot be the same thing» — The Indian atoms are physical, the solid and the liquid are ultimate elements

⁴ *Id.*, p. 90. 14 «And not even by thousand contrivances this can be induced to act upon the non-domain (of its activity)»

⁵ *gocarayitum*.

⁶ *an-anubhūta-pūrvam*

⁷ *netra-dhīr*

⁸ This is the continuation of the stanza whose first part is quoted above, p. 90 9 It is found in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, fol. 156^a 1, *Bstan-hgyur*, Mdo, vol. 95. Chomé ed. It is there separated into two halves with the authors own comment between them, just as it is done by Vācaspati: The Tib. has *arthāpūya*

⁹ *kalpanā* This refers to the five Categories established by Dignāga (*posita-vāda-kalpanā*) as exemplified in the judgments, «this is M-r 80 and 80», «this is a cow», «this is white», «this is the possessor of a jug» and «this is moving», cp. *Tātp*, p. 82. 6 and 102 2 ff.

¹⁰ *pratyakṣatvena*

not being susceptible to receive a name.¹ Its opposite is the fact of being susceptible of receiving a name. (Therefore this incompatible fact being established, it excludes the possibility of utterable ideas being reflexes).

(88.18). Nor (can it be maintained that simple reflexes may sometimes receive a name, and) that the contraposition (of the major premise in the above syllogism, *vis.*, «whatsoever is a simple reflex does not represent an idea associated with a name») is uncertain.² Indeed what is produced by the object must conform to the real content³ of the object, not to the (different) content of the name, and we have already stated⁴ that names are not contained in the object nor are they identical with them. If our ideas could reflect something which is not included in their object,⁵ they then could reflect anything, and (we would arrive at the absurd conclusion) that everybody must be omniscient,⁶ (his ideas being capable of reflecting anything you like).

§ 2. THE CONTENTION OF THE REALIST THAT NAMES CORRESPOND TO REALITIES REJECTED.

(88.21) (The Realist). Names are associated with things as a consequence of an arbitrary agreement.⁷ When a thing is perceived, the name given to it is remembered. Thus it is that a thing is apprehended as associated with a name.

(88.22) (The Buddhist) But then, let a name evoke the memory of just the thing about which⁸ the agreement has been concluded. (Humanity) have concluded an agreement exclusively concerning Universals which pervade⁹ (an indefinite number of particulars). But a (Uni-

¹ i. e., whatsoever is a sense datum is unutterable.

² *sandigdha-yatrektā*, means that the rule has exceptions, as assumed by the Naiyāyikas, since they maintain that the qualified percept is also produced by the sensory stimulus

³ *artha-rūpa* = *artha-sārūpa*.

⁴ Cp. above, Tātp p. 88.8 and 82.18 SS 13 ff

⁵ *asambaddha*

⁶ Like the Mahāyānistic Buddha possessing «mirror-like» omniscience.

⁷ *saukṣeta*. — The Buddhist admits only two relations, Identity and Causation (*īdāntya, tadutpatti*) Names are neither identical with external objects nor are they their products. But the Realist remarks that there are other relations, e. g., association by an arbitrary convention (P)

⁸ Read *yatraiva tarhi*.

⁹ *anugata* = *deśa-kāla-anugata* (P)

produced by a stimulus (coming directly) from the object¹ and a (composite) reflex² capable of being covered by the connotation of a name, (the latter is a creation of productive imagination) We maintain, as against this, that there would be incompatibility, if it were true that (every object is but a string of events and the only real object is a point-instant of efficiency), the extreme particular,³ (the thing in itself) But that is not so! (90.25) (The author) will establish in the sequel⁴ that the objects (of the external world are not momentary events, but) possess stability, and that they (really possess all their attributes), class-characteristics and other (real Universals) (He will establish that these enduring and composite objects) are ultimately real, (that their content) can be covered by a connotative name. Therefore the object itself produces the simple reflex⁵ and the conditioned reflex⁶ as well. Consequently there is between them no incompatibility

(90.27). It follows also that the above⁷ *deductio ad absurdum* (which was founded on the supposition that a reflex is always unutterable) is wrong, since there are reflexes⁸ which are utterable.⁹

¹ *artha-sāmarthyā*

² *pratibhāsa = pratibimba ādarśatā*

³ *avalaṅkāra = lāṅkāra = artha-līṅgā-kāraṇa = paramārthasat = caustu*

⁴ Cp. comments on N S, II, 2 58 ff.

⁵ *artha-sāmarthyagah (pratibhāsaḥ = nyāta-pratibhāsaḥ)*

⁶ *abhūṭa-samsarga-yogyah pratibhāsaḥ = anyāta-pratibhāsaḥ* as in N.

b. t., p. 8

⁷ The deduction against the Realist is the one mentioned on p. 88 10, «what is produced immediately by the external stimulus, is not accompanied by the connotation of the name». The contraposition will be, «what is accompanied by the name, is not produced by the object». This major premise is not warranted (*sarv-digāha*) by facts, according to the Realist, since according to him, the distinct perception is also produced by the senses

⁸ *abhūṭa-samsarga-yogyah pratibhāsaḥ = anyāta buddhīḥ*, cp. Tātp, p. 18 5

⁹ *Lit.*, p. 90 28—28 «First of all, as to what has been said, that there is a contradiction between being born from the efficiency of the object and being a reflex capable of coalescing with a name, to this we will say, that there would be a contradiction, if the own-essence were the only object, but it is not so. And he will teach (read *upapādayisyati*) an ultimately real object possessing class-characteristics etc., possessing stability, fit to coalesce with a name. Therefore cognition produced by it is produced by the efficiency of the object and contains a reflex (*pratibhāsa*) capable of coalescing with a word. Thus no contradiction. And thus a doubtful contraposition (*vyatirekāt*) of the *deductio ad absurdum*. — It is clear from this that according to the Realist the logical and grammatical, or syntactical, structure of the world preexists, and is borrowed by our understanding from objective reality.

(which is inherent in it), the Universal is *also a reality*¹ and it is in this (united form, together with the Universal) that the Particular produces perception (of both).

(89.2) Thus a simple reflex² (or pure sensation) is produced in the first (moment) of the sensory stimulus³ coming from the object). But the real object⁴ which is apprehended⁵ by it, is endowed with class character. When this (double reality) is thus apprehended, its name, whose connotation⁶ has been previously established, is brought to memory and then a qualified perception,⁷ (or a perceptual judgment) of the form «this is a cow» arises. It is produced (initially) by a contact⁸ between the organ and the object, (but) it apprehends⁹ (ultimately) a thing which is endowed with class-characters and is designated by a (connotative) name.

(89.5) (Kumārila)¹⁰ the author of the Digest puts it thus,

The thing perceived is double,¹¹

Although¹² evoked by a reflex.

And further,¹³

And then a judgment¹⁴ is produced.

In our mind¹⁵ the thing appears

With Qualities and Universals.

This also is a sense percept.

¹ *vastu-bhūta*.

² *nirvikalpalena*

³ *ālśa-sannipāta*

⁴ *vastu*.

⁵ *vedanāt*

⁶ Read *upalabdādhāra-sambandhasya*

⁷ *vilāpa-pratyayah*.

⁸ *sannikarsa*

⁹ *avagāhn* = *visayā-laroti*

¹⁰ Śloka-vārtika, pratyakṣa-sūtra, 118. Nirukta is here the name given to Śloka-vārtika

¹¹ Kumārila, kār. 118—119, admits that what is perceived in the first moment is the «pure» object (*buddham vastu* = das «reine» Object), the object shorn of all its extensions and distinctions (*anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-rahitam*), but it nevertheless contains them.

¹² Read *bodhēpi*

¹³ *Ibid*, 120

¹⁴ *avasiyate*

¹⁵ *buddhi*.

although designating the person, does not inhere¹ in it, and the personal identity² indicated by the name is but a logical construction³ (covering a series of events). This construction⁴ is not (a simple reflex, it is not due entirely to the stimulus) coming⁵ from the object,⁶ (but to a mental synthesis).

(91.4). (The Realist). However, this again is wrong⁷ We have already had occasion⁸ to discuss this point when commenting upon the term "Unutterable"⁹ (introduced by the Naiyāyiks into their definition of sense perception as against a school of Grammarians¹⁰ which pretended that the names were inherent in the things¹¹). (We have maintained there¹²) that our conceptive thinking does not represent (external) objects as identical with their names. The name is arbitrarily given. It (means the object and) is connected with it by a special relation of naming. (91.5) Nor is the name apprehended by the same sense-organ by which the corresponding object is perceived. On the contrary (what really happens is this). At first the object, although it possesses all its general and special features, produces a simple reflex,¹³

¹ *bhinnena śabdena*.

² *abhedā*

³ *kalpanam*, cp. B Russel, Outline, p. 56. «Peter really covers a number of different occurrences and is in a sense general», cp. Tāt p 84 8, *dittho nānā-deśa-lāla-avasthā-samsrētaḥ pinda-bhedaḥ*

⁴ *vikalpānam*

⁵ *anarthajatiṃ*

⁶ Lat., p. 91 8—4. «And it is not right that by arranging non-difference *abhedā-kalpanāt* of the object through a separate name «this is Dittha», the arrangements (or synthetic images-*vikalpānām*) are not born from the object, (*vis*, are not reflexes)»

⁷ Cp. Tāt p., p. 84 8 ff

⁸ *avyapadeśya*

⁹ The school of Vaiyākaraṇa's, cp above p. 269

¹⁰ Read with the Benares ed., .. *yathā na śābdhūbdeśena artho vikalpau upa-darśyate*, *kyntu tatastha eva śābdāḥ svatāyayatayā samsargena saṃyajinam upalak-sayati, na ca śābdārtthayor...* Lat, (it has been said) that non-sensuous thoughts (*vikalpa*) do not point to the object as non-different from the name, but the name is standing quite aside, it points to the possessor of the name by a relation consisting in being named». — Thus the relation of the name to the thing is neither Identity (*tādātmya*), nor Causality (*tādutpatti*), nor attribution (*māna-viśeṣya-bhāva*), but a special relation (*svatāyā-śābda-samsarga*) arbitrarily established (by *saṃlāta*) The name is not a *viśeṣana*, but an *upalaksana* (P)

¹¹ Cp. Tāt p., p. 85. 9 ff.

¹² *ālocite*, cp. Tāt p., 84 16, *prathamam indriyārtha-sannilarsād ālocite .. artha-mātre* («das reine Object»).

This means that (the recollection of the name of the object) does not produce a break in the operation¹ of the senses and of the external object,² (they create both the primitive sensation and the subsequent synthetic conception).³

§ 3. ANSWER TO THE BUDDHIST THEORY THAT EVERY MOMENT IS AN OBJECT APART.

(91.16). (The Buddhist). The sensible stimulus⁴ calls forth (the simple sensation, but) not the complex percept,⁵ because the latter depends upon a recollection of former experiences.⁶

(The Realist). This is not to the point! (The causes of a phenomenon are always complex). You yourself (are responsible) for the dictum,⁷

From a unique cause nothing is produced.

From some totality of causes (and conditions)

Does every (single) thing arise.

(91.18). If that were not so, the object and the senses could not even produce a simple sensation, because they depend on light and aroused attention. If the (fully qualified percept) has not been produced in the first moment, that comes because memory has not yet cooperated. But if the seed in the granary has not yet produced the sprout, it will not be prevented to produce it (later on), in cooperation with soil, (light, moisture) and all the totality of causes (and conditions).

(91.22) (Of course you, the Buddhist, will maintain that the seed producing the sprout and the seed not producing it are two different

¹ *arthendriya* = *artha-sahitenāriya* (P).

² As assumed by the Buddhist, cp. above, p. 271, text, p. 90 ff.

³ This only means that the sensory stimulus is «lodged in the centre of all the factors» (*madhyam adhyāśanam indriyam*) which participate in the production of a full percept, memory plays an important part among them (P). This the Buddhist also admits, because he admits that the synthetic image is *indirectly* (*pārampariyeṇa*) produced by the senses and the object. Nevertheless, since the external object for the Buddhist is a string of events, the synthetic image would have no corresponding object at all, because it corresponds to an enduring object. Therefore the Realist brings forth the next argument based on the stability of the external things (P).

⁴ *indriyārtha-sanniharsaḥ*.

⁵ *vikalpasya* = *savikalpaka-pratyakṣasya*

⁶ *prāg-vasthā*, cp. 91.9

⁷ Most probably by Dignāga, not yet identified.

have exhibited) its capacity of supporting the Universal «Existence». But just the same essence of the object is supporting all the other Universals, Substantiality etc., (since all are supported at once) (89. 25). Thus it is that all of them, Substantiality, Solidity, Arboricity, Aśoka-ness etc., become quite useless, since when the Universal «Existence» is cognized, they ought to be cognized *eo ipso*, they are included in the same essence. (In our opinion), the Universal «Existence» is nothing but an indication of the ultimately real (element in our knowledge, all its distinctness is brought in by productive imagination).¹

(89. 29). Accordingly it has been said (by, Dharmakīrti), «If a philosopher admits that in perceiving one thing with many attributes, we really perceive many things, then, in perceiving one attribute, we *eo ipso* ought to perceive them all, since all are produced at once, by the same force».²

(90. 2). «If one is perceived the others become irrelevant. Is it possible (under these conditions) that the one should be perceived and the others not? Surely when one is perceived all are perceived».³

«If an object with different (real) attributes is apprehended,⁴ it is then split⁵ (in a number of realities). But if it is a unity⁶

¹ Lit. p. 89 25—27. «Thus just all Substantiality, Solidity, Arboricity, Aśoka-ness etc., determined by its essence, are objectivized by the idea of Existence (*sat-tva-rūpāpena*) which is merged in the absolutely existing thing».

² Lit. p. 89 28—90. 2 «For whom (= *yasya dārṣane*) the intellect (= *vilāpa-dhīr*) apprehends an object possessing (*bhēdino = vāstasasya*) different additions (*upādhis*), (for him), if the characterized thing (*upalāryasya = viśeṣyasya*) being the same (*ekātmānas*) as the force serving to help (*upalāra-angam yā śaktiḥ*) the different additions, is apprehended at once (*sarvātmanā = sarvair upādhibhis ekasrabhātā*), what differentiation there will be, is uncertain?» (P — *apitu sarvopādhibhir viśeṣo nīcīta eva syāt*) These stanzas are found in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārtika* in the *apoha*-section, ch. I, *kārikā* 54 and first half of 55 (fol. 12^v. 2 of the Sholutor monastery edition) (A. Vostrickoff).

³ Lit. p. 90 2—3 «If one helper has been apprehended, the others do not help (*nopalārās = nopalāralāh stabhātāh*), therefore (*tato*) the others are they not perceived while this one is perceived? (read *adretā ye*, acc. to Tib. and Tātp, 389. 5, P. adds *kim nāma?*) If this one is perceived, all are perceived». Ibid, I 579. It is interesting to compare what W. James *Psychology* II. 8, says about the first sensation of an infant, «in a mere «this», or «something there»... it has Objectivity, Unity, Substantiality, Causality, in the full sense in which any later object... has these things». For the Buddhists the «this» is the ultimate element.

⁴ *dhīr*.

⁵ *bhēdin*.

⁶ *abhinnaūtan*.

proved by the joint Method of Agreement and Difference,¹ not by the homogeneity² of the objects, (we will not object), it is also our opinion.³

(92.3). (The Buddhist). But (a qualified percept) refers (also) to that condition of the object which belongs to a past time, this previous condition of the object cannot produce a stimulus⁴ on our sensitivity, how then could it be a *sense* perception?

(92.4). (The Realist). The Cosmic Aether, the atoms etc. are in a (perpetual) contact with the senses, does it follow that they are perceived? Do you (really think⁵) that whatsoever is in a contact with the senses ought to produce sense-perception?

(92.6). Not⁶ every contact with the senses produces, indeed, sense-perception, but whatsoever (possesses the nature of belonging to) the special domain of sense cognition is perceived through it,⁷ (and the qualified object belongs to this domain of perception).

(92.7). (The Buddhist). But really, how can the senses without being stimulated by a contact⁸ produce that kind of knowledge? Or we may ask, this knowledge, (the qualified percept, if it exists) why should it be sense-knowledge? And if it is sense knowledge, does your characteristic «born from a stimulation of the senses by the object» apply to it? because just that kind of knowledge, (*vis*, the synthetic perceptual image), will not be comprised in the definition. (Real sense-perception, in the strict meaning of the term, is only pure sensation)

¹ *anvaya-vyatiśheka*.

² *samāna-viśayatā*

³ Udayana remarks that, as a matter of fact, both parties, the Realist and the Buddhist, admit heterogeneous causation, for instance, when an olfactory sensation is immediately followed by a visual one. This fact is known from experience, *phala-darśanāt* (V). But the function (*vyāpāra*) is determined by induction (*lāryena anumāhīyamānatā-mātra-unmēya*) which proves that a visual sensation is never produced by the olfactory sense, but only by the sense of vision. But the Realist thinks that although the sense of vision by itself (*levala*) apprehends only the present, in cooperating with memory this function can be altered, it will apprehend the present combined with the past. The Realist thinks that such a combination is objectively possible, the Buddhist denies it.

⁴ *sannikṛṣṭa*.

⁵ Read *tat* *īam* *yaḍ*.

⁶ Drop one *na*.

⁷ Here the Realist frames his definition so as to include in it a sense-perception of the Universals inhering in particulars.

⁸ Read *asambaddham*.

reality? No! If it be maintained that) the object and the senses (after having been stimulated and) after having produced a simple reflex,¹ subsequently produce, in collaboration with memory, also the distinct image,² (we answer) that this is impossible, because (the two different acts of the senses) will be separated by the intercalation of an act of memory. *viz.*, the recollection of the name of the object.³ (90.9). This has been put (by Dharmakīrti) thus.

«If a (reflex) of the object has been produced⁴ and afterwards the recollection of the name appended,⁵ and if we consider (the resulting distinct image) as a sense-perception,⁶ (it is clear that) this object (the object corresponding to the image) will be separated (from the first)».⁷

(90.10). Neither can it be maintained that just the same act of the senses which has produced the simple reflex, itself produces, with the collaboration of memory, the distinct image.⁸ For it cannot be maintained that an act of memory does not separate (the process of sense-perception in two parts), because of the rule, that not separating is (only) the thing itself,⁹ (nothing can be regarded as separated by its own self). (90.12) (It has been said by Dharmakīrti).¹⁰

⁷ *ālocita* ⁸ *sarvīkalpāṃ api dhiyam*

⁹ Lit., p 90.7—9 «And further. When the real object has been indistinctly felt (*ālocita*) by the senses, then the senses (*indriyam*), possessing a function separated by the immediately produced recollection of the name and the object, cannot produce (together) also the distinct thought (*sarvīkalpāṃ api dhiyam*)». Read *tadanantarotpinnasābda* ..

¹⁰ *arīhopayogaḥ* = *sannīlargaḥ* (P)

¹¹ *anu-yaṇanam*

¹² *akṣa-dhīr*.

¹³ Lit., p 90.9—10 «If the object has been efficient and again there is the mnemonic subsequent efficiency of the word, if that is referred to sense-knowledge, this object will be separated» — This stanza is found in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-viniścaya*, fol 154^b. 6, *Bstan-hgyur*, v 95. Choni ed. — The problem whether sensation (*nirvīkalpa*), being quite heterogeneous from conception (*vīkalpa*), can nevertheless produce the latter, has raised a long controversy. Śāntirakṣita, Kamalaśīla and others answer in the affirmative, cp. Tattv., 1806. they admit heterogeneous causation, *ibid* 1810, but Bhāvavikṣa(?) and others object, because of *bhūna-viśaya*. *ibid*. 1807 As a consequence of this there was also a divergence between the two parties on the character of *samanāntara-pratyaya* and *mānasa-pratyaya*.

¹ *vīkalpa-pratyaya*.

² *svānga*

³ This is the first part of the stanza, it is continued on p 90.16

(experience). And also, (first of all), the judgments (applying the Category) of Substance¹ of the form ("this is a brahmin) carrying a stick", (i. e., "this is a sticky thing"). (Dharmakīrti has said on this occasion),

"The relation of characterizing Quality to a characterized Substance, this foundation of our empirical knowledge, is created (by our Reason), it is not (cognized by the Senses)".²

(90 19). Indeed this complicated function³ (of a synthesis of apprehension) could never be discharged by (passive) sensitivity, it can be done only by (spontaneous) Thought, because the senses apprehend only the present moment. They do not think!

(90 21). (What Dharmakīrti here says with reference to the Category of Substance equally refers to the Categories) of Quality and Motion, they also are not (ultimately real). It has been said above,⁴ (with respect to the Categories of Substance and Quality, that things which have not produced reflexes separately) can not be put together like milk and water. Analysis and synthesis are not reflexes.⁵

(90.22). It follows that the qualified percept is not a sense perception.

PART II.

The Realist takes up every Buddhist argument and answers. The Buddhist passes remarks.

(90.23). (The Realist). We answer as follows

§ 1. THE SIMPLE REFLEX AND THE QUALIFIED REFLEX ARE BOTH PRODUCED BY A SENSORY STIMULUS.

(90.23). (The Realist). First of all (we must consider the Buddhist) view that there is an incompatibility between (a simple reflex)

¹ *dravya-lāpānā*.

² *Lit*, p 80 18—19 "Having grasped the common-sense standing, the characteristic, the characterized and the relation, this is understood (by the Reason) in putting them together, not otherwise".—This stanza also is found in the *Pramāṇa-viniścaya*, *ibid*, fol. 155^a, 3 —Usually the words of *Dignāga sarvō'gam anumāna-anumeya-bhāvo* etc are quoted on this occasion, cp. *Tātp*, p. 89 18, 127. 2 etc.

³ *vyūpāra-lāpā*.

⁴ *Tātp*, p. 89 10.

⁵ *evola-sambandhāyor*. . On the analogy of 89. 10 we would expect *rūpa-vic-
lena apratibhāsane*

As regards its location in the external world it is (an inference¹ and) a construction, as regards its subjective side, the sensation, it is present and it is a datum.²

(93.2). Therefore ought you not to admit that there may exist one cognition notwithstanding some complexity in the object?³ But then, in the present case, what contradiction can there be, if the same cognition transcends the ken regarding the object at the previous space-time and does not transcend the ken regarding just the same object at the following space-time?⁴

(93.2). As to the question that (every point) of space-time makes a different object, (thus converting the existence of the object into a string of events), this is also wrong!

(93.3) Right it is that when we perceive the real⁵ ruby we (at the same time) negate the opposite, (the non-rubies). If we would not exclude the negative, we would not have the other, (the positive), because all entities contain the negation of their opposites by implication.

(93.5). But why are topazes and all other precious stones negated (when a ruby is ascertained)?

(Buddhist). Is it not because they are necessarily included in the non-rubies?

(Realist). But wherefrom comes this necessary inclusion in the non-rubies?

(Buddhist). From the fact that their identity with the rubies has never been apprehended⁶

¹ That the external object is inferred is now generally admitted. In India it was a special tenet of the Sautrāntikas.

² *Lit.*, p. 92.27—93.2 «It also, indeed, transcends the ken and does not transcend, it is an arrangement (*vikalpa* = *lapanā*) and a non-arrangement. Regarding the object it is transcending and it is an arrangement, regarding the self it is non-transcending and a non-arrangement (*avikalpah*).»

³ *Lit.*, p. 93.2 «Therefore through a break in the object no contradiction, if so?»

⁴ Read with the Benares ed. «*nanu śhāpi tad avāṣam vyñānam tasyavasthāsyā vastunah pūrvā-deśa-kāla-sambandhe parokṣam aparokṣam cāpara-deśa-kāla-sambandha itī lo virodhah*»

⁵ *svarūpa* refers to the realist view that the ruby is a positive thing and its negation a real absence, while for the Buddhist the ruby is what A. Bain calls a positive-and-negative name, since «the negative of a real quality is as much real as the positive». According to Buddhists all names are in this sense relative (*apoha*)

⁶ Read with the Benares ed. «*adāvid apī tādātmyen-ānupalambhād itī cet, yatra tarhi tādātmyam upalabhyate na tatra...*»

§ 2. THE ATTRIBUTES OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS, BUT NOT THEIR NAMES, ARE EXTERNAL REALITIES.

(90.28). (The Buddhist's view is that) the attributes¹ are not something apart from the substance of the thing,² but productive imagination³ constructs⁴ them as something different. Thus (the synthetic images⁵) are not due to a stimulus⁶ coming from the object, (but to imagination).⁷

(91.1) (The Realist). (This view) is not to the point. We shall prove in the sequel⁸ that (the attributes and the Universals) are separate⁹ (realities connected with the substance of a thing by Inherence¹⁰). (91.2). As to the names of the things we admit that they do not inhere¹¹ in them. This does not prevent the names and the attributes (to refer to the same things¹²), there is a conformity of external reality (with the structure of language). This we have explained above.¹³

(91.3) (The Buddhist's view, indeed, is that if) we have (a judgment of naming of the form) «this is M-r So and So», the name,

¹ *jātyādi*.

² *dravyādi*, the «real» thing has no parts (*niramaśa*).

³ *vikalpāḥ*.

⁴ *alpayaṇṭah*.

⁵ *vikalpāḥ*, this term here refers to both the act and the content of productive imagination.

⁶ *artha-sāmarthyā*.

⁷ *Lit*, p 90 28—91 2 «And it is not to the point, that the synthetic images (*vikalpāḥ*), which arrange (*alpayaṇṭah*) as different the class-characteristics etc. which are not different from the things etc., are not born from the efficiency of the object».

⁸ Cp. comments upon N S, II 2 53 ff.

⁹ *bhedaḥ*.

¹⁰ Inherence (*samavāya*) is imagined in the kindred Vaiśeṣika system as a kind of omnipresent Universal (*padārtha*), a kind of semisubstantial force which connects the result with its material cause. The result is declared to be something quite different (*atyanta-bhīna*) from the material out of which it is created (*ārabdhā*), but nevertheless connected with it by Inherence. The attributes or Universals are likewise imagined as separate entities, but connected with their respective substances by Inherence.

¹¹ *bhede 'pi*.

¹² *sāmānādhikaranyam*.

¹³ *Lit*, p 91.2—3 «And how, although there is difference of them, their designations possess co-substrateness, that has been taught below». Cp. Tātp., p. 84.8 ff.

(93.16). And if (the Buddhist) answers that he makes some difference between (a datum), the perception (of a pattern of colour), blue or other, and the perception (of the mental image) of the beloved woman, (we will retort that) from our standpoint there is likewise a difference between images originating in sensation and not so originating. (The latter are produced) by our faculty of imagination, (the former) by the faculty of perception.¹

(93.19) (The Buddhist) (The difference is the following one). When we in the image (we are contemplating) feel the action of our perceptive faculty, (when the image is a percept), (we conclude) that it contains a layer² of pure sensation, provided there is no evidence to the contrary.³

(93.20) (The Realist). The right view,⁴ (on the contrary, is the following one) All the functions⁵ (of which our cognition consists), without any exception,⁶ have their origin in our sensitivity. They are either (direct), non-constructive⁷ or (indirect), constructing and contrasting⁸ They all rush upon the same object in an uninterrupted stream, every one concerned only with itself⁹ and disregarding all the others. They come up and down, (appear and disappear), it is impossible to discern (any fixed order between them), so that the one would necessarily follow the other. Therefore¹⁰ those our images (or concepts) which have their origin in sensation (are percepts), produced by our faculty of sense perception, they are nothing else.¹¹

§ 5. ANSWER TO THE BUDDHIST ARGUMENT OF THE UNUTTERABLE CHARACTER OF SENSATION.

(93.24). (The Realist). (The Buddhist argues¹² that sensation is unutterable, if it were utterable we would know what heat is from its name, just as we know it from actual experience, and if we could really feel it from its name, cold would be removed as soon as the word heat would be pronounced To this we answer), the sensation¹³

¹ Cp the same phrasing in the closing word of the first chapter of N b 1, text p. 16 ² *upādhi* ³ *sati sambhava*

⁴ *yuktam utpadyāmaḥ*, p 93 23—24. ⁵ *vytiṣṭāḥ*. ⁶ *sarvā eva*

⁷ *avikalpalāḥ* ⁸ *vikalpalāḥ* = *anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-lalpalāḥ*

⁹ *aḥam-aḥamīkāyā* ¹⁰ Read *tasmāt* ¹¹ Read *nānye*.

¹² The argument is found in the first part, text p 93 26—28

¹³ *pratyakṣa*

argument¹ that if the bare presence of something is discerned at a great distance and if this fact is interpreted as the perception of a substance supporting² the Universal³ «Existence»,⁴ why then are all the other attributes of the thing, (if they are on the same footing as the Universal Existence), not equally perceived all at once? (We answer, — because the thing and its attributes are not a unity) Indeed the substance of the thing is characterized by, (i. e. related to), its attributes, but neither the attributes nor their relation⁵ to the substance are identical with the substance itself,⁶ (all are different unities)⁷

(93. 28). If what is related to the substance (were nothing over and above the substance), if it were the substance itself, there would be (in the world) no relations altogether, because the same thing cannot be related with its own self⁸

and a causal relation for the Buddhist It is clear that the Buddhist never could accept the perceptibility of relations through the senses. Even causality as a relation was for him a construction of the mind. Only its members, the moments, were real.

¹ Cp above, in the first part, text p 89. 17—90 7. P. says that this is an answer to Dharmakīrti's *vārtika gasyāpi* etc, cp p 89. 28 ff

² *viśiṣṭe* = *upalārye*, cp p 89 24

³ *upādhi* = *jāti* (P)

⁴ For the Buddhist this is the only really perceived element and its perception the only real sense-perception, all the other elements of the subsequent distinct image are constructions of imagination

⁵ *viśiṣṭatvam* = *sambandha* (P) = *samarūpya*

⁶ Every attribute is cognized according to the special conditions of its perceptibility (V). The Realists have never admitted that the attributes and the relations (*araccheda* = *upalāra*) are supported by the substance in its one supporting essence (*upalāra-ka-śa-bhāvatayā*), so as to be included in one unity (P). This means that the Realist has never admitted a mechanical separable relation (*samyoga*) between substance and attribute, comparable to apples in a basket. This is imputed by the Buddhist for the sake of argument (*upagama-vādo 'yam saugatasya*). The Buddhist is therefore accused of great skill in extraordinary combinations (*atī-parāmarśa*) with utter inaneity of real argument and receives at the end the advice of sticking to sound realism, p 94 15

⁷ Lit, p 93 26—28 «And not, if this one is characterized by one characteristic, the consequence of it's being perceived as characterized by other characteristics. Indeed, the substance of the thing is characterized by the characteristics, but neither the characteristics nor the fact of being characterized by them are the substance».

⁸ Lit, 93 28—94. 1. «And what is substance-joined is not substance, if it were so, no conjointness at all, indeed just this does not join with this». — Cp Bradley, *Logic*, p. 254—«the terms of a relation must always be more than the relation between them, and, if it were not so, the relation would vanish».

objects, the seed is a string of events), according to the Law of Contradiction the same thing cannot be producing and not producing (the sprout¹)! But this is wrong! We will establish that in the chapter devoted to the repudiation of the Buddhist theory of a Universal Flux.²

(91.28). (The Buddhist). There could be (cooperation between the senses and memory, if their respective fields of action were not quite different). However, (you must admit) that the previous condition of the object is not amenable to the senses. The field of action of the senses is limited to the present. Neither is the present amenable to memory. The field of action of memory is limited to the past.³ A recollection is produced when the former impressions⁴ (which lay dormant in our consciousness) are stirred up to activity. (91.25). Therefore the senses can never cooperate with memory. They both have different fields of action. Indeed, even if you take a thousand eyes and (a thousand) lamps, they will not help your ears in the perception of a sound, (because) their proper field of action (is limited), it is only a coloured (surface)!

(91.27). (The Realist). However, do you not yourself (admit heterogeneous causation). When a visual sensation of colour follows immediately upon an olfactory one, (do you not admit) that the latter, (as a preceding moment), is one of the causes of the former.⁵ But the sense of vision⁶ perceives only colours, it cannot cooperate with a perception⁷ which is bent upon odour. If you retort that causation is

¹ *Lit*, p 91.22—28 «And not is it that the mixture of contradictory attributes, consisting in productive and non-productive, is a cause of a break. This will be taught in the Break of the Breaking into moments». — An allusion to the Buddhist theory of Causation which admits only causation as coordination of events and transforms every object into a string of events. According to this theory the seed in the granary is «other» than the seed in the soil

² *Cp Tātp*, p 979 25 ff.

³ *pūrvānubhava*

⁴ *samskāra*.

⁵ An allusion to the Buddhist theory of causation. Every object being resolved into a string of events the foregoing moment is always the cause of the following one (*samanantara-pratyaya*). The visual sensation is produced by the sense of vision (*adhipati-pratyaya*), the object (*ālambana-pratyaya*), light (*sahakāri-pratyaya*) and aroused consciousness, i.e., the preceding moment of consciousness which may be an olfactory sensation. *Cp.* however *Tattvas*, p. 18. 10 and Kamalaśīla's comment

⁶ Read *caḥṣū rūpa-viśayam*.

⁷ *jñānam*.

remain an object of cognition (naturally), without entering into a special relation to an observer, every one would be omniscient,¹ (since every thing would be his object).

(94.5). (The Buddhist remarks),—“Is not the subject-object relation² and ultimate fact³? The (essence of the external) thing is to be an object, and (the essence of) cognition is to be the subject, (there is no third reality between them in the shape of a relation)

(94.6). (The Realist) Well then, (let us admit for the sake of argument) that the relation of substance and quality⁴ is also, just as the subject-object relation, quite an ultimate fact. It will then be nothing over and above the terms related⁵. However, in the chapter devoted to the repudiation of the Buddhist theory of a Universal Flux,⁶ we will prove (the contrary, i.e., we will prove) that the relations are (something real, something) over and above the things related⁷.

(94.8) Thus, (the above Buddhist argument against the reality of the Universals, *viś*), if one Universal, (say simple Existence) is perceived (at a great distance), all other attributes (if they are on the same footing as realities) ought to be equally perceived, (this argument) is wrong.⁸

§ 7. IS IT POSSIBLE THAT TWO SEPARATE REALITIES SHOULD BE COGNIZED IN ONE PRESENTATION?

(94.9) (The Realist). (As to the other Buddhist argument⁹ against the reliability of our qualified percepts and the reality of the

¹ This over-absurdity (*atiprasaṅga*) is already mentioned above text p 88 20. The Yogācāras, falling in line with some modern philosophers, have deduced from this consideration that the objects do not exist when we do not look at them, and the real world of the Realist is nothing but a dream.

² *artha-jñānayoḥ*

³ *svabhāva eva*, i.e., *svabhāva-sambandha*, cp p 287 n 8

⁴ *upādhi-upādhiimator apī*

⁵ *svaiṃśā-abhedah* = *svabhāva-anatirikta* = *svabhāva-sambandha*

⁶ *Isanīyatā*, this theory transforms the world-process into strings of events developing in a staccato movement, cp Tātp, p 379 27 ff

⁷ In the Nyāya-kanikā, p 256 3, Vācaspati also records a Buddhist argument against the reality of relations which is just the one used by Bradley (Logic, p 96, Appearance, p 32)

⁸ For the Buddhist *jñānārthayoḥ sambandha* is *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* and *svabhāva-sambandha*, for the Realist there is *svabhāva-sambandha* in the cases of *bhāva-abhāva*, *samavāya-tadratoh*, *visaya-visayinoḥ*, but a real link (*anubhūyamāṇa-sambandha* = *agrahāvān sambandha*) in *dravya-guna-karma-jāti-tadratām* (P)

⁹ This argument appears in the first part, text p 89 12—17

(92.9). (The Realist). We concede the point!¹ The previous condition of the object is not amenable to the senses, (it is the domain of memory)! It is nevertheless apprehended² by that our cognition which is the outcome of our sensitivity with the collaboration of memory, or with the collaboration of learned reflexes.³ (92.11). You cannot indeed maintain that what is produced by our sensitivity⁴ with the collaboration of memory is *not* produced by our sensitivity. Thus it is wrong to maintain that our definition of sense perception does not comprise (the fully qualified percept or the perceptual judgment).⁵

§ 4. THE PERCEPTION OF STABILITY NOT AN ILLUSION.

(92.18). (The Buddhist). However, how can a gliding cognition,⁶ a cognition that apprehends (two) consecutive (momentary) events in the object, represent one cognition? The objects are different. They are even incompatible, since the one is present in the ken, the other absent.⁷ Indeed, (if we take the perceptual judgment of the form «this is that», e.g., «this is a cow»), we have in it the element «that» which refers to (a Universal, and a Universal is always) beyond the ken.

¹ mā bhūti

² iṣayī-kriyate

³ samskāra = pūrva-samskāra-pātava, traces of former experiences

⁴ indriyārtha-sanniharsa

⁵ The real intention (*āśaya*) which the Realist has here at heart is the following one. The past condition of the object is not totally absent, it is also present, since it resides in the object as its characteristic (*vśesatayā*). The present is related to the past, and this relation (*sambandha*) is a reality, hence the past must be a reality (P). The definition of the Naiyāyiks mentions a contact between the senses and the object. But the object, according to them, contains its characteristics, hence there is also a contact with these characteristics, and with the past of the object. This relation is called conjunct inherence (*samyakta-samavāya*). The Nyāyakaṇikā, p. 256, records the Buddhist argument against the reality of relations which is very similar to the one used by Bradley and repudiated by B. Russel, Outline, p. 269. Whether M-r Russel would endorse the Naiyāyika view I do not venture to decide. In any case it would be wrong to maintain that the Naiyāyiks «conceive a relation as something just as substantial as its terms». They establish very subtle differences between various kinds of relations.

⁶ parāmārṣa, Udayana, p. 587, accuses the Buddhist of *atiparāmārṣa-kūśalāt deśya-atutucchātā ca*

⁷ Lat., p. 92.14 «And because of coalescence of the incompatible attributes of transcendency and non-transcendancy of the ken»

capacity of our Reason) that the logical relation of substance and quality is due.

§ 8. THE REALIST CONCLUDES.

(94.14) (The Realist). Let us for the present leave off considering the reality and the ideality¹ (of the Universals and their relation² to particulars)! We will take up this subject later on³ However, (let me tell you) that it would be better for you if all the efforts you are making to prove their⁴ ideality⁵ were bestowed on the proof of their (reality and) amenability to the senses.⁶ If you would have done it, you would have (certainly) succeeded in establishing with clear evidence⁷ that (substances and their qualities really exist and are picked up) by our faculty of perception,⁸ (they are not constructed by our faculty of imagination⁹) (94.16) Otherwise, (if you are not willing to do this, there is nothing left for you than) to imagine¹⁰ an under-stratum¹¹ of pure sensation¹² (corresponding to a thing in itself¹³ upon which these categories have been erected by our Reason)

(94.16) (The Buddhist) (You maintain that these categories are produced from sensation) However, the senses do not think,¹⁴ (they only react)! How could they put together¹⁵ all (the complicated edifice of the categories), Substance, Quality and others?¹⁶

¹ *aiāstava* = *mānasava*

² viz, *viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva*

³ N S, II. 2 58 ff

⁴ *asya* = *viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāvasya*

⁵ *mānasava*

⁶ *indriya-jatva*

⁷ *sāṃsāt*, but P has — *asya indriyārthasannulārasajate svābhāvikaṃ sāṃsāt-lāṅgīyam eva pramāṇam ity arthaḥ*

⁸ *darśana-vyāpārata* (from *darśana-vyāpāra* as *bahuvr*) = *indriyajatva*

⁹ *darśana-vyāpāra* is here evidently contrasted with *utprekṣā-vyāpāra*, cp. above text p 88 8—9 and the concluding passage of the first chapter of N b t.

¹⁰ *kalpyeta* (sc *bhavatū*), i e, *vinā pramāṇena* (P)

¹¹ *upadhānam*

¹² *nirvikalpakā*

¹³ *śvalakṣana* = *paramārthasat* is evidently understood, cp N b t, I 14.

¹⁴ *avcāraka*

¹⁵ *samākalayet* = *vikalpayet* = *utprekṣeta* etc

¹⁶ *viśeṣana-viśeṣya-ādī*

rence in substance). Indeed it is just as when a precious ruby is perceived, its non-existence, (i.e. all non-rubies) are excepted, if they were not excepted, neither would the presence¹ (of the ruby) be determined, because the one term is the complete negative of the other.² The topazes and other precious stones are also *eo ipso* negated (when a ruby is determined). If they were not negated, we would be landed in an absurdity; the same thing could at the same time be a ruby and a non-ruby, because the ruby could then be identical with a topaz or some other precious stone and consequently it would be necessarily identical with the non-ruby.

(92.22) Just so when the same thing is located in a former space-time the negation of this space-time is excluded, and in this way³ any subsequent space-time is also excluded, since it is necessarily covered by the negation of this space-time. Thus it cannot possess the essence of being located in a subsequent space-time. Consequently if a thing would possess another substance than that which is located in a given space-time, we would be landed in the incongruity of it being identical and non-identical (with itself).

(92.26). Thus it is proved that the objects (of the simple sensation and of the qualified percept) are different, since location in one space-time makes the thing materially different from the thing located in another space-time.⁴

(92.27). (The Realist). To this (argument) we answer as follows. If (in the perceptual judgment of the pattern «this is that») there is a break in the gliding cognition referring to (two) consecutive conditions of the object, the one of which is absent and the other present, well then! there will also be a break in the (single element) «this» which is also a construction. It is also partly absent and partly present, partly a construction and partly a non-constructed (datum).

¹ Read *bhāvo*.

² Lat., «because its essence (*rūpa*) is the exclusion of its own non-existence».

³ *kramena*

⁴ «The notion of substance, in the sense of a permanent entity with changing states, is no longer applicable to the world» says a modern philosopher. (B Russell, Outline, p 309) Here we have one of the Buddhist arguments. There are many others. The one derived from the analysis of causation, as existing only between moments, is favoured by Dharmakīrti. The Buddhists began by denying the Ego at a very early date, they then denied every essence (*svabhāva*), or substance, in the external world. The existence of a thing was by them converted in a string of events or in a staccato movement of discrete moments (*lāṣaṇa*)

apprehend every object, (since it does not apprehend the present)? According to our system the Intellect¹ (or inner sense), although not limited in its objects (like the other senses), is nevertheless by itself just as unconscious (as all senses are). It does not think.² Conscious is the Soul alone. The Soul is the receptacle of all cognitions and of all the traces³ which are left behind by them (in our experience). The Soul puts on record every sensation and arranges (past experience in suitable combinations).

(94.22). (Kumārila⁴) has expressed this idea in the following words,

The Soul alone contains all knowledge,⁵
The Soul is known as the cognizing Ego,
It has indeed⁶ the force of recollection,
It has the force of combination.

(94.23). It is, indeed, the Soul that (at first) in a sensation⁷ throws a glance⁸ at an indistinct⁹ object, the (actual) possessor (of those general attributes which are not noticed in the first moment). It then awakens the dormant traces¹⁰ (of former experience and) cre-

force, or the Force, the Force *par excellence*, which creates the world as it appears to naive realism, *vikalpa-vāsanā* can thus be compared with Reason when it is charged with the task of an autonomous creation of the Categories of our Understanding. It is clear from the context that much of the business which in realistic systems devolves upon the Soul, is in Buddhism entrusted to *vāsanā* or *vikalpa-vāsanā*. We may accordingly translate it in this context as Reason. On the theory of cognition in Early Buddhism, cp my Central Conception, p 54 P and V explain — *yadā pūriṣṭam vyāñnam manas pratipatty-anubandhitayā na sarva-viśayam*, and the following *acetanatayā na sakala-samskāra-anūdhāratayā*, 1 e, *na ālaya vyāñnatayā*

¹ *manas*. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realistic systems all consciousness is an upsurtenance of an omnipresent substantial and eternal individual Soul. The senses are physical (*bhautika*). There is an inner sense, or Intellect (*manas*) which is also imagined as physical, having the dimension of an atom. It is swiftly moving between the senses so as to establish their connection with the Soul. It may be, to a certain extent, likened to a nervous current

² *na vicāraṇam*

³ *samskāra*.

⁴ Ślokavārt, pratyakṣa, 122

⁵ *sthitam jñānam = jñāna-vāsanā* (P)

⁶ *co hetau* (P)

⁷ *indriya-artha-sannikarsāt*

⁸ *ālocya*

⁹ *sammugdha*

¹⁰ *samskāra*, in Buddhism replaced by *vāsanā* which discharges the same function without a Soul.

(Realist). Well then, (it will follow that), if identity is apprehended, there will be no necessary exclusion. (93. 8). And thus the ruby which is apprehended as identical through different space-times in a synthetic presentation called forth by a sensation,¹ (such a ruby) cannot be divided (in itself in a string of events). (93. 9). Therefore let there be two different space-times, or two different locations² (of the object in them), they are (really) mutually exclusive of one another, never have they been reflected³ (in our knowledge) as being one and the same. But not so the ruby, the precious stone whose substance is embraced by these (different situations). The ruby is a thing apart from the two (points in time-space in which it alternately is located). (93. 12). If one thing is different, this does not mean that the other thing is different too. This would lead to the over-absurdity⁴ that there would be altogether nothing identical (or similar in the Universe).

(93. 13). (The Buddhist). A constructed image which embraces different conditions of the object (sometimes) arises independently from any stimulus exercised by the object upon our sensitivity. Therefore (it is clear that the images in general) do not originate in our sensitivity.

(The Realist). This is not to the point⁵! Because, (it is true), we know from experience⁶ that a man fallen desperately in love can evoke the image of his beloved and his perception will be as direct⁷ (as a sensation), although there will be no stimulation of his senses (by the object). However, it does not mean that all our images are such, (*vis.*, that they are independent from our sensitivity), and that our sense data consisting in a feeling of awareness of a pattern of colour, blue or other, will also be independent from our sensitivity.⁸

¹ *indriyagena vikalpena*

² *sambandhau.*

³ *apratibhāsanāt*

⁴ *ati-prasangāt.*

⁵ *na sāmpratam*

⁶ *dṛṣṭam.*

⁷ *avikalpalam*

⁸ *Lit.*, p. 93 13—16 «And not correct is it that also in the absence of a contact between the sense organ and the object, because a concept (*vikalpaśya*) exists consisting in touching (*parāmarṣa*) the former and following condition, there will be a non-sense-origination. If that were so, it has been observed, that even without any interaction between sense-organ and object there is also a direct perception (*avikalpalam*) regarding this object, of the love-sick man imagining his beloved, therefore it would follow that also direct perceptions (*avikalpalāḥ*) consisting in experiencing (*anubhava*) blue etc. will be not sense-originated». — It must be remembered that according to Buddhist philosophers even the image of a blue patch is already a construction or a real concept, since it includes the opposition with the non-blue or the other colours of the spectre, it is as A. Bain puts it, a positive and negative name. Pure sensation, the quite indefinite moment, is alone absolutely free from any mental construction.

which we here admit, (but not the causation between two parts of an indivisible presentation).¹

(95.1). Indeed, (in the external world) we see colours and things which possess them. Both these parts are real separate entities. Reality as it stands consists always of these two things.² It is wrong to maintain³ that reality only appears in our knowledge in this (double aspect of Substance and Attribute), and that our Reason is autonomous⁴ in creating them. On the contrary, they are reality itself,⁵ (they appear as they exist)

(95.3) (The circumstance that both parts are not grasped in full at the first moment of cognition is irrelevant. Nothing warrants us to expect) that whatever exists must be apprehended (in full at the first moment). If only one part of the reality is seized at first, this does not mean that the cognition is wrong. (95.4). The full complex percept⁶ is produced by (two) causes,⁷ (sensation and memory), as has been stated. It may very well be a constructed image⁸ in which the colour will be assigned the rôle of an attribute, and the possessor of the colour the rôle of a substance. It will be a sense-perception⁹ nevertheless, since, although representing a later stage, it is also produced by a sensory stimulus.¹⁰ (95.5). (In our opinion the circumstance that a part is later produced does not make it an "other" thing)

¹ *Īt*, p. 94 27—95 1 «Therefore, although there is no relation (*bhāva*) of producing and being produced as a relation of intimating and being intimated, when something is apprehended in a single presentation, nevertheless efficient production (*upāhāra-kāraṇam*) consists in being the efficient cause (*utpādaka-kāraṇam*) in regard of a cognition which apprehends (*avagāh*) the relation of characterizing attribute to characterized substance (*viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva*), between a glance at the object (*artha-ālocana*) and a recollection of its extensions (*anugata-smaraṇa*)»

² *arthau*

³ as the Buddhist have done in India and Kant in Europe.

⁴ *āpāta-janman* «born nobody knows where», since in this context this characteristic is understood as the opposite of *artha-svarūpa-janman*, it is clear that an autonomous intellect is meant, an *intellectus archetypus* as contrasted with an empirical knowledge, an *intellectus ectypus*

⁵ *svarūpa-mātrina*.

⁶ *savikalpakam*

⁷ *sāmagrī*, «totality of causes and conditions» = *hetu-kāraṇa-sāmagrī*, here two causes are meant

⁸ *laipayet*

⁹ *pratyakṣa*

¹⁰ *indriya-artha-sannikarsa-prabhavatayā*

of heat and its name refer to the same real fact, however the reaction¹ is different, and thus finds its explanation in the fact that the causation is different, the sensation is direct, the name an indirect suggestion. Therefore the sensation of cold ought not to disappear from the mere idea of heat (when suggested by its name), since an (actual) connection with some heat is indispensable. (Consequently the universal quality denoted by the name is not a reality *per se*).²

§ 6. ANSWER TO THE ARGUMENT OF THE UNREALITY OF UNIVERSALS.

(93.26). (The Realist³) (We will now examine the Buddhist

¹ *pratyaya*, here a term embracing both sensation and conception

² Lat, p 93 24-28 «And although word and sensation are intent upon reality (*vastu*), there is not non-difference of cognition, because through a difference of causes the difference of transcendency of the ken and non-transcendancy is possible. Nor ought the removal of cold which originates from a conjunction with heat arise from knowledge of heat».

³ In order to understand here the argument of the Naiyāyika we must keep in mind that they admitted the reality of relations, viz, they admitted that between the two terms related (*sambandha*) there was a third unity in the shape of the relation itself (*sambandha*). The relation of this third unity with the related terms was a so called «simple relation» (*svabhāva-sambandha* = *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*), i e, a relation without a third relating unity. In this way the Indian realists escaped from the danger of an infinite process which obliged Bradley to deny the reality of all relations as well as of separate unities and to merge them all in One Whole. The Indian Realists assumed thus three kinds of relations, mechanical or separable conjunction (*samyoga*) between substances, inherence or inseparable conjunction (*samavāya*) between substance and attribute — these both relations real unities — and simple relation (*svabhāva-sambandha*) without the reality of the link. The absent jar, which was for them a reality, resided, they declared, upon the empty place, by a simple relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* or *svabhāva-sambandha*) and was perceived by the senses. The subject-object relation (*viśaya-viśayī-bhāva*) was also a simple relation. The reality of relations required as a corollary the stability (*sthāyitva*) of enduring objects. The Buddhist who denied this stability and converted the existence of every object into a stream of momentary events (*kṣaṇikatva*) divided all relations into real (*vāstava*) — that was the relation of Causality between the consecutive moments (cp. above, Short Treatise, p 69), and logical (*kalpita*) — these were the relations of the thing with its attributes and motions superimposed (*āropita*) upon it by productive imagination (*kalpanā* = *vikalpa-vāsanā*). The first relations can also be called external or causal (*baḥutpatti*), the second internal or relations of existential identity (*bhūtaḥitva*). The subject-object relation was thus a simple relation for the Realist,

(95.9). Thus it is established that the words "containing a perceptual judgment"¹ (have been inserted into the definition of sense perception in the aphorisms of the Nyāya system) in order to include among sense perceptions, (not only pure sensations, as the Buddhists intend, but) also the qualified percepts, (or perceptual judgments of the form "this is a cow")

¹ *vyavasāyātma*

§ 6 THE SUBSTANCE-ATTRIBUTE RELATION IS AS REAL AS THE
SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION.

(94.1). Moreover, (if you contend that the substance-attribute relation is contained in a single entity, you may extend¹ the argument to the subject-object relation.² Supposing) we perceive a coloured surface. It is a subject-object relation.³ The object is a system of atoms (characterized by the fact of their cognition). But they do not constitute a single entity (with this cognition).⁴ If they did, (this would involve you in a series of absurdities,⁵ e.g., the following one). Since all cognitions by all observers would be on the same footing (as included in the atoms themselves), all the atoms would be (always) cognized by everybody.

(94.4). (If you retort that the subject-object relation is distinguished from the substance-attribute relation in that) the atoms of the coloured surface remain as external objects (even if they are not perceived), i.e., even if their relation to their cognition (by an observer) does not exist, we will answer no! (the thing cannot be related as an object, if the relation does not exist), or else, if a thing could

¹ *na leśalam lāipamke iyavahāre tarauam samarthanam, api tu pāramārthikā' pi* (P) According to the Sautrāntikas the relation between *śalākṣaṇa* and *jñānākāra* is *pāramārthika* — Cp with this Bradley's difficulties in considering the subject-predicate relation, when a character is assigned to Reality, Logic, p. 484

² *visaya-visayinoh parasparam viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāvaḥ* (V)

³ *visaya-grahana-dharmam*, acc to V. we must read — *dharma*, cp *Siddhānta-kaūmudī*, § 863.

⁴ Lit, p. 94 1—2 «Moreover the cognition of colour is an attribute of apprehending an object, intent upon a multitude of atoms, it is not the essence of the atoms (or, the atoms are not its essence)». — P says that *paramāṇu-svabhāvaḥ* is a *satthi-tatpuruṣa*, but he admits also the interpretation *paramāṇavo jñānasya svabhāvaḥ* V. explains this remark by the fact that on the analogy of *visaya-grahana-dharma* which is a *bahuvrīhi*, we would expect — *svabhāvaḥ*

⁵ Other absurdities could be deduced, if cognition were included in the object, 1) if the cognition included in the atoms were one cognition, the atoms would be known only to one person, a second person would never know them, since his cognition would not be included, or else 2) there would be as many cognitions as there are atoms, 3) if the cognition were one, the atoms would be one atom and the thing would be invisible; the Buddhist would be bereft even of the constructed unity of the thing which would become imperceptible, 4) if the atoms became identical with their cognition, there would be only one atom and again an invisible thing, 5) the thing would be immaterial. Since these absurdities are too obvious, the author has neglected them (P)

Universals which are reflected in them, the argument, namely that, if substance and attribute are two realities, the one characterized by the other,¹ they cannot be included into the compass of one presentation,² (since two separate things are always perceived in two separate presentations, this argument is also wrong). We answer as follows.³

(94.10). Neither would such a relation be possible, if substance and attribute were perceived in two separate (independent) presentations. Indeed, an (independent) cognition of the characterizing attribute, if it at the same time knows nothing about the characterized substance, will never be fit to determine this substance, and (*vice versa*, an independent) cognition of the characterized substance, if it knows nothing about the characterizing attribute, will not be able to determine its own object, because (*ex hypothesi*) they know nothing about one another.⁴ (Consequently there must be one qualified percept corresponding to a characterized substance).

(Buddhist. The substance and quality relation is logical, it is not ultimately real, the ultimate reality is something unique, undivided, but) a congenital capacity⁵ (of constructive imagination, our Reason, imputes upon it a double aspect as substance and quality. It is to this

¹ *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*

² *śa-vijñāna-gocaratiṣṭi* (read thus with the Benares ed)

³ Lat., p. 94. 9—10 «And that between two objects of one cognition there is no relation of characteristic to characterized, to this we say».

⁴ This is not a *bona fide* positive argument, but a dialectical retort called *pratibanda* = *pratibandhī-lapaṇa* = *deśya*-(or *codya*)-*ābhāsa* = *tulyatā* = *tulyatā-āpādāna*

⁵ «We do not deny the empirical usage of those Categories, but we explain it, to a certain extent (*yathā-kathamcit*), by assuming a special creative Force (*viśaṇā*) of our reason. Those for whom their empirical use is founded on objective reality must explain it by its correspondence to that reality (*artha-āśārena*)» (P) — *tā-bhīyām viśaṇā* = *viśeṣya-viśeṣapābhīyām viśaṇā*, the same idea as in the text p. 89. 11—12 is here laconically expressed. Thus the difference between the realistic and nominalistic view-points reduces to a shade — *viśiṣṭa-vyavahāram upapādayan saugato nanyāyikam eva āśrayate* (V) The Realist finds the origin of our knowledge in the objective world (*artha*) and passed experience (*samskāra* = *viśaṇā*), the Buddhist finds it also in the same two places, but the objective world for him are only the momentary things, the point-instants of efficiency (*śiṣa-lakṣaṇa* = *lakṣaṇa*), and past experience (*viśaṇā*), replacing the Soul, assumes the role of a transcendental Force of Illusion (*avidyā-viśaṇā* = *māyā*) creating the categories as «fictions of the mind... which a common delusion erroneously takes for independent facts» (Bradley. Logic. p. 96)

of indirect, conceptual or inferential knowledge. It will be seen from the examples given by Vācaspati that even the perceptual cognitions of the form «this is blue», «this is a jar», «this is a cow» are treated as perceptual judgments, as conceptions, i. e., conceiving states of mind and, therefore, inferences, op Tātp, p. 388 O, *sa ca vilāpānām gocaro yo vilāpyate, deśa-kāla-avasthā-bhēdena śaktiṇa anusandhīyate* and Udayana adds *anumānāmālatiāā vilāpasya* —According to Sigwart, Logik, II p 395, the perceptual judgment «this is gold» is an inference, — «sobald ich sage «es ist Gold», interpretire ich das Phänomen durch einen allgemeinen Begriff, und vollziehe einen Subsumtions-schluss» By a broader definition of inference all conceiving activity, all comparing knowledge (*sārūpya-pramāṇa*) is called indirect, i. e., non-sensuous cognition or inference. The Buddhist view receives the name of a «radical distinction» between the sources of our knowledge (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*), the Realist maintains the view which is called their «coalescence» (*pramāṇa-samlāva*).

§ 2. A PASSAGE OF UDDYOTAKĀRA'S NYĀYA-VĀRTIKA,

ed Calcutta, 1897 (B I), pp 5 5—5.12

(5.5). (The Buddhist) objects and maintains that the cooperation¹ (of the different sources of our knowledge in the cognition of one and the same object) is impossible, since each of them has its own special field of action. This we (Naiyāyiks) deny, because we do not admit that (each has its own special object). There is indeed such a theory. Every source of our knowledge is supposed to have a special object. Sensation² apprehends particulars (only), inference³ apprehends universals (exclusively). That alone is an object of our knowledge which is either a universal or a particular. Sensation is not intent upon a universal, and never is inference⁴ intent upon a particular⁵ (5.9). This we, (Naiyāyiks), deny, because we do not agree (with the reason). We neither admit that there are only two sources of knowledge, (sensation and conception⁶), nor that there are only two (quite distinct) objects of knowledge, (the particular⁷ and the univer-

¹ Or mixture — *samlāva* = *saṅkara* = *śakṣm viśaye sarvesām pramāṇānām pravṛttiḥ*

² *pratyakṣa*, sense-perception according to the realists

³ *anumāna*, according to the Buddhists it includes conception.

⁴ The Buddhist understands «conception».

⁵ The Buddhist understands «the ultimate particular, the point-instant» the Naiyāyik understands the empirical concrete thing

⁶ The Naiyāyik understands «sense-perception and inference».

⁷ i. e., the ultimate particular. This fundamental feature of the Buddhist system has been noticed and very well expressed by the learned editor of the Tattvasaṅgraha, Introduction p. 43, — *svatāksanasya atītyatvam*, *atyantika-*

(94.18). (The Realist). Well then! do you really think that your Reason¹ can construct them?

(94.19). (The Buddhist) Yes, it does! because the Reason (is not limited in its objects as the senses are), it apprehends every object

(94.19). (The Realist). (If you confine the function) of the Intellect to (the cognition) of the past,² how can you tell that) it can

¹ *mānasam jñānam* = *vicāraṇam, saṃkalāṇam jñānam*, i. e. Reason as constructive, logical, even mathematical (*saṃkalāṇa* = *ganana-rūpa*) thought, thought integrational of differentials (*ksana*). It is a spontaneous capacity of our Reason to create the Categories under which reality is subsumed by cognition

² *Manas* as *vilāpa-vāsanā* may be assimilated to Kant's Reason (*sarvārthān lāpaysiyati*). Here perhaps the rôle assigned to the Intellect (*manas*) in early Buddhism, which is quite different, is alluded to. There it is a synonym of *vyñāna* and *citta*, they all mean pure sensation (*vyñānam pratavyāptih*). It is classified as the sixth sense, the inner sense (*āyatana* № 6). The qualified percept, termed *samyāh*, is a special faculty (one of the *samskāras*) which is classified under *āyatana* № 12, not among the *indriya*'s, but among the *viśaya*'s, and under *samskāra-śāndha*. As to the combining, creative force of the Reason it is rather to be found in the element (*dharma*) called *cetanā* «Will» which, besides its function as the personal will of individuals, has a cosmical function and is a synonym of *karma*. This meaning the term *cetanā* has only in Buddhism. When all the elements (*dharma*s) are classified in 18 *dhātus*, the intellect (*manas*), for the sake of symmetry, as is expressly stated, occupies two items, the *dhātu* № 6 (*mano-dhātu*) and the *dhātu* № 18 (*mano-vyñāna-dhātu*), they represent the same element of pure sensation (the same *dharma*), but they are distinguished in that the first is the preceding moment of consciousness, the moment preceding actual sensation (*sparśa*), after sensation comes feeling (*vedanā*) and after feeling the image or qualified percept (*samyāh*). All these three mental phenomena are again classified under *āyatana* № 12. In this arrangement *manas*, although participating in the cognition of every object, fulfills the very modest part of a preceding moment of consciousness, it cannot be charged with the burden of constructing the Categories, Substance, Quality and others. The Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school has brushed this whole construction of the Vāibhāṣikas aside, and replaced it by two faculties, sensation and conception, also called direct and indirect cognition, or sense-perception and inference (*pratyakṣa-anumāna*). The *ālaya-vyñāna* of the old Yogācāras has been rejected. The functions of our Reason belong to indirect cognition; it is variously determined as arrangement (*lāpanā*), imagination (*utprakāśa* = *āropa*), dialectical arrangement (*vilāpa* = *atad-vyāvṛtti*), judgment (*adhyavasāya*) etc. Imagination is helped by memory and memory is founded on impressions (*samskāra*) left by past experience. For the Realist who admits a Soul, these impressions are residing in the Soul as qualities belonging to a spiritual substance. For the Buddhist, for whom there is no Soul and no substance altogether, the impressions become autonomous, they then receive the name of *vāsanā* (probably borrowed from the Sāṅkhya) which is sometimes explained as *pūram jñānam*, sometimes as *sāmarthyam*, i. e., a

object), since it is altogether devoid of any kind of (direct) causal efficiency.¹ (12 19). (Nor can the empirical² Particular, which is the meeting point of several Universals, do it. But the transcendental Particular can. This alone is (pure reality), reality in the ultimate sense, (the thing in itself), because the essence of reality (according to the Buddhists) is just the faculty of being causally efficient (12 20) It is a point-instant (in time-space, it transcends empirical space and empirical time³), it is just the thing in itself shorn of all its extensions⁴ It is not an extended body.⁵ The ultimate reality is not a thing which is one and the same in different points of space.⁶ Nor has it duration through different instants of time. Therefore sense cognition,⁷ (sensation) apprehends the point-instant of reality,⁸ (the efficiency moment, the thing in itself, which alone⁹ possesses the faculty of affecting our sensitivity).¹⁰

(12.22) That a Particular (of this kind) should also be cognized (by the conceiving, synthetic, faculty of our mind, or) by inference, is impossible. (The sphere of absolute particulars is not the sphere of inference). The latter cognizes relations,¹¹ and relations are of two kinds only, (either logical or real), either Identity or Causation¹² In an absolute particular no relation can be found. (Uniformly) related¹³

¹ This is against the Naiyāyikas who admit that sense perception apprehends the particular and the Universals inhering in it as well, thus admitting a complex (*samplava*), qualified perception which the Buddhist denies as sense-perception, *viśiṣṭa-viśayaṭvam abhigrahyā sāmānyasya pratyakṣa-aviśayaṭvam uktam* (V)

² *sāmānyavāhārīṇām svalakṣaṇam* (P), = *vyaśāhāra-mātra-viśayah=avāśṭavam* (V) *sāmānyavāhārīṇah = anādi-vāsanā-vāśṭah* (N Kandalī, p 279 15)

³ *artha-īryā-samarthyena eva vastutva-vyāvasthāpanāt, karmartham tasya deśādī-ananugamah?* (V) — *deśa-lāla-ananugātam vācāra-saham ity arthah* (P)

⁴ *asādhāraṇa*

⁵ *adeśātmaḥ.*

⁶ *deśato 'nanugamena*

⁷ *pratyakṣam*

⁸ *svalakṣaṇa = lāṇa*

⁹ *artha-īryā-sādhy-artham tad-abhūdānam* (V)

¹⁰ Lat, p 12 20—22 «This alone is its own non-shared (read *asādhāraṇam*) essence, that there is ultimate reality of the one which possesses an un-spatial Ego by not being extended (*ananugama*) in space (or by not being repeated in space), and there is momentariness by not running through (*ananugama*) time».

¹¹ *grhīta-pratibandha-hetukam*

¹² Causation between «strings of events» (*santāna*) is also constructed, cp

N b t, p 69

¹³ *pratibandhaḥ sāmānya-dharmāḥ āśrayate*

ates a recollection of formerly experienced things.¹ Armed with this recollection, it creates, but again necessarily² through the medium of the senses, the judgment³ «this is a cow!».

(94. 25). This idea has been expressed in the following (stanza⁴),

The senses are the instrument of knowledge,
The conscious Agent is the Soul alone,
And since it has the faculty of recollection
It will arrange⁵ all things in combinations.

(94. 27). Therefore, although we agree that it is impossible to distinguish in a single presentation two different parts, the one causing the other, in as much as the one suggests the existence of the other,⁶ nevertheless (a single cognition of a substance with its attributes is possible). There is in every percept an element of sensation⁷ and an element of former experience⁸. They are (as though) the one characterized by the other. Both these elements together produce the qualified percept. This is the sort of efficient production

¹ *pūtra-panda-anusmṛti*

² *prāg eva*, P. refers *prāg* to *ālocya*

³ *vikālpayati*, *vikālpā* = *adhyavasāya* = *niscaya*. Thus, in order to save the qualified percept (*savikalpaka*), the senses activated by the Soul are credited not only with the faculty passively to react (*grahana*), but also actively to construct (*kālpana*) the object as substance and qualities. The senses think and judge, because the Soul thinks and judges through the senses (!).

⁴ The first part of it is found in Śloka-vārt, *pratyakṣa*, 121

⁵ *kālpayisyati*, the same function which p 94 28 is called *samādhāna* «synthesis»

⁶ *upakārya-upakāraṇa-bhāva* is a term which embraces both logical suggestion (*jñāpya-jñāpaka-bhāva*) and real causation (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*). Here only the first is mentioned, but it is an *upakāraṇa*, both are meant (P). *nāsti* is explained as *na saviatra asti*, *kvacit tu dravya-guṇa-karmanām asti*, because according to the Nāyāyiks there is a special quality or force (*sambandha*) uniting the substance with its qualities. P. remarks that there is no *upakāra* in the *viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva*, since it is *svābhāvika*, i e., *svābhāva-sambandha*, cp above notes on text p 93 26 and 89 22. The *upakāra* is therefore limited to *atañ-adhikāraṇa-vyavaccheda-pratīti-jananaṃ eva*, what seems to be nothing but our old friend *apoha*. Udayana adds that since no *upakāra* is needed in a *svābhāvika* relation, we must understand the term to be used according to the majority of cases (*sambhāva-prācuryaṇa*), i e., according to the substance-quality relation where a *sambandha* = *upakāra* is needed. Evidently the problem of the relation of sensation to a perceptual concept is insoluble on realistic lines and Udayana rightly points to the contradictions in Vācaspati's expressions.

⁷ *arthālocana*

⁸ *anugata-smarana*.

images, (i. e., they contain a sharp distinction from, or negation of, all other things).

(As regards the first point the argument can be thrown into the form of the following syllogism).

(Major premise). Whatsoever can alternately be affirmed and denied (has no existence in itself, but becomes existent relatively), as distinguished from something else.

(Example). As, e. g., the fact of not being a body of limited dimensions¹ It is found in consciousness (which is not impenetrable and) exists, and in the horns on the head of a hare which do not exist (and therefore are also not a body).

(Minor premise). A (Universal, being) a mental construction,² can be alternately affirmed and denied, "there is a jar", "there is no jar".

(Conclusion). ("Jar" is not existence "in itself", it exists relatively to other things).

(Verification). If "jar" were existence in itself,³ the words "it is" would never be used, being superfluous; nor would the words "it is not" be possible, because they would contradict (the existence which would then be included in the thing "jar"). If it were non-existence in itself, the same consequence would follow⁴

(13.4). (As to the second point, it should be noticed that the Universal) is devoid of every direct efficiency, it is an (imagined) illusive Ens. There is no sameness between it and the point of absolute reality (represented by the element "this", so as to produce the perceptual judgment "this is a cow"), except the fact that both exclude⁵ the negation ("non-cow").⁶

(13.5). (As to the third point, it must be noticed that) the distinct image of "a cow", and the definite connotative designation "a cow", would never be possible without (having present in the mind its) distinctions⁷ from horses or other (animals).⁸

¹ *amūrtā*

² *valalpa-gocaro*.

³ *asādhārano-bhāvo*

⁴ Cp. Bradley, *Logic*, p. 121, "It may be, after all, that everything 'is' just so far as 'it is not', and again 'is not' just so far as it 'is'"

⁵ Instead of *manyate' nya-vyāvrtteḥ* read *anyato' nya-vyāvrtteḥ* or *anyatra vyāvrtteḥ*.

⁶ Cp. Bradley, *ibid* "If everything thus has its discrepant in itself, then every thing in a sense must be its own discrepancy".

⁷ Cp. Bradley, *ibid* "Everything is determined by all negation".

⁸ *Lat.*, p. 13.5 "And the definite idea and designation «cow» not without the exclusion of horse etc." — What is here called *nyatā buddhī* refers to the same

Things possess duration,¹ and (during the time their existence lasts) they gradually produce then results, by successively combining with the totality of causes and conditions² which create together a (stable) result. Thus our Theory of Causation will be established later on³ (as against the Buddhists who admit causation only between moments and no duration at all).⁴

(95 7) Thus (we can throw our conclusion in the form of the following syllogism⁵ which can be considered) as proved.

1. (Thesis). The qualified percepts,⁶ (the minor term), the subject of our discourse, are sense perceptions with respect to (all facts constituting) the proper domain⁷ (of perception)

2. (Reason) Because they are produced by a sensory stimulus⁸ with which they are invariably concomitant.

3. (Major premiss and example). Whatsoever is thus (invariably concomitant with a sensory stimulus) is a sense-perception, just as a bare sensation⁹

4. (Minor premiss) The (qualified percepts) are such, *viz.*, (invariably concomitant with a sensory stimulus).

5 (Conclusion) Therefore they are such (sense-perceptions).

¹ *akramasya*

² *sahakāri-bhāda = hetu-lāraṇa-sāmagrī*

³ In the chapter on the theory of Universal Flux (*Āpāṇikā*), Tātṭ, p. 379 27 ff.

⁴ *Lit.*, p. 95 1—6. «Indeed two things are also standing in a relation of colour and the possessor of colour, they are not thus apprehended by knowledge which is born adventitiously, (i.e., nobody knows wherefrom), but (they are both so apprehended) in their bare essence. Indeed, not is it that whatsoever exists, so much must be apprehended, therefore if one part is apprehended there is no want of reliability (*apramānatā*). But qualified (complex) perception born from the mentioned complex may (nevertheless) arrange (*kalpayet*) class-character etc. as the colour, the thing as the possessor of colour. It will be taught that also a non-gradual (thing) does its effect by degrees, owing to the gradual taking up of the co-factors».

⁵ The syllogism is here inductive-deductive. 5 membered, the form admitted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school

⁶ *vilāpāḥ = savikalpakam pratyaṣam*

⁷ *svagocara*; the proper domain of sense perception is thus, for the Realist — the thing together with its qualities, for the Buddhist the bare thing without any qualities or relations.

⁸ *indriyārthika-sannilāraṇa-jā*

⁹ *ālocanam*

§ 4. THE ANSWER OF UDDYOTAKĀRA.

Nyāya-vārt., pp. 5. 9—14

(5.9). This is wrong! We do not admit it. We, first of all, do not admit (the limitation) of two sources of knowledge, nor of two kinds of object, nor of the impossibility of their mixture. Why? The sources of our knowledge are, indeed, four in number, (perception, inference, analogy and testimony) The objects are of three kinds, the particulars, the universals and their mixture. (5.11). A mixt (knowledge) is possible in that sense that the same object can be apprehended by any source of knowledge, as e. g., by the senses (etc.). (5.12). A sense faculty is a source of knowledge, it illumines, (as it were), the objects. Sometimes it is limited, sometimes mixed. It is limited, e. g., in the cognition of odours (which can be apprehended by one sense faculty only) It is not limited in the cognition of solid bodies which are cognized by two senses, (by vision and touch). As regards the perception of Existence or of the fact of possessing attributes, (i. e., the Categories of Substance and Quality), this is cognized by every sense

§ 5. COMMENT OF VĀCASPATIŚĪRA.

Tātp. p. 13 12—13

(13.12). In saying «this is wrong!» (the author of the Vārtika) rejects (the Buddhist theory) and explains (the reasons for doing it). That the theory is really such, (i. e., wrong), will be (repeatedly) stated here, (in the course of this our work).

(Remark of Udayana, p. 114) If the Universal is unreal and the Absolute Particular alone ultimately real, the latter cannot be mixed with the former, because a combination of the real with the unreal is impossible. (The empirical individual thing is thus founded on an absurdity). The author says, «that this theory is wrong, (will be proved later on)». He wishes to say that the path (of Buddhist philosophy) leads into great depths (and cannot be lightly dealt with at present)

(Remark of Vardhamāna, *ibid*). Since the (Buddhist) onslaught leads into great depths, if the author would undertake to refute it here, it would make his text very heavy (reading¹)!

¹ This is the first short statement of Buddhist Idealism in the Tātparyā-
ṭīkā. Its different phases will be repeatedly expounded and refuted in detail in
the course of the work wheresoever the opportunity of doing it will present itself,
cp pp. 88 ff., 100 ff., 127 ff., 144 ff., 162 ff., 268 ff., 338 ff., 379.25 ff., 468 ff
etc etc These subtlest Naiyāyiks, Udayana and Vardhamāna, deemed Buddhist
philosophy an «impervious path», *gahanaḥ panthāḥ*

APPENDIX II.


Vācaspatimiśra on the Buddhist Theory of a radical distinction between sensation and conception (pramṇāa-vyavasthā *versus* pramāṇa-samlava).

Vācaspatimīśra on the Buddhist theory of a radical distinction between sensation and conception. (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā versus pramāṇa-samplava*).

§ 1. PRELIMINARY.

The Indian realists, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas etc., admitted two kinds of sense-perception, a primitive, simple sensation without participation of conception (*nirvikalpa*), and a more determinate, complex perception with participation of conception or construction (*savikalpa*). The difference between the two kinds of perception was for them one of degree, of distinctness and clearness. Dignāga starts, *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, I.2, by establishing a radical, essential and even, as will be seen, transcendental, difference between pure sensation and conception. The latter in his system includes judgment and inference. What the realists call perception and inference is by Dignāga replaced by sensation and conception; although he retained the terms, but gave them another interpretation and scope. We have thus in his system pure sensation and pure conception and the corresponding distinctions of pure object, which is identified with reality itself, or the thing in itself, and pure Universals. According to the realists the Universe contains particulars, universals and mixed things (*vyakti-jāti-śrīti*). They are apprehended by different sense faculties and by ratiocination. The same thing may be cognized in many ways. There are no strict distinct limits for each source of knowledge. Dignāga opposed to this a sharp distinction between two sources corresponding to two kinds of objectivity. The objects are either Particulars or Universals and the sources of knowledge are, accordingly, either Sensation or Conception. Particular and Universal are empirically (*sāmvyavahārika*) conceived by the realists, transcendently (*paramārthatah*) understood by Dignāga. His Particular is the point instant, the thing in itself, absolutely undifferentiated and radically different from all constructions of the conceptive faculty of our mind. The concrete individual thing (*stabhāna-vśesa*), being a meeting point of several Universals, is nevertheless treated as a particular in European logic, for the Buddhists it is a construction and therefore treated as a Universal cognized by inference. The presence of fire is perceived, according to the Realists, by two sense-faculties, the visual sense and the tactile sense, or it may also be inferred from the presence of smoke. This fire is the concrete, empirical, physical object fire. For the Buddhists the sense of vision apprehends only colour, the tactile sense only heat, and the distinct image of fire is a construction of productive imagination (*kalpanā*), a Universal, a conception by dint of its sameness with similar points of reality and its contrast with every thing dissimilar. Such construction by similarity and contrast is the essence

current of consciousness into subject and object is already an imputation (*āropa* = *lāpanā* = *grāhya-grāhaka-lāpanā*). Instead of the three real currents producing together sensation in early Buddhism, we now have in the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school only two constructed ones. Their cooperation can be represented in the following table, —



1 is the object (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of A; it is also the substrate (*upādāna*) of 2, it precedes A in time.

2 is the object (*ālambana* = *visaya* = *gocara*) of B, but it is contemporaneous with A, it is also the substrate of 3, it precedes B in time.

3 and its continuation are the object of the constructed image (*savikalpaka*), they represent the duration (*santāna*) of the object 1—2—3 etc.

A is produced by 1; it is contemporaneous with 2, it is the substrate-cause (*samanantara-pratyaya*) of B, it follows in time upon 1.

B is produced by 2 in collaboration (*sahakārin*) with A which is its substrate, it is also a flash containing no synthetic imagination and therefore not capable of illusion or mistake; it is contemporaneous with 3 and follows upon 2 in time.

3 and the following moments, as well as C and its following moments, represent the parallel duration (*santāna*) of the object and of its qualified cognition.

1 = *śivalaśaṇam* = *prathama-lānaḥ* = *rūpa-lāṇāntarasya upādānam* = *indriya-vyñāna-visayaḥ* = *tasya ca ālambanam* = *nirvikalpaka-janakaṁ*

2 = *rūpa-lāṇāntaram* = *prathama-lāsanasya upādēyam* = *uttara-lānaḥ* = *nirvikalpaka-jñāna-samāna-kālaḥ* = *nirvikalpaka-indriya-vyñāsyasya sahalāri* (*mānasa-pratyakṣa-nirpāda-līryām prati*) = *mānasa-pratyakṣa-visayaḥ* = *tasya ca ālambanam* = *mānasa-pratyakṣa-janakaṁ*

3 etc. = *santāna*

A = *indriya-vyñānam* = *śivalaśana-ālambitam* = *samanantara-pratyayaḥ* (*mānasa-pratyakṣam prati*) = *rūpa-lāṇāntarasya sahalāri* = *viśadābham* = *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣam*

B = *mano-vyñānam* = *manasi-lārah* = *rūpa-lāṇāntara-ālambitam* = *rūpa-lāṇāntara-sahakārinā indriya-vyñānena jantam* = *nirvikalpakaṁ* = *viśadābham* = *mānasa-pratyakṣam*.

sal), nor do we maintain that they cannot coalesce. Why? The sources are four in number, (perception, inference, analogy and testimony). The objects are of three kinds, the universal, the particular and the individual thing as possessor¹ of Universals, (concrete universals)

§ 3. THE COMMENT OF VĀCASPATINĪŚRA.

Nyāya-vārtika-tīkā, Vizian ed. pp 12.16 ff, Benares ed. (1925).
pp 17 16 ff.

(12.16). There is a theory (of the Buddhists according to which Perception is Sensation, and Inference is nothing but Conception, they represent two originally independent sources of our knowledge), each apprehends a special, originally independent² (element) in the cognized object. When a reference to them is made in the plural (and not in the dual), their subdivisions are meant. (12.17). Sense-perception, being produced by a stimulus coming from an object, is intent upon that object, (because it is produced³ by it. But moreover) only that thing is an object of perception whose presence invariably calls forth its image⁴ (12.18). A Universal cannot produce the same (results, it neither can exercise a stimulus, nor can it call forth an image of the

vibhedat *cy jāter istah svalakṣaṇāt*, the particular is conceived as something unique and inexpressible, because possessing no connotation.

¹ *tadvat* = *sāmānyarād-videsaḥ*, it is really a «particular universal», a *contractio in adjecto*, just as sensation-imagination

² It is not enough to state that perception and inference have special (*viśeṣa*) objects of cognition, these objects represent originally independent (*bhinnā*) elements, since empirically there is an element of sense perception when we infer the presence of fire on the hill, and there is an element of constructive thought in every percept, thus *pratyaṅsayor anumānayoṃ vā sampāda na bādhaḥ uktam* (*viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa*), *tathāpi vijñāna - pramāṇa - samplava - nirālāraṇa - paro yam granthah* (V)

³ It is not enough to mention that cognition is intent on the object (*artha-gocaras*) in order to imply that it is produced (*artha-sāmarthyā-samutthā*) by it. This would be the standpoint of the Naiyāyikas and the Universals would be included among the causes of perception. Therefore emphasis is put upon *artha-sāmarthyā*. Only an efficient object, only a particular is a cause (*hetu*) producing perception. This again is not enough, because there is always a plurality of causes. Therefore that cause alone is the object which calls forth in our cognition its own image (*ālāra-ādāyaka*) (V)

⁴ *Ist*, p. 12.17—18. «That object alone is the field of perception which oblige its own knowledge-reflex to conform with a positive concomitance and its contraposition». — *jñāna-pratibhāsa* = *jñāna-ālāra* (V), *anyata-pratibhāsa* is meant in the sense of N. b. t, p. 8. 8

will make the object present in our ken; why indeed should then pure sensation not arise in the second moment also, why should not both moments receive the same name of a sensation of the outer sense (or of pure sensation)?¹

(30.5). Another question is then asked. If mental sensation² is really something different from pure sensation,³ this must be established by positive facts, by observation, (experiment⁴ or other proofs). (If that cannot be done), then its definition, so far it is not at all founded on facts,⁵ will be (useless, it will be as though) non-existent. (Dharmottara) answers,⁶ «the existence of such mental sensation is a postulate of our system, there are no facts to prove its existence».⁷ In describing the character of this (mental sensation) as something similar to sensation in general⁸ and in stating that its existence is assumed as a postulate of the (whole) system, Dharmottara re-

¹ Lit, p 80 3—5 «When the eye is engaged, why, for sure, should cognition by the outer sense not arise, (a cognition) homogeneous, since the second moment would (also) be making amenable to sense? therefore why should not both be called sensations of the outer sense?».—We would expect *yogyi-lāraṇa* instead of *yogyā-lāraṇa* = *sāḥsāt-lāraṇa*, cp above p 8 10. Dharmottara says, p 10 22 ff, that if we do not admit, or postulate, a difference in kind between the first and the second moment of sensation, there will be no pure sensation of the outer sense altogether. The Tipp explains this as meaning that either both moments will equally be pure sensation or none. Dh insists that we have no empirical proof of the existence of mental sensation in the second moment of perception, because we cannot isolate it and observe it, but if we will not assume its existence, the whole system falls asunder, since the system requires a radical difference between the world of pure sense and the constructions of imagination. The arguments in favour of the existence of mental sensation imagined by Jñānagarbha and others Dharmottara does not admit as valid, cp. below.

² *mūnasam pratyakṣam*

³ *indriya-jñānāt*

⁴ As has been pointed out in the Introduction Dharmakīrti establishes the existence of pure sensation by what may be called a real experiment (*pratyakṣa*) in introspection, *pratyakṣam laṭhanāpōdham pratyakṣenaiva sādhyatī*

⁵ *yāvatā pramāṇāsiddham eva.*

⁶ N. b. †, p. 11. 1.

⁷ Mallavādī, f 81, introduces this passage thus, *nanu indriya-vijñāna-vyavṛtka-lāṣanālasya adarśanāt lāṣanam ayuktam etety āśankyāḥ etao cetiyādī* (p. 11. 1) The existence of a mental sensation following immediately on the sensation of the outer sense is thus regarded as something transcendental (*śin-tu ilog-pa* = *atyanta-parokṣa*).

⁸ *indriya-vijñāna-sādṛśa.*

are always two Universals. (12.24). (But a real Universal is an impossibility).¹ A thing cannot represent a unity and reside in different places, at different times and in different conditions. (12.25). (Since Universals are thus illusory realities, and inferential knowledge has to deal with Universals only, does this mean that their knowledge is altogether objectless? ²). The Universals are indeed (not realities ³), they are logical constructions produced by a congenital capacity (of our Reason ⁴); we must admit that their objective existence in the external world, belongs (only) to the domain of our inferential knowledge, it is either a dialectical (superstructure upon reality) or an objectivized image.⁵

(12.26). Their essence,⁶ indeed, (is not positive, but relative, since they always contain) a correlative negation.⁷ (This is proved by three ⁸ facts), 1) (reality is not their essential attribute), they are positive and negative,⁹ 2) (although internal mental constructions they have) resemblance with external reality, and 3) they are *distinct*¹⁰

¹ *paramārthasat sāmānyam vicāra-asaham* (P), *kārtanya-śādeśa-vṛtti-nirāsāt* (V), the Buddhists admit a *vyāvṛti-rūpam*, *ālīkam*, *anādi-vīlakṣa-cāsanā-cāsitam sāmānyam*.

² *tat kim, sāmānyasya caśitvāt, svalakṣaṇe ca pratibandha-graha-asambhāvād anumānam nirvāsayam eva?* (P).

³ *vīlakṣādhisṭhānam = (vīlakṣa)-nisayo 'īkam iti yāvat* (V)

⁴ *adhishṭhānam vīlakṣākārasya cā alīkasya bāhyatvam anumāna-gocaro*... V thinks that *ālīkabhāgyatvam* and *vīlakṣākāratvam* refer to two different ideas (*matāntaram*), the first refers to an objectivized image, the second, as is seen from the sequel, — to a dialectical superstructure, having *indirect* reality.

⁵ *Int*, p. 12.23—26. «That indeed is caused by the apprehended mark of a (uniform) tie. And the tie consisting in identity-with-that and origination-from-that cannot be grasped in a particular as its object, it thus reposes on two Universals. And the one Universal cannot reside in different places, times and conditions. Therefore it is the place of construction originating from a beginningless Force, it must be assumed that the sphere of inference is the externality of a (dialectically) constructed form or an objectivized image (*alīkasya*)».

⁶ *māhā = svarūpam*.
⁷ *anya-vyāvṛti=apoha*, *anya-vyāvṛti-niṣṭham=pratyogī-nisēdha-svarūpam*.

⁸ Cp the somewhat different formulation of the three points T3tp, p. 340. 6 ff, translated in Appendix V

⁹ Cp Bain, *Logic*, I 54 ff. — Existence, is not their essence, their *asādhā-rana-dharma*, in contradistinction from an ultimate particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) in which existence is inherent, which is only positive, since we cannot say «something is not», because this «something» is nothing but mere existence, pure reality. Cp. T3tp., p. 338.1 and F. Brentano, *Psychologie*, II, p. 49 ff

¹⁰ *nyāta-pratibhāsa = nyāta-ālāra* as in N. b t, p. 70 6, = *anya-vyāvṛtīyā*; it is exactly the opposite of *nyāta-pratibhāsa* in N. b t, p. 8—9, where it is = *arthena, mānyeta cā, nyamta*.

sations (of different origin), of different senses, should arise simultaneously.

(30.12) Nor is it right to maintain that mental sensation, since it is not apprehended as existing separately, does not exist at all. (Its existence is proved by the fact that) in the next moment something homogeneous with it, *viz.*, the image of the blue patch of colour,² is present to the mind. If there were (nothing intermediate), no mental sensation, then the constructed image of the blue¹ patch, which immediately follows in its track,³ could not arise. A mental construction can arise out of something homogeneous with it, out of something mental,⁴ not out of a quite heterogeneous simple reflex.⁴ (30.15). Just as when a patch of blue is apprehended⁵ (by the senses in the stream of thought called) Devadatta, the judgment⁶ «this is blue» is produced (in the same person), not in the (different) stream called Yajñadatta. The difference between mental sensation⁷ and the enduring phenomenon of a mental image⁸ is not the same, (not so radical), as between the two streams of (passive) pure sensitivity and of the stream of a (spontaneous) mentality.⁹ Indeed, both (the mental sensation and the mental image) do not represent (passive pure) sensitivity, both are called *mental*.

(30.17). Our reply to the upholders of this theory is as follows. You maintain that a mental construction¹⁰ must arise out of something homogeneous with it, and you deduce from that the necessary existence of a mental (element, although unobservable directly). This deduction is unwarranted, because experience proves¹¹ that things can (also) originate out of elements heterogeneous from them. This can be established by

¹ *nīla-viśāṣa*, thus the perception of a definite colour is considered to be a mental construction by way of contrasting the blue with the non-blue, it is also a perceptual judgment «this is blue»

² *tat-pratīka-bhāṣā*.

³ *mānasāntīkama*.

⁴ *indriya-vijñānāt*.

⁵ *grhīte*

⁶ *nirvāṇa*

⁷ *mānasa- vi. pratyaṣa*

⁸ *mano-viśāṣa-santāna*.

⁹ *mano-vijñāna-santāna*, in the opinion of Jñānagarbha it is a *santāna*, in the opinion of Dharmottara it is a *ksana*. Instead of *tathendriyā bhinnatā* read *yathendriya... bhinnatā na tathā...*

¹⁰ *viśāṣa*

¹¹ *darśanāt*

(13.6). Therefore the Universal is nothing but the Negation of the Correlative,¹ it is (therefore) an internal² (mental construction, but related to external reality, since in our behaviour) we do not notice the difference,³ it is quasi-included in external reality⁴ and thus gives reality⁵ to our (conceptual, or) inferential knowledge. (13.7). Being thus indirectly connected with external reality, it has efficacy,⁶ it becomes consistent experience.⁷ Although it is an illusion of reality, it is nevertheless a source of right knowledge, in so far it belongs to a man who thinks (and acts) consistently.⁸

(13.9). Thus it is that the particular (as the ultimate reality) is not the object on which inference (or conception) is intent. That sensation, on the other hand, is not intent on Universals, has already been pointed out. Nor is there any other source of knowledge (except these two, sensation and conception). Whatsoever (has a claim to be) a source of right cognition is included in these two, or, if it is not included in them, it is not a source of right knowledge. Nor is there any other object of cognition different from the particular, (*vis.* the ultimately particular) and the Universal. (there is no mixed entity in the cognition of which) both sources of our knowledge could participate.

thing which above p 12 27 was designated as *nyata-pratibhāsa*. It is evident that *nyata* is here used in the sense of «distinct», *nyata-pratibhāsa* = *nyatā bud-dhāḥ* = *nyata-ālāsa*, not in the sense of «limited» *nyata* = *arthena indriyena sū-nyamita* as in N b t, p 8 9 and 8 20, cp above, p. 305 n 10

¹ *anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpam*.

² *abāhyam*

³ *bāhya-bheda-agrahāt*, i. e., we do not think that «a cow» is not an external object.

⁴ *bāhyateṇa avasāyamānam*

⁵ *pravartayati*.

⁶ *prāpyati*.

⁷ *samādālam sat*

⁸ Our conceptual knowledge is thus a dream accompanying real facts. This theory will be expounded with more detail in Appendix V. — Int, p 13.6—8. «Therefore the Universal whose essence is distinction from the different (*anya-vyāvṛtti*), being non-external, being plunged in the external through non-perception of the difference from the external, directs inference towards the external; and by being indirectly tied up to the external, it makes us reach the external; being consistent, although wrong, it is, by being located in the cognizer, a means of right knowledge».

would it be right to assume that the mentioning of consciousness¹ (in the above aphorism of Dharmakīrti) refers to something mental,² (not to pure sensitivity), since the point at issue³ (in this passage) is whether pure passive sensitivity⁴ (without any mental spontaneity) can guide our purposive actions,⁵ and whether it can be reckoned as a source of right knowledge. (81.10). Indeed, how is it possible to consider a simple passive reflex⁶ to be a source of right cognition? (O, yes!). It is (a source of right knowledge), if it accomplishes its own function. And its function is just the function of evoking a mental image of its own object.⁷

Consequently this (argument of Jñānagarbha and consorts) is negligible,⁸ because a mental construction can be evoked from a heterogeneous source, (from a simple reflex).

III.

The Nyāya-kanikā of Vācaspatimiśra on the theory of Mental Sensation

(Reprint from the Pandit, p 120 7—120 17)

(120 7). We (Buddhists⁹) do not favour (the theory according to which) the Mind is a special organ¹⁰ (of sense), an organ to be put on the same line as the organ of vision etc.¹¹ But we maintain (that the Mind is a stream of thought, and in that stream) every preceding mo-

¹ *saṃvrt*

² *mānasam*

³ *antīyavūṭ*

⁴ *indriya-vyñānasya*

⁵ *vyavahārena.*

⁶ *indriya-vyñānasya.*

⁷ *svapnaye vilalpa-janakaivam*

⁸ *yat kincit*

⁹ I. e., the Yogācra-Sautrāntika school, cp Tātp, p 97.1. The other Hīnayānist reckon 6 organs of sense, 5 of the outer senses and one of the inner sense. They also have a series of 22 *indriyas*, but then these organs have quite a different function, cp Abh. Kośa, I 48. The realists, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsaka, and the Sāṅkhyas characterize *manas*, the Mind, as a sixth organ. The Mādhyamika-Buddhists and the Vedāntins, very characteristically, fall in line with the realists. According to W. Ruben, Die Nyāyasūtras, An. 55, 56, the author of these sūtras did not regard *manas* as an *indriya*, but according to the Bhāṣya, he admitted 5 outer and one inner sense, just as the other realists.

¹⁰ *kincid indriyāntaram* cp Tātp, p 97 28 ff.

¹¹ *caḥsurādīvat.*

APPENDIX III.

The Theory of Mental Sensation
(mānasa-pratyakṣa).

second moment of the external object, this second moment of the object being a product of its preceding, first, moment and the first moment, (as has been just mentioned), is the object grasped by pure sensation, (the object which has produced the simple reflex).¹

(120.15). And it is not true that there would be no blind and no deaf persons, (if they could perceive external objects by a reaction upon their inner sense).² The sense faculty,³ (the organs of the outer sense), are absent with them, hence they have no pure sensation,⁴ (no simple reflex) produced upon the senses⁵ They, consequently, (will have no mental sensation, since) the latter is a product⁶ of the former. Nor can it be objected that (such a secondary mental flash) is not a sensation. It is a sensation, because it is vivid, (it is not an abstract thought)⁷

¹ The compound *indriyaja-viśaya* . must be analysed thus — *indriya-jasya* (= *nirvikalpalasya*) *yo viśayah* (= *svālakṣanam*), *tasya yad vijñānam* (*nirvikalpalam*), *tasya* (*nirvikalpalasya*) *yo viśaya-lānaḥ* (= *svālakṣanam* = *prathamaviśaya-lānaḥ*), *tena yaj jantam lānāntaram* (= *rūpa-lānāntaram* = *daśīyo viśaya-lānaḥ*), *tasya gocaratvam, tasmāt* The upshot is very simple, the second moment of cognition apprehends the second moment of the object. But they are not contemporaneous, since the moment of the apprehended object precedes the moment of consciousness which apprehends it.

² Cp. N. b t, p 10 20

³ *indriya*.

⁴ *-vijñāna*.

⁵ *taṁ-ja-*.

⁶ Lat «because there is no substrate».


⁷ Lat, p. 120 7—17. «We do not favour (the thing) called the Mind as some other organ, the eye etc. But we say that it is just the preceding (pure) consciousness, the substrate of the following one. Just this, indeed, is similar as sensation and immediate as non-separated, it is called a homogeneously immediate cause. Here it is created (*jantā*) by another moment of colour (*rūpa*) having as its substrate (*upādānena*) the object-moment of that-sense-produced (*taḥ-indriya-ja*), with whose sense-produced consciousness (*vijñāna*) as a homogeneous precedent it is working together, having as object the moment which is its own producer, a vividly shining cognition (of the man) whose sense-function is over, this is mental sensation. It is not sense-produced, since it appears when the function of the latter is passed. An it has no object in the internal, (it is not intent upon internal facts), because it is intent (*gocara*) upon another moment, produced by the object-moment of the consciousness of the object of the sense-produced, (cp above the analysis of the compound). Nor is there absence of the blind and deaf, because of the circumstance (*-tajā*) that they have no organs, (and) because through not having consciousness by it produced, a substrate is lacking. Nor is it non-sense-perception, since it shines vividly».

The theory of Mental Sensation.

I.

Preliminary.

The genesis of sensation according to the Abhidharma can be represented thus (cp. my Central Conception, p 54 ff.), —



The moment of sensation (*sparśa*) has 1) a homogeneous cause (*causa materialis* = *samanantara-pratyaya*) in the preceding moment of the Mind, or of consciousness in general, including latent consciousness, 2) a predominant cause (*causa efficiens* = *ādhipati-pratyaya*), in the special sense-organ (*indriya*), and 3) an object-cause (*ālambana-pratyaya*), say, in a patch of colour for the sense of vision. The interconnection of these cooperating elements is imagined in early Buddhism according to the prevailing view of causality (*pratītya-samutpāda*) as functions of one another, as cooperators or cooperating forces (*samākāra* = *sambhūya lāriṇaḥ*), because a cause never works alone (*na kimaṁ alam elasmāḥ*). The elements are not pulling one another, but appearing contiguously (*nirantara-utpanna*) as functions of one another. In Mahāyāna the conception is radically changed. All elements of existence have only *relative* (*śūnya*) reality, as «the long and the short» (*dirgha-kṛtsva-caḥ*), cp. my Nirvāṇa, p 30 ff. The separation of the unique

§ 1. DEFINITION.

2. 5 By a mental sensation (or non-sensuous feeling) we understand a (peculiar) sensation of the presence of an external object, a sensation following upon the sensation of the outer sense which itself evokes it; it apprehends the second moment of the object seized by the (outer) sense, and (it is also) characterized as excluding all constructive imagination and (hence) incapable of illusion. This is its definition. The fact falling under this definition¹ is, (e.g.), the mental feeling² of something blue evoked by the outer sense (of vision) when the latter contains the reflex³ of a patch of blue colour. Incidentally the words of the definition «it is a sensation apprehending the second moment of the object seized by the outer sense which itself evokes it» do away with the query, whether (it is not a recollection, whether) it apprehends its own object, an object present to it,⁴ or whether it is not
3. 6 (already) a clear and distinct cognition⁵ Indeed, «The Language of Dialectics⁶» says, «it is excluded that it apprehends the already apprehended, because it seizes the second moment». Since it is (also) defined as a moment of consciousness immediately following the preceding moment (in the same stream of thought), it is distinguished from the direct perception of the Mystic, (whose direct perception of the Absolute is also an intelligible intuition, but not at all homogeneous with the moment which precedes the moment of illumination). In telling that mental sensation is produced by, (and follows on), the sensation of the outer sense, an objection urged (upon this theory) by non-Buddhists is answered, (the objection namely) that there would be no blind and no

of the monastery La-brang, a very celebrated seat of learning in Amdo (Eastern Tibet), and the author of an enormous amount of scholastic literature very much studied in Mongolia and Tibet

¹ *mtshan-gzhi*

² *ñion-hāsn yid-mñion*

³ *ñior-snañ dbañ-mñion*

⁴ it really apprehends the moment of the object which immediately precedes in time the moment of mental sensation, cp above table on p 312

⁵ *bcad-ñes* = *paricchinnam jñānam*, the definition of clear and distinct cognition is given in the Blo-rigs, 10^a 2 On f 6^b 1 This kind of cognition is mentioned as one of the seven different kinds of mental processes (*blo-rigs*)

⁶ *Btog-ge-skād* = *Tarka-bhāṣā*, a work by Mahāpanḍita Bhikṣu Mokṣākaragupta (Cordier has Ghāṭrīyākaragupta du grand Vihāra de Jagātala) = *Thar-pai-hbyun-gnas-kyi-spas-pa*, it is incorporated into the *Bstan-hgyur*, Mdo, vol. 112 (28), the passage quoted is found f 380^b. 6 (Narthang).

C = savilāpalam jñānam = santānāmbhitam = adhyavasāyātmapakam = sārūpyātmapakam = anyā-vyūṣṭi-rūpam = anumānātmapakam = nirvilāpala-jñāna-utpannatvāt pratyakṣam api.

In the now following translations from the *Ṭippaṇī*, from *Vācaspatimīśra's Nyāya-karikā*, and from *Jāmyaṇ-shadba's Blo-rigs* a vivid picture can be gathered of the controversies that raged in India and Tibet on this interesting problem of a gap between a simple reflex and a constructed mental image, a problem not yet solved by modern epistemology.

II.

The Nyāya-hindu-*ṭīkā-ṭippaṇī* on the Theory of Mental Sensation.

(N b *ṭippaṇī*, ed B. B, pp. 29. 15—31. 11).

(29. 15). Further, is it sure that as long as the outer sense faculty¹ is engaged, the existence of a mental feeling (concerning the same object) is excluded? Answering this question (*Dharmottara*) says, "as long as the sense of vision is engaged whatever (bit) of cognition (of the presence) of a patch of colour (in our ken) we may have, necessarily depends on that sense (alone)"²

(30. 1) The following question is then raised. Although two homogeneous cognitions cannot exist at the same moment, (two heterogeneous ones can). Therefore a sensation of the outer sense³ may exist at the first moment (and continue to exist) in the second moment when a mental feeling will (also) arise, notwithstanding the fact that the organ of vision will continue to be engaged?⁴ To this (*Dharmottara's*) answer is as follows. "(This is impossible, since) otherwise, says he, no such sensation as depends (exclusively) on the sense of vision would at all exist",⁵ (i. e., there will be no pure sensation, no simple reflex althogether, there will always be a germ of mental synthesis present).

(30. 8). What he means is this. If we assume that in the second moment (the outer sense, e. g.), the sense of vision, is engaged just as it is engaged in the first moment, its function will also be the same, it

¹ *caḥsusi*

² *sarvendriyāśritam* in 29 16 is meant for *sarvam indriyāśritam jñānam*.

³ *indriya-vyñānam*.

⁴ *vyāpāra-vat caḥsusi*.

⁵ Cp N. b 1, p. 10. 21.

pure sensation (again) arises, and so on, pure sensation and mental sensation (of the object) are alternately¹ produced. This is, (they maintain), the opinion of the author of the *Ālamkāra*, (i.e., of *Prajñākaragupta*).

2. (Second theory). At first one moment of pure sensation arises. In the next moment there is a double sensation, a pure one and a mental one, it is the second moment of (outer) sensation, together with the first moment of (internal) mental feeling. They are conditioned by the immediately preceding moment of consciousness, playing the part of a *causa materialis*, and the sense-faculty, playing the part of a *causa efficiens*. In accordance with these conditions, (both sensations) run simultaneously (making two parallel streams of sensation), beginning from the second moment of pure sensation up to the end (of the perceptual process). During it (we must distinguish) three elements, a double element of sensation of the external object and one element of internal self-consciousness. This three-partite sense-perception is advocated, (they maintain), by the brahmin Śaṅkarānanda³.

3. (Third theory). Finally, Master Dharmottara maintains that (a mental sensation) necessarily arises just when pure sensation is at an end⁴.

From among these three theories the first and the last, (says the author of the «Mine of Logic»), are wrong. That one in the middle is alone the right one. It is there stated,⁵

¹ *spol-mar*, lit. «mixed up»

² *Pramāṇa-vārtika-ālamkāra*, a work by *Prajñākaragupta* usually quoted as *Rgyan-khan-po* = *Ālamkāropadhyāya*. The work contains a commentary on books II–IV of *Dharmakīrti's* *Pramāṇa-vārtika* and fills up the vols 99 and 100 of the *Bstan-hgyur* Mdo. The author lived presumably in the IXth century and initiated a new school in the interpretation of *Dharmakīrti's* philosophy.

³ *Bram-ze Bde-byed-dgah-pa*, author of an independent commentary on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of *Dharmakīrti* called *Pramāṇa-vārtika-tikā*. The work was planned on a very large scale and has been left unfinished. The extant part covers only the first book of *Dharmakīrti* and fills up vols 103 and 104 of the *Bstan-hgyur*, Mdo. The author was a Kashmir brahmin, he is usually quoted as the Great Brahmin. *Bram-ze chen-po*.

⁴ *dbaṅ-mñon-gyū rgyun-mthah-lho-nar*, *rgyun* usually means duration, but here it is apparently used in the sense of no-duration or duration of a moment. It is just the opinion mentioned N b t, p. 111.

⁵ Since no copy of the *Rigs-gter* is available, this quotation could be identified only in *Rgyal-tshab's* commentary, where it is found f. 91^a 1. The

repudiates the argument adduced by Jñānagarbha¹ and others for the sake of establishing its existence, (viz., the argument that) mental constructions spring up² (from mental sensation which is something intermediate between pure sensation and conception). (He repudiates this argument) indirectly,³ (without mentioning it), simply by emphasizing⁴ (that no direct proof is needed).

(30. 9). They, indeed, give the following explanation. Both the pure sensation and the mental one arise while the sense of vision is operating. It is not right to maintain that two sensations cannot exist at the same time, because two sensations of the same sense really cannot, but not two sensations of two different senses. It has been established (in the Abhidharma) that six (different sensations) can exist simultaneously.⁵ Therefore (there is no impossibility that) two sen-

¹ Ācārya Jñānagarbha is the author of a short treatise *Satya-dvaya-vibhanga-kārikā* and its *vṛtti*. A block print of its Tibetan translation, printed at the monastery of Bde-chen-lhun-grub-gliṅ (Aga in Transbaikalia) is in my possession. There is in the *Betan-hgyur*, Mdo v. 28, only a commentary on it, the *Satya-dvaya-vibhanga-pañjikā*, by Śāntirakṣita. Whether it is the same person as the celebrated ācārya Bodhisattva is doubted by Tārānātha, cp. his text p. 168. Tsoñ-kha-pa denies it, cp. *Legs-bśad-shānbo*, f 70^b. 2. *Kārikā* 14 (mūla f. 2, *vṛtti* f. 7) deals with causality in the usual Mādhyamika style—a manifold is neither produced from a manifold, nor from a unity, nothing is produced from a unity, nor a unity from a manifold. The *vṛtti* explains, that if many causes did not produce many things, they would cease to be causes, since every cause, in order to be a cause, must produce something. The perception of colour, being produced by a double cause, the sense of vision and the intellect (*samanantara-pratyaya* = *manas*), the result is also double, as containing a sensation and a conception. On the other hand, the percept of a colour is a unity (*ekam vyākṛānam*). As a Mādhyamika the author evidently rejects the momentariness of being (*ksaṇikā* and *śalākṣaṇa*), he conditionally may admit the parallel run of sensation and thought. It seems that some of those logicians who were Mādhyamikas at heart admitted the possibility of a parallel simultaneous run of sensation and thought, but not Haribhadra, cp. below, p. 389 n., and this has given rise to much controversy in India and Tibet, as will be seen from the *Blo-rigs* of Jamyañ-shakdā, translated below. In the *Tattvas*, p. 391, Śāntirakṣita and Kamalaśīla admit heterogeneous causation, cp. also *Parīśuddhi*, p. 609 ff.

² *vilāpodayāt* are evidently the first words of a *kārikā* by Jñānagarbha or some of his followers, it is repeated below, p. 30. 17, in the words *saṁāna-jatīya-vilāpodayāt*.

³ *bhāṅgyā*.

⁴ *avadhāranād eva*

⁵ According *Abh Kośa-bh*, I 28, a great number of mental *dharma*s can arise simultaneously. The idea of the Sāṅkhyas is also that different sensations of different senses may be present to the mind simultaneously, the idea of the Naiyāyikas is that this is quite impossible.

many mistakes and it contradicts the standpoint of *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, (although everyone pretends) to speak from this very standpoint (If it be objected that) this is not clear,¹ (that the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* is not explicit enough, we will answer that), (on the alternation theory) the alternately arising sensations (of the outer sense) will not be able to apprehend the object continually, just because the moments of the outer and the inner sense will be mixed up. And it is also impossible to admit (that there will be a continuous apprehension also on the alternation hypothesis), because it is stated in the *Pramāṇa-vārtika*,² «if a thing would be apprehended in turns, we would not have the experience of its continuous contemplation».

(Moreover the contention) that the *Alamkāra* favours the alternation theory cannot be correct, because (we know that) it assumes simultaneity of the sensations of the outer and inner senses, (their parallel run). That this is really so,³ (follows out of the circumstance that) this Master did admit in mental sensation a germ of constructive thought,⁴ and he did not deem it a contradiction to admit the simultaneous existence of pure sensation⁵ with constructive thought. Indeed, he delivers himself as follows, «the element⁶ «this» (of the judgment «this is that») which arises in us with regard to something lying in our ken before we have recognized⁷ in it (an habitual object), we reckon as a mental sensation, since its (function) is to make the thing present to our senses⁸. It is also true that *Dharmottara* has a quarrel⁹ with him (on this point), as will be detailed later on

If we compute the elements present in such sense-perception (as ascribed to the author of the *Alamkāra*), we will really find that they are three, (viz. an element of pure sensation or simple reflex, an element of mental feeling including some imagination, and the element

¹ *ma-grub-na*

² *Pr. vārt*, ch. III (on sense-perception), *lāṛikā* 256, f 188^b 2 in the Agastya block-print

³ *der-ihai*

⁴ *rtog-pa gang* = *kalpanā lāoud*.

⁵ *dbaṅ-mñon dus-su*, lit, «that at the time of sensation of the (outer) sense-construction is produced»

⁶ *les-pa* = *jñānam* in the sense of *īdanti-jñānam*

⁷ *goms-las mdum-na gnas-pa-las* = *abhyāsāt priṣṭhā viasthānāt*, this evidently refers to *anabhyāsa-dāśā-āpannam jñānam*, cp. *Tātp*, p 8—9

⁸ This quotation could not yet be identified

⁹ Cp *N. b t*, p. 111 and the *Tipp* translated here

positive and negative examples¹ Nor is the origination of a mental element possible as long as (the stream of consciousness) is engaged in a visual reflex. Indeed, we never have experienced the simultaneous appearance of two simple reflexes,² two bare sensations, of the same patch of blue colour at once. This has never been witnessed.

(31.1). Therefore a constructed image³ can be called forth by a simple reflex⁴ (or pure sensation), notwithstanding it is heterogeneous. Consequently the production of a mental image does not prove the existence of a mental (element in the form of a mental sensation). (31.2). Nor is it right to maintain that a simple reflex and a mental image⁵ belong to two different streams of existence,⁶ just as the two (personal) streams called Devadatta and Yajñadatta are (If that were the case), it would make⁷ the origination (of the mental image) from the quite heterogeneous simple reflex impossible. (31.4). Both (phenomena, the bare sensation and the constructed image), belong to the same stream of consciousness; we must therefore necessarily admit the (partially) heterogeneous origin of the mental image, because (Dharmakīrti), the author of the *Vārtika*,⁸ has stated,

«When the one, (the simple reflex), is apprehended, (the other features) also will be apprehended, they will appear by the force of a conscious (germ),⁹ and by the force of memory which has its own function to achieve».

Here in the words «a conscious (germ)» just a simple reflex¹⁰ is referred to, not something mental¹¹ (31.8) And therefore if it is asked how can a constructed mental image, (i. e.), something remembered, be called forth by a simple (passive) reflex, (we answer, that this is possible), because heterogeneous origin (is also possible). (31.9) Nor

¹ N Kanikā, p 121.11, gives the example of the cognition of something refreshing which follows in the track of a sensation of white colour produced by a piece of camphor, white colour and refreshment are heterogeneous.

² *nirvikalpakāyor*

³ *vikalpakasya*.

⁴ *indriya-vyānāśa eva*.

⁵ *savikalpaka-nirvikalpakāyor*.

⁶ *bhūna-santāna-vartitvam*.

⁷ The *śloka* before *yena* must be dropped, and one after *na syāt* inserted.

⁸ Not found in Pr-vārt., but Pr.-vinīśaya (Co-m, f 158^a. 8) has — *don mthoñ-ba-ñad mthoñ-ba-la, myoñ-bas-mithu-las byuñ-ba-yi, dran-pas mthoñ-bar hād-pa-yi, tha-ñad rab-tu lgu-pa-yin*. (A. Vostrikoff)

⁹ *samvit-sāmarthya*.

¹⁰ *indriya-vyānāśam eva*.

¹¹ *mānasam*.

of these mathematics¹ is questionable. You may, if you like to, reckon seven elements, it will even be more accurate. Really it is so,² because on the side of the object there are five elements, (its five sensible qualities), with the element of sensation and the element of attention,³ this will really make seven elements (Rgyal-tshab) in his Commentary upon the "Mine of Logic" says,⁴ "if we reckon the elements in the object, they will be five, and if we add the elements of sense and of the intellect, it will make seven". And (Kha1-dub) in his "Elucidation of the Seven Treatises" also says,⁵ "there is no great utility in computing how many elements there are in this genesis (of mental sensation), therefore there can be no precision in the work of computing them".

1.4 And further It is a very great mistake to imagine that in the stream of thought which constitutes the ordinary man,⁶ at the time when his sensitivity is engaged in apprehending an external patch of colour, there is (simultaneously with it) an intelligible feeling clearly apprehending this same patch. This is in glaring contradiction with all the passages of the Seven Treatises and their commentaries where the definition of mental sensation is taught. Not enough of that, it is directly denied in passages like the following ones,

1.5 1. "Although heterogeneous (sensations) may arise simultaneously, but one of them will be (always) predominant in clarity. It will then weaken the force of the others and will not allow any other to appear over the threshold of consciousness"⁷

¹ *rtsi-dgos-pa*

² *der thal*

³ *gyā-byed* = *manasikāra*, here mental sensation (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) is simply called attention, which is one of the *citta-mahā-lhūmika-dharmas*

⁴ *Rigs-gter-dar-tik*, f. 91b. 5.

⁵ *Op cit*, f. 124^a 2

⁶ *pi-thag-jana* The holy man (*ārya*) is credited with exceptional intuition.

⁷ Pr. vārt, III ch., *kārikā* 521, f. 230^a. 5 of the Aga block-print. Only the first part of the *kārikā* is quoted by Jam-yāñ, the second part is,

nus-pa nams-par byas-pai-phyir.

kun-gzhu-las gzhan hbyuñ-ba min

The term *kun-gzhu* = *ālaya* in this place has given rise to a great deal of controversy among Tibetan commentators. The majority are not inclined to interpret it as meaning *ālaya-vijñāna* in the sense in which that term is used by Asanga and Vasubandhu, i. e., as implying the doctrine of a «store-house-consciousness» where all the traces of former impressions and all the germs of the future ones are stored up. They therefore interpret here *ālaya* as meaning only *mano-vijñāna*, and

contradiction with all the passages where the definition of mental sensation is taught), is quite right, because (this theory) contradicts all the characteristics of that (mental sensation), viz, 1) that (mental sensation) is called forth by the sensation (of the outer sense), 2) that it apprehends the second moment of the object which has been (in the preceding moment) cognized by the outer sense, etc. With all these characteristics the theory of the simultaneous presence of two different (currents of) sensation is in contradiction. This is quite clear.

And further. You, (Saskya-paṇḍita) maintain that from the standpoint of the Brahmin (Śaṅkarānanda) there is at first a moment of sensation by the outer sense and, after it, a double sensation arises, an outer one and a mental, inner one. (And you also maintain) that, according to his standpoint, sensation always necessarily consists of three elements. This is not right, because (the supposed theory of the Great Brahmin) requires us to admit that there is a double kind of sensation, the one consists of two elements, the other includes three. It is really so,¹ because the one kind of sensation, (the first moment) which² must be characterized as consisting (only) of two elements, is endowed by you with three parts. That the first circumstance is right,³ (viz. that the first moment (is dipartite), must be admitted, because in the first (moment), when the single moment of sensation (by the outer sense) is produced, it consists only of two elements. It is really so,⁴ since at that time there is no other sensation than 1) this sensation (of the outer sense) and 2) self-consciousness. If you do not admit that,⁵ (and insist that sensation is always three-partite), then you will have to assume the double sensation, (outer and mental, already) in this (first) moment, and many other incongruities will ensue, (you will be obliged to admit the collapse of the whole theory).

§ 6. VINDICATION OF DHARMOTTARA'S THEORY.

Therefore, in our opinion, the view of the great scholar Dharmottara is the only right one. He has the proper view of the genesis of intelligible sensation as established (by Dharmakīrti) in his

¹ *der thal*

² *gañ-shig* here also points to the first part of a dilemma which in the sequel will be alluded to by the words *dañ-po grub-ste*.

³ *dañ-po grub-ste*

⁴ *der thal*.

⁵ *ma grub na*

1^a 2 or absent. We read¹ in the "Elucidation of the Seven Treatises" (by Khai-dub), —

"It does not matter much for the continuity of pure sensation, (without any participation of mind or attention), and for its discontinuity, whether all causes (and conditions) producing it are completely present or not, but it is not indifferent whether some counter-acting agency has appeared or not, because as long as there is nothing to stop the run of (the moments of) pure sensation, it will go on enduring without interruption, and the entrance-door for intelligible sensation will be closed."

1^a 8 Mental sensation appears for not more than a single moment, because if it were a lasting phenomenon (it would apprehend a distinct image in a perceptual judgment), and we would have clear and distinct cognitions produced straight off by the force of a simple reflex, (we never would have illusions), and the constructed judgment "this is not right" would never arise.² This is quite right, (i e., it is quite right that, if mental, direct sensation could last more than a single moment, an error would be impossible, since truth would arise automatically). Therefore, since the matter is quite transcendental,³ (the existence of this moment of mental sensation) is assumed (more or less) dogmatically.⁴ We read in the "Commentary upon the Short Treatise"⁵ (by Dhai-mottara), "This mental sensation is merely a postulate of our system. There are no facts which could establish its existence 1^a 5 (directly)". And (Rgyal-tshab) in his "Commentary upon the Short Treatise of Logic"⁶ delivers himself as follows, "Now, this

¹ *Op cit.*, f 121^a 8

² Lat, "Mental sensation does not appear after one moment, because, if a duration (*rgyun* = *santāna*) did appear, certainty (*ñes-pa* = *niscaya*) would appear by the force of a simple reflex (*myon-ba* = *anubhava* = *pratibhāsa*) and the imputation (*sgro-hdogs* = *āropa*) "this is not right" would not be produced" Cp. Dharmakīrti's words quoted Anekāntajaya-patākā, p 177, — *na pratyakṣam laṣyaṇā niscāyakaṁ, tad yad api gñhātī tan na niscāyena*, *kim tarhi tat-prati-bhāṣena*

³ *ñu-tu-llag-rgyun*

⁴ The Nyāya-bindu-tīkā is evidently quoted under the name of Hthad-ldan-chuñ-ñu "The Small Commentary", since the passage is found on p 25 9-11 of our edition of its Tib. translation (B. B VIII). The "Great Commentary" would then be the same author's comment, Ramanī, on Pīamāna-viniścaya

⁵ *ñuñ-gi tshad-mas* = *āgama-pramāṇena*

⁶ *Rigs-thigs-dar-tik*. The full title of this work is — *Tshad-ma-rigs-thigs-kyi hgrei-ba legs-bśad-shññ-poi gter*, the passage is found f. 14^a 6 of the block-print of the La-brang monastery.

deaf persons, if they could perceive external objects by a mental sensation.¹ The (same) «Language of Dialectics» has it, «since it is said that 28^{b.2} it is a intellectual fact, (but) produced by sense-cognition. . . » beginning with this passage up to the words — «. . . by telling that it is exclusively produced by a homogeneous preceding moment, the confusion of an (ordinary) mental feeling with the intuition of the Buddhist Saint. (the Mystic), is excluded²». Thus it is that the fact of being a mental sensation is necessarily subordinated to the fact of being produced by a sensation of the outer sense. This is (also confirmed) by the «Language of Dialectics», where it is said that «mental sensation is produced immediately after the sensation of the outer sense³».

§ 2 THE VARIETIES OF MENTAL SENSATION

There are five varieties of mental sensation, viz, mental sensation 28^{b.4} grasping colour (and lines), mental sensation grasping sounds, olfactory mental sensation, flavorful mental sensation and tactile mental sensation.

§ 3. THE PECULIARITY OF THE GENESIS OF MENTAL SENSATION. THREE THEORIES.

The (author) of the «Mine of Logic»⁴ (Saskya-paṇḍita) 28^{b.4} and his followers maintain that (there are three different solutions of this problem, viz) —

1. (First theory). At first one moment of pure sensation. (a simple reflex produced by a stimulus sent out by the object) arises. After it one moment of mental sensation is produced. After it, one moment of

¹ Cp. N. b t., p 10 20.

² *Ibid.*, f 380^{b.6} — 381^{a.1}.

³ This quotation is probably an abridgement of the passage — *rañ-gi yul-gyis de-ma-thag lhan-cig-byed-pa-can-gyi dbaṅ-poṭ ses-pa mtshan-pa-de-ma-thag-pa rhyen-gyis bshyed-pa yid-gyi rnam-par-ses-paṭ zhes paṭ*, *ibid*

⁴ *Ri-gs-gter* = *Nyāya-nidhi*, a concise treatise in mnemonic verses by Saskya-paṇḍita Kun-dgaḥ-rgyal-mtshan, held in high esteem by the Tibetans as their oldest original exposition of Buddhist Epistemology. Copies of the Lhasa block print are very rare, no one is available at Leningrad, but a commentary by Rgyal-tshab is found in the Mus As Petr The author lived in the XIIIth century (1182—1251) A. D. in the celebrated Sa-skya monastery, south-east of Lhasa. He is also the founder of a sect which had many votaries and monasteries, at present either in decay or turned over to the dominant Ge-lugs-pa sect. According to tradition his work was originally written in sanscrit.

"Both the alternation (theory of *Prajñākaragupta*), and the substitution (theory of *Dharmottara*) contain contradictions".
(Such is the view of *Saskya-pāṇḍita* and his followers)

§ 4. EXAMINATION OF THE THEORY ASCRIBED TO
PRAJÑĀKARAGUPTA.

Now, it is wrong to impute to (the author) of the *Alamkāra*, 29^a 4 (*Prajñākaragupta*), the alternation theory. Not in a single Tibetan translation of the commentary and sub-commentary on this work can it be found.

(*Khai-dub*)¹ in his "Elucidation of the seven Treatises" says, "That the author of the *Alamkāra* favoured the alternation theory, (according to which the moments of pure and of mental sensation follow one another in turns), this is founded exclusively upon a tradition current among scholars. Not in a single work, as far as they are translated in Tibetan, does it appear, neither in the text of the *Alamkāra* itself nor in the literature following it".

And (*Rgyal-tshab*) in his Comment upon the "Mine of 29^a 5 Logic" says, "the alternation theory is not to be found in the translations of the *Alamkāra* existing at present". It seems that the alternation theory is a great mystification,² because it is pregnant of

full title of this commentary is *Tshad-ma-rigs-gter-gyi rnam-bśad legs-par-bśad-pai śhīn-po*, but it is also known under the abridged title of *Rigs-gter-dar-tik*; we read there — *Rgyan-gyi bśhed-pai spel-ma-dān-ni Chos-mchog-gis bśhed-pai rgyun-gyi mīhah-mar geng-lho-nar shye-ba glis-la-la-yañ gnod-byed yod-par thal*, etc. The words marked by ° will make up together the verse quoted

¹ *Mkhas-grub*, a pupil of *Tsoñ-kha-pa*, the work quoted is a commentary upon the seven logical treatises of *Dharmakīrti*, its full title is *Tshad-ma-sde-bdun-gyi rgyan yid-kī mun-sel*, the passage is found on f. 117^a. 4 of the block print made in the *Agā* monastery, *Bde-chen-lhun-grub-gliñ Tsoñ-kha-pa* (1857—1419), the founder of the now dominant sect, had three celebrated pupils, *Gyal-tshab* (*Rgyal-tshab*, 1864—1462), *Khai-dub* (*Mkhas-grub*, 1385—1488) and *Gendun-dub* (*Dge-hdun-grub*, 1391—1474). The latter was the first *Dalai Lama*. All have written logical works. The Commentaries of *Rgyal-tshab* are renowned for original and deep thought, they are usually called *dar-ṭik*—*vistara-ṭikā*'s, those of *Khai-dub* are distinguished by detailed discussion, they are called *ṭik-chen*—*mahāṭikā*'s

² *Rigs-gter-dar-ṭik*, f. 31^b. 6 (*Agā*)

³ *tha-chad*

gñis-pa de-la dbye-ba-na gzugs-hdzin yid-mñon, sgra-(28b.4) hdzin yid-mñon, dri-hdzin yid-mñon, ro-hdzin yid-mñon, reg-bya-hdzin-pai yid-mñon dan lña yod.

gsum-pa. skye-tshul-la Rigs-gter rjes-hbrañs-dañ-bcas-pa na re, dañ-por dbañ-mñon skad-cig-ma (28b.5) gcig skye, de rjes-su yid-mñon skad-cig-ma gcig skye, de rjes dbañ-mñon skad-cig ma gcig skye-ba-sogs dbañ-yid spel-mai-skye-ba Rgyan-mkhán-po i lugs-su byas-pa dañ. yañ dañ-por dbañ-mñon skad-cig-ma (28b.6) gcig skye, de rjes des de-ma-thag-rkyen dañ dbañ-pos bdag-rkyen byas-nas, dbañ-mñon skad-cig-ma gñis-pa dañ yid-mñon skad-cig dañ-po gñis, rkyen, mtshuñs-pas skyed la, dbañ mñon skad-cig gñis-pa-(29a.1)-nas mthar hgags-pai-bai dus-mñam yin-pa, hdi-la phyir-ltai mñon-sum gñis dañ, nañ-ltai rañ-rig-gi hgros-gcig dañ gsum ste mñon-sum hgiös gsum-po hdi bram-ze (29a.2) Bde-byed-dgah-ba-am Šam-ākara-nanda i lugs-su byas-pa. yañ dbañ-mñon-gyi rgyun mthañ kho-nar skye-ba slob-dpon Chos-mchog-gi lugs gsum gyi sna-phyi gñis mthad-la, bar-ma hthad zer-te Rigs-gter-las (29a.3),

spel-ma dañ ni rgyun-gyi mthañ
gñis-ka-la yañ gnod-byed-yod,

ces-sq.

Rgyan-gyi lugs spel-mar hdod-pa mi-hthad-par-thal, de Rgyan-gyi hgrel-pa hgrel-bśad bod-du hgyur-ba gcig-las-kyañ mi hbyuñ-(29a.4)-pai-phyir-te. Sde-bdun-yid-kyi-mun-sel-las, dbañ-yid spel-nas skye-bar Rgyan-mkhan-pos bzhed-do, zhes mkhas-parnams la grags-pa tsaṃ-du zad-kyi, bod-du hgyur-bai Rgyan rjes-hbrañs-dañ-bcas-pai gzhuñ-(29a.5)-lugs gañ-na-añ mi gsal-lo, zhes dañ, Rigs-gter-dar-ṭik-las kyañ, spel-mar skye-ba da-lta hgyur-bai Rgyan-gyi hgrel-pa-na mi snañ-ño, zhes gsuñs-pai-phyir. spel-mar skye-ba tha-chad yin-par-thal, gnod-byed mañ-(29a.6)-la, Rnam-hgiel lugs-las phyir hgyur kyañ, de lugs-su smra-bai-phyir, ma grub-na, dbañ-mñon rim-gyis skye tñise-bar-ma-chad-par yul mi hdzin-par thal, dbañ-yid skad-cig-ma spel-ma de phyir. hdod-mi-nus-te Rnam-hgrel-(29b.1)-las,

im-gyis hdzin-na de myoñ-ba,

rnam-chad med-par snañ mi-hgyur,

zhes gsuñs-pai-phyir. des-na Rgyan-gyi lugs-la dbañ-yid spel-mar hdod-pa mi-hthad-par-thal, Rgyan-gyi lugs-la dbañ-mñon yid-mñon dus-(29b.2)-mñam-pa bzhed-pai-phyir. der thal, slob-dpon des yid-

of self-consciousness) (However) this theory (of the author) of the *Alamkāra* cannot be accepted (as a correct account of the part) of the senses (in perception), because, as a consequence¹ of it, we will be obliged to admit the presence of (a germ) of constructive imagination in direct cognition,² (i.e., in a simple reflex), whereas (our best authorities), the *Sūtra*³ and the *Vārtika*, establish that sensation, (i.e., the part of the senses in cognition, or the simple reflex) does not contain any mental construction. This and other objections (can be made against this theory). However, from the stand-point of the Extreme-Relativists, (the *Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas*), it will be quite acceptable⁴

§ 5. EXAMINATION OF THE THEORY ASCRIBED TO
ŚĀṆKARĀNANDA.

Further, it is not true that the (Great) Brahmin favoured the 29^b theory imputed to him (by *Saskya-pandita*), because neither the translation of his works nor the authorities of the Holy Land⁵ point to it as favoured by him. It is a bare affirmation (on his part). (*Khaiḍub*) in his "Elucidation of the Seven Treatises" says,⁶ "It is a mere tradition among the ancient (teachers) that the Great Brahmin favoured such a view. Not in any of the Tibetan translations of his works is the source (of this mistake) to be found". Moreover, you 29^b (*Saskya-pandita*) assume that this (sensuous part of cognition which you imagine as having been analyzed by Śāṅkarānanda) necessarily always contains three elements⁷ We object that the precision

¹ *thal-ba dañ.*

² *sgrub-hyug-pa tog-pa*, the realistic *Vaiśiṣṭikas* admit a germ of imagination, called by them *svabhāva-vīcarā* in every sense-cognition, cp. *Abh. Kośa*, I. 33. The *Mādhyamikas* would probably fall in line with the realists.

³ *Sūtra*, in this context, refers to *Dignāga's* *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*.

⁴ The *Mādhyamikas* cannot admit the absolute reality of the "thing in itself" (*svataḥana*), because this would mean a deadly blow to their Universal Relativism. As a consequence of this they cannot accept neither the theory of sense-perception, nor the separateness of the two sources of cognition (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*), nor self-perception (*svasamvedana*) etc., cp. my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 135 ff. They are obliged to accept the realistic logic of the *Nāgārjikas* with a proviso concerning its relativity and worthlessness for the cognition of the Absolute.

⁵ *hphags-yul = ūrya-deśa*, India, *ūrya* means here a Buddhist Saint

⁶ *Op. cit.*, f. 125^b 6

⁷ *viz.*, sensation of the outer sense mental sensation and self-consciousness

zhes-(30a.6)-sogs du-ma dañ dños-su hgal-bai-phyir. dañ-po grub-ste, dbañ-poi rgyu byas-pa-dan, dbañ-mñon-gyi bzuñ don skad cig gñis-pa bzun-bar bsad-pai rgyu-mtshan thams-cad dañ hgal-bai-phyir šn-tu rtogs sla.

(30b.1) gzhan-yañ. Bram-zei lugs-la khyod-krys dañ-por dbañ-mñon skad-cig-ma gcig kho-na dañ, de rjes dbañ-mñon dañ yid-mñon gñis skye-bar hdod-pa dañ, dei lugs-la mñon-sum hgros gsum-pa-kho-nar byed-pa mi-(30b.2)-hthad-par-thal, de-ltar-na mñon-sum hgros-gñis-pa dañ hgros-gsum-pa gñis-kar hdod dgos-pai-phyir. der thal, mñon-sum hgros gñis-pa gcig dgos-pa gañ zhig-hgros gsum-pa khyod-krys khas-blañs-(30b.3)-zin-pai-phyir. dañ-po grub-ste, dañ-por dbañ-mñon skad-cig-ma gcig kho-na skye-dus mñon-sum hgros gñis-pa ym-pai-phyir, der thal, de dus dbañ-mñon dañ rañ-rig gñis-las mñon-sum gzhan med-pai-phyir. (30b.4) ma grub na, mñon-sum hgros gñis-par dei-tshe hgyur-ro sogs skyon-du-ma hphen šes-par bya.

des-na rañ-lugs-la Sde-bdun-gyi yid-mñon skye-tshul pan-chen Chos-mchog-ltar dbañ-mñon-gyi rgyun-mthar skye-ba ym-te; de skye-(30b.5)-pa gañ-zhig, dban-mñon skad-cig gñis-pa phan-chad yid-mñon yin-pa-dañ, spel-mar skye-ba dañ, rtog-bral-gyi mñon-sum hgros-gsum-du skye-ba-dañ, mñon-sum rtog-bcas Rgyan lta-bu-rnams mi-hthad-par bsgrubs zin-pai-(30b.6)-phyir. rtogs-phyi-ma-rnams sla, dañ-po grub-ste, yid-dbañ-gis bdag-rkyen byas-pai gzhan-rig mñon-sum mi bzhed-pai-phyir-te; Mdo-las,

gzugs-šes-pa-ni rnām-gñis te,
mig dañ yid-la brten-pa-o,

zhes dañ Tšhad-ma-(31a.1)-kun-btus-las, yid kyañ don dañ, zhes gsuñs-pai-phyir, dbañ-mñon dus-su yid-mñon mi-skye-la, de rdzogs rjes de-ma-thag-tu skye-ste, de-dag-gi dus-su dbañ-mñon skye-bai rgyu-tshogs tšaň-ma-(31a.2)-tšaň mtshuñs kyañ hgal-rkyen yod-med dbañ-gis yin-pai-phyir-te Sde-bdun-yid-kyi-mun-sei-las, hdi rgyun dañ rgyun ma rdzogs goñ la rgyu-tshogs tšaň-ma-tšaň mtshuñs-kyañ, hgal rkyen yod med mi-mtshuñs te, rgyun ma-(31a.3)-rdzogs goñ-du dbañ-šes bar-ma-chad-par hbyuñ-bas, yid-mñon skye-bai sgo bkag-pai-phyir-ro, zhes gsuñs-pai-phyir yid-mñon skad-cig-ma gcig-las mi-skye-ste, rgyun skye-na myoñ-stobs-krys ñes-par hgyur-bas, mi-hthad-(31a.4)-do, zhes sgrö-hdogs mi-byed-pai-phyi. khyab-ste, des-na de šn-tu lkog-gyur yin-pas luñ-gi, tšhad-mas grub-pai-phyir-te. Hthad-ldan-chuñ-ñu-las, yid-kyi mñon-sum de-ñi grub-pai-mthah-la grags-pa tsam yuñ-kyi, hdi grub-par-(31a.5)-byed-pai tšhad-ma-ni yod-

2. «When consciousness is engaged in cognizing one object, it is incapable of cognizing (at the same time) another one», etc., etc.¹

The first² (circumstance, *vis.* the circumstance that the theory of 80^a. the simultaneous presence of two different sensations is in glaring

the passage as meaning «there is thus (in that moment) no other consciousness than mental sensation» It seems however possible to assign to *ālaya* here the meaning of consciousness in general without referring it to a special theory As a matter of fact the *Pramāna-vārtika* never mentions the *ālaya-vijñāna* doctrine and there is evidence enough to maintain that Dharmakīrti rejected it as a Soul in disguise. Jam-yañ-shadpa says, *Phar-phyin-mthañ-dpyod*, vol. 8a (*nam-rūzogs*), f. 61^b—62^{as} (Aga) — *yañ lha-cig, kun-gzhi sten-du tshogs-drug khor-beas-pa gag-pa-la hdoḍ-pa mi-hthad-par-thal, skabs-hdr kun-zhi mi hdoḍ-pai-phyir. hgrēl-chen-du, loñ-gšegs-kyi luñ, rnam-par-thar-pa* (read *ses-pa*) *bryad-lid dañ ches drañs tsam ma-gtogs kun-zhi dañ non-yid-kyi bśad-pa med-par-phyir. lhyab-ste. Hyhags-Señ dañ sde-bdun skabs-su lun-zhi hdoḍ-pa mun-mdañ yin-pai-phyir. Zhi-htshos lyañ, dbu-ma-rgyan dañ rañ-hyid las, de dag-gis nī gañ aña-phyi med-par seme-gñis lhyuñ-ba hdr-mi gnas med-do nas, luñ dañ hgal-ba bzlog dkaḍ, ches dañ, rnam-hgrēl-las, rtog-gñis cig-car mthoñ-ba med, ces gñis-par phyir. sde-bdun-rgyan-las, sde-bdun-gyi skabs-su kun-gzhi lhas-len-par hdoḍ-pa de-dag-ni rañ-lid ma-rig-par dmus loñ shes-so.* This means—Further, some maintain, that it is wrong to hold that all six kinds of consciousness with the accompanying mental phenomena (*citta-caitta*) are locked up in a store-house-consciousness, because in this case, (i.e. from the standpoint of the *Svāntarīka*) the «store-house» doctrine is not accepted With the exception of the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* and some purely metaphorical (*drañs = neyya*) expressions neither the «store house» nor the *Alīta-manas* are ever mentioned This is right, because both Ārya (*Vimuktasena*) and Haribhadra, and also (Dharmakīrti) in his *Seven Treatises* hold that the theory of a «stored consciousness» is an arrow shot into darkness. Moreover, Śāntirakṣita in his *Mādhyamikālamkāra* with his own comment, says, «a double sensation (*seme-gñis*) which appears (at once) without succession from two (different sources *de-dag-gis*) cannot exist», and he continues up to the passage «it is difficult to deny that this runs against Scripture» And again *Pramāna-vārtika* says «two ideas (*kalpanā-dvaya = tog-gñis*) cannot exist simultaneously». «The ornament of the Seven Treatises» (by Gendunḍub) says, «those who maintain that in the system of the Seven Treatises the «store-consciousness» doctrine is admitted are blind men (living) in the darkness of their own ignorance!» — The passage quoted from Śāntirakṣita's *Mādhyamikālamkāra* is found f. 15^b. 1—16^a. 2 of the blockprint (Aga), and the passage from Gendunḍub (the real title of the work is *Tshad-ma-rigs-rgyan*) is found f. 98^b. 3—97^a. 2 of the block-print (Aga). (A. Vostrickoff).

¹ *Idā*, II ch, *lāñā* 113, f. 98^b 5 of the Aga block-print: the second quarter of this *lāñā* is,

nus-med don-can mi-hdan-phyir.

The block-print of the Sholutai monastery reads *don-gshan*

² The words *dañ-po grub-ste* usually point to a dilemma mentioned precedently, viz to the first part of the dilemma with the closing words *gañ-ching*.



Seven Treatises, (viz., that mental sensation) arises immediately after pure sensation, when the run of (pure sensation) has vanished. (Pure sensation is one moment). This is (the only plausible way to realize) its procedure,¹ since (all other attempts to describe it) are proved to lack logical consistency, viz., 1) the theory according to which mental sensation continues to exist after the moment following on pure sensation,² 2) the alternation theory, 3) the theory that pure sensation consists of three elements, 4) the theory of the *Ālambkāra*, that (every) sensation includes (a germ) of constructive imagination. These last, four theories evidently have (no great importance), authoritative³ is only the first one, (that one of *Dharmottara*), because that cognition of an external object, where the predominant part⁴ is played by the intellect, is not reckoned as sense-perception, (i. e. it is not a sensation). Indeed, the (*Abhidharma*)-sūtra says, "the apprehension of colour (and lines) is double, as conditioned by the sense (of sight), and as conditioned by the intellect⁵", and the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*⁶ (confirms this) in stating that the intellect also when it apprehends an object (in a mental sensation, does not possess the character of constructive imagination) Thus, in the moment of pure sensation (by the outer sense), intelligible sensation is not yet present, but when the first has vanished, the second immediately arises. It is immaterial whether at the time of both these sensations the totality of causes producing the pure sensation is complete or not, because, (albeit they be complete), the change is produced by the efficiency of a conflicting factor (the intellect, or attention), which may be present

¹ The construction of this sentence is worthy to be noticed, *gan-shig* here also points to the first part of a dilemma of five parts, it will be in the sequel indicated by the words *dan-po grub-ste* Let α... because just such is its genesis on the one hand (*de skye-ba gan shig*) and because (on the other hand) the existence of mental sensation after the second moment of (outer) sensation, and the alternate origin, and... are proved to be wrong. The last arguments are easy (to understand as wrong) The first is right.

² Mental sensation lasts only one moment, the moment of aroused attention, and this moment is the moment following the outer sensation, its continuation is constructive imagination, the real function of the intellect

³ *grub-ste*

⁴ *dban-riyen = adhepati-pratyaya*

⁵ According to the *Abhidharma* sensation (*sparsa*) arises at the meeting point of three things, the object, the sense-organ and consciousness (sc. bare consciousness-*vyñāna*) The next step is a feeling and a distinct cognition (*vedanā-samjñā*).

⁶ Cp. *Pr samucco*, I. 6

other one remembers it. How is this possible? In this case things experienced by Devadatta's consciousness would be remembered by the consciousness of Yajñadatta.

(*Sautrāntika*). No! because there is no connection between them. They are not mutually related as cause and effect, as is the case between moments belonging to the same stream of thought. Indeed we do not at all maintain that one consciousness perceives and another one remembers. (The stream of thought is the same). On a previous occasion¹ we have explained the manner in which a complete change is gradually taking place in a chain of consecutive moments. Thus it is that a consciousness which did perceive an object formerly, is (gradually) producing a consciousness which remembers it now. What fault can you find with this argument?

As to recognition it is simply the consequence of a recollection, (and requires no further explanation).

(*Vatsīputrīya*). If there is no Soul, who is it that remembers?

(*Sautrāntika*). What is the meaning of the word «to remember»?

(*Vatsīputrīya*). It means to grasp an object by memory.

(*Sautrāntika*). Is this «grasping by memory» something different from memory?

(*Vatsīputrīya*). It is an agent who acts through memory.

(*Sautrāntika*). The agency by which memory is produced we have just explained. The cause productive of a recollection is a suitable state of mind (and nothing else)!

(*Vatsīputrīya*). But when (in common life) we are using the expression «Caitra remembers» what does it mean?

(*Sautrāntika*). In the current (of phenomena), which is designated by the name Caitra a recollection appears. We notice the fact and express it. It is no more!

(*Vatsīputrīya*). But if there is no Soul, whose is the recollection, (whom does it belong to)?

(*Sautrāntika*). What is here the meaning of the Genitive «whose»?

(*Vatsīputrīya*). It denotes proprietorship.

(*Sautrāntika*). Is it the same as when somebody enquires, of what objects who is the proprietor?

(*Vatsīputrīya*). It is just as when we say «Caitra is the owner of a cow».

(*Sautrāntika*). What does it mean to be the owner of a cow?

¹ Abh Kośa, II 36. c

but a case of cognition of external objects. and it is maintained¹ that 81^b 3 every cognition is also self-cognition (of whatsoever may be found in it). If (the argument) is admitted,² we will have the absurd consequence³ that (every ordinary man) must be a Saint!⁴ They have accepted it!

All other points are easy to understand.

81^a 4

V

The text of the translated part of the Bio-rigs

Tsu-gol block-print, Blo-rigs, f 28^a 3-31^b 5.

gñis-pa, yid-(kyi) mñon-(sum) la mtshan-ñid, dbye-ba. skye-tshul-gsum. dañ-po ni. rañ-hdren-byed-kyi dbañ-mñon-las byuñ zhiñ. dei bzuñ-don skad-cig gñis-pa hdzin-pai. rañ-ñid rtog-bral ma hkhru-l-bai cha-nas bzha-g-pai gzhan-rig mñon-sum-de (28^a. 5) dei mtshan-ñid. sñor sñañ dbañ-mñon-gyis drañs-pai sñon-hdzin yid-mñon lta-bu dei mtshan gzhi. dei mtshan-ñid-kyi zur-du rañ-hdren-byed-kyi dbañ-mñon-gyi bzuñ-yul skad-cig gñis-pa hdzin zhes smos-pas (28^a. 6) rañ yul daltar-ba hdzin nam sñam-pa dañ, de bcad-śes yin nam sñam-pai log-rtog sel-te, R to g - g e - s k a d - l a s, skad-cig gñis-pa hdzin-pai-phyir bzuñ-zin-pa hdzin-pa-ñid bsal-lo, zhes gñis-pai-phyir. (28^b. 1) mtshuñs-pa de-ma-thag smos-pas rnal-hbyor mñon-sum bsal-zhuñ. dbañ-poi mñon-sum-las byuñ zhes-pas phyi-rol-pas loñ-ba dañ hon-pa-sogs med-par thal-bai log-rtog bsal te. R to g - g e i - s k a d - l a s. dbañ-(28^b. 2)-pai śes-pa-las skyes-pai yid yin-pas, zhes-pa-nas, mtshuñs-pa-de-ma-thag-pai rkyen-gyi khyad-par-gyis kyañ rnal-hbyor-pai śes-pa yid-kyi mñon-sum-ñid-du thal-ba bsal-te zhes-pai bar gñis-pai-phyir. des-(28^b. 3)-na yid-mñon yin-na dbañ-mñon-gyi rjes-su byuñ-bas khyab-ste, R to g - g e i - s k a d - l a s, dbañ-mñon hdas-ma-thag-tu yid mñon skye-bao. zhes gñis-pai-phyir.

(that), because it is (nothing but) his knowledge of the external world (81^b. 1). This concomitance (they) admit. If they admit (the argument), it will follow that (the ordinary man) is a Saint. since they have accepted it. The remaining is easy to understand.

¹ *llyab-pa-lhas*

² *hdod-ra*.

³ *lhal* = *prasaṅga*.

⁴ In order to have a direct intuition of the irreality of the phenomenal world and of the non-existence of an Ego, an educated man must have undergone a long course of philosophic studies and after that practice concentrated meditation. If illumination comes, he will contemplate the absolute truth directly and become a Saint (*ārya*). cp. my *Nirvāṇa*, p. 16 f.

(*Sautrāntika*) It must be explained what this Devadatta is.

(*Vatsīputrīya*). It is an Ego.

(*Sautrāntika*). That is begging the question!

(*Vatsīputrīya*). It is what in common life we call a man.

(*Sautrāntika*). This does not represent any unity whatsoever. It is a name given to such elements (of which a man is composed). The elements are meant when we say "Devadatta walks". When we say that "consciousness cognizes", it is just the same.

(*Vatsīputrīya*). And what is the meaning of the expression "Devadatta walks", (if there is no individuality whatsoever)?

(*Sautrāntika*). It is an unbroken continuity of momentary forces (flashing into existence), which simple people believe to be a unity, and to which they give the name of Devadatta. Their belief that Devadatta moves is conditioned (by an analogy with their own experience, because) their own continuity of life consists in constantly moving from one place to an other. But this movement is but a (series of new) productions in different places, just as the expressions "fire moves", "sound spreads" have the meaning of continuities (of new productions in new places). They likewise use the words "Devadatta cognizes" in order to express the fact that a cognition (takes place in the present moment) which has a cause (in the former moments, these former moments being called Devadatta). (But is it simple people alone whose language is so inadequate?). Great men have likewise condescended to denote the (mentioned facts) by such (inadequate) expressions, when they were pleased to use the language of common life.

(*Vatsīputrīya*). But we read in Scripture. "consciousness apprehends". What is consciousness here meant to do?

(*Sautrāntika*). Nothing at all! (It simply appears in coordination with its objective elements, like a result which is homogeneous with its cause). When a result appears in conformity with its own cause it is doing nothing at all, nevertheless we say that it *does* conform with it. Consciousness likewise appears in coordination with its objective

this controversy about the reality of a subject is directed against a Sāṃkhya philosopher. The aim of Vasubandhu is to establish that there are cognitions, but no real cognizer. This may be directed against the Sāṃkhya system where *āśman* is the cognizing principle, but it does not agree with it inasmuch as the *āśman* is passive, not an agent. We retain the designation of Vatsīputrīya as adversary, because, as usual, he may start questions not only in accordance with his own views (*svamatena*), but also from the standpoint of an other system (*paramatam āśrīya*).

mñon-la rtog-pa gcig hdod-pas, dbaṅ-mñon dus-su yaṅ rtog-pa skyed-
pa mī-hgal-pai-phyir-te, Rgyan-las,

goms-las mdun-na gnas-pa-la
«hdio», zhes-(29b.3)-ni šes-pa-gaṅ,
mñon-sum byed-phyir de-la ni
yid-kyi mñon-sum yin-pai-hdod,

ces gsuñs-pai-phyir daṅ, Chos-mchog daṅ rtsod-tshul-yaṅ yod-mod-
kyaṅ, gzhan-du spro-o. hdir hgros btsi-na hgros gsum-par (29b.4)
bya-o. Rgyan-gyi lugs de mñon-sum-du mī ruñ-bar-thal, de-la
sgrub-hjug-gi rtog-pa yod-par thal-ba-daṅ, mñon-sum rtog-bral-du
Mdo daṅ Sde-bdun-gyis bsad-pa mī lthad-par thal-ba sogs-kyi
skyon yod-pai-phyir. thal-(29b.5)-hgyur-bai phyogs yin-na ruñ-bai-
hgyur-ro

yaṅ Bram-zei bzhed-par hdod-tshul de yaṅ mī lthad-par-
thal. de Bram-zei gzhuñ-hgyur-ba-daṅ, hphags-yul-gyi mkhas-pás
dei bzhed-par ston-byed med-pas, dam-bcah (29b.6) tsam-du hgyur-
bai-phyir-te. Sde-bdun-yid-kyi-mun-sel-las, Bram-ze-
-chen-po bzhed-pa-ym zhes sñā-ma-dag-la grags-pa tsam ma-togs,
Bram-zei bod-du hgyur-bai gzhuñ-lugs gaṅ-na-aṅ kḥuñs-med-ciñ,
-zhes gsuñs-(30a.1)-pai-phyir.

gzhan-yaṅ. khyod-kyis de la hgros-gsum ñes-can byas-nas, rtsi-
-dgos-par hdod-pa mī-lthad-par-thal, hgros-bdun-kyaṅ rtsi-hdod-na,
brtsis chog-pai-phyir. der thal, yul-gyi sgo-(30a.2)-nas hgros lña daṅ
dbaṅ-po daṅ yid-byed-kyi hgros gñis-daṅ bdun yod-pai-phyir-te.
Rigs-gter-dar-tik-las, yul-gyi hgros sbyar-na lñar hgyur-la,
dbaṅ-po daṅ yid-kyi hgros bsnan-na, bdun-du-hgyur-ro, zhes (30a.3)
daṅ, Sde-bdun-yid-kyi-mun-sel-las, skye-tshul hdi-la
hgros-du yod brtsis-pa-la dgos-pa-chen-po yod-par ma-go-bas, hgros-
du-rtsi-dgos-pai ñes-pa-med-la, zhes gsuñs-pai phyir.

gzhan yaṅ mig-gi (30a.4) dbaṅ-mñon yul-gzugs-la hjug-bzñin-pai
dus-su so-skye-dei rgyud-la gzugs gsal-bar mthoñ-bai yid-mñon hdod-
pa śin-tu tha-chad yin-par-thal. de-ni Sde-bdun rtsa-hgrel-gyi yid-
mñon-gyi mtshan-fid ston-(30a.5)-pai gzhuñ thams-cad daṅ hgal-ba
gaṅ-zhig der ma zad, Rnam-hgrel-las,

cig-car rigs-mī-mthun skye yaṅ,
śin-tu gsal-bai sems gcig gis,

zhes sogs daṅ,

rnam-šes daṅ gzhan zhugs-pa-yaṅ,

exist. The same applies to consciousness, (there is nothing that does cognize, apart from the evanescent flashings of consciousness itself)

(*Sāṃkhya*).¹ If consciousness is not a product of a Soul, (if it has no other cause than consciousness itself, if it is only a string of conscious moments), the following moment springing up from the preceding one, then how is it to be explained 1) that it does not remain perpetually just the same, and 2) (if there be a change), why not in a fixed order of succession, like a sprout, a stem, leaves etc (produced from a seed)?

(*Sautrāntika*). (As regards the first point, we answer that) all elements which partake in the process of life are characterized by a constant change, (they have no duration). They constitute a stream in which the next moment is necessarily different from the preceding one. Such is the inmost nature of every thing living!

(*Sāṃkhya*). (There are exceptions! e. g. in cataleptic states neither body nor mind undergo any change)

(*Sautrāntika*). If there really were exceptions (to the principle of Universal Change), and if the ascetics after being merged in transic meditation and having reached the climax of it would really appear in a state of perfect identity of body and mind, (without absolutely any change in them), then there could be no difference between the last and the first moment of such a state of meditation, and there could be no spontaneous awakening from the trance in the last moment. (Therefore there is an imperceptible constant change going on even in such states as catalepsy).

(As regards the second point we maintain that in the continuous stream of ideas) there positively is a fixed order of succession: if one idea springs up from another one, it does so with necessity. There is a certain affinity (between ideas), in virtue of which there are ideas somehow related to others and having the power of evoking them. As for instance, when the idea of a woman is immediately associated (in the mind of an ascetic) with the idea of an impure body, or (in the mind of a married man) with the idea of husband, son etc., and if later on, in the changing stream of thought, the same idea of a woman reappears, it has the power of evoking these ideas of an im-

¹ According to Yaśomitra the opponent is here a Sāṃkhya philosopher. That system admits the existence of two substances only, the one spiritual (*puruṣa*) representing the Individual's Soul which is an eternal light of pure consciousness, unchanging and motionless, and the other material (*pradhāna*), perpetually changing (*mya-parināman*) according to causal laws. The question would then mean «your «consciousness» (*vyākāṇa*) must be either *puruṣa* or *pradhāna*».

pa-ma-ym-no, zhes dañ. Rigs-thigs-dar-tik-legs-bšad-rin-po-chei-gter-las, yid-kyi mñon-sum de-yañ bdag-cag-rnams-kyis dpyad-pa-gsum-gyis dag-pai luñ-la brten-nas rtogs-par-bya-(31a.6)-ba-ym-gyi, tshad-ma gzhan-gyis rtogs-par mi-nus-so, zhes gsuñs-pai-phyir.

de-la kho na re. so-skyei rgyud-kyi yid-mñon chos-can, khyod so-skye-la śin-tu lkog-gyur ma-ym-par-thal, khyod dei rgyud-kyi mñon-sum-gyis grub-(31b.1)-pai-phyir. der thal, dei rgyud-kyi de-ḥdzin-pai rañ-rig-mñon-sum-gyis grub-pai-phyir. der thal, dei rgyud-kyi śes-pa-ym-pai-phyir-na. ma-khyab. khyab-par-thal, śes-pa yin-na rañ-ḥdzin-pai rañ-rig yod-pas khyab-pai-phyir-(31b.2)-na, yañ ma-khyab-ste, rgyun-ldan-gyi śes-pa dañ tshad-ma-la rañ-rig mñon-sum-gyis grub-pas khyab-kyañ, śes-pa-tsam-la rañ-rig-gis gzhal-bas ma-khyab-pai-phyir. ḥdi-yañ go-thob byas-so.

kho-rañ-la ḥo-na, tshur-mthoñ-gi rgyud-gyi gañ-(31b.3)-zag-gi-bdag-med-kyis khyad-par-du-byas-pai śes-pa chos-can, khyod tshur-mthoñ-gi rgyud-kyi mñon-sum-gyis rtogs-par-thal, dei rgyud-kyi rañ-rig-mñon-sum-gyis rtogs-pai-phyir. khyab-pa-khas. der-thal, dei rgyud-kyi gzhan-(31b.4)-rig-gi śes-pa ym-pai-phyir. khyab-pa khas. ḥdod-na, ḥphags-pār-thal, ḥdod-pai-phyir. des lhag-ma-rnams rtogs sla-o.

The meaning¹ of this is the following one. If you adhere to the view that sense-perception is an instrument of cognition, then there should be a result of (the act of cognizing by this instrument, a result) in the shape of a definitely circumscribed² patch of colour or some other (sense-datum), just as an axe (being an instrument through which the act of cutting wood is carried into effect) must have, as experience shows,³ a (separate) effect in the fact that the piece of wood which is being cut becomes separated into two pieces (Every action has its instrument and its result). (52. 7). Therefore, (in opposition to this view), it is said that «this perceptive cognition is itself the result of (this) instrument of cognition». This perceptive cognition, (the instrument), is just itself (also) the result produced by the instrument, there is no other separate result, (the *act* of cognition and its *content* are the same).

(52. 10). It is now asked, how is it (to be understood) that (the act) possesses the essence of a result of sense-perception? To this it is said,

I. 19. Because it has the essence of a distinct cognition of the object.

A distinct cognition is (here a perceptual) judgment.⁴ When sense-perception possesses this essence, or this nature, (it is said) that it has the essence of a distinct cognition. This condition⁵ is just the fact that sense-perception receives a definite form. Therefore, because (the act of) sense perception appears in the form of a distinct cognition, (there is no difference between the act of being *intent* upon an object and the resulting *content* of the cognition of that object). (52. 15) This (should be understood) in the following manner. If we artificially construct a relation⁶ between the cognizing (act of cognition) and the cognized (content of cognition), then we (really) shall have a result in the shape of a perceptual judgment on that object. Knowledge is indeed of the essence of a judgment⁷ regarding its object, and sense perception *also* is regarded as being of the essence of knowledge (52. 19). Therefore, sense perception, so far as it possesses

¹ *hrii-l-ba* = *sambandha*.

² Read *yoñs-su-bcad-par* instead of *yoñs-su-dpyod-par*

³ *miñhoñ-ba-bshin no*

⁴ *gtan-la phebs-pa* = *niscaya*

⁵ *dei dños-po-ne* = *tasya bhāvaḥ*

⁶ *tshad-ma dan gshal-byas tha-sñad btags-pa* = *pramāṇa-prameya-vyavahāra-*

-āropa

⁷ = *jñānam artha-niscayana-svabhāvam, pratyaśam api jñāna-svabhāvam*
 *ptam Op. Bosanquet maintaining, Logic p. 32 ff, that cognition is a perpetual judgment

APPENDIX IV.

Vasubandhu, Vinitadeva, Vācaspatimiśra, Udayana, Dignāga, and Jinendrabuddhi on the act and the content of knowledge, on the coordination (sārūpya) of percepts with their objects and our knowledge of the external world.

sation could produce a cognition (of the presense) of a blue patch, and could not produce a cognition of a yellow or of some other patch of colour, then it would possess the force of producing distinctness. But since as (pure) sensation it is (everywhere) present¹ and (always) the same, it is not the cause producing distinctness. On the other hand coordination is not always the same, it is therefore the cause producing the distinctness (and clearness) of every single cognition. (54.6). Indeed, when we cognize something as being blue, it is then the image of blue, (its sameness with other blue objects), which produces (clearness and) distinctness, because (we then are aware) that it is not yellow or of another (colour).

(54.8) Because, when we have (constructed) the image² of the blue, we can judge³ «this is a cognition of blue and not of yellow», therefore this coordination (or coordinated image is the real) source of (all) our knowledge.⁴

III

Vācaspatimiśra on the Buddhist theory of identity between the act and the content of knowledge, and on coordination between our images and external reality.

Nyāyakamkā, pp. 254 12—260 22

§ 1. REPUDIATION OF THE MĪMĀNSAKA THEORY OF A PURE, IMAGELESS, CONSCIOUSNESS.

(254. 13) The opponent, (viz., the Buddhist), now raises another problem⁵ It is impossible, (says he), that our cognitions should (exactly) correspond to external objects,⁶ because of the following (inso-

¹ *śleṣa* = *samskṛta*

² *rnam-pa* = *ālāpa*

³ *śālam-pa* = *mat*

⁴ By pure sensation we have knowledge of the presence of a blue patch, but we do not yet know that it is blue, it is *nīlasya jñānam*, but not *nīlam it jñānam*

⁵ In the preceding passage the theory of the origin of our knowledge through direct intuition (*nirvisaya-pratibhā-vāda*) was discussed. Although on this theory knowledge is autonomous, independent from experience, nevertheless for the sake of argument (*dūṣanābhīdhitayā*), the problem was divided, and it was asked whether these direct intuitions correspond to external reality or not, op p. 254 8 ff. Mandanamīśra and his commentator Vācaspatimiśra seize this opportunity to discuss the various phases of Buddhist Idealism, pp 254. 18—260. 15

⁶ Read *bāhya-visayan*

Vasubandhu, Vinitadeva, Vācaspatimiśra, Udayana,
Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi on the act and the
content of knowledge, on the coordination (sārūpya)
of percepts with their objects and our knowledge
of the external world.

I

Vasubandhu on Coordination (sārūpya) between
images and their objects.

Abhidharma-Kośa, book IX, Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, vol 68. ff. 108^b. 7—105^b. 1,
transl. by L. de la Vallée-Poussin, Abh. kośa, IV, p. 278 ff., and by me in the
Bulletin de l'Académie des sciences de Russie, 1919, p. 852 ff.

(*Taiśiputriya*). Now, if there absolutely is no (permanent) Soul, how
is it then, that the detached moments of consciousness can remember
or recognize things which have been experienced a long time ago?

(*Sautrāntika*) Consciousness, being in a special condition and con-
nected with a (previous) knowledge of the remembered object, produ-
ces its recollection.

(*Taiśiputriya*). What is this special condition of consciousness which
is immediately followed by remembrance?

(*Sautrāntika*) It is a condition which includes 1) attention directed
towards this object, 2) an idea either similar or otherwise connected
with it and 3) absence of bodily pain, grief or distraction etc., impair-
ing its capacity. But supposing all these conditions are realized, con-
sciousness nevertheless is not able to produce remembrance, if it is
not connected with a previous experience of the remembered object.
If on the other hand it is so connected, but the above conditions are
absent, it likewise is not able to produce it. Both factors are neces-
sary — (a previous cognition and a suitable state of mind). Then
only memory appears. Experience shows that no other forces are ca-
pable (of evoking it).

(*Taiśiputriya*). But (if there were absolutely nothing permanent, it
would mean that) one consciousness has perceived the object and an-

ditions producing together the act of cognition), but then (the former objection remains, viz.), the organ of vision and the other organs, since they also are contained in the same totality, will be simultaneous with cognition and will be, (according to the definition, not the organs producing cognition, but the objects) apprehended (in that cognition).

(54. 24) (*Mīmāṃsaka*). Be that as the case may be! Knowledge (is knowledge)! It is a special faculty which is produced by its own causes, (and obeys to its own laws). It throws light upon some objects only, not upon every object, and only upon an object present (in its ken). Such is its sovereign power (that cannot be questioned)! (This is enough to explain why) the senses are not objects, (but organs), of cognition! Accordingly it has been stated that "the essence of cognition is to cognize its object".

(255. 2). (The Buddhist) Now, let us consider the following point. (You maintain that) cognition is a certain (mental) activity whose existence is conditioned by its own laws. (We will then ask) what is the object upon which this activity is intent?

(*Mīmāṃsaka*). The object which this activity is intent upon is the cognized thing

(The Buddhist). And how is this thing affected by that activity? Is it "turned out", as a figure shaped by the sculptor, or is it modified as rice corns are when they are crushed in a mortar, or is it consecrated as the pestle and other sacrificial implements are when they are sprinkled with holy water, or is it acquired as milk is by milking (the cows)?¹

(255. 6) (*Mīmāṃsaka*). What is the use of these imputations which are out of question! I maintain that cognition has the power to reach the object.

(The Buddhist) And what is this "reaching" (of the object)?

īyaya, the object (*ālambana*), preceding consciousness (*samanantara*), the predominant factor or the sense faculty (*indriya*=*ādhipati*) and light (*sahajāri-pratyaya*), unite accidentally in one totality (*sāmagrī*) and become cooperating forces (*sahajāren*=*eka-kārya-kāren*) Nobody knows who produces whom, but when they meet cognition is produced, cognition is their function, it is a case of *pratyaya-samutpādo, asmiṃ sati idam bhavati*, cp my *Nirvāṇa*, p 86 The Buddhist idealist answers that if the object is defined as the cause producing cognition all the four members of the "totality" being equally causes, they all will fall under the definition and, according to it, all will become objects

¹ An allusion to the old scholastic division of the objects into objects produced, modified, consecrated and reached, (*utpādya, vikārya, samakārya, prāpya*)

(*Vatsīputrīya*). It means that it depends on him to employ her for milking or driving purposes etc.

(*Sautrāntika*). Now, I should like to know to what place must I dispatch my memory, since it is supposed that I am the master of it.

(*Vatsīputrīya*). You must direct it towards the remembered object.

(*Sautrāntika*). What for shall I direct my memory?

(*Vatsīputrīya*). In order to remember.

(*Sautrāntika*). Hallo! I must employ the very thing I already possess in order to get it! Indeed that is well spoken! Great is the merit (of such discoveries)! And then I should like to know, in what sense memory is to be influenced. in the sense of its being produced, or in the sense of its being dispatched, (like a servant)?

(*Vatsīputrīya*). In the sense of production. since memory cannot move (like a servant)

(*Sautrāntika*). In that case the proprietor is simply the cause and the property will simply be its effect. The cause has a rule over the effect, and this rule belongs to the cause (only in the sense of its producing) a result. Memory is the property of something which is its own cause. As to the name of an owner given to the united elements of *Caitra* with respect to those of the cow, this name has been given only because it has been observed that there exists a relation of cause to effect between him and the movements and other changes in the cow, but there is no real unity whatsoever neither in *Caitra* nor in the cow. Consequently there is in this case no other proprietorship than a relation of cause to effect. The same argument may be applied to the questions «who is it that perceives?», «whom does perception belong to?» and other similar questions (who feels, who has notions, who acts etc.?) The difference consists in the fact that (instead of the described state of mind producing memory), the corresponding conditions for a perception are activity of the senses, presence of the object and aroused attention.

(*Vatsīputrīya*). There are others who argue as follows: (a Soul must exist), because wherever there is an activity it depends on an agent. Every action depends on an agent as, e. g., in the example «Devadatta walks» there is an action of walking which depends on Devadatta, the agent. To be conscious is likewise an action, hence the agent who cognizes must also exist.¹

¹ Yaśomitra supposes that the view of the grammarians is here alluded to: *bhāṣya bhavīr-apel-gatāḥ it iayākaraṇāḥ*. But Hsien Tshang thinks that

(255.9). (The Buddhist) I may open my eyes (as wide as possible), I do not arrive at perceiving this attribute of "cognizedness" in the same manner as I perceive the attributes "blue" etc. Moreover it will follow (from your theory) that objects past and future will never be cognized, because it is unthinkable that a thing should be absent, while its attribute (its "cognizedness") should be present¹

(255.13). (Mīmāṃsaka). But if I maintain that this attribute of illumination by cognition is nothing different from cognition itself! On the contrary, it is just the light of cognition! And the light of cognition is but cognition itself!

(The Buddhist). How is it that the illumination of one thing becomes the illumination of another one, (the luminosity of knowledge becomes the illumination of its object)?

(Mīmāṃsaka). (255.15). Because such is the specific character of their nature. Indeed, physical objects like colours etc. (have their own laws), as they spring up from the causes producing them, they do not throw any light (of cognition), neither upon themselves nor upon others. But knowledge, as it springs up from its (specific) causes,² has the power³ to throw light upon its own self and upon others. Knowledge cannot begin its existence without an object, and then unite with an object at a later date. An axe, (e. g., obeys to other laws), it springs up from its causes and exists (at first) alone, it then combines with a fissure (by it produced) at a later date.⁴ But (knowledge) is always combined with an object, this fact cannot be questioned (or explained). Indeed the axe also, according to the causes which have produced it, consists of iron. There is no special reason for this fact and its explanation is never asked.

(255.20) And although the (double faculty) of throwing some light on its own self and on others is the quintessence of our knowledge, (this does not mean that the object is immanent to knowledge and that this double faculty is objectless. When we contrast it with other things, (with inanimate things which are unconscious, we say) it

here compared with the Vaiśeṣika theory of number and Śrīdhara accordingly deals with the whole Buddhist theory of cognition in his section on Number, cp N Kanda II, p 122 33—130 19

¹ Read *apratyutpanno dharmī dharmāś ca* .

² Read *sca-pratyaya-samāsūḍita* —

³ Read *pralāṣana-samartham*

⁴ This is according to the Realist, but not according to the Buddhist, cp below, the translation from Udayana

elements. It is (properly speaking) *doing* nothing. Nevertheless we say that consciousness *does* cognize its object.

(*Yatsūputrīya*). What is meant by coordination¹ (between consciousness and its objective element)?

(*Sautrāntika*). A conformity between them, the fact owing to which cognition, although caused (also) by the activity of the senses, is not something homogeneous with them. It is said to cognize the object and not the senses. (It bears the reflection of the objective element which is its corollary). And again the expression "consciousness apprehends" is not inadequate, inasmuch as here also a continuity of conscious moments is the cause of every cognition. ("Consciousness apprehends" means that the previous moment is the cause of the following one). The agent here also denotes simply the cause, just as in the current expression "the bell resounds" (the bell is doing nothing, but every following moment of sound is produced by the previous one) (We can give an other (illustration): consciousness apprehends similarly to the way in which a light moves.

(*Yatsūputrīya*). And how does a light move?

(*Sautrāntika*). The light of a lamp is a common metaphorical designation for an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing flames. When this production changes its place, we say that the light has moved. (but in reality other flames have appeared in another place). Similarly consciousness is a conventional name for a chain of conscious moments. When it changes its place (i. e. appears in coordination with another objective element) we say that it apprehends that object. And in the same way we are speaking about the existence of material elements. We say matter "is produced", "it exists", but there is no difference between existence and the element which does

¹ *Sārūpya* (= *sārūpya* = *tad-ākāratā* = *viśaya-tā*) is here not simple similarity, but a Buddhistic technical term, "coordination" which is here meant to explain the connexion between consciousness and its object. It is clear that there is no "grasping" or "apprehending" of the object by knowledge according to *Vasubandhu*. The objective element is appearing simultaneously with the flashing of consciousness, both are independent, but there is a mutual correspondence between them, cp. my *Central Conception*, pp. 55—56, and *Praśastapāda*, p. 112. 20. The latter explains *sārūpyatā* by *viśeṣaṇa-sambandham* (= *saṃatāyām*) *antareṇa* and contrasts *Varā. S VIII 1 9* which implies that the attribute, e. g., colour inheres in external reality and is the cause producing our cognition of it. Thus the term *sārūpya* implies an idealistic view of attributes, or of Universals, and is contrasted with the term *saṃatāyā* which implies a realistic one. Cp. below, p. 355 n. 2.

in its cognition, (i.e., in two different places), and then it will be itself different, just because it resides in different places. (There will be no union at all, object and subject would be separated as before). Therefore only these two different entities will remain, (their supposed uniting tie is itself disuniting).¹ Moreover, as already mentioned, the past and the future (could never be cognized on this hypothesis, since) how could this one uniting tie reside in objects (separated by time). (256. 5). But if you admit, (as you are now bound to do), that the subject-object relation is immanent to our knowledge alone, how can it then be connected with external objects? Thus it is that while you are expatiating on the capacity of our knowledge to throw a light upon itself and upon others, you are driven against your will to admit the identity of (the external objects), the patches of blue etc., with their cognition. (256. 7). And thus it is that if you maintain that knowledge contains no images, we will never arrive to know what it means to be an object of this pure imageless consciousness,² (i.e., what union there can be between this internal light and an external object).

(256. 8). We must conclude that the external object corresponds to a cognition which includes its image

(256. 9). Moreover, (the theory of an imageless consciousness leads to an absurdity) If, (as you maintain), the illumination of the object (by knowledge) is nothing but the fact of the self-luminosity of knowledge, the difference among the objects must be then determined according to a difference between their cognitions. But cognition (according to this theory) contains no differences, since it contains no images, (it is always the same). (Neither will the objects contain any differences). We then will not be able to distinguish, «this is our consciousness of something blue», «that one, of something yellow». People wanting to take action (in pursuit of their special aims will not know how to do it, and) will commit no purposive actions at all.

¹ Cp Bradley, *Appearance*, p 88 «The links are united by-a link, and this bond of union is a link which also has two-ends. this problem is insoluble»

² *Ist*, p. 256. 7—8 «And thus, since the essence of an object of knowledge is *averse (avyogāt)* to imageless consciousness, the (external) thing is an object of image-containing consciousness»

pure body or of a husband, son etc, because they are associated with it, but it has not the power of evoking other (ideas, not so associated). Again the idea of a female may be followed by various ideas arising one after another, (but if we examine them, we shall find) that only such ideas really appear which are either very common (in the corresponding stream of thought), or most intensely felt in it, or (at last) have been experienced at a very recent date. The reason for this is that the Vital Energy¹ of such ideas has more power (to the exclusion of other influences), except (of course) the influence of the present state of one's body and the immediate objects of cognition.

(*Sāṃkhya*). If this Vital Energy (inherent in ideas) has so powerful an influence, why does it not produce perpetually (its own, one and the same) result?

(*Sautrāntika*). Because, (as we have said above), the elements partaking in the process of life are characterized by a perpetual change. In conformity with this principle of Universal Change the Vital Energy itself is perpetually changing and so does its result (the idea). This is only an abridged account of all the modes (of association) between ideas. A thorough going and full knowledge of them belongs to Buddha. This has been stated (by Rāhula, the Elder) in the following stanza:

Every variety of cause
Which brings about the glittering shine
In a single eye of a peacocks tail
Is not accessible to limited understanding.
The Omniscient knows them all!

(If this is true in respect of complicated material phenomena), how much more is it with respect of immaterial, mental phenomena!

II

Vinītadeva's Comment on the sūtras I. 18—21 of the
Nyāyabindu.

(Tibetan text ed in the Bibl Ind, Calcutta, 1913, pp 52.1—54.10)

(52.1). In order to repudiate the (current) misconception of a (separate) result (in the shape of a *content* cognized by the *act* of sense-perception, the author says),

I.18. This direct cognition is itself the result of (this) way of cognition.

¹ *bhāvanā* = *vāsanā* = *karma* = *cetanā* = *samskāra*

corresponds to its image.¹ Thus the senses; (although also being producers of cognition), are not its objects.² (As to the simultaneousness of cognition and object, they are also explained on *this* theory). To be conscious of an object³ means to be conscious of its image which has been evoked by the object. The images are present at the time of cognition, thus their simultaneousness is explained. It has been said (by Dharmakīrti) —

«If it is asked, how can an (absent) object, separated from us in time, be perceived, we will answer, to be perceived rightly, means only to be the cause of the (corresponding) image, to be the moment (capable of) evoking the mental image».⁴

(256.23). And thus, in this sense it is right to maintain that the (external) object is *felt*, (i. e., cognized). For this reason the Sautrāntikas teach that the (external) things are the objects of our cognition, but then (definite, constructed) form is immanent to knowledge.

§ 3. CONTEST WITH EXTREME IDEALISM. SENSE PERCEPTION DOES NOT WARRANT THE EXISTENCE OF AN EXTERNAL WORLD.

(256.25) (The Yogācāra). All this is wrong! Because, indeed, if you maintain that images are inherent in our knowledge and they refer to (external) reality, we shall ask, (how do you come to know this?) Do you know it by direct evidence or by inference?

(257.1) First of all, you cannot invoke direct awareness,⁵ because your awareness testifies to the presence in you of the image of something blue, this image is locked up⁶ in its own self, (it cannot make a step beyond, in order) to grasp another blue thing, (the blue object). Indeed the reflected image is one blue thing, not two blue things, (the image and the object)?⁷ And we have already called

¹ Op. N. Kandalī, p. 124 9.

² Lat., p. 256 18—19. «And owing to an objectivity through coordination-with-it and origination-from-it there is no deduction-of-it upon the senses etc.»

³ *artha-vedanam*

⁴ Quoted Tātp., p. 101.14 with the reading — *śamam* instead of — *śa-nam*

⁵ The discussion of the first part of this dilemma is finished below p. 258.15

⁶ Lat. «is quite finished in its own image merely».

⁷ Among modern Europeans B. Russell, e. g., is opposed to «the intrusion of the idea between the mind and the object», cp. *Mysticism*, pp. 183 and 222, *Analysis of Mind*, p. 180. He will consequently be a *nirālāra-cādin*, just as a *Mīmāṃsaka*

the essence of a (perceptual) judgment regarding its object, receives the character of a result, (of a distinct image, the presence of which is called forth by the senses). So is this to be understood, this is established (by the author).

(53.8). (Now, from this point of view), if we consider the phenomenon of sense-perception¹ in its resulting phase,² what shall we then regard as the instrument, (through which the act of cognition arrives at this result)? To this it is said,

I.20. (The instrument) of cognizing consists in co-ordination (between the image) and its (real) object.

Coordination is similarity.³ «Its (instrument)» means the instrument of perception. That sense perception which is a perception of an object representing a distinct image, this its (coordinated image) is the (real) instrument of cognition.⁴ (53.8).

What is the meaning (of the assertion) that coordination (of the image) with the object, (or the sense of sameness) is the (real) source of (all) our knowledge? To this it is said,

I.21. By the way of it a distinct cognition of the object is established.

Since by the way of a coordination of the object, its distinct cognition is ascertained (in a judgment), this coordination, (or this sense of sameness), is the (real) source of (all) our knowledge

(53.11). Indeed we then have (the judgments) «this is distinctly blue», «it is not yellow». The source of this definiteness (is the sense of sameness) and we can maintain that this is the (real) source of our knowledge, (when we make an imputed distinction between the act and the content of knowledge).

(53.15). Indeed the senses cannot produce this definiteness (by themselves), because the (pure element of) sensation, although it is the cause (of our cognitions) is the same in all cognitions. How could it then (by itself) possess the force of distinguishing every separate cognition (from all the others)? (54.1) If a given (pure) sen-

¹ *mān-sam-śid* = *pratyakṣa-bhāva*.

² *ābras-bu rañ-bhūn* = *phala-svabhāva*.

³ Coordination (*sārūpya*) first of all means the connection between the object and its image, but it implies the difference of the image from all dissimilar ones and its connection, owing to the sense of sameness, with all the similar ones

⁴ *śāśad-ma* = *pramāṇa* in the sense of *sādhakatama-lāraṇa* = *pramā-lāraṇa* (cp. *Tarka-bhāṣā*, p. 10, Poona ed.), = *prakartopakāraṇa* (cp. N b t Tipp., p. 42.3), the nearest psychological antecedent, the *causa efficiens par excellence*.

particular to the general and inference proceeding from the general to the particular), are right means of cognition only in respect of successful purposive action, as has been stated (by Dignāga¹), "a man who has distinctly delineated his object by these two modes of cognition in a judgment,² takes action, and is not lead astray". Thus it is that the external (real object) is not accessible to our direct knowledge, but being indirectly ascertained (in a judgment) it is an object (of cognition nevertheless).

(Yogācāra). (257.14). All this is wrong!³ You do not know at all what a judgment is!

(Sautrāntika) A judgment is a mental construction⁴ (of the form "this is blue").⁵ Indirect cognition (or inference), because in its essence it is nothing but constructive thought, is conterminous with (judgment).⁶ Direct cognition (or sense-perception) is also a judgment because it calls forth a thought-construction⁷

(Yogācāra) (257.16). But a construction also, since it is intent upon the image (produced by it and cannot make a step beyond it), how can it judge, (or execute constructions regarding external reality)?

(Sautrāntika). (257.17). (This is however possible), if you accept (the following explanation) The image (which a man feels inwardly present in his mind) is his own. It is not something (artificially) constructed⁸ (by combining in thought). On the contrary, it is something intimately and directly felt.⁹ Indeed, a mental construction is something arranged (by our mind's initiative) The true essence of a thing is never an arrangement. It is always (something unique), something not standing in any relation to whatsoever,¹⁰ (something unutterable), something that cannot be designated by a (connotative) name. It is (also something concrete and vivid), a gla-

¹ This quotation has not yet been identified

² *adhyavasāya*

³ Read *tan na*.

⁴ *vikalpa*, cp Tātp, p. 87 25, 888 15 and Tipp, p 28. 4—5.

⁵ A fuller definition of a perceptual judgment (*vikalpa* = *adhyavasāya*) is found Tātp, p 888 15, translated below in Appendix V.

⁶ *vikalpa-īpativāi tad-vicayam*, cp. Udayana, *Parīśuddhi ad Tātp*, p 388 15.

⁷ *vikalpa-janant*

⁸ Lit "the domain of choice or arrangement"

⁹ *samvedanam*

¹⁰ *sarvato bhinnam* cp Tattvas., p 890 25, *traiḷōkya-vikalpaṇa*, cp. Tātp, p. 388. 17.

table) dilemma. Is the cognized object¹ apprehended by pure consciousness or is it apprehended by a consciousness which includes the image of the object?² The first is impossible, because (really, what does it mean to be an object?). None of its definitions will apply to such an object (of pure consciousness)! (254. 16). Indeed, (we have the definition that to be an object means simply to exist, whatsoever exists is an object). This means that every thing becomes an object (automatically), because it exists.³ But (on this theory), since all things (of the universe) exist equally, all will equally be objects of our knowledge, (all will be cognized because they exist), and every body will be omniscient!

(254. 17) Now, (take another definition), a thing which *produces* knowledge is its object. We thus evade the absurd consequence (just mentioned), because (a cognized object) will be only a definite thing, for a definite person and for one definite⁴ cognition only. (254. 19). But another absurdity arises, (*viz.*), the organ of vision and all other sense-organs are also factors producing cognition, they (will fall under the definition and thus become, not organs, but) objects of cognition. (254. 20) A further absurd consequence will ensue, *viz.*, that (by this flash of pure consciousness) we will never be able to cognize something present, since at the time of (this flash) the thing which has produced it will be just gone by; (according to our system, all efficient things) are moments,⁵ and (the moment of) the effect can never be simultaneous with (the moment of) the cause (254. 21). The simultaneousness of the object (and of its cognition) can be saved, if we assume that the object) is contained in the one totality⁶ (of causes and con-

¹ *tad-viśayaḥ*, *viz.* *artha vijñāna-viśayaḥ*.

² *Lit.*, p. 254. 18—19 «The opponent takes up the second part. Is it not that consciousness (*vijñāna*) possessing (*bahuvr*) an external object (read *bāhya-viśayam*) is impossible, because it cannot stand before the dilemma, whether its object is of the non-shaped (*nirālākṛtīya*) consciousness or of (consciousness) possessing shape?».

³ Read *sattayā*.

⁴ Read *kaṃ cid eva*.

⁵ Drop the *cheda* before *ksāṃśattvena*.

⁶ The Buddhist assails the Mīmāṃsaka in urging upon him the fact that since his pure consciousness will be posterior to the object that called it forth, it will illumine nothing, the momentary object will be gone. The Mīmāṃsaka in defence appeals to the Sautrāntika theory of cognition (*para-matam āśrītya*). The cognized object is not the preceding moment (*pūrvā-lāṇa*), but the next following one contained in the same «totality» of factors which are simultaneous with cognition (*prā-śmagrī-vartamāna-jñāna-samūha-lāṇa-viśaya-lāṇa*). The four factors (*pra-*

(Sautrāntika) Does it not mean that it imagines a real object, (i. e., some efficient point-instant producing a possible sensation)?

(Yogācāra). What is the essence of constructive thought? Is it an imagined sensation² or some other function? The first is impossible! (An imagined sensation is indeed a *contradictio in adjecto*). Sensation and imagination being the one passive and the other active,³ (the one non-constructive and the other constructive, imaginative sensation) would be as it were a liquid solid stuff.⁴ (Constructive thought or imagination) is a function different (from sensation). The question is whether it operates after (sensation) or simultaneously with it? The first is impossible, because cognition⁵ being a momentary⁶ flash cannot operate by degrees. Even those schools who deny Universal Momentariness,⁷ even they maintain that thought, as well as motion, cannot operate intermittently⁸ and therefore (sensation

¹ Read p 257 25—258 1, *kim vikalpasya svarūpam, anubhāvōropa uta vyāpārātaram*, and drop the following *svaiṃpānubhavaḥ*

² *anubhava-āropa* = *pratyakṣa-āropa* = *pratyakṣa-vikalpa*, this would involve a *samplava* between the two quite different sources of knowledge in contradiction to the Buddhist principle of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*, cp App II

³ *vikalpa-avikalpa*, the order of these two terms is here inverted in keeping with Pīnini, II. 2 34

⁴ Lat p 258 1—2. «Because of the impossibility of identity between actual experience (*anubhava*) and construction (*samāropa*) whose essence is non-differentiation and differentiation, just as between the solid (read *laṭhina*) and the liquid» — The solid and the liquid elements are, according to Indian conceptions, ultimate elements, not two different conditions of the same stuff. When milk coagulates into curds this is explained in assuming that the solid element which was always present in milk becomes prominent (*vikṛsta*). Only the Sāṅkhya would explain it as a *pariṇāma*. In the eyes of the Buddhist as well as of the Nyāyik the simile means that sensation and thought are different in principle and cannot be mixed up.

⁵ *vyākṣāṇasya*

⁶ For the Buddhist every existence is motion, and motion consists of a chain of absolute infinitesimal moments (*pūrvā-apara-kāla-lāṭā-vikāla-ksana*), for the realists the things are either moving or stationary and every unit of motion, as well as of thought, consists of three moments, the moments of its production, its existence and its extinction

⁷ The Mīmāṃsaka and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools are first of all meant. They deny that the existence of every object is split into point-instants. In fact all schools except the Buddhists deny the Universal Flux, and among the Buddhists the Mādhyamikas also deny it, on the same grounds as the Vedāntins. The Sāṅkhyas with their *pariṇāma-nityatva* of *pradhāna* come very near the Buddhist *ksanikatva* cp. Central Conception, p. 80 and Introduction.

⁸ *varāmya-vyāpāra*

(Mīmāṃsaka). It is the fact of being rightly cognized, it is an attribute of the thing cognized, (its illumination).¹ It exists (nevertheless) only in regard of a definite cognizer, just as the numbers, two (three) etc. are qualities (residing in the object), but they exist only relatively to the individual mind who counts them. (This attribute of being illuminated by knowledge) ceases to exist as soon as cognition is over, just as the numbers, two, (three) etc., exist no more (apart from the separate unities) when the cognition which has counted them is over.²

¹ The Indian Realists, Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, held a kind of anti-conceptualist doctrine of knowledge. They denied the existence of concepts, or images, altogether and imagined cognition as a pure light of consciousness which is not in itself affected by the form of the object cognized, just as the light of a lamp is always the same and does not change according to the object illuminated. According to the Mīmāṃsakas knowledge produces in the external object a new quality called «cognizedness» (*jñātātā*) or «illumination» (= *artha-pralāśa*), which disappears as soon as cognition is over. The realists devised this theory probably wishing to escape all the consequences of the fact of coextensiveness of existence and knowledge (*sahopalambha-miyama*), urged upon them by the idealists. They also denied selfconsciousness (*eva-samvedana*) and direct introspection, and maintained that we have no direct experience of our knowledge at all (*vijñānam atyanta-parokṣam*), but when the quality of «cognizedness» is produced in an object, we by an inference conclude of the presence in us of knowledge, cp. Śloka-vārti śūnyavāda, 78 — *śuddham eva mūlāram grāhalam samvit asti hi*.

² The idea that number (*dvitvādī-sankhyā*) as well as position in time and space (*paratva-aparatva*) are relative, and hence subjective and notional, seems to be an early concession of Indian Realists to Buddhist criticism. These notions are said by them to owe their origin to the Principle of Relativity (*apekṣā-buddhijanya*), cp. Praśastapāda, p. 111 ff and 164 ff. But for the Buddhists relative means unreal (*apekṣito'yaṃ viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāvo, na vāstavaḥ*), for the Realists, all Universals being realities, relations are also real in spite of being relative (*apekṣito vāstavaś ca*, cp. N. Kandali p. 117. 25). Number two is imagined as a full blown reality comfortably residing in two things, in two different places. The Buddhist contention that they are purely notional, merely signs of reality (*jñāpaka, laṅkā, jñānamātram*), is rejected by Praśastapāda on the score that all attributes, or all Universals, are real, cp. ibid. p. 112. 16. He says that the characteristics (*viśeṣana*) of an object cannot owe their origin to mere «coordination» (*sāriyapāt*), but to «characterization» (*viśeṣana-viśeṣya-sambandha*). Both terms, although they grammatically mean the same, are used, the one as connoting an idealistic interpretation, the other—as an extremely realistic one. The Indian realists have gone in their tendency to infer realities from mere names a considerable bit further than their European matches. The Mīmāṃsakas follow the same tradition when they assert the real production by the pure light of knowledge of a real quality in the shape of the «cognizedness» (*jñātātā*) of the object. This theory is

sive actions towards a definite aim, since (undiscriminated from our image will be not exclusively one definite object, but all) others will be also undiscriminated at that time, and the consequence will be that (our image) could direct us not towards the definite object to which it corresponds, but) to another one.¹

(258.11). Thus it is that our immediate feeling cannot be relied upon as a proof of the reality of an external world.

§ 4. IMPOSSIBILITY TO PROVE THE REALITY OF AN EXTERNAL WORLD BY RATIOCINATION.

(258.16). (Yogācāra). Neither can (the reality of the external world) be established by inference. It has been, indeed, sufficiently explained that, just as simple awareness, inference cannot seize the external object neither directly, nor indirectly.² There is no fact from which its existence could be deduced with logical necessity.³ (If such a fact exists), it must be either an effect (of external reality from which the existence of the cause could be necessarily deduced) or a fact possessing externality as its inherent property, (the existence of this property could then be deduced analytically). There are no such facts.⁴

¹ Lat., p 258 14—15 «But if it is not grasped, there will be no definiteness of action by not grasping the difference, because, since other ones are at that time not grasped, towards another one also activity will be consequent». — For a more detailed explanation of the principle of *bhedāgraha* or Neglected Difference and the use which is made of it in order to make intelligible our perception of the external world cp preliminary note to Appendix V, on *apoha*

² According to the Sautrāntikas the direct function of sense perception is the awareness of the presence of something in one's ken (*grahana*), its indirect function — the evoking of its general image in a perceptual judgment (*pratyaśa-balād utpannena vikalpena adhyavasāyah*) The direct function of inference, on the other hand, is the construction of a general image, its indirect function is the ascertainment of the presence of something in our ken, cp above p 257 4 ff and N.b. t, p 7.18, 11.12 and 12.16 ff The Yogācāra of the old school and the Mādhyamika-Yogācāras reject this theory

³ Since there are only two kinds on Uniformity in nature, Uniformity of Succession or Uniformity of Coexistence, a necessary deduction is only possible either from a following effect or from a subaltern quality, but no such successive facts or coexisting facts can be found from which the externality of our objects could be deduced The Sautrāntika will presently appeal to Solipsism as a fact inherent in the denial of an external world.

⁴ Lat., p 258 17—18 «And there is no such *probans* dependent (read *prati-baddhas*) upon the external, neither its identity nor its result»

is a *light* which illumines itself and others. When we contrast it with other faculties (we say it is) a *power* of throwing light upon itself and upon others. (In the first case) we more or less imagine it as a result, (as a content). (In the second case we, on the contrary), imagine it as an instrument (or as an action produced by) cognition. The differentiation is more or less imputed, (the fact is the same, but in this way) there is a faculty of cognition and there is an object of it.¹

(The Buddhist). (255.24) To this we reply as follows. What meaning do you attach to the assertion that knowledge possesses the power² of throwing light upon itself and upon others? If you mean that such is its own nature,³ we agree! But if you mean that there is a real mutual relation (between the object and the subject), we will ask, of what kind is this relation?

(Mīmāṃsaka). It is a subject-object relation.

(The Buddhist). (256.3) The consequence will be that this relation, (if it is something real) must inhere in the object as well as

¹ Lat 255 20—23 «And illumination of self and other (read *sia-para-prakāśanam*) having its own nature by a contrast (*svorityā*) with non-illumination, in some way or other (*katham* etc) receives (*bahuvr*) an imagined differentiation as «a result», the power of illuminating self and other, by a contrast with non-power, in some way or other becomes through an imagined exclusion «an instrument of knowledge», thus the power is not without an object»

The Mīmāṃsaka is here represented as compelled to admit that his light of pure consciousness and the illumination of the object by it are not two facts, but one, because knowledge is never without an object, such is its nature that can neither be questioned nor explained. The Buddhist avails himself of the opportunity to bring home to the Mīmāṃsaka his favorite idea of the identity of image and object. The light of knowledge, if it is the same thing as the illumination of the object, is in danger of having no object at all, since the object will be immanent to knowledge. It is just what the Buddhist wants, and he represents the Mīmāṃsaka as admitting self-consciousness (*sia-para-prakāśa* = *sia-samvedana*) and an imagined difference (*kalpita-bheda*) between the act and the content, the instrument and the result, or between the object and subject, of cognition (cp below the translation from Jñānendra buddhi).

² Read *sia-para-prakāśana-samartham*

³ Both the Mīmāṃsaka (cp above, p 254 15) and the Buddhist admit that the essence of cognition is to include an object and to be self-conscious, but the Buddhist explains it as the same fact which in different contexts can be differently characterized, according to the view we take of it. The Mīmāṃsaka, although very near to that view (cp above, p 255 20—24), nevertheless, as a realist, admits a real relation, a real tie (*sambandha*) between object and subject, something like a chain which resides at once in both the related things and unites them. On relations and their reality cp above p 287 n 3.

evokes an idea, this idea is also accidental (and changing concomitantly with a change in its cause).

(258.24) (Sautrāntika) But is not your Biotic Force (in this case simply) the force of subjective thought, contained in one continuous stream, the force to produce out of itself corresponding objective thoughts. Its (so called) maturity is its (perfect development and) readiness immediately to produce its effect. Its cause is the preceding moment of the same stream, because you (the Yogācāra) do not admit (in this case) causality between different streams¹ (259.8) But then, either

tanā of the Mīmāṃsakas, the *adrsta*, *apūrva*, *abhyāsa* and *samskāra* of all schools. The Sāṅkhyas derive it from the root *īś* «to perfume», the Buddhists from the root *vas* «to live». In the Abh Kośa, IX, it is used identically with *bhāvanā* as a designation of the universal force which propels life. We have accordingly tried to render it by the Bergsonian élan vital, since it seems to possess some of its connotations. *Vāsanā* is sometimes divided into *anubhava-vāsanā* and *avidyā-vāsanā* or *anādi-(avidyā)-vāsanā*. The first = *samskāra* = *smṛti-gaṇa-lā-sāmagrī*, means the influence of former experience, habit, habitual way of thought and life in general. On the difference between *vāsanā* and *samskāra* cp S. N Dasgupta, The Study of Pātañjali, p 111. (Calcutta, 1920) This notion implies the reality of the external world. The term *avidyā-vāsanā* or *anādi-vāsanā*, on the other hand, implies an idealistic view of the Universe, different in the old Yogācāra and the new Yogācāra-Sautrāntika schools. The importance of former experience is by no means denied (*vāsanā* = *pūrvam gñānam*), but the existence of a duplicate world beyond the world of our sensations and ideas is deemed problematic and metaphysical. It is thus an internal, spiritual force creating the illusion of this external world and might also be called the Force of Transcendental Illusion, similar to the *māyā* of the Vedāntins. Every idea is impregnated or perfumed by that force (*vastrāder mṛga-madādunā śīṣyatoam yathā*). The extreme Yogācāras apparently denied the doctrine of *śvalaṣaṇa-sāmrūpyam*, they maintained that (na) *drsta-artha-kṛvyā-śvalaṣaṇa-sūlakṣaṇyena* (= *sūtrūpyena*), (apt tu) *anādi-vāsanā-lasāt* (*ālākṣyaṇva dūha-pūkādāka-sāmarthyā-ūropah*), cp. Tāt p, pp, 145 9 ff, 464 11 ff, N vārt, p. 69 — *śakti-viśiṣṭaḥ attitpādo vāsanā*. We have seen above, p. 296, that when the origin of the the Categories of our understanding is found in former experience, the force producing them is called *anubhava-vāsanā*, and when it is ascribed to a spontaneous faculty of our Reason, it is called *vikalpa-vāsanā*. Thus Empiricism may be called *anubhava-vāsanā-vāda*, and Rationalism — *vikalpa-vāsanā-vāda*. The extreme Idealism of the Yogācāras may then be called *atyanta- or ekānta-vikalpa-vāsanā-vāda*. Our Reason in the role of the creator of the illusion of an external empirical world would be then called *avidyā-vāsanā*, our Reason as containing innate ideas — *anādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*, the empirical world as contrasted with transcendental reality — is then *anādi-vāsanā-viśiṣṭaḥ sāmānyarā-hīlākḥ pratyayaḥ* cp N Kandali, p. 279 15

¹ Dharmakīrti admits that the presence of another personality is the predominant cause (*bhāg-rīṇen* = *adhipati-pratyaya*) or *causa efficiens* of our presentations of external purposive movements and speech, cp Sautrāntarasiḍḍhi, p 67

§ 2. CONSCIOUSNESS CONTAINS IMAGES COORDINATED WITH EXTERNAL OBJECTS.

(256.12). On the other hand, if we admit that our cognitions contain definite images, then the coordination of the blue patch¹ (with its image), being the cause which imparts definiteness to it, will be the source of our right cognition, and its aspect of being a content of our consciousness which receives, (as it were), definiteness in the shape of a patch of blue colour will be the result (of that act of cognition)² (256.14) And although (on this theory) coordination (of our knowledge) and that knowledge itself are just one and the same reality, nevertheless they can be differentiated (in imagination), by imagining a double aspect of the same thing, the aspect of an act of cognition and the aspect of its content. The essence of cognition is settled by one principle contrast (of cognition to non cognition). But many other differentiations may be imagined which are all included in it, and thus an imagined differentiation is created, according to different stand-points, so far the fact of cognition is differently viewed and differently contrasted, (as an action when it is contrasted with other actions, or as a content when it is contrasted with other contents).³ (256.16). It has been said (by Dignāga)⁴ «the mere existence of pure consciousness is not yet the definite consciousness of an object, because it is always the same, and (if there were no images), we would arrive at the consequence that all our cognitions must be undifferentiated But the sense of sameness introducing itself into our consciousness, brings in coordination».

(256.18) (We now have a good definition of what an object of cognition is) An object is the cause which produces cognition and

¹ i. e., the indefinite point of external reality will become a definite patch of blue only for us, only owing to the existence in us of an image corresponding to it

² Here apparently Vācaspati-miśra borrows his expressions from Dharmottara, cp. N. b. t., p. 15 20 ff.

³ Lat, p. 256 14—16 «Although coordination and cognition is (here) just the same thing, nevertheless through constructions (*vikalpav*) whose essence is an intention (*avagāhana*) of the shape contained in one contrast, (i. e., many secondary differentiations can be evolved from one chief differentiation, or chief feature), it reaches the condition of sources and result of cognition, (this condition) being an imagined difference, produced by a difference of things to be excluded, (or to be contrasted with)». Cp. *ibid.*, p. 262.2.

⁴ Quoted also in the N. Kandalī, p. 123 24

avoid Solipsism) in regard of some of our (external) perceptions, (viz.), the perceptions of external purposive movements and of (another man's) speech¹ (259.14). Moreover, even assuming, (for the sake of argument, that every occasional external perception) is produced by the influence of a foreign personality, the effect cannot be changing, since such a personality is constantly present. (259.15). (You cannot maintain that the other personality is sometimes present and sometimes absent), because the chain of moments constituting the personality is quite compact² and cannot be occasionally relegated to a remote place, since according to (your) Idealism,³ space as an external entity does not exist. And because thought is not physical, (the foreign personality which is only) thought, never does occupy a definite place (259.18) (Nor can a stream of thought be occasionally present) in respect of the time (of its appearance), since you do not admit the appearance of something (new, of something) that did not previously exist. Therefore our syllogism proves the existence of external (physical) objects⁴

(259.19) (*Yogācāra*). This is wrong! Although (in our opinion) the origin of all our external perceptions is exclusively to be found in our internal stream of thought,⁴ there is nevertheless an occasional variety of perceptions. The reason (in your syllogism) is fallacious, it

¹ Read *gamana-vacana-pratibhāṣasya vyākāṣasya*

² *sāndratara*

³ The solution of the problem of Solipsism by Dharmakīrti in his *Sāntānāntarsiddhi* is that, from the point of view of absolute reality, there is only one spiritual principle undivided into subject and object and, therefore, no plurality of individual existences. But from the empirical point of view there are necessarily other personalities existing in the external world, just as there are external objects existing and cognized by the two sources of our knowledge, sense-perception and inference, as they are characterized in Dignāga's and his own epistemological system. Nevertheless he himself calls his view idealism (*vyākāṣavāda* and *yogācāra*) and maintains that an idealist can speak about other personalities and an external world just as a realist does, but for the sake of precision he ought to speak not about other personalities, but about «his representations» of other minds, to speak of other minds is only an abbreviation. Our ideas, in this system, are not cognitions of reality, but constructions or dreams about reality. They are indirect cognitions just as dreams are, since dreams are also conditioned by former real experiences, but feebly recollected in a morbid state of mind. Hence Dharmakīrti and Dignāga are represented here as *Sāntāntikas*, although in their own opinion they are *Yogācāras*. They are therefore called *Sāntāntika-Yogācāras*. Their opponents are the old *Yogācāras* of Asaṅga's school and the later *Mādhyamika-Yogācāras*.

⁴ *sva-santāna-mātra-prabhavāpi = ālaya-vyākāṣa-prabhavāpi*

attention¹ to the fact that it is impossible to be at once (out of the cognition and in the cognition), to be a separate thing (from knowledge and to be cognized by it as) its object.

(Sautrāntika). (257.4). Let it be so! However the object of cognition is double,² the *prima facie* apprehended (in sensation), and the distinctly settled (in a perceptual judgment). (257.5) - Now, in respect to sense-perception, what is immediately seized (in a sensation) is only one single moment, but what is distinctly settled (in a perceptual judgment) is a compact chain of moments, (the constructed thing), the object of our purposive action (257.6). If that were not so, cognition could not guide the actions of those who act in pursuit of definite aims.³ (When we speak of) knowledge guiding⁴ our actions and leading to successful attainment⁵ of aims, we only mean that knowledge points⁶ to an object of a possible (successful) action.⁷ Now, the moment of sensation is not the moment of action,⁸ since the latter does not exist any more when the action takes place. But the chain of moments, (the continuity of the object) can be (the aim of purposive action) (257.9). However, (a chain of moments) cannot be grasped directly (in sensation), and therefore we must admit (the importance and conditioned reality) of the constructed⁹ (chains of moments)

(257.9) The same applies to an inferential judgment.¹⁰ The object it is *prima facie* intent upon is a Universal, (an absent thing constructed in imagination), whose essence is to represent a contrast with some other things.¹¹ But the (corresponding) judgment¹² refers that Universal to (some particular point of reality¹³), which becomes the object of our purposive action and is capable of being successfully attained. (257.11). Both these ways of cognition, (direct perception proceeding from the

¹ Cf. above, p. 255 14 ff.

² Here again Vācaspati's phrasing seems to be influenced by Dharmotara, cp. NBT, p. 12 16 ff.

³ Read *artha-līyārthinaḥ*.

⁴ *pravartaka*

⁵ *prāpaka*

⁶ *upadarsaka*.

⁷ *pravṛtti-śāya*. With this passage cp. NBT, p. 3 6 ff.

⁸ Lit. «not the object of action»

⁹ *adhyavasāyaka* = *vikalpitaka*

¹⁰ *anumāna-vikalpa* = *anumita-adhyavasāya*

¹¹ Read *anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpam*

¹² *adhyavasāyaka*

¹³ i. e., *śvalaisana*, cp. NBT, p. 12 20—21.

purely internal, but in the following moment we have constructed an image, projected in into the external world and identified it with a point of external reality, i e., we have judged).

(Yogācāra). No! We have already answered this. We have proved above¹ (that neither by immediate awareness nor by inference can the reality of the external world be established).

IV

Udayana-Ācārya on the Buddhist theory of an identity between the act of cognizing and the content of a cognition.

Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā-Parīśuddhi, ed Calcutta 1911, pp 152—155

(152.1). A source of knowledge² (is compared by the Realists with) an instrument. It is the special cause (of a mode of cognition), its predominant cause,³ (such as the senses in sense perception). When the result is achieved there is no need of such an (instrument) to produce (the result a new),⁴ just as, when (the tree) has been cut down, there is no need of an axe (in order to cut it down anew). Therefore, just as the function of an axe consists in cutting down the tree which is not yet cut down, just so does the function of our sensitivity and of the other (sources of our knowledge) consist in cognizing an object which is not yet cognized. This is the opinion of the Mīmāṃsakas.

(152.6). However, there is another theory, (the Buddhist one). (The ultimate cause producing cognition is the fact of) a coordination⁵

¹ Cp above, p 257 4 ff.

² *pramāṇa*

³ *kāraṇa* = *sādhakatama-kāraṇa* = *prakṛsta-upakāraṇa* = *ādhyapatti-pratyaya*

⁴ Lit. «And when the thing to be produced is produced, there is no producing for its like» *kāraṇa-jatīyasya indriyādeh (V)*

⁵ Lit. «Therefore, just as the axe becomes functioning with respect to cutting, because of the fact that its object is the non-cut, just so . . .»

⁶ The definition of *pramāṇa* as *anādhigata-artha-adhigant*, is accepted by both the Buddhists and the Mīmāṃsakas, but the latter understand under object the empirical object which has stability and, in the continuous run of its perception, receives in every moment a new time-characteristic. The Buddhists understand the transcendental object which has no duration, which is «other» in every moment.

⁷ *cārūpyam*, cp Tātp, p 14 13, the fact that a constructed mental image with all its inhering attributes corresponds to the utterly heterogeneous (*atyanta-vilakṣaṇa*) point-instant of efficient reality, the transcendental object. In Appendix V, on *apoha*, it will be explained that this coordination is founded on relativity (*anyā-vyāvṛtti*)

ring reflex,¹ (non-operated upon by the mind). (257. 20). Thus it is that images are not mental arrangements (for a consciousness which feels their immediate presence) in itself. But the mind projects the inward reflex² into the external world and guides the purposive actions of those who are desirous of dealing with these external objects, in directing them towards this or towards that thing. Nor are the people (who are thus guided by images projected into the external, world) deceived (in their aims, since experience does not contradict them), because indirectly (these images, although themselves subjective and notional), are produced by external (reality); and since they are related to reality, the real aims are successfully reached. Accordingly, it has been stated (by Dharmottara³), (judgment or inference guides the purposive actions of men), because «the course it takes consists in having *prma facie* to deal with mental contents of a (general) unreal character and in ascertaining through them some real fact».⁴

(257. 24). (Yogūcāra). Please explain what is meant by the words «(knowledge) constructs (in a perceptual judgment a kind) of reality out of that unreality which is the image present to it».

¹ Cp N b t, p. 12 3 (= *spatūbha*), and N Kaṇikā, p. 281. 6 — *sāḥsāḥāro vādaḥ*. — *vāda-pratibhāsa* refers to the same thing as *nyāta pratibhāsa* in N b. t., p. 8 10

² *svābhāsam vikalpayantaḥ*.

³ Cp N. b. t., p. 7 18.

⁴ Lit 257 17—28 «If it is opined that one's own shape is not the object (or the domain) of constructions, (of choice, of combinations), but of intimate feeling (*samvedanasya*) which is immediate (direct), (drop the *cheda* before *pratyakṣasya*, and put it after that word, and insert *sa* before *hi*) An object of mental construction is something, that is being arranged combined and contrasted), but the essence of something is not being constructed, because it, being excluded from everything, cannot be (combined with a name, and because it is a vivid reflex Therefore, not being in themselves constructions, they arrange their own shape as being external and direct, here and there those who wish to deal with them And since mediately they are produced from the external, because they are connected with it, because they reach it, they do not deceive the people As has been said «because it operates (read *pratyakṣa*) in ascertaining an object in a non-object which is its own (immediate) reflex».

⁵ When the cognition of a blue patch arises we experience internally a modification of our feeling and project it into the external world in an internal judgment «this is the blue». The words of Dharmottara quoted by Vācaspati refer in NBT, p. 7. 18, to inference, but p. 18 9 ff he also maintains that there is in the resulting aspect of inference no difference between perception and inference, since both are judgments asserting a coordination (*sārūpya*) between an image and a point of reality

distinct image will not be coordinated with the object. (153.5). If it did produce a cognition of some indefinite object, how could it be called a means of right knowledge?

Now, such (passive sources of our knowledge as our) senses are, although they belong to the causes producing knowledge,¹ cannot (alone, by themselves impart distinctness and) determine our cognition as referring just to the right object.²

(153.7). Indeed, a sensory stimulus produced on the visual sense by a patch of blue colour, is not yet a cognition of the blue as blue, because pure sensation produced by a patch of yellow colour (so far it is only pure sensation) is just the same. It is the concept (or the image) of the blue alone which makes the stimulus produced on the sense of vision a real cognition of the blue patch.³

(153.9). Therefore it is the image⁴ of the object alone, the image contained in our understanding,⁵ which determines our cognition as a cognition of a definite object.⁶ It also determines the (cognized external) object. Therefore it (can be compared with) an instrument, (with the ultimate cause) of Cognition, since it determines (and distinguishes) the objects of our knowledge (between themselves).

(153.12). This has been expressed by Dharmakīrti in the following words,⁷

«The source of cognizing consists in coordination (between the constructed image and its real) object. Owing to this a distinct cognition of the object is produced».

(153.14). The words «a distinct cognition of the object is produced» mean that a distinct cognition of the object is determined, and

¹ Read *jñāna-lānaṁ*

² *tadvyatayā = nyāta-vśaya-sambandhitayā* (V).

³ Lit., p 158.7—9 «Indeed, the blue-knowledge of the blue is not simply because produced by the eye, because of the consequence of suchness of the yellow-knowledge, but only from being the form of the blue there is blue-knowledge of the blue». — The difference between a pure sensation produced by something blue (*nūlasya jñānam*) and the definite cognition or judgment «this is blue» (*nūlām-ita jñānam*) is found already in the Abhidharma-sūtra, it is quoted by Dignāga in his bhāṣya on Pr. samucc, I. 4, by Kamalaśīla in TSP, p 12 and his NB-pūrvā-pakṣa-saṅkṣipti and in other texts.

⁴ *artha-ālāra = artha-sārūpya*

⁵ *buddhi-gata = mānasa = lālpamśa*.

⁶ *tadvyatayā = nyāta-vśaya-sambandhitayā*.

⁷ NB, I. 20—21.

and imagination), cannot operate alternately, (when something is felt and imagined at the same time). (258. 5). But if you assume that sensation and imagination work simultaneously, we can admit this, with the proviso¹ that the object² is immanent³ in cognition; because if we suppose that what we feel is (not in us), but out of us,⁴ the term «feeling» will loose itself every intelligible meaning.⁵

(258. 7). And thus, what is really immediately felt in us is the (double) subject-object aspect of our knowledge,⁶ and what is constructed in imagination is the (external) object. (258. 8). Our own self, what we internally feel in us, is not something constructed in imagination,⁷ (on the other hand the external) object, since it is constructed in imagination, is not the thing actually felt in sensation.⁸ (258. 9) (We cannot know) whether the (external) object exists or does not exist, but (what we call) construction (of an object) is nothing but the (imagined) «grasping» (aspect of its idea).⁹ It has been already mentioned that to «grasp» something external to our knowledge is impossible.¹⁰

(258. 11) (Sautrāntika). (We also assume a kind of) imputed externality,¹¹ (viz), our images (coalesce with external objects in that sense) that we are not conscious of the difference,¹² and that is why our purposive actions, (when guided by our judgments), are directed towards external objects (and are successful)

(258. 12). (Yogācāra). But (when they coalesce), is the external object also cognized at that time or not? The first is excluded, according to what we have just said, viz, that (real) «grasping» is an impossibility. But if no external object is really apprehended and we simply don't feel the difference (between the external thing and an imagined idea), this undiscrimination alone could not guide our purpo-

¹ *kevalam*

² *vedyāḥ*

³ *ātma-bhāva-avasthita*

⁴ *para-bhāva-vedane*

⁵ *svatūpa-vedana-anupapattiḥ* = *svatūpena vedanasya anupapattiḥ*.

⁶ Read *grāhya-grāhaka-ākāro* 'nubhūto.

⁷ *I*dt, p 258 8—9 «But the self is not superimposed upon the non-felt».

⁸ *pratyakṣa-vedyāḥ*.

⁹ *I*dt, p 258 9—10 «And this superimposition is nothing but (etc) the grasping of something either existing or not existing»

¹⁰ Cp. above, p 256. 1—6.

¹¹ *bāhya-samūropas*

¹² *bhedāgraha* = *alhyāti*, this celebrated principle has been also adopted by Prabhākara for the explanation of illusions, cp *Tātṭ*, p 56 ff.

ded in every) self-conscious idea¹ and (such is) in the external field, (the relation of some logical marks to the fact deduced from them, e g., when) we deduce that whatsoever is an Aśoka is also a tree. (154.8). The tree is, indeed, not something different from the Aśoka, nor the Aśoka different from the tree. Their difference lies in the logical field, (the conceptions are alone different). (The same thing can be differently conceived from different standpoints). It is then differently contrasted,² (as contrasted with other trees it is an Aśoka, and as contrasted with other plants it is a tree). The same applies to the difference between (an instrument or) a factor³ (in general and the function) produced by it. There is no difference at all, (it is absolutely one and the same thing). This is the theory of the Sautrāntikas⁴

(155.1) The author⁵ quotes another (Buddhist) theory. pure⁶ knowledge containing in itself no image at all has the capacity (like a lamp) to shed light both on its own self and on the non-self, (i e., on the external object. This capacity) is the source of our knowledge. That, indeed, is the source of light knowledge whose function it is to throw light upon the objects (of our cognition) By light-throwing we understand the essence of consciousness, it is the attribute of those (beings) who are conscious (155.3) But such sources of our knowledge

¹ *sva-pralāṣe vyñāne* V remarks *gamyā-gaṃhāyā yadā viśaya-viśayi-bhāvas tatrāha, sva-pralāṣa iti, atha jñāpya-jñāpaka-bhāvas, tatrāha, bāhye ceti*

² *vyāpiti-bhēdas*.

³ *kāraṇa* is more general than *larana*, the latter is the «instrumental factor», all cases, except the Genitive, express some «factors».

⁴ *Lat.*, p. 155 1—11 «And there is no contradiction of instrument and result (being found) in an undivided self. Thus, indeed, is either the relation of a function to the possessor of the function or of the conveyed to the conveyor. Indeed, only the axe which is conjoined with trees etc. by conjunction, by function, is called in common life an instrument. And there is, for sure, no conjunction possessing a body, (a thing) different from the conjoined axe. The relation of conveyed to conveyor also has been surely (*eva*) experienced in a self-luminous cognition and in an external tree suggested by śimśapā. Indeed the tree, for sure, is not something other than the śimśapā, nor the śimśapā (other) than the tree. But in imaginative dealing, just as there is a difference of exclusion, just so between a factor and its possessor, thus no difference whatever, thus the Sautrāntikās» — The Sautrāntika-Yogācāras are meant, since Dharmakīrti is quoted. But in the 9th Kośa-sihāna Vasubandhu speaking from the standpoint of the Sautrāntikas emits similar views, cp my Soul Theory of the Buddhists, p. 854

⁵ *Tāt.*, p. 14 14.

⁶ *eva*.

(258.18). (Sautrāntika). However there is one! Yourself, you the Yogācāra, deny Solipsism, and you admit the influence of a foreign stream of thought upon my stream of thought. When the perceptions of walking and speaking arise in my mind (and they do not refer to my own walking and speaking because they) are not preceded by my own will to walk and to speak, (we assume the existence of another person who walks and speaks) We then can throw the argument in the following syllogistic form),

(Major premise). If something appears accidentally in a combination otherwise constant, it must depend upon a special cause.

(Example). Just as my perceptions of external purposive movements and of (foreign) speech, which depend upon the presence of another personality.

(Minor premise). Such are the perceptions of external objects, the subject of our controversy.

(Conclusion). (They are due to a special cause).

This is an analytical judgment,¹ (since the predicate, the necessary existence of a special cause, is an inherent property of the subject, the occasional change in our stream of thought). And this special cause lying outside our subjective stream of thought is the external object

(258.23). (Yogācāra).² (The external object is superfluous, there is an internal) Biotic Force³ which accidentally becomes mature and

¹ Lat, p 258 18—22. «Does not the following (proof) exist? All things that are accidental, if something exists, depend upon a cause additional to it, just as the ideas reflecting out-off-walking-and-speech (read *vedhūna-gamana-lacana*) depend upon another stream, and such are also the subject of controversy (= the minor term), the six (kinds) of outwards turned ideas (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), while the stream of the store of inwardly turned ideas (*ālaya-vijñāna*) exists. Thus a reason of own-existence». — Op. the same argument as quoted by Vācaspati in Tātp, p 464.12 ff., and by Jinendrabuddhi, in an abridged form, in the following translation in this Appendix. The *pravṛtti*- and *ālaya-vijñāna* are thus defined in Tātp, p. 145 17—*pūrvā-cittam pravṛtti-vijñānam yat tat sad-viḍham, pañcārūpa-vijñānaṃ vikalpalakṣaṇaṃ, śaśtham ca vikalpa-vijñānam, tena saha jātaḥ samāna-lākṣaṇa-cetanā-viśeṣaś cād ālaya-vijñānam ity ucyate*.

² Beginning with 258. 28 the Yogācāra assumes the rôle of a *pūrvapakṣin*

³ *vāsanā*, often *anādi-vāsanā*, sometimes explained as = *pūrvam jñānam*, cp Santānāntara-siddhi, sūtra 65, sometimes as = *sāmarthyam*, cp Kamala-śīla, p 367. 21. It performs in the Buddhist system of Idealistic Monism the function of explaining the origin of phenomenal plurality out of transcendental unity and is in many respects similar to the *larma* = *cetanā* of the early Buddhists, the *māyā* of the Mādhyamikas and Vedāntins, the *vāsanā* of the Sāṅkhyas, the *bhā-*

We do not follow here the realistic (philosophers) in assuming that the result of cognition differs from the act, because the supposed result is only the image of the cognized object and (this image) is wrongly imagined as separated into an act (and a content).¹

It is a metaphor, when we assume that our ideas are instruments of knowledge, and (when we assume) that they cannot exist without exhibiting an activity.

As for instance, when coin is produced, it agrees (in kind) with its cause (the seed), and people say that it has "taken" the shape of its cause. The same thing has happened also here, (when people think that cognition) is also not debarred of activity, (they think it "takes" or "grasps" the form of its object).

§ 2. COMMENT OF JINENDRABUDDHI ON THIS APHORIEM.

Batan-hgyur, Mdo, vol 115, ff 34^b 6—36^a 7 (Peking)²

(34^b, 6) "The words «here also» mean «according to our opinion». The words «because it is imagined as possessing activity» mean «because it is imagined³ (as a thing) together with its activity». This is the cause why the rôle of an instrument of knowledge is metaphorically imputed⁴ (to cognition). The (supposed) instrument of cognition exists only as a result, i. e., the cognizing activity of this instrument of knowledge⁵ is (its own) result, and it is (the result) just itself, in its own identity. Therefore there is here no difference (between the act of cognition and its resulting content). Here, (in this system), there is no result of cognition separately from the instrument (or the act) of cognizing, as this is the case in the realistic⁶ (systems). In this (system) no such fault as they alone have committed! The words «only

¹ *lhoras-bur gyun-pai see-pa* = *phala-bhūta-gñāna*, lit. «because this cognition has arisen as possessing the form of the object».

² Jinendrabuddhi is the author of a very thoroughgoing and detailed commentary on *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* which fills the whole of vol 115 of the *Batan-hgyur, Mdo*. He is presumably the same person as the author of the great grammatical work *Kāśikā-vivarana-pañjikā*, also called *Nyāsa*, and lived, according to the editor of that work, S C Chakravarti, in the middle of the VIIIth century A. D.

³ Read *rtog-pai-phyir* instead of *rtogs-pat-phyir*.

⁴ *ka-bar-hdags-pas rgyu* = *upacārasya kāranaṃ*.

⁵ *tsahad-mai rtogs-pa m*.

⁶ *phyi-rol-pa-rnams* = *bāhyāḥ*, non-Buddhists.

every (moment) in the subjective stream of thought will be a "cause of maturity", or not a single one, because (as moments of subjective thought all are in this respect) equal. They are equal, because if you, according to your intention, chose in the subjective stream one moment as ready (to produce out of itself a given objective thought), all other moments will be just in the same position!

(259.5). (Yogācāra) (No!), because every new moment has a different force. Since the moments change, their effects are also changing.

(259.6). (Sautrāntika). But then, (if every moment is different), there will be only one moment capable of producing the image of a blue patch or¹ capable of arousing it from (its dormant condition in the store-consciousness). No other moment will be able to do it, (the image of the blue patch will then never recur in the same individual). Or, if (other moments) will also be (able to do it), how is it that every moment (is supposed) to have a different efficiency? (If it is not different), then all the moments of the stored up subjective stream of consciousness² (uninfluenced by external objects, being in the same position), will have the same capacity; and, since an efficient cause being present, cannot postpone³ its action, (all the moments will then produce just the same image of a blue patch).⁴

(259.10). If all our ideas have the same origin in the subjective stream of thought, they must be always the same, (since their cause is always the same). But this (constancy) is incompatible with the (actual) changing character of our ideas.

(259.11). (If there were no external cause), there would be unchanging constancy of thought, which excludes change. (But change exists, and) is thus proved to depend upon an external cause.⁵ Thus it is that an invariable concomitance (between the change of thought and its external cause) is established. (259.12). Neither do you, Idealists,⁶ admit all our knowledge of the external world⁷ to be produced by the influence on us of other minds,⁸ you admit it only (in order to

¹ Read *eti*

² *ālaya-santāna*

³ Read *ca . anupapattiḥ*.

⁴ Cp. the same argument developed in *Śāstra-dīpikā*, p. 180 ff.,—*sarva-dāta nīla-vyñānam syāt*, and *SDS*, p. 26

⁵ This would be a negative deduction according to the 4th figure, *nātra lādā-cūṭam, sadātānatvasya prasangāt*, or according to the 6th figure, *nātra sadātānatvam, hetvantarāpēkṣāvāt, sadātānatvasya yad vīruddham lādācūṭatvam, tena yad vyāpnam (vyāpakam?) hetvantarāpēkṣatvam, tasya upalabdhiḥ*, cp. *NB*, II 85 and 87.

⁶ *vyñānavādin*.

⁷ *pravṛtti-vyñāna*.

⁸ *santānāntara-nimittatvam*.

our ken and a consciousness of its *coordination* with some external object, (a sense of sameness) according to which we can distinguish and determine «this is a cognition of blue», «that one is of yellow» (Our cognitions) then receive these (definite) shapes¹ If this were not the case, any cognition would refer to any object and no cognition would refer to a (definite) object, because there would be no differentiation.²

(35a. 7). All determination (maintains the Sāṅkhya) is evolved from an undifferentiated³ (primitive) condition of all things and (qualities as having their root in primitive Matter). But this we cannot admit, because 1) (primitive Matter) is inanimate,⁴ 2) all cognitions as having the same cause (would not be differentiated). Moreover there is (according to the Sāṅkhya system) no interaction⁵ (at all between Matter and Consciousness). This alone would be sufficient to make any perception of objects⁶ impossible.⁷ (35b. 1) Without (assuming) a «coordination» (of the image) with its object no perception of objects is at all possible, since definite knowledge consists just in this (coordination) Therefore, the definiteness of (our judgments) «this is my cognition of blue», «this one is of yellow» is due to the fact of a coordination (between our image) and its object, it is (immediately produced) by the latter, and there is nothing else that could create it.

(35b. 2). Therefore just this (coordination through the sense of sameness) is (predominantly) the producer⁸ of a distinct cognition of

¹ Lat, f. 35^a 6—7. «There, by what cognition (*śes-pa gañ-gu*) having the essence of coordination (*hāra-ba = sūrūpya*) with the essence of immediate feeling (*ñams-su myōñ-ba = anubhava*) concerning the action (*las-la* in both ed) of colour etc., (by what cognition) the distinctness «this is a cognition of blue», «this one is of yellow» is produced, by that (its) essence of a producer of what is being definitely settled, is this being made to appear »

² Coordination through our sense of sameness is thus the real source of cognition, if we at all are to distinguish between cognition as a source of knowledge and cognition as its result. This (inexplicable) sense of sameness is thus much more the cause of cognition than the coarse concept of a supposed «grasping» of the object through the instrumentality of the senses, because it appears as the most efficient feature, the *sādhakatama-kāraṇa = prahastopakāraṇa = adhyatmi-pratyaya*

³ *mi-gsal-ba = avyakta*

⁴ *śes-pa ma-yin-pa*.

⁵ *phā-ad-pa = sannikarsa, samyoga, samsarga*

⁶ *don-la lta-ba*

⁷ The reason why Sāṅkhya views are mentioned in this context is perhaps that this school also constructs a kind of *sūrūpya*, sp. my Central Conception, p. 64.

⁸ Cp the definition of *adhyatmi-pratyaya* Ab. Kośa, II, and Mādhy. vṛtti, I. p. 86, cp my Nirvāṇa, p. 17. 6.

is uncertain,¹ its absence in contrary cases is uncertain,² (since the change of our perceptions can be explained from within). (260. 11). Moreover, when you maintain that to be an object of knowledge means to be, 1) (a point of reality) producing cognition, and 2) to be coordinated with the respective image (by the sense of sameness),³ (we will object that all the other causes and conditions of our knowledge are also to a certain extent coordinated with it through a sense of sameness, viz.) when a perception of colour is produced the sense of vision produces the limitation⁴ (of it to the visual sphere), light produces the distinctness⁵ (of the image), the previous moment of consciousness⁶ produces the following⁷ one. Since all these causes are coordinated with their respective results by (special kinds of) coordinations,⁸ and since they are the causes (of our perception of a blue patch of colour), they (according to your definition) must be also objects, (not only causes), just as the blue patch (is an object, because it is a cause). (260. 18). And if you maintain that the object is absolutely the same⁹ (as its image), and that that is it what makes it an object, then (we will answer) that the preceding conscious moment,¹⁰ the moment preceding our perception of the blue, possesses still more sameness than the (external) blue object, and that it consequently (will fall under your definition and) constitute an object of our image of the blue patch! (Hence your "coordination" explains nothing!).¹¹

(260. 20) (Sautrāntika). To be an object of our knowledge does not only mean to be (a point of reality) producing it and coordinated with its image, but it also means to be established as such by a perceptual judgment,¹² ("this is the blue"). This judgment refers just to an external thing, not to something else. (The sensation or feeling is

¹ *śaśāntika*.

² *sandigdha-vipaśya-vyavṛtita*

³ *utpatti-sārupyābhyām viśayatī (satī)*, cp. Tātp, p. 468 25 — *na sārūpya-samutpattī apī viśaya-lalasanam*

⁴ *nyama*.

⁵ Read *spatati*

⁶ *samskāra* here evidently in the sense of *samanantara-pratyaya*

⁷ *jñāna*

⁸ *sārūpya*.

⁹ *atyanta-sārūpyāt*

¹⁰ *nīla-vijñāna-samanantara-pratyayaśya*

¹¹ *Iāt*, p. 260. 15—18. "Moreover, if objectness comes from origin and coordination, eye, light and *samskāra* also respectively, through the coordinations of limitation, clearness (read *spatati*) and consciousness, and through origin from them, must be grasped just as the blue"

¹² *adhyavasāyāt*

having the same form or not, can at all be found. (35a.1). Neither is an external support for it logically admissible¹ Why? This question we will discuss in the sequel, on the occasion of an examination of the opinion of (Vasubandhu) the author of the «Vāda-vidhāna»²

(36a.1). As to the (usual) argument³ (of the Sautrāntikas in favour of the existence of an external world), it is the following one

(If an instance in which a visual) perception is the result, (and an instance in which) it does not occur,⁴ have every circumstance in common save one,⁵ (that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ) is clearly the cause of our perception. And such is the external object, (since an intact faculty of vision, the presence of light and aroused attention⁶ do not produce perception in the absence of a patch of colour, but they do produce it as soon as a coloured surface is present). Thus it is that by the Method of Difference⁷ the existence of an external world is proved.⁸ This (argument) is not well-grounded, because the absence of the effect in the shape of a perception (in the second instance) can be also explained (without imagining an external reality), by the circumstance, (namely, that at the given moment), the Biotic Force⁹ (which controls

¹ *dmgs-pa hkhad-pa yañ ma-yn-te* = *ālambanam api na ghatate*, i. e. *vecārya-mānam buddhau na ūrohati*

² Pr. samucc, I 14 ff

³ Lit, «construction», *rtog-pa* = *lalpanā* It is, in an abridged form, the same argument as the one mentioned in the N Kanikā, 268 18 ff and the Tātp, p 464 8 ff

⁴ *hbras-bu tes-pa mi-slye-bas m*

⁵ *rgyu-gshan-rnams yod-pa-yañ* = *lāranāntarām santy api*

⁶ The *lāranāntarām* «every circumstance in common save one» are 1) *adhi-pati-pratyaya* = *cakṣuḥ*, 2) *sahajārī-pratyaya* = *glōha* and 3) *samanantara-pratyaya* = *manasikāra* or *samskāra*, the one additional and decisive is 4) *ālambana-pratyaya* = *artha*

⁷ *vaidharmya* = *lādog-pa*

⁸ Lat, f 36^a. 1—2. «Albeit the other causes be present, since the result, the cognition is not produced, another cause is elicited That is the external object».—It will be scarcely doubted that, leaving alone the extreme laconicity of the Indian author, his argument as formulated according to the Method of Difference agrees exactly with J. S Mill's method of that name, cp *Logic* I, p 452 (1872) This is also a glaring example of how misleading literal translations are, if it is desired to have an idea of the full connotation present to the mind of the Indian thinker.

⁹ *bag-chags* = *āśanā*, cp. above, p 368, *aridyā-āśanā* is here meant

(between a mental image and the real) object (corresponding to it). What indeed is the result produced from a source of knowledge? It is (knowledge itself), a distinct cognition of the object. Nothing else is meant by the content of right knowledge¹. A source of knowledge has, indeed, nothing else to do with respect to its object than to cognize it. (To attend to the object and to "fetch" it are the same). The "fetching"² of the object by our knowledge is nothing but the focussing³ of our attention on it, and the latter is nothing but the cognition of an aim of our possible purposive action⁴.

(152.10). Therefore a source of knowledge has no result over and above the distinct cognition of its object, (the result of cognition is cognition, the act and the content of cognition are undistinguishable). This has been expressed by Dharmakīrti (with respect to sense-perception) in the following words,⁵

"Just this direct cognition is itself the result of (the act) of cognizing, as far as it has the form of a distinct cognition".

(153.1). That alone is a source of right knowledge what determines the object (in distinguishing it from all similar and all dissimilar ones). And that alone determines the object what restricts its image as belonging just to this object. If it is not restricted to the right object, it will belong neither to that object nor to any object, and thus the

¹ *pramā* = *pramiti-kriyā* = *artha-pratīti-rūpā*, evidently here refers to the "content" *kriyā*, when distinguished from *āraṇa*, will be its result. If the senses are compared with an instrument, sense-cognition will be the result. The Mīmāṃsākas assume three consecutive steps in cognition, the following being the result of its predecessor, sensation, attention and "fetching" or conception (*drsti-pravṛtti-prāpti*). The ultimate result (*prāpti* = *pratīti*) is evidently the "content" of cognition, it is called here *pramiti-kriyā* = *pramā* = *pratīti-rūpā* only with the respect to the simile of the axe — the instrument, and its result the act of cutting (*chedana*). If the senses are the instrument, sensation is the result, if sensation is the instrument, attention is the result, and if attention plays the part of an instrument, conception will be the result. That these three steps exist empirically the Buddhist would not deny, but cognition is for him the correspondence of an image constructed by our productive imagination according to the forms, or categories, of our understanding with a point-instant of external reality. This is *sārupya*, conformity of the image (*ākāra*), and this is also the image itself, there being no real distinction between the image and the fact of its coordination with the object, cp. NBT ad I.20—21.

² *prāpti* = *adhigati* = *pratīti* = *bodha*, the ultimate result, the "content".

³ *pravṛtti*, the "act" proper, viz. *jñānasya pravṛtṛh*, cp. NBT, text, p. 3. 5 ff.

⁴ *pravṛtti-yogya-artha* = *artha-kriyā-samartha-artha*. — *pravṛtti* here in the sense of a purposive action, not of an act of objective cognition.

⁵ Cp. NB, I. 18.

§ 3. DIGNĀGA'S APHORISM, PRAMĀNA-SAMUCCAYA, I. 10 AND
HIS OWN COMMENT.

(Bstan-hgyur, vol 98 f 95^b 7 ff)

We can also envisage the internal feeling (of something either desirable or not) as a kind of resulting content in the process of cognition, since the object (and the consequent purposive action) are determined¹ by it. The image of the object will in any case assume the rôle of the source of cognizing it. Through it alone something is cognized²

(95b.7). The self-feeling³ can be also⁴ (constructed as a kind) of resulting content (as against the act of cognizing). Every cognizing (mental state) is here (from one side) the reflex⁵ of an object, (from another side) it is a reflex of the (cognizing) self. From among these both reflexes, the second, that one which represents self-feeling, (can be regarded as a kind) of result. Why? Because the object (and the

¹ The aphorism is quoted by Pārthasārathimīśra in his comment on Śloka-vārtika, p. 158, but the order of the pūdas is inverted and *tādārupyāt* = *de-* *ño-bo-las* must be read instead of *tad-dvaye*, (which is probably due to a desire of contrast with the *trayam* of I 11)

sva-samvittih phalam cāśya, tādārupyād artha-niscayaḥ,
viśayākāra evāśya pramāṇam, tena mīyate.

Lat., «Its result is also self-feeling, according to its form the object is determined, just the image is the source of knowledge, through it it is cognized» — The words *tādārupyād artha-niscayaḥ* are reminiscent of *artha-sūryūpyam aśya pramāṇam*, N. b, I. 20, cp. Tātp., p. 84 7 and Kamalaśīla, p. 560. 18, *tādārupyād itī sūryūpyāt*. But here the term refers to a coordination between feeling and the ascertainment (*niscaya*) of the object, and evidently also to the subsequent purposive action, not between the point instant of reality and the image as in the NB. Pārthasārathi thinks that the opinion of the Sautrāntikas is here expressed, *jñānasya viśayākāro nīla-pīṭādi-rūpo* (instead of *rūpā*) *arthena jñāne ātitaḥ sa pramāṇam*, cp. Tātp., p. 14 12, where the same theory is alluded to — *viśaya-sūryūpyam sūlārasya vyjñānasya pramāṇam*, and N Kapikā, p. 256 14 (translated above)

² *dan-ñes* = *artha-niscaya* is explained as *don tops-par-byed* = *artha-adhigama*, and *artha-adhigama* is explained in NBT, pp 8 9 and 15. 4 as the attitude of the cognizer, his possible purposive action.

³ *rañ-rig-pa* = *sva-samvedana*.

⁴ «also» (ca) points to a possible arrangement, *nam-par-rtog-pa*.

⁵ *śnañ-ba* = *pratibhāsa*

(342.4). (The Realist.) (But then, you are assuming a second, unreal particular!) What will be the result of so-assuming a community between an unreal, (imagined) particular and an unreal, (imagined Universal)? No purposive action, (which is the test of reality), could be directed towards it, because an unexisting (object) cannot be the aim of an efficient action.

(342.5). The real aim¹ (is the underlying point of efficiency but it) has nothing in common with the unreality (of the image). If there were some *śat dharma* between them, it would be superfluous to admit a (second, empirical) imagined particular.

(342.6) (The Buddhist). We do not resort to a second, imagined particular. (The burning and cooking efficiency is the only test of a real fire), but this burning and cooking we fictitiously connect with the image of a fire as it is constructed (in our mind).² The latter is not the (ultimately real) particular, because the real particular is a thing shorn of all extensions,³ (it is unique in itself, it is unutterable,⁴ it is unimaginable,⁵ (it is transcendental). (The cooking and burning) which we can name and which we can extend (to every cooking and burning) is not the (real) particular.

(342.10). Thus it is that the function of our empirical conceptions is to call forth human activity with its various aims, by imputing efficiency to an inefficient (image) with its extensions⁶ and distinctions.⁷ (And because our empirical conceptions, constructions though they be, are indirectly⁸ related to reality, (they are to a certain extent real), they therefore lead to successful action in regard of a causally efficient

śābhoṭto-anupapattiśā. Usually the terms *prāṇ* and *nāḥyaṇaś* are used in opposition to one another, the first refers to direct perception by the senses, the second to judgment or thought construction, cf. N. Kan., 267, 4 ff (translated above) and NBT, p. 12.16. But in *śābhoṭto-pratyakṣa* both sources of our knowledge coalesce, *śābhoṭto-pratyakṣa*; the Buddhist will not admit that they coalesce really or transcendentially (*vyāpāra-anubandhādyaś*), but they coalesce empirically (*pratyakṣa-anubandhādyaś*).

¹ Real *pratyakṣa-anupapattiśā*.

² i. e., in accordance with the categories of our understanding and with the grammatical categories of language.

³ *śarvato vyākṛtiśā*.

⁴ *śābhoṭto-anupapattiśā*.

⁵ *śābhoṭto-pratyakṣa-śābhoṭto*.

⁶ *śābhoṭto* = *śābhoṭto* = *śābhoṭto*.

⁷ *śābhoṭto-pratyakṣa* = *śābhoṭto-pratyakṣa*.

⁸ through pure sensation (*śābhoṭto-pratyakṣa*).

reality,¹ thus bringing about (the efficacy of thought and) producing consistent human experience.² This, in our opinion, is the right view!

§ 6. THE IMAGES ARE SHAPED ACCORDING TO EXPERIENCE.

(342.12) (The Realist) (You maintain) that there is an imputation of causal efficiency no that⁴ (image of a fire, which being a thought-construction) does not (really) possess any.⁵ (The question arises, whether in so doing we are influenced by former experience,⁶ or we are doing it (*a priori*), on the basis of a primordial Biotic Force⁷ (hidden in the depth of human Reason)? (342.14). The (real) particular thing, indeed, is a thing shorn of association, being (merely) the faculty of affecting⁸ (our sensitivity), it possesses nothing in common with the image which contains (all kind) of extensions (in space, time and characteristics), and which is absolutely devoid of every kind of causal efficiency. (342.15). (You maintain) that there is a link,⁹ a negative one¹⁰ (in as much as the image of a fire contains a distinction from all non-fire, and the corresponding point of efficient reality also contains the negation of all non-fire). (We answer) that this implies¹¹ a correspondence also on the positive side between (the efficient point

¹ *samartham vastu prāpayanto*.

² *na vāsanādayanti*.

³ *Īt*, p. 342, 10—12 «Therefore, by imagining, the efficacy of the non efficient, of the self-extended, whose essence consists in the exclusion of the different, the common life ideas proceed in propelling (and *pravartayantah*) the acting beings which are desirous of this and that, in making them reach, through an indirect connection, the efficient thing, they do not deceive people, thus we regard as being right».

⁴ *asya = atīkasya*

⁵ *atad = na tasya* i e, *atīkasya* as *atīkasyā*

⁶ *dr̥ṣṭa-asīthakṛiyā-svalakṣaṇa-sādharmyena* = «through similarity with formerly experienced particular (cases) of causal efficiency» — It must be clear from the text translated in App I that only the forms of our ideas, the Categories of our understanding, are admitted by the Buddhist to owe their origin, not to experience, but to a spontaneous capacity of our Reason. Their contents are sensations which are even (if we discount the *grāhya-grāhaka-lakṣaṇā*) the very stuff of reality. But here the Realist, evidently for the sake of the argument, imputes to the Buddhist a wholesale rationalism.

⁷ *anūśīlānā-vāsanā*, on *vāsanā* see notes on pp 367—3

⁸ *samarthena*, it is *ālāra-ādihāyaka*

⁹ *āvirūpya*.

¹⁰ *anya-vyāvṛtīyā* (read so)

¹¹ *prasanga*

and the image). We have already established that there is no difference between the positive and the negative formulations.¹

(342.16) But if the connection² (between a fire-image and the corresponding focus of efficiency) is produced by an innate capacity³ (of our Reason), then a man arriving from another continent,⁴ (who never has seen a fire), must (*a priori*) be cognizant of its faculty to burn and cook, although he sees it for the first time (in his life)!

(342.17) (The Buddhist). We impute to the unreal (imagined fire) that kind (of burning and cooking), (simply) because we neglect its difference from, (and identify it with), the particular (point-instant, the focus of that energy) which is the real producer of burning and cooking. Is it not so?

(342.18) (The Realist). But is the particular (point instant, the thing in itself) cognized, (at that time) or is it not cognized? The first is impossible, because, as you maintain, (the ultimate reality is uncognizable), it is not an imaginable object!⁵ It produces a momentary sensation⁶ which apprehends the thing itself,⁷ (but nothing *about* the thing), it cannot introduce this its object, (the bare thing without any attributes), into our conceptual thinking.⁸ The one is as different (as possible) from the other, they know nothing about the existence of one another.

(342.21). Neither can our conceptual thought seize the (absolute) particular, even if we assume (with the Buddhist) an indirect function⁹ of the immediately preceding sensation,¹⁰ because, as has been stated, (conceptual thought) apprehends only such objects (as are utterable), whose images are capable of being designated by a (connotative) name.

(342.24) (The Buddhist) (The first moment in the cognition of an external object) is pure sensation. The image follows immediately in its track. The particular (momentary thing) is not the object ade-

¹ Cp. *Apoheśuddhi*, p. 6 — *apaha-śabdāna anyo-apaha-cāristo vidhiv ucyate*.

² *Śropa*.

³ *anādi-ākāśa*.

⁴ Lat. «from *Nivāheru-dēśan*».

⁵ *vilāpya-jñāna-gocaratā-ādhyāt*.

⁶ *śat-samaya-bhāva*.

⁷ *caittam*.

⁸ *vilāpye*.

⁹ *vyākhyāta-pāramparya 'pa*.

¹⁰ *śamanantara-upama-nirvāṇa-pala*.

quate to the image, but it appears as though it were its object, because *indirectly* (the image) is produced from it,¹ (the image is the indirect function of some focus of external efficiency)?²

(342.25) (The Realist). (Quite right!) Thus, as possible,³ but only (on the empirical hypothesis, i. e., if you admit that our images are constructed) from traces left in our consciousness by former experience,⁴ (and that our images thus correspond exactly to external reality). It becomes, on the contrary, (quite impossible on the hypothesis of rationalism, i. e., if we admit that the forms of our thoughts) have nothing corresponding to them in the external world, that they are created (by our Reason) which is a Force producing the (transcendental) Illusion (of an empirically real world).⁵

(342.26). And even if you admit that (our conceptions are partly) produced by the force of (former) impressions,⁶ the illusion that we perceive in them (a genuine reality), this illusion cannot be explained simply by the fact that they are (indirectly) produced from a (sensory stimulus), if reality itself continues to remain uncognizable.⁷

(342.27). (We also cannot admit the principle of Identity) through Neglecting the Difference.⁸ If the fire as an ultimate particular remains uncognized and our image of a fire is nevertheless (wrongly) identified with it, because their difference is neglected, then the whole Universe might also be identified with it, because there is no reason for limitation.⁹

¹ Lat., p. 342 24—25 «Since it is produced from sensation (*anulalpiti*) as its immediately preceding homogeneous cause (*sam-ānantara-pratyakṣā*), through the medium of its function, although not its object, it appears as though it were its object».

² But the external objects are nevertheless really moments of a motion not stable substances having attributes and duration

³ *bhaved apyāyam gatiḥ*

⁴ *anubhava-vāsanā-prabhavaḥ* (read thus), i. e., *samskāraḥ*, cp above notes on *vāsanā*, p. 367—8

⁵ Lat., p. 342. 25—26 «But not is it possible (with concepts) merged in transcendental non-existence, originating in the Force of (transcendental) Illusion».

⁶ *anubhava-vāsanā*

⁷ Lat., p. 342 26 «Moreover even for (the image) originating from the force of experience, the illusion of the objectivity of it, (i. e. of the particular) while it is not cognized, simply because it is produced by it, (i. e., the image by the particular) cannot arise»

⁸ *bheda-agraha* = *albyāṭi*

⁹ Lat., p. 342 27. «But if the particular essence of fire is not grasped, if its form is imputed through not apprehending the difference from it, the consequence

(343.1) If the fire as a thing in itself¹ is not cognized at the time when (we have its image present to us), the whole Universe is in the same position. If the limitation consists merely in the fact of the origin of the image, (in its origin) from the sensation produced by the real fire, well then, there will be no limit at all, there will be no reason why the ideas of a God, of Matter (as it is imagined in the Sāṅkhya-system) etc, these ideas which also have their origin in a (congenital) Force of Illusion, (should also not be identified with the point-instant representing the real fire, through neglecting their difference). And we have just mentioned that to explain the correspondence of the image to the point-instant of external reality by the principle of Neglected Difference is inadmissible. Consequently it is idle talk to assume that the object corresponding to our conceptions is (an objectivized mental image) and that its presence in the external world is not true.²

§ 7. THE BUDDHIST THEORY REDUCED AD ABSURDUM.³

(343.6) (The Realist) And further, (you maintain that our concepts, and the names expressing them, are not intent on external reality, but upon our objectivized images. We answer), neither is the objectivized image the object on which our conceptual thinking is intent. (It fares not better than the uncognizable) thing in itself or the (relational and negative universal) image.⁴ It depends, indeed, upon an act of our productive imagination. When this act is produced, it (*viz.* the concept) *quasi* arises; when the act is over, it *quasi* vanishes. It apparently changes with every change in the activity of our conceptual imagination. (Hence it changes constantly), and can never be conceived⁵ as a unity (in the shape of one idea having relative stability).

will be the imputation of the form of the three worlds, since there is no cause for limitation.

¹ *śūnyam-svalakṣaṇa*, it must be clear from all this context that the transcendental cause affecting our sensitivity is meant.

² *śūnyasya bījāyatanam*.

³ The Buddhist theory is that reality, being a constant flow of momentary events, cannot be named and grasped by conceptual thought, or by imagination, because images or concepts require stability and duration. Yācāspati now turns the Buddhist argument against itself. He says that imagination also consists of momentary events, hence the images or concepts having no stability cannot be named.

⁴ *śūnyarūpaṁ = pratibhūtatā = na tu nityarūpaṁ*

⁵ Read *pratyupasthānam*

(The Buddhist). By neglecting the difference (a relative stability is produced)

(The Realist). But then its essence, (the unity of this objectified image) will equally be neglected?

(The Buddhist). O yes! it will!

(The Realist). Then it neither will be imagined, (since the image is a unity)

(The Buddhist). But the discontinuity of the image is not real. (When we talk of an object as a string of momentary events) we mean reality, its discontinuity or continuity, but not (the discontinuity) of the objectified image.

(343.10). (The Realist) We can concede the point. The discontinuity of the image is not ultimately real. But you must admit that the objectified image depends upon an act of our imagination. It changes whenever there is a change in the latter, or else it would not depend¹ on it. (343.11) The dependence of the image upon the act of imagination consists just in the fact that it follows every change, or non-change, in the latter. If it did not so depend,² it would not be imagined, and it would not be an image erroneously (projected into the external world). (343.12). Therefore let us leave alone the question about the reality of the continuity or of the discontinuity of the image. However, what depends on a changing imagination cannot appear to us as a unity, it must appear as being discontinuous, (as split into discrete moments).

(343.13). Consequently (the following syllogism can be) established,

(Thesis) The objectified image (being a unity) is not the object upon which our conceptual imagination is intent.

(Reason). Because that image (must be) unutterable

(Example). Just as a momentary feeling of pleasure³ or (pain is unutterable).

(Major premise). (Whatever is unutterable is a moment which is not the object upon which our conceptual imagination is intent)

¹ Read *ind-avadhānato-nigatāh*

² Read *ind-avadhānato*

³ *anubhūti-vyākhyāna*

(343.16). It is indeed impossible to give it a name, because it is impossible to agree (upon its connotation), just as it is impossible (to express in speech) what the momentary feeling¹ of pleasure or (pain) is.

(343.17) We can really give a name to something when we can agree on its connotation. (The name) is concomitant with (such an agreement), otherwise we would be landed in the over-absurdity (of every name meaning anything)

(343.18) Since there is no such (possibility of agreement) upon the import of an objectivized image which changes with every (moment of) our imagination, there neither can be any possibility of giving names (to the objectivized images constituting the external empirical world). It is thus proved that whatsoever is conceived is unutterable, (i e., just the contrary of the Buddhist idea that whatsoever is transcendently real is unutterable)²

§ 8. A FINAL ARGUMENT AGAINST THE BUDDHIST THEORY.

(343.20). (The Realist). (You maintain that the genus «cow» is an objectivized image and is relative, being merely the negation of all non-cows. We then ask), this negation of all non-cows is it the image itself³ or only its attribute? If the essence (of the image) is a negation of non-cows, this cannot be understood without assuming the reality of (the positive counter part), the cow. Non-cow is but a negation of cow. Its reality depends upon the reality of the cow. You cannot escape being accused of a hopeless circle, (cow being dependent upon non-cow, and non cow upon cow).

(343.22) But if it is only an attribute (of the image), the genus «cow» must be positive, and its attribution also positive. And thus an end is made of the objectivized image which is (supposed to be) nega-

¹ Read *anulokanayat*

² Cf. p. 343 18—19 «The (impossibility of agreement) being excluded from the spurious externality (of the image) which is different with every (moment of) imagination, produces also an exclusion of the possibility of coalescing with a name, thus the connection is established» — This is a negative deduction formulated according to the 5th figure of negation (*vyāpaka-anupalabdhi*), cp. NBT, p. 32, text.

³ Cf. Lotze, Logik § 40, according to whom «non-cows» would be «ein wider-sinniges Erzeugnis des Scholwitzes».

tive in essence. And we have (so *ipse*) discarded the theory that its attributes are identical with it, (i. e., the theory that there is no substance-attribute relation which would be transcendently real) That such a Universal can be (alternately) asserted and denied we have already explained.

(343. 24). Wishing to escape redundancy we are afraid to have fallen in still greater verbosity! We must nevertheless have an end with this process of tempering the arrogance of the Nihilists!

APPENDIX VI

Corrections to the texts of the Nyāya-bindu,
Nyāya-bindu-tikā and Nyāya-bindu-tikā-Ṭīp-
panī printed in the Bibliotheca Buddhica.

Corrections to the text of Nyāya-bindu and tika.

- 7.12 before the words *bhāṇam* by *anumānam* the following passage must be inserted in accordance with MSS and the Tib. translation: *tathābhāṇato-grahayen-āpy anumānam nirusam sptā, kalpanāpodotha-grahayam te vipratipatti-nirū lāraṇār-tham*
- 11.23 insert *arthaśya* after *bhāṇayomāśya*.
- 13.15 insert *eva* before *śaśṇamā*.
- 15.2 insert *grāhyā* before *arthād*.
- 15.8 drop the *cheda* before *sa eva*.
- 16.8 *ātrāpy* instead of *atrāpy*.
- 19.2 *jñānāpādāpaka* " " *jñānāpaka*.
- 23.16 insert *mātra* before *bhāṇa*.
- 25.15 *taśya* instead of *taśyā*.
- 25.17 insert *na* before *ev*.
- 28.19 " *bhūta* " *bhūṣamāne*.
- 38.18 *bhāṇābhāṇasiddhā* instead of *bhāṇāddhā*.
- 38.21 drop the *cheda* after *sādhya*.
- 46.4—5 *upāśikāśasana-* instead of *upāśikāśam*.
- 47.13 *kaśakāśam* " " *kaśakāśam*.
- 50.1 *vaśikāśam* " " *vaśikāśam*.
- 50.1 *upāśikāśam* " " *upāśikāśam*.
- 50.6 drop the *cheda* after *śaśṇamā*.
- 50.16 " " " *śaśṇamā*.
- 53.18 *śam* *eva* instead of *śam eva*.
- 56.18 *śam* " " *śam*.
- 56.21 *śam* " " *śam*.
- 65.18 *tathāparāya* instead of *tathā parāya*.
- 66.1,3 (bis), 6 *nityatva* " " *nityatva*.
- 66.7 *nityatva* " " *nityatva*.
- 67.10 *śamāśam* " " *śamāśam*.

- 68.14 *avasthādhāna-yogyo* instead of *avasthāna-yogyo*.
 70. 7 'i^{ho} " " 'i^{ho}.
 70 11 insert *ea* after *evam*.
 71. 3 *adṛśyasya* instead of *adṛśasya*.
 71.14 *vidhīh* " " *vmdhīh*.
 72 1,2 *vālān anasya* instead of *vā kām anasya*.
 72 7 *rūpāsiddhī* " " *rūpāsiddhīh*.
 72 16—85—86 " " 86
 76. 8 *vyuktam* " " *avyuktam*.
 77 10 *asiddheh* " " *asiddhīh*.
 77 10 drop the words *tābhiyam na vyatiricyate* and insert them in
 77 18 after *asiddheh* (instead of *asiddhīh*).
 78 20 *nāntarīyakatvāt* instead of *-vatvāt*.
 82 6 *svabhāvasyo-* " " *svabhāvoo-*
 85 28 insert a *cheda* after *gunas tat*
 90 8 *yathāsa vajñah* instead of *yathā sa va-*
 90 16 *ityāśa hetuḥ* " " *ityādhetuḥ*
 92 12 insert *na* before *sa*.
 95.2 *niśayābhāvo* " " *-ābhāvau*.
-

Corrections to the text of Nyāya-bin-du-tīkā Tippaṇi.

- 8.13 read *pradarśanam* and *pravarṇanāśīlam*
 11. 7 -*avayavāde* instead of *avayavādeḥ*.
 12 1 read *saṃgrahāṇena prāptih. prāpti-lālo-bhādena* ..
 12.12 -*śāstrakṣipābhāṣam* instead of -*śāstrabhāṣā-*,
 12 13 -*uttarati āpi* " " *an āpi*.
 16.16 *trivṛṣṭi* instead of *ov āpā*.
 18. 4 read *śikṣa-laiṣaṇam. tatkā pratyakṣam anūdya* ..
 19 4—5 *gopāśiro-matena* instead of *gopāśiro-matē. na* .
 19 6 *abhirūḍa-śabdo* " " *bhirūḍa-*.
 19.13 *prasaḍḍha-* " " *śiḍḍhi*.
 20.13 *śaś āśṛty abhivṛṇta-* (fat type) " " *tatāś soti*.
 20.16 *tatkāśābhirūḍa-grahāṇensyāśi* fat type.
 21 14 *aty avo odhoḥ* instead of *uī nīv odhaḥ*
 22 14 read *yatkā calsur-ayāṇam*.
 22. 5 *gaḥ* instead of *ya*.
 26. 6 *bhāṇṭe* " " *bhāṇṭa*.
 27 5 *na saṇṭa* " " *na saṇṭapṭa*
 29 16 *saṇṭam uāḥ ṛgā-* " " *saṇṭeḥ ṛgā-*.
 30 15—16 read *yathauḥ ya* . . *bhāṇam na tatka* . .
 37 5 insert *na* before *bhāṇṭi*.
 37 8 *nīla-* instead of *nīlom*.
 40.12 *abhinmatam* " " *bhāṇam*.
 42. 4 *minuṭa-lāḥa* " " *nīnuṭāḥāḥa*.
 43.14 *evāṇṭimāḥṛyā* " " *evāṇṭamāḥṛyā*.
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